COLLECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 1917-1949 VOLUMES 1-2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04-01460R000100010001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 310
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 22, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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22 September 1978
COLLECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG
(1917 - 1949)
VOLUMES 1-2
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA
1. Report No.
JPRS
2.
3. Recipient's Accession No.
SHEET
71911-1
4. Title and Subtitle
5. Report Date
COLLECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG
22 September 1978
(1917-1949), Volumes 1-2
6.
7. Author(s)
8. Performing Organization Rept.
No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.
Joint Publications Research Service
1000 North Glebe Road
11. Contract/Grant No.
Arlington, Virginia 22201
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address
13. Type of Report & Period
Covered
As above
14.
15. Supplementary Notes
MAO TSE-TUNG CHI, Hong Kong, 1975
16. Abstracts
This report contains selected speeches, articles, essays, reports, letters,
interviews, declarations, decrees, telegrams
, poems, inscriptions of Mao
Tse-tung covering a multitude of subjects.
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Behavioral and Social Science
Political
Mao Tse-tung
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms
17c. COSATI Field/Group 05
18. Availability Statement
19.. Security Class (This
21. No. of Pages
Unlimited Availability
Report)
308
Sold by NTIS
20. Security Class (This
22. Price
Springfield, Virginia 22151
Page
UNCLASSIFIED
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22 September 1978
COLLECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG
(1917 - 1949)
VOLUMES 1-2
Hong Kong MAO TSE-TUNG CHI in Chinese, Vols 1-10, Oct 1975.
CONTENTS PAGE
VOLUME 1 (pp 33-51, 53-131, 133-159, 161-185, 187-206)
Introduction to 'Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung' ....................... 1
Letter to Toten Miyazaki (March 1917) ................................... 3
Study of Physical Education (1 April 1917) .............................. 4
Advertisement for Workers' Evening School (1917) ........................ 14
Advertisement for Workers' Evening School (1917) ........................ 14a
Inaugural Statement of 'HSIANG-CHIANG P'ING-LUN' (14 July 1919) ......... 15
Great Union of the People (21, 28 July, 4 August 1919) .................. 18
Outline of Organization of Wen-hua Bookstore (1 August 1920) ............ 27
Announcement of Wen-hua Bookstore (October 1920) ........................ 29
Business Report of Wen-hua Bookstore (No 2) (March 1921) ................ 30
Inaugural Statement of Tsu-hsiu University, Hunan (August 1921) ......... 34
Inaugural Statement of 'HSIN-SHIH-TAI' (10 April 1923) .................. 38
Peking Coup d'etat and Merchants (11 July 1923) ......................... 39
'Sheng-Hsien-Ching' and Chao Heng-t'i (15 August 1923) .................. 43
The British and Liang Ju-hao (29 August 1923) ........................... 45
- a - [II - CC]
[III - CC - 80]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Cigarette Tax (29 August 1923) ....................................... 47
Kuomintang Central Committee Refutes Kuomintang Members for
Convening Illegal Meeting in Peking (27 November 1923) ............. 49
Propaganda Outline for Kuomintang's War Against Feng-t'ien
(27 November 1925) ................................................. 51
Reasons for Publishing 'CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO' (5 December 1925) ....... 57
The 'Three-three-three-one System' (5 December 1925) ................. 59
Yang K'un-ju's Notice and Liu Chih-lu's Cable (5 December 1925) ...... - 61
If There is Common Aspiration for Combating Communism, Then My
Enemy's Enemy Is My Good Friend (5 December 1925) .................. 62
Acclamations Will Come From All Nations (5 December 1925) ............ 63
'Long Live the Great Union of Anticommunist Chinese National
Army' (5 December 1925) ............................................ 64
Communist Regulations and Sham Communism (5 December 1925) ........... 65
Tsou Lu and Revolution (5 December 1925) ............................. 66
To Turn Left or Right? (13 December 1925) ............................. 67
Communization Clarified (13 December 1925) .......................... 69
Who Killed All the Intellectuals? (13 December 1925) ................. 70
Peking Rightist Conference and Imperialism (20 December 1925) ........ 71
Last Tool of Imperialism (20 December 1925) .......................... 72
The Most the Rightists Can Do (20 December 1925) ..................... 74
Propaganda Report (8 January 1926) ................................... 76
Analysis of the Various Strata of Chinese Peasantry and Their
Attitude Toward Revolution (January 1926) ......................... 85
Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society (1 February 1926) ........ 91
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 CONTENTS (Continued) Page
National Revolution and Peasant Movement--Foreword to 'Nung-min
Wen-t'i Ts'ung-k'an' (1 September 1926) ............................ 100
The Agony and Resistance Movement of Peasants in Kiangsu and
Chekiang (25 November 1926) ........................................ 104
Declaration of the First Hunan Peasant Congress (December 1926) ...... 109
Hunan Peasants--Changsha Newsletter of 30 November (1926) ............ 114
VOLUME 2 (pp 9-69, 71-125, 127-262) .................................. 124
Latest Directive of National Peasant Association (13 June 1927)...... 124
Letter From Hunan to Central Committee (20 August 1927) .............. 126
Letter From Hunan Provincial Committee (30 August 1927) ............... 128
Report of the Ching-kang Mountains Front Committee to Central
Authority (25 November 1928) ....................................... 130
Notice of the Fourth Army Headquarters of the Red Army
(January 1929)..... ..................................................... 161
Hsing-kuo County Land Law (April 1929) ............................... 163
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Resolution of the Ninth CCP Congress of the Red Fourth Army
(December 1929) .................................................... 165
Letter to Comrade Lin Piao (5 January 1930) .......................... 197 .
Question of Rich Peasants After Land Distribution (Situation .
at Yung-hsin and in the Northern Party) (October 1930) ............. 207
Investigation in Tung-t'ang and Other Areas (8 November 1930) ........ 209
Land Distribution in Western Kiangsi (12-15 November 1930) ........... 217
Mistakes in Land Struggle in Kiangsi (14 November 1930) .............. 223
Harvest Distribution and Rent Problems (15 November 1930) ............ 227
Investigation at Mu-k'ou Village (21 November 1930) .................. 233
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Land Administrative Program--1930 .................................... 236
Land Law Promulgated by Chinese Revolutionary Military Commission
(1930) .............................................................. 238
Investigations in Hsing-kuo County (26 January 1931) ................. 243
Duties of General Political Department and Relationship Between
the Red Army Political Departments and Commissars
(17 February 1931) ................................................. 298
No Investigation, No Right To Speak, No Proper Investigation
and No Right To Speak (2 April 1931) ............................... 300
Question of Opposing Rich Peasants (1931) ............................. 302
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VOLUME 1
INTRODUCTION TO 'COLLECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG'
[Excerpts] The "Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung" is compiled and edited
according to the following principles:
Wherever possible, the works of Mao Tse-tung between 1917 and 1949 are
included.
Chronological order, according to the date of writing or speech, is followed.
Where the date cannot be ascertained, the date of publication is used. For
details, please refer to the "Supplement." The scope of the collection
is determined according to the following criteria:
1. All articles signed by Mao Tse-tung, whether individually or jointly
with others, are included.
2. All unsigned articles which have been verified as his work are also
included.
3. In accordance with the above, besides essays, reports, speeches, and
letters, other items such as interviews, declarations, decrees, and telegrams
are also included.
4. Poems, inscriptions, excerpts, and collective articles are included
in the "Supplement."
5. However, all works which have already appeared in the current edition
of "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" or "Selected Readings of Mao Tse-tung's
Works" are not included.
In regard to the same article appearing in different publications, the
choice is made according to the following criteria:
1. The first appearance of the article, or the publication closest in time
to its first appearance, is used.
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2. However, the above is limited to the 1944 edition of the "Selected
Works of Mao Tse-tung" published by the Chin-Ch'a-Chi [Shansi-Cha-har-
Hopeh] Daily News Press and the 1947 edition of the same titld published
by the Central Chin-Ch'a-Chi Central Bureau. Variations in wording appear-
ing in prior publications are explained in footnotes.
3. Errors, omissions, and ambiguities in the source used are corrected and
supplemented according to other publications whenever possible.
4. Variations from the current "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," whether
major or minor,. are explained in footnotes [not translated].
The last volume'of this collection is considered the "Supplement." In ad-
dition to poems, inscriptions, excerpts, and collective articles, an ap-
pendix of the publications and a chronology of Mao Tse-tung's works appear
at the end of the volume.
The current simplified characters of the Chinese language are used.
The following symbols and methods of annotation are used:
At the end of each article, the monographs, periodicals, etc. in which
it appeared are listed. The symbol "o" indicates the source used for
this collection; the symbol "*" indicates the source on which correction
of errors and filling in of omissions are based; the symbol "A" indicates
a publication not seen by the editors. No symbol appears on publications
which do not affect the article. Variations from the current "Selected
Works of Mao Tse-tung" are indicated by top marginal notes, side notes,
and footnotes [not translated]. The source used for comparison is the
1951-1960 Peking edition of "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" (hereinafter
referred to as "Selected Works").
Where the date of publication is not given in the source, it is.added
along the side of the title whenever possible.
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[Text] Dear Mr Shiranami Toten: We have long admired your fame from afar,.
but have not had the occasion to meet you. Hearing about you far away, one
cannot but be inspired.
You were most kind to Mr Huang. During his lifetime, you rendered him
moral support. Now that he is dead, you mourn him-with tears. For his
coming funeral, you have travelled 10,000 li to attend the burial. Your
friendship reaches to the sun and the moon; your sincerity moves the gods.
What you do is rare in the world and unheralded at all times. We are stu-
dents of Hunan. We have studied poetry and the classics, and we hold am-
bitions in our heart. We wish to meet you and hear your instructions. We
hope you will grant us the opportunity.
Hsiao Chih-fan [5618 2784 5603]
Mao Tse-tung
Students of Hunan Provincial First
Normal School
?ASAHI SHINBUN (Tokyo edition), 3 July 1967
[While the name in the title if "Miyazaki Toten," the person is addressed as
"Shiranami Toten" in the text.]
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1 April 1917
[Text] The national strength is weak; the martial arts are not flourish-
ing. The physical quality of the nation becomes ever more debilitated.
This is a distressing situation. As those advocating physical. education do
not reach the source, their effort has produced no result over a long period
of time. Not only has there been no improvement, but the weakness worsens.
Hitting the mark and reaching far are external matters, the results. Full-
ness in physical strength is internal, the cause. When the body is not
firm, one is afraid of arms. How can one hit the mark? And how can one
reach far? Firmness comes from tempering; tempering comes from awareness.
It isn't that today's physical education advocates do not think of all kinds
of means, yet they produce no result. It is because the external force
cannot stimulate the mind. They do not know the true meaning of physical
education. When it comes to the value of physical education, its effect,
or where to start, they are in a fog. No wonder they produce no result.
To make physical education effective, we must promote subjective awareness.
Once there is awareness, the particulars of physical education will become
clear without need of explanation, and the effect of hitting the mark and
reaching far will appear without seeking. I deeply feel the importance of
physical education, but regret the improper approach of the advocates. I
know that there are many who feel like I do. Setting aside my diffidence,
I would like to present my views for discussion. What I say is not all
practical, and maybe much is mere empty words and ideals. I do not wish
to deceive you. Should you favor me with your thoughts and instructions,
I shall be humbly grateful.
I. Explanation of Physical Education
Ever since the beginning of mankind, be they wise or obtuse, there has
been no one who does not protect his own life. Therefore, the ferns of the
western hills were eaten when hungry; the plums on top of the well were
swallowed. Using,timber for shelter and pelts for clothes--it was in-
stinctive, without knowing the reasons. But it was not refined. The sages
appeared. Then, there were rites, and there was order in daily living.
In his private life, Confucius was serene and at peace. He ate no spoilt
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meat. When he went shooting in the garden, spectators lined up like a wall.
The structure of the human body is no different from the animals, and yet
the animals do not live as long as man. It is because the animals do not
have order in their lives. Man regulates his life, becoming ever more so
with time. Therefore, there is physcial education. Physical education
is the way to foster life. Different people follow different ways. Chuang-
tzu learned from the cook; Confucius pursued archery and charioteering. In
today's civilized nations, Germany is the most advanced. The popularity of
fencing spreads in the entire country. Japan has its samurai and recently,
influenced by China, judo. They are most impressive. However, when we study
their contents, they are all based on physiology, the structure of the human.
body, the movement of the vessels and energy, the parts which develop the
earliest, and the parts which are deficient. Their physical education fol-
lows such order, checking the excessive and remedying the deficient. In
conclusion, it is for the balanced development of the body. Therefore,
physical education is the way of mankind to foster life, enabling the body
to develop in a balanced manner and according to order.
II. The Position of Physical Education
Physical education supplements ethical and academic education. Yet, vir-
tue and wisdom both rely on the body. Without the body, there can be neither
virtue nor wisdom. But there are few who are aware of it. Some stress
wisdom; others say virtue is the most important. Knowledge is truly valu-
able. That is where man is different from animals. Yet what is the vessel
of knowledge? Virtue is truly valuable. It is order and equity among men.
Yet what is the lodge of virtue? The body is the vessel of knowledge and
the lodge of virtue. Like a cart, it carries knowledge; like a house, it
shelters virtue. The body is the cart to carry knowledge and the house to
shelter virtue. Children, upon reaching the proper age, enter elementary
schoool. During elementary school, the development of the body should be
specially stressed, while the improvement of knowledge and the building of
virtue are secondary. Fostering and caring are major matters, while teaching
and training are supplementary. Today, many people are ignorant of this
principle. Therefore, there have been children who became sick or died as
a result of studying. In middle school and above, the three kinds of educa-
tion should be equally stressed. Today, most people incline to stress the
academic. In middle school years, the body is not fully developed, yet to-
day there are less people who build it and more who destroy it. Will it
not suspend development? Under the education system of China today, the
subjects are so numerous that even adults with a strong body cannot handle
them, let alone the young and, the weak. It seems that the educators pur-
posely set up such a tedius and heavy curriculum to harass the students
in order to trample their body and sabotage their life. Those refusing
to accept it are punished; those with superior ability are assigned addi-
tional books, induced by sweet words and tempted by large rewards. Alas,
the students seem to hate their own life and wish to destroy and sacrifice
it! How muddled can they be? Man's only worry is not to have a body; there
is no other worry. Once the body is sound, everything else follows. There
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is nothing better than physical education to improve the body. Physical
education should be of primary importance. Once the body is strong, one can
advance vigorously and effectively in the academic and the ethical aspects.
Physical education should be considered an important part of our study.
There must be the primary and the secondary, and the beginning and the end.
Such is the way.
III. The Defects.of Physical Education in the Past and What Should Be Done
The three kinds of education should be equally stressed. Yet scholars of
the old days stressed the moral and the academic while ignoring the phys-
ical. The results were slight body and bowed head, and fragile white hands;.
short of breath when climbing a mountain and cramped legs when crossing a
water. Yen-tzu and Chia-sheng were short-lived; Wang Po and Lu Chao-ling
either died young or became crippled. They were all superior in virtue
and wisdom. Yet one day when the body no longer existed,. their virtue and
wisdom perished also. That the North was powerful was because there were
many able-bodied men. The patriots and warriors mostly came from Liang-
chou. In the beginning of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Yen Hsi-chai and Li Kang-
chu were scholars and warriors simultaneously. Yen Hsi-chai travelled 1,000
li to learn the skill of fencing and beat the warriors in a match. There-
fore he said that one must master both knowledge and martial arts. Ku
Yen-nan was a Southerner, but he preferred to live in the North and liked
horses more than boats. These ancients are worthy of our emulation.
With the establishment of schools, the ways of other nations have been
adopted, and there has been some change in the customs. Yet the educators,
as a result of what they learned before, cannot free themselves from the old
ways. They seek external display only, ignoring the fundamental while pur-
suing the details. Therefore, I feel that today's physical education has
the form but not the substance. There exist the physical education course
and the physical education teacher, but few benefits and there is more harm
than good. The teacher gives the orders, and the students force themselves
to obey. The body follows but the mind refuses, and there is immeasurable
mental agony. Mental agony brings physical agony. At the end of a physical
education session, everyone is exhausted in body and spirit. When the food
and drink are not clean, inorganic matter and germs enter the body and cause
disease. Improper lighting damages the eyesight. Improper heights of the
tables and chairs damage the body. Such instances are too many to be
enumerated.
Then what should our students do? The school equipment and the teachers'
teaching are external objective matters, while we still have our internal
subjective matters. The mind determines all, and the body follows the
order of the mind. The good or the bad all depends on ourselves. We get
what we want. This applies to physical education. If we do not arouse
ourselves, even if the external objective matters are perfect, we will not
benefit from them. Therefore, we must begin with our own initiative in
physical education.
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IV. The Effect of Physical Education
As man is an animal, he acts. As he is a rational animal, he always acts
with a reason. Why is man's action valuable? Why is man's rational action
valuable? In a narrow sense, action is to make a living. In a broad sense,
it is to defend the nation. Neither constitutes the principal significance.
Action is to foster our life and please our mind. Chu-tzu advocated respect;
Lu-tzu urged tranquillity. Tranquillity is inaction. Neither is respect;
it is also inaction. Lao-tzu said that inaction was great; Shih-shih sought
quietude. Mediation was followed by the disciples of Chu and Lu. Recently
someone by the name of Yin-shih-tzu promoted mediation, bragging about its
ingenuity and scorning action for being self-destructive. That may be one
way, but I cannot subscribe to it. According to my opinion, action is the
only thing in the world.
The action of man, when regulated, is physical education. As stated be-
fore, the effect of physical education is the strengthening of tendons and
bones. I once heard that man's structure and blood vessels were determined
at a given age and could not be changed. Usually after age 25 there was no
further change. Now I know it is not so. Man's body changes every day.
Metabolism goes on continuously in the tissues. Eyesight and hearing can be
improved. Even those 60 or 70 years old can change their physical structure.
I also heard that it was difficult for the weak to become strong. Now I have
also found out that it is not so. For those who are born strong, if they
abuse themselves, indulging in addictions and relying on their natural
strength, they will become weak. As for the weak, as they are aware of
the imperfections of their body and fearful of dying young, they are care-
ful with themselves. In the negative aspect, they strictly abstain from
addictions, afraid to do damage. In the positive aspect, they diligently
temper themselves, remedying their deficiencies, and they become strong after
a prolonged effort. Therefore, those who are born strong have no need to
congratulate themselves, and those born weak have no need to feel sorry for
themselves. I was born weak, but maybe Heaven wants to induce me to become
strong. Famous athletes in the West, such as America's Roosevelt, German's
(Sun-t'ang), and Japan's Kano, all attained the greatest of strength from
the weakest of bodies. I also heard that the mental and the physical could
not be both perfect, and that those using their mind were often deficient in.
body, and vice versa. Such theory is also fallacious. It only applies to
those who have no determination; it does not cover everyone. Confucious
died at age 72, and one has never heard of him suffering from ill health.
Buddha travelled incessantly to spread the doctrines, and he also died
at an old age. Jesus unfortunately met with an unjust death. Mohammad,
with the Koran in his left hand and a sword in his right, conquered the
world. They were all sages of ancient times and the greatest thinkers.
Today's Mr Wu Chih-yung is in his 70's, and he thinks he will live to 100.
He also is a man using his mind. WangHsiang-ch'i died when he was in his
70's. He was healthy and alert up until then. How can all such instances
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be explained by the above fallacy? In sum, physical education strengthens
the tendons and bones; when the tendons and bones are strengthened, the
quality of the body will change. The weak will become strong, and the body
and the mind will both become perfect. It is not destiny, but man's effort.
Not just strengthening the tendons and bones, but physical education will
also increase knowledge. There is a recent saying: Civilize the spirit;
barbarize the body. It is an apt statement. To civilize the spirit, the
body must first be barbarized. Once the body is barbarized, civilized
spirit follows. Knowledge is to understand the things in the world and ren-
der judgment. This requires physical effort. Direct observation depends
on the ears and eyes; thinking depends on the brain. The ears and eyes and
the brain are parts of the body. Only when the body is sound will knowledge
become perfect. Therefore, one can say that knowledge is acquired indirectly
through physical education. There are hundreds of fields of. study today.
Whether to study in school or by oneself, those who can handle the task are
strong in body, and those who cannot are weak. The realms of. the strong
and the weak are different.
Not just increasing knowledge, but physical education will also harmonize
the emotions. Emotions are very powerful in man. The ancients controlled
them with reason. Thus, it was said that the master was always alert. It
was also said that reason controlled the mind. Nevertheless, reason comes
from the mind, and the mind exists in the body. The weak are often enslaved
by their emotions and cannot extricate themselves. The crippled are often
unbalanced in their emotions and cannot be saved by their reason. Only when
the body is sound will the emotions be harmonized. It is an immutable
principle. Take the following instance: When we encounter an unpleasant-
ness and become excited, our mind is disturbed and we cannot control our-
selves, but.if we engage in vigorous exercises, we can immediately cleanse
ourselves of the old concept and clarify our mind. An instant effect is
produced.
Not just harmonizing the emotions, but physical education will strengthen
our determination. This is where the major effect of physical education lies.
The essential point of physical education is courage, and the goal of cour-
age, such as bravery, fearlessnes, intrepidity, and perseverance, belongs
to the realm of determination. Take the following instance: Cold water
baths will train one to be brave and fearless, as well as intrepid. In any
kind of exercise, one must persist steadily, leading toward perseverance.
Long-distance running, for example, is most apparent in perseverance. The
strength to extract the mountain and the bearing to conquer the world were
nothing but bravery. The determination not to return home before killing
Lou-lan was nothing but fearlessness. Converting the family into the coun-
try was nothing but intrepidity. Passing by the door of his home three times
without entering after an absence of 8 years was nothing but perseverance.
All these qualities can be attributed to constant physical education. De-
termination is the harbinger of one's career.
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Those slight of limb are flighty in behavior; those slack of muscle are
soft and slow in mind. Thus the body influences the mind. Physical educa-
tion strengthens the tendons and bones, thereby increasing knowledge, there-
by harmonizing the emotions, and thereby reinforcing determination, The
tendons and bones are our body, while knowledge, emotions, and determination
constitute our mind. When the body and the mind are both sound, there is
excellence. Therefore, physical education is the only thing to foster our
body and please our mind.
Exercise is the most important part of physical education. Most of today's
scholars dislike exercise. There are four reasons: One is the lack of
awareness. For something to materialize in one's action, there must first
be an inclination toward it. But even more than inclination, one must first
have the intelligence to gain a detailed understanding of it. Understanding
is awareness. Most people do not know the relationship between exercise
and themselves. Or, they may have a rough idea, but have no detailed knowl-
edge. Therefore, their intelligence is not activated, and their senses not
stimulated. That some people can study science diligently is because of its.
close relationship with themselves. If they do not study it today, they
will not have the means to make a living in the future. But when it comes
to exercise, they do not have such awareness. This is partly because they
do not ponder profoundly, and partly because the teachers do not know how
to enlighten them. Another reason is that old habits are difficult to
change. In China, we Shave always stressed the academic. "Good men do not
serve as soldiers." Though we know that exercise is proper and that the
nations have become strong due to exercise, the force of the old concepts
remains strong. Exercise, which is a new concept, is only half accepted.
Therefore, it is not surprising. that many people do not like exercise. The
third reason is the lack of promotion. This point can be further subdivided
into two factors. First, the so-called educators today mostly do not under-
stand physical education. Hearing about it but not knowing what it is, they
also engage in physical education. Therefore, they have neither the sin-
cerity nor the method. As a result, they only discourage students from
studying it. When a profligate talks about independence, or a drunk dis-
cusses abstinence, naturally no one will believe them. Second, the phys-
ical education teachers are mostly uneducated. Their language is so coarse
that the listeners have to cover their ears. They only know one skill, and
not necessarily expert at it. Day in and day out, they perform the me-
chanical movements. Anything in form only, without substance, cannot exist.
Such is today's physical education. The fourth reason is that the students
think of exercise as something shameful. I personally feel that this is
the major.reason for disliking. exercise. As society prefers a well-dressed
man with gentlemanly manners, it makes people feel ashamed to expose their
arms and legs and wave them around. Therefore, there are those who know
the importance of exercise and wish to exercise, but cannot do so. Others
can exercise in a group but not by themselves. Still others will exercise
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in private but not in public. In a word, it is due to bashfulness. The
foregoing are the four reasons for aversion to exercise. The first and
fourth are subjective, and it is up to the individual. The second and third
are objective, and it is up to others. A gentleman relies on himself. He
must disregard what is up to others.
VI. Fewer Methods of Exercise Preferred
Being weak, I wanted to study the means to improve my health. The ancients
discussed the subject extensively. Now the schools. have gymnasiums and
books. After much studying, I was not benefited. The reason is that prac-
tice, rather than words, is important. If one can practice, learning a lit-
tle bit is enough. Tseng Wen-cheng was greatly benefited by washing his
feet before retiring and walking 1,000 steps after a meal. One old man was
very healthy even at 80 years of age. When asked, he said: "I do not eat
my fill." Today, there are hundreds of exercises. A bird needs only one
branch in the forest to build a nest; a field mouse needs only a stomachful
out of a-river. We have only this one body, only so many bones and vessels.
All the 100 methods of exercise are only for the purpose of blood circula-
tion. One method will serve the purpose. Thus, 99 out of the 100 methods
can be discarded. The eyes can see clearly if they do not see two things
at a time, and the ears can hear clearly if they do not hear two things at
a time. To temper the tendons and bones with 100 methods only serve to
disturb them, and the desired result may not follow. What is suitable for
different purposes is not the same as tempering one's own body. There are
the swinging bridge for the sailor, pole carrying for the pole-vaulter,
games for the elementary school, and military maneuvering for the middle
school and above. They are for different purposes. Exercising the tendons
and bones will help blood circulation. It is for tempering one's own body.
There should be more methods when there are different purposes, but less for
tempering one's own body. Today's scholars often do not realize it, result-
ing in two defects. Those who like to exercise think the more the better.-
To do 100 things with one body, one may not benefit at all. In regard to
those who do not like to exercise, when they see others possessing so many
skills, they feel so inadequate that they may give up altogether. More is
not necessarily good, and less not necessarily bad. Even the bending and
stretching of one arm or one leg, if done regularly, it will produce a bene-
fit. Only when this is understood will there be improvement in physical
education.
VII. Important Points in Exercising
Constancy is required in all undertakings, and this applies to exercise.
Of two men exercising, one of them does it sporadically, while the other
perseveres diligently. The results will be different. First, constancy
in exercising will produce an interest. The static cannot move by itself.
There must be something to make it move. To move is due to interest. All'
sciences produce interests in many aspects, and this applies to exercise
also. It is restful to be quiet but tiring to move. Man usually prefers
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leisure to effort. If there is nothing to make him move, then his status
and preference cannot be changed. Interest comes from daily exercise. It
is best to exercise upon rising and before retiring. It is preferable to be
naked. Or, wear very thin clothes, because too many clothes are clumsy.
Doing it daily will produce the concept of exercise, continuous and uninter-
rupted. Today's exercise is a continuation of yesterday's and the forerunner
of tomorrow's. It does not have to be long. Some 30 minutes will be enough.
By so doing, a sort of interest will naturally follow. Secondly, constancy
in exercising will bring happiness. After exercising over a long period, the
result will become apparent, and one will feel a respect for oneself. One
will become efficient in studying andln.building one's ethics. One will feel
an unlimited happiness. All these come from constancy. Happiness must be
distinguished from interest. Interest is the beginning of exercising, and
happiness its end. Interest comes from doing while happiness comes from the
result. The two are different.
Constancy without attention will not produce results. Like viewing flowers
while riding a fast horse, even if one views the flowers every day, it is
equivalent to not viewing. Thus, full attention is required when exer-
cising. One must brush aside all idle thoughts and irrelevant worries,
and concentrate on the circulation of blood, tensing and relaxing of the
muscles, bending of the joints, and breathing. The movements must follow a
rhythm, bending and stretching, advancing and retreating, all done consci-
entiously. According to Chu-tzu, one must concentrate on eating when eating,
and on putting on clothes when dressing. The same principle applies to
exercising.
A gentleman is civilized and docile, but this does not apply to exercising.
One must be barbarous and solid. Only then will one build up one's strength
and the tendons and bones. The method of exercising should be solid. Being
solid will make it substantial and easy to practice. It is most important,
especially for those who are beginners.
The three important points in exercising are constancy, concentration, and
being barbarous and solid. There are many other points of attention, but
these are the important ones.
VIII. What I Have Gained Through Exercise
I dabbled in all kinds of exercises, but it was all external tempering, with-
out something which could be considered my own. Thus, I extracted the good
points of the various exercises and created a new one. I have greatly bene-
fited from it. It consists of six sections: Arms, legs, body, head, hit-
ting, and harmonizing. The sections are further divided into 27 steps. It
is called the six-section exercise, which is described below. I hope my
readers will correct me.
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1. Arm exercise, sitting position
(1) Form fists; stretch and retract in a forward movement, left and
right alternating, three times. Left and right alternating means when the
left is in motion the right rests, and vice versa.
(2) Form fists; bend elbows; make semi-circular motions by moving for-
ward, sideways, and backward, left and right alternating, three times.
(3) Form fists; stretch and retract in a downward motion, left and right
together, three times. Left and right together means both sides moving to-
gether, not alternating.
(4) Palms up; stretch forward, left and right alternating, three times.
(5) Palms down; stretch forward, left and right alternating, three times.
?(6) Stretch fingers; bend elbows; thrust forward, left and right al-
ternating, three times.
2. Leg exercise, sitting position
(1) Hands form fists hanging downward. Legs remain at original position;
bend forward and stretch sideways, left and right alternating, three times.
(2) Hands form fists level in front. Legs stretch sideways; then bend
forward. Position may change when stretching; use toes when tending; touch
heels with buttocks; left and right alternating, three times.
(3) Hands form fists hanging downward. Legs advance and lift, left and
right alternating, three times.
(4) Hands form fists hanging downward. Legs advance and kick forward,
left and right alternating, three times.
(5) Hands form fists hanging downward. Legs bend forward and stretch
backward. Keep original position when bending but'change position when
stretching. Both legs roughly on a straight line. Left and right alter-
nating, three times.
(6) Open hands. Body rising and falling; touch heels with buttocks
when lowering. Three times.
3. Body exercise, standing position
(1) Body bends forward and backward, three times. Hands form fists; same
below.
(2) One arm stretches upward, and the other hangs downward. Expand left
and right sides of chest. Left and right once each.
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(3) Legs form T shape. Arms swing left and right, twisting the waist.
Left and right once each.
4. Head exercise, sitting position
(1) Bend neck backward and forward, three times.
(2) Turn neck left and right, three times.
(3) Massage with hands the forehead, cheeks, nose, lips, throat, ears,
and neck.
(4) Free movement: Head remains more or less stationery; exercise skin
and lower jaw; five times.
5. Hitting exercise, no set position. Hitting exercise is to hit all parts
of the body with fists in order to accelerate blood circulation and firm up
the tendons and bones.
(1) Arms: Hit left hand with right, and vice versa.
(a) Upper arm: Top bottom, left, right.
(b) Lower arm: Top, bottom, left, right.
(2) Shoulder.
(3) Chest.
(4) Flanks.
(5) Back.
(6) Stomach.
(7) Buttocks.
(8) Legs, upper and lower.
6. Harmonizing exercise, no set position
(1) Dancing, 10 odd times.
(2) Keep breathing, three times.
OHSIN CH'ING-NIEN [New Youth], Vol 3, No 2, 1 April 1917
6080
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ADVERTISEMENT FOR WORKERS' EVENING SCHOOL
1917
[Text] Please hear a few words from me.
What is your biggest disadvantage? Do you know? It is as described in
the popular saying: You'can say it but you cannot write it; what is written
you cannot understand; given the figures, you cannot compute them. We are
all human beings, but are you not similar to wood and stone? Therefore,
you must seek some knowledge, and learn to read and write a little and do
some arithmetic. Only then will it be advantageous. But then, you are
working people. You have to work, and you have no one to teach you. How
can you do it? There is an excellent way. Our First Normal School has
started an evening school, specially for you workers. Monday through Fri-
day, there will be 2 hours every evening. We teach letter writing and
accounting, which are needed by you constantly. We will issue you the
lecture notes, free of charge. Evening school will not interfere with your
work. Those who wish to attend please enroll promptly at the registry of-
fice of the normal school within a week. Please think why we are doing this?
It is only because we think of your difficulties and hope you will be able
to write and calculate. So, why not enroll as soon as possible and come to
the lectures? Some people are worried about the situation and afraid of
violating the curfew. We can guarantee you on this point. When you attend
school, we will issue you a lecture card. When stopped by. the soldiers or
police, all you have to do is to say that you are a student of the evening
school of the normal school. Should you run into any difficulty, I will serve
as your guarantor. Please set your mind at ease on this point. Please come
and register promptly; do not delay any more. ?
Education Research Department, Student
Association of Hunan Provincial First
Normal School
o"Advertisement for Workers' Evening School," Mementos of Workers' Evening
School, Hunan First Normal School
6080 14
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ADVERTISEMENT FOR WORKERS' EVENING SCHOOL
[Text] Please hear a few words from me.
What is your biggest disadvantage? It is as described in the popular
saying: You can say it but you cannot write it; what is written you
cannot understand; given the figures, you cannot compute them. You
are working people. You have to work, and you have no one to teach you.
How can you learn to write a few words and do a few figures? Now there
is an excellent way. Our First Normal School has started an evening
school, specially for you workers. Monday through Friday, there will
be 2 hours every evening. We teach letter writing and accounting,
which are needed by you constantly. We will issue you the lecture
notes, free of charge. Evening school will not interfere with your
work. Those who wish to attend please enroll promptly at the registry
office of the normal school within a week.
Some people are worried about the situation and afraid of violating
the curfew. We can guarantee you on this point. When you attend
school, we will issue you a lecture card. When stopped by the sol-
diers or police, all you have to do is to say that you are a student
of the evening school of the normal school. Should you run into any
difficulty, we will serve as your guarantors. Please set your mind
at ease on this point. Please come and register promptly; do not delay
any more.
Education Research Department, Student Association of
Hunan Provincial First Normal School
* "Advertisement for Workers' Evening School," Exhibition Hall of
Comrade Mao Tse-tung Mementos
6080
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INAUGURAL STATEMENT OF 'HSIANG-CHIANG P'ING-LUN'
14 July 1919
[Text] With the rising roar of the "world revolution" and the. striking
progress of the "emancipation of mankind" movement, we must change our old
concepts of the issues which we have never doubted before, the methods which
we have never adopted before, and the words which we have always been afraid
to utter. We doubt what we have never before doubted. We adopt what we
have never before adopted. We are no longer afraid. Such trend cannot be
blocked by any force, and it cannot but influence people, regardless of who
they are.
What is the biggest issue in the world? The issue of food is the biggest.
What force. is the strongest? The force of mass unity is the strongest. What
should not be feared? Fear neither Heaven, nor ghosts, nor the dead, nor the
bureaucrats, nor the warlords, nor the capitalists.
With the Renaissance and the emancipation of thinking, "how man should live"
became a big issue. When this issue was studied, the conclusion that "this
is the way to live" and "that is not the way to live" was reached. With
the scholars taking the lead and the majority of the people echoing them, many
reforms were accomplished, or almost accomplished.
In religion, the Reformation resulted in freedom of religion. In literature,
the literature of the aristocrats, the classic literature, and the dead liter-
ature became the literature of the people, modern literature, and living
literature. In politics, tyranny became parliamentarism, and restricted
election became unrestricted. In society, the dark society under the tyran-
ny of the minority class became a bright society of the free development of
all people. In education, there was the principle of popular education. In
economics, there was the principle of to each according to his labor. In
thinking, there was experimentalism. Internationally, there was the inter-
national alliance.
In a word, all the reforms are the results of "freedom from might." The
fundamental ideology of the many forces opposing might is "popular-ism"
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(democracy, also known as democratic theory, people-ism, or plebeian-ism).
The might of religion, of literature, of politics, of society, of education,
of economics, and of thinking, and international might have not any room for
existence. They must all be overthrown by the loud appeal of popular-ism.
As for the means of overthrowing them, there are two theories: One is
violent and the other moderate. We must make our choice between the two.
(1) We recognize that all those exercising might are human beings, and our
fellow creatures. Abusing power is their unconscious error and their mis-
fortune, resulting from contamination and harm by the old society and old
thinking. (2) The result of overthrowing might by force is still might. Not
only is it contradictory, but also ineffective. The European war between
the "Allies" and the "Central Powers" and China's civil war between the North
and the South'were all instances of such.
Therefore, according to our view, we advocate thorough study in the academic
aspect, untrammeled by legends and superstitions, and we must spread the
truth. In regard to the human element, we advocate mass unity, continuing
our "counseling movement" toward those in power, and practicing "revolution
by appeals"--appeal for bread, appeal for freedom, and appeal for equality,
or, "bloodless revolution." It will not lead to any major chaos or the in-
effective "revolution by bombs" and "bloody revolution."
International might pressing in on us is Japan. The various movements, such
as student strikes, market strikes, work strikes, and boycotting are the
effective means to handle the mighty Japan directly or indirectly.
Hsiang-chiang is a river in the east of the Eastern hemisphere on the globe.
Its water is clear and its flow long. The people living on its shores and
in its vicinity are ignorant and uninformed. They know little of the affairs
of the world. They do not have an organized society. Everyone for himself
and scattered, they only have the narrowest self and the shortest time.
They have never dreamed of the common life or the long-range concept. In
politics, they have not reached a thorough solution. They only know private
struggles. Engulfed by the tidal waves of the external world, they have also
undertaken some education, but without much effect. The bureaucratic educat-
ors, inflexible and stereotyped, consider the school a jail and the students
prisoners. They have not developed their industry. The few useful talents
among them acquired learning and art by studying abroad or in outside areas,
but there is no room for them to make use of their talents. The confining
Tung-t'ing Lake blocks them gently. Entrenched in tribal thinking, the
practice the principle of Hunan's rice for Hunan's people. Those in educa-
tion and industry cannot tolerate those differing from them. Their mind is
impoverished and decadent and needs improvement, yet there is no one to
undertake the task. They have many young men in school, full of potential,
yet there is no one to enlighten them with new knowledge and new art by an
effective means.' Alas! Hsiang-chiang, Hsiang-chiang! Like a pillar you
exist on this Earth!
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The opportunity has arrived! The great tide of the world surges forward!
The locks of Tung-t'ing Lake are moving, and opening! The powerful new
trend is roaring along the shores of Hsiang-chiang! Those following it
will live; those resisting it will die. How to receive it? How to spread
it? How to study it? How to promulgate it? These constitute. the most
intimate and most important great issues of all the people of Hunan as well
as "Hsiang-chiang" upon its birth.
o "The Influence of the October Revolution on China's Revolution (Shu-yang),"
People's Publishing House, 1957
A HSIANG-CHIANG P'ING-LUN, Inaugural Issue, 14 July 1919
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GREAT UNION OF THE PEOPLE
21, 28 July, 4 August 1919
[Text] (I)
The state is at its worse; the misery of man is at its extreme; society is
at its darkest. The means of remedy, of reform? While education, industry,
effort, progress, destruction, and construction are all correct, the funda-
mental means is the great union of the people.
When we look back at history, no movement was not the result of the union
of certain people. The bigger movements required bigger unions; the biggest
movements required the biggest unions. Such union was most apparent at the
time of reform or resistance. Always, the reform or resistance of religion,
of the arts, of politics, and of society resulted from bigger unions. The
outcome of victory or defeat depended on the strength or weakness of the
union and on whether the principle of the union was new or old, true or false.
The measure of uniting was always the same.
Most of the ancient unions were those of the powerful, of the aristocrats,
and of the capitalists. The many kinds of "alliance" agreements in diplomacy,
for instance, were the union of international powers. China's "Pei-yang
Faction" and "Southwest Faction," and Japan's "Satsuma clan and Choshu clan,"
for instance, were the unions of domestic power holders; the political par-
ties and parliaments of the various nations were the unions of aristocrats
and capitalists. (While the upper house, being the house of the elders, was
the den where the aristocrats converged, the lower house, with its voting
rights-restricted by property, was mostly monopolized by the capitalists).
As for the trusts (iron and steel trust, petroleum trust...) and corpora-
tions (the Japan Steamship Corporation, Manchurian Iron Corporation...),
they were purely unions of capitalists. By the present time, the unions of
the powerful, the aristocrats, and the capitalist have reached the limit;
therefore, the state is at its worst, the misery of man is at its extreme,
and society is at its darkest, resulting in reform, in resistance, and in
the great union of the people.
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Since the victory of the "political reform" in France as a result of the
great union of the people against that of the royalists, the various na-
tions followed suit and produced many "political reforms." Since the vic-
tory of the "social reform" in Russia last year as a result of the great
union of the people against that of the aristocrats and capitalists, the
various nations, such as Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia,.and Germany, fol-
lowed suit and produced many social reforms. Though the victory is not yet
complete, that it will inevitably become complete and spread worldwide. can
be imagined. Why is the great union of the people so powerful? Because
the people of a nation are always greater in number than the aristocrats,
capitalists, and other power holders. Since the number of aristocrats,
capitalists, and other power holders is small, what they rely on to defend
their own special interests and exploit the public interest of the people
are knowledge, money, and force. Education in the old days was the special
privilege of the aristocrats and capitalists, which the ordinary people had
no opportunity to enjoy. Since. knowledge was monopolized, the intelligent
and uninformed classes were created. Money is the medium-of living, and
everyone should be able to.get it. Yet the knowledgeable aristocrats and
capitalists, by such means as "capital concentration," gradually directed
it into the hands of the landowners and plant bosses. While they made land,
machinery, and houses their own and called them "fixed property," they ga-
thered money, the so-called movable property, into their.treasury (banks).
The millions of common people working for them were given francs and pennies.
Since those who work had no money, the rich and poor classes were created.
With knowledge and money, the aristocrats and capitalists set up camps to
train soldiers and plants to make guns. Under the excuse of "foreign ag-
gression," tens of divisions and hundreds of battalions were recruited.
Imitating conscription, they invented the "selective service system." Thus,
the vigorous sons of the people became soldiers. When a problem was encount-
ered, they brought out the machine guns to attack their incapable and weak old
men. When the Southern army was defeated in Hunan, didn't they kill many
of their old men? The aristocrats and capitalists utilized such ingenious
methods, and the ordinary people were afraid to express themselves:. Thus
were created the strong and weak classes..
Luckily the ordinary people surreptitiously studied some of their "secret"
textbooks, and gradually acquired knowledge. Envying the comfort of the
capitalists, the ordinary people eyed the farmland and plants where money
came from. As for the soldiers in the camps, they were their sons, brothers,
or husbands. When the soldiers aimed the machine guns at them, they shouted
in a loud voice. Such shouts turned the bullets into mud. Unconsciously.,
they returned home together hand in hand, changing together into staunch
warriors against the aristocrats and capitalists. We only have to look at
the hundreds of thousands of troops of Russia which suddenly substituted the
red flag for the vulture flag to understand the profound reason therein.
The ordinary people saw through the three methods of the aristocrats and
capitalists and realized that they practice them.by means of union. They
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also saw that they were few and we were many, and so they resorted to the
great union. In regard to the actions after union, one faction was very
violent, "used their own medicine,".and waged a death struggle against them.
The leader of this faction was a man born in Germany named Marx. The other
faction was more moderate, did not seek instant results, but began ty working
toward the awareness of the ordinary people. Everyone must possess the virtues
of mutual aid and voluntary work. As long as they would repent and were able
-to work, and would help, rather than hurt, others, it was not necessary to
kill the aristocrats and capitalists. The intent of those of this faction
was more extensive and profound. They wished to unite the entire earth in-
to one nation and all mankind into one family. With harmony and friend-
ship--not Japan's friendship, together they would strive for prosperity in
the world. The leader of this faction was a man born in Russian by the name
of Kropotkin.
We must know that anything in the world is easy to do to start with. What
is not easy is due to. the influence of history--habit. If we can shout in
unison, we will break down the influence of history. We must unite even more
extensively and, when we encounter. what we feel is wrong, we must form our
ranks and loudly. shout at the opposing side. We have already. had the ex-
perience: Lu Jung-t'ing's [7120 2837 1694] shells would never hit the vil-
lains like Ts'ao Ju-lin [2580 3067 7207]. But when we rose up and shouted,
the villians stood up and trembled; they fled for their lives. We must know
that our brothers of other nations constantly. resort to this means to seek
their interest. We must emulate them. We must form our great union!
(II) Small Unions as the Foundation
In a previous issue of this newspaper, the possibility and necessity of the
"great union of the people" were covered. Today, the means of the great
union will be discussed. It is the "small unions of the people."
What we want is a sort of great union, in order to resist those holding power
and injuring others and attain our own interest. Then, we must.have all kinds
of small unions to serve as its foundation. Man has the instinctive talent
for union. It is the talent to form groups, the talent to organize society.
"Group" and "society" are what I refer to as "union." There are large groups
and small groups, large societies and small societies, and large unions and
small unions, the same thing in different names. That we must have a
group, a society, and a union is because we want to seek our common interest.
Due to the differences in our circumstances and occupations, the sphere of
our common interest also varies. As there.are large and small common in-
terests, the means to attain common interest (union) also differs in size.
Gentlemen! We are peasants. We must form a union of those of our kind in
order to seek the various interests of the peasants. The interests of the
peasants must be sought by the peasants themselves. As those not engaged
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in farming do not have the same interests, they will not help us. Farming
gentlemen! How do the landlords treat us? Are the rents heavy or light?
Is our housing adequate? Are our stomachs full? Is the farmland too little?
Are there people in the village without farms? We must constantly seek the
answers to these questions. We must form a union with those of our own kind,
and concretely.and openly seek the answers.
Gentlemen! We are workers. We must form a union with those of our own kind
in order to seek the interests of the workers. The various problems con-
nected with our labor, such as the amount of wages, the hours, whether there
is equal distribution of profit, whether there is improvement in recreation...,
all require answers. We must form a union with those of our own kind, and
concretely and openly seek the answers,
Gentlemen! We are students. We have a hard time. Those teaching us treat
us as enemies, trample us as slaves, and confine us as-prisoners. The win-
dows of our classrooms are so small that the light cannot reach the black-
board, making us nearsighted. The tables are unsuitable, and we suffer
from "spinal curvature" after sitting over them too long. The teachers only
want us to read more books. We read many books, but we cannot understand
them, merely wasting the effort of memorizing. Our eyes are blurred, our
brains confused, our blood deficient, and our complexion pale. We suffer
from anemia and neurasthenia. Why are we so stiff? So dull? So wasted?
They are all because the teachers force us to stay still and keep quiet. We
are stiff like corpses. Physical pain is still secondary. Gentlemen!
Please take a look at our laboratories! They are so cramped and so poorly
equipped--a few pieces of broken instruments. It is impossible for us to
do any experiment. Our Chinese language teachers are so cantankerous.
Quoting the classics endlessly, they do not understand the meaning. Una-
ware that it is not the 20th century, they continue to force us to perform
the "ancient rites" and follow the "ancient laws" and stuff the classical
dead literature into our mind. Our library is empty; our recreation field
dirty. The nation is perishing, yet they still post announcements pro-
hibiting us from being patriotic. Take the save-the-nation movement this
time: We received must of their generosity! Alas! Who are destroying our
body and spirit and making us miserable? If we do not unite now and pursue
our "self-education," when will we do it? Sunk into an ocean of misery,
we must save ourselves. The "self-education" invented by Rousseau is most
.appropriate. We must lineup our comrades wherever possible and study by
ourselves. We must not rely on the vicious teachers. Whenever anything
happens, such as the outrageous conduct of Japan's and our domestic power
holders, we will form ranks and shout at them loudly.
Ladies! We are women. We have sunk even deeper into the ocean of misery!
Since we are also human beings, why are we not permitted to take part in
politics? Since we are also human being, why are we not permitted to have
social contact? We gather in holes and cannot step out of the front door.
The shameless men and the hoodlums consider us as playthings, force us into
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long-term prostitution, and destroy the freedom to love! "Chastity" is
limited to women! There are many shrines for chaste women, but where are
the temples for chaste men? Some of us gather in women's schools, but those
teaching us are the shameless men and hoodlums. All day long they discuss
'virtuous wife and good mother." It is for no other purpose than to teach us
to specialize in long-term prostitution. They are afraid that we will not
accept control. What misery! God of Freedom, where are you? Please rescue
us! We have awakened! The women must unite and sweep aside all the evil
ghosts violating us and destroying our physical and spiritual freedom!
Gentlemen! We are elementary school teachers. All day long we teach class
and are very busy. All day long we inhale chalk dust, and there is nowhere
for us to relax. Elementary school teachers in such a big city must number
in the hundreds, in the thousands, yet there is no recreation facility for
our use. When we teach, we must constantly improve our learning, yet there
is no research organ established for us. The inflexible classroom hours
are many, and there is no spare time, energy, or spirit to study. Thus, we
become phonographs, performing and reciting what our teachers taught us
in the old days. Our stomach is empty. The monthly wage of 8 or 10 yuan
is even discounted. Some principals follow the method of "reducing military
ration" and pocket the money allocated by the government. Without money, we
become-married widowers, living tens or hundreds of li away from our spouses.
We are told that teaching elementary school is a lifetime career. Does it
mean that we should spend our entire life as widowers or widows? According
to the theory of education, the teachers and their families should live in
the school in order to serve as models to the students, but it is impossible
now. As we have no money, we cannot buy books, nor travel and observe. No
need to say more! Elementary school teachers are only slaves! If we do not
wish to be slaves, the only way is for us to unite with our own kind and form
an elementary school teachers' union.
Gentlemen! We are policemen. We also wish to unite with our own kind and
form a union beneficial to our body and mind. The Japanese say that the most
miserable are beggars, elementary school teachers, and policemen. We feel
more or less the same.
Gentlemen! We are cart pullers. Our perspiration falls like rain. The
cart owners charge so much for rent, while the fare we get is so little!
How can we live? Is there also a method of union for us?
The above are the wails of the peasants, workers, students, women, elementary
school teachers, and cart pullers. Unable to endure the misery any longer,
they wish to form all kinds of small unions in their own interests.
Among the small unions discussed above, the union of workers is a very large
and general term. To put it in greater details, the following are of the
lowest level in the workers' unions: Unions of railway workers, of mining
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workers, of telegraph employees, of telephone employees, of shipbuilding
workers, of steamship workers, of metal workers, of textile workers, of
streetcar operators, of cart pullers, of building workers.... The workers of
Western nations all have small unions according to the occupations and pro-
fessions. Such unions as the transport workers' union and the streetcar
workers' union are found everywhere. Many small unions become a large union,
and many large unions become the largest union. Thus, "associations" and
"alliances" come into being. When it is for the common interest of a small
number of people, a small union is formed. Due to the common points of in-
terests among the small unions, a large union can be established. Studying,
for-instance, is the obligation of us students, and we form an academic union.
The pursuit of liberation and freedom is something which concerns everyone.
Thus, we must rally all kinds of people to form a large union.
Therefore, we must begin with the small unions when we want a large union.
We must emulate our fellow beings of other nations, and form many small
unions.
(III) The Situation of China's "Great Union of the People"
In the two previous installments we have discussed: (1) the possibility and
necessity of a great union of the people and (2) the fact that the great
union of the people is founded on the small unions. Now, in regard to
China's great union of the people, do we have the awareness? Do we have the
motivation? Do we have the ability? Can we succeed?
(1) In regard to China's great union of the people, do we have the aware-
ness? The revolution of 1911 appeared to be a union of the people, but it
was actually not so. The 1911 revolution was instigated by students studying
abroad, encouraged by the Ko-lao Society and fought by the soldiers of the
new army and patrol camps. It had nothing to do with the majority of the
people. Though we supported their principle, we did not take any active,
part. Nor did they need us. But we gained an awareness. We found out
that the sacred emperor could be overthrown and that the treacherous demo-
cracy could be established. If we had anything to say or anything to do,
we could say or do it at any time. After 1911, we again overthrew Emperor
Hung-hsien in 1916. Though it was undertaken by a minority, we realized
that the arrogant Emperor Hung-hsien could also be overthrown. In recent
years, there were the civil war betwen the North and the South and the World
War, and things changed even more. The outcome of the civil war was that
we acquired more ironclad evidence to show that the bureaucrats, military
men, and politicians injured, poisoned, and exploited us. The outcome of
the World War was that the people of the nations, due to the hardships in
their living, suddenly undertook many actions. Russia overthrew the arist-
ocrats and expelled the rich. The workers and peasants jointly formed a
provisional government. The Red Flag Army fought everywhere and swept
aside many enemies. The alliance changed its form as a result, and the
whole world was shaken. Hungary rose, and a brand-new worker-peasant
government appeared in Budapest. The Germans, Austrians, and Czechoslovakians
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responded and waged a death struggle against their domestic enemies. The
angry tide surged West and then shifted to the East. After the many general
strikes in England, France, Italy, and America, large scale uprisings broke
out in India and Korea. Then, there was the 4 May Movement in China be-
tween the Great Wall and Po-hai. Shifting the standards and banners toward
the south, the movement crossed the Yellow River to the Yangtze, from Huang-
p' u to Hankow, all the way to Tung-t'ing Lake and the Min River, the tide
rising ever higher. Heaven and Earth rose out of hibernation; the treacher-
ous and the evil fled. Alas! We understood! We awakened! The world is
ours; the nation is ours; society is ours. If we do not say it, who will?
If we do not do it, who will? We must actively proceed with the urgent
great union of the people!
(2) Is there the motivation for China's great union of the people? In re-
gard to this question, I will directly answer yes. If you do not believe
me, let me explain. The origin of China's union of the people must be traced
back to the establishment of the Provincial Bureau at the end of the Ch'ing
Dynasty and the formation of the revolutionary party--the Revolutionary Al-
liance. With the Provincial Bureau, there was the joint petition of the
provincial bureaus in the provinces for an early parliament. With the revol-
utionary party, there was the appeal to those in China and abroad to launch
an uprising and expel the Manchus. The 1911 revolution was a joint venture
by the Provincial Bureau and the revolutionary party. Subsequently, the
revolutionary party became the Kuomintang, and the Provincial Bureau the
Progressive Party. It was the beginning of political parties in China.
Thereafter, the republic was founded. The central government convened the
parliament, and the provinces also held provincial assemblies. At this time,
the provinces formed three kinds of organizations: Provincial education,
commercial, and agricultural associations. (Several provinces had labor
associations; others included the workers in the agricultural associations,
such as Hunan). Meanwhile, the counties also established county education,
commercial, and agricultural associations. (Some counties did not do so).
These constituted firm and effective unions. Other types of organizations
were also formed according to the conditions and situations, such as, alumni
associations of the schools, fellow-provincials' associations for those away
from home, general and branch associations of students returning from abroad,
"Shanghai Daily News" Guild, World Chinese Students' Association, Peking and
Shanghai European and American Returning Students' Associations, and Peking
Chinese-French Education Association.
All kinds of academic societies (such as Ch'iang Society, Kuang Society,
Shang-chih Society, China Vocational Education Association, China Science
Association, Asian Civilization Association...), all kinds of occupational
or professional associations (the various occupations and professions in
industry and commerce, such as banking association, rice association...;
research associations in the schools, such as the Painting Research and
Philosophy Research Associations in Peking...dozens of them), and all kinds
of clubs were the products of political liberation and ideological
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enlightenment not permissible or possible in the period of government by one
man. The above mentioned associations were all very simple--the "small
unions" discussed in the previous installment. Recently, due to political
unrest and foreign pressure, our awareness has been raised and the motiva-
tion for large unions has appeared, such as the National United Association
of Education Associations, the National United Association of Commercial
Associations, the United Association of Canton's 72 Guilds, the United
Association of Shanghai's 53 Organizations, the United Association of
"Shang-hsueh Kung-pao," the National United Association in the:Field of News-
papers, the National Hope-for-Peace Association, the National United Peace
Association, the Peking China-France Association, the People's Diplomacy
Association, the Hunan Reconstruction Association (in Shanghai), the Shantung
Association (in Shanghai), the united students' associations of Peking,
Shanghai, the provinces, and the cities, the united associations of all
fields, the National United Students' Association.... Though many "gentle-
men" and "politicians" who are not of the people are inevitably found in the
various associations, societies, units, united associations, etc. (such as
the national parliament, provincial assemblies, provincial education associa-
tions, provincial agricultural associations, National Hope-for-Peace Associa-,
tion, and National United Peace Association, which are completely gentlemen's
or politicians' associations), the occupational or professional associations,
academic societies, research associations, etc. are purely organizations of
ordinary people or scholars. The united students' associations and the united
associations of the various fields created recently are a sort of great
unions of the people organized purely to deal with foreign and domestic
power holders. I feel that here is the motivation for China's national great
union.
(3) Do we have the ability to undertake China's "great union of the people?"
Can we succeed? When it comes to ability, there are doubts. The Chinese
people only concentrate on maximum, yet futureless private-profit. Those
in commerce fail to form corporations; those working fail to establish labor
parties; those studying only follow the old method of making carts behind
closed doors and fail to do joint research. The Chinese people cannot under-
take large scale organized enterprises. That politics is not properly hand-
led needs no mentioning. The little achievement in postal and salt admin-
istration must be credited to the foreigners. So long after the seas
were opened for trade, we still do not have even a small ship which can travel
to Europe. "Chao-shang Chu" and "Han-Yeh-P'ing," the only ones in the coun-
try, operated at a loss every year. When they could not stand the loss,
they recruited foreign capital. Railways managed by foreigners are super-
ior in cleanliness, equipment, and personnel. Any railway managed by the
Department of Communications becomes messed up. All travelers on the Peking-
Hankow, Tientsin-P'u-k'ou, and Wuch'ang-Ch'angsha lines have to cover their
nose and grit their teeth! As for the rest, the schools, self-government,
or even a family, an individual, is not properly handled. "Jackals of the
same lair," that's what they are! It is not easy to discuss the great union
of the people! It is not easy to compete against the deeply entrenched
power holders!
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Even so, it does not mean that we basically do not have the ability. That
we do not have the ability has its reasons. It is because "we have not
practiced."
For thousands of years, the millions of Chinese people lived the life of
slavery, and only the "emperor" was not a slave. (Some people said that the
"emperor" was the slave of "Heaven.") When the emperor was in charge, we
were not allowed to practice our ability. Politics, academic learning, and
society all prohibited us from thinking, organizing, or practicing.
Today it is different. All aspects have been liberated--the liberation of
thinking, of politics, of economics, of men and women, and of education. We
all wish to see the blue sky from the depth of hell. The people of China
have great abilities! The stronger the pressure, the greater the reaction.
After a long suppression, the eruption will be quick. I would like to make
a wild statement: The reform of the nation of China in the future will be
more thorough than any other nation; the Chinese society will be brighter
than any other; the great unity of the nation of China will be achieved ahead
of any area and any nation. Gentlemen! Gentlemen! We must exert ourselves!
We must strive forward! Our golden world, our brilliant world, is ahead of
us!
?"Reference Material of the History of the Chinese Communist Party," Vol 1.
A HSIANG-CHIANG P'ING-LUN, Nos 2-4; Hunan United Students' Association,
21 and 28 July, and 4 August 1919
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1 August 1920
[Text] (1) The main purpose of this bookstore is to sell all kinds of use-
ful Chinese and foreign books, newspapers, and magazines. We strive to be
inexpensive and prompt in the sale of such publications, so that all kinds of
useful new publications will spread in the entire province and everyone will
have the opportunity to read them. In regard to books published in other
cities, we have formed special agreements with the various bookstores and
publishing houses. All new publications will be shipped to us as soon as
they are published. In regard to the useful daily newspapers, in view of the
large number of readers, we have formed agreements with the publishers to .
serve as their branches. In regard to the useful magazines, we have formed
agreements with the publishers to serve-.as their distributors.
(2) The capitalization of this bookstore is unlimited. The founders will
first subscribe to the opening expenses, beginning on a small scale, to be
gradually expanded. Thereafter, the entire assets will be jointly owned
by the investors. Anyone having the same interest with this bookstore may
invest 1 yuan or more at any time, but the investors must agree that his
investment becomes; the public property of this bookstore and it is no longer
his personal property. Ii cannot be withdrawn, nor will it earn any interest.
(3) The investors will organize a council and elect a manager who will be
given full authority to handle all affairs of the bookstore. For the pur-
pose of managing the affairs, the manager may employ necessary assistants.
The manager and his assistants should receive appropriate living and opera-
ting expenses, the amount to be determined by the council.
(4) The manger must settle the accounts daily and monthly and make a general
accounting every 6 months and report to the council. The council will hold
a meeting every 6 months (March and September) to examine the business situa-
tion reported by the manager and discuss future plans.
(5) The main office of this bookstore is to be established in the provincial
capital with branches in the counties. The branches will be opened when
there are sufficient funds.
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(6) The bookstores will establish a reading room in the store, stocked with
books and newspapers for the public to read. Branch reading rooms will be
established when there are sufficient funds.
(7) The business of this bookstore will be open to the public. The business
situation will be published once a month. Anyone wishing to know the condi-
tion of this bookstore may do so by personal visit or by writing us at any
time, and such queries will be answered in detail.
(8) Detailed regulations of the council and of business will be separately
provided.
(Hunan "Ta Kung Pao," 25 August 1920)
?"Hunan Historical Data" (quarterly) No 3, 1959, Hunan People's Publishing
House, 28 September 1959
A"Hunan Ta Kung Pao," 25 August 1920
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ANNOUNCEMENT OF WEN-HUA BOOKSTORE
October 1920
[Text] Education Delegates of the Counties and All Those Attending this
Meeting: This bookstore was organized jointly by our comrades for the spe-
cial purpose of introducing all kinds of new publications to the public.
Now, for the purpose of spreading the new publications in the various coun-
ties of the province, so that more people will have the opportunity to
read them, we plan to establish branch stores or reference rooms in the
counties. Whoever wishing to undertake this task please come to the book-
store at 56 Ch'ao-tsung Street to contact us (or by letter).
o"Hunan Historical Data" (quarterly) No 3, 1959, Hunan People's Publishing
House, 28 September 1959
t"Hunan Ta Kung Pao," 11 January 1920
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BUSINESS REPORT OF WEN-HUA BOOKSTORE (No 2)
March 1921
[Text]
Last year we issued a business report concerning the "initiation" and the
condition of the "temporary business period." Now, "Business Report No 2"
deals with the condition of the "first half-year" from last September, when
this bookstore was inaugurated, to the end of March this year. The book-
store was opened at the beginning of last September; therefore, it has been
7 months by the end of March this year, which is 1 month over the "reporting
every 6 months" provided in the Organization Outline. This is for the con-
venience of accounting. Hereafter, "reporting every 6 months" in the Organ-
ization Outline will be observed.
In regard to the purpose of this report, first, we want to report to our mem-
bers how those members directly connected with the bookstore and those manag-
ing the business market the publications, so that our members will know the
actual situation of the bookstore. Only by so doing will we fulfill our
responsibilities. Second, the Chinese people always follow the policy of
secrecy in doing business. Besides the inner circle, no one knows what
they are doing. Such secret policy is actually a sin. When one is open
and aboveboard, why shouldn't the situation be made public? Wen-hua Book-
store is an organization publicly owned by society; it is not for private
gain. To avoid the sin of secrecy, we oppose secrecy and adopt complete
openness, reporting all conditions of the bookstore to the public besides
just the members. Third, in regard to the missions of our bookstore, we
stated in our "Objective" that "...we wish to introduce all kinds of new
Chinese and foreign publications by the fastest and simplest method to serve
as the study material of the young people and all the people of Hunan."
In the "Organization Outline," we also stated that "...all kinds of useful
new publications will spread in the entire province and everyone will have
the opportunity to read them." Such a great mission cannot be accomplished
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by our few dozen members alone. To attain the goal of "everyone having the
opportunity to read" the publications, we give serious attention to setting
up branches in the counties. With one branch in each of the 74 counties,
and 10 members per branch, we must have 750 members. Therefore, the only
way is to publish the business conditions, so that all those of like mind
near and far will understand the benefits of the store, set up branches in
all areas, and help us spread our intent by word or deed. The goal of
"spreading in the entire province" may then be reached. Fourth, what our
bookstore' has are books and newspapers, but what it lacks is capital. Why?
Because books and newspapers come from outside, and we can have all we want,
but capital comes from the members, and not all members are rich. In addi-
tion, our members are not involved in just the bookstore alone so there is
not that much money available to serve as capital. Furthermore, this book-
store follows the principle of "public assets," with no withdrawal or in-
terest, so our poor members cannot produce much money. Nevertheless, the
undertaking of Wen-hua Bookstore is definitely something worthy of attention.
Let us enumerate the.benefits: (1) Simple operation and (2) no waste of capital.
As we all know, the urgent task today is to spread culture, and just the few
schools alone are not enough to do so.' Therefore, to expand the business of
the bookstore and set up branches in the counties, we hope that our comrades
who are able, will help us with larger funds. (We plan to raise .3,000 yuan
of public capital within 2 years). We don't know who are willing to help
us. Naturally, we cannot ask everyone. Only by making public our business
condition will those sympathetic to us step forward voluntarily and render
aid. Fifth, we have, up'till now, been selling books only, without doing
any publishing. Now we plan to organize an "editing and translating depart-
ment" and a "printing press," coordinated with the bookstore's "distribution."
Then., our bookstore will have its independent publications. As the business
will be further expanded, we will have to enlist more comrades and raise more
funds (3,000 yuan for the editing and translating department and 5,000 yuan
for the printing press). Therefore, we have to make public the business con-
dition of the bookstore in order to win the sympathy and attention of every-
one. The final point concerns the handling of business by our staff members.
This is the sixth point. To make the business prosperous, the accounts must
be clear. In regard to our accounts, we have daily, monthly, and half-
yearly reckonings. In daily reckoning, the business figures of the day are
totaled every evening. In monthly reckoning, the business figures of the
entire month are totaled on the first of the following month. The results
of the previous 6 months are settled in the half-yearly reckoning. The
"business condition" in the report is the result of the "first half-yearly
reckoning." By so doing, the procedure is followed and the concept clear,
and it will be easy to correct the errors and formulate new plans.
What was covered in report No 1 will not be repeated. Since our meeting on
1 August last year at Ch'u-i Elementary School, our signing of the lease of
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a part of the Hsiang-ya Medical School buildings on Ch'ao-tsung Street on
20 August, the start of business on 9 September, and the first council meet-
ing on 22 October, the events of the bookstore worthy of recording are brief-
ly as'follows:
1. Special council meeting, 29 December: The meeting was attended by Ho
Shou-ch'ien, Wang Chi-fan, Chou Tun-yuan, Kuo T'ao-seng, P'eng Yin-po,
Hsiung Chin-ting, Chao Yun-wen, Liu Yu-chieh, and Mao Jun-chin, and the
problems of "finding another location" and "raising additional funds" were
discussed. The problem of location was discussed first. As the current
location was stuck in a corner of Ts'ao-ch'ao-men and the space inadequate,
for the purpose of developing business, it was decided that the bookstore
must be moved to a more centralized location with more space. However,
caution was required, and we wanted to move once and for all only. Before
finding an appropriate spot and making definite arrangements, we would re-
main where we were. As the day before the meeting Ch'-uan-shan Academy prom-
ised to loan a part of its buildings to the bookstore, everyone felt it would
be a good move. However, there must be a clear contract, in accordance with
the goal of "safe progress." It was finally decided that the bookstore would
negotiate further with Ch'uan-shan. The next problem was funds. The first
council meeting decided that 1,000 yuan should be raised this'year, and we
were still 530 yuan short. Everyone felt that it was not practical to raise
money piecemeal. X X X volunteered to raise the 530 yuan by himself. The
meeting was adjourned.
2. Contracts with the Commercial. Press and other bookstores: These hap-
pened after January this year. Prior to. that, we had contracted to market
publications with out-of-town bookstores such as Chung-hua, Ya-tung, T'ai-
tung, New Youth Press, Peking University Publication Department, and the
Academic Lecture Association. By January this year, we entered an agree-
ment with the Shanghai Commercial Press through Yang Tuan-liu to distribute
its publications. at 10, 20, and 30 percent discounts. In February, we
succeeded in our negotiations to market for the Shanghai Evans Publishing
House, but it handles mostly Western language books and very few Chinese
books.. Hunan did not need much Western language books; therefore, we could
not sell much. In March, Hsin-chih Bookstore was formed in Peking, which
was a new bookstore with roughly the same policy as Wen-hua Bookstore. It
discussed distribution with us, and we promised to do so. Hua-yang Books
and Newspaper Circulation Office asked us to market its remaining stock of
books in Szechwan, and the Asia Civilization Association in Peking entrusted
us with its "Current Affairs Monthly," a new publication since its reorgani-
zation, and we promised both of them. In addition, many new magazine pub-
lishers negotiated with us to serve as their distributors during this period.
3. Marketing of publications: We sold over 160 kinds of books, over 40
kinds of magazines, and 3 newspapers. Since the start of business last
year to the end of March this year, besides the 1-month winter vacation,
business was good. The demand always exceeded the supply. On the one hand,
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as our store was short of capital and could not buy in large quantities from
outside areas, the small quantities were exhausted upon their arrival. On
the other hand, it was the sudden upsurge of demand for new publications by
society, resulting from the positive stimulation of the new thinking and
the negative stimulation of the old thinking. A sudden rise of interest
made the public buy all they could. It was an encouraging situation. While
most of the customers belonged to the academic world, many pamphlets of the
"labor field" were sold to the laborers. Age-wise, naturally most of the
customers were young people, and the middle-aged adults came next.
4. Forming branches: As we want the new books to be accessible to the peo-
ple in all the counties, we must set up branches in all the 75 counties.
We will not handle the task ourselves, but will help the comrades in the
counties to set up the branches. Those unfamiliar with the conditions of
our bookstore may feel that it will be difficult to do so, but actually it
is easy. One only needs sufficient capital for the first and second batches
of books, as little as 50 yuan or as much as 100 yuan. Proceeds from selling
the first and second batches will be sufficient for the third, and so on.
Next, if the business in the counties is good, there is no problem. If
not, it is not important either. The branches are always established in
public places and require no independent front; therefore, the overhead is
not much. In out-of-the-way counties and towns, an annual sale of tens of
yuan, or even down to a few yuan, will not matter. Third, our bookstore
will only charge the cost to the branches. All preferential prices and
discounts are credited to the branches. Therefore, if the branches cannot
make a profit due to lack of business, they will not suffer a loss either.
Fourth, as a supplementary operation, the branches will not require many
personnel. Fifth, the unsold stock may be returned to us. There will be no
waste resulting from unsaleability. With these five advantages, we maintain
the opening a branch is "easy." By the end of March this year, we already
formed seven branches, i.e., P'ing-chiang, Liu-hsi, Wu-kang, Pao-ch'ing,
Heng-yang, Ning-hsiang, and Shu-p'u., Besides the branch stores, there are
seven "sales departments." What are the differences between the branch
stores and the sales departments? First, a branch store will receive the
entire discount, whatever the main store gets, while the sales department
receives less, only 5 percent. Next, the branches are located in other
counties, while the sales departments are located in the schools in the
city or operated by individuals. (Preferential prices are given to in-
dividuals selling pamphlets to ordinary people and those in the field of
labor)....
o"Hunan Historical Data" (quarterly) No 3, 1959 (excerpts), Hunan People's
Publishing House, 28 September 1959
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INAUGURAL STATEMENT OF TSU-HSIU UNIVERSITY, HUNAN
August 1921
[Text] The Hunanese have recently inaugurated Self-Study University whose
approach is to assume the form of the seminary of old, but adopt a study
program of modern school. It expects all students to study by themselves
and do research together. In China today when "university mania" seems to
be the order of the day, this is probably the most practical educational
institution. It has recently issued a statement setting forth its inaugural
purposes:
Man cannot but study. To study requires a place and an organization. Form-
erly, the place for study was the seminary. When the school is introduced
upon the abolition of the seminary, people vie to criticize the latter and
praise the former. In fact, both have merits and demerits. The demerits
of the seminary lie in the emptiness of its program on how to write "eight-
legged" literature for acquiring positions in government. As such litera-
ture is a mere passtime, how can it be called real learning? From this
point of view, we can say the seminary is empty. But it also has its merits.
If we want to find such merits, we must first know the demerits of school.
The school indeed has many virtues, but it also has many weaknesses. Its
first weakness is lack of affection between instructors and students. The
instructor aims at salary and the student aims at a diploma. After they
have made their deal, they return to where they come from. What they call
"teaching" and "learning" are but commercial transactions. Its second
weakness is to waste the student's precious time by using stereotyped
pedagogical and administrative methods. Man's intelligence, talent and
comprehension vary, but the school, neglecting these differences, tries to
cram the same material into the student's mind. To respect human dignity,
nobody should be "administered" by others. Yet the school, taking advan-
tage of the residual power of the totalitarian emperor, looks down upon
the personality of the student and openly "administers" the student. Since
there is the stereotyped professor, the. student loses his integral human
nature; since there is the mechanical "administration," the student loses
his integral personality. This is the biggest defect of the school which
should not be neglected by educators. Its third weakness is heavy curricula
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with a great variety of courses. The student has to attend classes all day
long and knows nothing else. He often becomes puzzled and can hardly use
his mind to initiate his own research. To sum up, although it cannot be
said that all schools have these defects, that.they cannot be corrected,
and that there is no room for future improvement, this picture is generally
true. It cannot be whitewashed if one wants to. The root cause lies in
the passiveness of the student. His character has been eroded, his wisdom
obliterated, and he. is to sink or swim cowardly with the rest of the world.
Even the talented will not take the initiative. Now look at the seminary.
Although it has defects in form, it has none of the aforementioned weaknesses.
In the first place, there is profound affection between instructors and
students; secondly, there is no "administration" by professors but free re-
search for exchange. of ideas; thirdly, the curricula are concise and research
thorough and there is plenty of time for acquiring research findings. From
the viewpoint of "research form," the seminary far excels the school. But
the modern school has one strong point, that is, it either has a "research
program" based on science or uses scientific methods to study philosophy or
literature. The seminary lags behind the school in this regard. The reason
the Self-Study University becomes a new institution lies in that it assumes
the form of the seminary of old but adopts the program of the modern school
and that it is a special organization that suits the human nature and facil-
itates research.
The above shows that both the seminary and school have merits and demerits.
The Self-Study University will retain the virtues and reject the weaknesses.
Now let us talk about the exclusive merits of the Self-Study University
which happen to be the demerits of the seminary and school: popularism and
anti-popularism. Both literary academy and government university have strict
requirements. Those who are unable to meet these requirements are, of course,
rejected. Even those who can normally meet these requirements but fail to
do so in a particular case, that is, those who have the talent but fail to
pass the entrance examination are turned down and thus barred from pursuing
their advanced studies. It is a great pity that, at the moment, many prom-
ising young people are deprived of the opportunity to attend school. This
is the first point I wish to make. Both the seminary and government spon-
sored university treat learning as such a secret that only a few people
with special privileges can attend school; the majority of common people
could not share the opportunity. Thus learning became the monopoly of a
few "academic lords" and was kept at a farther and farther distance from
the common people. It was finally turned into a weird instrument for the
intelligentsia to control the common people. The above is the second point
I wish to make. Poor people cannot enter the seminary. Only rich people
can enter the university. To get a diploma from a government sponsored
university requires somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 yuan. For poor people
to enter a government sponsored university is as difficult as it is "for
a wildcat to eat swan's meat." The above is the third point. The Self-
Study University will correct these defects. First, except for resident
students upon whom certain limitations have to be imposed concerning
housing arrangements, others who are interested in learning may be admitted.
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Second, it regards learning as something analogous to tea or meals which
can be taken whenever people feel thirsty or hungry. The secrecy of learn-
ing is thus torn down. Learning is now made available to all and everybody
can have his share. Third, although in the present era when "money is life,"
the Self-Study University cannot yet provide everybody of the proletariat
with an opportunity to pursue advanced studies, it is moving toward the goal
that "learning does not necessarily require a great deal. of money." Students
of the Self-Study University may study in school, at home, in various shops
groups or agencies. It is more convenient than government sponsored uni-
vesities and therefore less expensive.
As I have already mentioned, the Self-Study University is a sort of popular
university, then what is its program? First, the main approach of the stu-
dents of the Self-Study University is "to study and think by oneself." The
"library" at the university is designed for this purpose. Second, the. stu-
dents at the university, aside from studying and thinking by themselves,
"discuss and do research together." The organization of various research
societies is designed for this purpose. Third, the Self-Study University
does not require instructors to cram everything into the student's'mind as
if forcing food down the student's throat. However, it needs those who
can help guide the students in doing their research. Fourth, the Self-
Study University is based on course study. The students may take one or
more courses. The time and scope of each course vary with the wish and
level of the student. Fifth, students at the Self-Study University should
not only study but also be ambitious. They are encouraged to cultivate a
good personality, discard bad habits and prepare to reform the society.
Finally, we will talk about the necessity of establishing the Self-Study
University in Hunan. Gentlemen' Isn't it that as of today there has been
no institution of higher learning in Hunan? It is well known that there
is no possibility for the establishment of a provincial university in the
near future. Even if there is, it will be a 'government sponsored university.
Then how to demonstrate or disseminate the spiritual urge and cultural im-
pulse of the 30 million Hunanese who live along the valleys of the Hsiang,
Yuan Tzu, and Li rivers? Although the Hunanese are as active as the rising
sun and very promising, what will become of them if their spiritual desires
and cultural impulse cannot be satisfied? At this point, we feel the
Hunanese have a big mission to accomplish. What is the mission? It is to
form, develop and mold their individual as well as their group character and
personality. This has been the very raison d'etre for the inception. of the
Self-Study University. Although it is, in fact, not possible to link the
university to every Hunanese, it should, in spirit, become a public insti-
tution of learning for the whole Hunanese society. Although it is difficult
to ensure good results, we are sure that with our unswerving efforts we
will some day attain our goals as time rolls by.
The university now has two divisions: letters and laws. Courses of letters
include: Chinese literature, Western literature, English, logic, psychology,
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ethics, education, sociology, history, geography, journalism and philosophy,
etc. Courses of laws include: laws, politics and economics, etc. The
above are listed in the organic framework of the university. It is released
simultaneously with this statement.
?iTung-Fang Cha-Chih," Vol 20, No 6. The Commercial Press, Shanghai.
I Mar 1923
7455
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INAUGURAL STATEMENT OF 'HSIN-SHIH-TAI'
10 April 1923
[Text] This journal, founded by colleagues of the Hunan Self-Study Uni-
versity, can be taken as an organ to publish findings of their research.
This journal is different from other school journals which accept all sorts
of articles as if they were "groceries of words." This journal has certain
principles and purposes. We all have an independent and enterprising spirit
and unswerving determination. In view of the bad social system and inade-
quate educational institution, we pool our efforts to organize and establish
this "fugitive state of learning," to try to acquire practical knowledge,
and to prepare to carry out social reforms. At the initial stage of Self-
Study University, the value of our ideals has to be tested and the results
are not yet known. However, we believe our goals are correct. Based on
this spirit and determination, there is ample chance for success. This
journal can be a yardstick for experimentation.
The inception of this journal is of great significance. It is expected
that this journal will make a thorough study and present concrete sugges-
tions to those issues such as how to reform the government, how to clean
up political practices, how to topple imperialism, how to overthrow the
warlords, how to renovate educational institutions and how to revolutionize
and renovate arts, literature and other branches of learning. It is our
sincere and earnest hope that this journal will urge those who. have the
same ideals to study and implement these social reforms.
?WU-SSU SHIH-CHI CHI-KAN CHIEN-SHAO (Introduction to Periodicals of the
May 4 Period) Vol 2, People's Press, April 1959
16HSIN-SHIH-TAI (New Era) No 1, published by Hunan Self-Study University,
10 April 1923
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PEKING COUP D'ETAT AND MERCHANTS
11 July 1923
[Text] This coup d'etat suddenly aroused the political interest of the
merchants who used to be apathetic to politics. What happy news: The
General Federation of Business Circles of All Streets in Shanghai issued
a declaration on 14 June urging the convocation of a national assembly to
solve national issues. The General Chamber of Commerce, in accordance
with a resolution adopted by a plenary session, made a declaration on
23 June which read in.part:
"It is hereby solemnly declared that from the fourteenth of this month,
our nationals will refuse to recognize that the internal and external
activities of Tsao K'un [2580 6924], Kao Ling-wei [7559 0407 5588] and
others who seized government power illegally represent the nation. Aside
from sending telegrams to military and civil leaders in all provinces,
urging them to maintain law and order under their jurisdiction to maintain
the status quo, it is hereby requested that all matters pertaining to re-
habilitation and reconstruction be solved in consultation with the people
of the whole nation."
Meanwhile, the General Chamber of Commerce resolved not to recognize the
National Assembly which "cannot represent the people." It created a Rule-
by-People Committee as an organization to actively solve national issues.
This move by the General Federation of Business Circles of All Streets in
Shanghai and the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce constitutes the first
step of merchants to participate in political activities and a manifesta-
tion of the potential of merchants as can be explained in a Chinese saying:
"their shout, after 3 years of silence, surprises all."
The current political issue in China is none other than the single question
of national revolution: to topple, by our own efforts, the warlords and
foreign imperialists which colluded with warlords. This is the historical
mission of the Chinese nationals which should be borne by the whole people:
Merchants, workers, peasants, students and faculty and staff should all
come forward and share part of the revolutionary work. Due to historical
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inevitability and current circumstances, the role of merchants in national
revolution is more urgent and important than that of others. As we know,
semi-colonial China is under the dual political pressure of warlords and
foreign imperialists who colluded with each other to suppress the people
of the whole nation. Under such dual pressure, the whole nation has suf-
fered a great deal. It is, however, the merchants who are most sensitive
to such pressure and suffer the most. It is well known that "likin" and
tariffs are two vital items to merchants. Their urgent requests are to
abolish the likin and increase the tariff both of which are closely related
to their interests. But they are difficult to accomplish because abolition
of likin impairs the interests. of warlords and increase of tariffs impairs
the interests of foreign imperialists. If likin is abolished, warlords
will wither while merchants will prosper. At that time, merchants can
overthrow warlords merely by "issuing a call." This is tantamount to lift-
ing a stone just to hit one's own feet. Clever warlords will not do this.
If tariffs on foreign goods are increased, or the tariff agreement is abol-
ished so as to let China work out protective tariffs at will, the shackles
on Chinese merchants will be removed. Then the development of domestic in-
dustry and commerce will be accelerated in no time and foreign goods will
loose their footholds in China. Cunning foreign imperialists will not do
this. Therefore, abolition of likin and increase of tariffs are matters
of a life-and-death nature to foreign imperialists and omestic warlords.
This cannot be done by a funny directive by Li Yuan-hung [7812 0337 3163]
at his inauguration. Take another example. The textile merchants in
Shanghai recently requested the government to issue textile bonds which
were undermined by Tsao, Jui [2580 6904] and Chin Yun-peng [7246 7189 7720].
Their request for a government ban on exporting cotton was frustrated by
the foreign minister corps. This further proves that foreign imperialists
and warlords cannot coexist with merchants. These frustrations were per-
sonally experienced by such influential merchants as Mu Ou-chai [4476 5665
7872] and others who attended the plenary meeting of Shanghai General Chamber
of Commerce on the 23rd of last month.
Merchants always "love peace." They do not realize that political reforms
need revolution and that these reforms cannot be accomplished by a few
telegrams concerning "disarmament, constitution and financing." Nor do
they realize that the real strength of revolution can be mustered only by
personal participation, organizing the whole nation and launching a mass
movement. They even had the thought that political reforms did not need
a political party and considered the revolutionary efforts made by the
Kuomintang were unnecessary. If we compare the current situation with
their childish and timid mentality in the past, couldn't we help laughing?
In the past, some merchants who had blind faith in the United States held
that the United States was a good friend of China; but they did not realize
that it was the first-rate executioner. Let us examine a few examples to
show why those who had blind faith in the United States are wrong: The
United States secretly helped Tsao Kun, who are opposed by both merchants
and the whole nation, to seize political power; it did its utmost to foil
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the cotton export ban requested by merchants. From the activities taken
by Shanghai merchants in the coup we may find that their attitude has
changed. They have made great progress; abandoning a peaceful approach
adopting revolutionary methods and having the courage to participate in
national affairs. As for their hatred for the U.S, scheme to make inroads
in China, the notorious label of "Chinese merchants are xenophiles" can at
least be partly erased by the following telegram sent by the Shanghai
General Chamber of Commerce and Bankers Federation to the American Chamber
of Commerce and the Association of Overseas Americans accusing the latter
of "taking advantage of our struggle for rule-by-people movement to intimate
that the best policy is for China to be placed under international control,
fraudulously asserting that they have obtained the consent of the Chinese
Chamber of Commerce and banking circles in making such a proposal to the
government."
The merchants in Shanghai have stood up and taken action. We hope that
merchants elsewhere will also stand up and take action.in unison. It is
urgent as fire burning near eyebrows which does not allow us to lie idly
on the bed. Now it is high time to unite the whole nation to carry out
revolution and not to allow merchants to have factions. It must be made
clear that foreign imperialists and warlords are the common enemies of
merchants as well as the whole nation, and that the results of a success-
ful revolution will be our common benefits. It is most necessary to unite
and struggle against common enemies and for common benefits. We hope the
merchants in Tientsin and Peking will not be taken in by Tsao Jui and other
"bureaucratic capitalists," and the merchants in Hankow will not capitulate
to Wu Pei-fu. They will rise and join the merchants in Shanghai to take
joint revolutionary action. The more the merchants unite, the stronger
they will be; the greater their role in leading the nation, the more chances
for the revolution to succeed.
Finally, we must warn the merchants: First, revolution is not an easy task.
It proves more difficult in China which has been under the dual pressure of
foreign imperialists and warlords. The only way for the revolution to suc-
ceed is to call upon merchants, workers, peasants, students, faculty and
staff and all oppressed people to establish a united front. Meanwhile, we
must implement the declaration of General Chamber of Commerce to solve
national issues "in conjunction with the whole nation" and not to fall into
the rut of Federation of Teachers and Merchants which rejected the partici-
pation of workers. Second, now that merchants have taken the first step
toward revolution, they must take the second step immediately. They must
insist on convening a national assembly for solving national issues. They
must move forward in unison until their goal is attained. They should not
stop whenever there is an obstacle or move along the erroneous road of col-
luding with foreign imperialists and warlords. We must have the conviction
that national revolution is the only way to save ourselves as well as our
nation. Many instances in history can be our reference or guide. Our situa-
tion urges us to carry out the historical mission. We should not relax
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our efforts; We must use revolutionary methods to open up a new era and
create a new nation! We should never forget this is the historical mission
of the Chinese nation!
?HSIANG-TAO CHOU-PAO, Nos 31, 32 combined. Hsiang-Tao Chou-Pao Press,
11 July 1923
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.'SHENG-HSIEN-CHING' AND CHAO HENG-T'I
15 August 1923
[Text] "...Since the outbreak of the West Hunan issue, Chao's position
has become precarious and cannot but use the Sheng Hsien (Provincial Con-
stitution) as a shield to protect himself. Several days ago, he ordered
his cohorts Fang Ko-kang [2455 0344 0474] and Li Chi-min [2621 3444 3046]
and others to use cash bribery to buy over civic organizations or to launch
a mass campaign... attempting to support Chao by means of Provincial Consti-
tution.... A parade has been scheduled at 8 am on the fifth.... Most of
their letters were sent to workers organizations. They assumed that as
workers are simple-minded, more than 1,000 would come. But up to 10 am,
not a single workers body showed up. Highly disturbed, they sent out people
all over: to Chinese Workers Union, Care and Relief Association, Buddhist
Speakers Group, etc., which were dominated by the bandits. Each person was
given half a yuan and a snack. More than 100 were hired. The parade started
at noon. Before the parade was begun, between 120 and 130 monks and beggars
held a meeting in front of the slide showing.room of the Association of Edu-
cation.
(1) The meeting was chaired by Monk Che-pei [3589 1014] who explained the
purpose of the meeting in part: 'Provincial Constitution shall better be
called Sheng-Hsien-Ching [4164 4009 4842] just as the Buddhists have the
Buddhist Bible....' All the monks and beggars attending the meeting wildly
waved their hands.
(2) The parade immediately followed the meeting. Two large flags in the
front--one bearing the words "The Association to Protect the Provincial
Constitution" and the other, 'Provincial Citizens Petition Rally.'
The First Detachment--About 20 or 30 people wearing robes and jackets,
pretending to be representatives of citizens of the province;
The Second Detachment--About five or six people representing the Chinese
Workers Union;
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The Third Detachment--About 40 or 50 people representing the Buddhist
Speakers Group with bald heads and wearing Buddhist robes;
The Fourth Detachment-About 40 people representing the Care and Relief
Association;
A medley gathering...a farce, and the funniest...." (see MIN-KUO JIH-PAO)
We have been opposing the Confederation of Provincial Self-Government be-
cause it is not as what the name suggests but a confederation of military
governors who desire to control their separate domains in that name. We
have been opposing the phoney Provincial Constitution manipulated by war-
lords and dirty politicians because it cannot protect the people but serve
as a pretext for power struggles among warlords and dirty politicians.
Hunan serves as a good example. Chao Heng-t'i [6392 1854 1912] now un-
ashamedly launched a "crusade to protect Provincial Constitution." But
for the last two years--since the establishment of Provincial Constitution--
he coldbloodedly murdered the workers (Huang Lung [7806 1690] and others),
clamped down on newspapers (TA-KUNG-PAO, CHIH-CHIH HSIN-PAO, HSIN-HSIANG-
PAO), deprived the people of freedom of correspondence (postal and telegram
censorship has never ceased for a single day), deprived the people of free-
dom of assembly and association (shut down Ricksha Pullers Union, Rice
Millers Union, Association To Back Up the Nation's Foreign Policy, and re-
peatedly banned students and workers meetings), protected the planting and
peddling of opium by his troops, bought votes through bribery (sent subor-
dinates to stuff voting boxes with false ballots in the general ballot on
Provincial Constitution and used cash bribery to create the new Provincial
Assembly and a provincial governor), extorted contributions from the mer-
chants (president of the Changsha General Chamber of Commerce was forced
to flee), collected land rentals from the peasants in advance (some up to
1928), upset the legal budget proportion by reducing the educational portion
and increasing the military portion), and colluded with Wu Pei-fu and Hsiao
Yao-nan [5618 5609 0589]. All these show that Chao, who used Provincial
Constitution as a mask, is in fact a public enemy of the people. The real
purpose for. him to hold rallies and conduct campaigns this time stems from
his fight for the opium tax (the so-called special tax) with Tsai Chu-yu
[5591 6880 3731]. The Hunanese cannot but feel ashamed to allow such a
diabolical criminal as Chao Heng-t'i to harp on "protecting Constitution"
under false pretext.
0HSIANG-TAO CHOU-PAO, No 36, Hsiang-Tao Chou-Pao Press, 15 August 1923
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29 August 1923
[Text] We are now forced to sign an agreement on the Wei-hai-wei negotia-
tions. The whole nation, except the people in Shantung, has not raised any
protest. What is the reason? Is it that the nation is too preoccupied in
the campaign for retroceding Port Arthur and Dairen and forgets the drive
for returning Wei-hai-wei? Or that the nation knows to hate only Japan but
not England, only that Japanese imperialists are making inroads in China
but not that the inroads made by British imperialists are far more severe
than those made by Japanese imperialists.
Two officials responsible for the Wei-hai-wei negotiations: one is Liang
Ju-hao [3009 1172 3185], and the other Ch'en Shao-t'ang [7115 4801 0781].
According to the announcement made by Ch'en Shao-t'ang at the Shantung
Residents Society in Peking, Mr Liang committed the following crimes:
"Commissioner Liang, who is a zenophile, made a suggestion to the British
to retain Liu-kung-tao [0491 0361 1497]. The return of Wei-hai-wei is
vital from the military point of view. Mr Liang is willing to sell out
national interests, transforming unconditional retrocession into continued
lease and again into permanent lease. This obviously stems from an exchange
for his personal interests.... Mr Liang is resentful of my frustrating his
scheme. He has, at the outset, asked somebody to buy my acquiescence with
promises of profits, stating that all my personal expenses can be reim-
bursed through him and that I may share the spoils upon conclusion of the
negotiations. After having repeatedly rejected the offer, I insisted that
the negotiations be made public. Noting that I cannot be moved by promises
of profits, he resorted to coercion. When our arguments came to an impasse,
he would often pound the desk and shout: "It is I who have full power to
conduct negotiations." Then he would order his guards to see me to the
door. I was greatly enraged and wanted to kill myself for national inter-
ests. One day, I picked up an inkstand and tried to hit my forehead with
it. Upon seeing this, an Englishman was greatly astonished and persuaded
me not to do so. Mr Liang was not moved at all...."
The draft agreement concluded by Liang Ju-hao and the British consists of
two parts and 23 articles. On 23 August the National Assembly in Tsinan
pointed out its salient terms that impair national interests as follows:
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(1) Substitute leasing for ceding--The draft agreement allows England to
continue the lease for 10 years. It may extend the lease at the end of 10
years. In addition, the lease adds to the new lease the city of Wei-hai-wei
which hasnever been leased to England and is now designated as a special area.
(2) Impairs territorial land and territorial waters--The draft agreement
stipulates: (a) The local authority of China should grant original British
lease holders licenses of "permanent lease"; (b) no handling fees should
be charged in accordance with the common practice by foreigners who hold
permanent leases; and (c) China should not use the official land reserved
for England; China should recognize the land leased by England. This re-
veals how much territorial rights has been yielded. The draft agreement
further stipulates: (a) China may use the anchorage in the Liu-kung-tao
waters only when the British navy is not using it; (b) the British navy
may send marines to Liu-kung-tao and practice drills and marksmanship; and
(c) The British navy may practice drills in the outer harbor of the anchor-
age of Liu-kung-tao. According to the provisions, England is to occupy Liu-
kung-tao and the adjacent waters and its marine and naval detachments may
enter and leave our territorial land and waters at will.
(3) Gives away national sovereignty--The draft agreement stipulates that
the area between Liu-kung-tao and Wei-hai-wei be designated as a specail
area. It should belong to neither Shantung authority nor the Central Govern-
ment. Our government may nominally appoint administrative officials, but
the police is directed by the British, finance controlled by the Customs
Inspectorate (British) and the city affairs is jointly conducted by a Sino-
British Committee composed of Chinese and Englishmen. The administrative
officials appointed by the Chinese Government are but titular ones and
their chief responsibilities are to repay the debts to the Englishmen and
raise funds for public expenses. Wei-hai-wei has thus become Hong Kong II.
Our national sovereignty has completely been undermined.
Compatriots having blind faith in the Washington. Conference: What did the
Washington Conference do for us? Compatriots believing England is better
than Japan: In what way is England better than Japan? The return of Wei-
hai-wei means only to turn it into Hong Kong II. England wants to renew
the lease of its settlements in Hankow and Tientsin upon the expiration of
their present leases; its request of connecting the Canton-Kowloon Railroad
and the Canton-Hankow Railroad is to put the upper reaches of the Yangtze
River and southwest provinces under the economic aggression of Hong Kong.
The tariff agreement is limited to discussing.the likin issue only (26
August London dispatch). They have recently removed their masks to suggest
joint administration of the railroads. Compatriots having blind faith in
the Washington Conference and believing England is better than Japan: What
did the Washington Conference do for us? In what way is England better
than Japan? The nation should rise immediately to oppose the pirate-like
British who have exposed their aggressive intention:
The nation should rise immediately to oppose traitor Liang Ju-hao!
?HSIANG-TAO CHOU-PAO, No 38, Hsiang-tao Chou-pao Press, 29 August 1923
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29 August 1923
[Text] We often say: The Chinese government is the bookkeeper of foreign-
ers. Some people may doubt it. Do we often say: Foreigners (especially
the British and Americans) try to squeeze more Chinese blood in the name of
"goodwill"? Some people may also doubt it. Since the lifting of the cotton
export ban due to objection by foreigners, some people have begun to believe
there is some truth in it. Now that foreigners are pressing the government
to abolish the cigarette tax in Chekiang and other provinces, they have be-
gun to believe there is more and more truth in it. According to a 29 August
dispatch from Peking in the SHEN PAO [3947 1032] which read: "The Cabinet
has, as a result of the protest by British and American ministers, resolved
to order all provinces to stop collecting the cigarette tax." What is the
cigarette tax? Please read the 30 June telegram sent by the General Chamber
of Commerce in Hangchow to the Peking government:
"It is a common practice for governments to levy taxes on luxury items. In
recent years, cigarettes have had a field day. For Chekiang Province alone,
the annual sales volume exceeds 10 million yuan. The consumption volume is
shocking and the poisonous effects are as detrimental as opium. The auth-
orities have therefore established bureaus to collect the cigarette tax,
trying to use revenues from this wasteful item for repairing roads. It is
learned that foreigners, under the pretexts of treaty rights, have made
repeated protests with the government against this tax. It should be pointed
out that this special tax, imposed exclusively on the smokers, has nothing
to do with the cigarette merchants. This is the tax paid exclusively by
people in Chekiang, foreigners should not interfere with it. Moreover, it
is purely a domestic matter, and foreigners should not interfere. The
government is urged to present all possible justifications and allow no
pretexts so as to protect our sovereign rights."
It is thus clear that the British and Americans, taking advantage of tariff
agreements, are trying to force China not to levy taxes freely on imported
luxury items. They disregard whether it is "the tax purely paid by people
in Chekiang" or it is "purely domestic matter." They insist that no
tax should be imposed on imported goods.
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Of the cigarettes produced by British and American companies, a small por-
tion is imported from England, the United States and Japan, the greater
portion is manufactured in factories in inland China in such cities as
Shanghai and Hankow, using Chinese tobacco leaves and Chinese labor. After
paying a nominal tax in accordance with the terms of the "agreements," the
merchants send the cigarettes in bulk to various provinces, not allowing
China to levy taxes "freely." The annual cigarette sales volume in Chekiang
Province alone exceeds 10 million yuan. Based on this figure, the total
annual cigarette sales volume in the whole nation should at least exceed
200 million yuan. It is really "shocking." Let the 400 million compatriots
think it over: What is the real purpose behind the "goodwill" of foreigners?
The "Cabinet meeting" of the Chinese government is really quick in yielding.
Even the fart of foreigners can be taken as "fragrance." The Cabinet meeting
lifts the cotton export ban because foreigners want cotton; it orders "all
provinces to stop collecting the cigarette tax" because foreigners want to
import cigarettes. Let the 400 million compatriots again think it over:
Isn't it correct to say that the Chinese government is the bookkeeper of
foreigners?
?HSIANG-TAO CHOU-PAO, No 38, Hsiang-Tao Chou-Pao Press, 29 August 1923
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KUOMINTANG CENTRAL COMMITTEE REFUTES KUOMINTANG MEMBERS FOR CONVENING
ILLEGAL MEETING IN PEKING
27 November 1923
[Text] Telegram to Kuomintang Headquarters of All Levels
Members of Kuomintang Headquarters of All Levels: Upon receiving the
16 November telegram from Lin Sen [2651 2773] and other members of the
Central Executive Committee in Peking urging the convocation of the Fourth
CEC Plenary Session at the Western Hills, the Central Executive Committee
strongly refuted the move. From a legal point of view, since the Third
Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee resolved that the
National Congress and the CEC Plenary Session be convened in Canton, nobody
should violate the resolution. From a practical viewpoint, if the CEC
Plenary Session, which is intended to be a public meeting, should be held
in Peking, it would be under the pressure of imperialists externally and
obstruction of reactionaries through the warlords internally. This was the
reason for the participants in the Third CEC Plenary Session, held in
Peking in April, to stop the meeting mid-way and move southward and continue
to meet in Canton. Whenever we plan for the future, this bitter experience
should be remembered. How could the Fourth CEC Plenary Session fall into
the same rut and let warlords and reactionaries attain their scheme of under-
mining the revolution? Moreover, the Second National Congress was originally
scheduled for' 15 August in Canton, it was repeatedly postponed because of
strikes in Kwangtung and Hong Kong, transportation difficulties, campaigns
against reactionaries in Canton and incessant civil wars. Now all
Kwangtung Province has been unified and Canton is as safe as a rock. Even
if there is still some transportation difficulties, the meeting can be held.
The Central Executive Committee has therefore resolved to call its Fourth
Plenary Session on 11 December and the Second National Congress on New
Year's Day of the Fifteenth Year. It has sent telegrams to Comrade Lin
Sen and others, urging them to respect the resolution, take consideration
of the circumstances, come to Canton to attend the meeting immediately, not
to insist on their deviationist views and stir up trouble. Aside from
sending telegrams to Comrade Hu Han-min [5170 3352 3046] who is now in
Moscow and Comrades Li Lieh-chun [2621 3525 6874], Po Wen-wei [2672 2429
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5588] who now serve outside Peking for their concurrence, we wish to ex-
press our unanimous support to the resolution adopted by the Third Plenary
Session of the Central Executive Committee and the CEC's latest stand and
will do our utmost to put them into force. We hereby solemnly make this
declaration and solicit your support. Members of the Central Executive
Committee: Wang Chao-ming (3076 0340 6900], T'an Yen-kai [6223 1693 1956],
T'an P'ing-shan [6223 1627 1472], Lin Tsu-han [2651 4371 3211], Li Ta-chao
[2621 1129 6856], Yu Yu-jen [0060 0671 0084-], Yu Shu-te [0060 2885 1795],
Wang Fa-ch'in [3769 3127 0530], Ting,Wei-fen [0002 1919 3083], En-k'o-pa-
yuan [1869 0344 1572 0956]; Alternate CEC Members: Mao Tse-tung, Ch'u
Chiu-pai, Han Lin-fu [7281 7673 4569], Yu Fang-chou [0060 3455 5297], Chang
Kuo-t'ao. (27 November)
?CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO (Political Weekly) Vol 1. Canton Political Weekly
Press, 5 December 1925
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PROPAGANDA OUTLINE FOR KUOMINTANG'S WAR AGAINST FENG-T'IEN
[Text] In view of the fact that the'war against Feng-t'ien is a momentous
matter, that it forms a part of the national revolutionary movement against
British and Japanese imperialism, and that party units of all levels in all
areas should direct all the comrades to propagandize extensively so that
the people of the entire nation will understand the reason and the goal of
the war, the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Kuomintang Central Execu-
tive Committee has formulated a propaganda outline, analyzing the various
aspects of the war, presenting an outline of propaganda, and listing nine
slogans. This outline was submitted by Department Chief Mao Tse-tung, and
passed at the meeting of the Central Committee on 27 November.
(A) Analysis of the War Against Feng-t'ien
(1) In regard to imperialism: The war between Chih-li and Feng-t'ien last
year was an attempt of British and American imperialism to support the
Chih-li faction to unite China and oust Japanese imperialism. It was ig-
nited by the Kiangsu-Chekiang war, because American imperialism wished to
monopolize Kiangsu's wireless telegram loan and expel Japan's loan. There-
fore, at that time, America and the pro-America faction did their utmost
to help Ch'i Hsieh-yuan [7871 3610 0337] while Japan and the pro-Japan
faction supported Lu Yung-hsiang [4151 3057 4382]. The war against Feng-
t'ien this time is along the same line. Japanese imperialism stands behind
the Feng-t'ien faction while American imperialism backs the Chih-li faction.
As for British imperialism, seeing the incompetence of the Chih-li faction
in the Feng-t'ien-Chih-li war last year, when the nationwide anti-British
30 May Movement broke out, British imperialism compromised with Japan and
induced Chang Tso-lin [1728 0155 7207], by means of generous rewards, to
suppress the anti-British movement in Shanghai. It was subsequently rumored
that Britain supplied large sums of money to Feng-t'ien to expand the Feng-
t'ien Arsenal in order to enable the Feng-t'ien faction to unite China.
Feeling that Shanghai's military reinforcement handled by Yang Yu-t'ing
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[2799 1342 7200] and the customs conference held in Peking were favorable
to Chang of Feng-t'ien, the Chih-li faction started trouble on an early
date. Whether the cunning British imperialism is on the side of Feng-t'ien,
or Chih-li in the war this time cannot be clarified completely at this time.
Probably Japan, for the purpose of resisting America, would rather associate
with Britain and jointly make use of Chang Tso-lin. However, if Britain
should detect any unfavorable situation on the part of Chang Tso-lin and
the possibility of victory on the part of its old servant Wu P'ei-fu [0702
0160 1318], it may, for the purpose of consolidating its power sphere along
the Yangtze valley, abandon its new love for its old flame. It is something
which will not be surprising. One can see that British imperialism will
back the side which appears to be more certain of victory.
(2) In regard to the warlords: In the confrontation between Chih-li and
Feng-t'ien, the Chih-li faction controls Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, Anhwei,
Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien, a total of seven provinces. Szechwan's
Yuan Tsu-ming [5913 4371 6900] and Kweichow, which is under his control,
nominally also belong to the Chih-li faction. However, there are specific]
factions inside these several provinces, and Wu P'ei-fu and Sun Ch'uan-fang
[1327 0278 5364] will inevitably split. In the critical period of the war
against Feng-t'ien, Sun and Wu had to unite and fight. Now that the war is
at a standstill a fissure has appeared. A split will be inevitable once
Chang of Feng-t'ien is defeated. In the Feng-t'ien faction, there have
always been the old and the young factions. Since defeating the Chih-li
faction last year, their hidden internal struggles have been ever aggravat-
ing due to the distribution of rights and privileges. Their treasury is
exhausted, and the Feng-t'ien paper currency has dropped to below 50 percent.
The seizure of Hopeh, Shantung, Kiangsu, and Anhwei was for the purpose of
solving the financial problem. With the loss of Kiangsu and Anhwei, the
threat of the Kuomintang army, and the precarious situation of the Peking-
Hankow line in Shantung and Hopeh, their financial sources inside Shan-hai-
kuan have withered. When several hundred, thousand hungry troops are
stationed inside and outside Shan-hai-kuan, the situation requires early
war, not perseverance. Between the Feng-t'ien and Chih-li warlord factions,
regardless of which side wins, it.will be unfavorable to China, because each
has a vicious imperialism backing it. However, in the nation-wide anti-
Feng-t'ien movement, since the Chih-li faction is against the Feng-t'ien
faction, it has to be counted as one of us in order to resist the powerful
enemy together. Once Feng-t'ien collapses, it can then be wiped out with
the strength of the nation. This is a necessity in the war strategy.
(3) In regard to political factions: In the war against Feng-t'ien, the
noteworthy political factions are the An-fu, Study, Joint Control, and New
Diplomacy Factions, and the comprador class in Shanghai and Nan-t'ung.
The military power of the An-fu Faction can be considered as nil at this
time. In regard to its political power, it has long split into the pro-
Chih-li and pro-Feng-t'ien factions. As the pro-Chih-li faction is out of
power and the pro-Feng-t'ien faction is in power in Peking, the Peking
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government has become something completely representing Chang Tso-lin.
The Study Faction always followed Ts'ao [2580] and Wu [0702] when they
were in power. Though Ts'ao and Wu have failed, it still remains behind
Wu P'ei-fu. With the triumph of the Chih-li faction, the Study Faction's
Chiang Fang-chen [5592 2455 7201] and its members are swarming in Hankow
to acquire benefits. The Joint Control Faction consists of many small
political factions, including the I-yu Society of the Political Studies
Faction and the politicians of the so-called Kuomintang Comrades' Club such
as Chang Ping-lin [4545 3521 7792]. Currently, all its members are gathered
under the banner of Wu P'ei-fu and making plans for action. The Ku Wei-
chun [7357 4850 6874] faction, which is the so-called New Diplomacy Faction,
has always served as the traitorous agent between the Chih-li faction and
British and American imperialism. Currently, it is associated with the
Study Faction and the comprador class of Shanghai and Nan-t'ung, gathering
together under the banner of the Chih-li faction and vigorously pursuing its
traitorous activities. Last year, in the war against Chih-li, the comprador
class in Shanghai and Nan-t'ung, under the direction of American imperialism,
stood alongside the Chih-li faction. With the resumption of power by the
Chih-li faction, it has immediately followed the intent of its master
(American imperialism) to serve as a resounding echo of the Chih-li faction
and its effective support. Of the political factions discussed above, be-
sides the An-fu Faction which represents the interests of Japanese imperial-
ism and the bureaucrats and belongs to the Feng-t'ien faction, all the rest,
including the Joint Control Faction of the Study Faction representing the
interests of the bureaucrats and the landlord class, the New Diplomacy
Faction representing the interests of Britain and America, especially
America, and the comprador class of Shanghai and Nan-t'ung, stand on the
side of the Chih-li faction.
(4) In regard to the National Army: The National Army has no connections
with British, American, and Japanese imperialism; therefore, it is sympa-
thetic to the anti-imperialist movement. This is its most outstanding
characteristic. Currently, due to the necessity of strategy, it has not
split with Chang Tso-lin. Actually, it may even adopt a temporary compro-
mise. But it is a temporary matter. If our party wishes to make a long-
range substantial progress in the national revolution after the war against.
Feng-t'ien, the victory of the National Army in the North is one of the
important keys.
(4) In regard to the National Government: The foundation of our party in
Kwangtung is very stable. Hsiung K'o-wu's [3574 0344 2976] troops along
the Pei River have long been liquidated, and Ch'en Chiung-ming's [7115 3518
2494] troops along the Tung River have been.wiped out. Forces have. been
sent after the small contingents sneaking into the Fukien border, eliminat-
ing them. Teng Pen-yin's [6772 2609 3009] men in Nan-lu will soon be
eradicated. The unification of the entire area can be considered completed.
The attempt of British imperialism to destroy our party's revolutionary
force by associating with Ch'en Chiung-ming has failed altogether. In regard
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to the strikes in Canton and Hong Kong, the businessmen and government of
Hong Kong know that there is no way to resist and are now doing their best
to negotiate. A successful solution will soon be reached. The current
tasks of our party in Kwangtung are the training and reenforqement of the
revolutionary army, the renovation and rectification of civil administra-
tion, finance, judicature, and education, and the expansion of the mass
movements of workers, peasants, merchants, and students. In a word, we
must actively gather our strength within the shortest possible time, immed-
iately send our troops North when the situation in the North and the South
develops to a certain stage, and lead the people of the entire nation for
the thorough solution of the affairs of the nation. In the name of the
Central Executive Committee, our party has published a declaration on the
current situation and pointed out the goal of war against Feng-t'ien. We
have also, in the name of the National Government Committee, sent telegrams
to the top generals of the Chih-li and Feng-t'ien factions, urging them to
overthrow Feng-t'ien's Chang and organize a government and formulate policies
compatible with the will of the people, in order to test their reaction to
our party's principle of defending the interests of the people.
(6) In regard to the people: In the understanding of the people, the anti-
Feng-t'ien movement this time is a movement against the warlords of the
Feng-t'ien faction who support British and Japanese imperialism and sup-
press the patriotic movement. Therefore, the main force of the movement
against Feng-t'ien should be the revolutionary people of the entire nation.
By initiating the movement, the Chih-li faction only serves as the front-
runner, not the main forcp. Currently, the wrath of the people against
the Feng-t'ien warlords is unprecedented. Their concept that resisting
Feng-t'ien is resisting British and Japanese imperialism and victory over
Feng-t'ien is victory over Britain and Japan is the same as that of the
people of Kwangtung that punishing Ch'en Chiung-ming was attacking British
imperialism and victory of the eastern expedition was the victory of the
strikes. Therefore, the war against Feng-t'ien, in the understanding of
the people, is different from the wars between Hopeh and Anhwei and be-
tween Feng-t'ien and Hopeh.
(B) Our Propaganda and Preparation
The responsible comrades of party units of all levels in all areas must,
with organization and.planning, seek all kinds of opportunities to explain
to the comrades and propagandize to the people the following points:
(1) They must explain the conspiracies of the imperialists in this war.
(2) They must explain the grave dangers to the people in case of victory
of the Feng-t'ien warlords who serve as the running dogs of British and
Japanese imperialism.
(3) The people may temporarily utilize the resistance of the Chih-li fac-
tion.against the Feng-t'ien faction, but they must not permit it to take
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the place of the Feng-t'ien faction, because if so, the people will like-
wise be in grave danger. The people should not forget the lesson when the
Chih-li faction was in power. Special attention must be given to the propa-
ganda of this point in areas in the Yangtze provinces where Wu P'ei-fu and
Sun Ch'uan-fang are popular with the merchant class.
(4) All types of counter-revolutionary factions, such as the An-fu, Study,
Joint Control, and New Diplomacy Factions, and the comprador class are
absolutely incompatible with the people's interest. Their secrets must be
exposed and they must all be ousted.
(5) Among the anti-Feng-t'ien forces, the difference between the Feng Yu-
hsiang [7458 3768 4382] faction and the Wu P'ei-fu and Sun Ch'uan-fang
faction is that Feng has no connection with imperialism and he supports
the national revolution, while Wu and Sun are under the orders of imperial-
ism and resist the national revolution. The distinction between friend and
foe, as far as the people are concerned, depends on whether there is a re-
lationship with imperialism. Regardless of who and when, the moment such
a relationship arises, the people will not consider him as a friend.
(6) The true leader of the people is the Chinese Nationalist Party; the
true government of the people is the National Government in Canton; the
true army of the people is the National Revolutionary Army in Kwangtung.
The Nationalist Party, the National Government, and the National Revolu-
tionary Army are the vanguard against imperialism, the defenders of the
people's interest, and the comforters of the people in their suffering
(illustrated by Kwangtung's resistance to British imperialism and its
unification and active construction this time).
(7) All the oppressed people of China are the ones to decide on all the
problems of China. In the war against Feng-t'ien this time, the people
should serve as the commander in chief. The people must organize and take
charge of the great movement against Feng-t'ien.
(8) The four principles in the Nationalist Party's declaration on the cur-
rent situation are: 1. A united nation-wide national government must be
formed. 2. The national government must, as soon as possible, call a
preparatory meeting for a national congress. 3. The national government
must, as soon as possible, call a preparatory meeting for a national con-
gress and find the fundamental solution for the unequal treaties. 4. The
national government must defend the freedom of the people to speak, form
associations, and hold meetings. These four principles are the only way
to conclude the war. If they are not followed, then the situation of joint
control by imperialism and the warlords will remain even after the end of
the war, and the people will still face the same danger as before.
(9) To implement the principles of the Nationalist Party, a national con-
gress truly representing the people must be prepared as soon as possible.
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Among the many kinds of people's organizations, a renewed and general
propaganda of "the necessity of the national congress in solving national
affairs" should be promoted as a continuation of last year's propaganda.
When necessary, the party units of the provinces and special municipalities
should, within their jurisdictions, order a general mobilization and vigor-
ously propagandize the national congress, in order to arouse the attention
of the people.
(C) Slogans
(1) Down with Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Ch'i-jui [3008 4388 3843]:
(2) Down with British, American, and Japanese imperialism:
(3) Down with all conspiratorial political factions;
(4) The people must rise and direct the anti-Feng-t'ien movement:
(5) Let the national congress representing the people conclude the war
against Feng-t'ien;
(6) Form a united nationwide national government:
(7) Abolish unequal treaties;
(8) Freedom of meeting, association, speech, and strike:
(9) All revolutionary elements must immediately join the Nationalist Party:
?CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 1, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 5 December
1925
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REASONS FOR PUBLISHING 'CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO'
[Text] Why do we publish "CHENG-CHIN CHOU-PAO" ["Political Weekly"]?
It is for the revolution. Why do we want a revolution? It is to liberate
the nation of China, to realize control by the people, and to gain economic
happiness for the people.
For the revolution, we have offended all enemies--imperialism throughout
the world, large and small warlords throughout the nation, the comprador
class, local tyrants, and evil gentry of all areas, and all the reactionary
political factions such as the An-fu, Study, Joint Control, and Nationalist
[Kuo-chia Chu-i] Factions. These enemies, with the development of our revo-
lutionary force, are reenforcing their oppression and mobilizing all their
strength for the purpose of destroying us. They have foreign and domestic
navies, armies and police, large international progaganda machines (Reuter,
etc.), national newspapers, and schools. Though there are frequent con-
flicts among them due to differences in interest, none of them has a good
intent toward us.
After wiping out Yang [2799]. and Liu [0491] and eliminating Cheng [6774] and
Mo [5459], our work in Kwangtung has reached a new era. Canton city has
realized peace which was unseen in the past 14 years; the people have truly
gained the freedom to hold meetings, form associations, speak, and strike;
there has been no coercive conscription for the eastern expeditionary
forces; gambling has been abolished in Canton's market; military affairs and
political administration of the entire province have been unified; financial
administration is gradually centralized; a part of the harsh taxes harassing
the people has been abolished, and measures for eliminating the rest have
been decided on; policies of reform have been formulated for the civil
affairs, judicial, education, and communication organs; the counter-revolu-
tionary remnants of Pei River, Tung River, and Nan-lu are gradually elimin-
ated; strikes and large-scale blockade of Hong Kong are continued to support
the patriotic workers' movement. We do not hide our shortcomings. We do
not claim that Kwangtung has been reformed--Kwangtung's reform is just be-
ginning. There are still many bandits disrupting law and order; there are
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still many local tyrants, evil gentry, and corrupt officials preying on
the people; many behind-the-scene evil practices in the civil affairs,
finance, judicial, education, and communication organs have not been
eliminated. We do not-say that all the defects, no?,longer exist. We say
that we already have a revolutionary force; we already have an opportunity
to eliminate the bandits; we already can begin the overhauling of civil
affairs, finance, judicial, education, and communications organs. In sum,
we already have a foundation for revolution. In everything we do, we follow
Mr Sun Yat-sen's strategy, open and clear to the eyes of the public. Mean-
while, Hong Kong's British imperialism, the counter-revolutionary remnants
such as Ch'en Chiung-ming [7115 3518 2494] and Teng Pen-yin [6772 2609 3009],
and the numerous local tyrants, evil gentry, and corrupt officials cannot
but tremble. Angry and indignant, they go to the extreme to curse, slander,
and injure us. The counter-revolutionary propaganda organs in Peking,
Tientsin, Shanghai, and Hankow are in an uproar, and they stop at nothing
to curse, slander, and injure us with their evil mouth and poison tongue.
The people of the entire nation, especially those in the North and along
the Yangtze, are confused by them and completely isolated from the true
situation in Kwangtung. Suspicions arise even among the comrades.. Even
the unsuspicious elements have no factual basis to argue the case. Such
terms as "internal"squabble" and "communism" are spread everywhere, as if
Kwangtung had become hell itself.
We can no longer let it go. We must begin to counter-attack. "Propagan-
dize counter-attack to the counter-revolutionaries in order to break down
the counter-revolutionary propaganda." This is the mission of "Cheng-chih
Chou-pao."
We do not need. much argument in our counter-attack of the enemies; we only
need to report truthfully the facts of our revolutionary work. When the
enemies say "Kwangtung has turned communist," we say "Please look at the
facts." When they say "Kwangtung is squabbling internally," we say "Please
look at the facts." When they say "The Canton government associates with
Russia, yields power, and disgraces the nation," we say "Please look at
the facts." When they say "The people under the Canton government live
in misery," we say "Please look at the facts."
In the structure of "Cheng-chih Chou-pao," 90 percent are factual reports,
and only 10 percent are arguments against the propaganda of the counter-
revolutionaries.
Accept the truthful report of our revolutionary work; Arise, revolutionary
people of the entire nation:
?CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 1, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 5 December
1925
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THE 'THREE-THREE-THREE-ONE SYSTEM'
5 December 1925
[Text] "What is communism? Confiscation of property; no private savings
permitted; the rich and poor are both poor. A good term is coined. It is
called emphasis on agriculture. Three-three-three-one, actually it makes
no sense. Thirty percent to the landlord, 30 percent confiscated, 30
percent to oneself, and 10 percent for the association." This is the "anti-
communist" announcement in four-word rhymes posted by Yang K'un-ju [2799
0981 1172] inside and outside Hui-chou. A friend of a rather clear mind
newly arrived from Peking asked me: "Is there actually such a thing as
the 'three-three-three-one system'?" I was surprised. Before answering
him, I thought: "Do you suspect that the Kuomintang is practicing the
'three-three-three-one system'?" With an ironic expression, I answered:
"There is, but not like what Yang K'un-ju described." He said: "Isn't
the 'Hong Kong Morning News' a Kuomintang paper? It also published it."
Only then did I learn that the "Hong Kong Morning News" also had such odd
ideas. Before the revolt of Yang and Liu, the paper did have connections
with the Kuomintang.. After the revolt of Yang and Liu and the strikes in
Canton and Hong Kong, it was bought by Liu Chen-huan [0491 7201 1403] to
serve as an organ of Hong Kong's foreign excellencies and the so-called
Commander in Chief Ch'en [7115]. By taking advantage of the severance of
communication between Canton and Hong Kong, many "facts" have emerged in
the pages of the paper on the isolated island of Hong Kong. "Three-three-
three-one" was but one of the many "facts," yet it was delivered all the
way to Peking to feast the eyes of my Peking friend. I, therefore, thought
that, in regard to the things in the world today, whether animate (such as
man) or inanimate (such as a newspaper), we must not be too rigid in our
view, because, as "revolution" and "counter-revolution" had parted company,
the animate and inanimate things could belong to one side today and the
other side tomorrow. When the "Hong Kong Morning News" was with the
Kuomintang, it served as the organ paper of the Kuomintang. When bought
by Hong Kong's foreign excellency Mr Liu Chen-huan and the so-called Com-
mander in Chief Ch'en, it could only become their organ paper. Precisely
like Feng Tzu-yu [7458 5261 3945] and Ma Su [7456 4790], when they were
with the Kuomintang, they were Kuomintang party members. Once bought by
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Tuan Ch'i-jui [3008 4388 3843], though they still claimed to be members
of the Kuomintang and labeled themselves with the "Kuomintang Club," they
were Tuan Ch'i-jui's men. I hold no special grudge against the "Hong Kong
Morning News" or Messrs Feng and Ma; I only borrow this instance to warn
my friends inside and outside the country against being tricked when observ-
ing people and things. As for Yang K'un-ju's announcement, his composition
is fine, except for the phrase "it makes no sense," which spoiled his pen.
Isn't it that one pellet of mouse dropping spoils the whole pot of soup?
But, then it was the fault of the secretary.
?CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 1, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 5 December
1925
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YANG K'UN-JU'S NOTICE AND LIU CHIH-LU'S CABLE
[Text] We have already studied Yang K'un-ju's [2799 9081 1172] announce-
ment, but there is Liu Chih-lu's [0491 1807 7120] telegram to "Executive
Tuan [3008], Ministers and Vice-Ministers of the Ministries, Commissioner
Chang [1728] of Feng-t'ien, Governor Chao [6392] of Hunan, Commissioner
Hsiao [5618] of Wu-ch'ang, Superintendent Fang [2455] of Kiangsi, Superin-
tendent Chou [0719] of Fukien, and Messrs Ts'en Hsi-lin [1478 6007 2651],
Wu Tzu-yu [0702 1311 3768], K'ang Nan-hai [1660 0589 3189], and Liang Jen-
kung [2733 0117 0361]" which is slightly different. In his "seventh count
of the indictment," he states: "In the society. of China, agriculture has
always been emphasized. The interests of the landowner and the tenant
are always balanced. The spirit of mutual help makes them naturally com-
patible. Now, the inducement of the land division theory has undermined
the mutual benefit." This statement conflicts with Yang K'un-ju's announce-
ment. According to Yang K'un-ju, "30 percent to the landlord, 30 percent
confiscated, 30 percent to oneself, and 10 percent for the association."
So everyone gets something, and it can be called "mutual benefit." Yet
Liu Chih-lu says that it is "land division," indicating that the Canton
government tells the peasants to seize the land from the landlords and
divide it up, and the landlords will have no rent to collect thereafter.
Therefore, "mutual benefit'is undermined." One says that the landlord
still retains 30 percent, while the other says that he will have nothing
left. I wonder whom my friends in Peking and other areas believe.
?CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 1, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 5 December
1925
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IF THERE IS COMMON ASPIRATION FOR COMBATING COMMUNISM, THEN MY ENEMY'S
ENEMY IS MY GOOD FRIEND
[Text] After enumeration the eight counts against the National Government,
Liu Chih-lu [0491 1807 7120] and others, in their telegram, add an "Alas:"
paragraph and continue by stating: "In sum, when sending troops to quell
rebellions, punish the criminal, and save the people, if there is common
aspiration for combating communism, then my enemy's enemy is my good friend.
An army is strong when its cause is just. No combat is required to determine
the-outcome. Those with Heaven on their side will prosper, and the right
and wrong are not hard to distinguish." The titled addresses of Liu's
telegram, such as Executive Tuan [3008], the Ministers and Vice-Ministers
of the Ministries, Commissioners, Superintendents, and Governors Chang
[1728], Hsiao [5618], Chao [6392], Fang [2455], and Chou [0719], and Messrs
Ts'en [1478], Wu [0702], K'ang [1660], and Liang [2733], are naturally com-
rades with common aspirations to combat communism, but what about Governor
(Chin) of Hong Kong and Prime Minister Baldwin in London? Are they not also
comrades with common aspirations to combat communism? Yet their titles are
not listed. Furthermore, Governor Chin helped with such large amounts of
money and weapons and protected the commanding headquarters set up by Com-
mander in Chief Ch'en [7115] in Hong Kong. His aspirations to combat com-
munism are clear like the sun and the stars, and yet he was left out! One
truly cannot understand the intent! The sentences at the end of the tele-
gram, "an army is strong when its cause is just," etc., are even more con-
fusing. He is actually writing a eulogy to the National Government!
?CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO,
1925
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ACCLAMATIONS WILL COME FROM ALL NATIONS
[Text] A Ch'ao-Mei gentry, student, and merchant joint association sent a
telegram supporting Liu Chih-lu [0491 1807 7120], stating: "The evil com-
munist party brought calamity to eastern Kwangtung. Nearby, it can sink
China into a hopeless situation; far away, it can engulf the world and
destroy all mankind. Mr Liu relies on righteousness and steps forward,
ahead of the world. Wherever his banners point, the people will welcome
him with broth and food. Bringing down the rotten and destroying the
withered, he will soon establish great merits. (The reporter finds the
word "soon" defective.) Communization will be eradicated, and the founda-
tion of the nation will be stabilized. Not only his. achievement will rank
with the Yunnan Uprising and the Ma-ch'ang Harangue of the Troops, but man-
kind in the whole world will be safeguarded and the calamity of the entire
globe will be averted. He will be remembered a thousand years; acclamations
will come from all nations." Everywhere, "the whole world" and "the entire
globe" are not forgotten. How far-reaching is the sight! If Liu Chih-lu
truly eradicates "communization," "acclamations" for sure will come. But
whether they will come from all nations is unknown, but at least from the
following four: Britain, America, France, and Japan.
?CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 1, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 5 December
1925
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'LONG LIVE THE GREAT UNION OF ANTICOMMUNIST CHINESE NATIONAL ARMY'
[Text] This is a slogan in the anticommunist literature distributed by
Ch'en Chiung-ming [7115 3518 2494] in Tung-chiang. It is truly sonorous,
but it's a pity that it is rather difficult for the "anticommunist Chinese
National Army" to have a "great union." Such troops as those commanded by
Feng-t'ien's Commissioner Chang [1728] and by Hankow's Mr Wu Tzu-yu [0702
1311 3768] can truly be considered an "anticommunist National Army," but
where is the "great union"?
?CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 1, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 5 December
1925
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COMMUNIST REGULATIONS AND SHAM COMMUNISM
[Text] The counterrevolutionaries generally call the national revolution a
communist revolution, the Kuomintang the communist party, the National Govern-
ment a communist government, and the National Revolutionary Army a communist
army. They do so for no other purpose than to fabricate a few simple terms
and spread them in accordance with the intent of imperialism in order to
split the united front created through the cooperation of the various classes
in the national revolution. But such fabrication has to be rather abstract.
It must not be too concrete, because they may expose themselves and lose
their credibility. However, for the purpose of a lucky win by one single
throw, Ch'en Chiung-ming [7115 3518 2494], this time in Tung-chiang, ex-
hausted all means. He actually fabricated the so-called "Communist By-law"
to frighten the people. One of their handbills, entitled "Urging the Peo-
ple of Kwangtung To Help the Kwangtung Army Punish the Red Party," states:
"Alas! Do our fathers and brothers know about the Communist By-law drafted
by Chiang Chung-cheng [Chiang Kai-shek]? I fear that the common people,
being ignorant, may think that sharing property means sharing the property
of the rich and has nothing to do with the poor in general. They may even
think that it will greatly benefit the poor. Actually, it is completely
false. I inquired into the said by-law and now generalize as follows: The
so-called three-three-three-one system deals with. farmland. The so-called
four-four-two system deals with houses. Plants and stores with rather sub-
stantial capital are completely confiscated." Nevertheless, a recent issue
of the Hong Kong KUNG-SHANG.JIH-PAO reported: "The Canton merchant rep-
resentatives came to Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong merchant representatives
received them in the. Chinese Merchants' Club and asked them to hold a second
general meeting to discuss the solution of strikes and resumption of com-
munication.. Chinese businessmen and merchants and Canton merchant repre-
sentatives all sat together at a long table. Canton merchant representative
Chien Ch'in-shih [4675 3830 4258] rose and made a statement, saying that
the Canton government was actually not practicing communism." If someone
should ask Ch'en Chiung-ming [7115 3518 2494] about Chien Shih-ch'in's
[4675 4258 3830.] [sic] statement, I imagine he will say: "Chien Shih-ch'in
told a lie. When others took away his property to share, he still insisted
that it was not taken away."
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[Text] Tsou Lu [6760 7627] said: "Our Koumintang comrades must be aware.
You must not obliterate everything just because others say that the old com-
rades are non-revolutionary. Had our comrades not persevered after every
setback, there would not have been the republic. Had the campaigns to fight
Yuan [5913], defend the law, punish the bandits, and attack the North not
been victorious, there would not have been today's history. Even in the
burning of the commercial groups, the masterpiece work of the communists, we
still had to rely on Yang [2799] and Liu [0491]. To hit Yang and Liu, we
still had to rely on Hsu [6079] and Liang [27332. Even the restraining of
Hsu and Liang today, it is still the old comrades." Excellent! Mr Tsou!
Please go ahead and revolutionize! Actually no one has the skill to obliter-
ate the revolutionary old comrades! You must know that "the republic" and
"history" alone do not count. We must prosecute the revolution now; we
must prosecute,the revolution in the future. As for old comrades Yang and
Liu, or old comrades Hsu and Liang, I think it is better not to give so many
examples.
OCHENG=CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 1, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 5 December 1925
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[Text] In the past 6 months, some people have been advocating a theory:
The left is not good, nor is the right. Another group has proposed an inter-
mediate opinion: They reject the left as well as the right and indicate that
they, themselves, take the middle position. Such things are not often seen
in Kwangtung, but quite widespread in Kiangsu and Chekiang. The reason is
that, in Kwangtung, the left is Canton and the right is Hong Kong. Stand-
ing under the banner of Canton, he inevitably opposes Hong Kong, and vice
versa. Ch'en Chiung-ming [7115 3518 2494] leads the counterrevolutionary
military, politicians, comprador class, local tyrants, and evil gentry and
stands under the banner of Hong Kong, while the Kuomintang leftwing leads
the workers, peasants,. soldiers, students, merchants, and all types of rev-
olutionary masses and stands under the banner of Canton. Therefore, they
mutually attack each other with artillery. There can be no intermediate
in the midst of such mutual attack. If there is such an intermediate ele-
ment, he can only cover himself up and hide under the banner of one side,
speaking quietly and treading lightly. If there is someone standing be-
tween Canton and Hong Kong, he will have to declare that "Hong Kong is no
good and Canton is also no good." Then, Hong Kong will train its artillery
on him, and so will Canton. Currently, there has not yet been any incident
of mutual attack with artillery in in the Kiangsu-Chekiang area, and there-
fore, the theory of "both sides no good" flourishes. On 30 May this year,
the artillery of side A rumbled in the Nanking area, but luckily side B
had no artillery. Just fists alone could not become "mutual attack," and
no chaos resulted. (Strikes did not amount to much). The theory of "both
sides no good", can still be openly spread, "retaining righteousness between
the two and saving freedom between heaven and earth." However, if we set
up a hypothetical situation, if the masses on Nanking Road had generals as
well as fists, and were led by Wang Ching-wei [3076 4737 5898] and Chiang
Kil-shek, then, when the police station was levelled by artillery, they
could immediately occupy the Bureau of Works, capture all the turbaned
policement, blockade Wu-sung Harbor, mount artillery in Nan-pei-t'ang
and Shih-tzu-lin (similar to Hu-men), and hoist the banner against imperial-
ism over the artillery positions. By then, Shanghai would unfortunately
be in a "chaos," similar to Canton. A garrison headquarters would be set
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up and those like Mr Wang Mao-kung [3769 2021 0501] would be asked to serve
as the commander who would then ride around in an armored car every day on
the streets. The "Shih-shih Hsin-pao" and its like would be allowedto pub-
lish again (perhaps also the "Hsing-shih Chou-pao"). Only the majority would
be permitted to enjoy the freedom of speech, and the freedom of the minor-
ity would have to be deprived, exactly the opposite of before. By then, the
intermediate elements, as in Canton, would not be able to spread their theory
openly. What should they do? Naturally, there would still be Peking. But
they could not rely on Peking for long. It would be contingent on the sta-
bility of Executive Tuan.[2008]. As long as he remained in power, there
would be no problem. Not only could the Kuomintang Comrades' Club hoist
its sign high, but even the Fourth General Central Committee could hold its
meeting there. It would be even more liberal than in Changchiakou. While
we say this, I am still somewhat confused. How come Changchiakou does not
permit the Fourth Central Committee to hold a meeting? Isn't it also under
the jurisdiction of the Tuan government? If the Executive Tuan is not there--
Wait a minute!. Even when Executive Tuan is there, there can be unforeseen
incidents. Did we not hear that two persons were kidnapped and put into
an automobile, taken into the city and beaten up, and forced to write state-
ments of repentance? Alas! Such disturbances could happen even under the
rule of Executive Tuan! The affairs of the world are truly difficult to .
determine! Even more distressing: According to the telegram of the Peking
Executive Department, a revolutionary movement occurred on 28 November and
the urban residents laid siege to the Executive Residence, demanding the
ouster of Tuan Ch'i-jui [3008 4388 3843]. It also said that the National
Congress decided on three items, and the first was to organize a national
government. (Most unfortunate! Naturally it will be similar to Canton!).
Then, according to Reuter, "there was a demonstration in Peking on the 28th.
The students carried the banner of Canton, the workers displayed red flags,
but no national flag was seen. The demonstrators scattered handbills, de-
manding to overthrow Tuan Ch'i-jui, punish Chu Shen [2612 3234], execute
the traitors, dissolve the customs conference, arm the people, carry out
mass revolution, organize a true national congress, etc." The "Shin-shih
Hsin-pao" headlined the telegram "Frightening Demonstration!" What's to be
done? A "frightening demonstration" happened here! If, in the future, a
"national government" is actually organized and the "Canton banner" is
hoisted high over the roof of that government, will it not result in a
"chaos" similar to Canton? Not just this alone, but the "chaos" may spread
to the entire country, imitated everywhere. The majority may rise to gain
their "freedom" and arbitrarily deprive the minority of their freedom.
Gentlemen who stand in the middle! What should you do? To the left? Or
to the right?
o CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 2, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 13 Decem-
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13 December 1925
[Text] "Shen Pao" reports that, according to the telegram from Peking of
23 November, "the diplomatic corps received a detailed report from Kwangtung.
Though Chiang Kai-shek is communistic in his principles, he rather cares
for the people. On the contrary, the anticommunist troops of Ch'en [7115],
Lin [2651], and Hung [31631 perform many communist activities wherever
they go." Thus, communization is caring for the people. Communization--
wish it would spread throughout China!
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[Text] Among Chen Chiung-ming's [7115 3518 2494] anti-communist literature,
there is the article: "Respectfully Advise Young Students." The last few
sentences of this article read; "Communist Party policy also calls for
exterminating the intellectual class. You young students are, after all,
grouped in the intellectual class. Upon triumph of the Communist Party,...
[one word indistinct] intends to kill the intellectual young students one
by one." In order to see whether Chen Chiung-ming's words are right or
wrong, it would be necessary, first of all, to analyze the position of the
Chinese intellectual class. We feel that those individuals with intellig-
ence should not be classified as a social class. We should recognize them
only as knowledgeable persons. The reason for this is that they do not have
a common interest which would assure their unity as a class. Among them,
some have become secretaries or staffers to Chang Tso-lin [1728 0155 7207],
Wu Pei-fu [0702 0160 1318], Chen Chiung-ming and their like; and others
have performed as attorneys or clerks for Chang...[word indistinct] [1728],
Mu Ou-chu [4476 5665 0443], Chen...[word indistinct] -po [7115 .... 0130].
They say peasants should not demand rent reduction and workers should not
strike. At the same time, however, some intellectuals have joined the ranks
of the worker-peasant class.
Accordingly, we can see that each knowledgeable person is merely an intel-
lectual. As an inevitable consequence of modern industrial development,
these intellectuals have long lost the dignity and assurance of their so-
called occupational freedom, and have been downgraded temporarily from
intermediate class to proletariat. As such, they must devote themselves
wholeheartedly to the worker-peasant movement. If they should forget their
own position in the current society and choose to reverse themselves to
serve warlords, compradores, and local despots, then, these knowledgeable
youths may be regarded as dead. By whose hands do they perish? They are
wasted directly by warlords, compradores, and local despots; and. indirectly
they are poisoned by imperialism.
o CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 2, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 13 Decem-
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PEKING RIGHTIST CONFERENCE,AND IMPERIALISM
[Text] Imperialists abhor the Canton Central Executive Committee of the
leftist Kuomintang which has assumed general command over the nationwide
anti-imperialist movement to strike terror among all imperialists. The
Peking rightist conference adopted a resolution to cease the functions of
the Canton Central Executive Committee. Imperialists abhor the Kuomintang
Political Committee which can exercise power to direct the Kwangtung and
Hong Kong strikes and to eradicate such useful tools to them as Yang Hsi-
min [2799 1585 7063], Liu Chen-huan [0491 7201 1403], Liang Hung-kai [2733
7703 2261], Cheng Jun-chi [6774 3387 3823], Mo Hsiung [5459 7160], Wei Pang-
ping [7614 6721 1726], Chen Chiung-ming [7115 3518 2494], Lin Hu [2651
5706], Hung Chao-lin [3163 0340 7792], Teng Pen-yin [6772 2609 3009], and
Hsiung Ko-wu [3574 0344 2976]. The Peking rightist conference resolved to
dismiss the Political Committee. Imperialists abhor Kuomintang leftist
leader Wang Ching-wei [3076 4737 5898] who leads the national revolution
in an all-out campaign against imperialism; and the Peking rightist con-
ference resolved to expel Wang Ching-wei from Party membership. Imperialists
abhor Soviet Russian assistance to the Kuomintang and Nationalist Govern-
ment employment of Russian advisers. to enhance their power to attack imperial-
ism; and the Peking rightist conference resolved to dischange Russian adviser
Borodin. Imperialists abhor Kuomintang acceptance of Communist Party mem-
bers to acquire a major force opposing imperialism; and the Peking right-
ist conference resolved to expel Li Ta-chao [2621 1129 6856], Tan Ping-shan
[6223 1627 1472], and others from Party membership. Observing all this,
we can see what the Peking rightist conference has done for imperialism.
o CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 3, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 20 Decem-
ber 1925
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[Text] As described before, the Peking rightist conference has performed
various tasks to meet the requirements of imperialism. It is, however, the
final method used by imperialism against the Chinese anti-imperialist move-
ment. Imperialist tools Yang Hsi-min [2799 1585 7036] and Liu Chen-huan
[0419 7201 1403] were ineffective in their attempt to overthrow the Canton
government on behalf of the current Peking rightist conference. Imperial-
ist tools Liang Hung-kai [2733 7703 2261], Cheng Jun-chi [6774 3387 3823],
Wei Pang-ping [7614 6721 1726], Mo Hsiung [5459 7160], Chu Cho-wen [2612
0587 2429], and others were also ineffective in carrying out the goal of
the current Peking rightist conference after the assassination of Liao
Chung-kai [1675 0112 19561. Imperialist tool Hsiung Ko-wu [3574 0344 2976]
also failed in his attempt to capture Canton from Pei-chiang on behalf of
the current Peking rightist conference. Imperialist tool Tuan Chi-jui
[3008 4388 3842] likewise did not succeed in his attempt to attack Canton
by warships from Hu-meng. Imperialist tools Chen Chiung-ming [7115 3518
2494] and Teng Pen-yin [6772 2609 3009] also failed in their attempt to
fight into Canton from the east and the south, on behalf of the current
Peking rightist conference. All these imperialist tools were ineffectual in
what they did. The Kuomintang rightists, aroused in indignation, thus
called the Peking conference. From "Attack by guns," they clanged to the
"Resolutions" method.
What is the effect of this method? It is difficult to say. The various
resolutions of the rightist conference, to be sure, are only childish
resolutions. This method of "opposition within the next" is truly a pro-
gression from "opposition outside the next." After it has exhausted all
tools, imperialism has found this last tool to gain a small consolation
in their failure.
Although a few among the rightists may talk about opposing imperialism,
although they may serve imperialism without sincerity, and although they
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may deny that they have become imperialist tooks, nevertheless, they are
in fact effectively helping imperialism. In reality, they have become im-
perialist tools, because their work meets the requirements of imperialism.
o CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 3, Canton Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 20 Decem-
ber 1925
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THE MOST THE RIGHTISTS CAN DO
[Text] The 3 December editorial of the rightist Shanghai MIN-KUO JIH-PAO
stated: "There are only warlords who fear the revolutionary party, but not
a revolutionary party which fears warlords." With this as the rationale, the
editorial opposed the following passage in the telegram sent by Wang Ching-
wei [3076 4737 5895] and others: "A plenary session of the Central Committee
is open by nature. Should it meet in Peking, there would be pressure from
warlords from without, and reactionaries from within using warlords to cre-
ate problems." MIN-KUO JIH-PAO thus alleged that it would be a show of
courage and of disregard of warlords for the plenary session of the Central
Committee to meet in Peking.
What is the mistake of MIN-KUO JIH-PAO? The mistake lies in ignorance of
the fact that there is a difference between the overt and covert activities
of a revolutionary party. Operating under the enemy influence, a truly
revolutionary party would maintain complete secrecy with regard to its
party organizations and meetings, but would openly advocate its proposals
and conduct propaganda. Under the enemy influence, it is necessary to ob-
tain prior enemy understanding in order to make public the party organiza-
tions and meetings. In other words, there would be at least a few points
benefiting the enemy before the enemy would grant consent or even possibly
protection. However, what would the party be then? It would become a
friend of the enemy, instead of a revolutionary party aimed against the
enemy. Tuan Chi-jui 13008 4388 2976] permitted the rightists to hold their
conference in Peking. Would he also allow Wang Ching-wei, Tan Yen-kai
[6223 1693 0418], and others to publicly go to Peking to attend the con-
ference?
The newspaper also claimed that Premier Sun visited Peking last year with-
out fearing Tuan Chi-jui. It ignored the two reasons which made it pos-
sible for Premier Sun to visit Peking last year: One, Tuan Chi-jui was
then new in power, and had neither consolidated his regime nor adopted
the policy to oppress the Kuomintang. Two, control of the police in Peking
was then in the hands of Feng Yu-hsiang [7458 3768 4382], who was sympathetic
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to the Kuomintang. Without these two reasons, it would have been impossible
for Mr Sun to openly go to Peking. If Mr Sun lived today, Tuan Chi-jui
certainly would not tolerate his open revolutionary activities in Peking.
He must maintain secrecy, or go elsewhere.
In Peking and other areas throughout the coutitry where warlords are in con-
trol, there are Kuomintang organizations, and party headquarters have organ-
izations everywhere. Party members and comrade cadres have meetings at all
times, as they also bravely engage in efforts striving to eliminate the
enemy influence. All this, however, is secret. In these organizations and
activities, only the leftists are waging incessant struggle, while the
rightist party members invariably are seized by fear and dare not to move.
The strong point of rightists is that they can talk, and recite such slogans
as "Down with imperialism" and "Down with warlords" without referring to
party resolutions. Once they learn about realistic methods and actions,
they immediately lose heart. The rightists have only their mouth, but not
hands or feet. They have courage to hold a conference in front of Tuan
Chi-jui, but would not dare to attend a conference in Canton, because they
fear the revolutionary air of Canton. They have decided to hold their so-
called Second National Congress in March next year in either Shanghai or
Peking. My observation is that even if they can call the meeting (regardless
of the number of those attending), they may not dare to hold it in Peking,
since the court of Tuan is unstable. They probably would meet in Shanghai.
In the old next of imperialism, they would openly hold the Kuomintang Nation-
al Conference in front of foreign lords of various foreign consulates and
police forces, and thus show off their "courage." The most the rightists
can do is to openly hold conferences in front of warlords and imperialists.
The leftists can never match that!
o CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, No 3, Canton, Cheng-chih Chou-pao Press, 20 Decem-
ber 1925
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PROPAGANDA REPORT
8 January 1926
[Text] Written Propaganda
(1) Dailies
(A) Party Sponsored:
(1) Shanghai MIN-KUO JIH-PAO. This was originally a private newspaper
owned by Yeh Chu-tsang [5509 2806 3318] and others. After the first nation-
al congress, the Party assumed management, invested several tens of thous-
ands yuan in expansion, and subsequently subsidized monthly 2,500 to 3,000
yuan. However, it has never been a true party newspaper, and has contained
much absurd statements and reportage. Following the Hsi-shan Conference,
it became a mouthpiece of the reactionaries.
(2) Canton MIN-KUO JIH-PAO. This was sponsored by the Canton Municipal
Party Headquarters and came under the administration of the Central Prop-
aganda Department in October 1926. The circulation increased from over
1,000 to over 11,000.
(3) Canton KUO-MIN HSIN-WEN. This was a mouthpiece of reactionaries. Af-
ter the Liao case, it became a party newspaper under the administration of
the Central Propaganda Department. Upon establishment of the Kwangtung
Provincial Party Headquarters, it came under the administration of the
provincial party-headquarters. It now circulates over 7,500 copies
daily.
(4) HSIANG-CHIANG CHEN-PAO. Under party management at one time, it later
defected to the enemy party. It has now ceased publication.
(5) Hong Kong HSIN-WEN-PAO. It discontinued relationship with Chen Chiung-
ming [7115 3518 2494] in July 1926 and came under Party control. It was
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closed by the Hong Kong Government after the strike. Before that, its
circulation exceeded 8,000 copies, with greater circulation overseas than
in Hong Kong.
(6) Peking MIN-PAO. This was closed by Chang Tso-lin [1728 0155 7027] not
long after it commenced publication.
(B) Daily newspapers sponsored by individual comrades or under the names of
societies and organizations. Survey incomplete. Not described.
(C) Many daily newspapers of all sizes sponsored by Overseas Chinese
Party Headquarters abroad. Survey incomplete. Not described.
(II) Weeklies
(a) Party Sponsored:
(1) CHINA KUOMINTANG WEEKLY. This was managed by the Central Committee af-
ter the First Party Congress. It ceased publication soon afterward.
(2) Canton MIN-KUO JIH-PAO. There were eight weeklies supplemental to the
newspaper covering literature, science, study of Sun Wen doctrine, eco-
nomics, citizenship, agriculture, women, and cinema. They were soon de-
funct.
(3) PARTY VOICE WEEKLY. Sponsored by the Central Propaganda Department.
It was a supplement to the Canton MIN-KUO JIH-PAO at first, but soon also
ceased publication.
(4) CRITICISM OF CRITICISM. Sponsored by the Shanghai Executive Headquarters
Propaganda Department after the First Congress as a supplement of SHANG-HAI
MIN-KUO JIH-PAO. It soon ceased publication.
(5) Several weeklies supplemental to SHANG-HAI MIN-KUO JIH-PAO all ceased
publication soon afterward.
(6) CHEKIANG WEEKLY. Sponsored by Chekiang Provincial Party Headquarters.
It soon ceased publication.
(7) HSIN-MIN WEEKLY. Sponsored by Hunan Provincial Party Headquarters af-
ter the First Congress. Ceased publication soon afterward.
(8) CHINA KUO-MIN. Published after the First Congress by the Joint Com-
mittee of Shanghai regional party headquarters. Its aim is to oppose the
Hsi-shan Conference and the rightists. Publication now takes place once
every third day.
(9) WUHAN PING-LUN. Sponsored by Hupeh Party Headquarters. Currently in
circulation.
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(10) POLITICAL WEEKLY. Sponsored by the Central Propaganda Department
since December 1925. Circulation is 40,000 per issue, and its aim is to
break the counterrevolutionary propaganda of the North and Yangtze River
region.
(B) Weeklies and bimonthlies sponsored by various armies and military
schools in Kwangtung. Among these are:
HUANG-PU-CHAO of the Huangpu Military Academy
REVOLUTIONARY SEMIMONTHLY of the Second Army
CHUN-SHENG of the Fourth Army
JEN-TAO of the Army Attacking Hupeh
(C) Several periodicals are managed by individual comrades under the names
of societies and organizations. Among these are:
Periodicals of student organizations in many areas, such as CHINESE STUDENTS.
Periodicals of worker organizations, such as WORKERS' ROAD.
Not many periodicals of peasant organizations, with only a few in Kwangtung.
Periodicals of military organizations, such as CHINESE MILITARYMEN, REVOL-
UTIONARY ARMY, and WEEKLY OF YOUNG MILITARYMEN ASSOCIATION in Kwangtung,
and NEW NAVY in Yentai.
There are about four or five periodicals of women's organizations.
Periodicals. published by other organizations.
(III) Monthlies
The two periodicals NEW CONSTRUCTION and NEW REPUBLIC ceased publication
last year. There is now only one new publication: CHINESE PEASANTS,
sponsored by the Central Peasant Ministry.
(IV) News Agencies
(1) Central Correspondence Agency. Is under the direct administration of
the Central Propaganda Department. In the 2 years since its inception, it
has made some accomplishments.
(2) Several other related news agencies.
(V) Books
(1) Central. The Central Propaganda Department has published about 30 books
(among them are 12 books concerning Mr Sun such as "San-min-chu-yi"
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and "Chien-kuo-fang-lueh": collections of speeches by other comrades such
as Mr Wang; and about five books compiled by the Central Propaganda Depart-
ment) with the total circulation of 393,959 copies. The dissemination
concentrated, however, in Kwangtung.
(2) Local--Information and statistics unavailable.
(VI) Handbills
'(1) Central--The Central Propaganda Department has issued 83 varieties of
handbills, but distribution has been limited to Kwangtung.
(2) Local--Information and statistics unavailable.
(VII) Posters
(1) Central. In Canton, the Central Propaganda Department has' cooperated
with the.Canton Public Security Bureau in producing two types of posters:
one nailed to electric wire poles, and the other written on walls. Content
of the these posters has been derived from the Declaration of the First
National Congress and the speeches of late Mr Sun.
(2) Armies. The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Army of the National
Revolutionary Army, the Navy, the Huangpu Military Academy, and the mili-
tary officers schools of the Second and Third Army have all issued posters
through their political departments in considerable quantity with great
effect.
(3) Various mass organizations. In Kwangtung, the peasant and worker organ-
izations have issued a considerable number of posters.
Pictorial Propaganda
(1) Importance of Pictorial Propaganda
More than 90 percent of Chinese are illiterate. Only a small portion of
the masses in the country are accessible through the written propaganda of
this Party. Pictorial propaganda is therefore of particular importance.
(II) Past Accomplishments
(1) Central. Started only in April last year, with little done and lim-
ited to Kwangtung, in the following three categories:
(A) Provide four cartoons weekly to Canton MIN-KUO JIH-PAO (with omissions
sometimes).
(B) Propaganda pictures once a week (sometimes once every 2 or 3 weeks)
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(C) Small photographs of Mr Sun Chung-shan and Mr Liao Chung-kai.
(2) Armies. Political departments of various armies have issued consider-
able pictorial propaganda materials, especially under combat conditions.
Wherever the troops are on the march, they post many pictorial propaganda
materials, which have considerable influence among the masses.
(3) Various mass organizations. The Kwangtung peasant and worker organi-
zations have promoted considerable pictorial propaganda to mobilize the
worker-peasant masses. Some pictorial propaganda work has also been done
in Peking and Shanghai.
Oral Propaganda
(1) Oral propaganda has an important position in our propaganda effort,
in terms of quantity and effect.
(2) At meetings of peasants, workers, soldiers, and students, we have
regularly promoted oral propaganda by delivering speeches of all descrip-
tions.
(3) As extemporaneous oral propaganda, we have delivered speeches at var-
ious demonstration for political change. The Central Party headquarters
has organized propaganda teams on several occasions. During and after the
30 May movement, large-scale organized propaganda campaigns were promoted
in various provinces and large cities.
(4) At meetings of party members, responsible comrades have delivered poli-
tical and party reports to educate comrades within the party. At the
Premier Sun weekly memorial meeting, the Party Central headquarters regular-
ly promotes oral propaganda.
Propaganda on 14 Important Events During the Last Two Years
(1) Reorganization of this Party. We promulgated the declaration of poli-
tical program to proclaim opposition to imperialism and its adjuncts, re-
sulting in:
(A) Enabling the masses to understand this Party and the goal of this Party,
and to change their former attitude of skepticism of this Party. This is
extremely effective in propaganda outside the Party.
(B) Unifying objectives and methods within the Party, and gradually clean-
ing out those who harbor personal or minority goals and methods. This also
has considerable effect in terms of education within the Party.
(2) Repossession of Canton Customs House. This anti-imperialist propa-
ganda made clear the break between imperialism and this Party. It was ef-
fective in terms of propaganda.
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(3) The anti-imperialist strike in Shan-mien.
(4) Commercial Organization Incident. We helped the masses to recognize
crimes committed by the compradore class. In this incident, this party's
propaganda effort was inadequate, while the counterrevolutionaries were
very enthusiastic in their attack against this party.
(5) Sino-Russian Agreement. Our compatriots have learned the difference be-
tween imperialist countries and anti-imperialist countries, among nations.
Anti-imperialist alliances rose in Peking and other areas. The slogan
"Oppose imperialism" has begun to be accepted by the masses. To this end,
our Party has issued a statement.
(6) Anti-Hopeh Campaign. The masses have lost faith in this power warlord.
Mr Sun promulgated the Declaration of the Northern Expedition.
(7) Premier Traveled North. The Statement on Travel North pointed out two
slogans: "Hold National Conference" and "Abrogate Unequal Treaties."
(8) Movement to Promote National Conference. Opposition to Tuan Chi-jui
resulted in the masses losing faith in Tuan's fence-mending conference. At
the same time, the masses have further realized the political proposals of
this party. During this campaign, the two slogans: "Hold National Con-
ference" and "Abrogate Unequal Treaties" have gained greater acceptance
among the masses.
(9) Campaign for memorial of the Premier. It helped the masses to under-
stand Mr Sun, this Party, and the goal of this party. This extensive
memorial campaign spread far and wide, extending to remote and secluded
areas. The two slogans of "Hold National Conference" and "Abrogate Unequal
Treaties" have thus penetrated further among the masses. At this time,
this party issued the statement severing contact with Tuan Chi-jui.
(10) 30 May Movement. An unprecedented anti-imperialist movement in which
specific meanings were mentioned for abrogating the unequal treaties, such
as repossess concessions, customs house, and judiciary; and evacuation of
foreign navies and armies stationed in China. Through this, the masses
recognized what are the unequal treaties. This movement failed under ex-
treme pressure exerted by the Liaoning warlords. There was, however, one
accomplishment: the Shanghai workers have risen. In terms of propaganda,.
the movement was very effective for the rural masses have universally come
to know that this party has issued a declaration to support the people in
resisting imperialism.
(11) Liao Case. The masses realized the brutality of imperialists and
their lackeys. Through memorial services, and written and pictorial ma-
terials, this party has promoted considerable propaganda.
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(12) Anti-Liao-ning Campaign. We helped the masses to learn the relation-
ship between imperialism and their tool, the Chinese warlords; and to
recognize the. rapid collapse of Chinese warlords. In the course of this
campaign, the masses felt a closeness to the success of the revolution. In
the movement opposing Tuan in various areas, slogans were introduced to
initiate direct clash against the local warlords, such as the Peking masses'
slogan of "Expel Tuan Chi-jui," Wuhan masses' slogan "Expel Pei-fu," and
Changsha masses' slogan "Down with Chao Heng-ti [6392 1854 1912]." The
masses have changed their former peaceful attitude into a tense revolutionary
atmosphere.
(13) Anti-religious Movement. During the last 2 years, anti-Christian
organizations and propaganda have spread throughout the country to enable
the masses to'be aware of the imperialist religious aggression.
(14) Political education in peace time and political propaganda in war time
among troops. The political education promoted by this party in Huangpu Mili-
tary Academy and National Revolutionary Army has created a military force
against imperialism. The propagara for military-civilian unity as launched
in various campaigns in Kwangtung has assured that the troops love and pro-
tect the people, and that the people support the troops. This has been a
great success of this party.
Enemy Propaganda
Part of our propaganda, by necessity, must aim at the enemy's propaganda.
Now we should take a look at the antirevolutionary propaganda waged by the
enemy during the last 2 years.
(1) Imperialism. During the last 2 years, since this party has particularly
heightened the anti-imperialist propaganda, the imperialist propaganda to
calumniate this party has also been especially fierce. The imperialists
raised the two slogans of "Oppose communism" and "Red imperialism" to call
on their tools in China, bureaucrats, warlords, compradores, and local despots
to attack this party. Foreign newspapers and foreign news agencies in Hong
Kong, Shanghai, Tientsin, Shenyang, and Hankou have created rumors to
caluminate and sow dissension, and have tried their utmost wherever they can.
(2) Warlords of all factions. Warlords of all sizes and factions in the
country invariably support and expand the two slogans issued by imperialists
(Oppose communism, Red imperialism).
(3) Compradore Class. Besides their anti-revolutionary propaganda, this
group has shown greater effort than any other counterrevolutionary faction.
The Hong Kong KUNG-SHANG JIH-PAO and Shanghai HSIN-WEN-PAO are representative.
(4) Research Faction. They uphold the interest of bureaucrats and large
landlords, and also engage in counterrevolutionary propaganda. SHIH-SHIH,
HSIW-WEN and CHEN-PAO are representative.
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(5) An-fu Faction. They represent Japanese imperialism and likewise engage
in counterrevolutionary propaganda. HSIN-SHENG-PAO is representative.
(6) LIEN-CHIH-PAI. They support'the interest of bureaucrats and landlords,
and.also promote counterevolutionary propaganda. CHUNG-HUA HSIN-PAO is
representative.
(7) Nationalist Faction. They have acquired some trappings of Western na-
tionalism to support the interest of small landlords and the Chinese indus-
trial and commercial bourgeoisie, and are very enthusiastic in "opposing
communism" and "opposing Soviet Russia." HSIN-SHIH WEEKLY is representative.
(8) Right-wing Kuomintang. After the HSI-SHAN Conference, the right wing
of this party has also acquired the slogans "oppose communism" and "oppose
Soviet Russia," and has competed against the above other counterrevolution-
ary factions in their hostile attitude toward this party. Shanghai MIN-KUO
JIH-PAO is their representative.
In the mutual antagonism between revolutionary propaganda and counter-
revolutionary propaganda during the last 2 years, the revolutionary prop-
aganda has adopted an offensive. This offensive was particularly illus-
trative during the 30 May Movement. The counterrevolutionary propaganda has
consistently been defensive. When they could not cope with the offensive,
they resorted to the slogans "Oppose communism" and "Red imperialism" as
protective covers. This phenomenon of antagonistic offensive and defensive
came as a result of the Chinese revolutionary force daily enhancement of
unity and progress, while the counterrevolutionary force became increas-
ingly more shaky and leaned toward collapse.
The following defects have been discovered in the propaganda work during the
last 2 years:
(1) Party newspapers are faulty.
(2) Propaganda on various important events lacks promptness in guidance and
falls short of full coverage.
(3) The command system is imperfect. There is a lack of coordination,be-
tween the upper and lower level party headquarters, leading to an each-
for-himself situation. Consequently, many responsible persons of the propa-
ganda department have abandoned their duties.
(4) Inspection and correction were completely ignored.
(5) Sufficient collection of propaganda materials and supply of them to lower
level party headquarters have not been done.
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(6) There was little evidence of planned education within the party.
(7) More stress was on urban masses than on general masses, more on written
propaganda than on pictorial propaganda.
The above are all major defects in the propaganda work of this party. Each
should be corrected in the future.
o CHENG-CHIH CHOU-PAO, Nos 6-7 combined issue, Canton, Cheng-chih Chou-pao
Press, 10 April 1926
6693
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ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS STRATA OF CHINESE PEASANTRY AND THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD
REVOLUTION
January 1926
[Text] Wherever you go in rural areas, as you carefully observe, you will
see the following eight different categories of persons:
Big landlords
Small landlords
Owner peasants
Semi-owner peasants
Semi-hired peasants
Poor peasants
Hired peasants and rural handicraft workers
Vagabonds
These eight categories of persons are divided into eight classes. Their
financial positions and living.conditions vary, and affect their psychology
and their differing views regarding revolution.
A large number of large landlords in China come from decendents of former
Ching Dynasty bureaucrats and current bureaucrats and. warlords, while a
small number of them are rich urban merchants who purchased land. Very
few big landlords built up their fortune through farming. They base their
interest on severe exploitation of owner-peasants, semi-owner peasants,
semi-hired peasants, poor peasants, and hired peasants. There are five
methods of exploitation. First is heavy rent, varying between 50 to 80 per-
cent. This is a very common and ruthless exploitation of the semi-owner
peasants, semi-hired peasants, and poor peasants. The second is usury,
with the monthly interest rate at 3 to 7 percent, and the annual interest
at 36 to. 84 percent. This exploitation also applies to semi-owner peasants,
semi-hired peasants, and poor peasants. This is sometimes an even more
ruthless exploitation than heavy rent, and often results in complete bank-
ruptcy within a few years due to accumulation of debts and compounding of
interest. The third is heavy contributions, using pressure to force the
owner-peasants and semi-owner peasants to offer contributions to the
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expenses of local defense regiments according to acreage owned. Such local
defense regiments are landlord class armies needed for suppressing peasant
uprisings to maintain the landlord class exploiting system. The fourth is
exploitation of hired peasants, that is, exploiting their surplus labor. In
China, however, there is not much capitalist agriculture yet. Big landlords
usually do not manage land themselves. For this reason, more small land-
lords than big landlords employ this form of exploitation. The fifth form
of exploitation is that used by warlords in collusion with corrupt bureau-
crats to levy heavy land taxes and demand high interest from peasants who
are unable to pay on time. It is impossible to describe the miseries of
peasants suffering from these five types of exploitation. The Chinese big
landlords are, therefore, the deadly enemies of Chinese peasants, the true
rules in the countryside, the solid foundation of imperialists and warlords,
only stronghold of feudal patriarch society, and the ultimate reason for
emergence of all counterrevolutionary forces. Estimated on the basis of
collecting yield from over 500 mou, the number of big landlords (including
their families) account for about one-tenth of 1 percent among peasants.
Among the 320,000,000 peasants in the country (estimated at 80 percent of
the population), they total about 320,000.
The small landlords are much more numerous than the big landlords, totalling
more than 2 million in the country. Most of them come from their own farms,
that is, they rose from owner-peasants. Some of them are urban merchants
who bought land, and others are degenerate decendents of bureaucrats and
current petty-bureaucrats. They employ heavy rent, usury, and exploitation
of surplus labor as methods of exploitation. They suffer from oppression
by warlords and big landlords, and are therefore rebellious. They also,
however, fear "communism," and thus adopt a contradictory attitude toward
modern revolution. In our country, high intellectuals such as teachers and
students in colleges and higher schools, as well as students studying in
Japan and the West, are mostly from small landlord families. They advocate
the so-called nationalism. The reason is that small landlords are the medium-
properties class in China with an ambition to attain the,position of big
bourgeoisie and to establish a nation ruled by one class. Beset by foreign
capital and oppression by warlords, they need revolution. They are, how-
ever, also skeptical about revolution since in the modern Chinese revolution-
ary movement, there is within the country wholehearted participation of the
national proletariat and, internationally, vigorous support by the inter-
national proletariat. There is a true Tai Chi-t'ao's [2071 1323 7118]
disciple (by his own description) who states in PEKING CHEN-PAO: "Raise
your left hand to strike down imperialists and your right hand against the
communist party." This is a vivid illustration of the contradictory and
frightened attitude of this class. They oppose interpretation of people's
livelihood principle by class struggle and object to Kuomintang association
with Russia and acceptance of communists. These constitute the right wing
of the Chinese medium-properties class. They are inclined to lean toward
a counterrevolutionary position. There is, however, also a left wing in
the medium-properties class which at the proper moment can be led toward
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revolution. For instance, at the height of the peasant association movement,
the leftists among small landlords can be guided to help peasant associations.
By nature, they compromise easily, since they are related by blood to the
right wing of small landlords, and are strangers to peasant associations.
We cannot expect them to come forward bravely to the revolutionary road
and to devote themselves faithfully to the revolutionary cause as other
classes do, except for the small number of them who are molded differently
by history and circumstances.
The owner-peasants belong to petty-bourgeoisie and subdivide into three
categories. In the first category, there are owner-peasants who have sur-
plus cash and provisions. Besides providing for themselves, there is a
surplus every year in their income from labor performed, usable as prelimin-
ary accumulation of capital. These persons harbor a strong concept of
"prosperity." While they do not vainly hope for great prosperity, they
always attempt to climb up to the position of small landowner. They usually.
envy those small property owners who enjoy respectability, and devoutly wor-
ship Marshal Chao-kung. They are timid, afraid of bureaucracy, and also
somewhat fear revolution. Since their financial position approximates that of
the small landlords of the intermediate properties class, they subscribe
to such propaganda as "Beware of radical party" and "Beware of communism,"
as propagated by those "elderly," "honorable," and "respected" small land-
lords in the countryside. These words of advice for caution, to be sure,
originate from the "seniors" and the "lords" among the landlords. These
persons with surplus cash and provisions constitute the right wing of petty-
bourgeoisie. Before they learn the truth about modern revolution, they adopt
a skeptical attitude. They are, however, a minority among owner-peasants,
amounting to perhaps less than 10 percent of the total. In China, the num-
ber of owner-peasants, some say, exceed the total of hired peasants and
farm laborers. Excluding the semi-owner peasants, however, they certainly
account for only a minority among peasants, totalling about 100 to 120 mil-
lion. The well-to-do portion among owner-peasants account for about 10
percent, or a total of 12 million.
The second category of owner-peasants are barely self-sufficient.. Their
annual income and expenditures are balanced without surplus or deficit.
While these owner-peasants are quite different from those of the first cate-
gory, they likewise long for prosperity. Marshal Chao Kung, however, has .
never granted them wealth. In the wake of oppression and exploitation per-
petrated by imperialists, warlords, and landlords in recent years, they
feel that the world is not what it used to be. They realize that by con-
tinuing the same amount of labor as they did before, they would not be able
to maintain their livelihood. They must increase their time at work, that
is, start earlier and stop later every day, and pay greater attention to
production before they can maintain. their livelihood. They curse others,
denouncing foreigners as "devils," warlords as "money grabbers," and local
despots as "the filthy rich." They are skeptical whether the movement
against imperialists and warlords will ever succeed (their rationale:
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foreigners and the military are more powerful), and thus would not dare to
participate. They adopt a neutral attitude, but would never oppose revo-
lution. This portion of owner-peasants are numerous, accounting for about
one-half of all owner-peasants, or nearly 60,000,000 persons.
The third category of owner-peasants are those who-show a deficit year after
year. Many of these owner-peasants were formerly the so-called solid, honest
persons who gradually turn more reserved and deficient. At the year-end
accounting, they are alarmed at every occasion and would declare: "Well,
another deficit." Since they lived well, before their gradual decline and
accrument of debts, they begin to realize "the future is uncertain and frigh-
tening." They are miserable in spirit, for they tend to contrast the pres-
ent and the past. These persons are rather important to the revolution and
can contribute to its progress. They number about 40 percent of owner-
peasants, or 48,000,000 persons. A sizeable mass, they constitute the left-
wing of petty-bourgeoisie.
In time of peace, the afore-described three categories of owner-peasants
hold different attitudes toward modern Chinese revolution. Once at war,
that is, at. the high tide of revolution when the dawn of victory is visible,
not only the left wing owner-peasants in the third category would immediately
join the revolution, but the neutral owner-peasants of the second category
would also participate in revolution. Pressured by hired peasants and the
leftwing owner-peasants, even the rightist owner-peasants in the first
category would also go along with revolution. Accordingly, the petty-
bourgeois owner-peasants can all turn to favor revolution.
The semi-owner peasants, semi-hired peasants, and farm laborers number about
150,000,000 to 170,000,000 among Chinese peasantry. Separately, semi-owner
peasants account for about 50,000,000, while semi-hired peasants and farm
laborers each account for 60,000,000. They constitute the huge masses in
the countryside. Most of the so-called peasant problems concern them. While
all three categories of peasants are among the semi-proletariat, their
financial conditions differ. The semi-owner peasants live a more miserable
life than the owner-peasants, since the former must rent farmland from others
or engage in small business to make up the difference in their deficit of
provisions. They must incur debt and borrow grain at high interest rates
during the season between spring and summer, while the owner-peasants would
not have to depend on others. The semi-owner peasants nevertheless are bet-
ter off than the semi-hired peasants who own no land and must work on others'
farmland to receive only half of the harvest. While the semi-owner peasants
also receive only half or less on the farmland which they rent from others,
they can receive the entire harvest from the land which they own. Accord-
ingly, the semi-owner peasants are more revolutionary than the owner-peasants,
but less so than the semi-hired peasants.
The semi-hired peasants and farm laborers are both hired peasants in the
countryside, and suffer from landlord exploitation, although their financial
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positions differ. The semi-hired peasants do not own land, but they have
adequate farm tools and some liquid capital. Peasants in this group can
receive one half of their annual productive labor. They make up for the
deficit by growing miscellaneous grains, catching fish and shrimp, and keep-
ing chickens and pigs to eke out their livelihood. In their assiduous
struggle for livelihood, they take comfort in the thought of working hard
for life. Their livelihood is more miserable than that of semi-owner peas-
ants, but better than farm laborers. On the other hand, they are more
revolutionary than the semi-owner peasants, but less so than farm laborers.
The farm laborers constitute the agricultural proletariat. There are the
long-term laborers, monthly laborers, and sundry laborers. These farm
laborers not only own no land and farm implements, but also not the slight-
est liquid capital. They live from hand to mouth every day. They exceed
other workers in their long hours of work, meager wages, poor treatment,
and uncertainty of employment. These persons suffer the most in the coun-
tryside. In promoting the peasant movement, we must pay particular atten-
tion to them. In the countryside, handicraft workers hold a higher posi-
tion than the farm laborers, since the former have their own tools and also
perform a free occupation. With burden of families, and wages incompatible
with cost of living, the handicraft workers share the oppression of poverty
and the fear of unemployment with farm laborers, and lead a life similar to
that of farm laborers.
The vagabond proletariat consist of peasants who lost their land and handi-
craft workers who lost the opportunity to work because of exploitation and
oppression perpetrated by imperialists, warlords, and landlords, and flood,.
drought, and other natural disasters. Among them are soldiers, bandits,
thieves, beggars, and prostitutes. The five are designated and regarded
by society differently, although they are alike as human beings. In their
different methods of seeking the same end of livelihood, the soldiers engage
in "fighting," the bandits in "robbing," the thieves in "stealing," the
beggars in "pleading," and prostitutes in "charming." They are the most
unstable among mankind. In all areas, they have their won secret organiza-
tions, such as San-ho-hui 10005 5071 2585] in Hunan, Hupeh, Kueichou, and
Szechwan; Ta-tao-hui [1129 0430 2585] in Anhwei, Honan, and Shantung; Tsai-
li-hui [0961 3810 2585] in Hopeh and the northeast provinces; and the Blue
Gang in Shanghai, as mutual-aid organizations in their political and finan-
cial struggles. The settlement of these persons constitute one of the great-
est and most difficult problems in China. As poverty and unemployment are
two problems in China, a settlement of the unemployment problem would amount
to putting to rest one-half of the problems in China. The number of Chinese
vagabond proletariat is alarming, totalling more than 20,000,000. These per-
sons are capable of brave struggle. Under proper guidance, they can become
a revolutionary force.
In organizing peasants, we mean to organize owner-peasants, semi-owner peas-
ants, semi-hired peasants, farm laborers, and handicraft workers into one
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organization. In principle, we employ the method of strife against land-
lords to demand financial and political concessions. In special circum-
stances, such as we encounter in Haifeng and Kwangning where the most re-
actionary and vicious local despots are tramping upon the people, we must
completely strike them down. Regarding the vagabond proletariat, we should
persuade them to help the peasant associations and to join the great revolu-
tionary movement to seek settlement of the unemployment problem. We should
not force them to join the enemy side to become part of the counterrevolu-
tionary force.
?CHUNG-KUO NUNG-MIN, No 1, Chinese National Central Executive Committee,
Peasant Bureau, January 1926.
6693
CSO: 4005
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ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSES IN CHINESE SOCIETY
1 February 1926
[Text] Who are our enemies? Who are out friends? One cannot be a revolu-
tionist if one cannot distinguish between enemies and friends. It is, how-
ever, by no means easy to distinguish between enemies and friends. That
the Chinese revolution has been going on for 30 years with scant results is
not due to errors in its goal, but is entirely due to errors in strategy.
The so-called errors in strategy were that we could not rally our real friends
to attack our real enemies. The reason why we could not do this was that we
did not distinguish who were our enemies and who were our friends. A revolu-
tionary party is a guide of the masses. In the army, there can be no vic-
tory in fighting if its guide leads them astray. In a revolutionary move-
ment, it will be impossible to avoid failure if the revolutionary party
takes the wrong road. We are all revolutionaries who lead the way for the
masses, and are the guides for the masses. Nonetheless, we cannot but ask
ourselves: "Do we have this ability? Won't we lead the masses onto the
road of defeat? Are we sure to succeed? In order to ensure that we will
"not lead to the wrong road" and "be sure to succeed," we cannot but devote
ourselves to an important strategy. In order to decide on this strategy,
it is necessary to first. distinguish between those who are our enemies and
those who are our friends.
The Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang served as
the declaration of this strategy and the distinction between enemies and
friends. But this manifesto is rather simplistic. If we want to understand
this important strategy and to distinguish between real enemies and friends,
we must make a general analysis on the economic status, class characters,
and number of people of the various classes in Chinese society, and their
attitudes towards the revolution.
There are bound to be three classes of people in any country--the upper,
middle and lower classes. A detailed analysis will show five classes--the
big bourgeoisie, the middle bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, the semi-
proletariat and the proletariat. In the case of the rural areas, the:big
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landlords constitute the big bourgeoisie, the small landlords are the middle
bourgeoisie, the self-farming peasants are the petty bourgeoisie; the
tenant peasants are the semi-proletariat, and the hired peasants are the
proletariat. In the case of the cities, the big bourgeoisie are the big
bankers, the big businessmen and the big industrialists. The money-shop
owners, the middle merchants and the small factory owners are the middle
bourgeoisie, while the small merchants and handicrafts operators are the
petty bourgeoisie. The shopkeepers, peddlers and handicraftsmen are the
semi-proletariat, and factory workers and the so-called coolie are the
proletariat. These five categories of people fall into.different economic
strata, and are fraught with varying class character. Consequently, they
cherish diverse attitudes toward the contemporary revolution, such as being
counterrevolutionary, semi-counterrevolutionary, neutral toward revolution,
taking part in revolution, or serving as the main force of revolution.
The attitude of the various classes in China toward the national revolution
resembles almost completely the attitude of the various classes in the capit-
alist countries of Western Europe toward their social revolution. This
may seem strange, but it really is not. The reason is that the contemporary
revolution [and the social revolution in Europe] is one and the same, fought
with a similar goal and tactic. The goal is to overthrow international capi-
talist imperialism, and the tactic is to unite the oppressed peoples and
oppressed classes to fight together. This is the greatest characteristic
which makes the contemporary revolution different from all revolutions in
history.
Let us take a look at the various classes in Chinese society.
First, there is the big bourgeoisie. In economically backward and semi-
colonial China, the big bourgeoisie was the vassal of the international
capitalists. The prerequisites of its existence and development depended on
imperialism. For example, [they included] compradores--such as bankers
(Lu Tsung-yu and Ch'en Lien-por), merchants, (T'ang Shao-i and Robert Ho-
tung), industrialists (Chang Ch'ien and Sheng En-hsi), big landlords,
(Chang Tso-lin and Ch'en Kung-shou), bureaucrats (Sun Pao-ch'i and Yen
Hui-ch'ing), and warlords (Chang Tso-lin and Ts'ao K':un).
Reactionary intellectuals--they are the appendages of the four categories
of people mentioned above. The higher ranking staff of compradore types of
banks, industries and business, plutocrats, high government officials, poli-
ticians, some returned students from Japan and the West, professors and
students of universities and colleges, and lawyers are also in this class.
This class is entirely incompatible with the goals of the national revolu-
tion. Standing consistently on the side of imperialism, they are ex-
tremely counterrevolutionary. They number fewer than 1 million, which is
.25 percent of our population of 400 million people, and they are the
deadly enemies of the national revolutionary movement.
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Second, there is the middle bourgeoisie. This is the Chinese-owned bank-
ing, and industrial and commercial class. In economically backward China,
the development of banks, and industry and business is still limited to the
middle bourgeoisie. The so-called banks refer to small banks and money
shops, while industry refers to factories on a small scale, and commerce refers
to merchants handling native goods. All big banks and industry and
business had some ties with capital, and they can only be classified under
the comprador class.)
The small landlords class. Many of the higher intelligentsia--such as the
staff of the Chinese-owned banks, the industrial and business establishments,
most of the returned students from Japan and the West, some college pro- .
fessors and students, and small lawyers belonged to this class. It was the
ambition of this class to strive for the status of the big bourgeoisie, but
it was hampered by the impact of foreign capital and the oppression of the
warlords. Consequently, this class has adopted a contradictory attitude toward
the national revolution. That is, whenever they feel the agonies of the blow
of foreign capital and the oppression of the warlords, they wanted to engage
in revolution and supported the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord revolu-
tionary movement. However, because of the vigorous participation in the
present revolutionary movement by the proletariat at home and the active
support of the international proletariat abroad, they sensed a threat to
the existence and development of the big bourgeoisie status to which they
aspire. Thus, they have become suspicious of the revolution. This class
is the so-called national bourgeoisie whose political platform is national-
ism--to realize a state ruled by a single class, the national bourgeoisie.
The "true disciple" (as he professed himself) of this is Tai Chi-t'ao who
wrote in CHEN PAO, Peking: "Raise your left hand to overthrow imperialism
and your right hand to overthrow the Communists!" This describes vividly
the contradiction and ambivalence of this class. They are opposed to using
the theory of class struggle to interpret the Principle of'the People's
Livelihood; they are opposed to the Kuomintang's alliance with Russia and
the admission of communists into that party. Nonetheless, the attempt of
this class to realize a state ruled by the national bourgeoisie has proved
to be completely infeasible. This is because the current world situation
is one in which the two great forces of revolution and counterrevolution are
locked in a final struggle. Hoisted by these two great forces are two
large banners: one being the red banner of revolution which is held high
by the Third International, calling on the oppressed nations and classes
to stand under it on one side; the other being the white banner of counter-
revolution, which is held high by the League of Nations, calling on the coun-
terrevolutionaries of the world to stand under it on the other side. It is
therefore essential for the intermediate classes, such as the so-called
Second International in the West, and the so-called Nationalists in China,
to be separated quickly, either to turn left to join the revolutionists,
or to turn right to join the counterrevolutionaries. There could be no
room for their "independence." Consequently, the ideology of an "independ-
ent" revolution on the part of China's middle bourgeoisie with its own class
interests as the main basis is merely an illusion. Although they are still
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only semi-counterrevolutionary, and although they have not yet become our
frontal enemies, nevertheless, as they begin to feel more the threat of the
workers and peasant class, and as they are compelled more and more to make
concessions to the interests of the workers and peasants class (such as
the rent reduction movement in rural villages and labor strikes in the
cities), they or a portion of them (the right wing of the middle bourgeoisie)
are bound to stand on the side of imperialism, thereby becoming counter-
revolutionary and our enemies completely. It has transpired that between
compradores and noncompradores, there are some who cannot be distinguished
readily. Take commerce for example, it is true that among many merchants,
there is a very clear distinction between merchants of foreign goods and
merchants of native products. Nonetheless, in some shops, they offer both
native and foreign goods side by side. Take the intellectual class for
example, there' are many returned students from Japan among the children
of small landlords. It is true that apart from their semi-native flavor,
they have also acquired some semi-foreign flavor. Even among the children
of small landlords who study in universities and colleges in China, be-
cause they have been taught by returned students that are semi-native and
semi-foreign, they could not but become semi-native and semi-foreign them-
selves. These people cannot be characterized as purely national bourgeoisie,
but may be called "semi-national bourgeoisie." This is the right wing of
middle bourgeoisie, and when the struggle of national revolution is intensi-
fied, they are bound to hasten to join the ranks of imperialist warlords,
thereby becoming good companions of the compradores. The left wing of mid-
dle bourgeoisie, namely, those who are totally unaffiliated with imperialism,
might be rather revolutionary at times (such as during the high tide of some
boycott of foreign goods). Nonetheless, it is not easy to shatter their
vain concept of "peace," and they are constantly frightened by the so-called
"Bolshevization." They tend to be compromising toward revolution and can-
not last long. Thus, there are also many dangerous elements in China's
middle bourgeoisie, whether they belong to the right wing or the left wing.
With the exception of a small minority who have special historical background
and environment, we cannot expect them to bravely embark on the revolutionary
road, and undertake the revolutionary enterprise loyally along with the
other classes. The number of people in the middle bourgeoisie is at most one
in every 100 (1 percent) in China, and so there are about 4 million of them.
Third, The Petty Bourgeoisie
To this category belong the owner peasants, small merchants, handicrafts
operators, small intellectuals--minor officials, clerks, middle school students
and teachers, small lawyers, etc. Both numerically and in its class charac-
ters, this class deserves great attention. The owner peasants of the petty
bourgeois alone number some 100 to 120 million; the number of small merchants,
handicrafts operators and intellectuals ranges from 20 to 30 million. The
combined total is about 130 million. Although these people share the same
bourgeois economic status, there are, in fact, three different sections.
The first section comprises those people who have surplus money and rice,
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that is, after supporting themselves with the income from their own phys-
ical or mental labor, they can still have some surpluses each year which
can be used to create the so-called preliminary accumulation of capital.
This kind of people are strongly inclined to "get rich." Although they have
no illusions tb.:amass huge fortunes, they nevertheless want to climb to the
status of middle bourgeoisie. They.envy those who have gathered a small
fortune and . who seem to get so much respect, and consequently, they worship
Marshal Chao [the legendary god of wealth] diligently. They are rather
timorous, being afraid of officials and also of revolution to some extent.
Because of the fact that their economic status approaches that of the mid-
dle bourgeoisie, they are therefore rather susceptible to the latter's
propaganda; and tend to be skeptical toward revolution. However, this
section is a minority among the petty bourgeoisie, being less than 10 per-
cent of them, or about 15 million, forming the right wing of the petty
bourgeoisie. The second section of the petty bourgeoisie is barely self-
sufficient, as their annual income is about equal to their expenditure.
They differ largely from the first section of people. They also would like
to be rich, but Marshal Chao won't let them. Under the oppression and ex-
ploitation of imperialism, warlords, and big and middle bourgeoisie in
recent years, they have begun to realize that the present world is no
longer like the world of the past. They realize that if they should ex-
pend the same labor as they did before, it would not be possible to main-
tain their livelihood. It is now necessary to increase labor time by rising
early and paying double attenton to their chores in order to survive. They
become abusive: they dub foreigners "foreign devils," scold the warlords
as "robber commanders," and denounce local despots and evil gentry for their
"ill-begotten wealth." In regard to the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord
movements, their only doubt is that they might not succeed, because "for-
eigners and commanders seemed to be so formidable" to them. Thus, they
take a neutral stand, not daring to participate in it resolutely, though
they are absolutely: by no means anti-revolutionary. The number of this
section is very large, almost one-half of the petty bourgeoisie, or 75
million. The third section consists of those who incur deficits every year.
Many of these people used to belong to families of moderate means, but
they have declined gradually, becoming barely able to break even at first,
and suffering from losses later. At the time of settlement of accounts
each year,. they are shocked, sighing: "We have lost money again!" Be-
cause they have had better times before, they would "shudder at the future
prospects" as their fortunes declined and as they contracted more and more
debts. Because of this comparison between now and before, these people
are important in the revolutionary movement and have the strength to push
the revolution. forward. Their number is about 40 percent of the petty
bourgeoisie or 60 million. They are sizable among the petty bourgeoisie
and form its left wing. The above-mentioned three sections of the petty
bourgeoisie may differ in their attitudes toward the revolution at normal
time. But in wartime, that is, when the revolutionary tide is high and
when victory seems to be in sight, then not only the left wing but also
the middle section of petty bourgeoisie would join the revolution. The
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right wingers, under the impact of the proletariat and the left wing of the
petty bourgeoisie, could not but also join it. Judging our experiences from
the 30 May Movement and the peasant movement in the last 2 years, this
assessment seems to be correct.
Fourth, The Semi-Proletariat
The so-called semi-proletariat mentioned here consists of: (1) the semi-
owner peasants, (2) tenant peasants, (3) poor peasants, (4) handicrafts-
men, (5) shop assistants, and (6) peddlers. Among the peasants of China,
the number of semi-owner peasants is about 50 million, while tenant peasants
and poor peasants number some 60 million each, making a total of 170 mil-
lion. The so-called peasant problem is largely their problem. Although
these three kinds of peasants belong to the semi-proletariat together,
their economic conditions may be further classified as upper, middle and
poor. In the case of semi-owner peasants, their lives are worse than the
owner peasants because they are short of one half of the food they need for
sustenance. To make up the deficit, they have to rent land from others, or
to work for others, or engage in petty trade. In late spring and early
summer when the harvest is not yet ready, they often have to borrow money
at usurious interest rates or buy grain at exorbitant prices. Their situa-
tion is naturally worse than that of the owner peasants who are self-suffi-
cient, but better than that of the tenant peasants. This is because of the
fact that the tenant peasants do not own land, and so they can take in only
half of the harvest each year. The semi-owner peasants, though they can
garner only half of the harvest from their rented land, or even less than
half of it, they can, nonetheless, reap the entire harvest of the land they
own. Thus, the revolutionary character of semi-owner peasants is better
than that of the owner peasants, but not as great as that of the tenant
peasants. Both the tenant peasants and the poor peasants are tenants ex-
ploited by landlords, though there is some difference in their economic
status. Although tenant peasants do not have land, they have sufficient.
farm implements and some current capital. Such peasants can earn half of
their own fruits of labor, and the shortages can be made up by planting
cereal crops, fishing, chicken farming and pig-raising, thereby enabling
them to eke out a living. They may suffer from hardships, but their live-
lihood is harder than that of the semi-owner peasants but better off than
that of the poor peasants. Nonetheless, their revolutionary character is
superior to that of semi-owner peasants, but not as good as that of the
poor peasants. In the case of poor peasants, they lack not only sufficient
farm implements, but also current'capital. Moreover, they are short of
fertilizers, and when there is lean harvest, they earn almost nothing after
delivering their rents. During a famine, they have often to beg their
friends and relatives to borrow a few sheng or bushels of grain to tide
them over for a few days. They become burdened with heavy debts. They
are the most distressed among the peasants, and so are more receptive
to revolutionary propaganda. The handicraftsmen are called semi-proletariat
because they own their own tools and are also self-employed. Their economic
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status resembles that of tenant peasants in agriculture. But because of
their heavy family burdens and because of the gap between wages and living
costs, they are often plagued by poverty and by the dread of unemployment,
resembling largely what happens to tenant peasants. The shop assistants are
employees of middle and small. merchants earning meagre wages to eke out a
living. However, despite the steady increases of commodity prices every
year, their pay is adjusted only once in several years. They will tell you
their sad story if you should get into a casual conversation with them.
Thus their status is about the same as that of handicraftsmen, and they are
receptive to revolutionary propaganda. In the case of peddlers, whether
they carry their wares on their shoulders or set up stalls in the streets,
they all have very little capital and earn meagre profit which is hardly
sufficient to live on. Their status is about the same as that of the poor
peasants, and like the latter, they also need a revolution that will change
the status quo. The number of handicraftsmen is about 6 percent of the
entire population, or 26 million; there are about 5 million shop assistants
and 1 million peddlers. Combining these people with the semi-owner peasants,
semi-tenant peasants and tenant peasants, the total number of people in the
semi-proletariat is about 200 million, being one-half of the entire Chinese
population.
Fifth, The Proletariat
The categories and the number of proletariat are as follows: industrial
proletariat, about 2 million; urban coolie labor, about 3 million, and
agricultural proletariat, about 20 million. Their combined number is about
45 million.
Because of China's backward economy,. the number of industrial workers (the
industrial proletariat) is rather, small. Most of the 2 million industrial
workers, are found in these five kinds of industries, namely: railroads,
mining, maritime transportation, textiles and shipbuilding. Most of
these industries are operated with foreign capital. Thus, although the
industrial proletariat is not numerous, it has become the main force of the
national revolutionary movement. We will realize the important position
of the industrial proletariat in national revolution if we take a look at
the strength that has been demonstrated by the strikes in the last 4 years,
such as the seamen's strikes, the railway strike, the strikes of the
Kailuan and Chiao-tso coal mines, as well as the general strikes in Shang-
hai and Hong Kong since the 30 May Incident. The first reason why they have
become so important is their concentration, and no other people could com-
pare to their "organized concentration." The second reason is that, with
their low economic status, they would be left only with empty hands after
losing their means of production. They have no hope of making a fortune.
Meanwhile, they have been subjected to the ruthless treatment of imperial-
ism, warlords and compradores, and consequently, they have become most adept
at struggling. The strength of the urban coolies also merits attention.
They consist mostly of dock workers and rickshamen. Street cleaners and
nightsoil movers also belong to this category. They possess almost nothing
except their hands. Though their economic position is somewhat similar
to that of industrial workers, they are not so concentrated organizationally,
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nor are they so important as a productive force. Since there is as yet no
modern capitalist agriculture in China, the so-called agricultural proletar-
iat refers to such hired peasants as hired laborer by the year, monthly
hired laborer,'and day laborer. They have neither farm tools nor funds,
and so they can only sell their labor to eke out a living. Compared to
other workers, they have to work longer hours, and their wages are the
lowest, and there is no security of employment. They are the most handi-
capped people in the villages, and occupy a position in the peasant move-
ment that is as important as the poor peasants.
The lumpen proletariat consists of peasants deprived of land and handi-
craftsmen deprived of their opportunity to work. They number some 20 mil-
lion or more, and constitute the root causes of banditry and war. The largest
segment of lumpen proletariat consists of bandits, followed by soldiers,
then beggars, robbers and thieves, and prostitutes. They are most unstable
in human existence. They have their secret organizatons in China, such as
the Triad Society in Fukien and Kwangtung, the Society of Brothers in Hunan,
Hupei, Kweichow and Szechwan, the Big Sword Society in Anhwei, Honan and
Shantung, the Rational Life Society in Chih-li and the three northeastern
provinces, and the Green and Red Gangs in Shanghai and elsewhere. These
secret organizations all serve as their organs of mutual aid in political
and economic struggles. The most difficult problem is how to handle these
people. The two problems of China are: poverty and unemployment. Thus,.if
.the problem of unemployment is solved, it would be tantamount to solving
one-half of China's problems. These people are capable of waging valiant
struggle, and when they are guided properly, the can become a revolutionary
force. The above are arranged in the following table:
CLASS No of People Attitude toward Revolution
(millions)
Big bourgeoisie
1
Middle bourgeoisie
4
Petty bourgeoisie
With suplus right wing
15
Self-sufficient center
75
Deficient left wing
60-65
Extremely counterrevolutionary
Right wing is counterrevolutionary,
left wing could join revolution
sometimes, but may compromise with
enemy; semi-counterrevolutionary
as a whole. '
Like middle bourgeoisie, semi-
counterrevolutionary in normal times,
but many respond to revolution at war
Neutral at normal times, but join
revolution at wartime
Welcome revolution.
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Semi-proletariat
Semi-owner peasants
50
Participation
Tenant peasants
60
Active participation
Poor peasants
60
Brave in struggle
Handicraftsmen
24
Same as tenant peasants
Shop assistants
5
Same as tenant peasants
Peddlers
1
Same as poor peasants
Proletariat
Industrial proletariat
2
Main revolutionary force
Urban coolie
3
Main force after industrial pro-
Agricultural proletariat
20
letariat
Brave in struggle
Vagrant proletariat
20
Can be guided to form revolu-
tionary force
We can now answer the question as to who are our enemies and who are our
friends. All those who connive with imperialism--warlords and bureaucrats,
compradores, big landlords, reactionary intellectuals--the so-called big
bourgeoisie of China, are our enemies, and our real enemies. All petty
bourgeoisie, semi-proletariat and proletariat are our true friends. As for
the wavering middle bourgeoisie, its right wing should be regarded as our
enemy--if not now, it is not too far away. Its left wing may be regarded
as our friend--but not true friend, and we must be vigilant toward them.
Don't let them jeopardize our front! How many true friends do we have?
About 395 million. How many real enemies do we have? About 1 million. How
many intermediate people who can either be friends or enemies? There are
about 4 million. Let us count these 4 million as our enemies so that they
could have an organization of 5 million people. It would still be impossible
for them even to withstand the splitting of 39.5 million people!
Let the 395 million people of China unite together!
?CHUNG-KUO NUNG-MIN, vol 1, No 2; Peasants Bureau, Executive Committee,
Chinese Nationalist Party, 1 February 1926.
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NATIONAL REVOLUTION AND PEASANT MOVEMENT--FOREWORD TO 'NUNG-MIN WEN-T'I
TS'UNG-K'AN'
1 September 1926
[Text] The peasant problem is the central problem of national revolution.
Unless the peasants rise up to join and support the national revolution, the
revolution will.-not succeed. Unless the peasant movement is launched quick-
ly, the peasant problem will not be solved. Unless the peasant problem is
solved to some extent in the existing revolutionary movement, the peasants
will not support this revolution. There are still many people who do not
understand these reasons now, even within the revolutionary party. They
do not understand that in an economically backward semi-colony, the foremost
target of revolution is the rural patrimonial feudal class (landlord class).
In an economically backward semi-colony, both for imperialism without and
the ruling class within, peasants are the main target of their oppression
and exploitation. In order to realize their oppression and exploitation,
they must rely on the firm support of the feudal landlords. They have no
means to practice their oppression otherwise. Thus, the rural feudal class
in an economically backward semi-colony is the only solid foundation for
the domestic ruling class and external imperialism. Without first shaking
this foundation, it would be impossible to shake the superstructure of this
foundation. The warlords of China are chieftains of these rural feudal
classes. It is penny wise pound foolish for one to say that warlords should
be overthrown, but not the rural feudal classes. A plain example is the
situation in Kwangtung: wherever the native bullies, bad gentry and corrupt
bureaucrats are less active, it must be a county in which the peasant move-
ment has been launched and there is mass participation of peasants in the
Peasants Association. In other words, a country where Ch'en Ch'iung-ming's
influences have. been curtailed must be a county where the peasants have
risen. It may be said that a year ago, Ch'en Ch'iung-ming--not the revolu-
tionary government--controlled Kwangtung. In the past year and up to now,
Kwangtung has been controlled equally by the Revolutionary Government and
Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, although Ch'en was not physically in Kwangtung himself.
From now on, the peasants must gradully stand up in the various counties
in Kwangtung before it will truly show that Ch'en Ch'iung-ming's
influences are steadily diminishing there.
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In Hai-feng, Ch'en Ch'iung-ming's native county, local bullies, bad gentry
and corrupt bureaucrats once proliferated. But after a Peasants Association
of 50,000 familes and 250,000 people was formed, it has become better ad-
ministered than any other county in Kwangtung. The magistrate there dared not
to do evil; tax officials dared not take bribes; the entire country was free
from bandits; and there were no local bullies and bad gentry tyrannizing
over the people.
Thus, it will be seen that the situation of Chinese revolution is like this:
it is either a base of imperialism and warlords in which local bullies, bad
gentry, and corrupt bureaucrats suppress the peasants, or a base of the
revolutionary forces in which the, peasants rise up to suppress the local
bullies, bad gentry and corrupt bureaucrats. The Chinese revolution can
be carried out only in this form and no other. It is incumbent on all parts
of China to achieve what has been done in Hai-feng before it may be con-
sigiered revolutionary victory, and it would be nothing, otherwise. It is
incumbent on all parts of China to achieve what has been done in Hai-feng
before the bases of imperialism and the warlords may be said to have been
really shaken. Otherwise, it cannot be considered so. Consequently, it
will be seen that in the so-called national revolutionary movement, a major
part of it is the peasant movement. Thus, it will be seen that those who
do not emphasize or even abhor the peasant movement are actually sympathetic
toward local bullies, bad gentry and corrupt bureaucrats. In fact, they
do not want to overthrow the warlords, or to oppose imperialism.
There are people who deem that the rampancy of compradores in the cities
is entirely similar to the rampancy of landlords in rural areas, and so they
should be mentioned together. This is correct in regard to their being ram-
pant, but incorrect to say that they are completely similar. There are only
a few places in China along the sea and the rivers where the compradore
class is concentrated, such as Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin
and Dairen, unlike the domains of landlords which spread into various prov-
inces and countries throughout China. Politically, all warlords in China,
big and small, are chieftains chosen by landlord class (not including band-
rupt small landlords). These feudal landlord chieftains--feudal warlords
make use of the urban compradore class to connive with imperialism. Both
in name and in fact, it is the warlords who occupy the principal position,
while the compradore class is subordinate. Financially, the warlord
government spends several hundred million dollars annually, of which 90
percent is directly squeezed from the peasants dominated by the landlord
class. The loans made with special conditions to the Peking government by
the compradore class, such as the Bankers' Association, etc., are compara-
tively few. This is why I feel that the urban workers, students and middle
and small merchants should rise up to attack the compradores fiercely and
to cope with imperialism directly. The progressive working class is, above
all, the leader of all revolutionary classes. However, if there are no
peasants to overthrow the special privileges of patrimonial and feudal land-
lords in the villages, then the influences of warlords and imperialism can-
not be basically destroyed.
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Based on this reason, apart from organizing the workers and students, we
must mobilize a large number of comrades to be resolved to undertake the
gigantic work of organizing peasants. They must make an immediate resolution
to start studying peasant problems. It is also necessary to apply for orders
from the party in order to proceed to some familiar or unfamiliar villages.
This involves enduring the scorching heat of summer and the severe cold
and snow of winter to hold hands with peasants, to inquire what are their
hardships and what they want. Based on their agonies and needs, we must
guide them to organize, to struggle against local bullies and bad gentry,
to cooperate with urban workers, students, and middle and small merchants
in forming a united front, and to participate in the anti-imperialist and
anti-warlord national revolutionary movement. We estimate that among the
300 million peasant masses in China, if 10 percent should join Peasant
Associations, it will be possible to recruit some 30 million or more organ-
ized peasants. Especially in such provinces as Hunan, Kwangtung and Kiangsi
in the south, Chihli, Shantung and Honan in the north, and Hupeh and Anhwei
in central China, which are particularly important politically, mass efforts
should be made in organizing. With the rising of the peasants from these
important provinces, it will be easy for peasants from the remaining prov-
inces to follow suit. It is only by then that the foundations of imperialism
and the warlords will be shaken and a bona fide victory will be achieved by
national revolution.
As we mention the studying of peasant problem, we begin to realize the in-
sufficiency of data. Naturally, such data will become more abundant as the
peasant movement is being developed. At present, besides Kwangtung, the
peasant movement is just beginning in other provinces, and so data are
extremely scant. This time we have just collected this much which is printed
as a set of books for the references of comrades engaged in the peasant move-
ment. The portion concerning investigations on rural conditions in the
various provinces has been written by some 300 students of the 6th class of
the Peasant Movement Institute. These reports have been discussed at the
Peasant Problem Study Meetings organized by students in their respective
provinces, and have been printed after a considerable period of reviewing
and screening. They have not done any detailed investigations on peasant
conditions before, and so what they have told is rather sketchy. However,
because we did not even have such sketchy material, it seems precious to
have this bit. It behooves us to accept this sketchy outline with the hope
that within a short period of time, it will be possible to obtain detailed
and concrete investigation report on the entire country from the practical
work and studying in various parts of China. In regard to the data concern-
ing the problem of agricultural production, only five categories (22d-26th)
have been collected in this book. There is no lack of materials on this
problem, but because of the pressure for time in publishing it, there is
not time to canvass them, but a separate publication will be issued later.
The peasant problem originally embraces the problems on two aspects, namely:
the problem of man-made oppression by imperialism, warlords and landlords,
etc.; and the problem of nature's oppression such as the natural disasters
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of flood and drought, insect pestilences, inferior techniques and produc-
tion decreases, etc. Although the former is an urgent problem on which the
attention of our comrades should be focused, the latter problem is also
rather serious, and we must pay great attention to it. In order to resolve
the latter problem, it is necessary to have a nationwide revolutionary regime
as well as scientific methods which, though not immediately feasible, will
come soon. We must make preparations in advance. In this book there are eight
kinds of materials'concerning Kwangtung. This is the best part of the book.
It tells us the methods of conducting the peasant movement. Those who do
not understand how to launch such movement should read this part carefully.
It also enables us to understand the character of China's peasant movement
in that it is a movement of class struggle in which political and economic
struggles are merged together. What is demonstrated most uniquely is in
political struggle which is somewhat different from the character of labor
movement in the cities. What the urban working class is striving for is the
completion freedom of assembly politically. They are not yet interested in
destroying the political status of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the
rural peasants have, from the very outset, to cope with the political power
that has for millenniums been used by local bullies, bad gentry and big land-
lords to oppress and squeeze them (this landlord regime is the real basis of
warlord regime). Thus, unless this oppressive regime is overthrown, it
will be impossible for the peasants to have their own status. This is the
most significant characteristic of China's current peasant movement. Judging
from the experiences of peasant movement in the last 5 years, and after read-
ing "The Resolution of the Peasant Conference of Kwangtung," "Report on
Hai-feng's Peasant Movement," and "The Story of Resistance of Peasants of
Kwang-ning and P'u-ning against Landlords," we cannot but have such a feel-
ing. This publication also includes some foreign data (15th to 18th),
though not too many. There is a wealth of materials from foreign countries,
especially on Russia's peasant movement and agrarian economy, but nobody has
yet translated them carefully. In this book, the article on Russian peasants
and revolution is comparatively more detailed.. We can also compare it with
the conditions in China.
1 September 1926
o PEASANT MOVEMENT, No 8, 21 September 1926
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THE AGONY AND RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OF PEASANTS IN KIANGSU AND CHEKIANG
25 November 1926
[Text] Kiangsu and Chekiang are two provinces in China where industry and
commerce are highly developed. Consequently, people pay more attention to
the workers and merchants there, while the peasants seem to occupy lower
position. Moreover, it has been generally assumed that because these two
provinces are peaceful and rich in resources, their peasants are better
off. In fact, this kind of interpretation is rather superficial, and it
betrays a complete lack of understanding regarding the actual conditions
of rural villages in Kiangsu and Chekiang. If we should try to investigate
the actual conditions, we will realize that they are completely contrary to
our conjectures. The concrete facts in each county as mentioned below con-
stitute only a small portion of the data that we have obtained recently.
Nonetheless, this is enough to prove that the peasants in Kiangsu and
Chekiang are not so peaceful, prosperous and free from agonies as the gen-
eral public has imagined.
Ch'ung-ming: an island at the mouth of the Yangtze River, its entire terri-
tory constitutes the country of Ch'ung-ming. The island was created by
Yangtze River's alluvial deposits of mud and sand. On. the fringes of the
island new sand bars are formed each year, which in turn serve as sandy
fields farmed by tenant peasants. Take Shang-sha for instance. The land-
lords there are extremely ruthless in exploiting tenant peasants. They
usually demand 50 yuan as security money for each 1,000 steps [pu 2975] of
land. Because this kind of land consists entirely of newly formed sandy
fields, the peasants have to convert it into ripe farmland for their land-
lords. By then, the landlords would have.ownership over the land, while
the peasants have the right to cultivate it. However, they must secure the
labor, fertilizer, farm implements, and seeds that are needed for planting
each year. After the autumn harvest, each 1,000 steps of'farmland will
have to deliver 500 catties or even more of grain for rent. When the land-
lord comes to visit his tenant, he must be invited to a good meal and wine.
Otherwise, the rent might be increased. The steelyard used by landlords to
weigh grain delivered by tenants as rent generally takes 20 ounces for a catty.
If the peasant displays any kind of resistance, he is immediately sent to the
county government for punishment. If the peasant owes 5 yuan in rent this
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year, he has to pay back 10 or 20 yuan next year. As a result, many peas-
ants become bankrupt each year. The peasants here staged a riot in the 11th
year of the Republic. There were no Reds or Bolsheviks to incite them, but
they marched together to attack the police station, cut off the ear of a land-
lord by the name of T'ao, and went to demonstrate at the magistrate's office,
demanding reduction of rents. Later, because of the lack of solidarity,
their leader was arrested and the riot failed. This year, Kiangsu has been
hit by drought, and the harvest has declined. At Shang-sha, the harvest
per 1,000 steps of land was only some 300 or 400 catties, yet the landlords
insisted that their tenants deliver 500 catties of grain for rent as before.
The landlords even used the "Resolution of the Tenant Maintenance Committee"
to deceive the peasants (the committee was organized by landlords in 1922 to
persecute the peasants). Consequently, the hatred of peasants toward their
landlords has intensified, and riots will soon erupt. -
Chiang-yin: From Wu-hsi one can take the steamer to a place called Ku-shan-
chen which is located between the three counties of Chiang-yin, Ch'ang-shu
and Wu-hsi. Big landlords abound in these three counties, and they are ruth-
less in oppressing tenant peasants. Last autumn, Chou Shui-p'ing, a native
of Ku-shan who is a returned student from Japan (Chou was a graduate of the
Provincial Normal School at Wu-hsi), returned to his own village. He did
not like what he saw, and so he persuaded the tenant peasants to set up an
organization called "Tenants Cooperative Society for Self-salvation."
Chou traveled to different villages to talk about the agonies of tenant
peasants, and sometimes he became so emotional that tears fell from his eyes.
He recruited many followers from among Ku-shan's peasants. In the bordering
counties of Chiang-yin, Ch'ang-shu and Wu-hsi, peasants were incited by him
to rise against the evil gentry and big landlords. They unanimously demanded
that the rents be reduced. Nevertheless, before the peasants had coalesced
themselves completely, the evil gentry and big landlords had joined forces.
In Chiang-yin, Ch'ang-shu and Wu-hsi, they took action simultaneously, making
their accusation by letters and by telegrams to [General] Sun Ch'uan-fang.
How could Sun Ch'uan-fang not listen to the charges of these evil gentry and
landlords? Thus, in November last year, the Tenants Cooperative Society
for Self-salvation was dissolved and Chou Shui-p'ing was arrested. Chou was
executed in January this year, and so the rent reduction movement has been
suppressed. When Chou Shui-p'ing's coffin was brought back to Ku-shan for
burial, the peasants went to his spiritual shrine in droves to kneel down
to pay their respects. They said: "Since Mr Chou died for us, we must
avenge him!" Due to a severe drought this year, the rice harvest is poor.
The peasants are again calling for rent reduction. This proves that they
are not scared by death. They realize that it is only through solidarity
and struggle that they will make the greedy landlords ease their exploita-
tion. In the eastern villages of Chiang-yin, there is a place called Sha-
chou where peasant resistance against landlords has occurred. The most
sinister example here is that the peasants are required to deliver to land-
lords the rent in advance. This is what the people of Kiangau call de-
livering at the time of Yin while planting at the time of Mou. This is
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also one of the most awful things in the peasant economy. The peasants
there are now demanding that they pay the rent only after the crop has been
hauled in, and are still struggling.
Tan-yang: Described here will be two incidents which occurred in Lu-ch'eng-
chen, Tan-yang (Lu-ch'eng-chen is located in the eastern countryside of Tan-
yang near the Shanghai-Nanking Railway). One incident involved peasant
resistance against a pawnshop which tried to cheat them, and this happened
this summer. The pawnshop at Lu'ch'eng-chen was looted one day by the
remnant soldiers under Ma Pu-jen that had become bandits at Mao-shan, west
of Tan-yang. They did not loot too much from the pawnshop. But in re-
porting the case, the proprietor of the pawnshop lied, alleging that all
the pawned items, including clothes and valuables, had been looted. In the
meantime, he moved these things secretely to some hiding place. When the
peasants of nearby villages who had pawned their belongings there heard about
this trick, they went out to intercept him, recovering some of the original
articles, but they could not get what had been concealed by the pawnshop.
The peasants who had pawned their things joined together to set up a
"Pawners' Union" in order to ask the pawnshop for settlement. As a result,
the pawnshop repaid some of the losses, that is, each pawner getting the
amount equivalent to the pawn price, reaching 900 dollars of compensation in
full settlement. This episode proves.that if the peasants are united, they
will have victory. But if they had no solidarity, then they would have been
cheated by the pawnshop, losing all their pawned articles. The other in-
cident is resistance against the evil gentry and rich peasants who forced
the tenant and poor peasants to pay money for pumping water. This has hap-
pened in this year's summer and fall, but it has not yet been settled. In
the villages of most countries in Kiangsu, a kind of machine-pumping has
been generally-adopted. This is called a "water-pump machine" which re-
places the old hand and foot waterwheels to pump water. The peasants of
several villages near Lu-ch'eng-chen have realized that it would be desirable
to use machinery to pump water. However, the evil gentry and rich peasants
there took advantage of this situation to organize a "Machine Pumping Company"
in order to make some quick profit. They raised 1,400 yuan as capital, bought
a set of machinery which was installed in the river, and issued a notice in
the name of the company that the peasants who wish to pump water pay an an-
nual fee per-mou of land. Those who do not pay would not get water. But
the peasants have also made their own calculations. They found out that
the money paid for each mou of land each year in these villages would be
enough to buy a machine. If they should raise money to buy one, they would
have to pay one time only, but they could use it every year. And if they
use the company's machine, then they must pay so much each year. Conse-
quently, they expressed their vehement opposition to the company of evil
gentry and rich peasants. In the meantime, several primary school teachers
volunteered to help the peasants in setting up an organization called
"Peasants Promotion Association," Under the association's sponsorship,
a "Machine Pumping Cooperative" was formed, collecting money from its mem-
ber peasants according to their acreage, raising 1,400 yuan to buy a
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pumping machine. The offshoot is there are now two pumping machines in the
river, one owned by the company and the other by the cooperative. But no-
body would care to use the former which is now completely idle. Enraged,
the bad gentry made many false charges and pleaded with Sun Ch'uan-fang.
As a result, soldiers were sent into the countryside in search of Bolsheviks,
arresting four persons, and placing three others on their wanted list. It
was further announced that those who refused to use the company's machine
would be dealt with severely. When the soldiers arrived, all able-bodied
men in the village hid in the tall rice stalks, leaving only the old, the
women and children to confront them. In order to avoid arrest, the accused
peasants had to offer bribes to the soldiers amounting to 1,000 yuan or more.
This does not include what the latter had looted during the searches. The
case has not yet been closed. It is gratifying that Sun Ch'uan-fang is now
in some predicament, so the bad gentry of Lu-ch'eng-chen might have to let
it go.
Wu-hsi: At Hus-hang-chen, about 15 li from the city of Wu-hsi, a minor
incident occurred recently. Jung Te-sheng, a prominent tycoon and big land-
lord here, attempted to build a road through the village. Houses and farm-
land was condemned at low prices. This would directly hurt the peasant econ-
omy, so the peasants formed a peasants' club to oppose Jung Te-sheng. Jung
capitulated, offering 200 yuan for each mou of land, and 10 cents each for
the newly planted mulberry trees, and promised to stop tearing down the
houses in the village.
Ch'ing-p'u: In Ch'ing-p'u county along the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway, an
incident occurred last month when peasants there opposed the sale of waste-
land at inflated prices. When peasants bought wasteland before, they used*
to pay 3 yuan per mou. However, some bad gentry colluded with magistrate
Lin Cheng-i to form a company which obtained wasteland at 3 yuan per mou,
selling it to peasants at 12 yuan. The peasants joined together to set up
a reclamation union to oppose it, but they have been intimidated by the
gentry as well as the bureaucrats. The dispute is still unsettled.
T'ai-hsing: At Wang-chia-chuang in the eastern countryside, peasants
demanded rent reduction because of this year's drought. A violent struggle
against the landlords ensued. The landlords not only refused to reduce
rents, but tried to apply pressures on the peasants. One of the peasants
became so exacerbated that he attempted to kill a notorious landlord. The
latter reported it to the magistrate, and 30 peasants were arrested and
imprisoned.
T'ai-hsien: The peasants of Sen-sen-chuang, T.'ai-hsien, started a movement
to demand rent reduction, as there was a drought in summer. Several leaders
were arrested by the government under the pressure of landlords.
Hsu-chou: Among the peasants of Kiangsu, those in Hsu-hai north of the
Yangtze suffer the worst agonies. The Red Spear Society and the Lien-
chuang Society proliferate, and rural struggles are more numerous than
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elsewhere. The terrain of the eastern and northern parts of Tung-shan
county being low, rice crops were submerged under water last year. It is
fortunate that the second wheat crop has been planted, and so peasants may
hope to tide over the famine. The lingering rains this fall have resulted
in flooding the rice fields, and the wheat crop has deteriorated. It is
still uncertain as to when the second wheat crop can be planted. Consequent-
ly, there is general dismay. In the meantime, apart from natural disasters,
the peasants have been plagued by the oppressions and exploitations of greedy
warlords and bureaucrats. Many peasants have degenerated and drifted to
become bandits. This is-why Hsuchow and its vicinities have become known as
a bandit-infested area.
Tz'u-ch'i: Tz'u-ch'i is in Chekiang, west of Ningpo. Recently, a big riot
occurred in the Shan-pei region where the peasants were sturdy and armed
feuds have been recurrent. Moreover, coupled with the unreasonable oppressions
of the bureaucrats and police, and the intensified exploitations of evil
gentry and landlords, the peasants have become more and more enraged and
hateful. It transpired that weather conditions have been bad this year.
Both cotton and rice harvests were poor, but the landlords refused to reduce
any rent. This has led to the eruption of a peasant riot stemming from
famine. As the riot began, it was joined immediately by the vagrant prole-
tariat. On the morning of 13 September, some 2,000 people gathered at the
police office to report famine and they clashed with the police, setting
the premises on fire, and seizing policemen's rifles. The crowd then turned
to the homes of the gentry and landlords to "eat up the big families." They
continued their rampage by destroying the antiques and furniture, windows
and cabinets, and whatever they found in the latter's homes. They did
this every day and refused to desist. Then, the villaege gentry escaped
to the city to make accusations. Soldiers and policemen were sent into the
countryside to arrest the delinquent peasants, but the ringleaders had
mostly fled. "Crime" and "violation of law" have become a commonplace slogan,
and the peasants lost their courage. The riot was suppressed. The failure
of this riot has been caused-.by the lack of organization and guidance among
the masses. Thus, it became a primitive riot which ended in a debacle.
?HSING-TAO CHOU-PAO, No 176, 25 November 1926
2077
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DECLARATION OF THE FIRST HUNAN PEASANT CONGRESS
(Text) Under the political and economic oppression of imperialism and
feudalism, the life of the peasants grows worse day by day. Many are "with-
out a tile over their heads or an inch of ground under their feet," truly
homeless and jobless.
Ever since the power of imperialism invaded the orient destroying our "closed
door policy," and bursting open our agricultural economy, our Chinese peasants
have become the slaves of foreign capitalists. We labor every day to produce
much grain, cotton, hemp, silk and tea and they merely produce a little cash
and buy it up; they use machines to manufacture all kinds of newfangled goods,
ship them over here, and sell them for God knows how much cash. Stuff like
foreign oil, foreign cloth, foreign nails, foreign ceramics and foreign iron--
a limitless number of foreign goods have all flooded our cities and are
gradually forcing their way into our villages. There is no one to buy our
native goods produced without machines and we can't even make a little cash
by farming while the foreign goods makers get richer every day.
The way in which the imperialists exploit us is to dominate our Customs and
ship in goods freely for sale at low prices, taking our silver and destroying
our handicrafts industry; it is to dominate our mines, our railroads, our
waterways, to start factories and banks, using our cheap resources to make
goods for themselves, and taking our coal and iron to control transportation.
The imperialists and the warlords have, moreover, colluded to exploit the
peasants indirectly by imposing local taxes and the salt tax and directly
through acreage tax and surtaxes. In addition, the imperialists have made
many loans to the warlords who in turn exploit the peasants even more
severely in order to repay them. The warlords also use unemployed peasants
as mercenary soldiers with weapons supplied by the imperialists to create
a force with which to oppress the peasants.
The imperialists exercise their money and military power and collude with
the warlords and cbmpradors and after having done this for a while in China
the product of the peasants labor finds its way by twist and turn into
their pockets.
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The exploitation of the peasants by internal warlords and local bullies and
rotten gentry is a kind of feudal exploitive system. They do not exploit
hired labor as does the capitalist but take away a large portion of the
peasants' produce--this is the rent and tax system. So the landlords exploit
the peasants directly and indirectly (e.g., through the tenant peasant
system), and so the warlords exploit them directly (e.g., with respect to
owner-peasants) or indirectly (e.g., with respect to tenant peasants).
Every year they rake off about 60 to 65 percent of the peasants harvest.
They conspire together and coordinate with the imperialists and compradors
to squeeze the peasants' blood and sweat and to jointly suppress the
peasants' resistance. When a drought comes and the peasants are driven
to the end of their forbearance, they naturally rise up violently, often
threatening the overthrow of feudalism and imperialism.
The Taiping Rebellion was an explosion of south China peasants. The Boxer
Rebellion was an explosion of north China peasants. Both, however, were
repressed by the reactionary forces of imperialism and feudalism.
But the revolutionary movement latent in peasant villages has not been
dissipated by the suppression of the imperialists and feudal classes. Such
organizations as the San Ho Hui, the San Tien Hui, the Ta Tao Hui, the
Ko Lao Hui which pervade the southern provinces and the Nien Tzu, the
Pai Lang and the Hung Ch'iang Hui in the north have been spontaneously
created to struggle with the imperialists and the feudal classes. For this
reason, cases of missionaries being killed and starving peasants rioting
are frequent (the most notable in recent years being the burning of the
Governor of Hunan's office in the 1908-1911 period, and the Lin-ch'eng
railway car hijacking case, both of which were done by these people).
These revolutionary organizations have no broad united front and do not
understand political strategy and so can never do anything of great
significance.
The organized, planned revolution by the workers of the world has given us
a fine example. Mr Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang which he leads got in
touch with these naturally occurring revolutionary groups in the villages
some 20 years ago and guided them to the path of the true political party
to lead our peasant revolution. In politics they "build democracy" and in
economics they established "equal land rights" as the standards for the
liberation of the peasants; they always provided we peasants with an
appropriate policy with which to fight imperialism and the feudal classes
and attain our goals.
Many years ago in Heng-shan and Yueh-pei the peasants of Hunan began to
develop organizational shoots. Year before last during the first half of
the year some of the peasants of Hsiang-t'an again rose up but they were
massacred by the warlord Chao and could not develop successfully. In
February of last year in Chu-thou Mr Wang Hsien-tsung became a martyr to
the peasants cause. The violence of the warlords and local bullies reached
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a peak and the peasants were in a high state of emotion. The saying goes
"when things reach their worst, there must be.a turn for the better." At
this time a fierce campaign to drive out Chao Heng-t'i was born and in this
the peasants constituted a major force. At the time when Wu and Yeh made
their counterattack, the peasants acted as spies, transport and guides for
the Northern Expedition Army and disrupted the enemy's rear. They even took
up lances and birdguns and became guerrillas or joined in battles, such as
at places like Li-ling, Chu-chou, P'ing-chiang and Hua-jung. No less than
10 battles have had peasant participation and many peasants have been killed.
See how brave and willing to sacrifice themselves have been the Hunan peasants
who have participated in the battles of the Northern Expedition!
When the Northern Expedition Army moved into Hupeh and Kiangsi and on to the
Chekiang-Honan front, the peasants in Hunan devoted all their efforts towards
consolidating the rear, overthrowing corrupt officials and throwing out the
local bullies and rotten gentry. This movement was extremely broad. The
local bullies, rotten gentry and corrupt officials almost everywhere were
utterly shocked. No more do they dare to exercise the power and high-
handedness to which they have been accustomed and treat the peasants as dirt
as they did. Since we peasants do not understand gentility or manners, we
stand up straight, beat up every corrupt official, local bully and rotten
gentry we hear about, not fearing that they may get together some remnants
of their power for a counterattack and may kill peasants on a large scale
such as at Chia-ho, Lin-hsiang, Yu-hsien, I-yang, An-hua and I-chang.
As these tragedies occur, we know that they are but the dying outbursts of
a departing storm and we have nothing to fear. This bit of revolutionary
work, we would dare compare with the taking of the city of Wu-ch'ang. This
is true because the power of the local bullies and rotten gentry of the
villages is the true foundation of the warlords, and the destruction of this
power would be difficult to accomplish without a rising by the peasants.
The primary task of the present revolutionary government should, we feel,
be to continue to dig up the political foundations of the warlords and
develop the organization of the masses; we peasants will brave death to
support the government as it works toward this goal.
But, the aim of the national revolution is to liberate all of the oppressed
masses, not just to liberate the peasants. How can we restrict our concern
to the liberation of the peasants? We cannot. But the liberation of the
peasants is a pivotal point. If the liberation of the peasants is realized,
the interest of all classes is served. At present, one of the main reasons
why industry and commerce are not developed is that 300 million peasants have
no purchasing power; and the reason why agriculture is not developed is that
the peasants have no productive power. If the peasants are liberated and
they can lessen the economic exploitation of the landlords they will improve
agriculture and, as a result of their purchases of fertilizer, tools and
cloth, industry and commerce will simultaneously develop. In the French
Revolution of years ago the peasants obtained a measure of liberation and
the wealth of France was greatly increased; in recent years the peasants of
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Russia have completely done away with exploitation by landlords and their pro-
ductive power increases year after year. These are both clear proofs of this.
If industry and commerce profit by the liberation of the peasants, how much
more so will education, culture and all kinds of construction.
However, the present financial difficulties of the government, the stagnant
money market, the extraordinary terrorism in society and many rumors, are all
blamed on the peasants and believed to be the result of the peasant revolution.
How they have wronged us! The fears of today do have causes. One is that
due to wartime blockades, rice cannot be shipped down the Yangtzu River and
salt cannot be brought in to Hunan. With this is lost all of the vast income
from taxes on rice and salt sales. Another is that finances have not been
unified in western Hunan, and the Kweichow Army and other newly formed units
have been syphoning off tax revenue so that one-third of the financial re-
sources of all. Hunan are lost. Another is manipulation by reactionaries,
for example, the attack on the Lai-yang Tax Bureau. Although this was
partially the result of corruption in the tax bureau which merited the
attack, it was also the result of reactionaries taking the opportunity to
create hatred among the party, government and mass organizations. The re-
actionaries have done many similar things, and for these reasons they have
been able to create disorder in society. How can the disorder be attributed
to the peasants?
Although the attacks by the peasants on the local bullies and rotten gentry
in the villages have used illegal methods, these are methods which must be
adopted in the course of revolutionary struggle. At a time when the East
wind will overcome the West wind or be overcome by it, how can we not be
severe? If we are afraid of conflict or adopt an attitude of doubt or
negativism, we cannot be considered revolutionaries. The old policies which
did away with conflict are not suitable; we have only the new policy estab-
lished by us all, that of bringing about democratic government by the
peasants in the villages and thoroughly destroying the feudal policy of
the local bullies and rotten gentry.
This Congress, representing Hunan's 27 million peasants, after careful
consideration, has decided upon a policy of revolutionary struggle from
now on to achieve liberation.
Peasants to Hunan! Unite under the banner of the Provincial Peasants
Association and resolutely fight according to the policy of this Congress!
Our slogans are:
Peasants of China, unite!
Support the Revolutionary Government!
.Uproot corrupt officials!
Overthrow local bullies and rotten gentry!
Exterminate bandits!
Put finances in order, get. rid of bribes!
Overthrow the warlords!
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Overthrow imperialism!
Long live the First Hunan Peasants Congress!
Long live the liberation of the Chinese people!
Long live the Peasants International!
Long live the success of World Revolution!
?A History of Revolution in China, Reference Materials, Second Collection;
Chinese People's University, 1956
The Declaration and Resolutions of the First Hunan Peasants Congress,
compiled by the Hunan Peasants Association, December 1926.
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HUNAN PEASANTS--CHANGSHA NEWSLETTER OF 30 NOVEMBER (1926)
[Text] (A) The Currently Organized Peasants
(1) Statistics on County Peasant Associations
Counties which have established Peasant Associations: 36
Counties which have Peasant Association Preparatory offices: 18
Total 54 counties
(2) Membership Statistics
1. Statistics compiled in November: 30 counties, 536,137 members.
Statistics compiled in October: 11 counties, 505,000 members.
Estimates where no statistics are available: 13 counties, 30,000 members.
Total 54 counties, 1,071,137 members.
2.
Counties with 100,000 plus members--4
Counties with 50,000 plus members--6
Counties
with
10,000
plus members--12
Counties
with
5,000
plus members--12
Counties
with
1,000
plus members--18
Counties
with
less than 1,000 members--2
.3. The county with the greatest number of members has 140,000. The county
with the least number of members has 274.
4. A chart of membership by county.
Note: "A"--membership figure based on detailed report received from the
county in November.
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"B"--membership figure calculated on the basis of last month's report.
"C"--estimated membership figure without statistics.
"D"--membership figure provided by County Peasant Association Preparatory
office.
Nan-hsien
A
7,000
Ch'a-ling
A
11,266
Heng-yang
A
88,223
Tao-hsian
A
1,435
Tzu-hsing
A
5,000
Lu-hsi
C
5,000
Sui-ning
A
1.,100
Hsiang-t'a
B
100,000
Lei-yang
A
24,445
Shao-yang
B
5,000
Pin-hsien
A
10,000
Hsiang-hsiang
B
60,000
Liu-yang
A
139,190
?
BC
1,000
Yu-hsien
A
10,000
Ch'ang-sha
A
71,450
Li-ling
A
50,000
Pao-ching
A
377 ?
Hua-jung
A
10,000
Lin-hsiang
OC
5
000
Han-shou
A
7,229
Ch'ang-ning
0C
,
5
000
Lan-shan
A
3,550
Ning-te
0C
,
1,000
Kuei-yang
A
6,243
An-hsiang
0C
2,100
Hsin-tien
A
5,150
Hsin-ning
C
1,000
Ling-hsien
A
5,468
Hsu-p'u
C
1,000
I-chang
A
74,183
Ning-hsiang
B
50,000
Hsiang-yin
A
17,600
Hsin-hua
OA
6,377
I-yang
A
15,680
Lin-chin
OA
1,166
An-hua
A
62,300
Yung-ming
OA
2,181
Ling-ling
A
700
Ju-ch'eng
OA
8,856
Yueh-yang
OA
2,070
Ch'ang-te
OA
9,545
Wu-kang
0C
5,000
Chih-chiang
OA
274
Yuan-chiang
0C
1,000
Ch'eng-pu
OA
889
7
OC
1,000
Chia-ho
0C
1,000
Ping-chiang
B
100,000
T'ao-yuan
0C
1,000
Lai-yang
B
100,000
?
0C
1,000
Yung-hsing
B
10,000
Chin-hsien
OD
2',549
(B) Peasant Participation in the Northern Expedition
(1) Supply: In those places through which the Northern Expedition Army
passed, the peasants were able to supply drink or small amount of food or
were able to assist with such things as cooking.
(2) Guides, Reconnaissance: This kind of work was done along the Chu-chou
P'ing-hsiang Rail Line, and in Liu-yang, P'in-chiang, Ch'ang-sha, Hsiang-t'an,
Ning-hsiang, Heng-shan, Nan-hsien and Hua-jung.
(3) Transport: In addition to those peasants voluntarily hired by the
army, there were also organized peasants doing transportation work for the
army.
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(4) Disrupting the enemy's rear: This took place in Hsiang-t'an, Ping-chiang,
Nan-hsien, Liu-yang and along the Chu-chou-P'ing-hsiang Rail Line.
(5) Participation in Combat: Exact statistics are not yet available on the
number of killed and wounded or the number of rifles captured. The figures
are approximately as follows:
A. Chu-chou: The second time Tang [Sheng-chih]'s army entered Ch'ang-sha,
the peasants and shopkeepers turned over more than 100 rifles plus some machine-
guns and cannon.
B. Li-ling: When the Northern Expedition Army entered Ch'ang-sha, the
peasants captured more than 200 rifles as well as some machine guns and
cannon, and in November when troops retreating from the Kiangsi front entered
Li-ling, the peasants turned over many rifles.
C. P'ing-chiang: When the Northern Expedition Army entered P'ing-hsiang in
July, the peasants lost 25 men in combat and captured hundreds of rifles as
well as machine guns. In November, when the Second Division mutinied, the
peasants captured some of the rebel soldiers and 250 rifles. The government
is now trying to get those rifles back, but the peasants refuse to comply,
and the issue is still unsettled.
D. Liu-yang: The peasants rescued a regiment of the Northern Expedition
Army which had been surrounded and, in driving the enemy back, sustained
casualties but captured some rifles.
E. Hua-jung: When Tsai Chien's Army entered Hua-jung_ the first time, the
peasants and the troops stationed there drove them back. The second time
Ts'ai Chien's Army entered Hua'jung, 3,000 peasants fought and repulsed it.
F. Yuan-chiang: When Ts'ai Chien's Army was attacked at Hua-jung the first
time, peasants from Yuan-chiang participated.
G. Hsiang-t'an: The peasants acted as decoys and helped the Northern
Expedition Army to cross the river and attack the enemy.
H. Ning-hsiang: Rescued a regiment of the Northern Expedition Army which
had been surrounded, and attacked the enemy and captured rifles.
I. Chu-chou-P'ing-hsiang Rail Line: Clashed with enemy troops and tore
up tracks.
J. Ch'ang-sha: Surrounded fleeing officers, and assisted the government
in capturing enemy soldiers and mutineers.
(6) Why the Peasants Fought
A. The effects of propaganda by party members. The peasants all knew that
the Northern Expedition Army supported the interests of the workers and
peasants, and that only by helping the Northern Expedition Army to win could
they be helped.
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B. Hatred for northern soldiers and mercenaries. When they compared the
armies of the two sides, the hatred of the peasants was even more deep.
C. Under command of the Peasant Associations. (A very small number were
volunteers.)
D. The peasants were willing to fight during September and October in
order to get rifles; by that time the peasants developed a need to arm
themselves.
(7) The Effects of the Peasants' Participation in the War
A. Advances in the political sense of the peasants.
B. Advances in the self-confidence of the peasants.
C. The government was able to realize the strength of the peasants, thus
favoring leftism.
(C) Current Trends Among the Peasants
(1) The peasants now feel that they should be rewarded for their contribu-
tion to the war. Even in those counties which were not involved in the
fighting, the peasants feel that the propaganda promises of the party should
be fulfilled.
(2) Economic demand: This kind of demand has spread throughout all of the
counties that have peasant movements. The following demands are most
pervasive:
1. Rent reduction--There is yet no demand for total rent exemption (land
ownership granted to the peasants).
2. Interest rate reduction--The peasants are satisfied by a reduction from
8 to 9 percent to 4 to 5 percent.
3. A way to solve the problem of short grain supplies in lean months--
Resulting in a movement to refuse selling grain to government at low prices.
4. Tax reduction--A small number of localities demand total tax exemption.
5. Reduce security money and stop repossessing land without cause--As yet
there are no clear ideas.
These demands may be said to be minimal and are all expressed by them of
their own accord. In some areas all of these demands are made, but in some
areas only one or two. The demands of those peasants in the area of Hunan
bordering on Kwangtung and Kwangsi are higher than those of the peasants
of central Hunan.
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(3) Political Demands:
1. Reform the militia--They still watch the personnel of the Militia Bureaus
very closely.
2. Oppose the militia--In many places the militia has lost its function and
there are many instances of militia headquarters being destroyed.
3. Wish for good government--The political and economic demands of the
peasants are all still quite naive. Not only the peasants are uninterested
in such slogans as popular election of county magistrates, but the political
demands of the villages are also negative. As far as the rumors spread by
reactionaries such as "confiscation of land" and "organization of a worker-
peasant government" are concerned, the peasants are least interested.
(4) Arms Demands: The demand of the peasants for arms grows more and more
urgent. They all want to take rifles from the hands of defeated and mutinous
soldiers. Among the peasants of P ing-chiang there is a vigorous movement
to keep the rifles (see previous passages on the peasants' participation
in fighting).
(D) Struggles Which Have Already Been Started by the Peasants
(1) The rent reduction movement:
1. The rent reduction movement in Heng-yang: The amount of rent paid by the
tenant to the landlord in Heng-yang is supposed to be one-half of the har-
vest, but in actuality, the tenant cannot get as much as half. From 1916,
due to floods and increases in education expenses, rents have gradually
increased throughtout the county and, although the amount of the increase
has not been uniform, there is no one who has not had his rent increased.
In. this way, the amount received by the tenant is less than the amount
formerly received which even then was not 50 percent. After T'ang's Army
left Hunan, the peasants in Heng-yang who joined the peasant associations
had an urgent demand for rent reduction. At this time they started the
slogan of rent reversion throughout the whole county, or reverting to the
rent levels of 5 years ago (that is, before 1916). The result was that
the whole county reverted to the rent level of 1916. The peasants joining
the peasant association during this movement numbered about 7.0,000. At the
same time, reactionary elements were united during this movement which was
participated in by all peasants whether they had or had not joined the
peasant association.
2. Rent reduction elsewhere: In addition to Heng-yang, there have been
scattered rent reduction campaigns elsewhere, and individual tenants have
reduced rent paid to individual landlords. Since changes in tenants or
changes in land ownership almost everywhere result in increases in rent,
when the. increase is too much, tenants are requesting reductions. Many of
these cases are handled for the peasants by the peasant associations.
Although this is not a struggle, it increases the confidence of the
peasants in the peasant associations.
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3. Although rent reduction campaigns are a pressing need of the peasants
everywhere, no struggle has occurred because the time of rent collection
is past. The opinion of most peasants is that the question of rent reduc-
tion next year will be a major struggle.
(2) Interest reduction:
1. A general interest reduction has been successful throughout An-hua County.
This has been from 7 or 8 percent per month to 4 or 5 percent. The peasants
are satisfied with this.
2. A campaign among some of the peasants in Yueh-yang has not yet had any
results, but probably will be victorious.
3. A demand by peasants in Hsiang-yin and Niu-chou for cancellation of
unpaid interest has failed.
4. Various counties have interest reduction campaigns and none of these met
with any major obstacles.
(3) Reduction in security money:
1. A campaign throughout Liu-yang County to reduce security money to 2 yuan
for every picul of grain to be paid as rent has been successful. Whether
there will be problems with this in the future is difficult to tell.
2. In the lake region around Yueh-yang, landlords wanted to increase
security money to 7 yuan per picul of grain to be paid as rent and the
peasants rose up in opposition. The landlords have combined the militia
of three counties to deal with this and there will be a big clash.
3. Various other counties have security money reduction campaigns on
smaller scale.
(4) Tax reduction campaigns:
1. Yu-hsien, Li'ling and I-chang all have tax reduction campaigns.
2. An-hsiang has eliminated the acreage tax throughout the county but
has increased the land surtax.
3. In Yueh-yang, some of the peasant campaigns which have been demanding
the abolition of the acreage tax have come into conflict with the militia
and nothing has been resolved.
(5) Land reclamation campaigns: The peasants of An-hua demand that no
rent be collected from coarse grain sown during the winter months. Some
have succeeded and others are still in dispute.
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(6) The question of restrictions on normal grain sales:
1. The cause: Hunan has had droughts for many years in succession. When
the dry months come, the villages are short of grain or the price of grain
skyrockets, and this has caused the peasants to carry out a movement to
restrict grain sales.
2. This movement is carried out in 7 or 8 out of 10 places where there is
.a peasant organization, in the following manners:
A. A decision on the price of grain is made by the peasant-association or
the peasant assembly to forbid selling grain at a higher price.
B. Two or three grain prices are set and certain kinds of people are made
to pay. certain prices.
C. Restrictions are placed on the amount of grain or rice to be transported
outside.
D. Grain and rice are totally prohibited from being transported outside.
E. No price is set for grain until a drought occurs.
F. Several tenths of the rental grain are withheld.
3. The conflicts caused by this struggle:
A. Boycotts: If landlords do not sell grain they are forced to sell, or
even fined or beaten.
B. Secret sales: If secret sales are discovered, the grain is confiscated
or the owner fined.
C. Conflicts arise out of disputes on grain prices.
4. Effects: The landlords and businessmen dislike these campaigns intensely
while the landowning peasants and tenant farmers don't want them either,
and since the government is urging the remission of land-tax and the landlords
are complaining that they can't sell their grain, the government is quite
dissatisfied also.
5. The policy of the provincial peasants association is that only a portion
of rental grain will be permitted to be withheld as a reserve for sales
at reasonable prices during drought seasons and that unlimited boycotts
are not allowed. This campaign has, however, already been accepted by the
masses and it will be hard to change for a while.
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(7) Conflicts with the militia:
1. The Chief of the Militia Bureau in Ning-hsiang (and the branch Bureaus'
in the townships) are all elected by the township assemblies and, in those
places where there is a peasant association, the peasants pay close attention
to the persons elected.
2. Yueh-yang:
A. The Militia Bureau prohibited the peasants from meeting and there was a
clash. After petition by the peasants, the Militia Bureau was disbanded.
B. The peasants clashed with the Militia Bureau over acreage tax, and this
issue has not yet been settled.
C. In two clashes with the militia, more than 10 peasants were shot to death.
3. The Chiaho militia has shot'some peasants to death.
4. In,Kuei-yang, reactionary elements conspired with the militia to send
troops into the city to disband the peasant association..
5. In Tzu-hsing, the militia forced a reorganization of the peasants
association.
6. In a fight between the peasants of Hsiang.t'an and the militia, one
peasant was-shot to death.
7. In Niu-chou (Yueh-yang) the militia prohibited the peasants from organiz-
ing an association.
8. There have been many conflicts in various places between peasants and
the militia and, in most cases, the militia has won.
(8) Conflicts with the local bullies and rotten gentry:
It may be said that conflicts between the peasants and local bullies and
rotten gentry are occurring everywhere all the time. The attacks of the
local bullies and rotten gentry upon the peasants are worsening every day.
The peasants have retorted with assault and battery, prosecution, parade,
fine and expulsion. Of course most of these are resulted from attacks
by them upon the peasants and this has aroused the hatred of the masses.
(E) The State of Local Government
(1) In some townships, the peasants association has taken over the govern-
ment.
(2) Township assemblies exist in many counties and act as the highest
legislative organization of the township. In a few counties, the Chief of
the Militia Bureau and the county magistrate are elected by'the township
assemblies.
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(3) In a few localities the peasant association, the teachers union, the
Chamber of Commerce, and the workers unions have united and taken over the
government of the township.
(4) In .many localities, township government is in the hands of the
Kuomintang Party Headquarters and they sympathize with or support the
peasant movement.
(5) In most localities, the government is still controlled by the local
bullies and rotten gentry in order to oppress the peasants. In places where
there are peasant associations, clashes occur frequently.
(F) Peasant Self-Defense Organizations
(1) Each county in Hunan has organized neighborhood defense units as ad-
vocated by Tang Sheng-Chih. Although the leadership of these organizations
is in the hands of the gentry and the landlords, the members and lower level
officers are all peasants. In places where there is a peasants association,
these units become organizations of the peasants without trouble. The units
do not have rifles, but do have lances (a dagger attached to a long pole),
birdguns and swords. Most have regular drills, for which participants are
paid (500 wen each). The counties in the central Hunan area around
P'ing-chiang, Liu-yang and Ch'ang-sha have this kind of organization but it
is not widespread, and there is no drill pay. In the recent fighting and
in resisting bandits, they have been of great use. There are no statistics
on their organization and membership.
(2) With the exception of the neighborhood defense units, the peasants of
Hunan have no other self-defense organization. Although there was once a
Peasant Self-Defense Army, and Self-Defense Regiments, these have been
discontinued because their operating expenses could not be met.
(3) In such places as P'ing-chiang, An-hua, Li-ling and Hsiang-t'an,
the peasants have captured a few rifles (P'ing-chiang has 250, and there
are problems yet to be solved) which can be brought out for use by the
peasants in their own defense.
(G) Measures Adopted by the Local Bullies and Rotten Gentry to Undermine
the Peasant Movement
The local bullies and rotten gentry are gradually united with all other
reactionary forces. They attack the peasants in the following ways:
(1) They secretly organize such groups as the Protect the Rich League,
the Protect Property League and the White League. They publicly organize
the League of District Magistrates and the Township League.
(2) They clamor that the peasant association is going to institute
conscription and tolls and, that when Wu P'ei-fu comes he will cut their
heads off, in order to frighten the peasants and keep them from joining
the association.
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(3) They clamor that the peasant association is communist and will institute
a so-called 3-3-1 system.
(4) They organize fake peasant associations and publish proclamations advo-
cating a so-called 3-3-1 system.
(5) They infiltrate the peasant associations in order to usurp their leader-
ship. Failing to do so, they make trouble.
(6) By means of bribery, sedition, promotion of homeland viewpoint,
religious thinking and superstition, they incite the peasants to oppose the
peasant association.
(7) They infiltrate the Kuomintang to oppress the peasants and manipulate
the peasant associations.
(8) They clamor that the Northern Expedition Army has failed.
(9)
They collude with Chao and Sun of the Kuomintang right wing.
(10) Masquerading rioting peasants they destroyed the Tax Bureau in order
to cause people to lose their sympathy for the peasants movement.
(11) They use the militia to directly oppress and kill the peasants, and
disband peasant associations. They have done such sabotage in a somewhat
coordinated way.
?The HSIANG TAO Weekly, NR 181, HSIANG TAO Publishing House, 1 June 1927
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VOLUME 2
LATEST DIRECTIVE OF NATIONAL PEASANT ASSOCIATION
13 June 1927
[Text] Because of the overly fast development of the peasant movement in the
past, it has not been perfect organizationally. Coupled with the fierce
counterattack of the local despots and evil gentry, this caused the rural
struggle to become more and more severe. Unorganized actions have occurred
whenever the superior organs failed to point out all possibilities. This
association has instructed the peasant associations at all levels to make
rectifications, so that the peasants in all places could, under the direction
of the Peasant Association, continue to struggle against the reactionary
feudal forces of all local despots and evil gentry with organization and
planning, to fulfill the responsibility of overthrowing the economic base
of the imperialist exploitation in the countryside and the political base
of the warlords' domination in the revolution. It has also been pointed out
that the present struggle goal should be to establish rural self-government
by the peasants everywhere. According to reports from all quarters, the
attack by local despots and evil gentry in the three provinces of Hunan,
Kiangsi and Hupeh has been most vicious, as more than 10,000 party members,
peasants and workers have been killed. A sinister plot to incite revolution-
ary soldiers against the peasants is being pushed. They have often fabri-
cated facts by calling a deer a horse, and exaggerated things in the hope
of provoking the soldiers to clash with mass organizations, thereby alienat-
ing the army and the people, splitting the united front and sabotaging the
Three Great Policies, in order to overthrow the party and the country. They
would have no regret even though this would aggravate the agonies of the
people and bring about national destruction. In the meantime, the corrupt
bureaucrats have connived with the local despots and evil gentry in
smearing the peasants, hoping to alienate the government from the people.
For instance,.the Peasant Association of Huang-kang has never tried to
destroy tobacco crops, but the corrupt bureaucrats made a false report to
the Central Government which disbanded the association. This is a case in
point. Now, the Military Affairs Committee of the National Government has
learned of the vicious plan of imperialism, warlords, corrupt bureaucrats,
local despots and evil gentry, compradores and all the reactionary forces to
unleash a concerted attack on the National Government just as our armies
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are launching the northern expedition against the Fengt'ien armed forces.
It has therefore issued a directive to all armed comrades that they should
not listen to false accusations and exaggerated propaganda. In order not
to fall into a trap of the reactionaries, they should limit their actions
to making investigations only. Nonetheless, the slaughtering of peasants
by local despots and evil gentry in conjunction with bandits and stragglers
in the various cities have become more and more serious recently. Numerous
instances have occurred in which conspiracies were hatched by corrupt
bureaucrats to undermine relations between the government and the people.
The various organs have received several cases of false accusations against
peasants everyday. Under these circumstances, the peasant associations
at all levels should request that the National Government (1) issue a
directive to protect workers' organizations, workers' pickets, and the
peasants self-defense army, and punish the reactionaries that slaughtered
workers and peasants and sabotaged the rear, in order that such revolutionary
organs as the trade union, peasant association and CP may have complete
freedom to rally the revolutionary forces and to launch an anti-Chiang
expedition; (2) liquidate the local despots and evil gentry in the various
counties in Hupeh who connived with enemy soldiers and bandits to slaughter
peasants and workers, and severely punish Chiang Kai-shek's agents and all
reactionaries who spread divisive rumors in order to consolidate Wuhan;
(3) issue a directive to punish Hsu K'o-hsiang [6079 0344 4382], Ch'ou Ao
[0092 7663], P'eng Kuo-chun [1756 0948 6874] and Hsiao,Yu-k'un.[5618 5038 2492]
and dissolve such reactionary organs as the Party Salvation Committee and
Party Purification Committee, restore the Hunan Provincial Government,
Provincial Party Committee, Provincial Trade Union and Provincial Peasant
Association as well as all revolutionary organizations that have been des-
troyed, accept the petition of the Hunan Petition Group, and instruct
Tang Sheng-chih [0781 3932 2535], chairman of Hunan provincial government,
to take immediate action to suppress the reactionaries in Hunan; and
(4) issue a directive to stop all actions in Kiangsi to oust the CP and
worker and peasant leaders, as well as to severely punish the reactionaries
who slaughtered the masses. It is incumbent on the Peasant Association itself
to redouble its efforts to rally the peasants, tighten up the organization,
and carry out armed self-defense in order to resist the armed attacks of
local despots and evil gentry as well as to suppress the provocations by
all reactionary and feudal forces. This is necessary because if the
local despots and evil gentry are not suppressed, it will be impossible to
establish rural self-government and democratic power, nor the realization
of economic construction, while the foundation of the National Government
will never be consolidated.
This directive is issued by the standing members of the Provisional Executive
Committee of the National Peasant Association of China: T'an Yen-k'ai
[6223 1693 7065], T'an P'ing-shan [6223 1627 1472], Teng Yen-ta [6772 3348
6671], Mao Tse-tung and Lu Ch'en [7120 3089], 13 June.
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20 August 1927
[Text] (3) A certain comrade who has arrived in Hunan said that the Comintern
has issued a new directive suggesting that the worker-peasant-soldier soviet
be implemented immediately in China. We have been very heartened by this
news. Although objectively speaking, China has reached the 1917 era, we
deemed before that it was still in 1905, which was a great mistake. The
soviet of workers, peasants and soldiers is completely in keeping with the
objective conditions. We should have the resolve to set up a worker, peasant
and soldier soviet regime in the four provinces of Kwangtung, Hunan,Hupeh
and Kiangsi. With the establishment of such a regime, we must, henceforth,
rapidly achieve nationwide victory. We hope that the Central Committee will
unhesitatingly accept this Comintern directive and implement it immediately
in Hunan.
In view of the fact that this new directive of the Comintern is bound to
affect our attitude toward the Kuomintang, as soon as we set up the soviet
regime of workers, peasants and soldiers, we can no longer carry the
Kuomintang flag. We should hoist high the flag of the Chinese Communist
Party vis-a-vis the Kuomintang flag that has been hoisted by such warlords
as Chiang Kai-shek, Tang Sheng-chih, Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang. The
Kuomintang flag has been the flag of warlords for some time now and so only
the. communist flag is the flag of the people. When we were in Hupeh, we did
not understand this too well. But after being in Hunan for a few days, we
have seen how the people regard the provincial party headquarters under
Tang Sheng-chih, thus realizing that we really cannot fly the Kuomintang
flag any longer or we are bound to be defeated. Previously, we have failed
to seek actively the Kuomintang's leadership power, but allowed Wang Ching-wei,
Chiang Kai-shek, Tang Sheng-chih, etc., to seize it. Now, we should return
this flag to them, because it has become a black flag completely. On our
part, we must resolutely fly the red flag. As for the petty bourgeoisie,
we must keep them under the leadership of the red flag, and objectively,
they must be placed entirely under the leadership of the red flag.
(4) Land Problem: From my recent investigation on peasant problems in the
two rural areas of Ch'ing-t'ai-hsiang, in Changsha and Shao-shan, in
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Hsiang-t'an (from where five peasants have come to the provincial capital),
I realize that it is the consensus of peasants that their agrarian problem
must be resolved completely. Yesterday, I talked with several peasant com-
rades from the countryside to consult their views. As a result, I have
drafted the following outlines:
(a) Confiscate all land, including [that belonging to] small landlords
and owner-peasants, and nationalize it. Land would then be redistributed
to all country people who wish to obtain land equitably on these two
standards by the peasants association; in accordance with "working ability"
and "consumption" (that is, in keeping with the actual amount of consumption
by each family).
(b) In redistributing land, the district peasants association should order
the township peasants. association to compile a census register, to be handed
over to the district association for redistribution of land accordingly.
(c) In redistributing land, the district, rather than township, should be
used as the unit; in a township where there is greater population than land,
it can be transferred to a township where there are fewer people but more
land. It is only thus that redistribution will be equitable. Temporarily,
it won't be possible for people to move from one district to another.
(d) After the land has been confiscated, measures must be provided to
settle the families of landlords (whether they are big landlords or not) in
order to pacify the people. There should be four classes: class 1, 4 percent
collection; class 2, 3 percent collection; class 3, 2 percent collection,
and class 4, 1 percent collection.
This draft proposal has been discussed at the provincial committee meeting
yesterday. We must canvass the views of more peasants before we will ask
you to make the final decision. The draft is submitted to you for references
of discussion. (abridged) 20 August
CHUNG-YANG TUNG-HSIN, No 3, 30 August 1927
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LETTER FROM HUNAN PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE
30 August 1927
[Text] Brother X X:
Your letter of Character Hsiang No 5 has been.received. Concerning the two
points of error mentioned therein, what you have said is not in keeping with
either fact or theory. We wish, therefore, to reply to you as follows:
(1) From the standpoint of the revolutionary significance as a whole, to
capture Changsha and to stage the Autumn Harvest uprising are both for the
purpose of promoting agrarian revolution. The Changsha uprising and the
Autumn Harvest uprising are the same thing. Whereas the Changsha uprising
serves as the starting point of the Autumn Harvest uprising, the Autumn
Harvest uprising is to unleash an agrarian. revolution in order to seize
political power. In our plan to capture Changsha, the main fighters are
workers and peasants. The purpose of transferring the two X and X regiments
to attack Changsha is to supplement the insufficiency in strength of the
workers and peasants. They are not the main force, but are deployed to
serve as a cover for the development of the uprising, and so they are not
the only important element of the uprising. Your committee has deemed that
this is a military adventure here, ordering that the plan for the Changsha
uprising be canceled. This shows your ignorance about the conditions here,
and it is a contradictory policy in which no attention is paid to military
affairs, but in the meantime, it calls for an armed uprising on the part
of the masses.
(2) You have said that we have been paying attention here only to our work
in Changsha, and neglected the other places. This is not true. It is true
that we have been amiss in reporting to you the situation in other places
where considerable preparations have been made (please see the plan on the
uprising in central Hunan). In regard to the problem of our work in
southern Hunan, we must also explain that making Changsha the starting point
of the uprising does not mean that we have given up southern Hunan. The
reason why we have not made Heng-yang the second starting point is because
our strength is only sufficient to stage uprisings in central Hunan. If
there should be uprisings in the various counties, our strength will be
so diffused that it will be impossible to implement the plan of uprising
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in central Hunan. That is why we decided against making Heng-yang the second
starting point. Nonetheless, where plans for uprising have been made and
preparations are underway in the various counties in southern Hunan, we have
already issued orders to them to carry out the uprisings effectively. As
soon as the Changsha uprising begins, it will be unleashed simultaneously
in the other counties. 30 August
CHUNG-YANG TUNG-PAO No 5, 20 September 1927.
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REPORT OF THE CHING-KANG MOUNTAINS FRONT COMMITTEE TO CENTRAL AUTHORITY
25 November 1928
[Text] To the Central Committee in care of the Hunan Provincial Committee:
(1) Concerning the Letter From Central Committee
The 4 June letter from the Central Committee, after passing through the
Kiangsi Provincial Committee and the Chi-an County Committee, only arrived
at the Ching-kang Mountains on 2 December. Very well written, this letter
has rectified many of our mistakes and resolved many controversial problems
here. Upon its receipt, this letter was forwarded to the army committee as
well as to local committees at all levels. On 6 November, the units heading
toward Sui-ch'uan were concentrated at Ching-kang Mountains, and some 30
persons including members of the Special Committee and the army's and local
active elements (such as Chu Teh, Chen I, Ho Ting-yin [0149 2185 7336],
Ho Ch'ang-kung [0149 7022], Yuan Wen-ts'ai [5913 2429 2088], Wang Tso
[3769 0146], T'an Chen-lin [6223 7201 2651], Teng Kan-yuan [6772 1626 0337],
Li Chueh-fei [2621 6748 7236], Ch'en Cheng-jen [7115 2973 0066], Wang.
Tso-nung [3769 0146 6593], Hsiao Fang-hsia [5618 5502 0704], Liu Hui-ch'ing
[0491 6540 7230], Hsieh Ch'un-piao [6200 2504 2871], Liu Ti [6491 2420],
Hsiung Shou-ch'i [3574 4388], Yang K'ai-wing [2769 7030 2494], Ts'ao Shuo
[2580 7007], Teng Chiu-t'ing [6772 0036 6599], Mao Tse-tung, Sung Ch'iao-
sheng [1345 0829 3932], P'eng Fu [1756 4375], and Yuan Te-sheng [5913 1795
3932] representing the Hunan Provincial Committee) attended a meeting held
by the Special Committee to discuss the letter from the Central Committee.
The consensus was that with the exception of one or two specific points
(such as the guerrilla area being too broad and the abolition of the party
representative system), all principles and policies are practicable and
should be carried out accordingly. The highest organ of the party is also
the front committee. According to the letter, when the front committee is
in Kiangsi, it is under the direction of the Kiangsi Provincial Committee,
and when it is moved into Hunan, it should be then under the director of
the Hunan Provincial Committee. What is regrettable is that among the four
attached documents in the Central Committee letter, we have translated only
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the two documents on "Confiscation of Land To Set Up Soviets" and "The
February Resolution of the Comintern" while the two on "Military Works"
and "Organizational Problems" cannot be translated, The last two items
are urgently needed. Please tell us about the method of translation or
send us another copy.
(2) Border Regimes and the August Defeat
China is the only country in the world today where one or more small areas
under a Red Regime have emerged in the midst of a white regime encircling
them. When we analyze the cause of this phenomenon it will be seen that
it is due to the continuous conflicts and wars among China's compradores
and powerful gentry. As long as the conflicts and wars between these
two classes continue, the existence and development of the armed entrench-
ment by workers and peasants will also continue. Where there are continued
conflicts and wars between compradores and the powerful gentry, the existence
and development of a soviet regime must have the following prerequisites:
(1) excellent masses, (2) a sound party, (3) a large, strong Red army,
(4) terrain favorable to waging war, and (5) economic power for self-sustenance.
Moreover, the strategy adopted by the border areas vis-a-vis the surrounding
ruling classes should vary, depending on whether the political power of the
ruling class is stable or in a state of disruption. For instance, when there
was disruption in the ruling class, such as during the war between
Li Tsung-jen and Tang Sheng-chih in Hunan and Hupeh, and the war in
Kwangtung between Chang Fa-k'uei and Li Chi-shen, we could be more venture-
some in our military strategy, and the area of our military occupation could
be expanded. Nonetheless, attention must be paid to setting up a firm
bastion in the central areas to serve as an impregnable bulwark when the
White terror descends on us. Where the ruling class is (comparatively)
stable, such as in the southern provinces since April of this year, we should
follow a strategy of gradual advance. Militarily, what is most undesirable
is to divide the forces for adventurous advances; in mass work (such as
distribution of land, establishment of soviets, organization of party and
local militia), what is most undesirable is the diffusion of manpower,
instead of paying attention to lay a sound foundation for the central areas.
The defeat of the small soviets in China has been due either to the lack
of objective prerequisites or to subjective errors in tactics. The reason
why there have been errors in subjective tactics is because of the failure
to differentiate the two different stages of the ruling class--when their
regime is stable, and when their regime is in disruption. When the political
power of the ruling class is stable, some advocate that the armed forces be
divided to make adventurous advances; they even advocate that the Red Guards
alone be deployed to defend extensive soviet regime areas, as though ignorant
of the fact that the enemy, apart from utilizing the house-to-house levies,
is also capable of using regular forces for concentrated operations. In mass
work, no attention was paid to laying a firm foundation in the central areas,
and, disregarding the potentials of our capacity,.they attempted unrestricted
expansion. If anyone advocated a policy of gradual military advance, and
the concentration of manpower in the mass work in order to set up a solid
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foundation in the central areas, to achieve an invincible position, it would
be dubbed "conservatism." This is the basic reason for the August defeat in
the border areas and the failure of the Red Army in Hunan.
The border area work started in October last year. At the beginning, there
was no party organization whatsoever in the various counties, and the local
militia consisted only of some 60 old rifles possessed by Wang Tso and
Yuan Wen-ts'ai each in the vicinity of the Ching-kang Mountains. The rifles
of the peasant Self-defense Corps of the four counties of Yung-hsin, Lien -hua,
Ch'a-ling and Ling-hsien have already been surrendered to the powerful
gentry, with the result that the revolutionary ardor of the masses has been
suppressed. By February of this year, county committees had been set up in
Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Ch'a-ling and Sui-ch'uan; a special district committee
was created in Ling-hsien. Party organization has also been under way in
Lien-hua, which has developed relations with the Wan-an committee. Except
for Ling-hsien, all the counties had a few local armed forces. In Ning-kang,
Ch'a-ling, Sui-ch'uan and Yung-hsin, especially in the two counties of
Sui-ch'uan and Yung-hsin, considerable work has been done in unleashing the
masses in guerrilla uprisings to kill the landlords, with much success.
During this stage, the agrarian revolution has not yet been intensified,
and the names used for the organs of political power were "Workers,peasants
and soldiers' representatives' committee" and the "people's committee."
They were known simply as the Government of the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers,
without the title of soviet. Soldiers' committees were organized in the army, and
salary system, abolished. When guerrillas were on active duty, action committees
were organized to direct them. These simple measures have been adopted
partly by improvization, and partly on the basis of the announcement (such as
the people's committees) of the 11 December uprising in Kwangtung which was
reported in the newspapers. This is because we have lost contact with the
provincial committee since November, thus becoming completely uninformed
about all party policies. It was only in April this year that the resolution
of the enlarged conference of the Central Committee in November which was
so significant in China's revolutionary history was brought from Hunan to
the border areas by Comrade Chu Teh and others. It was also then that the
impact of the resolution has reached the party organization in the border
area. The leading organ then was the Front Committee (of which.Mao Tse-tung
was secretary) appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee during the Autumn
Harvest Uprising. Early in March, the Front Committee was abolished at the
suggestion of the Hunan Special Committee and reorganized as the Divisional
Committee (with Ho Ting-ying as secretary). It thus became a party organ
for the army only and had no jurisdiction over the local party and was
fraught with shortcomings. Meanwhile, at the suggestions of the Southern
Hunan Special Committee, Mao Tse-tung's units were transferred to Hunan,
and for more than a month the border area was abandoned. At the end of
March came the defeat in Hunan. The units of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, as
well as the peasant troops in southern Hunan, retreated to Ning-kang in
April, thereby reoccupying the border area.
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After April, occupation of the Hunan-Kiangsi border area was effected at a
time when the ruling power in the southern provinces was enjoying comparative
stability. They were able to send out any time some 8 to 9 regiments and
sometimes as many as 18 regiments from Hunan and Kiangsi for their suppres-
sion campaign. Yet, with fewer than four regiments of our own troops, we
engaged the enemy for 4 months, while the occupied areas expanded, the
agrarian revolution was intensified, the soviet organization was promoted,
and the Red Army and Red Guards grew in number and strength steadily. The
reason for this is that the policy of the party in the border area (both
local party and army party) was correct. At that time, the policies of the
Border Special Committee (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary) and the Army
Committee (with Ch'en I as secretary) were: To struggle resolutely against
the enemy in order to establish political power in the middle section of
Lo-hsiao Mountains and to oppose any defeatist flightism; to intensify
agrarian revolution in the occupied areas; the army's party organization
should help develop the local party, and the regular army should help
develop the local militia forces; to be on the defense in Hunan where the
ruling power is stronger, and to be on the offense in Kiangsi where the
ruling power is weaker; devote great effort to develop Yung-hsin in order
to create a regime of the masses, and to prepare for a protracted struggle;
to concentrate the Red Army with a view to attacking the enemy confronting
them at the proper time, and to oppose dispersion of armed forces in order
to avert the danger of being destroyed individually; to adopt the tactic of
expanding the areas under the regime by wave-like advances, and to oppose
the policy of adventurist advance. Thanks to the correctness of these
tactics, coupled with the topography of the border area which was most favor-
able to our struggle, as well as the fact that the attacking troops from Hunan
and Kiangsi were badly coordinated, we were able to win military victories
during the 4 months from April to July and insure the expansion of the masses'
regime. Although the enemy outnumbered us by several times, he failed to
destroy the regime which was expanding steadily. The impact of the regime
was increasingly felt in the two provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi. The
August defeat was due solely to our ignorance of the fact that it was a time
when the ruling class was relatively stable. We adopted the kind of policy
that was geared to a ruling class facing disruption. Thus, in dividing our
armed forces to make adventurous advance in southern Hunan, we incurred
defeats in the border area and in southern Hunan as well. Tu Hsiu-ching
[2629 0208 4842], representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, and
Yang K'ai-ming, secretary of the Special Committee appointed by the
Hunan Provincial Committee, carried out perfunctorily the orders of the Hunan
Provincial Committee, taking advantage of the absence of such persons as
Mao Tse-tung and Wan Hsi-hsien [5502 0341 2009] who were then in Yung-hsin
and had objected to the orders strongly, without canvassing the situation
then and disregarding the resolutions of the joint conference of the Army
Committee, Special Committee and Yung-hsin County Committee which differed
from the views of the Hunan Provincial Committee. They also endorsed the
action of the 29th regiment (I-chang peasants) to abandon the struggle to
return home. The result was to bring about defeat both in the border area
and in southern Hunan, thus making a tremendous mistake.
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In the middle of July, the Eighth Army mounted an attack on the Kiangsi
border, but it was unsuccessful. As the bulk of the Red Army launched an
offensive against Ling-hsien and Ch'a-ling, and was changing its plans to
turn to southern Hunan, five, regiments commanded by Wang Chun [3769 0971]
and Chin Han-ting [6855 3351 7844] in Kiangsi, and six regiments under
Hu Wen-t'ou [5170 2429 2435], of the 6th Army, 11 regiments in all, laid
siege to Yung-hsin. We had only one regiment (commanded by Mao Tse-tung)
in Yung-hsin which, shielded by the broad Red masses and resorting to
guerrilla tactics on all sides, succeeded in pinning down these 11 enemy
regiments within 30 li of the city for 25 days. Finally, the enemy probed
our weakness and captured Yung-hsin by a fierce assault, and its loss was
followed by Lien-hua and Ning-kang. At that time, some internal bickering
flared up in the 6th Army, which withdrew suddenly and engaged Wang Chun's
units at Chang-shu. Only five Kiangsi regiments were left, and, panicked,
they withdrew into the city of Yung-hsin. Thus, if our main force had
not gone to southern Hunan, it would undoubtedly, with the help of the
masses, have routed this enemy force, and extended the regimes areas to in-
clude Chi-an, An-fu and P'ing-hsiang, and linked it up with P'ing-chiang
and Liu-yang. But as the main force was away and the one remaining regiment
was too exhausted and worn out, we decided to keep .part of it to defend the
Ching-kang Mountains, together with the two units under Yuan Wen-ts'ai and
Wang Tso, while ordering Mao Tse-tung to lead one battalion to Kuei-tung to
meet the main force and escort it back. By that time, the main force,
which had started toward southern Hunan, was retreating to Kuei-tung,
and the forces joined at Kuei-tung on 23 August.
The 8th Army under Wu Shang [0742 1424] had invaded Ning-kang and again
advanced into Yung-hsin. Our enemy from Hunan was anxious to fight but
could not (as our army missed his troops when we attacked from a side road).
Fearing harassment by our masses, his army then retreated to Ch'a-ling by
way of Lien-hua. Just one day later, 11 regiments of our Kiangsi enemy
moved into Yung-hsin. At that time, the main force of the Red Army (led by
Chu Teh) was attacking Ch'a-ling and Ling-hsien from Ning-kang. Upon reach-
ing Ling-hsien, the soldiers of the 29th Regiment, seized by deep homesick-
ness, demanded to go back to Hunan and refused to take orders. Another
segment of our army was opposed to going back to southern Hunan, because
they wanted to go to southern Kiangsi, and were also unwilling to turn to
attack the enemy in Yung-hsin. Their agitation was aided by Tu Hsiu-ching,
and even the Army Committee was helpless in averting this unfavorable
turn of events. Consequently, the main force set out from Mien-tu in
Ling-hsien on 17 July, moving toward Ch'en-chou via Tzu-hsing. On 24 July
a battle was fought against Pan Shih-sheng's [5400 4258 3932] units at
o Ch'en-chou. Initial success was followed by defeat. It was dusk when we
withdrew and we took the wrong road. The 29th Regiment hurried toward
I-chang; a part of it was annihilated by Hu Feng-chang's [5170 7685 4545]
men at Lo-ch'ang, while another part was scattered and lost in I-chang
and Ch'en-chou. Only some 100 rifles were recovered and assembled that
night, though fortunately the loss sustained by the main force was small.
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Kuei-tung was occupied on 18 August. On 23 August Mao Tse-tung and others
arrived from the Ching-kang Mountains, and it was decided to return to
Ning-kang. That afternoon, two regiments of Wu Shang's troops in Ling-hsien
launched a sharp attack on Kuei-tung and a hard fight lasted until the
morning of.the ensuing day. Our losses were heavy (though the enemy lost even
more heavily). We had to retreat into Kiangsi. When our army was moving
into southern Hunan from Mien-tu, the original Army Committee was abolished,
and the Front Committee appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee was
organized, with Ch'en I as its secretary. After the defeat at and retreat
from Kuei-tung, the Front Committee was abolished, and the Action Committee
was organized to.command it, with Mao' Tse-tung as its secretary. On
8 September we arrived at the Ching-kang Mountains via Chung-i, Shang-yu and
Sui-ch'uan.
The causes for the failure of our assault on Ch'en-chou were six-fold:
(1) Some officers and men were homesick, thus losing their fighting morale,
and some of them were unwilling to go to southern Hunan, thus running counter
to mass psychology; (2) it was a hot summer and the soldiers were exhausted;
(3) after marching several hundred li from Ling-hsien, we lost contact with
the border area and became isolated; (4) the worker and peasant masses of
Hunan have not been mobilized and so it became a simple military venture;
(5) we were ignorant about the enemy situation; (6) preparations were inade-
quate, and our officers and soldiers did not understand the significance of
the war.
After the rout, one infantry company and one artillery battery under battalion
commander Yuan Ch'ung-ch'uan [5913 1504 0350] rebelled. Although these two
units were eventually recovered, the regimental commander, Wang Erh-cho
[3769 3643 3820], was killed, which was of course a serious loss.
On 30 August four regiments of Wu Shang's Hunan troops and Wang Chun's
Kiangsi troops mounted a fierce attack on the Ching-kang Mountains, taking
advantage of the fact that our forces had not yet arrived after their
defeat at Kuei-tung. We had less than a battalion, but relying on the
natural barriers of Huang-yang-chieh (the path of the Ching-kang Mountains
from Ning-kang), we fought bitterly for a.whole night, repulsing the enemy
and killing many of them. This campaign has enabled us to preserve our
last bastion, and to frighten the enemy badly. This was one of the famous
battles in the border area.
When the Front Committee was in Hunan, it organized two county committees
in Kuei-tung and Ju-ch'eng which, together with the original county commit-
tees in Tzu-hsing and Ch'en-chou, were placed under the direction of a
Special Committee, with Tu Hsiu-ching as its secretary and located
Yu-ch'i Shih-erh-tung in Tzu-hsing. A Red Guard corps was formed for
Tzu-hsing, Kuei-tung and Ju-ch'eng which received 80 rifles. Ch'en-chou
had a Red Guard corps located at Yao-ling, possessing some 40 or 50 rifles.
The conditions in Lai-yang and Yung-hsing were unclear. The 30th and
33d regiments of the Peasant Army which returned to southern Hunan in May
had long been dispersed, and most of their arms, some 300 to 400 rifles,
had been surrendered to the enemy. The broad masses that had been mobilized
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by the Red Army during the spring also were totally suppressed by the enemy.
When the Red Army was passing through Tzu-hsing, Ju-ch'eng and Kuei-tung,
some of the local masses were mobilized to set up soviets. The sand fields
in Kuei-tung were distributed, though their present status is unknown.
Because of the barriers of communication, no letters have arrived from
the newly organized Southern Hunan Special Committee.
(3) Status of Border Independent Regime From September to Present
Since April of this year, the independent regime's areas have been extended
steadily. Following the battle at Lung-yuan-k'ou (on the border between
Yung-hsin and Ning-kang) on 23 June and the routing of the enemy in Kiangsi
for the fourth time, the border areas have reached their zenith [of develop-
ment] comprising all three counties of Ning-kang, Yung-hsin and Lien-hua,
small portions of Chi-an and An-fu, the northern part of Sui-ch'uan, and
the southeastern part of Ling-hsien. Most of the land has already been
distributed, and the remainder is being distributed. District and township
soviets have been set up universally. There are county soviets in Ning-kang,
Yung-hsin, Lien-hua and Sui-ch'uan, and a Border Area soviet has also been
established. In the villages, worker and peasant insurrection corps armed
with spears have been organized, At the district and county levels, Red
Guards have been organized, armed with rifles. In July, the enemy from
Kiangsi attacked, and in August enemies from Kiangsi and Hunan joined forces
to attack Huang-yang-chieh, with the result that all the county cities
and plains have been occupied by the enemy. The Peace Preservation Corps
(armed with rifles) and the levies (armed with spears) acted as their
vanguards. They ran amok, spreading the White terror into both towns and
the countryside. Most of the party and government organs have disintegrated
while the rich peasants and opportunists in the party have become undependable.
As a result of the battle at Huang_yang-chieh on 30 August, the enemy realized
that it was impossible to destroy the natural barriers of the Ching-kang
Mountains. The enemy from Hunan began to retreat to Ling-hsien, while the
enemy from Kiangsi began to entrench itself in the county towns, and in the
towns and villages on the plains. Nevertheless, they could not do anything
to us in our strongholds such as the western and northern districts of
Ning-kang, the Pei-hsiang Tien-lung district of Yung-hsin, as well its
Hsiao-hsi-chiang and Nan-nien-shan districts, the Shang-hsi district of
Lien-hua, the Ching-kang Mountains district of Sui-ch'uan, and the
Ch'ing-shih-kang Ta-yuan of Ling-hsien. During July and August, scores of
battles were fought by one regiment of the Red Army and by the Red Guards
corps in various counties. Although we were defeated, we lost no more
than 30 rifles. Finally, we withdrew deep into the mountains. The enemy
deployed its entire force to attack. They combined the armed forces of
Kiangsi and Hunan to attack our bastion in the Ching-kang Mountains, but
they withdrew dismally. On 30 August we won a.victory over the suppression
armies at Huang-yang-chieh; on 8 September our southern expeditionary force
returned to the Ching-kang Mountains, thus opening up a new situation after.
September.
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As our army was marching to the Ching-kang Mountains through Ch'ung-i,
Shang-yu and Sui-ch'uan, the Independent 7th Division of western Kiangsi
under Liu Shih-i [6491 1102 3015], taking advantage of our defeat, sent
five battalions to pursue us to Sui-ch'uan. On 13 September we deployed
four battalions to attack Liu's units, routed them at the city of Sui-ch'uan,
captured 250 rifles, a battalion commander and a company leader, 34 platoon
leaders and some 200 soldiers. The remnants withdrew to Kan-chou. The
Action Committee which directed the army (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary)
and the Sui-ch'uan county committee collaborated in guiding the masses of
Sui-ch'uan and in canvassing supplies for the army. Guerrilla action was
conducted in the countryside, divided into four routes, each directed by
an action committee. When the eastern route committee reached Wan-an,
it made contact with the Wan-an County Committee. On 24 September
Li Wen-pin's [2621 2429 2619] Kiangsi regiment came from T'ai-ho, while
the Independent 7th Division came from Kan-chou to attack the city of
Sui-ch'uan. As our force was not concentrated, we could only deploy two
battalions for the battle. We were defeated, but morale remained intact.
Our main force returned to the Ching-kang Mountains on 26 September. On
1 October we engaged the 27th regiment of Chou Hun-yuan's [0719 3268 0037]
brigade under Hsiung Shih-hui [3574 1709 6540] in a battle at Ning-kang,
capturing one battalion commander, one company leader, two platoon leaders,
100 soldiers and 110 rifles. Remnants of the enemy units retreated to
Yung-hsin and the entire county of Ning-kang was recovered. While we
were attacking Ning-kang, the regiment under Li Wen-pin's command rein-
forced the enemy forces via T'ai-ho and Yung-hsin from Sui-ch'uan,
leaving only the Independent 7th Division (which was the weakest) in
Sui-ch'uan. There was thus considerable hope for us to mobilize the masses
in Sui-ch'uan, and moreover, we were faced with the urgent problem of
seeding the army. We, therefore, reoccupied Sui-ch'uan on 13 October, as
the Independent 7th Division took flight without a fight. The Action
Committee of Sui-ch'uan (with Chu Teh as secretary) collaborated with the
County Committee there to carry out guerrilla tactics in five routes,
distributing land, setting up soviets, developing party organization, and
collecting funds. At that time, the 3d Division of the Eighth Army under
Yen Chung-hsing [7051 0112 5887], with 126 rifles, had defected to our
army and been reorganized as a special service battalion commanded by
Pi Chan-yuan. On 2 November Sui-ch'uan was again attacked by two regiments
of the 21st Brigade of Kiangsi troops commanded by Li Wen-pin as well as
the Independent 7th Division. With a view to avoiding any hard battle,
we evacuated Sui-ch'uan, trying to make a blitz attack on Ning-kang and
Yung-hsin where the enemy forces were weaker, in order to break one side
of the siege. On 9 November we routed the 27th Regiment of Chou's brigade
at the city of Ning=kang and Lung-yuan-k'ou, capturing 160 rifles, killing
one battalion commander and scores of soldiers. We captured two deputy
battalion commanders, a company commander and a platoon leader, and more
than 100 soldiers. Next day, we advanced to Yung-hsin to attack the
28th Regiment and the remnants of the 27th Regiment of Chou's brigade
until 3 o'clock in the afternoon. We defeated the enemy and our vanguards
occupied the city of Yung-hsin. However, unexpectedly, the enemy 35th
Brigade arrived from Hung-t'ien-ho as reinforcement. We had to withdraw
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to Ning-kang in the face of this adverse situation. Although there were heavy
casualties to the enemy, we also suffered scores of dead and wounded. This
was the biggest battle since our return to the border area. Red Guards
and insurrection corps fought in both battles, though they did not do too
much. The status now in the border area is: Chou Hun-yuan's 14th brigade
and Liu Shih-i's 15th brigade are now stationed in the Kiangsi border, both
of which have been defeated and are being reorganized; the 21st brigade
under Li Wen-pin and the 35th brigade are crack troops; the 8th Army under
Wu Shang is entrenched in the three counties of Cha-ling, Ling-hsien and
Kuei-tung on the Hunan border. The area of Red power extends from Sui-ch'uan
and the southern foot of Ching-kang Mountains in the south to the borders
of Lien-hua in the north, including the entire county of Ning-kang, parts of
Sui-ch'uan, Ling-hsien and Yung-hsin, and forming a narrow strip from north
to south. The Shang-hsi District in Lien-hua, Tien-lung District in Yung-
hsin, and the Wan-nien shan area are not contiguous, though they have also
been occupied by Red power. The enemy is attempting to surround this
unbroken bastion by both military attack and economic blockade in order to
wipe out this "Communist bandit lair." A hard struggle is bound to be waged
with the passage of time, and they will never give us any respite.
(4) Current Problems
A. Military Question
(1) The Military Stage: Since the struggle in the border area has become
exclusively military, both the party and the masses must be militarized.
How to deal with the enemy and how to fight have thus become important items
on the daily agenda of the army and local party organs at all levels. The
so-called independent regime must be armed; that is, where there is no armed
force, or an inadequately armed one, or though armed, the tactics are wrong,
then it will be, instead, captured by the White armed forces immediately
(White army, peace preservation corps and levies). This kind of struggle
is bound to become more violent every day, and so the problems will also
become more complex and aggravated.
(2) The Sources of the Red Army: They may be divided into the following
six categories: (a) units formerly under Yeh T'ing and Ho Lung at Swatow;
(b) the Guards Regiment at Wuchang; (c) peasant armies of Liu-yang and
P'ing-chiang; (d) peasant armies of southern Hunan and the workers of
Shui-k'ou-shan; (e) soldiers captured from the units under Hsu K'o-hsiang
[6070 0344 4382], Tang Sheng-chih, Pai Chung-hsi, Chu P'ei-teh,
Wu Shang and Hsiung Shih-hui; and (f) worker and peasant elements from the
various border counties. The first four types are the main force. However,
after more than a year of fighting, the old units of Yeh and Ho the Guards
Regiment, and the peasant troops of Liu-yang and P'ing-chian have lost
two-thirds of their strength, leaving only one-third intact. Even the
Red Army of southern Hunan has.also suffered terrific losses after 8 months
of fighting. Thus, the first four categories, because of their excellent
quality, have remained the basic strength of the 4th Red Army, but are
outnumbered by the last two categories. Of the last two categories,
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captured soldiers form the majority. Without this replenishment: it would
have been impossible to fill up the 4th Army. Moreover, its quality has also
suffered considerably. The increase in men has not kept up with the increase
in rifles. Rifles are not easily lost, but soldiers are wounded, killed,
fall sick or desert (during a defeat). Among peasants in the border area,
very few were willing to enlist. With the distribution of land, most of
them have gone out to plant the fields. At present, the number of worker
and peasant elements is extremely small in the 4th Army in the border area.
Thus, the problem is still rather serious. The Hunan Provincial Committee
has promised to send us workers from An-yuan and we hope this will be done
soon.
(3) Composition: One portion consists of worker and peasant elements while
the other is formed largely of the vagabond proletariat (the Hunan Provincial
Committee has alleged that they are all vagabond proletariat, but this is
not true). This vagabond proletariat portion must be replaced by worker
and peasant elements., though it is difficult to find them. The vagabond
proletariat elements seem to be excellent in combat and, as the.war goes on
every day casualties have been heavy. Thus, the vagabond proletariat are
indispensable, but it is not easy to find replacements from among them.
Under these circumstances, we must intensify political training in order to
improve their quality.
(4) Character: The majority has been converted from mercenary forces but
the mercenary system is abolished as soon as they join the Red Army. There
has never been any pay, but there there is rice money and petty cash for
miscellaneous expenses. In regard to land distribution among the Red Army
officers and men, with the exception of those soldiers in various counties
in the border areas whose families.are given land as a rule, it is rather
difficult for officers and men from remote places to obtain land. This is
because, first, there is very little land in the occupied area which is
mountainous. Moreover, peasants have complained that the land distributed
to them is insufficient, and so there is no surplus land. Secondly, because
of the constant changes in the fortunes of war, the occupied area is very
unstable. The land distributed by Red power yesterday could be easily
taken away by White power today, in which case one must pay rent to the
landlord. Thus, it is not only the officers and men in the Red Army who are
wary toward the concept of land distribution; even among the peasants, many
are aware of the uncertainties of the situation. This is due to the fact
that the White power is too strong, and the struggle between White and Red
has been too recurrent and too severe. Nonetheless, that the Red Army
officers and men should receive land is an irrevocable principle, though
the methods of implementation remain to be discussed.
(5) Political Training: The Red Army soldiers have learned class conscious-
ness and such essentials as distribution of land, the establishment of soviets,
the arming of workers and peasants, etc. They realize that they are fighting
for themselves and the workers and peasants. Because of this, they have not
complained even though they have had to endure hardships in the midst of this
bitter struggle. There is a soldiers' committee at the company, battalion
and regimental levels whose duties are to supervise the officers, represent
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the interests of soldiers, participate in army administration, undertake
political training internally (in the army) and launch mass movements.ex-
ternally. With a sound soldiers' committee, it may not be necessary to have
a political department. The working personnel can be incorporated into the
soldiers' committee, which is better than maintaining a political department
separately. Before April this year, there was a political department in all
army units here, but it has been abolished because the results have not been
too satisfactory. With the political. department, there was a feeling on the
part of the officers, soldiers and masses that political work could be done
by a few people of that department, and so they deemed that the duty of the
remaining people was limited to fighting. But after its abolition, everybody
realized that they not only have to fight, but also must undertake political
work (political training and'mass movement). This has resulted in breaking
the simple military-minded tradition. Based on past experience, it has been
held that the party representative system should not be abolished. Party
representatives at the army and divisional levels, however, could be abolished
(there being no divisional level here, while the regiment is directly under
the army). Party representatives cannot be abolished at the regiment,
battalion and company level, particularly at the company level at this time.
This is because the party branch is built upon the company. The party
representative of a company has the duty of supervising the soldiers' commit-
tee to carry out political training and to direct mass movements, and he is
also the branch secretary in the party. As it has been borne out by facts,
where the company's party representative is better, that company will also
be better. Among the lower echelon cadres, it often happens that because of
the heavy casualties, some of the enemy soldiers captured only yesterday
would be promoted to serve as platoon or even company leaders today. Among
those enemy soldiers that were captured in February and March this year, some
have become battalion commanders. It seems rather absurd to think that
just because ours is now called the Red Army, there is no need to have party
representatives. When Chu Teh's units were in southern Hunan, the system
of party representatives was abolished. Later, he felt that it was not too
good, and so when he came to the border area, the system was restored. If
the name is changed to "director," this would be confused with the directors
of the Kuomintang, whom most of the captured soldiers detest. Moreover,
any change of name will not change the nature of the system. Hence, it has
been decided that there should be no change. There have been too many
casualties among party representatives. It is hoped that apart from conduct-
ing training classes, the Central Committee and the two provincial committees
will send us at least 30 persons who could serve as party representatives.
(6) Military Training: It usually takes other people from 6 months to
1 year to train their soldiers before they can fight: our soldiers might have
entered the army yesterday, and required to fight today with no time for
training at all. Consequently, among some middle and lower echelon cadres
and many soldiers, the military technique is rather poor. Their only
advantage in combat is courage, and this is very dangerous. Since it is
impossible to have long periods of rest and training, the only thing is to
try to avoid fighting in order to gain the necessary time for training. We
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have established a training corps of 150 members and we intend to continue
this practice. We hope that the Central Committee and the two provincial
committees will send us at least 30 more officers at the company and platoon
level, to the border areas as soon as possible.
(7) The Problem of Supplies; The Hunan Provincial Committee has asked us
to pay attention to the material life of the soldiers to make it at least
a little better than the average worker and peasant. At present, however,
army life is just contrary to that, and we feel that no one else lives so
badly as the Red Army soldiers. Because of the shortage of silver dollars,
we have found it difficult to continue to give each person 5 fen for their
food (rice is supplied locally) each day. The soldiers' adage that "down
with the capitalists, as we can eat pumpkin every day" is an indication of
their distress,. They can endure hardships; no others can endure hardships
better than the 4th Army. They need only money for food--all other expenses
have been curtailed, and even this requires some 10,000 silver dollars a
month. They can get this money only by making the local despots pay. But
first, wherever they have been, there are no more local despots from whom
to collect it; second, as the siege of the enemy is so tight, unless one
side of it has collapsed, it would be impossible to venture out too far to
strike at the local despots; and third, the enemy threat being so serious,
it is impossible for one or two battalions of soldiers to go out to look
for funds, and if you want to get more, you have to have more soldiers. This
is no simple problem. Now, although we have the cotton for winter clothing
for the 5,000 soldiers of the entire army (regular Red Army), we are still
short of cloth, and do not know when this can be solved. It is already so
cold now, but. many soldiers are still wearing two layers of thin clothing.
Fortunately, they are used to hardships, and they are equally poor regard-
less of who they are. From the.army commander down to the cook, each person
gets 2 fen uniformly for their food. When the expense money is 20 fen each,
they would all get the same amount, and when it is 40 fen, they would all
get 40 fen each. Because they all understand this is "suffering hardships
for the proletariat," they do not complain. Although this is so, the economic
problem remains rather serious.
(8) The Problem of Wounded and Sick Soldiers: After each engagement, there
are some wounded soldiers. Because of the lack of nutrition, the cold, and
other causes, there are many sick. The Red Army's hospitals are built in
the Ching-kang Mountains. They treat patients with both Chinese and Western
medicine, but both drugs and doctors are in short supply and the problem
is grave. In September there were more than 200 wounded and sick soldiers,
and this number has increased since the recent battle at Yung-hsin. There
are now more than 800 patients in the hospitals, including some nursing
staff. Morale will be affected if the wounded are not given proper care.
But to do this requires adequate equipment and supplies which are unsatis-
factory and difficult to obtain. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised
to send some medicines, but no delivery has been made so far. We hope that
the Central Committee and the two provincial committees will loan us a few
doctors [trained in] Western medicine and some iodine.
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(9) Democracy in the Army; Although the material life of the Red Army is
poor and although there have been incessant engagements, it has managed to
maintain its morale. Apart from the role played by the party, this is due
largely to the thorough implementation of democracy. The officers do not
abuse their soldiers; officers and men receive equal treatment: they eat
the same food and dress alike. The soldiers enjoy freedom of speech and
assembly. All formalities and protocol have been abolished and economic
management is open; the representatives of the soldiers can look into the
budget and accounts. They also manage their own mess, and though each person
gets about only 5 fen for their mess, they could still put aside 60 or 70
coppers a day for personal expenses. These measures have proved to be most
satisfying to the soldiers. This is especially true for the newly captured
soldiers who realize how different their new army life is from their old
army life,'so much so that they seem to be two different worlds. Although
they may feel that the material life of the Red Army is not as good as
that of the White, their spirit is liberated and they get along well. Al-
though they are the same soldiers, they did not fight so bravely for the
enemy as they do now for the Red Army, and this is due to the influence of
democracy. The Red Army is like a melting pot in which captured soldiers
can be melted as soon as they. come over. This is a fact. In China, there
is great need for democracy not only among the worker and peasant masses,
but also for the army, and even more urgently. To practice democracy
thoroughly in the army constitutes an important policy to destroy China's
feudalistic mercenary armies. This is because the life of soldiers in
China's feudal mercenary army is simply intolerable.
(10) Party Organization in the Army: There are now four levels in the party
organization of the army: the company branch, battalion committee, regi-
mental committee and army committee. The party branch is established in
each company; and a small group is established in each squad. An important
reason why the 4th Army has remained intact after so many battles is due to
the fact that "the party branch is organized on the company basis." Two
years ago, our party organization in the Kuomintang army failed to grasp
the soldiers, and even in Yeh T'ing's units, there was only a party branch
in each regiment, which was most absurd. Now, the ratio between party
members and nonpartisans in the army is one to three, which means there
is a party member in every four persons. Recently, we decided to develop
more party members among the combat soldiers so that the number of party
members and nonpartisans will attain a fifty-fifty ratio. There is now a
shortage of good secretaries in the company branches. Therefore, we are
asking the Central Committee to send more active elements who find it
difficult to stay in their respective localities to come here to serve as
company party representatives. Among the working staff who came from
southern Hunan, almost all of them are doing party work in the army (and
they do political work simultaneously). In August we lost some of them in
southern Hunan, and so it is even more difficult now to spare them. Since
the Army committee (Army party committee) was elected by the first army
representatives conference at Ning-kang in April, six army party representa-
tives conferences have been held in the past 7 months, the last on
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14-15 November. This conference was held after receipt of a letter from the
Central Committee. Thus, decisions have been adopted on political, military,
organization and propaganda affairs, and it was a better conference than all
previous ones. The conference elected an army committee of 23 members, with
Chu Teh as secretary (designated by the Central Committee). It is the highest
party organ in the army and is under the jurisdiction of the Front Committee.
Externally, this is the military council of the border area soviet, commanding
the Red Army and local militia forces. The party organization in the army
has been set up with considerable success, and some party members are very
determined in their revolutionary outlook, though the majority of them to not
have a good education. We must pay more attention to this later.
(11) Local Armed Forces: The local forces consist of the Red Guards and the
worker and peasant insurrection corps. The insurrection corps is armed with
spears and shotguns. It is based on the village as the unit, each village
having one detachment, whose strength is based on the size of the village.
Its duty is to suppress counterrevolutionaries and to protect the village
regime. When the enemy comes, the insurrection corps will help the Red Army
or the Red Guards in combat duties. A secret organization used to launch
uprisings, the insurrection corps was founded in Yung-hsin. Later, it seized
the political power of the entire county, thus becoming an open, organization.
This system has since been extended in the border areas, and retains its
original name. The arms of the Red Guards corps consist of five-, nine-
and single-shot rifles, with five-shot ones in the majority. The numbers of
rifles in the various counties are as follows: 140 in Ning-kang, 220 in
Yung-hsin, 43 in Lien-hua, 50 in Ch'a-ling, 90 in Ling-hsien, 130 in
Sui-ch'uan and 10 in Wan-an, for a total of 683. Most of these have been
supplied by the Red Army, while a small portion has been captured from the
enemy. Most of the Red Guards units have been fighting constantly with the
peace preservation corps and the levies of the big gentry in the-various
counties and as a result their ability to handle weapons and their fighting
capability have increased steadily. Before the Ma-jih.(21 May) incident,
the number of rifles held by the peasant self-defense corps in the various
border counties was as follows: 300 in Yu-hsien, 300 in Ch'a-ling,
60 in Ling-hsien, 50 in Sui-ch'uan, 80, in Yung-hsin, 60 in Lien-hua,
60 in Ning-kang (Yuan Wen-ts'ai's units) and 60 in the Ching-kang Mountains
(Wang Tso's units), totaling 970. After that incident, with the exception
of the Yuan and Wang units, which remained intact, only 6 rifles were left
in Sui-ch'uan, 1 in Lien-hua, all the remaining rifles having been seized
by the big landlords. As a result of the opportunist line, they were unable
to hold on to their rifles. Now, the Red Guards units in the various
counties are still short of rifles, and the big landlords possess far more
rifles than the Red Guards. This is why the Red Army must continue to supply
rifles to the various counties, and where it will not impair the Red Army,
everything must be done to help arm the local militia forces so that, they
can be strengthened steadily. The Red Army conference has stipulated that
the four-company system be adopted, with 75 rifles in each company (when
this number is added to the rifles of the special services company,
machine--gun company, mortar company and the battalion and regimental
headquarters, each regiment should have 1,075 rifles). Moreover, weapons
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captured from the enemy should have been distributed as much as possible to
the local militia forces of workers and peasants. The officers of the Red
Guards corps should be trained at the training corps maintained by the Red
Army. Hereafter, the number of officers commanding Red Guards who have been
sent by the Red Army must be curbed gradually. In the meantime, Chu P'ie-teh
has also been massively arming the peace preservation corps and the levies,
and the number and combat strength of the armed forces equipped by 'the big
gentry in the border counties are also formidable. Thus, expansion of the
Red local militia forces in the border area cannot be delayed any further.
(12) The Strategy of Red Army and Red Guards:. In addition to recognizing
guiding principles (that where the enemy is small in number, it should be
eliminated immediately by superior force, and where the enemy is numerous
and strong, mass war strategy should be adopted instead of fighting a hard
battle), the Red Army should concentrate its strength while the Red Guards
should disperse its strength. Now, the bourgeois regime is comparatively
stable, the enemy is in a position to deploy an enormous number of troops
against the Red Army. Thus, it would be most inimical for the Red Army
to disperse its strength. In our experience, we have almost always suffered
defeat when our strength was spread thin. But we have invariably won when
we have concentrated our forces to attack enemy forces that were smaller
than ours, equal to ours, or slightly larger than ours. The area of
guerrilla warfare as prescribed by the directives of the Central Committee
covers thousands of li in length and breadth. This is too extensive and was
due probably to the over-estimation of our military strength. (Since the
number of rifles in the 4th Red Army is known to the Hunan Provincial
Committee, we have asked Comrade Yuan Teh-sheng to make a report orally,
and so it is not listed here.) In regard to the strategy of the Red Guards
corps, it would be better to disperse their strength. This method is being
adopted by Red Guards in the various counties.
(13) Military Organization: We are still following the old Kuomintang method
of organization. We are unable to decode the Central Committee's "Resolution
on Military Work." Also we cannot surmise what was the military system of
the T'ai-p'ing regime. Please send these documents again so that we may
discuss them.
(14) Propaganda Aimed at the Enemy: The most effective propaganda is to
release captured soldiers and to give medical treatment to wounded enemy
soldiers. When enemy soldiers and enemy battalion company and platoon
commanders are captured, they are, after some propaganda work on our part,
C divided into those who want to stay and those who wish to go. We should
allow those who want to leave to get their wish and give them the necessary
traveling expenses. This kind of propaganda will shatter the enemy
allegation that "Communist bandits kill anyone in sight." As a result of
this policy, the "Ten-day Bulletin of the 9th Division" issued by Yang
Chi'ih-sheng said that our method is "sinister." The officers and men of
the Red Army are most enthusiastic in welcoming and comforting captured
enemy soldiers. At each "rally to bid farewell to new brothers," the
captured soldiers responded with warm gratitude in their speeches. Medical
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treatment for the wounded enemy soldiers also has a great effect. Some clever
enemy (such as Li Wen-pin) have imitated our method by not killing our cap-
tured soldiers and by treating our wounded soldiers. However, after our
men have been captured by the enemy, they often bring their rifles back with
them at the next engagement. Such incidents have occurred twice. Very few
Red Army soldiers have been captured by the enemy in the border area. This
is because the Red Army has rarely lost any battle there. Additionally, we
have also done much in written propaganda, such as slogan-writing. Whenever
we reach a new place, we cover the walls with our slogans. We are, however,
short of persons who have drawing skills and so we hope the Central Committee
and the two provincial committees will send us some.
(15) Military Strongholds: The first stronghold is the Ching-kang Mountains
located at the juncture of the four counties of Ning-kang, Lin-hsien,
Sui-ch'uan and Yung-hsin. Its northern foot is Mao-p'ing, in Ning-kang,
and its southern foot is Huang-pa in Sui-ch'uan, a distance of 90 li between
them. Its eastern foot is Na-shan in Yung-hsin and its western foot is
Shui-k'ou in Ling-hsien, 180 li apart. It has an area of 550 square li,
extending from Na-shan and Lung-yuan-k'ou (in Yung-hsin) to Hsin-ch'eng,
Mao-p'ing and Ta-lung (in Ning-kang), to Shih-tu, Shui-k'ou and-Hsia-ts'en
(in Ling-hsien), and then to Ying-pan-yu, Tai-chia-pu, Ta-feng, Tui-tzu-ch'ien,
Huang-ao, Wu-tu-chiang, and Ch'e-ao (in Sui-ch'uan). In the mountains are
located such places as Ta-ching, Hsiao-ching, Shang-ching, Chung-ching,
Hsia-ching, Tzu-p'ing, Hsia-chuang, Hsing-chou, Ta'ao-p'ing, Pai-ni-hu and
Lo-fu where paddy fields and villages are scattered. These places have
been historically the lairs for bandits and stragglers. The population is
less than 2,000, and the grain crop is under 10,000 piculs and so all the
grain for the army must be supplied from Ning-kang, Yung-hsin and Sui-ch'uan
counties. All strategic passes in the mountains are defended by heavy
fortifications. Located in the mountains are the Red Army hospitals, clothing
shops, arsenal and the rear offices of the various regiments. Foodstuffs
are now being hauled to the mountain bastions from Ning-kang, and if we can
get sufficient supplies (grain and cash, the most important being cash),
it will be impregnable. There is a defense committee in charge of local
defense, with Wang Tso as its director. The second stronghold is Chiu-lung,
located at the juncture of the four counties of Ning-kang, Yung-hsin,
Lien-hua and Ch'a-ling. This base is not as important as the Ching-kang
Mountains, but is fortified and serves as the rearmost base for the local
militia forces of the four counties. Surrounded by White regimes on all
sides, a military bastion with strong natural barriers is indispensable for
the existence of the Red regime. Because of the fact that it is surrounded
by the enemy, it is necessary to defend every side, and so natural barriers
are important in reinforcing the inadequacy of human resources. However,
when the bourgeois political power is stable, protracted Red occupation
will be difficult.
(B) Agrarian Problem
(1) Agrarian Status in Border Area: Generally speaking, over 60 percent
of the land is controlled by landlords, and less than 40 percent is in the
hands of peasants. Individually speaking, land ownership is most concen-
trated in Sui-ch'uan in the Kiangsi border, where 80 percent is owned by
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landlords, Yung-hsin comes next, with 70 percent owned by landlords. In
Wan-an, Ning-kang and Lien-hua there are more rich peasants. With the
exception of Wan-an where no direct investigation has been made, although
we say that there are many rich peasants in Ning-kang and Lien-hua, land-
lords still own more land there--the ratio being 60 : 40. In Ch'a-ling
and Ling-hsien on the Hunan border, conditions are similar, as some 70 per-
cent of land is owned by landlords.
(2) The Problem of the Intermediate Class: Under these circumstances, it
would seem that confiscation of all lands and redistribution of them would
be supported by the majority. However, there are roughly three classes
in rural areas, namely, the big gentry consisting of big and medium-sized
landlords, the intermediate class of small landlords and rich peasants, and
the poor peasants. In the intermediate class, the rich peasants often align
themselves with the interests of the small landlords. Although the land
owned by the rich. peasants is a small percentage of the total, if combined
with the land.owned by the small landlords, the amount is sizeable. This
situation seems to be prevalent throughout the country. The policy in the
border areas has been to confiscate all the land and then to distribute it
thoroughly. Thus, both the big gentry and the intermediate class have been
attacked in the areas of Red power. Although this is the policy, it has been
hampered by the intermediate class during its implementation. In the early
days of the revolution, the intermediate class capitulated to the poor
peasants superficially, but in reality conspired to use their former social
status and their clannishness to spread rumors intimidating the poor peasants,
thus delaying the distribution of land. When they were-pressured to such an
extent that no further delay was possible, they either concealed the actual
extent of their land, or kept'the rich land for themselves and reported the
poor land to the authorities. During that period, because of the protracted
persecution and the uncertainty of revolutionary victory, the poor peasants
were deceived by the intermediate class and did not dare to take positive
action. It is only when the revolution has become resurgent and seized
political power in one or several counties, when the reactionary army has
been defeated repeatedly, and when the prowess of the Red Army has been
demonstrated effectively that positive action has been taken in rural villages
against the intermediate class. For instance, the southern section of
Yung-hsin has the largest intermediate class. It has also been most stubborn
in delaying redistribution of land and in concealing landholdings. But
it was only after the Red Army won a huge victory at Lung-yuan-k'ou on
23 June, and the district executed several people who tried to postpone
land redistribution, that land was actually redistributed. Nonetheless,
in almost any county, the feudal system of family organization is prevalent;
usually one single family dominates one village or even several villages.
The result is that it could take ?a long time before class splitting in
the village is realized and the clan sentiment overcome. In rural villages
dominated by family organizations, it is not the big gentry but the inter-
mediate class that creates the biggest problem.
(3) Defection of the Intermediate Class Under the White Terror: As the
intermediate class had been under attack during the revolutionary upsurge,
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it immediately defected as soon as the White terror came. The small land-
lords and rich peasants of Ning.kang and Yung-hsin led the reactionary
troops in burning down the houses of the revolutionary peasants there.
Pursuant to the directions of the reactionaries, they proved to be most
courageous in burning houses and arresting people. When the Red Army
again reached Ning-kang (in September), several thousand peasants of
Hsin-ch'eng, Ku-ch'eng and Lung-shih, persuaded by the propaganda of the
reactionaries that "the Communists would kill them," followed the reaction-
aries to Yung-hsin. It was only after we proselytized to them that "peasants
who had defected would be killed" and that we "welcome peasants who had
defected back to reap grain" that many peasants slowly returned.
(4) When the revolution is at a low ebb in the nation, the most difficult
problem in the occupied areas is that the intermediate class cannot firmly
be held. The main reason for the betrayal by this class is that it has been
dealt heavy blows by the revolution. However, if the poor peasants are
undaunted during the revolutionary upsurge, the intermediate class might be
scared and not dare to run amok. When the war between Li Tsung-jen and
Tang Sheng-chih spread to Hunan, the small landlords in Ch'a-ling
tried to make peace with the peasants, some of them even sent pork to
peasants as a New Years gift (At that time, the Red Army evacuated Ch'a-ling
to go to Sui-ch'uan). .After the conclusion of the Li-T'ang [action], such
incidents have also disappeared. Now that the counterrevolution has reached
its high tide in the whole country, the intermediate class that has been
under attack has become completely subservient to the big gentry in the White
areas, and the poor peasants have become an isolated force. This is a rather
serious problem.
(5) The pressure of daily life as an influence on the intermediate class to
defect: Red occupation and White resistance have created two enemy states.
Because of the enemy's stringent blockade and because of. our mishandling
of the petty bourgeoisie, trade has been completely stopped between the
two areas. The shortage and the high prices of salt, cloth and medicine
as well as other daily necessities, and the difficulty of exporting such
items as timber, tea and oil have affected the people in general. It has
also curbed their income. Although the poor peasants can endure hardship
the intermediate class cannot and will go over to the gentry when conditions
become intolerable. This economic problem is most serious. Thus, unless
the splits and wars between the big gentry and the warlords of China
continues, and unless the national situation moves forward, the small inde-
pendent Red regimes will be gravely threatened economically, and the protracted
existence of the regimes will become a problem. This is because such economic
pressure is not only intolerable to the middle class, but also unendurable
to the worker and peasant classes as well as to the Red Army. Both
Yung-hsin and Ning-kang have no salt to eat, and the supply of cloth and
medicine, not to mention other things, has been completely disrupted. Salt
is now sold, but at an exorbitant price, and there are still no cloth and
medicine. In Ning-kang and the western part of Yung-hsin as well as the
northern part of Sui-ch'uan (which are still occupied areas at present), it
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is still impossible to export timber, tea and oil which form their staple
products. There is an acute shortage of money, and if captured local despots
refuse to deliver money, there is no money to spend. That is why the problem
is very grave.
(6) The Standard for Land Redistribution: The township serves as the unit
for redistribution. Where it is mountainous and there is very little farm-
land, such as the Hsiao-chiang District in Yung-hsin, three or four townships
form a single unit for redistribution, though such cases are very rare. In
regard to human standards, then land is redistributed equally among all
persons regardless of age and sex. Now, however, in keeping with the new
measures prescribed by the Central Committee, the labor force is used as the
standard; those who can work receive twice as much as land as those who cannot.
(7) The Question of Concessions to the Owner-peasants: This problem has
not yet been discussed in depth. The rich owner-peasants have suggested that
the standard of redistribution be based on productivity, that is, those who
have more labor and capital (farm implements, etc.) should be given more land.
The rich peasants feel that neither equal distribution nor distribution
according to the labor force are to their advantage. They indicate that they
are willing to work harder which, coupled with their capital, would enable
them to raise more crops. If they are given land on an equal basis, it would
be tantamount to ignoring (and negating) their special efforts as well as
their surplus capital, and so they are unwilling. The measures prescribed
by the Central Committee have been carried out here accordingly, but the
problem must be discussed further, and a report will be made as soon as
conclusions are drawn. On the other hand, we request the Central Committee
and the two provincial committees to inform us as soon as possible the measures
adopted by Soviet Russia to treat its kulaks (rich peasants), and especially
what measures had been adopted by the Soviet Government within the White
regime during the time of its democratic revolution. As to the question of
not confiscating the land of rich-peasants, where the land has been completely
confiscated in the occupied border areas, it of course will not arise again.
However, as the area is expanded, the policy of nonconfiscation will be
applied during initial stages in order to enable the rich-peasants to strike
against the big gentry and to help the poor peasants.
(8) Land Tax: In Ning-kang, the tax is 20 percent, which is about 5 percent
higher than that prescribed by the Central Committee. Since collection is
now under way, it cannot be changed, but could be reduced next year. In
Sui-ch'uan, Ling-hsien and Yung-hsin, the terrain is mountainous and the
peasants are so poor that it is inadvisable to collect tax from them. The
funds for the government and the Red Guards must be obtained from the local
despots in the White areas. The rice for the sustenance of the Red Army can
be obtained for the time being from the land tax in Ning-kang, while cash
has also been obtained from squeezing the local despots. As a result of
guerrilla operations in Sui-ch'uan in October, some 10,000 yuan have been
collected which may last for some time, and we will try to look to some other
means after this money is gone.
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(C) The Question of Soviets
(1) Soviets of County, District and Township Levels: Soviets on all levels
have been organized in the border area, but more in name than in reality.
Among the worker and peasant masses, and even among party members, the
meaning of "soviet" is not widely understood. In many places, they do not
have the so-called workers, peasants and soldiers representatives conference.
The executive committee of the soviet at the district and township levels,
and even at the county level, is usually elected at a mass rally. It can
neither discuss problems, nor give political training, though it can be
easily manipulated by intellectuals and opportunists. This is due to the
fact that they do not understand what constitutes a soviet, that the repre-
sentatives of workers, peasants and soldiers form the highest permanent
organ of political power, while the executive committee is merely an adminis-
trative organ during the recess of the representatives' conference. This is
the biggest mistake of many localities in the border areas regarding the
organ of political power. In some places there are representatives con-
ferences, though they also merely regard the conference as an ad hoc elected
organ vis-a-vis the executive committee. After the election, the power is
controlled by the executive committee, and the conference will not even be
mentioned. This does not mean that there are no bona fide soviet organiza-
tions, though the number is extremely small. This is due to the woeful lack
of propaganda and education on this new political system of soviets. The
evil habits of dictatorship and dogmatism during the feudal era have become
steeped in the minds of the masses and even party members. They still cannot
eradicate these habits. They are prone to follow the easy course, and dislike
the complex democratic system. In order that democratic centralism may be
applied to mass organizations, its efficacy must be demonstrated in the
revolutionary struggle. This will enable the masses to understand that this
kind of organizational method is most conducive to mobilizing the strength
of the masses, and most beneficial to struggle. Only after they have
gained this understanding will it be universally and truly established. We
are now enacting detailed organic laws for soviets at all levels (based on
the outlines of the Central Committee) in order to correct some of the
previous mistakes. The soldiers soviet (soldiers' representatives conference
on all levels) in the Red Army is also being established regularly. This
would also rectify the mistake of having only soldiers' committees but no
regular soldiers' conferences.
(2) The Executive Committee on All Levels: The masses now generally under-
stand the "soviet government of workers, peasants and soldiers" at all
levels, to be the "ai government," so dubbed by the masses of Ning-kang
("ai" meaning "us" in the local dialect, and so this means "our government"),
or the "su government" dubbed elsewhere, both referring to the committee.
This is because they have not understood the powers of the representatives
conference, thinking the committee is the only authority. This kind of
executive committee does not have the backing of a sound representatives
conference and is apt to deviate from the views of the masses when decisions
are made. This is often manifested by its wavering and compromise in the
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redistribution of land, its recklessness and corruption in economic affairs,
its fear of the White Terror, and its lack of resoluteness in the struggle.
Very few plenary meetings are held, and there are also very few standing
committee meetings-on the district and township government level. Matters
are decided by the chairman, secretary, treasurer or Red Guards commander
(or insurrectionary leader). As a result, the practice of democratic
centralism even among government members has not become uniform.
(3) The government committee is dominated by the bourgeoisie. During the
early stage, especially in government committees on the township level,
small landlords, rich peasants and intellectuals vied with each other in
seeking power. They pretended to be enthusiastic, wearing red ribbons, and
wormed their way by deceit into the government committee to play dominant
roles, while poor peasant members were relegated to secondary roles. It
was only after they were unmasked during the course of struggles and the
peasants rose up that it became possible to get rid of them. Although this
state of affairs has not been universal, it has occurred in many places.
(4) The Relation Between the Party and Organs of Political Power: Although
there is no such thing as the party issuing orders to the government organs,
this does not mean that the government is independent. The party still
enjoys very great prestige among its members and the masses, while the
prestige of the government is much less. This is because the party, for the
sake of convenience, has often handled matters directly, paying no regard
to the government. This kind of mistake has been recurrent in many places.
In some government organs there are no party or corps organizations; in other
places, they have not been used efficiently. Hereafter, the party must be
the master behind the scene; the party's policies and measures, with the
exception of propaganda, must be carried out through mass organizations.
We must avoid the Kuomintang's mistake of interfering with the government
directly.
(5) The Supreme Soviet: The shingle of the "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet
of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area" was hung out in May. Nonetheless, it
has been established hurriedly and is rather imperfect. It is now decided
to reorganize the border soviet government and its committee as the supreme
organ of political power in the border areas.
(C) The Status of the Party in the Border Areas
(1) History of Struggle Against Opportunism: About the time of the Ma-jih
(21 May) incident, all party organizations in the counties in the border
areas may be said to have been opportunistic. For this reason, they did
not wage a resolute struggle when the counterrevolution set in. When the
Red Army (the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division of the 1st Army of the Worker
and Peasant Revolutionary Army) arrived in the border counties in October
last year, there remained only a few party members in hiding, and the
party organizations had been totally destroyed. The period from November
to April this year was one of rebuilding the party and the period since May
one of great expansion. In the past year, the phenomenon of opportunism
within the party has been found everywhere. Some of the party members,
lacking the will to fight, laid in ambush (by hiding themselves deep in
the mountains when the enemy came); others were more active, but they
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became idealisticadventurists as a result of their bourgeois mentality, This
situation diminished after an extended period of training and struggle with-
in the party. In the meantime, even in the Red Army, this kind of petty-
bourgeois restiveness has also lasted a considerable length of time. When
the enemy came, they would put up a fight, or they would take flight. This
kind of ambivalence was often found in the same person and on the same issue.
This has been gradually rectified only after prolonged inner-party struggle
and through lessons learned from actual events (for instance, from losses
incurred in reckless battle and defeats suffered during flight).
(2) Localism: The economy of the border area is not only an agrarian
economy, it has remained in the age of the hand pestle (the wooden hand
pestle is used in the mountains, while in the plains there are many stone
mills). The social organizational unit is the clan, consisting of-people
with the same name. The party organization in the villages consists usually
of one clan of the same surname living close together, forming one branch.
So the branch meeting is tantamount to a family meeting. Under this cir-
cumstance, it is of course very difficult to have a "fighting Bolshevik
Party." To say that the Communist Party does not have any national or
provincial demarcations is, of course, also incomprehensible to them.
They do not even understand that there are no county, district or township
differences. There is localism to a serious extent among the various counties,
and is strong even in the different districts and townships in the same
county. Reasoning is only partially successful in overcoming localism and
it takes White oppression--which is not localized--to gradually convince
the people to abandon their localism for common interests and struggle
(for instance, such as joint suppression by two provincial forces).
Localism is declining considerably as a result of a series of objective lessons.
(3) The Question of Native Inhabitants and Outsiders: There is another
unique thing in the border area, namely, the rift between the native resi-
dents and the outsiders who have settled down there. There is a great rift
between the native population and the immigrants from Kwangtung and Fukien
who arrived several centuries ago. Historically, there has been a deep
enmity between them which has become almost a "national" struggle. These
outsiders comprise a few million people, from the Kwangtung border, to the
borders of Hunan and Kiangsi, and even to southern Hupeh. The outsiders,
who live in the mountains, have been traditionally oppressed by the native
residents on the plains and have never had any political power. The outsiders
have welcomed the national revolution in the last 2 years, thinking it was
the prelude of better fortune for them. But the revolution became a counter-
revolution, and the outsiders have been repressed by the native population
as before. Within the border area, such as Ning-kang, Sui-ch'uan,
Ling-hsien and Ch-a-ling, the problem of natives and outsiders is very
serious, especially in Ning-kang. Last year and the year before, the in-
digenous revolutionaries and the outside settlers of Ning-kang joined forces
under the leadership of the Communist Party to overthrow the rule of the
native gentry, thereby seizing political control throughout the county.
In June of last year, Chu P'ei-teh's government launched a counterrevolution,
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and in September the local gentry led Chu's troops in an attack on Ning-kang
which continues to the present, In theory, this kind of rift should not
extend to the exploited workers and peasants, much less to the party, but in
point of fact, because this has been a historical relic, there is still a big
gap between the.native inhabitants and the outside settlers. For instance,
following the border defeat in August, the native gentry led troops back
to Ning-kang, announcing that the outside settlers would massacre the
indigenous residents. As a result, the native peasants began to change their
allegiance by wearing white ribbons and acting as guides to the troops to
search the mountains and burn down houses. When the Red Army routed the
White troops in October and November, the native peasants fled with the
latter, while the outsider peasants confiscated their cattle and belongings.
When this situation is reflected in the party, it often leads to meaningless
controversy. To deal with this situation, we must tell the masses that
"peasants who have defected will not be killed" and that "they will be given
land when they-return," thereby inducing them to desert the local gentry and
to return home without fear (many of them have already returned). In the
meantime, the county soviet ordered the settler-peasants to return the con-
fiscated cattle and belongings to their original owners, and posted notices
that the native, peasants will be protected. Efforts have also been made
within the party to eliminate the causes of friction as well as to intensify
education so that there will be greater unity.
(4) Defection of Opportunists: During. the revolutionary upsurge in June,
many opportunists wormed their way into the party, with the result that the
number of party members in the border area grew to more than 10,000.
Responsible persons in the party branches and in the district committees
consisted largely of new members, so good inner-party education was im-
possible. As soon as the White terror arrived, the opportunists defected.
They frequently helped the reactionaries to arrest our comrades. Thus,
most of the party organizations in the White area have collapsed.
(5) Party Purge and Establishment of Secret Organizations: After September,
a stringent purge has been enforced in the party, imposing strict limita-
tions on the composition of membership. In Yung-hsin and Ning-kang, all
party organizations were dissolved and a new registration was implemented.
Registration in Yung-hsin has already been completed, while registration
in Ning-kang will be completed soon. Though the number of party members
has been diminished greatly, combat strength has been bolstered. Whereas
the party organization was open to the public before, thus losing any
secrecy, since September, all organizational work has been undertaken
secretly. In the meantime, the party has been able to extend its influence
into the White area, so that it can play an effective role there. However,
there is as yet no foundation in the towns. This is due, first, to the
fact that the enemy is stronger in the towns, and second, we have done too
much damage to bourgeois interests in the towns, where business is slack
and the handicraft industry disrupted. As a result, we have no foothold
in the towns. We are now rectifying our former errors and are trying to
set up our organizations in the towns, though the results are still small.
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(6) The Guidance Organs on All Levels: The branch executive has been renamed
the branch committee; above the branch is the district committee? and above
the district is the county committee. Because of certain unique conditions,
a special district committee is formed between the district committee and
county committee, such as the Pei-hsiang special district committee and the
southeastern special district committee in Yung-hsin. There are five border
area county committees, namely: Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua, Sui-ch'uan
and Ling-hsien. There used to be a county. committee in Ch'a-ling, but
because it was difficult for our work to expand there, a number of the organs
set up last winter and this spring have been destroyed by the White forces.
During the past half year, party work has been done only in the mountainous
regions near Ning-kang and Yung-hsin, and so the county organization has been
changed to a special district committee. To carry out our work in Yu-hsien
and An-yuan, it is necessary to pass through Ch'a-ling. We tried to send
some people there, but it was abortive. In January the Wan-an county
committee held a joint meeting with the Front Committee in Sui-ch'uan but
since then, it has been cut off by White forces for more than 6 months. We
did not resume contact with Wan-an until September, when the Red Army con-
ducted guerrilla operations there. According to a letter from the Wan-an
county committee, there used to be nine district committees in Wan-an, but
their 120 rifles have all been lost. We still have our organization in the
Police guards there, and our comrades have some rifles, One battalion of
the guerrilla units of the Red Army has reached the vicinity of Wan-an city,
but our men there failed to come out to contact us. Nonetheless, some
80 revolutionary peasants followed us to the Ching-kang Mountains, and were
organized as the Wan-an Red Guards, with 10 rifles. An-fu has no party
organization. The Chi-an county committee has only contacted us twice,
though it is a neighboring county of Yung-hsin. They have not given us any
help at all, which is rather strange. In the Sha-t'ien district in Kuei-tung,
land was redistributed in March and again in August. There, a party organi-
zation was set up under the jurisdiction of the Southern Hunan special
committee with its center at Shih-erh-tung in Lung-ch'i. Above the various
county committees is the Hunan-Kiangsi border area special committee. On
20 May the first border area congress was held at Mao-p'ing in Ning-kang.
It elected 23 members of the first committee, with Mao Tse-tung as secretary.
In July, the Hunan provincial committee sent Yang K'ai-ming over as acting
secretary. Yang became ill in September, and was replaced by T'an Chen-lin.
When the main force of the Red Army went to southern Hunan in August and
the border area came under heavy pressure from the White forces, an emergency
conference was held in Yung-hsin. When the Red Army returned to Ning-kang
in October, the second congress was convened at Mao-p'ing. Beginning on
4 October, the congress met for 3 days. It adopted resolutions on political
problems, the tasks of the party in the border area, and propaganda, organi-
zation and agrarian problems. It elected 19 members of the second special
committee (namely: T'an Chen-lin, Chu Teh, Ch'en I, Lung Ch'ao-ch'ing,
Chu Ch'ang-k'ai, Liu Tien-ch'ien, Yen P'an-chu; T'an Szu-ts'ung, T'an Ping,
Li Chueh-fei, Sung I-yueh, Yuan Wen-ts'ai, Wang Tso-nung, Ch'en Cheng-jen,
Mao Tse-tung, Wan Hsieh-hsien, Wang Tso, Yang K'ai-ming and Ho Ting-ying).
Five of them were elected to the standing committee, with T'an Chen-lin
(a worker) as secretary, and Chen Cheng-jen (an intellectual) as deputy
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secretary. On 14 November, the 6th plenary conference of the Red Army was
held, electing an army committee of 23 members, with a standing committee of
five members, with Chu Teh as secretary. The special committee and the army
committee are under the jurisdiction of the Front Committee. On 6 November
the Front Committee was organized which, pursuant to the directive of the
Central Committee, comprised of five members, namely: Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh,
the secretary of the local party committee (T'an Chen-lin), a worker comrade
(Sung Ch'iao-sheng) and a peasant comrade (Mao Vo-wen), with Mao Tse-tung
as secretary. For the time being, the Front Committee has set up a secre-
tariat, a propaganda section, an organization section, a trade union movement
committee and a military affairs committee (which has been elected by the
above-mentioned Red Army conference). The Front Committee is placed in charge
of the local party' organizations in the various counties. Because the Front
Committee sometimes must move with the army, it is still necessary to keep
the Special Committee.
The problem of proletarian ideological leadership in the party is extremely
important. The party organizations in the various border area counties,
which can be said to be a party of peasants, will go astray unless they
accept the leadership of the urban proletariat. Besides rectifying the
previous errors and paying close attention to the trade union movement in the
various counties and towns, it is also necessary to increase workers' repre-
sentation in the soviets. It is extremely important for the workers, poor
peasants and soldiers. of the party to participate in the local party organiza-
tions and in the guidance organs of the party in the army. We have concen-
trated on this point for the past year, with the result that the number of
workers and peasants has been increased in local party organs at all levels.
Although in the Red Army, participation of soldiers in organs on all levels
has been satisfactory such participation must be further increased, and
attention must be paid to the quality of the participants so that they will
be able to undertake "practical leadership," gradually eliminating bourgeois
ideology completely.
(D) The Question of Revolutionary Character
(1) We completely subscribe to the Communist International's resolution on
China: China is still at the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution. The
thorough completion of democratic revolution in China includes, externally,
the overthrow of the imperialist special privileges in order to achieve
national liberation and unification, and, internally, the elimination of
the influences of'compradores in the cities, the eradication of feudal
relations in the countryside, completion of the agrarian revolution, and the
toppling of the warlord system which has served as another kind of political
organization for the big gentry. It is only by such a democratic revolution
that it will be possible to lay a true foundation of a workers' regime and
then advance to socialist revolution. Based on our experiences of fighting
in various places during the past year, we are keenly aware that the revolu-
tionary tide has steadily declined. Although Red political power has been
established in a few small areas, there are as yet no democratic rights in
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the nation as a whole. The workers, peasants and even the bourgeois demo
crats have no right of speech or assembly, and the worst. crime is to join
the Communist Party. The Red Army has met with apathy everywhere it has
gone; it is only after propaganda work has been done that the masses come
out slowly. The Red Army has to fight hard battles, there being few or no
instances of enemy defection or mutiny. This is also true with the 6th
Army, which recruited the most "hooligans" following the Ma-jih (21 May)
incident. This is merely fighting for the sake of fighting, and this method
will not be conducive to victory. This is so because there a nationwide
revolutionary upsurge is completely lacking. Under the ruthless feudal
rule of the big gentry, the broad strength of the oppressed classes has not
yet been mobilized, and consequently we have had to fight desultorily. We
are keenly aware of our isolation and hope that it will end soon. In order
for the revolution to reach its upsurge throughout the country, it will be
necessary to launch and consummate political and economic democratic revolu-
tion which includes the bourgeoisie. Thus, the resolution of the Comintern
is most correct.
(2) Policy Toward Petty Bourgeoisie: Up to February this year the work in
the border area was done fairly well. In March, Chou Lu, a representative
of the Southern Hunan special committee, arrived at the border. He said
that we did not do enough killing and burning, and had failed to carry out
the policy of "converting the petty bourgeoisie into the proletariat, and
then forcing them into the revolution," as a result of which the policy has
been changed. After the entire Red Army reached the border area in April,
although there was still not much killing and burning, rigorous measures
were carried out to confiscate the property of urban middle merchants and
to squeeze the rural small landlords. The slogan of the Southern Hunan
special committee of "All factories to the workers," has also been proselytized
vigorously. This policy of striking excessively at the petty bourgeoisie
has resulted in driving the majority of them to the side of the big
gentry. They put on white ribbons to oppose us. Recently, this policy has
been changed gradually, and conditions have improved somewhat. Salutary
effects have been achieved in Sui-ch'uan particularly where the small mer-
chants in the county and townships no longer tried to avoid us, and some
even said good things about the Red Army. Some 20,000 people are drawn to.
the market fairs in K'o-lin and Shang-feng (the fair is held every 3 days
at noon) which is unprecedented. This proves that our policy has changed.
Previously, taxes were levied on all kinds of agricultural produce in
transit, and heavy taxes were imposed by the pacification corps in Sui-ch'uan.
From Huang-ao to Ts'ao-lin, a distance of only 70 li, there were five toll
stations. We abolished such exploitation by the feudal gentry and our
action has been endorsed by the peasants and small merchants.
(3) Since the Central Committee has asked us to promulgate a policy platform
that includes the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, we suggest that the
Central Committee enact a democratic revolutionary program which encompasses
the interests of the workers, agrarian revolution and national liberation,
as well as a list of slogans for guidance in the border area.
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(4) A unique characteristic of the Chinese revolution is that it is based
on agriculture as its principal economy and uses armed forces to promote
insurrections. We suggest that the Central Committee exert great effort to
develop the military movement. This movement should be launched primarily
in the enemy forces, with the development of the Red Army being secondary.
(E) The Question of the Area of the Independent Regime
The area from the Kwangtung border to the Hunan-Kiangsi border, and even to
southern Hupeh all belongs to the Lo-hsiao mountain range geographically.
After traversing the entire Lo-hsiao mountain range, we have found out that,
comparatively speaking, the mid-section of the range which centers on
Ning-kang is most suitable for our occupation. The terrain in the northern
section is not as good as the middle section, which can be used for both
offensive and defensive purposes. Moreover, it is too close to some of the
big political centers. Unless plans are under way for the rapid seizure
of Changsha or Wuhan, it would be rather dangerous to station large forces
in such places as Liu-yang, Li-ling, P'ing-hsiang and Tung-ku. Although
the terrain in the southern section is better than that of the northern, its
mass foundation is not as good as the middle section, and its political
impact on Kiangsi and Hunan is smaller. On the other hand, any action in
the middle section can have a tremendous impact on the lower river valleys
of Hunan and Kiangsi.
A stocktaking of the advantages of the middle section reveals: (a) there
is a mass foundation that has been built up for more than a year; (b) the
foundation of the party is strong; (c) local armed forces with rich fighting
experiences which has reached its present scope after more than a year of
building up; this force, supplemented by the 4th Red Army, cannot be
annihilated by any enemy; (d) an ideal military bastion in the Ching-kang
Mountains, and each county with its own armed bastions elsewhere; (e) it can
influence Hunan. and Kiangsi, and the lower river valleys of these two
provinces which, compared to southern Hunan and southern Kiangsi which can
influence only one province or the upper river valley and the remote areas
at that, is very different in political significance. The setback of the
middle section is that because it has been occupied for a long time, it is
confronted with enormous enemy forces of suppression, and its economic
problems, especially the problem of cash, are very serious.
The policy of the southern Hunan special committee toward us here was changed
three times during a few weeks in June and July. First, a message was
delivered by Yuan Teh-sheng which endorsed a plan to set up a government in
the middle section. Then, Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang K'ai-ming came with the
message that the Red Army should without any hesitation move toward southern
Hunan, leaving only 200 rifles behind to protect the border area in conjunc-
tion with the Red Guards corps. The letter also said that this policy is
"absolutely" correct. After only 10 days, Yuan Teh-sheng returned with the
message that the Red Army march for eastern Hunan which was also described
as an "absolutely correct" policy. The letter, besides scolding us at some
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length, also wanted us to go "without any hesitation." This rigid directive
has placed us in a great predicament, because if we should disobey it, it
would be disobedience on our part, and if we should observe it, it would
mean certain defeat. When the second message came, a joint meeting of the
special committee, army committee and the county committee of Yung-hsin was
held. The consensus was that it would be dangerous to go to southern Hunan,
and we decided not to obey the views of the provincial committee. A few
days later, Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang K'ai-ming insisted that the view of the
provincial committee should be carried out. The 29th Regiment which was
composed mostly of recruits from southern Hunan, used the directive of the
provincial committee as its excuse to pull the Red Army along to mount an
attack on Ch'en-chou. This resulted in a disastrous defeat to the Red Army
and the border area. About one-half of the Red Army was lost, while countless
houses were destroyed and many people were slaughtered in the border area.
Other counties fell into enemy hands successively, and they have not been
recovered even now. In regard, to eastern Hunan, before there is disruption
in the political power of the big gentry in the three provinces of Hunan,
Hupeh and Kiangsi, it is also inadvisable to send the main force of the Red
Army there. Had it not been for the march toward southern Hunan in July, it
would have been possible to avert the border defeat in August, and, taking
advantage of the fighting in Chang-shu between Ch'eng Ch'ien's [4453 3383]
6th Army and Wang Chun's [3769 6874] forces, to smash the enemy at Yung-hsin,
thus engulfing Chi-an and An-fu and enabling the vanguards to reach
P'ing-hsiang to link up with the 5th Army in the northern section. Even
so, our general headquarters should still have been in Ning-kang, and only
guerrilla, units should have been sent to eastern Hunan. Since fighting
among the big gentry had not yet erupted,. and there were large enemy forces
in P'ing-hsiang, Ch'a-ling and Yu-hsien on the Hunan border, when-our main
force turned northward, it would have been overwhelmed by the enemy. The
Central Committee has deemed that it would be perilous to march either
toward eastern Hunan or southern Hunan. Although we have as yet had no
experience in eastern Hunan, our experience in southern Hunan has borne out
that once a wrong move is made, the entire game is lost. Contact was lost
between the border area, southern Hunan and the 5th Army stationed in
P'ing-chiang and Liu-yang, whole losses were also suffered at An-yuan. This
painful experience should be borne in mind at all times.
At present, the big gentry has not yet been broken up. There are now 10 or
more enemy regiments surrounding the border area. If we can continue to
find some cash resources (the problem of food and clothing is not too
serious), then, with what foundations we have already built up in the
border area, it.will be possible for us to cope with the existing enemy
forces or even more. For the sake of the border area, if the Red Army should
depart, then the kind of trampling that happened in August may recur
immediately. Although they might not be able to completely annihilate our
Red Guards units, the foundation of the party and the masses will be
seriously damaged. Although it might be possible to preserve some mountain
strongholds in the manner of bandits, in the plains we would have to go
underground as in August and September. But if the Red Army should determine
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to stay, it will be possible, with its existing foundations, to gradually
expand to the surrounding areas, and the future will be bright. For the sake
of the Red Army, in order to bring about this expansion, a protracted struggle
must be waged in the environs of the Ching-kang Mountains (namely: the four
counties of Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Ling-hsien and Sui-ch'uan) where we have
a mass base. In this situation, we can take advantage of the conflict'of
interest between the enemies in Hunan and Kiangsi which render it impossible
for them to concentrate their forces against us. We must also adopt some
profitable strategy so that when we go out to fight we must be able to win,
and with victory there will be captives which can be used to enlarge the Red
Army gradually. Thus, with the preparations made by the masses from April
to July, if the Red Army had not gone to southern Hunan, it would have
greatly expanded itself in August. Although the mistake had been made, now
that the Red Army has returned to the border area where the terrain is
favorable and the people are friendly, the prospects are still good. It is,
therefore, necessary for the Red Army to be resolved to struggle and to have
the stamina and patience in fighting before it can augment its arms and
train good soldiers. There is no other easy way than this.
The red flag has been hoisted in the border area for more than 1 year. Al-
though this has aroused the hatred of the big gentry in the three provinces
of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi, and even throughout the nation, nonetheless,
this has also aroused the hopes of the workers, peasants and soldiers in
the neighboring provinces. Consequently, "bandit suppression" in the border
area has been regarded by the warlords as an important event. As has been
said by Lu T'i-p'ing [7627 3321 16271, "one year of bandit suppression has
cost a million dollars," and by Wang Chun, "though they claim to be
20,000 soldiers, they have only 5,000 rifles." Such laudatory propaganda
like this has gradually attracted the attention of enemy soldiers and the
enemy's lower-echelon officers, and more and more will defect to our ranks.
This provides another source for the expansion of the Red Army. Moreover,
the fact that the red flag has flown over the border area consistently shows
not only the strength of the Communist Party, but also proves the bankruptcy
of the ruling class, and it is fraught with political significance nationally,
Thus, we deem that unless we have reached a dead end economically so that we
will not be able to maintain ourselves unless we go to southern Kiangsi, we
must not take such a course. Maybe we will go to southern Kiangsi when it
comes to the end of.the ropes, but this will be for economic reasons, not
political reasons. Politically, we have always deemed that the policy of
establishing and expanding political power in the middle section of Lo-hsiao
mountain range both most necessary and entirely correct.
(F) Communications and Others
(1) Establishing of communication organs is extremely important. We have
handed over to comrades Yuan and Hsiao 200 yuan (4 ounces of gold) and asked
them to assume full responsibility in setting up the organ. We will continue
to be responsible for the funds. The location should be at P'ing-hsiang.
A communications organ should also be set up at Chi-an,'which will be handled
by the Kiangsi provincial committee.
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(2) When this letter was about finished, we received a letter from the
Central Committee, The letter from Hunan contains circular No 47 (on the
problem of secret organization), though we are still without the resolution
on military work. Besides, there is the letter from Comrade Yung-hsien
dated 15 August which said the letter and the circular from the Central
Committee had not been received, and the three poems also cannot be found.
(3) We have been able to get newspapers and so we are much happier than
before when we did not see a newspaper for 2 or 3 months. We still hope
that you will keep us posted on political conditions and analyses.
(4) In regard to Tu Hsiu-ching's error, the representatives' conference of
the southern expeditionary forces which reached Sha-t'ien in Kuei-tung in
August has decided to request the provincial committee to punish him
because Tu represented that committee.
(5) The Front Committee has completely endorsed Mao Tse-tung's letter to
the provincial committee as well as his long letter to the Central Committee
which will be forwarded thereto by Comrade Yuan.
(6) Comrade Yuan Teh-sheng has just returned to the provincial committee
because he has had to wait for the discussion of and reply to the letter
of the Central Committee.
(7) Hereafter, when you give any direction to us, please refer to our reports
instead of basing unilaterally on the reports of inspectors. The report
made by Inspector Tu Hsiu-ching to the provincial committee in June contains
views that are entirely wrong (such as, if the Red Guards have 200 more
rifles, they will be able to defend the border area, and the Red Army was
conservative, etc.). The provincial committee has made decisions on the basis
of such reports, thus causing our defeat. Moreover, when you give any direc-
tions on military movements in the future, they must not be too rigid.
The Central Committee's letter asked us to make our own choice in accordance
with the environment, which is more flexible and so very proper. During
last winter and this spring, the Hunan provincial committee and the southern
Hunan special committee listened to the rumors of Su Hsien-chun, a regimental
commander who was dismissed from the party and later made secret charges which
resulted in Kuo Liang's arrest, and Ho Chieh, a chief of staff who later was
responsible for arson and murders in Chen-chou. This is even more dangerous,
and please don't listen to irresponsible rumors and allegations.
(8) Yang K'ai-ming is seriously ill, and Wan Hsi-hsien has important assign-
ment here, and so they cannot go to eastern Hunan.
(9) The status of the Youth League will be reported to the provincial
committee by the league's special committee.
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(10) This letter is written in three copies; one being forwarded to the
Central Committee care of the Hunan provincial committee; one being forwarded
to the Kiangsi provincial committee through the Hunan provincial committee;
and one being forwarded by the Chi-an county committee to the Kiangsi
provincial committee, and then to the Central Committee. One of these is
bound to be delivered duly.
Mao Tse-tung, secretary of the Front Committee
2077
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NOTICE OF THE FOURTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS OF THE RED ARMY
January 1929
[Text] The principle of the Red Army is to prosecute the revolution for the
people's rights. The fame and prestige of the army in western Kiangsi spreads
far. The plan this time is to advance in separate groups. The officers and
soldiers must obey orders. Fair buying and fair selling, let the facts be
the proof. Indiscriminate burning and killing are strictly prohibited.
Oppression is excessive in all areas in the nation. The workers and peasants
are extremely miserable. Local tyrants and evil gentry lord it over the towns
and villages. Everyone is angry over the high interests and rents. The
soldiers of the White army suffer hunger and cold. The petty bourgeois are
overburdened by taxes and levies. Foreign commodities crowd out domestic
merchandise. There is no one who does not hate imperialism. The Kuomintang,
a bandit party, is completely reactionary. What they say is not what they
think, and they cannot be very tough. Sleeping in the same bed, Chiang [5592],
Kuei [2710], Feng [7458] and Yen [7051] dream different dreams. The conflicts
have arisen and the warlords are encountering bad luck. Like rice which
satisfies hunger and medicine which cures illness, the principles of the
communist party are extremely just. The peasants will take over and cultivate
the land of the landowners. No debt will be repaid nor rent delivered. The
wages will be increased and the bosses will be responsible. Work will be
limited to 8 hours. The treatment of the soldiers will be improved. They
will have a share in land division. We will accept enemy officers and
soldiers, and ask no questions of their prior behavior. The progressive
method of taxation is the most suitable, and all harsh taxes and levies will
be swept clean. The urban merchants save their dimes and nickels. As long
as they follow our principles, we will not inquire into their past activities.
We must be strict toward the foreigners. Industrial plants and banks will D
be confiscated. We will not recognize foreign capital and foreign debts.
We will not allow foreign soldiers and foreign ships on our soil. Knocking
down the foreign powers, everyone is happy. Ousting the warlords, we must be
thorough in eliminating all evil. The whole country will rejoice when China
is united. The Manchurians, Mongolians, Mohammedans, and Tibetans will have
their own laws. The rascals of the National Government must be eradicated
and their chaotic politics cleansed. The workers and peasants of.the entire
nation must arouse themselves, and the day of seizing political power is
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drawing near. The success of the revolution depends on the masses. This
notice is published everywhere so that everyone will rise and give attention.
Army Commander Chu Teh
Party Delegate Mao Tse-tung
January 1929, Western calendar
o "Notice of the Fourth Army Headquarters of the Red Army," Exhibition
Hall of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Memorabilia
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HSING-KUO COUNTY LAND LAW
[Text] 1. All public land and land belonging to the landlord class are
confiscated and made into the property of the Hsing-kuo Worker-Peasant-
Soldier Delegates' Conference Government,, to be allocated to peasants who
own little or no land, for their cultivation and use.
2. After confiscation of all public land and land belonging to the land
owner class and allocation by the Worker-Peasant-Soldier Government, no land
may be bought or sold.
3. The criteria for land allocation are:
a. Use the population as the criterion and equally divide the land among
the male and female, old and young. b. Use the labor force as the criterion
and allocate twice as much to those who can labor than those who cannot.
Of the above two criteria, the first should be followed, and the second is
only for areas under special conditions. The reasons for adopting the first
criterion are:
a. Before the facilities for caring for the old and the young are completed,
if the land allocation to them is too little, they will not be able to
maintain a living.
b. It is simpler and more convenient to use the population as the criterion
to divide the land.
c. Very few households are without old and young members. Meanwhile, though
the old and the young do not have the ability to farm, the government may,
after land allocation, assign them certain public service tasks, such as
communication work.
4. The criteria for this area of land allocation are:
a. Use the township as the unit in land allocation. b. Combine several
townships as the unit in land allocation (such as the Hsiao-chiang area in
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Yung-hsin. c. Use the district as the unit in land allocation, Of the above
three criteria, the first should be followed, and the second and third may
be used under special conditions.,
5. The methods of dividing hills and woods are;
a. The division of tea hills and firewood hills follows the method of land
division--equal division with the township. as the unit.
b. Bamboo hills belong to the soviet, but the peasants may have the use of
the bamboo with its permission. For less than 50 stalks, permission of the
township soviet is required; for less than 100 stalks, that of the district
soviet is required; and for over 100 stalks, that of the country soviet is
required.
c. All bamboo is marketed by the county soviet, and the proceeds are handled
by the superior soviet.
6. The levy of land taxes is as follows:
a. Land taxes are divided into three categories according to the production
situation: (1) 15 percent; (2) 10 percent; (3) 5. percent. Of the three
categories above, the first one should be followed. The second and third
may be applied under special conditions with the approval of the supreme
soviet.
b. In case of natural disaster or other special conditions, application for
land tax exemption may be submitted to the superior soviet for its approval.
c. Land taxes are collected by the county soviet and transmitted to the
superior soviet.
7. Rural handicraft workers may, if they so desire, receive a half share of
the allocation to the peasants.
8. The officers and soldiers of the Red Army and Red Guards, and the person-
nel of the government and other public organs will receive land allocations
in the same amount as the peasants, and the soviet will hire people to culti-
vate the land for them.
Note: This version of the land law was promulgated when the Red Army arrived
at Hsing-kuo in southern Kiangsi from the Ching-kang Mountains in the 4th
month after the formulation of the previous land law. One important revision
in the contents was to change "the confiscation of all land" to "the confis-
cation of public land and land belonging to the landlord class." It was a
fundamental change. There was no other change. Changes were mot made until
1930. Both land laws are kept to show the development of our understanding
of the land struggle.
0 "Rural Survey," Liberation Press, July 1949
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RESOLUTION OF THE NINTH CCP CONGRESS OF THE RED FOURTH ARMY
West Fukien Ku-t'ien Conference, December 1929
[Text] I. Rectification of Incorrect Tendencies Toward Non-Proletarian
Ideas in the Party
The many kinds of non-proletarian ideas in the party in the Fourth Army exert
an extremely powerful influence and constitute a great obstacle to the imple-
mentation of the party's correct line. If not thoroughly rectified, the
Fourth Army will definitely not be able to shoulder the tasks assigned it by
China's extensive revolutionary struggle. The source of such incorrect ideas
naturally lies in the fact that the foundation of the party organization is
largely built on peasants and other petty bourgeois elements; yet the failure
of the party's leading organs to wage a concerted and determined struggle
against such incorrect ideas and to educate the party members along the cor-
rect line is also an important cause for their existence and growth. This
Congress, in accordance with the spirit of the September letter of the "Central
Committee", now points out the sources and manifestations of the incorrect
tendencies of the many non-proletarian ideas in the party in the Fourth Army
and the methods of rectification and calls on the comrades to eliminate
them thoroughly.
A. The Purely Military Viewpoint
1. The origin of the purely military viewpoint:
a. A low political level. Those with this viewpoint fail to understand
political leadership and the fundamental difference between the missions
of the Red Army and the White army.
'b. The mercenary concept. This is especially so in the numerous prisoners
of war captured in the.various campaigns who joined the Red Army and brought
with them a strong mercenary concept, thus laying a foundation for the purely
military viewpoint in the lower level.
c. From the two above factors arises the third, over-confidence in mili-
tary strength and lack of confidence in the strength of the masses.
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d. The party's lack of active attention and discussion of military work
is also a factor for the purely military viewpoint of some of the comrades,
2. The purely military viewpoint is unusually widespread among a number of
comrades in the Red Army. Its manifestations;
a. They regard military affairs and political work as opposed to each
other, and fail to recognize military work as only one of the tools to
accomplish the political tasks. Some even declare: "When'military work
is well done, political work is naturally done well; when military work
is not well done, political work cannot be well done either." This is to
go one step farther and regard military work as leading political work.
b. They regard the task of the Red Army as similar to that of the White
army--merely fighting. They fail to recognize the fact that the Red Army
is an armed force for carrying out the political tasks of the class. In
its work, especially in China today, the Red Army definitely does not exist
merely for the sake of fighting. Besides fighting, it must also shoulder
such important tasks as agitating, organizing, arming and helping the
masses, and building political power. The Red Army does not fight merely
for the purpose of fighting. It fights in order to agitate, organize,
arm and help the masses and build political power. Apart from such objectives,
fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence.
c. Therefore, organizationally, they subordinate the political work organ
to the military work organ and propose the slogan that "the army headquarters
deals with the public." If this idea continues to develop, it may lead to
estrangement from the masses, to usurpation of political power by the army,
and to a departure from the class position--similar to the path followed by
the Kuomintang army.
d. Meanwhile, they overlook the importance of the propaganda team in
propaganda work and ignore the soldiers' council and the worker-peasant
masses in mass organization work. As a result, both propaganda and organiza-
tion work are abandoned.
e. They are conceited when a battle is won and dejected when one is lost.
f. They subscribe to departmentalism of the Fourth Army, approaching
everything in the interest of the Fourth Army without understanding that to
arm the local masses is one of the Red Army's important tasks. This is an
enlarged form of cliquism.
g. Limited by the immediate environment in the Fourth Army, a small num-
ber of comrades think that no other revolutionary force exists, resulting
in the extremely deep-rooted idea of conserving. its strength by avoiding
action. This is a remnant of opportunism.
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h. Disregarding the subjective and objective conditions, they suffer
from revolutionary impetuosity,'are unwilling to perform detailed and care-
ful mass work, and only want to do big things, filling their mind with
illusions. This is a remnant of adventurism.
.a. The political level of the party must be raised by means of education,
and the theoretical source of the military viewpoint eradicated. The remnants
of opportunism and adventurism must be eliminated, and the departmentalism of
the Fourth Army broken down.
b. The political training of the officers and soldiers must be intensified,
especially the education of the captive elements during the period of their
induction. Meanwhile, local political power organs must select, as many as
possible, worker and peasant elements with struggle experiences to join the
Red Army, in order to weaken and eliminate the source of the simple military
viewpoint organizationally.
c. Local party units must be activated to criticize the party in the Red
Army and mass political power organizations (soviets) encouraged to criticize
the Red Army, in order to influence the party and the officers and soldiers
of the Red Army.
d. The party must actively pay attention to military work and hold dis-
cussions on it. All tasks, after discussion and decision by the party,
must be implemented through the mass line.
e. Rules and regulations must be formu]ated, clearly defining the tasks
of the Red Army, the relations between the military work and political work
organs, the relations between the Red Army and the masses, and the powers
and functions of the soldiers' council and its relationship with the
military and political organs.
B. Ultra-Democratization
1. After the party in the Red Army accepted the directives of the Party
Central, ultra-democratization has definitely diminished considerably. That
party resolutions are, better implemented, and that such slogans as "demo-
cratic centralism from the bottom to the top" and "discussion at the lower
level first before decision by the higher level," for instance, are no
longer heard are facts. Nevertheless, such diminution is only superficial,
and ultra-democratization definitely has not been fundamentally eliminated
from the mind of the party members in general. In other words, the poison
roots of ultra-democratization still lie deep in the minds of many comrades.
The reluctance in carrying out resolutions is one of the instances.
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a. The roots of ultra-democratization must be eradicated. First of all,
it should be pointed out that its danger lies in the tendency to damage and
even completely destroy the party organization, to undermine and even com-
pletely wipe out the party's fighting power, and to incapacitate the party
from shouldering its fighting tasks, thereby causing the failure of the
revolution and prolonging the counterrevolutionary life of the ruling class.
Next, it should be pointed out that the source of ultra-democratization lies
in the nature of the petty bourgeoisie (small farm production and urban
small capital)--its individualistic aversion to discipline. Such nature,
having found its way into the party, manifests itself politically and
organizationally as the idea of ultra-democratization. Such idea is
basically incompatible with the fighting tasks of the proletariat. ob-
jectively, it is actually one of the counterrevolutionary ideas. If not
vigorously rectified, and if permitted to develop, those with such idea
will inevitably follow the counterrevolutionary path.
b. Organizationally, the democratic way of life under centralized guidance
must. be strictly enforced. The line for this is:
(1) The party's leading organ must provide a correct line of guidance
and find solutions when problems arise, in order to establish itself as a
leading center.
(2) The higher level organ must understand the conditions of the lower
level organs and the life of the masses, in order to secure the social
source of correct guidance. .
(3) The party organizations of all levels must not make decisions without
due deliberation. Once a decision is reached, it must be firmly implemented.
(4) All decisions of any importance made by the party's higher level
organs must be promptly transmitted to the lower level organs and the member-
ship masses. The method for doing so is to call activists meetings, party
branch meetings, or even party membership mass meetings in the columns
(when circumstances permit) and to assign men to make reports at such
meetings.
(5) The lower level organs of the party and the membership masses must
discuss in detail the directives from the higher level in order to under-
stand their significance thoroughly and decide on the methods of implementa-
tion.
C. The Non-Organizational Viewpoint
The non-organizational viewpoint in the party in the Fourth Army is mani-
fested in many aspects. The most apparent are the following three categories:
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1. The minority refusing to obey the majority:
If a proposal is rejected, the individual concerned becomes extremely dis-
satisfied and is insincere in implementing the party's resolution. This is
one of the instances.
The methods of rectification:
a. At a meeting, all the people should be made to voice their opinions
fully. They must understand that the right and wrong sides over a contro-
versial issue must be clearly established without compromise or equivoca-
tion. Anything that cannot be settled at one meeting can be discussed at
another (provided no work is affected) in order to reach a clear-cut conclu-
sion.
b. Party discipline requires, among other things, that the minority obey
the majority. The minority, after their proposal has been rejected at a
meeting and before the holding of the next meeting, must support the decision
of the majority. Besides bringing it up again at the next meeting, they must
not show any opposition in their action.
2. Non-organizational criticisms:
a. Inner-party criticism is a weapon to re-enforce the party organization
and increase the party's fighting power. Yet many in.the Red Army do not
understand this significance and erroneously use inner-party criticism for
personal attacks. As a result, it damages not only the individuals but the
party organization. This is a manifestation of petty bourgeois individualism.
The method of rectification is to make the party members understand that the
significance of criticism is to re-enforce the party's fighting power in
order to attain victory of the class struggle and that it must never be
used as a tool for personal attacks.
b. Many party members make their criticisms not inside the party but
outside it. This is because of the failure to implant the political signi-
ficance of the party organization into the concept of the party members in
general; therefore, they do not understand the importance of the party
organization (meetings, etc.), finding no difference between criticizing
inside or outside the. organization. This may also result in leading the
party to destruction. The method of rectification is to implant the
political significance of the party organization into the concept of the
party members in general. Only thus will all the irresponsible non-organi-
zational criticisms giving the masses an unfavorable influence be wiped out.
3. Elitism of some party members:
On ground of being busy, some party members are actually unwilling to associate
with the masses and fear their criticisms; therefore, they do not attend the,
party branch mass meetings and cell meetings. When they do attend, they
do not make work reports. In everything, they differentiate themselves from
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the general party members. As a result, they are severed from the masses,
from the party. On this point, the responsible persons of the party branch
have not only failed to rectify the situation, but seemed to fear such elite
party members.
The creation of this situation is due to the following reasons:
First, the Red Army has always made a serious error: The party organ seldom
pays attention to the discussion of military affairs; therefore, it has not
urged the responsible comrades of the military affairs organ to make reports
on military plans (such as training, management and combat plans) at party
conferences. As a result, party discussions are separated from military
affairs, and the responsible military affairs comrades forget that they must
accept party guidance and make reports to the party. In consequence, the
military affairs work of the Red Army becomes a special part not understood
by the party organ and the general party members. Thus, it not only greatly
hampers the task of the militarization of the party members, bur also severs
the party from military affairs, endangering the party's leadership of the
army. Next, due to the serious error of the party in its tasks discussed
above, some of the responsible military affairs comrades have become an elite
group in the party. Meanwhile, the responsible comrades in charge of other
work have also become elite individuals who are unwilling to attend meetings
or to express themselves at meetings. This is one reason for the party
branch of the Red Army to become so abnormal and unsound.
The methods of rectification are: First, the meetings of all levels of the
party.(from the party branch to the Front Committee) must include the plans
and reports of military affairs work in their daily agenda for discussion
and decision. Next, regardless of their functions, party members must attend
party branch mass meetings and cell meetings and make work reports. They
must not be absent without cause.
D. Absolute Equalitarianism
1. At one time, absolute equalitarianism in the Red Army developed to a
very serious extent. After many struggles, it has certainly diminished
considerably, but some dregs still remain, such as objecting to different
allowances to the wounded soldiers according to the extent of the injury
but insisting on equal amounts, denying the necessity for officers to ride
horses in performing their duties but regarding riding as an inequality,
demanding absolutely equal distribution of supplies and objecting to larger
allotments to special cases, demanding equal assignment for all persons in
carrying rice, regardless of age or physical condition, demanding equal
space in billeting and even condemning the headquarters for occupying
larger quarters, demanding equal assignnent of duties and refusing any
extra work, and even abandoning both wounded men when there is only one
stretcher rather than carrying only one of them. All such instances indi-
cate that absolute equalitarianism among the Red Army officers and soldiers
has not been fundamentally eradicated from the mind of the masses. Whatever
that has been eradicated is merely partial or superficial..
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2. Similar to ultra-democratization in politics, absolute equalitarianism
is a product of the handicraft and small peasant economy, except that one is
manifested in. the political aspect and the other in the material aspect.
3. The method of rectification is as follows; It must be pointed out
theoretically that not only is absolute equalitarianism merely an illusion
of the peasants and petty bourgeois in the days before the disappearance
of capitalism but, even in the period of the socialist economy, material
distribution must be adjusted to the needs of the individuals and the tasks.
There definitely cannot be absolute. equality. The maximum equality in
material distribution in the Red Army should. be attained, such as equal pay
and equal rations for the officers and men, because it is the need of the
struggle in the current environment. But absolute equality beyond reason
must be opposed, because it is not the need of the struggle. On the contrary,
it will hamper the struggle.
E. The Idealist Concept
1. The idealist concept is extremely serious among party members in the
Red Army, and it constitutes an extremely great obstacle to political analysis,
work guidance, and the party organization. The inevitable accompanying result
of idealist analysis of politics and idealist guidance of work is either
opportunism or adventurism. As for the idealist critical spirit inside the
party, random talk not based on evidence, or mutual suspicion, it often leads
to controversies in the party not involving principles and without significance
and to disruption of the party organization.
In regard to the issue of inner-party criticisms, besides the idealist criti-
cal spirit, we should also mention the non-political critical spirit. The
major function of criticism is to point out political errors. Pointing out
organizational errors comes next. As for defects in personal life and minor
technical mistakes, if they are not closely connected with political or
organizational errors, it is not necessary to be so censorious as to place
the comrades concerned in a quandary. Moreover, once technical criticisms
develop, the attention of the party may become entirely diverted to common-
place technical trivialities, and everyone may become cautious and timorous,
thereby forgetting the party's political tasks. This is the greatest
danger. Similar to the unscientific idealist critical spirit, the inner-
party technical and non-political critical spirit in the Red Army will in-
evitably produce (and has already produced) the worst result.
2. The only method of rectification is to raise the political and scientific
levels of the party members in their thinking and inner-party life. To
attain this goal, it is necessary to: a. Educate the party members to
political analysis and class strength assessment with the Marxist
order to replace the idealist method of analysis and assessment.
the party members pay attention to survey and study of the social
as a basis to determine the struggle strategy and work method, so
comrades know that, apart from practical survey, they will fall into the
make
method, in
b. Make
economy
that the.
abyss
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of fantasy and adventurism. c. Eliminate the idealist and technical spirit
in inner-party criticism, basing all statements on evidence and giving atten-
tion to the political significance when discussing work.
1. The individualist tendency in the party in the Red Army manifests itself
as follows:
a. Vindictiveness: After being criticized inside the party by a soldier
comrade, the individualist will seek a chance to retaliate outside the
party--beating or scolding is one way of retaliation. There are many such
instances. Sometimes, retaliation is sought inside the party: You attack
me at this meeting, so I shall retaliate by finding fault with you at the
next. There are also many instances of such. Such vindictiveness proceeds
solely from the personal viewpoint. The individualist is ignorant of class
interest or party life as a whole. He only knows himself. His target is
not the enemy class but other individuals in his'own ranks. It is a corro-
sive which can weaken the organization and its fighting power.
b. Cliquism: On the surface, it is an expanded individualism, but under-
neath, it is still the narrow individualism. It also produces a strong
corrosive and centrifugal effect. In the Red Army, cliquism has all along
been rampant; although it has now become less serious as a. result of criticism,
its remnants still exist and further struggle is needed.
c. The mercenary concept: A person with a mercenary concept fails to
recognize that the party and the Red Army are the tools to implement the
class tasks, and that he, himself, is a member thereof. He fails to realize
that he, himself, plays a main role in the struggle, but feels that the
struggle has nothing to do with himself, and that he is responsible only to
the superior officers of the Red Army or the party organ, not to the revolu-
tion. Such mercenary concept of revolution is rather widespread in the Red
Army. It is the reason why there are not many unconditional, enthusiastic,
and positive activists. If the mercenary concept is not eliminated, the
number of positive activists will not increase, and the heavy burden of
revolution will always rest on the shoulders of a few, much to the detriment
of the struggle.
d. Hedonism: In the Red Army, there are also quite a few whose indi-
vidualism finds expression in hedonism. They constantly hope that the
troops will march to the big cities. They want to go there not to work but
to enjoy themselves. What they dislike most is, to work in the Red areas
where life is hard. The result of hedonism is thinking of personal interest
only, without consideration of the entire revolution or group action.
e. Passive slowdown: With the least bit of dissatisfaction, an individual
with this tendency becomes passive and slows down in his work. Though the
basic reason is individualism, because he has not accurately recognized his
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own class tasks, there are also objective reasons such as improper handling
of incidents, work assignments, or enforcement of discipline in the party
and the army.
f. The desire to leave the army: The number of people who ask for
transfer from the ranks to local work is on the rise. This is not entirely
due to subjective individualism, but also to (1) the material hardships in
the Red Army; (2) exhaustion after a long struggle; and (3) objective environ-,
mental reasons of improper handling of incidents, work assignments or
enforcement of discipline.
2. The origin of individualism is the influence of the small peasant and
bourgeois ideologies in the party. The method of rectification is mainly
through education, rectifying individualism in thinking. Next, the handling
of incidents, work assignments and enforcement of discipline must be proper.
In addition, measures must be taken to improve the material life of the Red
Army, utilizing all opportunities for rest and rehabilitation, in order to
better the objective conditions.
G. The Idea of Roving Insurgents
1. The origin of the idea of roving insurgents in the Red Army is as follows:
a. Homeless proletarians constitute the majority of the Red Army. This is
the immediate cause. b. The remote cause is the existence of large groups
of vagrants throughout the country, especially the southern provinces. With
these two causes, the political thinking and action with the idea of roving
insurgents are created in the Red Army. However, in today's China under
imperialist control, especially with the import of advanced weapons (grenades,
steel cannon, machine guns, etc.), advanced communication methods (military
telephones and radios), and advanced transport means (motor vehicles, steam-
ships, railways), the large-scale roving insurgent actions in the style of
Huang Ch'ao, Li Ch'uang or Hung Hsiu-ch'uan are no longer feasible; therefore,
the idea of roving insurgents naturally cannot become the final and effective
idea of the Red Army in its actions. Nevertheless, its influence, as mani-
fested in the various aspects, is still very strong, such as; a. being
unwilling to help the masses build political power by strenuous work for the
purpose of expanding political influence, but thinking only of accomplishing
the purpose by the mobile guerrilla method; b. in the organizational line
of expanding the Red Army, following not the line of expanding the local
Red Guard, the local units of the Red Army, or even the non-local units of
the Red Army, but the line of "recruiting soldiers and buying horses" and
"recruiting captives and accepting rebels"; c. being impatient to wage a
hard struggle together with the masses, but only hoping to go to the big
cities to eat and drink. All such manifestations of the idea of roving
insurgents seriously hamper the Red Army in performing the momentous tasks
assigned it by the revolution. Thus, the elimination of this idea is indeed
one of the important goals of the inner-party ideological struggle in the
Red Army.
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a. Change the incorrect ideas in the party coming from the vagrant elements
through education in order to eliminate the idea of roving insurgents.
b. Intensify the anti-vagabondism education of the current basic troops
of the Red Army and future captives.
c. Recruit active elements among the workers and peasants with struggle
experiences to join the current ranks of the Red Army in order to change its
components.
d. Raise new troops from the struggling worker-peasant masses.
1. The party in the Red Army has exerted a great effort in the struggle
against adventurism but not yet-to the full extent. Therefore, remnants of
adventurism still exist in the Red Army even though much of the adventurist
idea and action has been overcome. Adventurism comes from a combination of
the lumpen proletarian ideology and the petty bourgeois ideology. Its
manifestations are: a. Blind action without regard of the subjective and
objective conditions. b. Inadequate and irresolute implementation of urban
policies. c. Slack military discipline, especially when suffering a defeat.
d. Setting fire to houses without consideration of the mass foundation,. which
is a misconduct to varying extents in all the units. e. The practice of
executing deserters and of corporal punishment which are partially due to
adventurism.
2. The methods of rectification: a. Eliminate adventurism theoretically.
.b. Rectify adventurist actions by systems and policies.
II. Organization of the Party
The issue of the party organization in the Red Army has reached a very.
critical stage, especially the inferior quality of the party members and the
slack organization, which affect the leadership of the Red Army and the
implementation of policies. The Congress has made a careful analysis of the
issue and come to a decision. The comrades must follow the spirit of the
Congress and strive to reform the party organization, in order to enable it
to truly shoulder the party's political tasks. Only then can we consider
it successful.
A. The Party's Organizational Line
1. The combat soldiers are the main objectives in the development line of
party members. Meanwhile, the noncombatants, such as porters and orderlies,
must not be neglected.
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2. A party branch must be organized in every company and a cell in every
squad. This is one of the important principles of party organization in the
army. In units where the number of party members is too small and a cell
cannot actually be organized, the platoon may be used temporarily as the
unit to organize a cell and its members must be assigned systematically
to the squads.. But it must be understood that this is only a transitional
measure.
3. The current organization method of cells in the Red Army, i.e., the
method of mixing the cadre and general elements and the intellectual and
laboring elements is correct, but those with different occupations and
different abilities must also be systematically and successfully mixed when
organizing. Hereafter, more attention must be given to this point. As for
simply organizing the cadres into cells, it is undesirable.
B. The Slack Organization of the Party
1. The current situation of the party organization in the Fourth Army:
a. Enrollment is too easy. Many without the proper qualifications are
also dragged into the party, especially officers, who do not have to satisfy
any requirement to join the party. Therefore, the quality of the party has
become very inferior.
b. The party units of the various levels solve the problems in their work
but forget the task of educating the comrades. There are very few training
meetings, such as activists mass meetings, joint meetings of secretaries and
propaganda sections, joint meetings of committees, party branch mass meetings,
column or detachment party members' mass meetings.
c. Discipline in general is lax. This is especially true in regard to
individuals in charge of important work and who are irreplaceable. Their
mistakes are often overlooked, and discipline is not enforced. When one
person is treated this way, others have to be treated the same way. Thus,
discipline in general .is slackened.
d. All the officers are party members. As a result, all those working
in military affairs and political organs pay little attention to their
social occupational work, feeling that social occupational work is party
work and failing to distinguish the two. The military affairs work con-
ferences and the political work conferences of the various levels are almost
never held. They think that, whatever it is, once it is decided by the party,
that is the end of it. That the party member produces a nucleus effect in
social occupation is never discussed.
e. The higher and lower levels do not have a close relationship. The
higher level seldom comments or makes instructions on the reports of the
lower level, and it seldom sends men to attend the meetings of the latter.
While this is due to the lack of soundness. of the organization of the higher
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level, the lack of positivity in its work attitude is also one of the reasons
for the absence or inadequacy of its guidance of the lower level. This is
especially true in regard to directing practical work, such as the lack of
detailed instructions to units embarking on guerrilla work, In some units,
even rough guidance is almost nonexistent.
f. Many party branch mass meetings and cell meetings are not held on time.
a. The old foundation must be thoroughly overhauled. Those with erroneous
political concepts, smoking opium, making illegal profits, or gambling,
and refusing to reform after many warnings, be they cadres or not, must all
be expelled from the party.
b. The requirements for new party members hereafter:
(1) No mistake in political concept (including class awareness),
(2) Honesty.
(3) Possessing the spirit of sacrifice, and able to work positively.
(4) No desire for illegal profits.
(5) Abstinence from opium and.gambling.
Only those meeting all five requirements will be introduced into the party.
The introducer must verify in advance whether the introduced truly satis-
fies the requirements, and the necessary procedure of introduction must be
followed. After joining the party, the new member must be informed in
detail the party branch life (including secret work) and the important
points to be observed by party members. The introducer must shoulder
certain responsibilities toward the introduced. The party branch committee
must assign someone to interview the membership applicant and ascertain his
qualifications.
c. In addition to solving problems and directing practical work, the
party units of the various levels also have the tremendous task of educating
the comrades. They must systematically hold all kinds of training con-
ferences and other modes of training, such as training classes and discus-
sion meetings.
. d. Discipline must be strictly enforced, and the practice of merely
paying lip service to discipline stopped.
e. The natures of the party members' social occupation and their party
work must be distinguished. Each and every party member must undertake a
social occupation, and perform the work assigned him by the party in his
social occupation (except those responsible for important functions or
specialized tasks in the party who are professional revolutionaries).
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f. The work attitude of the party units of all levels must become more
positive than ever before. The lower level must make detailed reports to the
higher level, and the latter must discuss and reply to such reports in detail
and, whenever possible, assign men to attend the meetings of the lower level.
It must not borrow the excuses of shortage of personnel, inadequate work
capacity, and insufficient time to cover up its own lack of enthusiasm and
negligence in work.
g. The party branch committee and the party units above it must systema-
tically decide on the material for discussion at the party branch mass
meetings and cell meetings every month, determine the meeting schedules, and
strictly enforce the holding of meetings.
C. How to Make the Meetings Interesting
1. The reasons for the party members' lack of interest in attending meetings:
a. They do not understand the significance of meetings. The important
significance of the party branch meeting is primarily to solve problems.
All struggle and internal problems must be solved by concentrated discussion
at the meetings. If a party member does not attend, or if he does not
actively express his opinions when attending, it will indicate his failure
to understand the political significance of the meeting and his lack of
interest in struggle. Anyone with a positive feeling toward struggle will
attend the meetings enthusiastically and express himself eagerly. The next
significance is to educate the comrades. Meetings not only solve problems
but, in the process of solving problems, the circumstances of the problems
must be investigated and the instructions. of the higher level studied, thus
activating the mind and talent of the comrades. As the meetings become
political and practical, the mind of the comrades also become political
and practical. Then, the party's fighting power is increased. This is the
educational significance of meetings. The failure of the party members
of the'Red Army to understand such significance constitutes the first reason
for their nonattendance or lack of interest.
b. When resolutions are not implemented or inquiries to the higher level
are not answered for a prolonged period, the party members lose interest
in the discussions.
c. The responsible persons fail to make proper preparations in advance,
to formulate an agenda, to clarify the contents and circumstances of the
problems, or to form some opinions ahead of time on the solution of the
problems.
d. The chairman often interrupts at will a party member. When a state-
ment is slightly off the subject under discussion, the chairman will
immediately stop him, and the party member becomes discouraged and keeps
quiet. If there is any mistake in the statement, the chairman will also
ridicule him in addition to stopping him.
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e. The feudal style order of meeting is inflexible and sterotyped, and
attending a meeting is similar to sitting in jail.
2. The methods of rectification:
First, the meetings must become political and practical. Second, the comrades
must constantly be reminded of the important significance of meetings,
especially in regard to new members and members who are not positive in their
work. Third, resolutions must not be passed lightly. Once a resolution is
passed, it must be firmly implemented. Fourth, the higher level must be
prompt in answering the questions of the lower level. It must not delay too
long, causing the lower level to lose its fervor. Fifth, the responsible
-persons must prepare the agenda in advance. They must make the agenda
concrete, clarify in advance the contents and circumstances of the problems,
and give some prior thought to the solutions. Sixth, the chairman must handle
the meeting skillfully and channel the current of discussion toward the topic
on hand. However, should there be any development of important significance
beyond the topic, he must not only refrain from interrupting the speaker
and discouraging him, but must carefully seize upon the development, intro-
duce it to everyone, and form a new topic of discussion. Only then will
the meeting become interesting, the problems truly solved and the educational
significance of the meeting truly realized. Seventh, the feudal order of
meeting must be abolished. The meeting of communist party members must
reflect the positive, lively and joyful spirit of the proletariat and
incorporate it into the order of the meeting.
D. Youth Organization in the Party in the Red Army and Its Work
1. The interests of the youths and adults in the troops cannot be separated,
and the league has no special work objectives. Moreover, only when the party
cell is built with the squad as the unit will it benefit the struggle.
Therefore, there is no necessity to establish league tells in the party
branch.
2. As the youths among the party members possess different feelings from
the adults, besides general party training, they must receive a special
youth education. Furthermore, in view of the fact that fighting for the
young worker-peasant masses is one of the party's important tasks, there
must be a special organization to handle it. Therefore, young party members
in the party under 20 years of age (except those under special conditions,
such as being in charge of the party's important work) must be assigned to
form a youth work conference. In regard to such conferences, besides regu-
lar and systematic meetings with the battalion as the unit, the detachments
and columns must also deliberate on the time and call meetings.
3. For.the purposes of planning the education of youth party members,
devising means to fight for the young worker-peasant masses, and directing
the youth work conference, five-member youth work committees must be formed
in the Front Committee and column committee, and youth commissars appointed
in the detachment committee and party branch committee, under the guidance
of party units of the various levels.
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E. Relationship Between the Political Commissar and Inner-Party Work
Party secretaries of battalion and detachment levels must not, in principle,
also serve as political commissars. However, in units with personnel
shortage, they may temporarily serve in both capacities, In regard to poli-
tical commissars who do not also serve as party secretaries, the higher
level party unit must study the situation and, under suitable circumstances,
assign them as special. emissaries of the party with the duty of directing
the party work of their levels.
F. The Highest Party Organization of Directly Subordinate Units
The directly subordinate units of the army and the columns must organize
directly subordinate unit committees as the highest party organizations,
consisting of five to seven members.
G. The Question of Establishing Party and Youth League Organizations in
Soldiers' Associations
No party or youth league organizations should be established in soldiers'
associations at the battalion level, and the work of these associations
should be guided by the party branch committees concerned; but party and
youth league organizations should be established in soldiers'. associations
at the column level, and the work of these organizations should be guided
by the party committees of the columns concerned.
III. Inner-Party Education
A. Significance
Education must be considered the most urgent issue in the party in the Red
Army. For the purpose of improving and expanding the Red Army and enabling
it to shoulder the struggle tasks, we must start from inner-party education.
If the political level in the party is not raised, if the many biases are
not eliminated, we definitely cannot improve and expand the Red Army,
nor enable it to shoulder the momentous struggle tasks. Therefore, carrying
out planned-inner-party education and correcting the unplanned and laissez-
faire situation of the past constitute one of the important tasks of the
party. The Congress has decided to educate the party members with the
following materials and methods. The leading organs of the party must hold
more detailed discussions to implement the task.
1. Political analyses.
2. Discussion of documents from higher level leading organs.
3. Organization knowledge.
4. Rectification of eight erroneous ideas in the party in the Red Army.
5. Discussion of anti-opportunism and the opposition faction against
Trotskyism.
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6. Strategy and technique of mass work,
7. Survey and study of the social economy of guerrilla areas.
8. Study of Marxism-Leninism,
9. Study of social economics.
10. The current stage of the revolution and its future.
Of the 10 items above, except for a portion (such as the study of social
economics) which actually is limited to the cadres, they are all suitable
for the general party members.
1.
Party newspapers.
2.
Brief political reports.
3.
All types of pamphlets for educating the comrades.
4.
Training classes.
5.
Planned reading assignment.
6.
Reading of books and newspapers to illiterate party members.
7.
Individual conversations.
8.
Criticisms.
9.
Cell meetings.
10.
Party branch meetings.
11.
Joint meetings of party branch committees and cells.
12.
Activists' mass meetings of cell leaders and above with each column
as a unit.
13.
Activists' mass meetings of party branch secretaries and above of the
entire army.
14.
Party members'
mass meetings with each column as a unit.
15.
Joint meetings
of all levels
of secretaries, propagandists, and organization officers
with each column as a unit.
16.
Joint meetings
of secretaries, propagandists and organization officers
of the detachments and above of the entire army.
17.
Political discussion meetings.
18.
Suitable assignment of party members to practical work.
IV.
Propaganda Work of the Red Army
A.
Significance of the Propaganda Work of the Red Army
The goal of the propaganda work of the Red Army is to expand our political
influence and fight for the broad masses. Only when this goal is realized
will the general goal of the Red Army, such as organizing the masses,
arming the masses, building political power, eliminating the reactionary
forces, and promoting the revolutionary high tide, be realized. Therefore,
propaganda work is the foremost task of the Red Army. Overlooking it is
abandoning the main task of the Red Army and equivalent to helping the
ruling class undermine its power.
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B. Current Situation of the Propaganda Work of the Red Army
1. Defects of the propaganda contents:
a. No concrete political outline has been published.. (The political out-
lines published before, such as the four-word announcements, were not concrete.)
b. Propaganda and encouragement of the daily struggles of the masses
are overlooked.
c. Winning of the urban poor is overlooked.
d. Propaganda to the women masses is overlooked.
e. Propaganda to the youth masses is inadequate.
f. Propaganda to the lumpen proletariat is inadequate,
g. Propaganda against the armed organizations of the landowner class
(Civil League, Ching-wei League, etc.) is very little.
h. There is no proper choice of time and place in propaganda.
2. Defects of the propaganda technique:
a. The propaganda team is-not sound.
(1) The number of'propagandists has been reduced from five per battalion
to three, or even down to one.or two, or none.
(2) The quality of the propagandists is too inferior. They include
captives, cooks, grooms, opium smokers, suspected deserters who are disarmed,
those who failed as clerks, and cripples unwanted by other work units.
Today's propaganda team has actually become a receiving station and is
completely incapable of performing its duties.
(3) Almost all the officers and soldiers reject the propaganda team
(partly because of the inferior quality of the propagandists and their lack
of achievement, resulting in the dissatisfaction of others). "Loafers"
and "fake medicine peddlars" are the nicknames given them.
(4) The propaganda teams do not have adequate funds.
(5) The training of the propagandists is not systematic, nor the super-
vision of their work adequate. Therefore,. the work of the propaganda team
is very sketchy, and no one pays any attention whether it does anything or not.
b. The handbills, announcements and declarations are outmoded and stale,
and distribution and mailing are not properly handled.
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c. There are very few wall bulletins; the brief political reports are too
simple in content and too few; and the characters are too small and too hard
to read.
d. There is practically no revolutionary songs.
e. Only a few pictorials have been published.,
f. There is no costumed propaganda.
g., Clubs with the double significance of recreation for the soldiers and
association with the worker-peasant masses have not been organized.
h. Verbal propaganda is too little and too inferior.
i.. The discipline of the Red Army is a practical propaganda to the masses.
Now discipline is more lax than before; therefore, it produces an unfavorable
impression on the masses.
j. Putting up the gate boards, bundling rice straw, sweeping the floor,
friendliness in conversation, fair buying and selling, returning intact.
borrowed things, and reimbursing for losses all constitute a kind of the
Red Army's propaganda work, but now they are not fully performed.
k. Mass meetings are seldom held, and not successful when held.
1. The method of propagandizing to the White soldiers is not good.
C. The Lines of Rectification
1. Propaganda contents:
a. A concrete political program should be published, and be called the
"Red Army Political Program."
'b. Propaganda must be compatible with the struggle sentiments of the
masses. Besides the general riot slogans, there must also be slogans on
daily life, in conjunction with the riot slogans, in areas where the struggle
sentiments of the masses are still low, in order to activate the daily
struggles.
c. The urban poor (middle and small merchants and students). constitutes
a considerable strength in the civil rights revolution. Overlooking this
strength is equivalent to presenting it to the big business bourgeoisie.
Hereafter, in regard to the urban middle and small merchant and student
masses, intensive propaganda work must be performed in order to win them over.
d. Women constitute half of the population. The economic position of the
laboring women and the extreme oppression suffered by them not only indicate'
that they are in urgent need of revolution but also that they will constitute
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a determining force of the revolution.
Hereafter, there must be effective
slogans and extensive propaganda toward them,
e. The toiling youth masses constitute over 30 percent of the population,
and they are also the bravest and firmest in struggle. Therefore, propaganda
to win the youth masses is an important task in the entire propaganda program.
f. In regard to China's broad lumpen masses, if they take the side of the
revolutionary class, they will. become an instrument of the revolution; if they
take the side of the reactionary class, they will become an instrument of the
counterrevolution. Therefore, winning them over from under the influence of
the reactionary class is one of the party's propaganda tasks. When performing
propaganda work, attention must be given to the life and nature of the dif-
ferent groups of vagrants and appropriate propaganda measures adopted.
g. The destruction of the armed organizations of the landlord class and
the winning over of their masses constitute one of the conditions for the
victory of the rural land revolution.. Hereafter, special attention must be
given to the propaganda work on the membership masses of the civil defense
and pacification units.
h. The propaganda and agitation slogans must be adapted to the particular
areas, and different slogans must also be created according to the different
times (such as fall harvest, year-end, the Chiang [5592]-Kuei [2710] war
period and the Wang [3076]-Chiang [5592] war period).
2. Propaganda technique:
a. The propaganda team:
(1) Significance: The Red Army propaganda team is an important tool
of its propaganda work. If the propaganda team is not well organized, a
large part of the Red Army's propaganda task is wasted. Therefore, the reform
and training of the propaganda team is one of the tasks at present requiring
the party's re-enforced endeavor. The first step is to correct, from the
theoretical aspect, the contempt felt by the officers and soldiers for
propaganda work and propaganda teams. Such odd nicknames as "loafers" and
"fake medicine peddlers" must be deleted hereafter.
(2) Organization:
(a) Take each detachment as a unit; the detachments directly sub-
ordinate to the army and column command will eacn form a unit. Each unit
will organize a propaganda team composed of a commander and a deputy
commander, 16 propagandists, 1 porter (carrying propaganda materials), and
2 orderlies. The propagandists of each company are divided into a number of
subunits (the number of subunits to be decided according to the number of
battalions or other troop units and organs), and each subunit has a leader
and three propagandists.
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(b) The detachment propaganda team is under the command of. the detach-
ment political commissar. When the battalions proceed separately to perform
guerrilla work, each battalion must have attached to it a propaganda subunit
under the command of the battalion political commissar. The propaganda teams
of the columns are under the command of the propaganda section of the column
political department. The army propaganda team is under the direction of the
propaganda section of the army political department.
(c) The funds of the propaganda teams are disbursed by the political
department; they must be adequate.
(d) In regard to improving the quality of the propagandists, besides
requesting the local governments to select progressive elements to join the
Red Army propaganda team, the superior elements among the soldiers in the
various units must be selected (excluding,the squad leaders wherever
possible) to serve as propagandists. The political department. must regularly
formulate training plans for the propaganda team, specify the training
material, method, time and instructors, and actively improve the quality of
the propagandists.
b. In regard to the propaganda documents, such as handbills, announcements
and declarations, the existing ones should be reviewed, and new ones drafted
promptly.
The suitable and effective distribution of propaganda material is an important
item in the technique of the propaganda team. The political work organs must
give attention to such means as sending propaganda by mail, enclosing propaganda
material among other matters through the mail, or printing propaganda and
agitation slogans on postal matters, and they must do so successfully.
c. Wall bulletins are one of the important means of mass propaganda. The
army and the columns must each run a wall bulletin, to be handled by the
propaganda section of the political department and named "Current Affairs
Brief Report." The contents are: (1) International and domestic political
news; (2) the mass struggle situation of guerrilla areas; (3) the work condi-
tion of the Red Army. There must be at least one issue a week, written on
large pieces of paper, not mimeographed, in as many copies as possible.
Attention must be given to the following: (1) The production must be prompt;.
(2) the contents must be rich; and (3) the calligraphy should be fairly large
and clear.
d. The various political departments must collect and compile revolution-
ary songs expressing the sentiments of the masses, and the editing and com-
piling committee of the army political department has the responsibility
of supervision and inspection.
e. The art unit of the propaganda section of the army political depart-
ment must be reenforced. It must publish lithographed or mimeographed
pictorials. To reenforce the military art unit, all those with talent in
painting and drawing in the army must be gathered together.
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f. Costumed propaganda is one of the most concrete and effective means of
propaganda. All the propaganda teams of the detachments and directly sub-
ordinate units must organize costumed propaganda subunits, responsible for
creating and directing costumed propaganda to the masses.
g. Take each battalion as a unit, clubs must be organized in the soldiers'
associations.
h. Verbal and written propaganda subunits must be organized in the pro-
paganda teams, for the purpose of studying and directing verbal and written
propaganda techniques.
i. The three disciplinary rules must be strictly enforced.
j. The political departments and the propaganda teams must, with organi-
zation and planning, call all types of mass meetings. They must decide in
advance the order of meeting, the speakers, the topics and the time.
k. Propaganda aimed at the soldiers and lower level officers of the White
army is extremely important. Attention must be given to the following
methods hereafter:
(1) The text of the propaganda must be short and concise, so that it
can be read at a glance. It must be skillful and clever, so that it will
leave an impression.
(2) Besides systematically displaying many.slogans appropriate to the
particular units along the road traveled by the enemy, handbills must be
stored with the party units and mass organizations along the road, so that
they can be ingeniously distributed when the enemy soldiers pass through.
(3) The names of the enemy officers and soldiers and the identity of
their unit must be ascertained from the captives and through mail inspection,
so that propaganda material or letters can be sent to them.
(4) Preferential treatment of captives is an effective method of pro-
pagandizing to the enemy force. Preferential treatment includes the following
methods: The first is to refrain from searching them for money and things.
In the past, the conduct of the Red Army soldiers of searching captives for
money and things must be firmly stopped. The second is to welcome captives
with great warmth, so that they will feel a spiritual happiness. Insulting
them by word or deed must be opposed. The third is equal material treatment
of the captives, same as the old soldiers. Fourth, after propaganda, those
who do not wish to remain will be issued travel expenses and released for
them to return home, so that they will spread the influence of the Red Army
in the White army. Forcing the unwilling ones to remain just to satisfy
the desire for more soldiers must be opposed. Except under special conditions,
the above are suitable for all captured officers and soldiers alike.
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(5) Giving medical attention to the.enemy wounded is also an effective
method of propaganda. The medical treatment and monetary allowances to wounded
enemy soldiers must be exactly the same as wounded Red Army soldiers. All
possible opportunities must be utilized to return wounded enemy soldiers who
have received medical attention and monetary allowances, to the enemy army.
This principle applies to wounded enemy officers.
V. Political Training of Soldiers
A. Material
The following items must be artistically incorporated into textbooks to serve
as training material for soldiers:
1. Current political analysis and the tasks and plans of the Red Army.
2. All aspects of the land revolution.
3. The armed organization and its tactics.
4. The reasons for the three articles of discipline.
5. Slogans for morning and evening roll calls.
6. Literacy movement.
7. How to do mass work.
8. Individual explanation of Red Army slogans.
9. Rectification of the many biases.
10. The Red Army of Soviet Russia.
11. The current stage of the revolution and its future.
12. Comparison of the Red Army and the White army.
13. Comparison of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang.
14. Revolutionary stories.
15. Stories of social progress.
16. Hygiene.
17. The geography and the political and economic knowledge of the
guerrilla areas.
18. Revolutionary songs.
19. Pictorial news.
1. Political classes;
a. Political classes are divided into regular, special and cadre
classes. Regular classes are further divided into two types: When a detach-
ment is, together, classes are held with each detachment as a unit. For
instructors, the detachment political commissar serves as the instructor
in charge, and battalion political commissars are responsible for the various
subjects separately. Besides combat soldiers who are required to attend,
messengers, orderlies, porters, grooms and cooks must all attend. The goal
of the regular class is basic political knowledge for soldiers in general.
b. With each detachment as a unit, the special class, through selec-
tion and examination, consists of 50 soldiers from the battalions who can
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read some and have some political knowledge. The detachment political commis-
sar serves as the instructor in charge, and the battalion political commissars
are responsible for the various subjects separately. The goal of the special
class is to create personnel with political knowledge one level higher than
the regular class, in preparation for promotion to lower level cadres in
the future.
c. The column is the unit for the cadre class, and the directly sub-
ordinate unit of the army forms another unit, organized with battalion
commanders and deputy commanders, company commanders and deputy commanders,
military aides of the various levels, and other designated personnel. The
goal is to raise the political level of the current lower level cadres, so
that they can lead the masses, in preparation for promotion to middle level
cadres in the future. The political commissar, political department chairman,
and commander of the column and others with suitable qualifications serve
as the instructors.
d. The political. training committee must be organized with each detach-
ment as a unit, to include the political committee members of the detachment
and qualified military officers. The detachment political commisssar serves
as chairman. The function of the committee is to discuss the various problems
on the political training of the soldiers in the detachment.
e. The political training of the directly subordinate units of the army
and columns is handled by the political training committee organized by the
political propaganda sections of the army and columns.
Heuristic method (abolishing the cramming method).
From the near to the far.
From the elementary to the advanced.
Lecturing in colloquial style (explaining new terms in colloquial).
Clarity in lecturing.
Lectures must be interesting.
Lecturing supplemented with gestures.
Review the idea of the previous session at the current session.
Outline must be brought out.
Discussion method should be used in the cadre class.
2. Lectures at morning and evening roll calls:
a. Limited to a maximum of 30 minutes each time.
b. Material:
(1) Reporting of political news.
(2) Criticisms of daily life.
(3) Explanation of the weekly political slogan.
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 3. Assembly lectures:
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a. Once a week for the detachment; once every half month for the column;
no set schedule for the army.
b. For each lecture, the political work organ (political commissar of
the detachment), together with the military work organ, systematically speci-
fies the contents of the lecture, designates the lecturer and schedules the
time.
c. Except for the orderlies, everyone must attend the lectures.
d. The lower level political organ must report to the higher level
the contents of each lecture and the influence on the masses.
a. Individual conversations must be held with the following categories
of people:
(1)
Those with biases.
(2)
Those receiving punishment.
(3)
The
wounded.
(4)
The
sick.
(5).
New
recruits.
(6)
Captive soldiers.
(7)
Those. dissatisfied with their work.
(8)
Those wavering in ideology.
b. Before the conversation, the psychology and circumstances of the
objective must be. investigated.
c. During the conversation, one must take the attitude of a comrade
and talk with sincerity.
d. After the conversation, the. important points of the conversation
and its effect must be recorded.
a. With the battalion as the unit, the soldiers' association club
must be reenforced and the following types of recreation included:
(1)
Hide-and-seek
game.
(2)
Soccer.
(3)
Music.
(4)
Martial arts.
(5)
Flower drum tunes.
(6)
Old drama.
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b. A costumed propaganda group will be organized under each propaganda
team.
c. The funds for recreational equipment are paid out of the public
funds (funds for the battalion to be approved by the column political depart-
ment).
6. Improvement of treatment:
a. Corporal punishment must be abolished firmly.
b. Verbal abuses must be abolished.
c. Wounded and sick soldiers must receive preferential treatment.
d. The system of issuing 0.40 yuan per person per month for straw
sandals must be resumed.
7. Special education of new recruits and captives:
a. Explain to them the life and habits of the Red Army, such as
(1) equality of officers and soldiers (There is only the distinction of
functions between officers and soldiers, but no distinction of classes.
The officers are not the exploiting class, nor the soldiers the exploited.);
(2) the three disciplinary rules and the reasons; (3) the significance and
effect of the soldiers' association; (4) the economic system in the Red Army
(the source of revenue, the management organization, the principle of keeping
accounts open to the public, and the system of inspection by the soldiers);
(5) management of the battalion mess by the economic committee; (6) abolition
of corporal punishment and verbal abuses; and (7) preferential treatment of
prisoners of war.
b. Lectures on the brief struggle history of the Red Army.
c. The principles of the Red Army: (1) The difference between the
Red Army and the White army--detailed explanation of this point to the
prisoners of war; (2) the difference between the Red Army and bandits; and
(3) the three great missions of the Red Army.
d. Lectures on the organizational system of the Red Army.
e. Common political knowledge, such as (1) the Kuomintang and the
Communist Party; (2) the invasion of China by British, Japanese and
American imperialists; (3) how the warlords of the different factions fight
everywhere under the direction of imperialism; (4) land division; (5) the
soviet; (6) the Red Guard, etc.
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VI. Special Education of. Youth Soldiers
A. The political.departments of the columns are responsible for compiling
youth literacy texts (using the Commercial Press elementary school texts,
People's 1,000-word Vocabulary text and Lung-yen Cultural Press texts as
references).
B. Each column must organize a youth soldiers' school, divided into three
or four classes, one class for each detachment and one for each directly
subordinate unit, with a maximum of 25 students per class. The chairman of
the political department serves as the principal and the propaganda section
chief as the dean. Each class has an instructor in charge. One semester
consists of 90 hours.
C. Stationeries are paid by public funds and distributed to the students.
VII. Abolition of Corporal Punishment
A. The Effect of Corporal Punishment in the Red Army
In the units where corporal punishment is more severe, there are more' dis-
satisfied soldiers and deserters. There were the following most apparent
instances: A certain officer of the 8th detachment of the 3d column liked
to punish by flogging. As a result, not only almost all the messengers and
cooks, but even the supply sergeant and aides, fled. During. one period,
a battalion commander who liked to flog people was assigned to the 25th bat-
talion of-the 9th detachment. The masses nicknamed him "Ironsmith." In
consequence, the soldiers felt hopeless and utterly dissatisfied. They only
became liberated when the commander was transferred. The result of flogging
in the 3d battalion of the special service detachment was the desertion of
4 cooks, 1 special service chief and 2 squad leaders who had struggled for
a long time. One of them, Hsiao Wen-ch'eng [5618 2429 2052], left a letter,
explaining that he was not counterrevolutionary, but deserted because he
could not stand the oppression. When the 4th column was first organized, the
officers transferred from the 1st, 2d and 3d columns beat the soldiers
savagely. As a result, the soldiers deserted one after another. Finally,
this group of officers themselves could not stand their ground, and they
had to leave the 4th column. The 2d column has more deserters than any
other column., Though there are many reasons, the habit of flogging inten-
sively practiced by its lower level officers is one of the most important
ones. There were three suicide incidents in the 2d column (1 platoon
leader and 2 soldiers). This is the biggest stigma of the Red Army, and the
significance is extremely serious. It cannot but be considered an outcome
of flogging practiced intensively in the 2d column. Currently, the outcry
of the common soldiers in the Red Army is: "Officers do not beat the
soldiers; they merely flog them to near death!" Such expression of the
indignation and wrath; of the masses truly deserves our serious attention.
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B. The Origin of Corporal Punishment and the Reason for Its Abolition
To maintain its exploitation, the feudal class had to resort to the most cruel
punishment as a tool, in order to suppress the resistance and revolt of the
exploited. This was the reason that corporal punishment was created in the
feudal era. When economic development progressed to the capitalist system,
it became necessary to introduce liberalism in order to encourage the
individuality of the worker-peasant masses, enhance their labor and fighting
capacities, and create the conditions for the development of capitalism.
Therefore, the bourgeois nations generally have abolished corporal punish-
ment, and the monstrosity of flogging has disappeared in the troops. When
the economic development reached the stage of socialism, with the aggravation
of the class struggle, the worker-peasant class, for the purpose of over-
throwing the power of the ruling class and eliminating the exploitation based
on such power, must activate the strength of the broad masses of its own
class before it can win the victory of the struggle. The soviet political
power is the political power of the most progressive class, and no remnant
of the feudal system may exist under it.. Therefore, in Soviet Russia,
corporal punishment is not only no longer in existence in its Red Army, but
the use of corporal punishment is strictly prohibited in its laws in general.
The Red 4th Army was created in a China where the feudal system had not been
completely eliminated, and its.main components mostly came from the troops
of the feudal warlords. The thinking and habits of the feudal system remain
strong in the officers and soldiers in general, and therefore, the habit of
flogging and the saying of "no fear without flogging" are the same.as in the
troops of the feudal warlords. Though the slogan that the officers must not
beat the soldiers and the provision that the soldiers have the right to
express their grievances have long been proposed, they are not effective at
all, resulting in the alienation between the officers and soldiers, the low
morale of the officers as well as the soldiers, the growing number of
deserters, the atmosphere of dissatisfaction in the troops, and even inci-
dents of suicide. This situation is completely contrary to the fighting tasks
of the Red Army. If it is not promptly rectified, the danger is beyond
description.
C. Methods of Rectification
1. Firmly abolish corporal punishment.
2. Launch a movement to abolish corporal punishment. This campaign must aim
at both the officers and the soldiers, and spread the meaning that "only the
abolition of corporal punishment will benefit the struggle" generally in the
officer and soldier masses. Only then will the officers realize that the
abolition of corporal punishment not only will not make it impossible for
them to command the troops, but will benefit management and training. On the
part of the soldiers, not only will they not become more intractable, but,
because of the abolition of corporal punishment, they will enhance their
fighting morale. With the disappearance of the alienation between the
officers and soldiers, they will consciously accept control, training and
general discipline.
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3. After corporal punishment is abolished, certain temporary undesirable
phenomena may appear due to historical reasons. But the situation will only
serve to intensify our responsibilities. We must vigorously promote the
spirit of persuasion and the conscious observance of discipline to overcome
the most evil feudal system contrary to the struggle tasks. We must never
use the undesirable phenomena as an excuse to defend the practice of flogging.
All those opposing the abolition of corporal punishment under the excuse of
the temporary undesirable phenomena, or slacking off on the movement to
abolish corporal punishment, are objectively blocking the development of
the revolutionary struggle and thereby helping the ruling class.
4. The legal procedure to abolish corporal punishment in the Red Army is:
a. The penal regulations of the Red Army must be revised. b. The supreme
military and political organs' conference must jointly issue a general order
abolishing corporal punishment and promulgate the new penal regulations of the
Red Army. c. After the general order is issued, the military and political
organs must call a meeting of officers to explain in detail the reasons for
abolishing corporal punishment, so that they will support the momentous
reform embodied in the general order and implement it diligently in the
troops. d. Meanwhile, the soldiers' council must call a meeting of soldier
delegates, explaining that, besides supporting the reform, they must hereafter
consciously observe discipline and make stringent mass disciplinary sanctions,
in order to obtain the desired result of abolishing corporal punishment.
VIII. Preferential Treatment of Wounded Soldiers
A. The Misery of the Wounded and the Sick and Its Influence
1. The health organs of the various units are unsound. Medical officers,
drugs and stretcher facilities are inadequate, and the personnel are insuf-
ficient and not well organized. Therefore, many wounded and sick soldiers
sometimes cannot even obtain basic care let alone full treatment.
2. The military and political organs of the army do not give sufficient
attention to the wounded and the sick. For instance: a. In regard to the
soundness of the health organs, the authorities have not only failed to
make maximum effort, but actually paid no attention to it. The issue of
health is rarely discussed at the various meetings.. b. The officers are not
doing all they can to comfort the wounded and the sick. Such practice as
bringing tea to the patients, covering them at night, and visiting them are
almost.nonexistent in the Red Army. The officers take the attitude of
indifference, or they even find the patients annoying. c. When marching,
the officers, and even the soldiers, show no sympathy toward the wounded
dropping out of rank, refusing to help them, cursing them or driving them
on ruthlessly.
3. The seriously wounded and sick do not have adequate supplies and
allowances. Wounded soldiers do not have a change of clothes 7 or 8 days
after being wounded. Sick officers receive recuperation allowances, but not
the sick soldiers.
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4. The defects of Chiao-yang Hospital are: a. Being disorganized.
b. Shortage of medical officers and drugs. C. Medical officers selling
private medicine. d. Lack of cleanliness. e. Inadequate cold weather.
clothing and bedding. f. Shortage of medical attendants. g. Inferior
food. h. Cramped quarters. i. Bad relationship with the local people.
As a result, the wounded and the sick regard the hospital as a jail and are
unwilling to remain in the rear.
The ill treatment of wounded and sick soldiers has produced the following
effect: a. The soldiers become dissatisfied with the Red Army. "While
the Red Army is good, one must not become wounded or sick." Such opinion
is widespread among all soldiers and the lower level officers. b. The
dissatisfaction of the soldiers and the officers further aggravates the
alienation between the officers and soldiers. c. The soldiers and lower
level officers are afraid of being wounded. Therefore, the combat power
of the Red Army is reduced. d. There are many deserters. e. The worker-
peasant masses are less eager to join the Red Army.
B. Methods of Rectification
1. The military and political organs must not remain indifferent to the
issue of health. It must be fully discussed at the various meetings.
2. The organization of the health units must be improved. Qualified person-
nel must be assigned to work in such units, instead of packing all those not
needed elsewhere into the medical teams. Moreover, the personnel must be
increased, so that the patients will have adequate attention. The shortages
of physicians and drugs must be remedied. wherever possible. In regard to
physicians, they must be urged to be more careful in diagnosing,'instead
of being so indifferent.
3. Officers, especially company officers in contact with the soldiers, must
visit the patients from time to time, bring them tea, and cover them up at
night. If the patients are cold, the officers must find the means to help
them, such as borrowing from others, or putting more clothes on them. Such
means of caring for the patients must be made into a system, followed by
everyone, because it is the best way to win the masses.
4. In regard to the wounded dropping out of rank when marching: a. No one
is permitted to revile or ridicule them. b. When. the wounded or sick are
required to yield the way, they must be asked politely, instead of being
pushed aside'roughly. c. Regardless of which unit or organ, whenever a
soldier drops out of rank due to injury or illness, be he a combatant or
noncombatant, someone must be immediately assigned to look after him. If
the injury or illness is serious, all means must be exhausted to have him
carried. d. When marching, the rear guard must patiently help the wounded
and the sick who are out of rank, and carry their weapons for them when
necessary.
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5. Allowances for incidental expenses must be issued to the patients. Those
seriously wounded or ill must receive more than those not seriously wounded
or ill. In regard to those extremely sick or wounded, appropriate recuperation
allowances must be issued without distinction of officer or soldier.
6. In regard to the clothing and bedding of the patients, while the army must
do its best to provide them, donations must be solicited among the officers
and soldiers of all the units. It will not only increase the incidental
allowances of the patients, but also serve as a good means to stimulate the
spirit of mutual help in times of need.
7. The many defects of the Chiao-yang Rear Hospital must be rectified
systematically. In addition, a campaign for donations (clothing, bedding,
cash, grain) must be launched among the worker-peasant masses in western
Fukien, in order to bring closer the relationship between the worker-peasant
masses and the Red Army.
IX. The Relationship Between the Military and the Political Commands of the
Red Army
A. Before the high level local political organ is organized, the political
and military organs of the Red Army, under the leadership of the Front
Committee, perform their work in a parallel manner.
B. The Relationship Between the Red Army and the Masses
1. In all matters affecting the entire army, such as the promulgation of
political programs, the military and political commands will promulgate
them jointly.
2. Before the local political organ is organized, the direction and super-
vision of mass work, such as propagandizing to the masses, organizing the
masses, building political power, down to confiscation, trial, punishment,
soliciting donations, raising funds, and relief, are the functions of the
political department.
3. In all areas where an administrative organ has not yet been set up, the
Red Army political department serves in its place, until the time when it is.
In all areas where it has been set up, the principle that the local administra-
tive organ handles all matters independently in order to gain the confidence
of the masses must be followed. Only when the local administrative organ
is not yet soundly established, in matters concerning the Red Army and the
local area, the method of joint handling by the local administrative organ
and the Red Army political department may be resorted to.
4. Helping the local militia stabilize and develop is the responsibility
of the political department; helping it in peacetime military training and
wartime combat direction is the responsibility of Headquarters. Nevertheless,
whenever possible, it should be done through the local administrative organ,
and direct handling should be avoided as much as possible.
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C. In regard to the personnel and administration of the Red Army, the military
and political commands each has its independent line. In matters concerning
both, such as mutual transfers of personnel, mutual transmission of informa-
tion, etc., they are handled through official communications.
D. In regard to etiquette and discipline, the military and political commands
follow the principle of class subordination. There must be no disrespect or
insubordination on ground of different commands.
E. In regard to supplies, health, marching,. combat and encampment, the poli-
tical command must accept the direction of the military command. In regard
to political training and mass work, the reverse is true. But such direction
can only be issued to the subordinate organs (general affairs section or the
adjutant section) of the other command.
F. The direction of matters relating to Red Army fund raising and the
decision and disbursement of political work allocations are to be made by
the political department, and the military affairs organs may not interfere.
(Funds are drawn directly from the quartermaster's office by the political
department.) Allocations to the party units are made by the political depart-
ment.
G. All orders of the military affairs organ, except those which have to be
cosigned by the political commissar, require no endorsement by the political
department director. All orders of the political organs are singly handled
by the political department without having to be endorsed by the political
commissar.
Editor's note: This document is one of the earliest and most important re-
cords written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on the army and party building of the
Chinese Communist Party. Its standpoint and basic content are completely
applicable today. The many kinds of non-proletarian biases, i.e., manifesta-
tions of warlordist and petty bourgeois biases, pointed in the first part
of the resolution are the fundamental problems of the 8th Route Army and New
4th Army today as well as the Red Army at that time. Our troops exist for
the people; therefore, the three great missions of the Red Army at that time
were "fighting," "raising funds," and "doing mass work." This document is
extremely forceful on the mass work viewpoint of the Red Army. Today's
8th Route Army and New 4th Army still have three great missions, except
that "fund raising" has been developed to "production." The decisions on
abolishing corporal punishment (not beating people) and the propaganda and
education work of the troops in this document deserve our serious attention
today. In general, as our troops are founded on peasants and other petty
bourgeois elements and situated in an environment of prolonged dispersed
rural guerrilla warfare and in the midst of mercenaries and counterrevolu-
tionary enemies, such counterrevolutionary enemies, traitors and secret
service agents, old army officers, war prisoners, lumpen proletarians, old
peasants, petty bourgeois intellectuals, and the various dogmatist and
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sectarianist factors corrode us from the inside as well as the outside. There-
fore, to make our troops truly into the troops completely belonging to the
people under the leadership of the proletarian ideology, we must wage a con-
stant anti-bias struggle. Currently, ours are the best troops in the nation
supported by the people. There has been a ,great improvement since 1929.
However, in recent years, certain defects still remain in the relations between
the army and the party and government, between the. troops and the people,
between the officers and the soldiers, between the lower and higher levels,
between military affairs and political work cadres, and among military units.
The main ones among the defects are the warlordist biases of severance from
the masses and require the intensive examination and rectification by our
military affairs and political work cadres in the rectification movement and
the support-government-and-love-people movement. Meanwhile, this document
starts from the masses and gives considerations to the civilian and soldier
masses everywhere. Therefore, it furnishes us with an effective weapon
on this point. In the political education of our troops, this document was
not publicized for many years, and, when it was publicized, it was not used
to launch self-criticism, thereby re-committing an error long solved by this
document. This is one loss. Now, the Central has decided to make this
resolution a document for the rectification of the military cadres and a text
for the education of the entire army.
"Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," Vol 3, 1944 edition
"Resolution of the Ninth CCP Congress of-the 4th Army of the Red Army,"
New Democracy Publishing House (Hong Kong), January 1949
6080
CSO: 4005
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LETTER TO COMRADE LIN PIAO
5 January 1930
[Text] Comrade Lin Piao:
The new year has been here several days, but I have not yet replied to your
letter. First, because I have some business which keeps me busy. Second,
because after all, what could I write to you about? What was there that
was good which I could offer you? I cudgeled my brains, but could not think
of anything suitable. Hence the delay. Now I have thought of something.
I do not know whether it is appropriate after all to your situation, but
this matter of mine is in fact an important question in the present struggle.
Even if it is not appropriate to your individual situation, it is nevertheless
an important question. Hence I bring it up.
What is the question that I am going to bring up? It is a question of appraisal
of the current situation and our actions ensuing from it. I used to feel in
the past and still feel that your appraisal of the current situation has been
relatively pessimistic. This view of yours was most apparent at the con-
ference in Jui-chin on the evening of 18 May last year. I knew that you
believed that a revolutionary upsurge would come inevitably, but you did not
believe it possible that it would come soon, so you disapproved of action on
the plan to seize Kiangsi within a year and favored only guerrilla activities
in the three border areas between Fukien, Kwangtung and Kiangsi; and as you
had no profound notion about establishing a Red political power in these three
areas, you had no profound notion of promoting a nationwide revolutionary up-
surge through intensification and expansion of this Red political power. Since
you believe in the XXX-style policy of mobile guerrilla warfare, you seem to
think that, since the revolutionary upsurge is still far away, it will be
labor lost to attempt to build up-our political power by hard work. Instead,
you want to extend our political influence by lighter, mobile guerrilla means
and, when the masses throughout the country have been won over, or won over to
a certain degree, to launch a nationwide uprising which, with the forces of
the Red Army thrown in, would become a great, nationwide revolution. Your
theory of first winning over the masses and then establishing political power
on a nationwide scale, including all regions, is in my view not suitable to
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the Chinese revolution. According to my observation, this theory of yours
stems mainly from your failure to understand clearly that China is a semi-
colony contended for by many imperialist powers. If you clearly understand
this, then first, you will understand why in China alone in the world there
is such an unusual thing as a prolonged strife within the ruling classes,
why the fight intensifies and expands day by day, and why no unified political
power has ever come into being. Second, you will understand how important the
peasant problem is, and consequently why rural uprisings have developed on
such a nationwide scale as at present. Third, you will understand the
absolute correctness of the slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic
political power. Fourth, you will understand another unusual thing which
corresponds to and arises out of the first that only in China is there a
prolonged strife within the ruling classes, and that is the existence and
development of the Red Army and guerrilla troops, and, together with them, the
existence and development of small Red areas (soviets) that have grown amid
the encirclement of the White political power (no such unusual thing is found
anywhere. except in China). Fifth, you will also understand that the formation
and development of the Red Army, the guerrilla units and the soviet areas is
the highest form of peasant struggle in a semi-colony, a form which peasant
struggle in a semi-colony will inevitably take. Sixth, you will understand
that they. (the Red Army and peasants' soviets) undoubtedly are the most
important allied forces (which the proletariat must come forward to lead) of
the struggle of the, proletariat in a semi-colony, and that undoubtedly they
are an important factor in accelerating the revolutionary upsurge throughout
the country. Seventh, you will understand that the policy of purely mobile
guerrilla activities cannot accomplish the task of accelerating the nation-
wide revolutionary upsurge, while the kind of policy adopted by Chu [Teh]-
Mao [Tse-tung], Ho Lung, Li Wen-lin and Fang Chih-min is undoubtedly correct--
policy such as establishing base areas, building up political power according
to plan, close cooperation between Red Army guerrillas and the broad peasant
masses, their organization and training in struggle, deepening of the agrarian
revolution, expanding armed forces by developing first township uprising forces,
then district Red Guards, then county Red Guards, then local Red Army units,
all the way up to the regular Red Army, and expanding political power by
advancing in a series of waves. Only thus can we win the confidence of the
revolutionary masses throughout the country, just as the Soviet Union has
done throughout the world. Only thus can we create tremendous difficulties
for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their very foundations and precipi-
tate their internal disintegration. And only thus can we really create a
Red Army that will be one of our important instruments in the coming great
revolution. In short, only thus can we accelerate the revolutionary upsurge.
I wish to speak once'more now about the reason why you make a relatively
pessimistic--to my way of thinking--appraisal of the current situation.
Your appraisal, I think, is exactly the opposite of that made by a group
in the party who suffer from revolutionary impetuosity. Comrades who suffer
from this malady unduly overestimate the subjective forces of the revolution
and underestimate the objective forces. Such an appraisal stems largely from
subjectivism. In the end, it will undoubtedly lead to the path of adventurism.
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You have not made such a mistake. But you seem to have a fault in another
respect, and that is, you underestimate somewhat the subjective forces and
overestimate somewhat the objective forces. This is also an inappropriate
appraisal and will inevitably produce another kind of bad result. You admit
the weakness of the subjective forces and the strength of the objective
forces, but you do not seem to understand the following important features:
1. Although the subjective forces of the revolution in China are weak, so
are all organs (government, armed forces, parties, organizations, etc.) of
the ruling classes with their foothold on the backward and fragile social
and economic structure of China. This explains why revolution cannot break
out at present in the countries of Western Europe where, although the subjec-
tive forces of revolution are much stronger than those in China, the forces
of the ruling classes there are also many times stronger than those in our
country. The subjective forces of the revolution in China are weak, but be-
cause the objective forces are also weak, the revolution will certainly
move toward an upsurge more quickly in China than in Western Europe.
2. Since the defeat of the Great Revolution, the subjective forces of revolu-
tion have indeed been greatly weakened. The force that remains is to all
appearances very small and this naturally makes some comrades (who judge by
appearances) feel pessimistic. But it is a quite different thing if we
look into the essence of the matter. Here the old Chinese proverb, "A.single
spark can start a prairie fire," is applicable. In other words, although
the force is only a small one at present, it will rapidly develop. In China,
as things stand, its development is not merely a possibility but a necessity.
This was fully proved in the 30 May Movement and the Great Revolutionary
Movement which followed. In studying an event, we must examine its essence
and treat its appearance merely as a guide to the threshold of the essence.
Once we have crossed the threshold, we must grasp the essence and put aside
the appearance that serves as the guide. This alone is the reliable and
scientific method of analysis which has revolutionary significance.
3. Similarly, in estimating the objective forces, we must never look merely
at their appearance, but must study their essence. In the early period of our
independent regime on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, a small number of comrades
seriously believed in the incorrect appraisal made by the Hunan Provincial
Party Committee of that time and regarded our class enemy as not worth a rap.
The two phrases, "extremely.s.haky" and "exceedingly panicky," which have been
passed on as standing jokes even to this day, were precisely the description
used at that time (from May to June 1928) by the Hunan Provincial Party
Committee in sizing up Lu-Ti-p'ing, the ruler of Hunan._ Political adventurism
necessarily ensued from such an appraisal. But during the approximately
4 months from November 1928 to February 1929 (before the war between Chiang
Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords broke out), when the largest third joint
expedition pressed forward to Ching-kang Mountains, a section of comrades
raised the question, "How long can the Red flag be kept flying?" As a
matter of fact, the, struggle in China between Britain,. the United States
and Japan had by then become quite open, and the situation was taking shape
for a fight between Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang and the Kwangsi warlords.
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In reality it was just the time when the counterrevolutionary tide began to
ebb and the revolutionary tide to rise again.. But during this very period
not only was a pessimistic view found in the Red Army and local party
organizations, but the party center was more or less perplexed by surface
conditions and became pessimistic in its tone. The February. letter from the
Central Committee furnished proof of the pessimism shown by the party in its
analysis at that time.
4. The present objective situation may still easily perplex those comrades
who observe only the appearance of the existing conditions but not their
essence. Those of us working in the Red Army, especially when defeated in
battle, encircled on all sides or pursued by strong enemy forces, often un-
wittingly universalize and magnify what after all are only momentary, parti-
cular and local conditions, as if the whole situation in China and throughout
the world was dark and gloomy, and the prospect of victory of the revolution
dim and remote. They neglect the essence in making such an observation
because they have not made a scientific analysis of the general situation.
If it is asked whether the revolutionary upsurge will arise soon in China,
we can give a definite answer only after studying carefully whether the
contradictions leading to the revolutionary upsurge are really developing.
Since contradictions are developing internationally between the imperialist
countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between
imperialism and the proletariat in these countries, the imperialists feel all
the more urgently the need to contend for China. As the imperialists' conten-
tion for China intensifies, both the contradiction between the imperialist
powers and the whole Chinese nation and the contradiction among the
imperialists themselves develop simultaneously in China, a daily expanding
and intensifying strife thus ensues between the various cliques of rulers
in China and the contradictions between them develop daily. From these
contradictions between the various cliques of rulers--the strife between the
warlords--ensues an increase of taxation; thus the development of the contra-
diction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the rulers is accelerated
with every passing day. From the contradiction between imperialism and
Chinese capitalism, that is, the failure of the Chinese bourgeoisie to
obtain concessions from imperialism, ensues an immediate intensification of
the contradiction between China's bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class:
the Chinese bourgeoisie must now intensity their exploitation of the working
class. From the imperialist commodity aggression, the inroads made by Chinese
merchant capital, and increase of taxation by the government--all of which
are contradictory to the interests of the landlord class, ensues the sharpen-
ing of the contradiction between the landlords and the peasants, that is,
exploitation by landlords in the form of rent and usury becomes heavier.
Because of the pressure of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing
power of the broad masses of workers and peasants, and increase of taxation
by the government, dealers in domestic products and independent small
producers are forced daily further on the road to bankruptcy. Because of the
unrestricted expansion of [government] troops without sufficient provisions
and funds to support them and the steady spread of war, the masses of soldiers
constantly find themselves suffering from cold, hunger, exhaustion and
200
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casualties. Because of the increase of taxation by the government, the
mounting burden of rent and interest demanded by landlords, and the daily
extension of the horrors of war, which leads to widespread famine and banditry
throughout the country, the broad masses of peasants and the urban poor are
brought to such a pass that they can hardly survive. Because funds are lack-
ing for keeping schools open, many students are worried that they may not be
able to continue their education. Because of the backwardness of production,
graduates have little hope of obtaining employment. Once we understand all
these contradictions, we shall see how desperately precarious the situation
is, and how chaotic the state in which China finds herself. We shall also
see how inevitably and soon the revolutionary upsurge against the imperialists.,
the warlords and the landlords will arise. China is littered all over with
dry firewood which will soon be kindled and become a conflagration. The
proverb, "A single spark can start a prairie fire," appropriately describes
how the current situation will develop. We need only look at the nationwide
development of.workers' strikes, peasant uprisings, soldiers' mutinies, and
strikes by merchants and students to see that it is no longer merely "sparks"
but will undoubtedly not take long for these "sparks" to become "a prairie
fire."
The gist of what is said above was given in a letter from the Front Committee
to the Central Committee, dated 5 April 1929. It reads in part:
"The letter of the Central Committee (dated 9 February last year) gives too
pessimistic an appraisal of the objective situation and our subjective forces.
The [Kuomintang's] three campaigns of 'encirclement' against the Ching-kang
Mountains marked the height of the counterrevolutionary tide. But there it
stopped, and since then the counterrevolutionary tide has gradually receded
while the revolutionary tide has been gradually rising. Although our party's
fighting capacity and organizational strength have been weakened even to the
extent described by the Central Committee, they will recover rapidly with the
gradual ebbing of the counterrevolutionary tide and passivity among cadres
in the party will also soon disappear. The masses will certainly come over
to us. For not only has the [government] policy of massacre been 'driving
the fish into deep water' but even reformism no longer appeals to the masses.
It is certain that the illusions of the masses about the Kuomintang will
quickly evaporate. In the situation that will arise, no party can compete
with the Communist Party in winning over the masses. The political line and
the organizational line laid down by the Party's 6th National Congress are
quite correct: the revolution at the present stage is democratic and not
socialist; the immediate task of the party is to win over the masses and not
to stage immediate uprisings. But the revolution will rapidly develop,
and in making propaganda and preparations for armed uprisings, a positive
attitude should be adopted. In the great chaos of the current situation,
only by putting forward positive slogans and by taking a positive attitude
can we lead the masses. It is also certain that only by adopting such a
positive attitude can the party recover its fighting capacity. We think that
the party made a putschist mistake before, but that in some respects it now
has a tendency toward abolitionism.... Proletarian leadership is the sole
key to the victory of the revolution. The laying of the party's proletarian
basis and establishment of the party branches in industrial enterprises in
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key districts are the important organizational tasks of the party at present.
But at the same time the development of struggles in the countryside, the
establishment of Red political power in small areas, and creation and expan-
sion of the Red Army are also main conditions for helping the struggle in the
cities and accelerating the revolutionary upsurge. Therefore, it is the
biggest mistake to abandon the struggle in cities and be immersed in guerrilla
activities in rural areas. But in our opinion it is also a mistake for any of
our party members to fear the development of the power of the peasants lest
it become stronger than that of the workers and hence detrimental to the
revolution. For the revolution in semi-colonial China will fail only if the
peasant struggle is deprived of the leadership of the workers, and it will
never suffer just because the peasants, through their struggle, become more
powerful than the workers."
The letter also contains the following reply to the question of the Red Army's
line of action:
"To preserve the Red Army and arouse the masses, the Central Committee wants
us to divide up our forces into very small units and disperse them widely
over the countryside, and that Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung leave the ranks so
that the major targets will be hidden from the enemy. This is an idealistic
way of thinking. To divide up our forces into company or battalion-size
units, each operating on its own; to disperse them widely over the country-
side; to arouse the masses through guerrilla activities; and to avoid becoming
the enemy's target--all these we planned and tried on numerous occasions ever
since the winter of 1927, but they all proved failures. The reasons are:
(1) Most of the soldiers in the main force of the Red Army came from the
outside and are different from the local Red guardsmen in their origin,
(2) With small dispersed units, the leadership will become so weak as to be
unable to cope with adverse circumstances, hence we shall be liable to suffer
defeat. (3) Small units are easy for the enemy to crush separately. (.4) The
more adverse the circumstances, the greater becomes the need for the forces
tc be concentrated and for the leadership to conduct resolute struggle, for
only thus.can we achieve internal unity against the enemy. Only in favorable.
circumstances can the forces be divided for guerrilla operations, and it is
only then that the leaders need not stay with the ranks all the time, as they
must do in adverse circumstances..."
The defect of this passage is that the reasons given against the division of
forces are of a negative character, and that is far from adequate. The posi-
tive reason for concentrating our forces is this: only concentration will
enable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units and occupy cities.
Only after wiping out comparatively large enemy units and occupying cities
can we arouse the masses on a large scale and build up a unified political
power over a number of adjoining counties. Only thus can we arouse the
attention of the people far and near (i.e., "expanding our political influence"),
and make a material contribution toward accelerating the revolutionary upsurge.
For instance, both the regime we created on the Hunan-Kiangsi border in the
year before last and that created in western Fukien last year were the result
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of our policy of concentrating the troops. This is the general principle.
Are there, however, not times when the forces should be divided up? Yes,
there are. The letter to the Central Committee from the Front Committee
speaks of the Red Army's guerrilla tactics, including the division of forces
within a short radius:
"The tactics we have worked out during the last 3 years in the course of the
struggle are indeed different from any employed in ancient or modern times,
in China or elsewhere. With our tactics, the struggles of the masses are .
daily expanding and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with us. Ours are
guerrilla tactics. They consist mainly of the following points: "Disperse
the forces to arouse the masses and concentrate the forces to deal with the
enemy." "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy halts, we harass; the enemy
tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." "In an independent regime
with stabilized territory, we adopt the policy of advancing in a series of
waves. When pursued by a powerful enemy, we adopt the policy of circling
around in a whirling motion." "Arouse the largest number of the masses in the
shortest possible time and by the best possible method." These tactics are
just like casting a net. We should be able to cast the net wide or draw it
in at any moment. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to
deal with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have applied in the past 3 years."
Here, "to cast the net wide" means to divide up our forces for a short term.
For example, when we first captured the county town of Yung-hsin on the
Hunan-Kiangsi border, we divided up the 29th and 31st Regiments within the
boundaries of Yung-hsin. Again, when we captured for. the third time the
county town of Yung-hsin, we divided our forces by dispatching the 28th Regi-
ment to the border of An-fu, the 29th to Lien-hua and the 31st to the border
of Chi-an County. And again, in April. and May last year our troops were
divided up in the counties of southern Kiangsi, and in July they were divided
up in the counties of western Fukien. All these were appropriate examples.
As to the dispersion of forces over a wide area, this is possible only under
two conditions: when circumstances are comparatively favorable and when the
leading body is comparatively sound. For the aim of dividing up our forces
is to render ourselves more capable of winning over the masses, of deepening
the agrarian revolution and establishing political power, and of expanding
the Red Army and the local armed forces. It is better not to divide up the
forces if it is impossible to attain these aims, or if division of forces
could only lead to defeat and a weakening of the Red Army, as in August of
the year before last when our forces were divided up on the Hunan-Kiangsi
border for an attack on Ch'en-chou. If the two above-mentioned conditions
are present, we should undoubtedly divide up the forces, because then
division will be more advantageous than concentration. As for the division
of forces under emergency circumstances to.preserve our strength and avoid
concentration of target for the enemy, I am opposed to that in principle.
This is made clear in the letter from the Front Committee to the Central
Committee quoted above. In addition, will there be a time when work should
be done by dividing the forces because economic conditions do not permit
concentration? That is possible, but I cannot make a positive conclusion,
because we have not yet had concrete experience in this respect.
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The February letter from the Central Committee was not written in the right
spirit, and has exerted a bad influence on a number of comrades in the party
in the 4th Army. Even you seemed to have been affected too, The Central
Committee also issued at that time a circular stating that war between
Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords might not break out. Since then,
however, its appraisals and directives have in the main been correct. It has
already issued another circular to correct the one containing the inadequate
appraisal (as in fact it was only part of a larger circular). Although it
did not make any formal correction as to the letter to the Red Army, its
subsequent directives were entirely not tainted with such pessimism and its
views on the Red Army's movements now completely agree with ours. Yet that
letter remains a bad influence on a number of comrades. The Front Committee's
reply to the letter of the Central Committee was made public within the party
together with the Central Committee's letter, but it does not seem to have
had a considerable influence on this section of comrades, because the letter
from the Central Committee exactly suited their convictions. Meanwhile, many
subsequent correct directives from the Central Committee on its appraisal
of the current situation might not have been heeded by this section of comrades,
or even if they have heeded them, they are still unable to erase completely
the former impression given them. Thus I feel that even now it is still
necessary to give some explanation on the question.
The plan to seize Kiangsi within a year was also proposed by the Front Commit-
tee to the Central Committee in April last year, and a resolution was subse-
quently passed at Yu-tu. I record as follows the reason given then in the
letter to the Central Committee;
"The troops of Chaing Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords are drawing near each
other in the environs of Chiu-chiang, and big battles will take place presently.
The Kuomintang rule will consequently disintegrate and the revolutionary
upsurge will arrive soon. In preparing our work in these circumstances, we
feel that, so far as the southern provinces are concerned, the military
forces of the compradors and landlords in Kwangtung and Hunan are too strong,
while in Hunan, because of the party's putschist mistake, we have moreover
lost almost all our mass following outside as well as inside the party. In
the three provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi and Chekiang, however, the situation
is different. First, the enemy's military strength there is at its feeblest.
In Chekiang, there are only a small number of provincial guards under
Chiang Po-ch'eng. In Fukien, though there are altogether 14 regiments under
5 commands, Kuo Feng-ming's brigade has already been smashed; the troops
under the respective command of Ch'en Kuo-hui and Lu Hsing-pang are bandit
forces of small fighting capacity; the two brigades of marines stationed
along the coast have never seen action and certainly cannot have great
fighting capacity; Chang Chen alone is comparatively able to fight; but
even he, according to an analysis made by the Provincial Committee of Fukien,
has under his command only two regiments of some fighting capacity. In
addition, Fukien is now entirely in a state of confusion and disunity. In
Kiangsi there are altogether 16 regiments under two commands--that of
Chu P'ei-te and that of Hsiung Shih-hui; the military strength there is
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superior to that of either Fukien or Chekiang, but still far inferior to that
of Hunan. Secondly, we have committed fewer putschist mistakes in these three
provinces. With the exception of Chekiang, where the situation is not quite
clear to us, the party's organizations and mass following in both Kiangsi
and Fukien are better than those in Hunan. Take Kiangsi for instance. There
we still retain a fairly adequate basis in Te-an, Hsiu-shui and T'ung-ku in
northern Kiangsi. In Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua and Sui-ch'uan in
western Kiangsi the party and the Red Guards are still powerful. In southern
Kiangsi the situation is even more hopeful, as the 2d and 4th Regiments of
the Red Army tend to grow every day in counties like Chi-an, Yung-hsin and
Hsing-kuo, and the Red Army under Fang Chih-min is by no means wiped out. All
this places us in a position to close in on Nan-chang. We propose to the
Central Committee that during the period of prolonged warfare between the
Kuomintang warlords, we contend with both Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi
clique for Kiangsi and at the same time for the western parts of both Fukien
and Chekiang. In these three provinces the Red Army should be expanded and
an independent regime of the masses created. We set the time-limit at 1 year
for accomplishing this plan. Within this year proletarian bases for struggle
should be established in such places as Shanghai, Wusih, Ningpo, Hangchow,
Foochow and Amoy, in order to provide leadership to the peasant struggles in
the provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsi and Fukien. The Provincial Committee
of Kiangsi must be made healthy and strong. An effort must be made to build
workers' bases of Nan-chang, Chiu-chiang, Chi-an and the Nan-chang-Chiu-chiang
Railway."
The above proposal to seize Kiangsi in 1 year erred in setting the time-limit
mechanically at 1 year. The proposal to seize Kiangsi was based, in my
opinion, on the consideration that the nationwide revolutionary upsurge would
arise soon, apart from the conditions in the province itself. For if we had
not been convinced of this, we could not possibly have arrived at the conclu-
sion about the seizure of Kiangsi in a year. The only defect in the proposal
was setting the time-limit mechanically at 1 year, thereby affecting the
meaning of the word "soon" in the statement that "a revolutionary upsurge will
arise soon" and making it smack more or less of mechanicism and impetuosity.
But you do not believe in the seizure of Kiangsi in a year, because you
overestimate the objective forces and underestimate the subjective forces.
Consequently, you do not believe in the arrival of the revolutionary upsurge
soon, and hence your conclusion. As to the subjective and objective condi-
tions in Kiangsi, they will deserve our attention. Apart from the subjective
conditions as stated above to which I have no new opinion to add, three things
concerning the objective conditions can now be clearly pointed out: First,
the economy in Kiangsi is chiefly an economy of feudal vestiges, i.e., one
of exploitation through land rent; the power of the merchant bourgeoisie is
relatively weak; and the armed forces of the landlords are stronger than
those in any other southern province. Second, Kiangsi has no troops of its
own. It has always been garrisoned by troops from other provinces. Sent
there for the "annihilation of Communists" or "annihilation of bandits,"
these troops are not very enthusiastic because they are unfamiliar with
local conditions and do not feel such personal concern as native troops do.
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And third, Kiangsi, unlike Kwangtung which is close to Hong Kong where almost
all things are under British control, is comparatively free from the influence
of imperialism. Once we have grasped these three points, we can explain why
rural uprisings have been more widespread and the Red Army and guerrilla units
more numerous in Kiangsi than in any other province.
I have now said roughly all I want to say to you. I have perhaps said too
much, like a chatterbox. But I think our discussion of the question is good.
If this question which we are discussing is really correctly settled, the
influence on the action of the Red Army will be great. So I have written
this with great pleasure.
Lastly there are still two points which need making clear. First, how to
interpret the two words "arise soon" in the phrase "a revolutionary upsurge
will arise soon" is a common question among many comrades. Marxists are not
fortune-tellers. Of future developments and changes he should and can only
point the general direction; he should not and cannot mechanically fix the
day and the hour. My statement that the revolutionary upsurge in China will
arise soon emphatically does not refer to something utterly devoid of
significance for action, to a tantalizing phantom, which, in the words of some
people, "may arise." It is like a ship on the sea whose masthead is already
seen in the horizon by people standing on the shore. It is like the morning
sun which, rising with radiant beams in the east, is already seen from afar
by people standing on the top of a mountain. It is like an almost fully
formed child stirring in its mother's womb. Second, when I say you want to
extend our political influence by lighter, mobile guerrilla means, I do not
mean that you have a purely military viewpoint and the mentality of a roving
bandit. Obviously, you have neither, because neither has any idea of winning
over the masses, while you advocate "winning over the masses without reserva-
tion." You not only advocate it, but are actually doing it. What I do not
approve is your lack of a profound notion about establishing a [Red] political
power, as a result of which the task of winning over the masses to accelerate
the coming of the revolutionary upsurge will certainly not be satisfactorily
accomplished as you wish. The principal purpose of my letter is to make clear
this point,
Please correct me where I am wrong.
0 "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," 1947 edition, Mao Tse-tung, Ku-t'ien,
Shang-hang.
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QUESTION OF RICH PEASANTS AFTER LAND DISTRIBUTION (Situation at Yung-hsin
and in the Northern Party)
[Text] Exploitation by the rich peasants of the Red area of Yung-hsin is
done by (1) hoarding of grain to raise its price and (2) selling of indus-
trial products. Hoarding of grain is in turn done by two methods: one,
hoarding of their own surplus grain and two, buying of grain from poor
peasants at very low prices, causing this year's serious spring famine.
Because they wanted to hoard grain and raise its price, and as the maximum
price of grain was set by the government, the rich peasants concealed all
their grain, so that poor people and workers in the town had to subsist on
thin gruel for a whole week. Even farm hands and poor peasants in rural
villages, unable to buy grain, had to fight with starvation. Later, the
county soviet led a spring famine struggle, waging a resolute fight against
the rich peasants without making any concession, in a determined bid to hold
down grain prices. The party acted in all districts and villages, leading
Young Pioneers in throwing open storerooms and uncovering large amounts of
grain concealed by the rich peasants in wine barrels, double walls, barns
and under brick-covered yards and beds. As a result, there was enough grain
for all and to spare. And when new grain was harvested, the rich peasants
all brought their old grain to the town to sell. In selling industrial goods
and doing small business the rich peasants make extraordinarily large profit.
They deal mainly in salt, imported stockings, handkerchiefs, sugar and soap.
They have money and various old social connections. They can buy in quantity
what the poor peasants and farm hands cannot buy. (The above is reported by
Wang Huai [3769/2037]; the following is by Ch'en Cheng-jen [7115/2973/0086])
The situation prevails not only in Yung-hsin, but also in the northern parts,
where a spring famine struggle was also waged this year. There the rich
peasants do business and make money like their counterparts in Yung-hsin.
There is Chiu Ju-t'ang in Fu-t'ien which is smalltime capitalist. When
there is a shortage of salt in the north, it goes to buy salt in Nan-chang.
When supplies of printing ink and paper run short, it also buys them from
Nan-chang. Consequently, it has friendly contacts with the leader of the
Kuomintang lookout squads as well as old social connections. Chiu Ju-t'ang
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sells salt and other goods at a very high price, In June-July it sold salt
at 1 string and 600 coppers a catty. It owns two sewing machines and is
opposed by all tailors and dressmakers of Fu-t'ien, as it takes away work
from them. Because it sold goods at too high prices, the Fu-t'ien town soviet,
acting on demands by the masses, had the proprietor of Chiu Ju-t'ang arrested
and fined him 1,000 yuan. After the fine, he continued to do business in
Fu-t'ien. After the capture of Chi-an, his business has grown even more.
During the spring famine in the north, the rich peasants sold their grain in
White areas. The spring famine struggle was to stop grain from flowing to
White areas, permitting such flow only between Red areas.
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INVESTIGATION IN TUNG-T'ANG AND OTHER AREAS
[Text] On 30 October 1930, the Red Army Front Committee decided at Lo-fang on
a policy of luring the enemy deep into our territory. On 6 November the Red
Army moved from Hsia-chiang, crossed Kan-chiang and marched toward Yung-feng
and Nan-ch'eng, while I went from Hsia-chiang to Chi-an to make arrangements
for a withdrawal. On 7 November I passed the night at Tung-t'ang, arriving
at Chi-an the following day. On the way I made some summary investigations.
My investigations at Li-chia-fang have enabled me to know clearly the organiza-
tion and activities of village and township level soviets in the agrarian
struggle in these places. Prior to these investigations, my ideas of the
situation were vague. These investigations have enabled me to find out the
serious character of land distribution based on each village as a unit. Land
is already distributed in several dozen counties in southwestern Kiangsi.
The land law promulgated by the superior level government makes the distribu-
tion based on each township as a unit, and all personnel of superior-level
organs presume that distribution is made with each township as a unit. The
actual situation is quite different. Distribution is generally made with
each village as a unit. Only in a few instances has it been made with each
township as a unit. Such distribution based on each village--advantageous
to the rich peasants but disadvantageous to poor peasants--should be changed.
1. Investigations in Tung-t'ang
Tung-t'ang village of the 15th township, T'ung-shui Ch'u, Chi-shui County.
The township consists of 1,000 families of 3,000 persons.
Land is distributed with each village as a unit.
The population of this village is 290.
The village government has a chairman and a secretary, both of whom provide
their own food.
Land distribution is made at 1 tou 3 sheng per capita, yielding about
2.5 tan of grain. (1 tou of land yields 2 tan of grain.)
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The six large villages are Li-chia'-fang, Shang-Chao-tang, Tsang-hsia, Hsu-yuan,
Chin--pi and Chou-yuan. The three small ones are Yen-chia-fang, Hsiao-li-chia-
fang and Yang-p'ing-chou. The three small villages and Li--chia-.fang are under
one government, while each of the remaining five large villages has its own
government.
The village government of Li-chia-fang is run by four persons: one chairman,
one secretary, one officer in charge of land and grain, and one in charge of
communications and concurrently cooking. The chairman, secretary and communi-
cations officer who is concurrently the cook live and work in the government
building and eat at public expense. The officer in charge of land and
grain administration lives in his own home and eats his own meals. He is
provided with meals only when he works at the government office.
The village government's expenses are: (1) Regular meals for three plus
meals for an average of two persons a day. At 10 cents per person each day,
it comes to 15 yuan a month. (2) Office expenses for lamps, oil, paper
and pens, 3 yuan. (3) Every time Red Guards and Young Pioneers are sent
out on a mission they are paid expenses for straw sandals, haircut, cigarettes.
Sometimes they are paid 500'and other times 1 string of coppers (Actual
expenses are defrayed; overpayment is returned, underpayment is made up for.)
In the nine attacks on Chi-an, they sometimes went on a mission for a month
before returning. These pocket expenses amounted to 3 yuan a month on the
average in the past. In the past, the village government had also to pay
for their food. Later, the township government paid for their food and the
village government gave them pocket expenses. These. three items amounted
to a total of 21 yuan.
In the past nine persons worked for the village government. There were the
chairman, secretary, finance officer, procurement officer, land officer, grain
officer, judge, communications officer and the cook. All nine worked in the
government office and were provided with board.
The revolutionary force was in control from early in the 1st month this year to
the 19th of the third month, and again from the fourth day of the sixth month
to the fourth day of the ninth month. In the period from the 20th of the
third month to the third of the sixth month when the reactionary force was in
control, the village government was abolished and the responsible persons
fled to Fu-t'ien. From the fifth day of the ninth month up to the present,
only four persons work regularly in the government. More money was required
when nine persons worked in the office.
In the period from the tenth of the first month to the 19th of the third month,
and again from the fourth of the sixth month to the fifth of the ninth month, the
township government comprised the chairman, a secretary, buyer, treasurer,
cultural officer, lang officer, grain officer, judge, communications officer,
a cook, three women officers, three Young Pioneers (the leader, the deputy
leader and an instructor and concurrently secretary), and one leader of the
Children's Corps, a total of 18 [sic] persons. They were all provided with
board by the government. From the sixth of the ninth month up to the present
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the number of officers has been reduced to seven: the chairman, a secretary,
an officer in charge of land and grain, a cultural officer, the chairman of
the Woman's Committee, the leader of the Red Guards who doubles for the cook,
and another secretary who is the "Confiscations Commissar" and concurrently
the officer who "goes to the villages to do propaganda on the expansion of
the Red Army." These seven persons regularly live and have their meals in
the government offices. The four members of the Woman's Committee eat their
meals at the government office when they have official work to do, otherwise
they stay at home. The work of these four women members consists of going
to the villages to organize working women to serve as Red Guards, comforting
squads and washing squads, and doing propaganda to get the men to serve in
the Red Army.
In the second month this year eight men from this township went to join the
Red Army. During the second attack on Chi-an on the 18th of the sixth month,
two men from each village or a total of 18, went to join the Red Army.
During the seventh attack on Chi-an in the seventh month, another seven men
went. After the ninth attack on Chi-an on the 13th of the eighth month,
another 46 men went. These have been placed in the Independent Regiments and
are receiving training at the command post of the 2d Independent Regiment at
Ta-t'ang. Altogether 80 persons from this township have gone to join the
Red Army. They all did so after being agitated. But of the last batch of
46, 4 or 5 were unwilling to join up and wept. They went reluctantly.
This township comprises nine villages: Li-chia-fang (of the surname of Hu, over
220 persons), Hsiao-li-chia-fang (surname of Li, 30 persons), Yeh-chia-fang
(surname of Yeh, 45 persons) and Yang-p'ing-chou (surname of Tung, 24 persons);
these four villages have a population of 327 (155 male and 172 female).
Shang-chao-t'ang,(surname of Liu, 200 persons); Ts'ang-hsia, surname of Yen,
315 persons (150 male and 165 female); Hsu-yuan, surname of Chou, 300 persons;
Chin--pi, 190 persons; and Chou-yuan, 372 persons (176 male and 196 female).
The nine villages have a total population of 1,404.
The four villages headed by Li-chia-fang have altogether 921.1 mou of fields.
In Li-chia-fang each person receives 2.7 mou, yielding 7 tan of grain. In
Yeh-chia-fang each person receives 3 mou, yielding 6 tan of grain. In
Hsiao-li-chia-fang each person receives 2 mou, yielding 5.5 tan of grain.
In Yang-p'ing-chou each person receives 2.5 mou, yielding 5.5 tan of grain.
Of the remaining 17.9 mou of Li-chia-fang, 6 mou has been transferred to
Hsiao-li-chia-fang and another 6 to Yeh-chia-fang. Only 5.9 mou remains
"communal property." After distribution in Yang-p'ing-chou, 2.3 mou remains
"communal property." This remainder after distribution is difficult to
divide up again. So it is public land of the village government, which rents
it out at a rate of 60 percent of the yield. This rent in kind helps to
defray public expenses.
Shang-chao-t'ang Village has 820 mou of fields. Each person receives 2.4 mou,
yielding 2.5 tan of grain. After the distribution, 29.2 mou remains "communal
property."
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Ts'ang-hsia Village has 690.3 mou of fields. Each person receives a share that
yields 7.8 tan of grain.
Hsu-yuan has over 820 mou of fields. Method of distribution: Each person who
stays in the village receives 3.5 mou. The land is good, each mou yielding
5 lo (2 lo make 1 tan), so that 3.5 mou yields 17 lo. Each worker receives
1.75 mou, or half of what a peasant gets. Each person who has left to work
elsewhere receives 1.4 mou.
Chin-pi Village has 489 mou of fields. Each person receives 2.7 mou, yielding
6 lo of grain. Those who have left to work elsewhere get nothing.
Chou-yuan Village has 510.5 mou of fields. Each person receives 2.2 mou and
gets 6 lo of grain from it. Those who have left the village get nothing.
After the Red Army captured Chi-an, four members of the reactionary lookout
squad--the leader, his deputy, the secretary and a platoon leader--were taken
prisoner in Chi-an. They were sent under escort to T'ung-shu-p'ing Ch'u
Government and executed. All ordinary members of the squad joined in the
revolution in this township and no one went to Chi-an. Three platoon leaders
and 10 group leaders who stayed at home were not executed. They were permitted
to join in the revolution.
Yen Ch'un-wen, chairman of the township government, owned 8 mou of fields,
yielding 24 lo of grain at only 3 lo a mou, and supporting a family of four.
At the first distribution of land in the seventh month, when both those
at home and those who had left to work elsewhere received a share, Yen's
family had 1.2 mou taken away from him, so that he now owned only 6.8 mou,
capable of yielding 20 lo of grain or 5 lo for each member of the family.
After the capture of Chi-an in the eighth month another distribution was
made. This time those who had left and found work elsewhere received
nothing. Only those who stayed behind and those who had left but could not
find work elsewhere were given a share of 2.2 mou. Since the family already
had 8 mou, it received 0.8 mou. The family owed a debt of 500 strings of
coppers in the past. A daughter (7 years old) was sold in Chi-an (the buyer
was from Kanchow, but operated a money-lending shop in Chi-an called Ho Mao)
for 100 yuan. This the family paid the creditor, but another 200 strings
of coppers was still outstanding. Another daughter (newly born) was given
away to the Catholic Church in Chi-an, for which the family received nothing.
IV. Investigations in Hsi-i-t'ing
This is one of the villages of the 23d township of Ju'fang Ch'u of Chi--an.
It is 15 li from Chi-an.
Ju-fang Ch'u comprises over 30 townships.
There are nine village governments in this township.
Hsi-i-t'ing Village has a population of about 600.
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The village government is run by five persons; the chairman, a secretary,
grain officer, land officer and a woman officer. They all provide their own
meals, as the village government does not provide board. But when they gather
together for some business (such as a conference), the village government will
provide them with meals.
Public funds of the ancestral temple and other religious pools are combined
for the use of the village government.
The village government's expenses consist of payments to Red Guards and Young
Pioneers who are sent out on missions (as in the attacks on Chi-an and in
attending conferences) and to soldiers of the Independent Regiments for their
meals (10 cents a day for each man). This is the only payment. No money is
given for straw sandals, haircuts or cigarettes.
Nineteen persons work for the township government: one chairman, two secre-
taries (one works for the township government and the other for the Red Guards),
a cultural officer, buyer, grain officer, land officer, Red Guards officer,
social insurance officer, two women (one chairman of the Women's Committee,
one in charge of organization), a cook, a communications officer, one leader
of Red Guards brigade, three leaders of Red Guards teams, one Red Guards
instructor, and one Young Pioneer leader. This township government began
working on the ninth day of the sixth month. It was unstable, because the
reactionaries of Chi-an often came to this township to arrest people, and when
the enemy came the government moved out. It was only after the capture of
Chi-an that township work began to develop. The reactionaries took away
10 people, two of then were executed. After the capture of Chi-an, the
eight prisoners were released, and over 20 reactionaries from this township
were seized in Chi-an. Of these, six of the more brutal were executed, a
number was released after paying a fine, and the remaining were sent under
escort to T'ung-shup'ing Ch'u Government. The government is very busy now
distributing land and grain, opposing debts, and setting up a school.
Land distribution is being made right now in this township. Distribution is
already made in five villages, taking each village as a unit. But an order
has come from the superior level, stating that distribution should be made
on the basis of taking each township as a unit, so that distribution has got
to be made again. The opinion of the various villages is that distribution
should be made on the basis of taking each village as a unit where the land
owned by the village is extensive and each township as a unit where the land
owned by the various villages is small. Of the nine villages of this
township, eight want the distribution based on village as a unit, only one
wants it based on township as a unit.
The five villages where distribution is already made are Ting-t'ang,
Pan-chi-k'ang, T'a'shui, Hsin-t'ang and Hsia-shang. In Ting-t'ang the dis-
tribution is 2 mou (yieldijig between 4 and 5 lo) per capita. In Pan-chi-k'ang
it is 2.5 mou per capita. In T'ashui and Hsiashang it is also 2 mou per capita,
but in Hsin-t'ang it is only 0.8 mou per capita. Hsin-t'ang has little land
and wants distribution based on the township as a unit. Though the land of
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Hsin-tang, with a population of about 200 all surnamed Huang, is small, it
is all good land (with no flooding disasters), some high, some low.
Chi-an has been captured for more than a month, but distribution of land is
not yet accomplished in this township.. It will take another 5 or 6 days to
complete.
The anti-debts struggle means creditors are required to surrender the pro-
misory notes they hold, so they may be destroyed. Of the nine villages, only
Kuan-t'ien has so far surrendered all promisory notes to the township govern-
ment, but they are not yet destroyed.
The chairman of the township government has been dismissed by the Ch'u Govern-
ment. Wang Yu-t'ang, the new chairman, has been here only 5 days.
Liu Ch'uan-sheng, the previous chairman, is a carpenter. His family of three
owns 1.8 mou of land. He was made chairman in the sixth month.
Ju-heng and Fang-k'uo were formerly two districts, but are now combined into
one under the name of Ju-heng Ch'u. The new chairman if this township
government comes from Ju-heng, but this township formerly belonged to Fang-
k'uo Ch'u. Wang Yu-t'ang, a carpenter, owns 5 mou of land which yields
18 lo of grain for his family of four.. Besides being a carpenter, Wang
also tills the land. Over 70 men from this district have joined the Red
Army. Of these, over 40 are Young Pioneers, teenagers who are very brave.
The District Government is situated in T'ung-shup'ing. Its chairman, Ch'en
Chun-pin, is a rice miller.
0 "Rural Surveys," Liberation Press, July 1947
8564
CSO; 4005
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LAND DISTRIBUTION IN WESTERN KIANGSI
12-15 November 1930
[Text] These are delegates' reports made during the expanded conference of
the western Kiangsi Mobile Commission held on 12 November 1930 and the
expanded conference of the Provincial Mobile Commission held on 15 November.
I made brief notes during the conferences, and, although they are very
sketchy, from them one can see a small part of the land struggle in south-
western Kiangsi.
1. Distribution of Fields
Chun-hua: Townships are separated by as much as 10 li. In one township
the good and the bad [fields] were grouped for even distribution. The first
distribution took place in December of last year (1929). The second dis-
tribution took place in March of this year, taking the original tiller as
the basic unit and taking from those with more to compensate those with less.
Now the third distribution is taking place, using the fertile [land] to
compensate for the infertile. Distribution is beginning, and will take
over 10 days to complete.
Ju-yen: In December of last year (1929), the fields of the bad gentry and
landlords were distributed, but public fields and the fields of wealthy
farmers had not yet been distributed. In March of this year, all [fields]
were confiscated and distributed in accordance with productive capacity.
In May, all [fields] were confiscated for the third time and distributed
according to physical labor. Yet it was not thoroughly equal in that some
fertile land was taken from those with more fertile land while some infertile
land was taken from those having more infertile land. Equalization has not
yet been accomplished by division into three classes, A, B and C. The
majority used the village as the basic unit.
Shui-tung: The township was used as the basic unit for all three distribu-
tions. During the first, in January of last year, land was taken from those
with more to compensate those with less. During the second, in June, fertile
land was taken to compensate for the infertile, but it was still incomplete
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and many persons were dissatisfied with it. The third distribution is now
in process. Land committee members of the various townships were concentrated
at district level and land commissions were organized for mutual assistance
in distribution, and to carry out the taking of fertile land to compensate
for the infertile. When Chi-an was opened, over 1,000. people returned from
the city and received land in the same manner as others. On completion of
this distribution, distribution will have been completed in 13 out of 17
townships.
Western District: Two distributions have been made. During the second one
in August of this year, although distribution was made in three classes,
upper, middle and lower, with the good and the bad [fields] distributed
equally, it was actually not complete. The township was the basic unit.
The township is too big, with the district fields being as much as 6 or 7 li
away and unwanted by the farmers.
Recently the District Commission announced that the third distribution would
be complete, taking fertile land to compensate for infertile land, and burn-
ing tax records and land titles, with five inspectors dispatched by the
district to assist in the distribution.
Ju-fang: The first [distribution] was in January of this year, with the
good and the bad [fields] distributed equally. It was incomplete--public
fields remained. In some cases the township was the basic unit and in
some cases the village was the basic unit. The second was in May, when the
masses took the defector leaders' fields and distributed them to the poor
people (those receiving distributed land for,the first time). In the third
(the current one), equal distribution was made to the upper, middle and lower
classes. Territory newly seized in the three or four townships in the
Nan-yu-miao area has not been completely distributed. Distribution is
complete in Hsi-yi-t'ing, where the township was the basic unit.
An-fu: Distribution has not yet been made in places where there have been
no defectors--distribution was made first in places where there had been
defections, with 10 days to complete distribution which was to be totally
equal. Distribution is half complete in seven districts, two-thirds complete
in five districts, and has not yet been done in the remaining turncoat places.
Among the nine districts in the county, the First District is not turncoat
at all, one-third of the Second District is not turncoat, half of the Third
District is not turncoat, one-third of the Fourth District is not turncoat,
three-fifths of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Districts is not turncoat, half
the Eighth District is not turncoat, the Ninth District--the city--is com-
pletely turncoat, as is the 30-li area around the city. The reason some
areas are not turncoat is that they border on the red areas of Yung-hsin,
Lien-hua and Yuan-chou. All non-turncoat places are "weak and small minority
peoples" who have been oppressed by the large villages. Distribution of fields
has been completed in all such places, taking from those with much to compen-
sate those with little, but not yet taking the fertile to compensate for the
infertile land.
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Tung-ku: The township was the basic unit, Land was distributed in July of
last year (1929), taking fertile land to compensate for the infertile, and
equalizing by division into three classes: A, B and C. The second distri-
bution.has not yet taken place.. Later, because those serving in the Red
Army had returned their land to the government, such land in the various
villages was given to the villagers to till. The masses of the people
clamored, so the fields were evenly divided in July of last year under the
slogan "Group for evenness."
Hsia-chiang: In the first distribution which took place in January and
February of this year, the fields of the local tyrants and evil gentry were
divided. Public fields were divided during the second distribution held in
March. Fields of wealthy farmers were divided in the third distribution
held in April and May, completing the distribution by taking the fertile
to compensate for the infertile [fields], Taking the village as the basic
unit, there were unwanted fields because there was much land and few people.
Two distributions have taken place in the newly developed areas. The first
distribution was carried out in haphazard fashion 2 weeks ago. The second
and current distribution must be completed in 5 days. The good and the
bad [fields] are being combined for even distribution.
Shui-han: The first was made in March of this year, taking from those with
much to compensate those with little, For the second distribution carried
out during August along the border of the White areas, land was taken from
those with much to compensate those with little, but the fertile were not
taken to compensate for the infertile. In the remainder, fertile [land]
was taken to compensate for the infertile. Special distribution of good
fields, however, was made to responsible members of the party headquarters
and the farmers were directed to help work such fields.
Ju-lin: The first distribution took place in March of this year, taking from
those with much to compensate those with little. In May the entire district
defected. In June the guard unite were overthrown, and the second distribu-
tion of fields took place, with the fertile taken to compensate for the
infertile in several townships, but in the great majority of townships
distribution was performed in name only. This was because the AB group
was in control there. The township was the basic unit with the village being
the basic unit only under special circumstances.
Yung-hsin: In the Northwestern Special District, the old, young, and
crippled who had no tilling capability received an additional half-share.
It was. also so resolved at the first County Delegates' Plenary Conference,
in addition, it was resolved to add to those receiving the additional
half-share those "working personnel" whose dependents did not have a tilling
capability. This was carried out in part of the Northwestern Special
District, but was rejected by the Special Western Route Working Committee,
because it stemmed from a charitable view, and was derided by some as the
"Orphan and Widow Line." In Yung-hsin land distribution was performed
twice throughout the county, the first after Lung-yuan-k'ou was opened, the
second was carried out in September after being decided upon by the Western
Route Working Committee in June. Distribution has still not been completed
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in one-fifth of the county: the entire First District (city), half of the
Fourth District (Nan-hsiang), and the entire Fifth District (Tung-hsiang).
The farmers of Yung-hsin wished to use production capacity as the standard
for the distribution of fields, and this was accepted at the County Delegates
Plenary Conference.
Chi-shui: County seat and Feng-shui fields have been distributed; [fields in]
Chin-t'an have not.
"Distribute to people who can be seen." "Group good with bad." "Distribution
was poor at the outset."
The "Honan Fellows" are a difficult problem. In the township of Ku-ts'un,
each person received only 2 tan worth of land [production capacity].
Wan-an: The village was the basic unit. By the second distribution, the
fertile were taken to compensate for the infertile.
Fen-yi: Fields distributed with the village as the basic unit. Division
was by [amounts of] grain, not by field. Over 2,000 houses were burned by
the counterrevolutionaries, and for more than 20 li there were no old houses.
2. The Barren [Fallow] Field Situation
Tung-ku: Each person received a minimum of 16 tan of grain (a tan is about
80 catties); many fields were uncultivated. A large portion of the hills
were fallow because it cost too much to harvest peaches; nor were the hills
dug up.
Ch'un-hua: Fields capable of producing 400 or 500 baskets lay fallow
because (1) the March distribution occurred when farming was busy, the
farmers had no family property, furniture or equipment, the land distributed
was poor and distant, and (2) manpower was inadequate because of the elder
sons serving in the Red Army and working outside (that is to say 2,700 or
2,800 persons).
Shui-tung: Several li were fallow. This was because Lin-shui at the Red-
White border was frequently harassed by the reactionaries of Chi-an city.
Several hundred guards were required daily. Three lines of guards were
posted, and were frequently killed by the enemy at night.
Shui-nan: Fields [capable] of [producing] several hundred tan of grain lie
fallow because, when public fields are reserved, the farmers are unwilling
to rent them for tilling. "Having received distribution of fields [capable]
of [producing] several tan of grain, I have enough to eat, and am unwilling
to till public fields."
Ju-lin: Fields of several thousand tan of grain lie fallow, with no one
to harvest the ripe grain. This is because the fields belonged to the
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guards of the reactionary landlords and wealthy farmers, and when these people
fled, the government did not distribute the fields to the farmers, so the
farmers had no responsibility to till or harvest them (Ju-lin is a district
near the city of Chi--an).
An-fu: Fields of 6,000 tan of grain lie fallow in the Tao-p'u and Chung-wen
Districts, because reactionary farmers are afraid to return to their homes
in view of revenge-ism for slaughter. It was also because the distribution
of fields was not thorough, having been on the basis of numbers only. Both
reasons stemmed from the mischief-making led by the wealthy farmers. An-fu
has much land and few people. Most of the people from Hunan, Yung-hsin and
Honan work fields in An-fu. If you will only pay their taxes to the govern-
ment, they will give you their fields to work. Why are there so few people?
It is because many die because of poor sanitation.
Hsin-yu: Fields of several hundred tan of grain lie fallow in three Red
districts because part of the people left to serve in the Red Army. Some
[fields] are also fallow near the Red-White border.
Fen-yi: Fields of several tans of grain lie fallow.
Yung-hsin: Generally speaking, no fields are fallow, with total fields of
less than 100 tan of grain lying fallow.
Kung-nan: Much land lies fallow in all Red-White border areas.
3. The Problem of. Distributing Land to Workers
The farmers of Yung-hsin opposed the sharing of land equally with the workers,
but the Yung-hsin Delegates Plenary Conference did not accept this view.
In one district in Tai-ho the wages of workers were reduced after the distri-
bution of land to them, but the wages were later restored.
In Chi-an, workers who worked for less than a half-year received their dis-
tribution of land accordingly, whereas those who worked for more than half
the year received a half-share of land.
4. The Problem of Distributing Hills
The Yung-hsin Delegates Plenary Conference resolved that the township would
be the basic unit in tea-producing hills, with equal distribution made
according to population.
The Chi-an Delegates Plenary Conference (October 1930) resolved that bamboo-
covered and tree-covered hills would not be divided but would be controlled
by the township soviet and used by the farmers. Those needing bamboo or
wood must get the government's permission to cut [bamboo or trees]. Reeds
and grass may be freely cut and taken from hills.
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Tea-oil hills in Yung-hsin, Hsia-chiang, Yen-fu, Ju-hsing, Tung.ku, T'ai-ho
and the Western District have all been equally divided. Ju-fang and
Ch'un-hua have no hills producing tea and oil.. The hills of. Wan-an have
not been divided.
Fen-yi: On 5 November of this year (1930), the Provincial Mobile Commission
dispatched Liu Lin-tung to participate in the County Mobile Commission,
which passed by the County Workers Farmers and Soldiers Plenary Conference.
The method was: "Hills worth over 300 yuan will be turned over to the
soviets. Hills worth less than 300 yuan will be controlled by the original
owners." In May and June of this year (before the 2d Plenary Conference),
however, because of the receipt of orders from higher authority (the Fourth
Expanded Conference of the Northern Route Mobile Commission), the township
had already been taken as the basic unit in equal distribution of hills,
although no meeting had been held in this county. This decision was re-
versed in November, and the farmers were very dissatisfied.
There are seven types of hills: (1) lumber [producing], (2) miscellaneous
food, (3) raw material, (4) bamboo and wood (large and small), (5) firewood
(reed and grass hills and firewood hills), (6) mines and (7) barren hills.
o Investigations of Farming Villages, Liberation Press, July 1947.
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[Text] On 14 November 1930, the Kiangsi Provincial Committee met in Chi-an.
After the reports of Comrades Ch'en Yi, Ch'en Cheng-jen, and Ma Ming, I spoke
as the representative of past committee members, pointing out that the line
continually followed within the Western and Southern Kiangsi Party after the
"Second Plenary Conference" of cancelling land reform had been discussed in
conference, and all acknowledged that a determined struggle must be carried
out against this incorrect line. The following are a few important points
which I recorded during the reports of Comrades Ch'en Yi, Ch'en Cheng-jen
and Ma King, and only I can understand many of them.
Ju-lin District: Wash away loyal comrades, leaving the homogeneous AB group.
Red areas: Wealthy farmers control the economy.
Yung-hsin: Wealthy farms control the food. The government's policy of
suppressing wealthy farmers is correct.
District Committee secretaries do not visit townships to inspect.
The views of the Central Committee and higher authority are not transmitted
to lower levels.
"Kill all wealthy farmers and landlords."
"Must divide firmly."
Use the White Terror in discussing the policy of wealthy farmers cheating
poor farmers, "White Symbol."
When the line is not clearly specified, the wealthy farmers will encircle
and deceive, as was the case in the Fourth District Committee of Yung-hsin
(Ma Ming is the secretary).
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Distribution of the fields of the Eastern Route has not been completed at all.
In the Southern Route, distribution has only been completed in the Hsing-kuo
and Kung counties.
Tseng is a superior man.
Eighty percent of the Jui-chin Party is landlords and wealthy farmers; over
80 excellent party members, over 30 landlords and wealthy farmers including
the head of the counterrevolutionary guard unit. No fields have been dis-
tributed in 2 months. The grain of the local tyrants remnants has been
taken away.
The youth of the masses of the East Route are brave, the Youth Corps is
cowardly.
Women have not struggled.
"Everything must be divided, this is the farmers' consciousness."
There [are] many wealthy farmers but few poor farmers in the tea hills.
Failure to divide tea hills is to the benefit of the wealthy farmers.
Village peoples' schools are also benefits of the wealthy farmers, inasmuch
as the children of poor farmers have to work, so few of them attend school.
Wealthy farmers order the masses to fight to protect the interests of the
wealthy farmers. The officers of the Hsin-feng Red Guards are all wealthy
farmers. "Seize names," "adjust fields," "fight butchers," "fines."
With the slogan of protecting Red areas, the wealthy farmers of the north-
western townships of Hsin.feng incite Red troops to desert and return home.
The wealthy farmers are an obstacle to the expansion of the Red Army.
The problem of preferential treatment for Red Army dependents. In Yung-hsin,
preferential treatment was not afforded to Red Army volunteers, and no
assistance was provided in tilling their fields. The dependents of those
dispatched by the government were treated preferentially.
Hsin-feng: Those members of local Red defense units killed or wounded in
action were treated preferentially. Those killed or wounded in action in
the 22d Army were ignored. The wealthy farmers played tricks.
Only wealthy farmers opposed freedom of marriage. Saying "The farmers oppose
it" is a lack of differentiation.
At the Second Plenary Conference, eliminate farmers, cancel land reform.
Li Wen-lin went to the Southern Route on 24 August. He did not make a
specialized report on land reform. There was no specialized discussion.
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At the Southern Route Expanded Conference of 15 July, Ch'en Yi put forth eight
principles such as immediate distribution of fields and harvesting of grain,
taking from those with much to compensate those with little, taking the
fertile to compensate for the infertile, unconditional distribution of
housing, division of hills and woods, division of ponds, and so on, which
were promulgated by the Southern Kiangsi Revolutionary Committee.
The wealthy farmers of Jui-chin and Yu-tu [7184 6757], citing Article 14 of
the "Western and Southern Kiangsi Land Law"--the original tiller should be
the owner--spoke loudly of not violating the land law, but their violation
was counterrevolution, even to the extent of "fighting." The Revolutionary
Committee had to issue this official announcement.
There was some interaction between the two cooks at the Expanded Conference.
"It's hereditary, so now he wants to be chairman too?"
Afraid that the communists "won't talk, just chop off heads."
"Even if you paid your rent in years past, this field can't be worked!"
Red Army wives and freedom of marriage.
"Will you serve in the Red Army? If you serve in the Red Army, I cannot
marry you." "If people report that you have been killed in the Red Army,
must I still observe the festivals for you?" "Eight yuan for 80 catties of
meat." "Yesterday I went to him, today I go to the Chairman. That's
freedom." "Reporting to the West River Combined Conference, Ch'en Chi-chung
washed away the atmosphere of Ch'en Yi (After 9 days of meetings, Ch'en Yi
had resolved a detailed land law. Arriving on the tenth day, Ch'en Chih-chung
cancelled it.)
"Confiscation of the land of the landlords and dividing it equally is only
a temporary measure rather than an objective, nor will it develop a land
law of proletarian consciousness."
Hsieh Han-ch'ang transmitted the message in the Northern Route: "Using labor
is the standard in the poor farmers' consciousness."
The body strength of poor farmers does not equal that of wealthy farmers
(poor farmers have nothing to eat); nor are the sons of poor farmers strong.
Li Tui-ts'ung said, "At the Second Plenary Conference no one had a grasp
[of the subject], so the land question could not be discussed."
In the Western Route the message was transmitted (by Chou Kao-ch'ao): "To
divide everything is the poor farmers' consciousness."
On 28 October an expanded conference was held at Hsin-feng by the Southern
Route Mobil Commission, at which Kuo transmitted the message: "Take the
fertile to compensate for the infertile, make thoroughly equal distribution."
Yet after a day and a half of meetings, it had not been discussed, and there
was no resolution.
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The two lines of Southern Kiangsi (as stated by Chen Yi):
"Yung-hsin is not the wealthy farmers' line. I oppose," said Ma,
"I don't agree with entering deeply into land reform," Tuan Liang-pi said
to Ch'en Cheng-jen.
"To expand and deepen simultaneously is the total farmer consciousness.
"To fail to attack Chi.-an, and to attack Kiu-kiang later, will irrevocably
lose the high tide of the Chinese revolution," so reported the Special
Committee to the Central Committee.
o Investigations of Farming Villages, Liberation Press, July 1947.
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HARVEST DISTRIBUTION AND RENT PROBLEMS
[Text] On 15 November 1930, the Kiangsi Provincial Mobile Committee held an
expanded conference at Chi-an. Besides members of the Provincial Committee
and the Standing Committee, those-attending the conference included the
chairman of the Yung-hsin, Chi-an, T'ai-ho, Wan-an, Chi-shui, An-fu, Fen-yi
and Hsia-chiang soviets as well as Comrade Ch'en Yi of the 22d Army. I
participated in this conference as the representative of past committee
members. The special feature of this conference was the discussion of two
problems: harvest distribution and rent. With regard to harvest distribu-
tion, I brought up the mass basis of support for harvest distribution.
With regard to the renting of land, the previously prevalent leftist but
actually wealthy farmer theory of "Rent should not be collected in soviet
areas" was overthrown. In addition, the Chiang Han-po [3068 3352 3134]
method of distribution according to labor was opposed by pointing out that
its error lay in helping wealthy farmers while it was contrary to the
interests of poor farmers. This conference broke up prematurely because
reactionary troops had already reached Hsia-chiang, and those responsible
for the various counties had to return to prepare to deal with the enemy.
Therefore such questions scheduled for discussion as "Mountain forests,"
"Ponds," "Housing," "Fallow Fields," "Unemployment," and "Debt" were not
discussed. A serious enemy offensive and the Fu-t'ien Incident occurred
after the conference. So for this reason the resolutions of the conference
have still not been promulgated. What follows is a brief record made by
me during the day's conference. I retained it because it contained some
important material.
1. Distribution of Fields in Ch'un.hua With the District as the Basic Unit
The third distribution of fields in Ch'un-hua District (October 1930) had
progressed to using the district as the basic unit, taking a census of
population and production capacity to determine how much land each person
should receive. Then distribution was made within the scope of the town-
ship, "shifting fields where possible and shifting people where fields
could not be shifted." Now the more than 30,000 persons in Ch'un-hua
District have each received an equal amount of land (each person received
land capable of producing 11 shih of grain, with each shih equal to
44 catties).
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2. Deficiencies of Distribution of Fields With the Village as the Basic Unit
The deficiencies in using the village as the basic unit are: (1) large
villages are unwilling to give up fields to small villages; (2) with too
many basic units, it is not easy for district and township governments to
press [the program], so many concealed deficiencies developed; and (3) within
a single village, it was easy for the masses to be hoodwinked through the use
of surname-ism by landlords and wealthy farmers and not thoroughly divide
land evenly, nor thoroughly combat local tyrants. This view is worth noting.
3. The Land Struggle Cannot Be Deepened at a Stroke
In the distribution of land, no matter how many times the land is divided, the
wealthy farmers always conceal the good land the first time, making it
impossible to investigate and to classify the land into the three grades:
upper, middle and lower. Wealthy farmers and middle farmers always lead the
first time, while the poor farmers have no authority. "After some period
of unrest, the proletariat will arise." This view is correct.
4. Yang Ch'eng-fu's [2799 2052 5346] Plan for "The Socialization of
Agriculture"
Yang Ch'eng-fu, chairman of the Chi-art County Government (originally chairman
and secretary of Ch'un-hua District Committee), was determined to achieve
common tilling and expenditure of [the proceeds of] the land in three steps:
the first was to distribute land with the district as the basic unit, the
second was to organize cooperatives and the third was to share in the tilling
and expenditure. This is completely erroneous.
5. The Chiang Han-po [3068 3352 3134] Style of Distribution According to Labor
The deficiency of using labor as the basis for distribution of land is that
orphans, widows, the elderly, infants, women with small [bound] feet,. and
all people unable to till the land, would not have enough to eat. Even poor
farmers of great laboring capacity are no match for wealthy farmers because
poor farmers do not have the oxen, farming implements and capital of the
wealthy farmers. In addition, wealthy farmers can lease the land of the
orphaned, widowed, elderly, infants, women with small feet, and others.
Therefore, using labor as the basis for distribution is of benefit only
to wealthy farmers.
The "Chiang Han-po Method" using labor as the basic unit was carried out in
the "border areas" along An-fu's boundary with Chi-an and Fen-yi as well as
in Yen-fu Township in Chi-an. It was also carried out absolutely, regardless
of age, distribution was made to those with the capacity for labor and not
to those without it. Distribution was made to vagrants. Those with no
capacity for labor would receive food from the farming of those with the
capacity for labor. A member of the Political Committee of the Third Army
Group who carne to Chi-an said to Wang Huai [3769 2037) that the land
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distribution method on the border of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi took labor
as the basic unit, with those with no capacity for labor receiving a half-
share, and with nothing furnished by the government.
When labor is used as the basic unit for distribution, the wealthy farmers,
with much land, need to use their oxen, plows and harrows themselves, so
the poor farmers cannot even borrow them. It is only by equal distribution
that poor farmers will be able to borrow the excess farming implements of
the wealthy farmers, therefore the poor farmers demand equal distribution.
6. Harvest Distribution Problems
Part of the farmers of Jui-chin and Yu-tu [7184 6757] upheld the slogan
of the Ting-chou [3060 1558] Conference: "Unconditional distribution of
the harvest"; while others upheld the slogan of the Pi-t'ou [7095 7333]
Conference: "Do not distribute green young sprouts"; and the pretext was:
"Do not break the Land Law."
Land was distributed in the county of the Northern Route in May of this year.
Compensation was provided for capital and for original tillers at the rate
of 600 cash per shih of grain [capacity]. In Fu-t'ien the wealthy farmers
were not compensated for their land while poor farmers received a string of
cash per tan of grain for their land.
Land was distributed in Ch'un-hua in March, at which. time no planting had
been done, plowing had been done only once and fertilizer had been spread
in a few cases. After distribution no compensation was paid for capital.
On the Northern Route, compensation of 600 cash or a string of cash was paid
for capital'on each shih of grain. Before May, the county had resolved that
the price of grain would be 4 strings [of cash] per shih, with compensation
paid at the rate of one-sixth or one quarter. Land had not yet been distri-
buted at the time, and it was a period of famine, so prescribing the price
of grain at 4 strings was intended to help the poor farmers by equalizing
the price of grain, After the harvest, however, the price was still fixed
at 4 strings per shih. "This is incorrect."
In Yung-hsin during the fifth month of the old calendar last year, the
government of the Fifth District of the Northwestern Special Area prescribed
that land distribution would take place when the early grain crop was about
to ripen. Persons entering land would compensate those leaving the land
1 yuan "big money" for every 2 tan of grain (200 catties, which is a shih
of land). Rice is harvested once a year. In May, when the seedlings have
just been transplanted, the rice is still not fully grown, so persons leaving
the land were compensated a string of cash for each shih of land (2 tan of
grain). The County Committee had decided that land would be received without
compensation, but because of restricted communications, the Fifth District
did not receive the direction of the County Committee, and therefore proceeded
according to its own decision.
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The wealthy farmers in the eastern townships of Yu-tu and the northwestern
part of Kung County requested compensation of 2 Yuan "small money" (worth
4 strings) for each piece of land producing a shih of grain (actually only
8 tou). The party prohibited this and land was received without compensa-
tion.
A legitimate policy should be: "To receive land without compensation, and
to divide both land and harvest." Equal distribution would be made for
uniform application to family members of landlords, Assessments should be
made separately against landlords who have much money. Vagrants should
receive equal distribution because they work hard. The wealthy farmers'
opposition to vagrants' sharing the harvest is wrong. Middle farmers,
not having much land to be distributed, would not be affected. Although
the "top layer of poor farmers" which tills much land would be affected,
there will be other benefits to compensate them. The broad masses of the
low level poor farmers, manual laborers and tenant farmers support this
method 100 percent. After the distribution of the harvest, those not having
the strength to cultivate their land would be permitted to follow the rental
method.
7. Consolidating Original Tillers for Equal Distribution
In the past, using the "village" and "family" as the basic unit and the
original tiller as the criterion for equal distribution, resulted in benefit
for the wealthy farmers but not for the poor farmers. The legitimate way
should be: taking the township as the basic unit according to the total
population of the township divided by the total of the original tillers of
land in the entire township (total township population is the total of those
who originally tilled land in the village as well as those who originally
tilled land in other villages), taking from those with much to compensate
those with little, taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile,
shifting land when it can be shifted (villages with more land would give
part of their land to villages with less land). When land cannot be shifted,
move people (when distances are great, there is no way to shift land, so
people must be moved). This method is called "Distribution by Consolidating
Original Tillers."
8. The Non-laboring Population and the New Land Rental System
When people without the capacity for labor rent their land to those with
laboring capacity to farm, the tenant hands over grain as rent to the owner.
In Ch'un-hua, Wan-an and Hsin-yu four-tenths was handed over; in Fen-yi
and Ning-tu five-tenths was handed over; and in Yung-hsin one-third was
handed over. The land in Fu-t'ien (a district of Chi-an) was divided into
three classes--upper, middle and lower. For the upper class four-tenths
was handed over, for the middle class three-tenths, and for the lower class
two-tenths was handed over. This appears to be comparatively reasonable.
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In Ch'un-hua, An-fu, T'ai-he, Hsin-yu, Fen-yi and Hsia-chiang, those without
the capacity for labor who wish to rent their land comprise about 20 percent
of the population. In Ning-tu they comprise over 20 percent because of the
number of women with small [bound] feet. In Yung-hsin they comprise only
5 percent because the women all have big [unbound] feet, and the renters
are mostly widowed, orphaned, crippled, aged, very young or engaged in
revolutionary work. The above refers only to that portion of the population
in which the entire family lacks the capacity for labor and must rent its
land. There are even more of the population who do not have the capacity for
labor but who have family members who can farm the land, and thus do not
have to rent their land. Generally speaking, 75 percent of the entire popu-
lation does not have the capacity for labor, that is, only one out of every
four persons is a young man strong enough to till the land--this is China's
big problem. This so-called lack of laboring capacity, however, refers to
actual tilling of the land. About half of them have a partial capacity for
such labor as tending cattle, chopping wood, cooking rice, washing clothes
and preparing food. Statistically:
25 percent--have full capacity for labor
37.5.percent--have half-capacity or some capacity for labor
37.5 percent--have no capacity at all for labor.
The "Renting Land for Grain" in all the above-mentioned areas is the so-called
"Grain Distribution System" except for Ch'un.-hua's, which is the. "Rental
System." The deficiency in the grain distribution system is that those renting
land [from others] emphasize their own land, and invest effort and fertilizer
haphazardly in the landowner's land. When the grain is ripe, it is shared
according to the amount harvested, equally, or on a four-to-six or other
ratio. This system is not beneficial to the owner of the rented land. With
the rental system, the rent is fixed without regard to the amount harvested.
Therefore the tenant is attentive to the expenditure of effort and fertilizer,
which is of benefit to both production and the owner of the land.
The deficiencies of the rental system are:
(1) Fixed rent is detrimental to the tenant in disaster years.
(2) It is also detrimental to the tenant when Red Guard units are called
out for many farming days and farming is reduced.
In summary, the grain distribution system is of benefit to the wealthy
farmers, while the rental system is of benefit to the poor farmers.
A legitimate policy would be as follows:
(1) Should poor farmers, tenant farmers and the unemployed lack oxen,
farming implements or capital after receiving land, the government should
distribute surplus oxen, farming implements and other items confiscated
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from wealthy farmers and landlords to the tenant farmers, poor farmers, the
unemployed and others for their own farming. At the same time, the collective
use of such implements should be rewarded, and some items confiscated from
wealthy farmers and landlords given to cooperatives. Yet another method is
for individuals to borrow oxen and farming implements temporarily from
wealthy farmers for support, with the government controlling those wealthy
farmers who wilfully fail to lend their things, so as to help the poor
farmers, tenant farmers and the unemployed.
(2) Those totally unable to till the land should be permitted to rent their
land to wealthy and middle farmers to till under the following conditions:
(a) Abolish the grain distribution system, prescribing a fixed rental,
with no reduction for disasters.
(b) Prescribe the minimum rental (50 percent) to preclude excessive
exploitation of poor and tenant farmers by wealthy farmers.
(c) Do not permit wealthy farmers to use the pretext of farming only
their own land and not that of others. Should a wealthy farmer be willing
to rent land, the township government should take all land which must be
rented and distribute it among the wealthy and middle farmers of the township,
forcing them to farm it.
9. The Problem of Unemployed Workers From Cities Requesting Land
Over 200 unemployed masons and carpenters in the city of T'ai-he [3141 07351
requested that land be distributed to them, but received none. They were
from outside counties and the farmers of the city area would not permit land
to be distributed to them. The sugar cane workers from outside Nan-men City
also requested the distribution of land. This problem also occurred in
Hsing-kuo [5281 0948].
This problem deserves careful and deliberate consideration.
o Investigations of Farm Villages, Liberation Press, July 1947.
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[Text] On 18 November 1930, the Red Army abandoned Chi-an. On the 19th I
went with Comrades Ku Pai [0657 2672] and Hsieh Wei-chun [6200 0787 0193]
from Chi-an to Heng-t'ien [5899 3944], which belongs to Yung-feng [3057 6265],
to meet with the Main Force of the Red Army. Passed through Shui-nan
[3055 0589] to Pai-sha [4101 3097], ate lunch at Mu-k'ou [2606 0656] Village,
and investigated the composition of the members of the village government
and the reactionary elements killed in this village. This investigation
proved that, in the equal distribution of land, the middle farmers not only
do not lose but even gain; and that wealthy farmers and small landlords,
in the intense struggle of the farmers, will go over to the counterrevolu-
tionary camp.
Mu-k'ou Village of the 8th Township, Shui-nan District, Chi-shui [0679 3055]
County
There are 200 people in the entire village.
There are 46 able-bodied adults, all of whom have been enrolled in Red Guards
units.
The village government is established. in the ancestral hall'.
There are nine functionaries in the village government: Chairman, Secretary,
Committee Member for Land, Committee Member for Social Insurance, Committee
Member for Red Guards, Committee Member for Food, Committee Member for
Adjudication, Committee Member for Women, and Committee Member for Youth.
Chairman Liu Hsing-nan [0491 5281 0589] (small landlord), two persons to feed, has
56 shih of land (each shih of land produces 3 baskets of grain and each
basket of land 10 catties). Farms over 10 shih and rents 40 shih. Because
of his liking for gambling, he has no money to lend. During this distribu-
tion of land, most of his land was given up. Secretary P'eng Chia-fa
[1756 1367 4099] (middle farmer) eight persons to feed, has land for
48 shih of grain and rented [from others] over 20 shih more [of land], has
enough to eat, and has no debts. By this distribution each person received
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7 shih and 8 tou, totaling 64 shih; thus he received 16 shih in the distribu-
tion, proof that middle farmers receive land in the distribution. Committee
Member for Land Liu Hsing-wen [0491 5281 2429] (poor farmer), three persons to feed,
land for 10 shih of grain, and not enough to eat. He received 14 shah in
this distribution, and in the past had debts of 60 yuan. "Committee Member
for Social Insurance" Wu K'ai-lien [0124 7030 6647] (poor farmer), has four
persons to feed, 16 shih of grain land, not enough to eat, and rented over
20 shih from others. He received 15 shih and 2 tou in this distribution,
and had debts in the past. Committee Member for Red Guards P'eng Chia-hsiung
[1756 1367 0338] (middle farmer), one person to feed in the past, 12 shih
.of grain land, sold 6 shih to repay high-interest debts, leaving 6 shih which
gave him enough to eat. He also worked as a day laborer, had no wife,
and could not feed pigs. Liking to gamble, he had debts of 30 yuan. After
the revolution, he "acquired" a wife. The wife brought with her a 13-year-,
old son and a 13-year-old daughter-in-law. Now, with four people to receive
distribution of land, each person receiving 7 shih and 8 tou, they receive
a total of 31 shih and 2 tou. Speaking in terms of the individual, originally
having only 6 shih and now receiving 7 shih and 8 tou, an increase of 1 shih
and 8 tou, is another proof of middle farmers receiving land from the distri-
bution. Committee Member for Food Hsu Chuan-chang [1776 0278 4545] (poor
farmer), one person to feed, had only 2 shih of grain land, which was not
enough and he had to work as a day laborer. Now he has received through
the distribution 5 shih and 8 tou, and still does not have a wife. Chairman
P'eng [sic] Hsing-nan also serves as Committee Member for Adjudication.
Committee Member for Women Yang Chiu-ying [2799 0046 5391] (middle farmer),
five persons to feed, has 50 shih of grain land. With her husband and her
father farming, there is enough to eat but no excess, and she has no debts.
From this distribution, she received 6 shih of grain land--another proof of
middle farmers receiving land through distribution. Of the above seven
functionaries of the village government, one a small landlord, three middle
farmers and three poor farmers, all middle farmers received land through the
distribution.
Revolution began in this village the year before last, and land was distributed
in January of this year (distribution was from Tung-ku [2639 0942] District--
this village previously belonged to Tung-ku). All members of the village
government feed themselves, and the revolution came along without arousing
violent opposition.
A total of seven reactionaries have been killed in this village: P'eng
Chia-kuang [1756 1367 0342], P'eng Chia-shan [1756 1367 0810], P'eng Chia-
chun [1756 1367 0193], P'eng Pei-chun [1756 0971], P'eng Ch'ang-lung [1756
2490 7127], P'eng Ch'ang-hsi [1756 2490 4406], and Wen Chih-kuei [3306
1807 6311]. P'eng Chia-kuang (small landlord), three persons to feed, had
over 30 shih of grain land, was proprietor of a cloth shop in Shui-nan,
rented his land to others to farm and collected the rent. Business was
bad in the shop, which lost money every year. Handled the collection of
taxes of the 38th Tu and sought profit in so doing. Smoked opium, a scholar
and a very villainous member of the gentry. P'eng Chia-shan (wealthy
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farmer), younger brother of Chia-kuang, five persons to feed, had over 40 shih
of grain land, and had money to lend. Saddened because of the cancellation
of debts, he joined with Honan bandits, and was captured and killed along
with his elder brother in July of last year. P'eng Chia-chun [1756 1367
0193] (vagrant), three persons to feed, had no land and owed debts to
others. Joining the revolution, he served as adjutant in the Tung-ku
guerrillas. He also served as executive officer and quartermaster. Later
he deserted, acquired three guns and became a bandit, preying on local
tyrants. He was captured last year and killed. He liked to play cards.
P'eng P'ei-chun (wealthy farmer),four persons to feed, had 120 shih of
land, which he employed two old persons to farm, and also rented one-half
to others to farm. He had money to lend, When the masses divided the land
and burned [land] titles, he was unwilling and was killed. P'eng Ch'ang-
lung (small landlord), four persons to feed, had 60 shih of land, all of
which was rented to others to farm. Lent peppermint oil money, lent jute
money. A scholar, taught school in Chi-shui County. Went with the Honan
bandits, was captured on the front line and killed. P'eng Chang-hsi
(small landlord), three persons to feed, P'eng Chang-lung's younger brother,
60 shih of land, lent peppermint oil and jute money, receiving three baskets
of grain in return for each yuan lent, killed in March the year before last.
Wen Chih-kuei (wealthy farmer), seven persons to feed, 30 shih of grain land,
rented over 100 shih, besides his own labor, he hired an old person and many
day laborers, did not lend money, but engaged in small business carrying
ducks and oil seeds to sell. He plotted with the Honan bandits to leak
information of the revolution and was killed. (The so-called Honan bandits
were part of the Honanese who had moved to Chi-shui County in Kiangsi,
some of whom became bandits.)
The above seven reactionary elements who were killed--three small landlords,
three wealthy farmers and one vagrant-.?proved that, when land reform deepens,
many small landlords and wealthy farmers will move in the direction of
counterrevolution. Whether every one of these seven persons should have
been killed, however, is a question.
o Investigations of Farming Villages, Liberation Press, July 1947.
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[Text] 1. Overthrow the bureaucratic regime of the evil gentry and landlords,
disarm the counterrevolutionary forces, arm the workers and farmers and
establish a regime of farmers delegates conferences in villages.
2. Confiscate without compensation the property and land of the evil gentry
and landlord class, turn it over to the farmers delegates conferences
(soviets) for disposition, to distribute it to landless farmers, and farmers
with little land, for their use.
3. Real property of ancestral halls, temples and churches, as well as other
public property and government-owned fallow land, or ownerless fallow land
and sandy fields, should all be turned over to farmers delegates conferences
(soviets) for distribution to farmers for their use.
4. A portion of the state-owned land in provincial areas will be provided
to the soviet governments for population movement for reclamation and for
distribution to soldiers of the workers' and farmers' army to be put to
economic use.
5. Announce that all high-interest loan agreements are null and void.
6. Burn all land titles of the government of the evil gentry, as well as
other contracts which exploit the farmers (includes written and oral ones).
7. Cancel all taxes proclaimed by warlords and local yamen [governments],
cancel the monopoly tax system and cancel the likin [tax], establishing
a single agricultural economic progressive tax.
8.
The state will assist the agricultural economy:
(1)
To
manage
land construction projects,
(2)
To
improve
and expand water conservation,
(3)
To
prevent
natural disasters,
(4)
By
statement management of population movement,
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(5) By providing low-interest loans through agricultural banks, trusts, etc.
(6) By [establishing] a single currency system and a single system of
weights and measures.
(7) By placing all forests and waterways under the control of soviet
governments.
o Collection of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents, Volume 3, 1935.
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LAND LAW PROMULGATED BY CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION (1930)
[Text] Chapter I. Confiscation and Distribution of Land
Article 1. After rising up and overthrowing the regime of the evil gentry
and landlord class, all private and group-owned--ancestral halls of the evil
gentry and landlords, temple [religious] institutions and wealthy farmers--
land and fields, mountains and forests, ponds and houses, must immediately
be confiscated and turned over to public ownership by the soviet governments
for distribution to farmers with little or no land and other poor people who
need it for their use. In areas where there are only farmers' associations,
where soviets have not been established, the farmers' associations may also
carry out the confiscation and distribution.
Article 2. After investigation by the soviets, family members of evil gentry
and landlords and reactionaries will be permitted to live in the villages,
and those with no other means of making a living may receive distribution
of an appropriate amount of land.
Article 3.. Distribution of land will be made according to regulations to
officers and soldiers serving in the Red Army as well as to those engaged
in revolutionary work. The soviets will also assign people to assist their
family members in farming.
Article 4. Those in industry and commerce in villages who can make their
living will not receive land. Those who cannot make a living will receive
an appropriate amount of land limited to that necessary to compensate for
the deficiency and permit them to make.a living.
Article 5. Land must be distributed to tenant farmers and unemployed
wanderers who wish to have land distributed to them. Those wanderers who
receive land, however, must break themselves of opium, gambling and other
evil addictions, otherwise the soviets will recover their land.
Article 6. Those living away from their home villages will not receive land.
Article 7. The township shall be the basic unit for the distribution of land.
The farmers of a township will put together for common distribution all land
tilled by them in their own township as well as in neighboring townships.
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Should there be three or four adjoining townships in which some townships
have more land and some less, they will be considered a single township
for distribution. Those townships with so little land as to be incapable
of maintaining their livelihood, and which have no other means of production
to maintain their livelihood, may combine three or four townships into one
unit for distribution, but the township soviet must request and receive
authorization from the district soviet.
Article 8. To meet the demands of the majority, and to expedite the receipt
of land by farmers, men, women, old and young should receive equal distribu-
tion according to village population. The distribution method based on labor
as the criterion should not be adopted.
Article 9. In principle, city merchants and workers will not receive land.
When possible, however, appropriate amounts of land will be distributed to
unemployed workers and poor people from cities who request it.
Article 10. To seek speedy destruction of feudal influences and to attack
wealthy farmers, the distribution of land should be in accordance with the
principle of taking from those with much to compensate those with little and
taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile. Landlords and wealthy
farmers should not be permitted to conceal land, not reporting it, nor
to monopolize fertile land. After the distribution of land, wooden signs
prescribed by the soviets will be erected in the fields, with the amount of
production from the field and the present tiller inscribed thereon.
Article 11. All deeds covering land of evil gentry and landlords, wealthy
farmers, and ancestral halls and temples shall be handed over within a
limited period to township soviets or to township or district farmers'
associations, and burned publicly.
Article 12. After the distribution of land, county soviets or district
soviets shall issue farming certificates.
Article 13. Whenever anyone in a township dies, changes his occupation, or
departs, the land distributed to him shall revert to the soviet for redis-
tribution. When anyone arrives from outside the township or is born in the
township, the soviet should find a way to distribute land to that person,
but subsequent to the harvest.
Article 14. When land is distributed after an uprising and it is after plant-
ing by farmers, the production from the field shall be harvested by the
farmer receiving the field, and the original tiller may not keep it [the
production or harvest].
Article 15. Vegetable gardens, dams and fallow land (where miscellaneous
grains can be planted) must be distributed. Large ponds not suitable for
distribution shall be operated by the soviet or rented for a fixed price.
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Article 16. Bamboo [producing] and lumber [producing] hills should be divided
for calculation purposes into fields according to their production and combined
with fields for distribution. Those with the characteristics of industrial
capital [plant or equipment], employing labor, establishing factories and
manufacturing, however, may be rented as entities and need not be distributed.
Article 17. Pine, fir and other mountain forests will be managed or rented
by the soviets. When authorized by the soviet, however, and when the people
of the township need to use wood for repairing embankments, constructing
public facilities and houses, and for repairing buildings burned by the
reactionaries, they may take wood from the forests.
Article 18. Hills producing firewood will be managed by the soviet govern-
ments for public use.
Article 19. To meet the requirements of poor farmers, all confiscated land
should be distributed to them, and it need not be retained by the soviets.
Under certain conditions, however, that portion of the land which cannot
be completely distributed may be used to establish model farms or be rented
temporarily. At the same time a portion of such buildings should be retained
for public enterprises.
Chapter II. Cancellation of Debts
Article 20. All debts owed by workers, farmers and poor people to the evil
gentry and landlords and rich peasants shall not be repaid, and all bonds
and loan agreements shall be handed over to the soviets or farmers'
associations for burning.
Article 21. All debts new and old owed by the evil gentry and landlords and
merchants to the government or to workers, farmers or poor people must be
repaid in full.
Article 22. Old trading accounts owed by workers, farmers and poor people
to merchants prior to the uprising, irrespective of whether they were
commercial or high-interest, or whether they were personal accounts, shall
not be repaid.
Article 23. In principle, with respect to accounts incurred. by workers,
farmers and poor people among themselves, what was borrowed prior to the
uprising shall not be repaid. This excludes only no-interest loans made
with the objective of friendly assistance, and which the borrower is willing
to repay.
Article 24. Wherever workers, farmers and poor people have pawned or mortgaged
articles or houses to evil gentry and landlords, wealthy farmers or pawn-
brokers, the items given as security shall be recovered unconditionally.
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Article 25. Financial associations and grain associations shall all be dis-
banded.
Article 26. Under the soviet regime, high-interest loans are prohibited.
County soviets will prescribe appropriate interest rates according to the
monetary situation in the local area. The rates should not, however, exceed
that received from ordinary capital under the general economic conditions
in the area.
Chapter III. Land Tax
Article 27. To meet requirements for overthrowing the counterrevolutionaries
(such as to expand the Red Army and Red Guard units, to support governmental
organizations, etc.), and requirements to further the interests of the
masses (such as establishing schools and dispensaries; aiding the crippled,
the aged and infants; repairing roads and embankments, etc.), the soviets
may levy land taxes on farmers.
Article 28. In keeping with the principle of protecting poor farmers and
joining with middle farmers to attack wealthy farmers, land taxes may be
levied only after soviets have been established, the masses have realized
practical benefits, and the higher-level soviet has approved.
Article 29. Land taxes will be levied by classes according to the annual
harvest of grain from the land distributed to the farmers.
1. Each person who received distributed land who harvests less than
5 tan of grain shallbe exempt from land taxes.
2. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 6 tan of
grain will be taxed 1 percent.
3. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 7 tan of
grain will be taxed 1.5 percent.
4. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 8 tan of
land will be taxed 2.5 percent.
5. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 9 tan of
grain will be taxed 4 percent.
6. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 10 tan of
grain will be taxed 5.5 percent.
7. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 11 tan of
grain will be taxed No percentage listed.
8. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 12 tan of
grain will be taxed 8 percent.
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For each additional tan of grain harvested, an additional 1.5 percent in
land taxes shall be collected,
Article 30. Income and expenditures from land taxes must be centralized at
the high-level soviet government. Lower-level governments may not collect
and disburse freely. Expenditure standards shall be determined by the high-
level government according to the amount of revenue and the urgency and
significance of the requirements of the governments at various levels.
Chapter IV. Wages
Article 31. Wages of handicraft industry workers and tenant farmers in
farming villages which have been too low in the past should be raised.
Henceforth, wages shall be determined by the soviets according to two
standards--the rise or fall of prices of commodities and the abundance or
paucity of farmers' income. County or provincial soviets must approve
wages prescribed by township soviets.
0 Collection of Red Bandit Secret Documents, Chapter 5. Edited and printed
by Organization Section, 1st Bandit Extermination Propaganda Division,
General Headquarters of the Army, Navy and Air Force. 10 September 1931.
* Collection of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents, Volume 3, 1935.
8174
CSO: 4005
242
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26 January 1931
[Text] In September 1930 the Red lst Army returned to Kiangsi following its
attack on Changsha. In early October after breaking through Chi-an it entered
the Yuan River Valley where many peasants came from Hsing-kuo to join the
ranks of the Red Army. I took this opportunity to conduct an investigation
of the 10th (Yung-feng) District in Hsing-kuo County. I got together and
held fact-finding meetings with eight persons, namely, Fu Chi-t'ing,
Li Ch'ang-ying, Wen Feng-chang, Ch'en Chen-shan, Chung Te-wu, Huang Ta-ch'un,
Ch'en Pei-p'ing and Lei Han-hsiang. The investigation was undertaken at
the end of October 1930 with Lo-fang, Hsin-yu County as the meeting place
where a series of fact-finding meetings were held for a full week. Yung-feng
District is situated at the intersection of three adjoining counties.of
Hsing-kuo, Kan-hsien and Wan-an. It is divided into four townships, of
which the old Ling-yuan District is the 1st, Tung-chiang the 2d, Shan-k'eng
the 3d and Chiang-t'uan the 4th, with Yung-feng-yu of the 2d township as
the political.and economic center of this district. The distribution of
population is as follows: the lst township has 3,000 people, the 2d 800,
the 3d 3,000 and the 4th 4,000, so the total population of this district
is 8,800. Because this district is bounded by the three counties of
Hsing-kuo, Kan-hsien and Wan-an, so if the situation in this district is
well understood, there is not much difference in that of the other two
counties. In fact, conditions of struggle for land are not much different
in the whole region of southern Kiangsi. Practical policy must be deter-
mined on the basis of actual conditions. Things which you sit around the
house imagining about or which you read from sketchy written reports are
definitely not those based on actual conditions. It is dangerous to base
decision of policy on reports which were either unrealistic or "believed
to be true." In the past many mistakes were made in the Red areas because
the leadership of the party had not been in keeping with actual conditions.
It is, therefore, most essential to make detailed scientific investigations
based on actual conditions. Generally speaking, this investigation is still
not penetrating enough even though it is more so compared with those made
on previous occasions. First, I have made an investigation of eight families,
something which I have never attempted before. The truth is that without
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this kind of investigation it is impossible to have basic ideas about the
rural areas. Second, I have tried to find out the manifestations of land
struggle among various classes of people in Hsun:wu but my investigation
is not complete. The shortcomings of this investigation are that I have
not included in it the situations of the children and women, the situations
of exchange and comparison of commodity prices, the situations in farm pro-
duction after the land distribution, and the cultural situations. All these
aspects were intended to be investigated had it not been for the enemy
attack on Lo-fang. Because the Red Army had decided on the policy of luring
the enemy deep into our area, we were forced to conclude our fact-finding
meetings. The data given below was gathered in this way: I drew in an
outline of investigation, then everyone was asked questions followed by a
discussion; all conclusions were submitted by me; after they were agreed
to by the eight comrades I put them down in writing. On some points no
conclusions were reached, but their answers were described. Our fact-
finding meetings had been lively and interesting. Two or three meetings
were held every day with some lasting into the late night but they did not
feel tired. For this we should be deeply grateful to these comrades. Some
participants are members of the Communist Party but the majority of them
are not.
I. A Survey of Eight Families
1, Fu Chi-t'ing
A native of the 1st township of the 10th District. He runs a small butcher
shop but has no capital. There are five persons to be fed. He has a rice
field of 23 shih (piculs) on which 3 shih must be paid as rent leaving him
with a balance of 20.shih. Now each of the five persons eats 7 shih totaling
35 shih resulting in a shortage of 15 shih which must be made up by the
business in his butcher shop. He can make a profit of about 1.30 yuan for
each pig slaughtered (there are no more large pigs to be killed so he can
only earn about 0.50 yuan per pig killed). The five persons are: father,
80 years old; wife cooks, raises pigs, makes firewood, washes and mends
clothes, but tills no field; son, 5 years old; daughter, 1 year old; and him-
self, 39, tilling field and slaughtering pigs. In addition to his own, he
rents another field of 5 shih but has to hire someone to help him till it
for 1 month every year. His mother died 5 years ago. He spent over 100 yuan
for her burial. Apart from his brother's contributing share, he has to go
into debt for 50 small yuan which with compound interest added had already
come to 150 yuan this year. Out of the 23 shih of rice field, 17 shih were
owned by himself,'and 6 shih were "t'ui-chiao-t'inn" belonging to the
public lands of Chung-wu in Pai-lu (a subdivision of Kan-hsien, 10 li from
the 1st township of. the 10th District). For 6 shih of this public field
he had to pay 6 small yuan per shih totaling 36 yuan as mortgage money. In
addition, he must deliver 3 shih as land rent every year (at the rate of
50 percent).
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In March last year when the revolution failed, he fled into the hills of
Chun-ts'un helping people repair them. In September he returned home with
the arrival of the Red Army in Hsing-kuo when the jackals of the Pacification
Corps ran away into the hills. There was no land distribution then.
In February (March by solar calendar) the Red Army attacked Kan-chou and
in the same month land was distributed. Although he did not get any land,
he was relieved from the payment of his rent of 3 shih and his debt of
150 yuan. At the same time he did not get back his mortgage money of 36 yuan.
From February he served for 3 months as chief of land section in the town
government assisting in distributing land to the people. In April he became
a company commander of the Red Guards equipped with spears but no guns. He
served for 3 months. On 15 June he led his unit in one attack against
the jackals of the Pacification Corps in Hsing-kuo County. From June the
Red Guards were reorganized into a reserve contingent of the Red Army in
which he became a platoon leader. A month or so later he was made a company
commander. At this time two companies were formed in the 1st township. In
August he led his unit to attack Ch'i-fang and won a victory. During the
march (in October by solar calendar) on Hsin-yu he served as a batallion
commander. Because he was unable to leave production and because his meat
accounts were not collected so that he could pay back to others, he wanted
to go home and did not wish to serve in the Red Army.
He had a schooling of 6 years and can barely read newspapers.
2. Li Ch'ang-ying
A native of P'ang-wu-t'ung in the 1st township of the 10th district.
There were six persons. He himself, 48,tills fields. His wife, also 48, has
aching heart, cooks, washes clothes and feeds pigs. His son, 20, tills fields
but is stupid and unable to read. His daughter-in-law, 20, makes firewood
daily but cannot till fields. His daughter, 12, was married off in June
this year to someone in Wu-wa, 40 li away. His second son, 3, died in April
this year. There are only four persons to be fed.
He himself is owner of 30 tan (piculs) of rice fields. From his younger
brother Li Ch'ang-feng he borrowed another field of 20 tan. Because
Li Ch'ang-feng's field was of poor quality and did not yield enough to meet
his expenses he went to T'ai-ho and Lo..k'ang to farm for others.
Li Ch'ang-ying's own field of 20 tan could yield only 13 tan of rice because
water could not be pumped into it but he had to pay 9 tan of rent.
Li Ch'ang-feng owed a debt of 120 yuan and 9 tan of rice as rent. He paid
interest on them for Ch'ang-feng. As for his own 30-tan field, he could
only reap 17 tan because it was a hilly land situated on a broken cliff.
Coupled with Ch'ang-feng's actual yield of 4 tan, his total harvest came
to 21 tan. Besides they were all paddy rice (rough rice) which when
converted into dried rice at a 30 percent discount totaled 15 tan, at
best 17 tan in a good harvest year. Six persons need 40 tan of rice a
year. Thus there was a shortage of more than one-half which must be made
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up by his sweet potato harvest of 30 tan or so a year. He fed a pig until
December when he sold it for money with which he bought oil and salt for
home use. No meat can be had in ordinary times. It is bought and served
only during festive occasions such as Ch'ing-ming (Tomb-sweeping festival,
40 cents), Shih-t'ien (Planting crops, 1.5 yuan), Tuan-wu (Dragon boat
festival, 30 cents), Chi'ih-hsin (Eating new rice, 1 yuan), Ch'ih-yueh-pan
(the 15th day of the 7th moon, a ghost festival, 20-30 cents), Chung-ch'iu
(Mid-moon festival, 20-30 cents), Ke-ho (Harvesting festival, 2 yuan),
and Kuo-nien (New Year festival, 3 yuan). During Ch'ih-hsin 1 yuan's worth
of meat has to be served because field hands must be hired to plant sweet
potatoes. During Shih-t'ien and Ko-ho helping hands must be hired, tota-;_ng
20 man-days a year. Father and son, apart from working in their own field,
must help younger brother Ch'ang-feng till his 20-tan field. This would
cost him every year 80 man-days of hired labor (for each tan of rice a good
field needs 3 man-days of hired labor while a poor one, 4). The death of
his younger brother Ch'ang-feng left his wife a widow. She adopted his
(Ch'ang-ying's) second son as her own. As these 80 man-days of labor cannot
be paid for, he has to work his own as well as his sister-in-law's fields
so that there is no time left for him to work for other people.
He owed a debt of 120 yuan to the public granary for which he must give
7.50 shih of rice as interest (for each 160 yuan borrowed 1 shih of rice
must be paid as interest valued at 2.4 yuan). At the end of each year he
sold pigs for 20 or more yuan. Out of this sum he spent 6 or 7 yuan to buy
oil and salt and the balance was paid to the public granary after conversion
into rice as interest. The old and new public granaries of this village each
have 30 or more shih of rice totaling 70 shih.
In March this year land was distributed with each of the six persons getting
7 shih totaling 42 shih. All of Ch'ang-feng's land was awarded to Ch'ang-ying.
Ch'ang-feng's old debt on which Ch'ang-ying had paid interest was erased.
His own debt of 120 yuan to the public granary was also erased. The 42 shih
of rice field is infertile and can only reap a harvest of 40 percent
totaling 25 shih or so. This coupled with his sweet potato crop is barely
sufficient to keep the family fed.
In August this year the authorities of southwest Kiangsi ordered a re-dis-
tribution of land on the principle of taking out some fertile land to com-
pensate for the barren. In his family a son died and a daughter had been
married off. Only four persons are left now and each is given 6 shih 1 t'ung
(4 t'ung make 1 shih). Some of his barren lands were given to others while
he got some fertile ones owned by others. On this occasion land was divided
equally and evenly. In March each person was awarded 7 tan whereas in
August he was only given 6 shih 1 t'ung. Why? The reason is that following
the victory of the revolution. 12 of the P'eng-wu-t'ung peasants who went to
T'ai-ho to farm land earlier had come back by this time. There was then no
revolution in T'ai-ho. When they heard about the revolution in Hsing-kuo
and its land distribution they all came back. This is why the people were
given less land in this village than in others on a per capita basis.
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P'eng-wu-t'ung has only four family surnames of Yi, Li Ch'iu and Cheng,
numbering 130 or more people. It has no village government.
Li Ch'ang-ying did little work in the town government. His son Li Ch'uan-po
was in charge of weapons (spears, bird guns, swords, etc.) in the town govern-
ment. His son took part in attacks on Hsing-kuo and Liang-k'ou. He himself
participated in attacks on Ch'i-fang and Nanchang. He is willing to serve
in the Red Army but must ask for 1 month's leave so that he can go home and
buy a calf to help till his field. On 27 June his ox died from a fall. He
bought it 2 years ago for 23 yuan. After his ox died he sold it for beef
and got 10 yuan. In June he spent 12 yuan to buy another calf.but in July
it also died from a fall. He sold it for beef for 8 yuan (which he had not
yet collected). He must buy another calf to help him till his field. This
is why he must ask for 1 month's home leave before he can come back to serve
in the Red Army.
"Thanks to the kindness of the Red Army," an ox for which one had to pay
70 yuan can now be bought for 20 yuan. "Thanks to the kindness of the Red
Army," prices on everything are reasonable now. In the past edible oil cost
23 yuan for 1 tan (100 chin), now it.is only 10 yuan per tan. Rice used to
cost 4 yuan per shih, now it costs l"yuan per shih (3 coppers can buy 1 sheng
of rice). Firewood used to sell for 20 coppers per chin, now it only costs
8 coppers per chin. Meat which had been sold for 530 coppers per chin before
is now sold for 320 coppers per chin. Only the price of salt and cotton
cloth has become very high. Salt was sold for 320 coppers per chin, now
it is 800 coppers per chin. White cotton cloth used to sell for 140 coppers
per ch'ih, now it costs 320 coppers per chi'ih.
3. Wen Feng-chang
A native of the 4th (Hou-ching) township of the 10th district; it has a
population of over 300 and a township government.
There are four persons to feed.
Father, 56, has aching feet and cannot do any work. Mother, 46, cannot see
anything or do any work except feeding pigs. He himself, 22, tills fields.
In March this year he served as a platoon leader. In June he became a
member of the finance committee in the town government. In October he set
out to attack Nanchang as acting commander of a company of the Red Army
reserve detachment. His wife, 16, makes firewood, cooks, looks after cattle,
but tills no fields.
He himself owned 8 shih of "t'ui-chiao-t'ien." He did not know for how much
his father had mortgaged it but he must deliver 2.50 shih of dried rice as
rent per year. His 8 shih is paddy rice field and because it is a good field
it can reap 8 shih of dried rice. Four persons need 28 shih of rice a year,
thus short of 20 shih. He leased a 120-shih rice field from his landlord
who demanded no mortgage money but rent in kind. As this is all inundated
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field, it can only reap 90 shih of paddy rice (only one harvest a year) which
when converted into dried rice at a discount of 20 percent totals 72 shih.
Out of this he must deliver 55 shih of dried rice as rent in kind (rent is
75 percent), leaving a balance of 17 shih which is not enough to feed the
family. Harvest time is from June to July. After harvesting crops, paying
rent in kind and paying last year's rent on borrowed new rice, they soon found
themselves without anything to eat. In August and September they had to
borrow new rice again from rich peasants. For every shih of new rice borrowed
he had to pay 3 lo (basket). Every year he must borrow 10 or more shih of
new rice. With regard to the 12 shih of new rice he borrowed last year,
"thanks to the kindness of the Red Army," he does not have to repay them any
more. He owed big landlord Liu Hua-fang a debt of 60 yuan, on which an
interest was charged at 1 shih of rice for each 10 yuan due, that debt he
does not have to pay back now. Fortunately he is able to harvest 40 tan
of sweet potatoes, 3 tan of which equal 1 tan of rice, so the total would
be equivalent to 13 tan of rice.
In March this year, four persons were given a total of 32 shih of rice fields.
After deducting his own 8 shih of "t'ui-chiao-t'ien," he was actually awarded
24 shih. The method of distribution was as follows: out of the 128 shih
originally tilled by him (120 shih leased from landlord, 8 shih tilled by
himself), 96 shih were shoveled out to others while he kept the remainder
of 32 shih. What had been shoveled out were mostly poor land; what had been
kept were mostly good land. In August when land was re-distributed, it was
found that he had more and better land than he should have, so he had to
shovel out 2 shih more and kept the balance of 30 shih. Some of his good
land was shoveled out in exchange for poor land from others. "Land was
fairly distributed by the town government."
In the past when he tilled his 120-shih fields, he had to work himself almost
to death. During seasons of rice planting, rice harvesting and sweet potato
planting, he had to hire hands to help: rice planting required 6 or 7 man-
days of hired labor, rice harvesting 30 or more man-days of hired hands,
sweet potato planting another 30 or more (for early and late crops), a total
of 70 or more man-days of hired hands. This did not include exchanges of
labor (that is, you and I help each other with labor) during rice harvest
and sweet potato planting which came to another 10 or more man-days. Now
he only tills 30 shih so he needs no more hired hands or exchanges of labor.
If he used to work 3 times as hard, he now labors one-third as much. Because
he has more time on hand, he manages finances and does some other work in
t the town government, When attacks were launched against Hsing-kuo,
Liang-k'ou, and now Nanchang, he took part in all of them.
He had a schooling of 4 years, reads half of the posters, and can keep
accounts.
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4. Ch'en Chen-shan
A native of the 2d (Chih-ko-ssu) township of the 10th district.
The 2d township has 800 people with the town government established at
Yung-feng-yu.
There are seven persons to be fed: three brothers, three wives and one daughter
of the eldest brother. The eldest brother, 29; Ch'en Chen-shan, the
second of the three, 24; and the youngest brother, 18. The eldest set up a
street stall in front of another man's store selling edible oil and salt.
He borrowed 120 yuan as capital, lost it, and "joined the revolution as an
expediency." He did not have to pay his debt but could not operate his
street stall anymore. He is now a soldier in the Red 20th Army.
Ch'en Chen-shan had a schooling of 8 years. Before 19 he tended cattle at
home. At 19 he started to learn to farm land and worked for 5 years. He
became a propagandist in the town government. During the current march he
became a company political commissar. The youngest brother had been a
bamboo-splinter apprentice for 3 years. He is now a soldier in the Red
20th Army. The eldest brother's wife cooks, makes firewood and plants
vegetables. His (Chen-shan's) wife joined her in these chores. She now
serves as a unit commander of the Women's Red Guards. The wife of the
youngest brother is only 9 years old. The daughter of the eldest brother
is 2.
He owned a rice field of 12 shih. In addition, he leased another 10 shih to
be managed by his elder brother (a rent in kind of 5 shih must be paid).
Embankment work is usually done 1 day out of 3 on the Yung-feng-yu dike.
On such a day his elder brother. went out there selling oil and salt and
came home later to till his field. Apart from his own tilling, his elder
brother must hire 80 hands to help him every year.
He owed a debt of 130 yuan on which he must pay 10 shih of rice as interest.
He had a harvest of 30 shih of rice a year. After paying interest of 10 shih
on his debt and rent in kind of 5 shih, he had a balance of 15 shih left.
Among the seven persons, the youngest brother was away from home working as
a bamboo-splinter worker for some other people, so there were six persons
consuming 42 shih a year, thus leaving a shortage of 23 shih. This deficit
had to be made up by his elder brother selling oil and salt and by his
earning from land farming. During the period of his apprenticeship, his
youngest brother earned no money.
In February last year he and his elder brother joined the revolution. His
elder brother served as chief of the food and grain section of the peasant
association while he himself worked as a propagandist. The wives were all
in favor of the revolution because they were frequently hard pressed by
their creditors for debt payment and thus unable to observe the New Year.
They were delighted when they heard about resisting payment of rents, taxes,
grains and debts. This is why they were in favor of their husbands joining
the ranks of the revolution. The youngest brother is a simple fellow; he
would do what others have told him. He did not join the revolution at this
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time. In April when the revolution had failed the jackals of the Pacification
Corps came here. His elder brother fled to Chung-ts'un where he helped others
repair hills. He himself went to Kuan-ch'ao in T'ai-ho where he made 70 or
80 yuan as a farm helper. In December last year the Red Army re-took
Hsing-kuo. He and his brother came home and re-joined the revolution. During
the period of failure of the revolution the jackals of the Pacification Corps
had burned down six rooms of his house.
In March this year land was distributed. In addition to his own 20 shih, his
family was given 29 shih more, thus totaling 49 shih with each person getting
7 shih. When the wives witnessed the division of land without having to pay
rents and debts they were overjoyed. So his wife cheerfully went to the town
government to serve as a unit commander of the Women's Red Guards. In the
March distribution they got all good land. In August when land was divided
again, it was evenly exchanged this time between the good and the bad. They
had to give up one-half of the good land and take in one-half of the bad, but
the total remained 7 shih per person. The wives were still delighted because
they themselves were government workers and kept telling others that they
should even up their land between the good and the bad. So when it came to
even up their own land they were also in favor of it.
All three brothers including himself and his wife have left home to do revolu-
tionary work. Only three women stayed home: his elder sister-in-law and her
daughter, and his youngest sister-in-law, none of whom were able to till
fields. So the two on government sent people to till their fields; those who
were sent had more labor to spare; they first tilled those of the Ch'en
family and then their own; and the tilling was well done. The tillers who
were sent to till the fields of the Ch'en family eat at the Ch'en's home.
Because four out of the seven persons eat away from home, each of them saved
7 shih a year. This is sold for money to buy oil, salt and cotton cloth.
5. Chung Te-wu
A native of the 3d (Shan-k'eng) township of the 10th district.
This family has 11 persons. He himself, 28, had a schooling of 7 years, and
worked as a bookkeeper in Wang's grocery store in Pai-lu (30 li from Shan-
k'eng) at an annual salary of 60 yuan. From apprentice to bookkeeper he had
worked a total of 13 years. In March last year he followed the Red Army when
it entered Pai-lu and stayed home. His mother, 57, is getting old and looks
after children. His elder brother, 31, tills fields. His sister-in-law, 32,
cooks, makes firewood, washes clothes, but tills no fields. He has two
nephews, one, 9, going to school, and the other, 3. His wife, 28, cooks,
makes firewood, and feeds pigs. He has two sons, one, 7, going to school,
and the other, 2. His elder nephew is married to a girl of 9 who looks
after children. He also has a niece of 2. The above totals 11 persons.
Only his elder brother tills fields while he himself is engaged in business,
the rest all lacking productive capability.
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He owned 30 shih of rice field and rented another 36 shih totaling 66 shih.
On his leased field he must pay rent in kind at the rate of 60 percent, that
is, 21 shih 6 tou (peck) which was converted into money so he could keep
his rice. He reaps 40 or more tan of sweet potatoes a year. The 11 persons
need 77 shih of rice a year. Another 20 or more shih were needed to raise
chickens, feed pigs, make wine, hire labor, entertain guests, etc. Thus
he required a total of 120 or more shih a year and was short of over 20 shih
on balance. The whole family needed 150 to 160 yuan a year to pay for salt,
cotton cloth, workers' wages, borrowed rice and entertaining expenses. Among
these items salt cost 20 to 30 yuan, cotton cloth 30 or more yuan, borrowed
rice of 25 to 26 shih at 3 yuan per shih totaling over 70 yuan, and entertain-
ing for 20 or more yuan. The source of this 150 to 160 yuan came from: his
salary earned from the store in Pai-lu amounting to 60 yuan plus a bonus
of 20 yuan, 10 or more yuan from his miscellaneous crops such as beans,
10 or more yuan from selling surplus pork after feeding themselves, and 10 or
more yuan from selling pine firewood, thus totaling about 120 yuan a year.
Every year he owed a debt of 30 to 40 yuan. His family owed a debt of
200 or more yuan covering all the previous years.
In the past he had owned 46 shih of rice fields. He sold 7 shih 10 years
ago at 10 yuan per shih. He sold another 9 shih 2 years ago at 12 yuan per
shih. Now he has only 30 shih in all. Tilling by his elder brother alone
was not enough so a hired hand of 120 days was needed every year; labor cost
240 coppers a day so the total amount of wages came to 28 strings of coppers
a year.
In February (March by solar calendar) this year following the success of the
revolution each person was given 5.50 shih of rice field. The 11 persons
got a total of 60 shih 1 lo (including 30 shih of his own). Because land
in this township had not been evenly divided between the good and the poor,
another distribution became necessary but so far it has not been carried
out. There are more people than land in this township. Each person given
5.50 shih has not enough to live on. In the past his family needed about
120 shih of rice plus an expenditure of 150 to 160 yuan per year. As a
result of the land distribution they were given 60 shih 1 lo. This was
6 shih less than what they used to have before the revolution. However,
they need not pay the rent in kind of 21 shih (converted into 60 or more
yuan). Nor do they have to pay the interest of 40 yuan (at the rate of
20 percent) on their debt of 200 yuan. This is the good side. The bad
side is that with the collapse of Wang's store in Pai-lu he is left without
a job. Thus he has lost his income of 80 yuan a year (60 yuan as salary,
20 yuan as bonus). By comparison, the situation is about the same as it was
before the revolution. However, since the revolution living expenses have
been greatly reduced. In making wine some expense of hired labor is still
necessary but it is reduced to some extent. Less cotton cloth is needed
because of sparing use. Although it is still necessary to borrow rice to
make up the shortage, the price of rice is greatly reduced to 0.70 yuan
per shih. Entertaining has correspondingly decreased so that miscellaneous
expenses which used to require 150 to 160 yuan can now be reduced to about
one-half, totaling 80 yuan a year (in Hsing-kuo money is counted in terms
of yuan).
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In March land distribution "was based on existing land ownership, taking from
those who have more to compensate those who have less." Each village was used
as a unit of land distribution. Because this village has more people than
land, existing land ownership has not been changed. In the present re-dis-
tribution some land was taken from other villages so that everyone could
get about 7 shih of rice field. When this is done, there would probably
be enough rice to go around.
In May Chung Te-wu worked in the land section of the town government in charge
of distributing forest land (he was a member of a four-man committee) and
completed its distribution in the 3d township. The way it is done is by
resolution of the town people's congress after which he sets out to various
villages where mass meetings are held and lands actually distributed. Those
who were given more forest land get less on the plains and vice versa.
There were cases in which some got land on the plains but no forest land,
but no one got forest land without also getting some land on the plains.
In May he served as a company commander of the Red Guards reserve detachment.
In June he became a propagandist of an independent regiment. During the
current march to Hsin-yu he again served as a propagandist. He took part
in the 7th and 8th attacks on Chi-an. He is willing to work as a propagandist
in the Red Army.
6. Huang Ta-ch'un
A native of Ch'a-kan-ts'un (village) of the 1st township of the 10th district.
This village has 390 or more people.
There are four persons to be fed. He himself, 36, makes firecrackers for
others. His mother, 54, has been sick for 9 years and cannot do any work.
His wife, 31, chops and carries firewood on a shoulder pole to market in
Pai-lu (Ch'a-kan is 10 li from Pai-lu), buys rice with the money she earned,
cooks, plants vegetables and washes clothes, working extremely hard. His
younger brother, 32, is a bamboo-splinter worker. Since March last year he
had gone to serve in the 2d Regiment of the Red Army and was not heard from.
His family owned 5 shih of rice field tilled by himself. He rented no field
from other people.
He makes firecrackers for others as a hired hand earning 0.14 yuan a day.
If he works every day, he can earn 4 yuan a month. As a bamboo-splinter
worker his younger brother makes 0.10 yuan a day, enabling him to smoke
yellow tobacco and make some clothes, but has no money to save.
After the revolution he could make no more firecrackers. His younger brother
gave up bamboo-splintering to become a soldier.
In the past he depended on making firecrackers and his wife selling firewood
for a living. They worked hard all year around and still had not enough to
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eat. After land was divided, they had enough to feed themselves. He owed
rich peasant Ch'en a debt of 40 yuan for which he had to mortgage his
5 shih of rice field. This rich peasant was very bad; he was killed by the
masses during the revolution. In March last year Huang Ta-ch'un organized
a secret peasant association in Ch'a-kan--ts'un village. It had 50 or 60
members and he served as its liaison officer. In November last year he
became a unit commander of the Red Guards. In April this year he worked
as a land clerk; in June he served as a platoon leader of the Red Army
reserve unit; and in August he was made a company commander of the Red Army
reserve unit. He led his unit in the current march to Hsin-yu,
In March land was distributed. Each person was only give 6.50 shih which
was all poor land. Moreover, because the original tiller had already
planted seeds in his field, he was entitled to share 60 percent of the
harvest while the new owner could only get 40 percent. In July (August
by solar calendar) land was distributed again with each person getting
7.50 shih, of which one-half was good land.
He was a firecracker worker but now is without a job. His brother used to be
a bamboo-splinter worker but is now a soldier. This entitles them to their
land. Other workers with jobs also got their land in about the same amount
as peasants. The reason for this is that a worker even with a job now has no
security and is always fearful of losing it so he wants to have a share of
the land. Moreover, as a worker cannot till his field and must hire someone
to till it for him, he wants to get the same amount of land as given to others.
At first, the peasants only allowed the workers to get one-half share of
their land, but the workers said that in that case they would raise their
wages. Then the peasants said: "We will let you have your full share of our
land but you will not raise your wages."
After the workers have got their land, they do not have oxen so they must borrow
them from their relatives and friends. As they do not have plows and hoes,
they must borrow them too. They find it hard,
He had no schooling and can only keep accounts.
7. Ch'en Pei-p'ing
A native of the 3d (Shan-k'eng) township of the 10th district.
There are 11 persons: three brothers, three wives, two nephews, one father,
one mother and one grandmother. The eldest brother, 38, is a mason. The
second elder brother, 31, tills fields. The youngest, Ch'en Pei-p'ing
himself, 24., had a schooling of 6 and one-half years, studied at a primary
school for 1 and one-half years, and taught for 5 years at a countryside
primary school.. Father is 65. Mother is 62. The three wives stay home
to cook, chop wood, plant vegetables and wash clothes, but till no fields.
Two nephews are 2 and 3 years old. Grandmother is 92.
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They owned 32 shih of rice field and leased another 20 shih from others for
which they had to pay 10 shih as rent in kind. Two out of the 11 persons
eat away from home; the elderly and the young eat less. For this reason
they should have enough to eat if they had 60 shih a year. However, their
harvest only totaled 42 shih, thus leaving them with a shortage of about
20 shih a year.
In addition, there were miscellaneous expenses such as that incurred in wine-
making, artisan labor, and purchase of oil, salt, cotton cloth, sundry
articles, gifts for marriage, funeral and seasonal festivals, etc., which
amounted to 120 yuan or so a year. The eldest brother earned 50 yuan or
so in wages; his teaching salary came to 50 yuan or so; and an income of
about 20 yuan accrued from selling coil palm, firewood, bamboo, lumber, etc.,
from their hill. Their cow gives birth to a calf every year, which sells
for 20 yuan or so. All these added to a total of 140 yuan or so which was
used to defray miscellaneous expenses and make up their shortage of rice.
He owed a debt of 80 yuan.
Last year his mother, his eldest sister-in-law, and two nephews died, leaving
the three brothers, two wives of the two younger brothers, and the mother-
in-law of his eldest brother. There are six persons to be fed. -
In March land was distributed on the basis of nine persons (at that time there
were one new-born son, one new-born nephew, and one newly married sister-
in-law, but they all died in the latter half of this year) with each given
5.50 shih totaling 50 shih 5 tou. This included his own 32 shih; he was
awarded 18 shih 5 tou which was all poor land. At present, land was being
distributed again. Investigations have been completed but actual re-distri-
bution remains to be carried out.
With the fall of landlords and rich peasants, no more houses were built. The
eldest brother, being jobless, turned to till his field. Although he could
still teach at the newly established village people's school, he earned only
0.1 yuan a day as food money but no salary, the same as all government
workers. In March he, Ch'en Pei-p'ing, became a political commissar in the
standing detachment; in April he served as a propagandist in the town
government; in May he was chief of cultural section in the town government;
in June he became secretary of the town government; and in the intercalary
month of June he returned home to teach school. In September he became
political commissar of the 2d Company of the Red Army Reserve in the march
to Hsin-yu.
The two elder brothers took part in attacks against Wang-t'ang and Lang-ts'un.
8. Lei Han-hsiang
A native of the 3d (Shan-k'eng) township of the 10th district.
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There are five persons to be fed: three brothers, one mother and one elder
sister-in-law. The eldest brother, 43, spent one-third of his time as a
hired tiller and two-thirds to till his field. The second elder brother,
39, spent two-thirds of his time as a hired tiller and one-third to till
his field. Lei Han-hsiang, 25, the youngest of the three, worked as an
apprentice mason for 2 years, then came home to be a hired tiller. Mother
is 70. His eldest sister-in-law, 34, cooks, makes firewood and plants
vegetables.
He owned 7.50 shih of rice field and leased another 44 shih from the public
hall on which he must pay rent in kind of 60 percent.
He owed a debt of 120 yuan at an interest rate of 20 percent. He borrowed
it from rich peasant Lei Tsu-yung in the same town.
The two elder brothers worked on odd jobs for others. When they worked at
home, the eldest brother took two-thirds of his time while the youngest only
one-third. He himself spent almost all of his time to do off jobs for others.
The eldest brother was the head of the household.
His own 7.50 shih of rice field could only reap 6 shih in a year of poor har-
vest. The 44 shih of public hall field could reap 70 percent of the harvest
totaling 30 shih. While harvest is reduced, rent cannot be reduced: he must
still deliver 26 shih of rice as rent in kind of 60 percent on the 44 shih
of the public hall field. From the latter he had only 4 shih for himself.
This coupled with his own 6 shih came to a total of 10 shih. This was far
from enough to feed the family. Besides he must pay 24 yuan as interest
on his debt. Thus the whole family became extremely impoverished.
This was the way to sustain their livelihood. First of all, the two elder
brothers and especially he himself the youngest of the three were relied
on to bring home their wages. He did about 220 days of odd jobs a year,
his eldest brother did 30 or 40, and his second elder brother did 170 or
180, thus totaling 420 to 430 days of odd jobs a year. These odd jobs
normally earn 200 coppers a day while reaping crops and picking wood earn
500 coppers a day so that the wages come to a total of 40 yuan a year.
Second, planting sweet potatoes can reap 40 or more tan equivalent to
10 or more shih of rice. Third, cultivation of late rice crop can yield
10 or more shih on which no payment of rent is required. However, this
makes it impossible to raise coarse crops. Fourth, raising pigs at the rate
of two a year can earn over 20 yuan per pig totaling 40 yuan or more. If
they eat one-half, they still have a balance of 20 or more yuan.
According to the calculation given above, the family had an income of 30 or
more shih of rice and a cash of 60 or more yuan a year. On the side of the
outlay, only three persons ate at home (two of the three brothers ate away
from home, only one man and two women eating at home to make a total of
three persons). To this was added 24 yuan or 240 mao as payment of interest,
thereby leaving a small balance which could be used to buy oil, salt and
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other sundry articles. They should not feel too hard pressed, Why, then
was his family still very impoverished (all year around they simply had
nothing good to eat, eating daily sweet potato strings mixed with rice, and
nothing good to wear)? The first reason was that all three brothers were
fond of gambling, in which the second brother in particular always had losses.
The second reason was that the eldest sister-in-law was gluttonous and lazy,
turned the house upside down, made the three brothers loath to work, and beat
the pigs to death. The third reason was that two oxen died in a row, one
died from drinking nitric acid water and the other died from a fall. His
family fortune had turned bad against the times. For these three reasons,
his family always remained impoverished.
In March land was distributed. Each person was given 6.50 shih totaling
32.50 shih. That is, out.of their originally tilled land of 51.50 shih
(their own 7.50 shih and 44 shih leased from others), 19 shih were taken
out to be given away to others while they kept the remainder to themselves.
However, the 19 shih which were given away were mostly hill-side barren land
reaping only one crop a year while what remained was all good land
yielding two crops a year.
Land was to be distributed again. Investigations had been completed but
actual re-distribution remained to be carried out.
In March when land was divided, 19 ship was taken out to be given away to
the new owner. Because this field was then tilled by the new owner, he was
entitled to the full share of the harvest of 19 shih. In dividing land of
other families, a part.of the harvest was taken out with the original tiller
getting 60 percent and the new owner getting 40 percent. That is to say,
the new owner had nothing to do with the planting of the current crop and left
the work of fertilizing and sowing the field to the original tiller.
Accordingly, at harvest time the new owner would let the original tiller
take 60 percent'of the harvest while the latter would give 40 percent to the
new owner. This is like the original tiller paying the new owner 40 percent
of the harvest as rent in kind.
The eldest brother became a soldier in the Red Guards detachment of this town-
ship. He took part in the attacks against Chi'i-fang and Wang-tang. The
second eldest brother served as a squad leader of the Red Guards detachment.
He himself at first was a soldier in the Red Guards detachment, later became
a platoon leader; and in the current march to Hsin-yu he was made a company
commander.
II. The Old Land Relationship in This District
1. Land Distribution
With regard to land in the 10th district, namely, the area of Yung-feng-yu,
the old distribution of land was as follows:
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Landlords 40 percent
Kung-t'ang 10 percent (jointly owned by landlords
[Public Hall] and rich peasants)
Rich peasants 30 percent
Middle. peasants 15 percent
Poor peasants 5 percent
2. Composition of Population
In general, the composition of population in the 10th district of Hsing-kuo
County is as follows:
Landlords
1
percent
Rich peasants
5
percent
Middle peasants
20
percent
Poor peasants
60
percent
Hired peasants
1
percent
Handicraft workers
7
percent
Small merchants
3
percent
Vagabonds
2
percent
According to the above description, the real exploiting class (landlords and
rich peasants) constitutes not more than 6 percent of the population but
they hold 80 percent of the land. Out of this amount rich peasants take up
30 percent and substantial portions of public hall land were under their
control. Thus if the lands of rich peasants were not evenly distributed,
it would be difficult to solve the question of land shortage faced by the
majority of the people. Middle peasants comprise 20 percent of the popula-
tion but they only hold 15 percent of the land. Because of their insufficient
holdings, it is necessary for them to share in the equal distribution of land
which will result in an increase and not a decrease of their holdings. Those
who allege that equal distribution would hurt middle peasants are wrong.
In analyzing the composition of population in this district,.the family, not
the individual, is used as the unit. The 1 percent of hired peasants refers
to pure and simple hired peasants; those who are both poor and hired peasants
are not included in this category although their number is considerable.
Small merchants refer to full-time small merchants; those who are part-time
peasants and part-time merchants are not included in this category. The
2 percent of vagabonds refers to the group of people who are totally unemployed
and make their living as gamblers and bandits; those who are partially un-
employed are not included in this category.
Why landlords only constitute 1 percent of the population? This is because
the majority of the land-holding landlords of this district live in Pai-lu
and T'ien-ts'un districts of the neighboring county and in the urban area
of this county. If they were. included in this count, the landlord class
would generally make up 2 or 3 percent of the population.
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3. Conditions of Exploitation
Type 1: Exploitation by Rent
In the 1st (Ling-yuan-li), 2d (Yung--feng-yu), and 4th (Hou-chin) townships,
land rent is 50 percent. In the 3d (Shan-k'eng) township, it is 60 percent
in some areas and 50 percent in a small area. Because of floods and drought
in the 1st, 2d and 4th townships, harvests are frequently poor so rent is
lower. There is neither flood nor drought in the 3d township so rent is
higher.
Why are there floods and drought in the 1st, 2d and 4th townships and not in
the 3d? Because land is mostly poor in the former three townships where the
hills are full of shifting sand and devoid of trees. When the sands from the
hills were dashed by clashing water into the river, thereby raising the
riverbed higher than the farm land year after year, and when the dike bursts
open, the result is flood by inundation. On the other hand, drought comes when
there is no rainfall in a long time. In the 3d township land is mostly on
the hills and higher than the river. Although land acreage is small, there
is no fear of flood in case of rain and no drought in case of a long dry
spell.
There is no way to plant trees on shifting sandy hills.
In this district there is only one planting of fields in a year. Less than
5 percent of the people plant late rice crops. No rent is collected on
small late rice crops and miscellaneous crops.
Type 2: Exploitation by Usury
1. Money usury: This can be divided into two periods. Before 1927 interest
on money was 30 percent (annual interest of 30 yuan on 100 yuan), However,
not everyone could get this kind of loan; he had to mortgage his land,
hill or house to get it, Since 1927 "the world has changed." There were
few money lenders,
Very few pure landlords lived in this district. Most of them lived in the
districts of Pai-lu and T'ien-ts'un in Kan-hsien County although their lands
were held here. However, many rich peasants lived here. For this reason,
there was no instance of poor peasants borrowing money from landlords and.
80 percent of their loans were obtained from rich peasants and 20 percent
from public hall lands. Middle peasants did not need loans and hired
peasants could not get them. The only people who needed and could get them
were the poor peasants because they had the collaterals. On the other hand,
those who were in the business of lending money were mainly rich peasants.
Thus the struggle between the poor and rich peasants in the land revolution
would doubtless be very intense. Rich peasants sometimes also borrowed
money from landlords in amounts of several hundred or 1,000 yuan, at a lower
rate of interest ranging from 15 to 18 percent. The money thus raised by
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the rich peasants were in turn lent to peasants in smaller amounts of less
than 100 yuan each while they received mortgaged property and squeezed high
interest. In this way the rich peasants acted as the middle man in the
exploitation of poor peasants by the landlords. By the same token, the
interests of the rich peasants are inseparable from those of the landlords.
Most of the public hall lands were controlled by the evil gentry of this
district. The majority of this type of local gentry owned some land but
not enough to support himself. He is neither rich peasant nor landlord;
he is evil gentry. Because he had not enough to eat, he wanted to control
the public hall lands to exploit the poor in the process. In the 1st, 2d
and 4th townships, 60 percent of the public hall lands were in the hands
of the evil gentry and 40 percent in the hands of the rich peasants. In
the 3d township, most of these lands were controlled by the evil gentry
prior to 1912 because at that time only those who were endowed with official
rank or academic degree could gain their control. During the Republican
era the rich peasants had controlled most of them. In contrast with the
situation prevailing in the 1st, 2d and 4th districts, 60 percent of the
public hall lands in the 3d district were controlled by the rich peasants
and 40 percent by the local evil gentry. When poor peasants borrowed
from the public hall, the loan interest was a little cheaper than that
charged by rich peasants: the latter charged 24 percent while the former
charged 20 percent. A loan from the public hall required a mortgage as
collateral just the same. Collection of debt was even harsher by the public
hall than by the rich peasant. If interest on the loan was not paid when
it became due, the creditor would resort to hauling cattle and pigs and
reaping crops from the field. If the debtor failed to pay the loan interest
when due, he could still talk to the rich peasant by agreeing to pay it next
year in compound interest or he could sub-lease his mortgaged land to be
tilled by someone else and collect the rent to pay his interest. Since the
rich peasant is aimed at making money, he is able to compromise on the term
of maturity.
The harshest form of interest on money is interest by the month. This kind
of loan is made to rascals for gambling purposes. Its term is 1 month;
forlyuan the debtor pays 2 when due. But this is not often.
2. Rice usury: Borrowing rice is called "producing rice." It is borrowed
from the rich peasant at very high interest; if it is borrowed from the
public hall or public granary, the interest is lower. When a rich peasant
lends rice to a poor peasant, regardless of whether it was lent in November
or December last year, or in January, February or March this year, when he
reaps his rice crop in July, he pays the rich peasant a uniform interest
rate of 50 percent, that is to say, he must pay 3 lo (basket) as interest
for 1 tan of rice borrowed. It was less than 1 year from November when it
was borrowed to next July when it was to be repaid; it was only half a year
from January or February to July; and it was only 4 months from April to
July. Why was such a high rate of interest charged (30 percent higher than
.interest on money loans)? This was because in winter and spring the price
of rice was very high, 100 percent higher than in autumn; if it was
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1.50 yuan per shih in autumn, it would often be 3 yuan per shih in winter
and spring. For this reason, the rich peasant would add interest on the rice
he lent in order to compensate for the loss resulting from the lower price
of his rice. He would rather buy rice than lend it. Even if he had charged
an interest rate of 50 percent, it would still be more profitable for him
to sell his rice in winter and spring. So it would be a great favor to the
poor peasant if he could get a rice loan from the rich peasant. Out of
100 shih of rice owned by the rich peasant, more than 90 percent would be
sold and less than 10 percent lent. In Ch'a-kan (1st township) when poor
peasant Huang Ta-ch'un wanted to borrow rice from rich peasant Ch'en Feng-ming,
he was refused. However, when Huang asked to borrow money from Ch'en in
order to buy rice from him, Ch'en was willing to loan him the money.
Eighty percent of the money loans were borrowed by poor peasants from rich
peasants; only 20 percent of such loans were made by public halls and public
granaries; and no loans were made directly by landlords. In the case of
rice crop loans, poor peasants obtained 90 percent of them from the
public halls and public granaries, only 10 percent from the rich peasants.
Thus it can be seen that the rich peasant is an out-and-out exploiter while
some sense of compassion is shown by public halls and public granaries.
In the main the public hall is also an exploiter. In the 1st township, the
public halls sold 80 percent of their rice and only lent 20 percent. In
the 2d 3d and 4th townships, practically all of the rice was sold and
almost none was for loan. Only the rice crops owned by the public granaries
were totally for loan and none for sale. In this district every township
has its public granaries. There are four in the 1st township (population
3,000) with a total of 800 shih of rice. The 2d township (population 800) has
five with 500 shih. The 3d township (population 3,000) has six with 400 shih.
These three townships have a total of 20 public granaries with 1,700 shih of
rice. Practically every village has a public granary. The 4th township
(population 4,000) alone has only one public granary with 100 shih of rice.
In this district the poor peasants relied completely on the public granaries
to lend them rice to tide over the lean months; it was hopeless to borrow
rice from the rich peasants.
Although public granaries charged a lower interest of 30 percent than that
charged by rich peasants on rice loans, their requirements of pledges for
security were quite strict; iron implements (plows and hoes), pewter-ware,
silver ware, cotton blankets, mosquito nets, clothes, etc., could all be
used as pledge. Only in Yang-fang-ts'un village of the 1st township, however,
pledges were not required on rice crop loans by the public granary. It
would do if the borrower could get his neighbor to write a "note of
subrogation" guaranteeing the payment of principal and interest. The rice
crops of the public granaries were collected from contributions by landlords,
rich peasants and middle peasants. They collected rice to set up a public
granary for the purpose of giving relief to the poor people during periods
of famine and starvation. This was a deceptive reform policy used to pacify
the revolt of the people. Yet those who were ignorant of the truth were
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prone to sing the praises of their benevolence and virtue. Except for the
landlords, rich peasants and middle peasants who cannot and need not borrow
it, rice in the public granary may be borrowed by all poor peasants, hired
peasants, workers and vagabonds if they can put up their pledge or get
someone to write a "note of subrogation."
If "producing (borrowing) rice" is harsh enough, "picking money on new rice"
is even harsher yet. In the months of February, March, April and May when
the poor peasant had nothing to eat, he wanted to pledge his new rice for
money from the rich peasant. During that period the price of rice was
usually 3 yuan per shih, but the poor peasant only got 1.50 yuan per shih
for his pledged new rice. When it was time to deliver the new rice in June
or July, its price was usually 2 yuan per shih. Based on the market price
of rice at this time, this was not such a terribly harsh deal but the crux
of the question lay in the fact that the poor peasant had already delivered
his new rice at its lower price and he would just see the rich peasant
selling it for a much higher price by next spring and summer. The rich
peasant bought the new rice at 1.50 yuan per shih and he sold it for 3 yuan
per shih. Thus he made a profit of 100 percent which was 50 percent higher
than what was made out of "producing rice." Was not this even harsher yet?
3. Pig usury: None in this district.
4. Cow usury: This practice was in existence in all townships but not pre-
vailing. The rich peasant lends his cow to the poor peasant who feeds and
works her in the field; he gives the rich peasant 1.50 tan (3 baskets) of
rice per year as interest; and if the cow bears a calf, each shares one-half.
In the 1st, 2d and 4th townships, 3 out of 10 rich peasant families lent
out their cows in this manner. In the 3d township, only 1 out of 10 rich
peasant families lent out their cows. As the cow may die of disease or from
a fall, this kind of interest is not earned with safety so the rich peasant
has not made any effort to deal in it. He is afraid that the poor peasant
might not keep the cow well fed, make her thin, or work her too hard or she
might be stolen by thieves. So if the poor peasant could borrow a cow from
the rich peasant, it would be a big favor to him.
5. Oil usury: Some poor peasants were engaged in the cultivation of oil-
bearing crops. Between May and June when they ran out of rice, they had to
borrow money from the rich peasants to buy rice by pledging to sell new oil.
During these months the price of oil was 25 yuan per tan but they could only
get 12 yuan, sometimes. even 10 yuan per tan in the deal. They must deliver
the new oil in September without shortage. In other words, when they borrowed
12 yuan from the rich peasants in June, they pledged to deliver 1 tan of oil
in September. In September the price of oil was always 17 or 18 yuan per
tan, sometimes even 20 yuan, the lowest being 15 yuan per tan. Now suppose
they borrowed 12 yuan in June and the price of oil was 18 yuan in September,
then the balance of 6 yuan would be counted as interest for 4 months or at
an interest rate of 50 percent. Suppose the price of oil in September was
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20 yuan, then the interest would be 8 yuan or at a rate of 80 percent. The
rich peasant collected his oil in September, hoarded it and waited until
the following April to August when oil was in short supply, then transported
it down river to Chiang-k'ou and Kan-chou-fu where it could be sold at least
for 25 or 26 yuan per tan, sometimes even as high as 40 yuan per tan. Two
years ago in June peasants of the 1st township went to Pai-lu to buy oil,
they paid 1 yuan (10 mao) for only 1 chin (catty) 12 Jiang (ounce). Although
this was retail price but if it was added up it would take 57 yuan to buy
1 tan of oil. In June last year it took 1 yuan (10 mao) to buy 2.5 chin of
oil which was equivalent to 40 yuan per tan. Calculating on the basis of this
example, in June this year if a poor peasant borrowed 12 yuan from the rich
peasant for which he pledged to sell 1 tan of his new oil, by June of the
following year he would have lost as much as 28 yuan while the rich peasant
would have made a profit of more than 200 percent. This type of usury was
not only heavy but also quite safe. From September to December the poor
peasants would engage in oil extraction. The rich peasant who was not afraid
of finding the poor peasant "delinquent" would wait for him to deliver the
oil to his home. If he were afraid, he would go to the peasant's home waiting
for the oil to be extracted in order to take the oil home in person.
Such is the type of oil usury. Speaking from the side of the poor peasant,
it is called"picking money on new oil"; from that of the rich peasant, it
is called "lending money on new oil." The rich peasant seldom lent oil
(not lending money on new oil) but this was done occasionally. For example,
in December this year the poor peasant borrowed 1 tan of oil from the rich
peasant and sold it for 20 yuan. By next year when the oil price was high,
he had to return 1 tan of oil or repay it with money at the market price
but without interest. This would be tantamount to having the poor peasant
keep 1 tan of oil for the rich peasant and thus could not be regarded as
vicious usury. A poor peasant could borrow this kind of oil only if he was
favored by the rich peasant and could be relied on to repay it by the follow-
ing year. The poor peasant borrowed this kind of oil because his parents
died, or he was about to get married, or he had other urgent expenses to be
met. Then he would ask the rich peasant with whom he was on friendly terms
to lend him the money. The rich peasant told him that he had no money but he
had oil (or rice). In this way oil or rice was borrowed from the rich
peasant to meet the urgent need of the poor peasant. By the following year
when the oil price was high, if the creditor wanted oil, the debtor would
have to buy it at the market to make the delivery. If he wanted money, the
01 debtor would convert his oil into money at the market to make the payment.
This type of borrowing oil is called "hauling oil."
6. Pawnshop usury: There are two types of pawnshops: big pawnshops and
small ones. Big pawnshops are not found in this district but in Tien-ts'un
and Pai-lu. The rate of interest is 5 percent per month. If you pawn off
anything to get 100 coppers, you pay 5 coppers per month as interest; if
you get 1,000 coppers, you pay 50 coppers per month as interest; if you get
1 yuan, you pay 5 fen per month as interest. Money is counted in terms of
hsiao yang [small yuan]; the period of maturity is 10 months; if a pawn is
not redeemed when it matures, it is extended for 1 month after which it
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becomes irredeemable as dead pawn. If interest is charged at 5 percent per
month, it is 60 percent a year. This kind of exploitation is extremely
harsh. Many poor peasants, hired peasants, workers and vagabonds go to
pawnshops. Among these four types of people, 60 out of 100 families enter
pawnshops. Pawned articles which were desired included iron implements,
pewter-ware, silverware, mosquito nets, blankets and clothing. Many people
in this township went to pawnshops in Pai-lu; they made up 60 percent of the
poor masses. In Pai-lu the pawnshop owners were natives of Hsing-kuo County.
When pawned articles became irredeemable as dead pawn after 11 months, they
were carted off by their owners to Hsing-kuo to be sold at public auction.
If an article was pawned off for 1.50 yuan, it was worth 3 yuan. However,
the aim of the pawnshop owners is to make money on interest and not to
auction off pawned articles.
Every township in this district has small pawnshops. They were run by rich
peasants without a store front and not as a regular business. Whenever poor
peasants and workers were really hard up, they carried articles to the homes
of rich peasants to be pawned off for a little money. This happened not
too frequently. Out of 100 families of poor peasants and workers only
10 went to small pawnshops. Why, then, do more people go to big pawnshops
and less to small ones? Because small pawnshops were run with a bad reputa-
tion. In addition, local people were known to each other only too well.
When an article was taken in, the poor pawner always wanted to beg for a
little more money and the rich peasant found it hard to argue too much about
it. Thus he was rather reluctant to do this sort of business. Small pawn-
shops charged the same rate of interest as big ones but the period of maturity
was much shorter and determined by the rich peasant to be 1, 2, 3 or 4 months
beyond which a pawned article became irredeemable as dead pawn.
Of the eight persons who came to the fact-finding meetings at this time, the
families of Ch'en Pei-Wing, Chung Te-wu, Fu Chi-t'ing and Ch'en Chen-shan
had not been to pawnshops at all. The other four families of Wen Feng-chang,
Lei Han-hsiang, Huang Ta-ch'un and Li Ch'ang-ying had all been to pawnshops.
Wen Feng-chang had to go there once a year; between April and May he had to
pawn off something to buy rice. In April last year, he pawned off one iron
hoe and two wine kettles at Heng-hsing Pawnshop in Pai-lu and got 2.40 small
yuan with which he bought 1 shih of rice. In December they were redeemed
back by him. The family of Lei Han-hsiang must pawn every year. To say
nothing of the two elder brothers who were pawners, Lei Han-hsiang, the
youngest of the three, pawned off in January last year his unlined long
jacket for 1 yuan and two hoes for 6 mao (0.60 yuan); neither was redeemed.
In June he pawned off one masons knife for 3 mao and one "yang-t'ou-tzu"
for 5 mao (both were his masonry tools); neither was redeemed. Up to
2 years ago Li Ch'ang-ying had never been to a pawnshop. In February last
year when the revolution broke out, he went to work in the guerrilla
battalion. When the White bandits came, he fled to Pai-lu. His wife had
nothing to eat at home, so she pawned off her cotton jacket for which she
got 1.20 yuan. When the revolution broke out again, she did not redeem it.
Before last year Huang Ta-ch'un had never been to a pawnshop. In May last
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year when there was no market for firecrackers and nobody wanted to make them,
he had nothing to eat so he pawned off one cotton blanket for which he got
1.50 yuan. This cotton blanket was pawned to rich peasant Chung K'uei-tzu
of this village. In July this year the revolution broke out throughout
this county. When the Red guerrilla detachment arrived in this village from
Pai-lu, the poor people rose in revolt, arrested Chung K'uei-tzu and had him
killed in Pai-lu, and returned the blanket to him. The father of Chung
K'uei-tzu was a good man willing to give relief to the poor so he was not
killed by the masses. Chung K'uei-tzu operated a firecracker store in
Tang-chiang and learned to be a skillful fighter. He could fight off a
score of people. When he was killed, everybody cheered. His land was
distributed and his family fined three times amounting to several hundred y,an.
7. Salt usury: This is very harsh because all the salt in Hsing-kuo came
from Kwangtung. Many poor peasants were engaged in salt business as a side-
line trade. Out of 100 poor families, 10 took to carrying salt on their
shoulder-pole for sale as a sideline occupation. As they had no capital,
they had to borrow it from rich peasants. They collected young chickens
and carried them to Chia-ying-chou (Mei-hsien County, Kwangtung Province)
for sale: they went with one pole-load of chickens and came back with one
pole-load of salt. For every yuan borrowed, they had to repay with 1 chin
of salt as interest. Each trip took no more than 20 days or 1 month; 1 chin
of salt was worth 1.20 or 1.30 mao. In other words, 1 yuan of principal
must be repaid with 1.20 or 1.30 mao as interest. After 1927 as more and
more revolutions broke out everyday, interest rate came down to 24 percent
so no more money could be made out of interest on salt.
Type 3: Exploitation by Taxes
In this district there were no direct taxes levied on peasants except taxes
and rents on farm lands.
Each 3 shih of rice field is the equivalent of 1 shih of "seedbed field" on
which a farm land tax of 4 fen 4 li (0.044 tael of silver) must be paid.
For tax purposes 1 tael of silver is converted into 3.60 big yuan; 4 fen 4 li
into 0.1584 big yuan. This is the amount of the farm land tax on 1 shih of
"seedbed field." One shih of "seedbed field" equals 3 shih of the existing
ordinary field. Therefore, on 1 shih of ordinary rice field a land tax of
0.0528 big yuan must be paid. Last year the price of rice in this district
was 3 small yuan per shih converted into 6 strings of coppers. One big
yuan is converted into 2.80 strings of coppers; 0.0528 big yuan is converted
into 148 coppers which can buy 2.50 sheng of rice or less. This is to say
that at present 1 shih of rice field in Hsing-kuo must pay a land tax of
2.50 sheng of rice. However, in this area 1 shih of rice field can only
reap 7 tou of rice (harvest of 70 percent). Thus for every 7 tou of rice a
land tax of 2.50 sheng must be paid or 3.50 percent of the harvest.
Although there were no other forms of exploitation than taxes on farm lands,
those who traveled to Kwangtung for the salt trade were subjected to various
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types of taxes and levies all along the way. Middle or poor peasants who
were engaged in the salt trade collected 70 chin of young chickens in this
village at 0.32 yuan per chin. They shouldered one pole-load of chicken
to Chia-ying-chou. In terms of silver, 1 chin of chicken used to be worth
3 ch'ien (0.3 tael of silver) sometimes 4 ch'ien. This year the price had
gone even higher at 4.8 ch'ien per chin. Each 7 ch'ien 4 fen of silver is
converted into 1 big yuan; 4 ch'ien 8 fen is converted into 0.65 big yuan
or 0.91 small yuan. After deducting 0.32 yuan as capital, a profit of
0.59 small yuan could be made per chin. So 70 chin would yield a profit
of 41.3 small yuan. Why is the price of chicken in Chia-ying-chou so high
this year? Because of the revolution fewer chickens were brought there
from various counties in Kiangsi so prices rose sharply.
Out of the gross profit of 41.3 yuan as mentioned above, various items of
expenses incurred on the road must be deducted. The first item was wages.
During prior years it only took 10 days to Chia-ying-chou from here. But
now because the Red sector is separated from the White Sector, it is neces-
sary to make detours in many places, thus requiring at least 15 days to make
the trip. Wage is 0.25 yuan a day so it totals 3.75 yuan for 15 days. The
second item included food, yellow tobacco, tea and strawsandals for a minimum
of 0.45 yuan a day totaling 6.75 yuan for 15 days. The third item covered
feed grain for the chickens with 70 chin of them eating 0.30 yuan a day
totaling 4.50 yuan for 15 days. The fourth item was likin tax. From
Hsing-kuo to Meng-ling no levy was made. At Meng-ling likin must be paid
at the rate of 1 big yuan (converted into 1.40 small yuan) per tan. In the
past no likin was levied at Meng-ling. The fifth item included expenses
for collecting chickens requiring 3 days of wages, food and buying chicken
baskets totaling 2 yuan. The above four items of expenses came to 19.4 yuan.
Deducting 19.4 yuan from the gross profit of 41.3 yuan, the net profit per
tan of chicken is 21.9 yuan.
Going with 1 pole-load of chicken and coming back with 1 pole-load of salt.
This year 1 yuan can buy 18 chin of salt in Chia-ying-chou; in the past it
could only buy 14 chin; even last year that was so. Price is counted in
big yuan. This year the development of the revolution has slowed down
the market for salt and thus brought down its price to a reasonable level.
Carrying 1 pole-load of salt at a cost of 4.50 big yuan (converted into
6.30 small yuan), the salt trader brought it to Hsing-kuo where there was
a severe shortage of salt between May and June this year. Thus the price
rose sharply, and 1 small yuan could only buy 2.50 chin. Based on this
price, 80 chin of salt could be sold for 32 small yuan and after deducting
the cost of 6.30 yuan a gross profit of 25.70 small yuan could be made.
However, from the above gross profit of 25.70 yuan must be deducted expenses
on the road. First, wages came to 3.75 yuan for 15 days. Second were food,
yellow tobacco, drinking tea and straw sandals totaling 6.75 yuan. Third
was likin tax. There were six places: Chi-t'an, Meng-ling, Pai-fou,
Tiao-yu-t'an, Hui-ch'ang and Hua-ch'iao. In Meng'ling alone likin tax
must be paid. In the other five places, a ticket inspection was required.
Formerly payment of likin tax was 0.60 or 0.70 yuan per tan, now it is
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1 yuan per tan. Ticket inspection in five places cost 0.20 small yuan each
totaling 2 big yuan (converted into 2.80 small yuan). The above three items
of expenses came to 13.30 yuan. Deducting this from the gross profit of
25.70 yuan leaves a net profit of 12.40 yuan.
One pole-load of chicken on the going trip would make 21.90 yuan, and 1
pole-load of salt on the return trip would make 12.40 yuan so the total
profit came to 34.30 yuan. The period of time was 1 month. In the past
the profit in chicken and salt had not been as great as it is now, but it
was more dependable and did not require making detours. A roundtrip would
only take 20 days. At present, although greater profit can be earned, the
road is not safe for travelers. Local posse and elements of the Pacifica-
tion Corps frequently searched and robbed travelers of their money (only a
small amount of money from selling chickens was used to buy salt with the
greater portion being carried on their person). They did not want salt but
they often grabbed chickens for food; and the only thing they did not do
was kill people. Nevertheless, the number of such traders have not decreased.
In May and June the price of salt was high at 1 yuan for 2.50 chin. Now (in
October) it has become cheaper at 1 yuan for 3 chin 12 Jiang. This is because
the breakthrough at Chiang-k'ou and Ta-hu-k'ou has facilitated the transport
of salt from Kan-ch'ou to this area. Compared with the pre-revolution
period the price is still very high. Before the revolution 1 yuan could buy
6 chin 4 Jiang of salt. It was cheaper almost by 100 percent compared with
the present (in October). It was cheaper almost by 200 percent compared
with May and June this year.
III. The Classes in the Struggle
The landlords of the first township all lived in Hsing-kuo City or Pai-lu,
not in the township itself. The rents were delivered to Hsing-kuo City or
Pai-lu. Four or five landlords resided in Pai-lu, each collecting over
1,000 tan of rice as rent. Some operated stores in Pai-lu; others worked
in Nan-ch'ang or Kan-chou. One lived in Hsing-kuo City; collected 1,000 tan
as rent; operated the Heng-ch'un-hao imported goods store in the city and
a store in Kan-chou.
The second township had three landlords, each collecting over 300 tan as
rent, all residing in the township. Liu Yueh-lin did not farm; collected
300 tan of rent. Two members of his family were killed during the revolu-
tion, the first and third sons of [Liu] Yueh-lung, who were both commanders
of the pacification force. The family still had 10 mouths to feed after
the revolution. Land was allocated to them, and they obeyed the government.
Tu Hsi-yu, with over 20 members in his family, farmed 200 ku [6253], of land
and collected 300 tan as rent. In his 40's, he joined the revolution in
the second lunar month last year. When the Red Army arrived in the second
month this year, he was the first to surrender voluntarily the deed to his
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land to be burned. His farm was divided. He now works in the government
as a propagandist. Hsieh Wen-lin, with 30 members in the family, farmed
500 ku of land; collected 100 tan as rent; is related to Tu Hsi-yu;
voluntarily burned his deed and divided the land; now serves as chief of
the finance section in the government. Of the six brothers in his family,
five farmed; hired four employees; was the richest in the township, no one
literate in the family; very honest. (Hsieh Wen-lin was actually a rich
peasant.)
The third township had two landlords. Tseng Hsi-ch'un's family was divided
into five households, totaling over 20 members; collected over 1,000 tan of
rice as rent; did not farm themselves; well-known big landlord; counter-
revolutionary. All the men fled, leaving behind five or six women and
children. Each was allocated land. Houses were burned down. No one was
killed in his family, but two of those of his clan serving as his henchmen
were. Hsieh Yuan-hsiang collected over 400 tan as rent; did not farm; over
20 members in the family; counterrevolutionary; fled; no one killed.
In the fourth township, Wang Jun-lan [3769 3387 5695] was a big landlord;
collected 400 tan as rent; farmed 200 ku of land; owned many oil-bearing
crop hills, all tended by himself; counterrevolutionary, commander of the
pacification force; killed many workers and peasants and burned their
houses; fled. Liu Chia-hung owned 300 ku of land, farming 100 himself
and renting out 200; five members in the family; counterrevolutionary;
organized the pacification force together with Wang Jun-lan and Tseng Mei-hsi.
Liu Chia-hung and his sons were all killed. Tseng Mei-hsi collected 100 tan
as rent and farmed over 100 ku of land himself; a rich peasant; five members
in the family; assistant commander of pacification force; killed many workers
and peasants. The ghost of one of his victims, poor peasant Kao Lao-kou
"made trouble in his house, and he and his father were both haunted to death."
Hsieh Ch'uan-chen collected 300 tan as rent; did not farm; five or six members
in the family. He was arrested by the third district and delivered to the
government for detention; not yet killed; his assets were confiscated.
First township: 12 rich peasants, 7 among them counterrevolutionary. Heads
of two families killed; male adults of remaining five families fled. Family
assets of those who fled were confiscated, even including the cooking pots
of some of them. Assets of the two families with the heads of household
killed were not confiscated. Women, old people, and children of all seven
families remained behind; received land allocations. Some women remarried.
Liu Shu-yao, son of Liu Neng-ch'ang and now in his 20's, joined the
revolution; was sent to Hsin-yu as a squad leader. The other head of
household that was killed was Ch'en Feng-ming; his house burned. Five of the
12 families not against the revolution; donated money; divided their land;
joined the Red Guards; performed revolutionary work diligently. Hsu Ch'ang-han,
one of them, owned 400 ku of land, mostly farmed by himself, renting out a
small portion; over 10 members in the family; loaned out much money; was
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fined 700 yuan by the guerrillas; household assets not seized; grain not
divided up; farm divided. Age 26, he joined the revolution in the second
or third month last year; served as a director of the Young Pioneers since
the third month this year; subsequently went to work for the Southwest
Kiangsi Government (kind of work unknown); returned in the eighth month
and again served as a director of the Young Pioneers in the district govern-
ment; was accused as a member of AB League; detained. Ling Yueh-po owned
400 ku of land, all farmed by himself; 12 members in the family. His son
Ling Lei-han is a "graduate"; served as secretary in the village government;
was fined over 100 yuan, but still served as secretary; was accused as a
member of AB League; detained in the district government for more than
2 months; was permitted to confess and released. Hsieh Chung-chieh
owned over 200 ku of land, mostly farmed by himself and a part rented out;
eight members in the family; was arrested by the township government recently;
fine is considered; not yet released. Of the 12. rich peasants, 7 were active
counterrevolutionaries. Though the remaining five joined the revolution
on the surface, two belonged to the AB League which conspired to resist the
revolution, and one of the remaining three was arrested.
Second township: nine rich peasants: Ch'en Hsien-wei, Mei Chia-sheng,
Yang Tsu-lien, Hsieh Chung-yu, Hsieh Wen-lin, Chen Kun-wei, Wang Cheng-k'o,
Tsou Hsiang-ch'un, and Hsieh Liang-tz'u. Ch'en Hsien-wei owned 200 ku of
land, farming 120 himself and renting out 80; had money to lend; over
10 members in the family; very exploitative; counterrevolutionary. He fled;
all three sons killed; family assets confiscated, Mei Chia-sheng was
actually a small landlord; rented out all his more than 100 ku of land; had
money to lend; dealt in fabrics; counterrevolutionary; a commander of the
pacification force. He, his mother, and a permanent employee were killed
by the guerrillas; family assets seized. Yang Tsu-lien farmed half of his
100 ku of land and rented out the other half; counterrevolutionary; assassina-
tion team leader of AB League; killed by the district government in July.
Hsieh Chung-yu, also a small landlord, rented out all his land; had money to
lend; counterrevolutionary; a commander of AB League; evil gentry; killed
by the district government on the 16th day of the 8th month. Hsieh Wen-lin
farmed 500 ku himself and rented out 100; 30 members in the family; five of
the six brothers farmed; also hired permanent help; the richest peasant
in the township; was a big rich peasant; related to Tu Hsi-yu; voluntarily
burned the deed and divided the land; no literates in the entire family of
over 30 people; rather honest;-now serves as finance section chief in the
township government. Ch'en Kun-wei farmed half of his 200 ku and rented
out the other half; had money to lend; 20 members in the family; joined
the revolution; was accused, in the 8th month, as belonging to the AB League;
arrested by the district government. Wang Cheng-k'o farmed most of his
200 ku of land and rented out very little; counterrevolutionary; belonged
to the pacification force; killed in the 5th month this year. Tsou Hsiang-
ch'un rented out 100 of his 160 ku of land and farmed 60 himself; seven
members in the family; joined the revolution. His son Tsou Li-tung serves
as cultural section chief in the district government; rather honest. Hsieh
Liang-tz'u rented out his 40 ku of land; ran a variety goods store in
Yung-feng Market; joined the revolution at first; in charge of finance in
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the second township government and embezzled over 80 yuan; fired from his
job and fined 150 yuan. One day, at a mass meeting, he made use of the pen
and ink belonging to someone else and wrote two reactionary slogans: "The
AB League Reorganization Faction is needed to consolidate the soviet poli-
tical power"; "The AB League Reorganization Faction is needed to capture
Kan-chou and Chi-an." Was arrested and interrogated; confessed that he was
a secretary of the AB League; executed on the 17th day of the 8th month.
Of the nine rich peasants (including three small landlords and one merchant)
seven were counterrevolutionary; only two were revolutionary.
Third township: nine rich peasants: Hsieh Chiu-chang, Mao Shih-chi,
Lei Yung-hsia, Ch'en Feng-ming, Chiang T'ao-shu, Ch'iu Fu-t'ien, Ch'iu
Shih-li, Ch'iu Chih-k'uei, and Hsien I-hsing. Hsieh Chiu-chang farmed
over 200 of his more than 400 ku of land and rented out 200; eight members
in the family; made high interest loans; counterrevolutionary; a village
tyrant and local bully; entire family fled the revolution. Mao Shih-chi
farmed his entire 200-odd ku of land himself; lent money; had 23 members
in the family; now divided into four households. Grandson Mao Chang-ping,
age 22, a middle school student; a commander of the AB League; was arrested.
Lei Yung-hsia farmed 50 of his over 200 ku of land and rented out more than
100; had money to lend; went away before; township government assessed him
a donation of over 200 yuan. He returned; was asked by the township govern-
ment to attend the Red Army school, but failed the entrance examination.
The township government then asked him to join the instructors' team of
Hsing-kuo County. He is 21, a senior elementary school graduate. Ch'en
Feng-ming farmed all his 100-odd ku of land; seven members in the family;
had no money to lend, because his son studied in Kan-chou and needed the
money; counterrevolutionary; secretary of AB League; was killed; family
assets confiscated. Chiang T'ao-shu farmed his entire 100-odd ku of land
himself; had a little money to loan out; five members in the family;
counterrevolutionary; fled alone; wife went with someone else. Ch'iu Shih-li
farmed 40 of his 130 ku of land and rented out 90; smoked opium; had no money
to lend; counterrevolutionary; fled alone; wife was asked by the township
government to remarry; house turned into the office of the township government.
Ch'iu Chih-k'uei farmed his 150 ku of land himself; had money to lend; six.
members in the family; joined the revolution; son was assigned to the Red
Guards; was assessed a donation of 60 yuan. Hsieh I-hsing farmed half of
his 200 ku of land and rented out the other half; had money to lend; 12
members in the family; member of AB League; was arrested. His fourth son
fled; he still has three sons home. Of the nine rich peasants in the third
township, six were counterrevolutionary, and only three not yet counter-
revolutionary.
Fourth township: two rich peasants: Liu Chia-hung and Tseng Mei-hsi, both
counterrevolutionary. (See section on landlords)
Of the four townships in this district, 9 out of the 12 rich peasants in
the first, 7 out of the 9 in the second, 6 out of the 9 in the third, and
the 2 in the fourth were counterrevolutionary. The four townships had a total
of 32 rich peasants, and 24 of them were counterrevolutionary. Though the
remaining eight are currently not counterrevolutionary, what will happen in
the future is unknown.
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The farms of the rich peasants were very good, just as good as those belonging
to the landlords and the courts [kung-t'ang 0361 1016]. When they bought land
from the poor peasants, they always wanted to buy the good farms, and the poor
peasants had to sell. If the poor peasants sold the poor farms, it would take
several mou to make up the price of 1 mou of good land. When the rich peasants
loaned money to the poor peasants, they always asked for the good farms as
security. Therefore, the good farms gradually were concentrated in the hands
of the rich peasants.
When the revolution first started, such as the second or third month this year,
many of the rich peasants became opportunists and joined the revolution.
The rich peasants and their henchmen occupied 30 percent of the posts in the
township and district soviets. During the anti-rich peasant propaganda week
in the 4th and 5th months, they were thrown out. Currently, only two rich
peasants serve in the district (Hsieh Wen-lin serves as finance section chief
in the second township; Tsou Li-tung serves as cultural department chief in
the district government.)
The middle peasants benefited in the land revolution. First, not only suffer-
ing no loss in land, most of them gained in the land division. The middle
peasant population of this district constituted 20 percent of the total, while
their land was only 15 percent. Therefore, most of them acquired additional
land. Though some of them had their land reduced, it was a very small
minority.
Second, in the past, it cost around 200 yuan to get a wife, almost equivalent
to the entire family assets of a middle peasant. Therefore, it was difficult
for a middle peasant to marry, and many of them were in debt due to marrying.
If the wife died, it would be extremely difficult to marry again. Now, there
is freedom of marriage, costing not 1 penny. This is a great advantage.
Third, in the past, when an aged member died in a middle peasant family, the
funeral would cost at least 50 yuan, or as much as 100, or more. In the
past, very often a middle peasant became indebted or bankrupt due to the
death of a parent. Today, superstitious habits have been abolished. If
someone dies, it only requires burial, without wasting any money.
Fourth, in the past, when the family cow died, the middle peasant would
sell the beef for 8 or 10 yuan. He must then add 10 yuan or more to buy
another cow. Now, though he will only get 8 or 10 yuan for a dead cow,
he only has to put up 3 or 4 yuan to buy another one.
Fifth, now that the power of the landlords and rich peasants has been knocked
down, the rites abolished, and superstition abolished, it is no longer
necessary to give gifts or burn incense, and some expenses are saved.
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Sixth, besides the above five economic advantages, there is also the political
advantage, which is the major one. In the past, under the control of the
landlords and rich peasants, the middle peasants had no "right to speak,"
and must abide by the decisions of others. Now, together with the poor
peasants and hired help, they have the right to speak. Approximately 40 per-
cent of the middle peasants have responsibilities in the township and
district soviets. Among the middle peasants, those owing no debt at all
constituted 10 percent, and those owing a little debt but still able to manage
the household 30 percent.
The middle peasants were very brave in the revolution. Same as the poor
peasants, they "sallied forth" (assigned to the Self-Defense Army, at times
they had to sally forth to do battle), performed patrol duty and held
meetings.
In regard to the middle peasants of the district, their population constituted
20 percent of the total, and their land 15 percent. Though their land was
of better quality than that of the poor peasants,,it was far inferior to
that of the rich peasants. Generally speaking, it was good and bad--half
and half.
4. Poor Peasants
After the revolution, the poor peasants gained the following advantages:
(1) Land was allocated to them. This is their fundamental interest.
(2) Hills were allocated to them. In the past, the poor peasants rarely
owned any hills. Among the poor peasants of the first and second townships,
30 households had hills, and 70 had none. As there are many hills in
Chin-chun Village (Shan-k'eng) in the third township, 70 poor peasants had
hills, while 30 had none. The hills there are mostly oil-producing hills.
Of the 100 poor peasants in the fourth township, half of them had hills
and half had none. Among the poor peasants in the townships having hills,
the area per household was very small. As the hills in the first and
second townships are mostly sandy, the landlords only wanted farms, not
hills. The rich, middle and poor peasants each owned a part of the hills.
The distribution in the first township was: 40 percent owned by the rich
peasants; 40 percent by the middle peasants; 20 percent by the poor peasants.
The distribution in the second township was: 50 percent owned by the rich
peasants; 30 percent by the middle peasants; 20 percent by the poor peasants.
As there are more oil-producing hills in the third township, which are more
productive, the. landlords wanted them, but it was still the rich peasants
who owned most of the hills. The distribution was: 15 percent owned by
the landlords; 50 percent by the rich peasants; 20 percent by the middle
peasants; 15 percent by the poor peasants. It was stated before that
70 poor peasant households in the third township had hills, but what they
owned constituted less than 20 percent of the total, each household owning only
a very small area. The distribution in the fourth township was: 20 percent own-
ed by the landlords; 20 percent by the rich peasants; 50 percent by the middle
peasants;.l0 percent by the poor peasants. Owning little or no hills
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was a big difficulty of the poor peasants. First, they had little or no
firewood, and had to gather straw from hills belonging to others. Second,.
they could not chop firewood to exchange it for oil and salt at the market;
they could only gather straw in exchange for oil and salt, and it took
three loads of straw to make up for one load of firewood. Third, they had
no lumber to build houses or make tools. Fourth, owning none or little oil-
producing hills resulted in having little or no oil for food. Now that the
hills have been divided, according to the number of people in the household
similar to the division of land, every household owns hills. Though the
number of hills in the various townships varies and the people in some
have more while others have less, everyone has a little even in the townships
which have less hills and the difficulties of the poor peasants are solved.
Because of the need, the poor peasants firmly advocated the division of
hills. For the sake of production, the hills had to be divided. In the
past, due to the lack of manpower, those households with more hills left
some of them untended, while the large masses of poor peasants with adequate
manpower had to remain idle. Now that the hills have been divided, the poor
peasants can devote their effort to their own hills, and production will
greatly increase.
(3) At the beginning of the revolution, the grain belonging to the landlords
and counterrevolutionary rich peasants was divided, and the poor peasants
had their shares free of charge. The grain in Pai-lu (where the big land-
lords concentrated) was evenly divided among the people, and the poor
peasants did not finish eating it even at harvest time.
(4) Debts incurred prior to the revolution did not have to be repaid.
When the revolution first started in the third month, the higher authorities
instructed that debts owed to merchants, to collective funds and among the
poor workers and peasants themselves must be repaid. In the middle part of
the 6th month (July by Western calendar), an official communication came
from Southwest Kiangsi (the Southwest Kiangsi soviet) instructing that all
debts were cancelled. Actually, since the third month, no debt was paid,
which was a fact, but the three kinds of debts described above still had
to be paid, according to principle (a theory). After the 6th month, even
that principle was abolished. The poor peasants fully supported the move.
Why did they want to cancel even the three kinds of debts? First, in
regard to debts owed to merchants, most of the big merchants had fled.
(Ten big merchants among the 35 stores in Pai-lu had fled.) As for the
small merchants (such as the 25 small stores in Pai-lu), though the workers
and peasants owed them money for goods, most of them were in debt to the
big merchants, landlords and rich peasants. If the poor workers and
peasants did not repay them, nor did they have to repay the landlords and
rich peasants. When the two were compared, it was still advantageous to
the small merchants, because they owed more to the big merchants, land-
lords and rich peasants than what the poor workers and peasants owed them.
Second, in regard to collective fund debts, which were incurred for the
purpose of marrying or paying debts, the poor workers and peasants asked
their relatives and friends to set up a fund and borrowed from it. Such
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relatives and friends were either middle or rich peasants, and cancelling
the debt did not hurt them. Though such funds were set up to render friendly
aid, it was the poor peasants who borrowed from them and, as the poor
peasants could not pay, it was proper to cancel the debts. Even if the
second and third funds were borrowed by the rich peasants, it was also
reasonable to cancel them, because the rich peasants, after borrowing the
money, loaned it out to other poor peasants for interest, and now the poor
peasants did not have to pay them back. Furthermore, the entire assets
of the rich peasants were either confiscated or donated, and there was
nothing left. Therefore, it was proper to cancel the debt. As for the
funds borrowed by the landlords and rich peasants for the purpose of ex-
ploiting the poor workers and peasants, there was no such incident in this
district. Third, in regard to the mutual debts among the poor workers
and peasants, "as you are poor, and I am also poor, how do I pay you?"
Thus, the question was answered. Therefore, it was most proper to cancel
all debts.
(5) They enjoyed inexpensive rice. In the 1st and 2d months this year,
the cost of grain was 4.60 yuan per tan. The revolution started in the
3d month, and it dropped to 2 yuan per tan. From the 6th month to now
(9th month lunar calendar), it was .70 yuan per tan. By comparing .70
yuan with 4.60 yuan, it was 6.5 times cheaper. When the grain was cheap,
naturally it was unfavorable to the poor peasants who had received land
allocations and cultivated and harvested, but it was favorable to them
during the several months after the beginning of the revolution and prior
to harvesting.
(6) Greater freedom to get a wife. (The peasants of Kiangsi turned the
term "freedom to marry" into a verb, to distinguish it from the coerced
and mercenary marriages of the old days; the term is commonly used among
the peasants in the entire soviet area.) In the past, one must have money
to get a wife; therefore, many poor peasants could not get married. Or,
even if they did, it was either a child bride or someone very advanced in
years. Should the wife die, it was most difficult to remarry. Now, such
difficulties no longer exist.
(7) It is no longer necessary to spend money when there is a death in the
family. All one has to do is to bury the dead.
(8) The cost of cows is cheap. It is easy to buy or replace a cow. The
poor peasants are very short of draft animals. Take 100 poor peasant
households in the district: only 15 have 1 cow per household, 40 have 1 cow
per 2 households, 10 have 1 cow per 3 households, 5 have 1 cow per 4 house-
holds and 30 have none. Under this situation, the cheap cost of cows is
favorable to the poor peasants.
(9) Social obligations are abolished and superstition eliminated, and
the expenses for them are no longer necessary.
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(10) There is no longer opium smoking or gambling, or theft. Even if the
door is not closed at night, nothing is stolen.
(11) With the division of land, every household can raise hogs. Not just
to sell them for others to eat, but the poor peasants can eat the meat
themselves. In the past, very few poor peasants bought meat from the
butcher shops, but now more of them are buying meat.
(12) This is the most important point: The acquisition of political power.
The poor peasants are the main force of the rural political power and the
leading class of the village. The poor peasants can be divided into five
strata according to the number of cattle as discussed in item (8) above.
5. Hired Help
Similar to the poor peasants, the hired help also received land allocations,
because, as the landlords and rich peasants have been overthrown, no one
will hire permanent help though temporary help is still needed. Though
they now have the land allocated to them, they do not have draft animals
or farm tools, and it is difficult for them to farm the land. This problem
is not yet solved. Instead of allocating the animals and farm tools con-
fiscated from the landlords and rich peasants to the hired help, the
district and township governments sold them.
Fu Chi-t'ing's nephew, Chu Ta-hsi, was hired help. He has three brothers,
two parents and a wife (a grown up child bride). He is the eldest, age
22, and the boy next to him is 19 years old. He worked as permanent help.
for rich peasant Chung, at an annual wage of 39 yuan, small currency. His
19-year-old brother was a cowherd, earning an annual wage of 10 yuan.
Their total income of 49 yuan was enough to buy 16 tan of grain, sufficient
for 2 and a half persons. They relied on their mother and his wife to
gather and sell straw for food, eating two meals in winter time. He owed
over 30 yuan; had no house of his own; lived in a mountain shed belonging
to a landlord and took care of the latter's hills. His father, now over
60 years of age, had also worked as hired help.
The hired help in this district could draw 15 pays per year, reporting for
work after the 15th day of the 1st month of the year; no customary meals
of meat on the 1st and 15th days of the 1st month; bedding supplied by
the boss, but no clothes; paying for their own medicine; no wage deduction
due to illness of less than 3 days, but wages were deducted beyond 3 days.
Their wages were paid piecemeal. They worked from dawn to dark. Besides
the time spent on meals and rest, they worked at least 10 hours a day.
In winter time, they peeled mu-tzu [2606 1311] and potatoes.in the evenings.
Ninety-nine percent of the hired help had no wives. They were the most
miserable class in the rural village. Not only did all landlords and rich
peasants have wives, but.some of them had several. Ninety percent of the
middle peasants had wives and 10 percent did not. Seventy percent of the
poor peasants had wives and 30 percent did not. Seventy percent of the
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handicraft workers had wives and 30 percent did not. Ten percent of the
vagrants had wives and 90 percent did not. Even the vagrants were better
off than the hired help, as 99 percent of the latter had no wife. In the
7th month (8th month lunar calendar) [sic], the government issued an order
that the unmarried men and women must get married as soon as possible by
free choice. Thus, the number of marriages by the free choice of the parties
suddenly rose. In the 2 months since the 7th month, most of the formerly
unmarried middle and poor peasants have been married, and there are very
few single men or women. It is more difficult for the hired help. The
women object to the lack of utensils and articles for use in the hired help's
home and his long absences. Therefore, it is difficult for the hired help
to solve the wife problem. In Yang-fang Village in the first township where
Fu Chi-t'ing lives, of the four hired help (two sets of brothers belonging
to two families), only one acquired a wife by free choice. Actually, another
one could have acquired a wife also, but the social security section chief
of the township government refused to register them on ground of their
illicit relationship in the past. As a result, the woman married someone
else, and the man is still single. In the vicinity of Yung-feng Market in
the second township, four of the six hired help acquired wives by free
choice. In Hou-ching Village in the fourth township where Wen Feng-chang
resides, the one and only hired help is still single.
After
land division, there is no longer any permanent help, and only
30
per-
cent
of part-time help is left. Wages have not gone up, nor have the
hired
help asked for a raise. "There is not even any work, let alone a raise!"
Now we discuss the issue of draft animals and farm tools after the hired help
acquired land. Of the two hired help in Yang-fang Village, the Ch'en family
has two brothers, both working as hired help. The elder brother was a
permanent employee of rich peasant Ch'en, earning 33 yuan a year. The
younger brother worked for rich peasant Chung as a permanent employee,
earning 42 yuan. Their father, deceased, was a tenant farmer. Their mother
took them around begging after their father died. Grown up, they became
hired help. Their mother died. The older brother is now 29 and the younger
23. They have a house and cooking utensils, but no furniture. The farm
tools of the past were sold. After land was allocated to them in the 2d month,
both brothers returned home. The younger one acquired a wife by free choice.
They had no capital. The younger brother once had over 100 yuan, but he
lent it to poor peasant Chung. He could not collect it as all debts were
cancelled, and the poor peasant debtor had no way to repay him anyway.
Luckily, their uncle, a middle peasant, loaned them a draft animal and
tools. The three of them were allocated a total of 16.2 shih of farmland.
After receiving land allocation in the 2d month, they immediately farmed
the land and kept the entire harvest. Harvesting the first crop, they
cultivated a second one, which is growing well. With a cow, one person
can farm 100 ku of land, yet the two brothers together only cultivate over
10 ku. Therefore, they have much spare time, and they do odd jobs for
others, work as porters, and earn some money.
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The Chung family of Yang-fang Village also consists of two brothers. Their
parents were deceased. They live with their uncle (Chung En-chiang),
uncle's wife, their two sons, a daughter-in-law, and two granddaughters,
totaling nine members in the family. The uncle and his two sons were
tenant farmers. They owed money and could not make enough to live on.
The two brothers worked as hired help. The older brother, Chung Sheng-p'o,
in his 40's, worked for rich peasant Chung as a permanent help. The
younger brother, Chung Sheng-huai, age 36, worked for middle peasant
Chung, also as a permanent help. After land division in the 2d month,
they farmed their own land. Formerly they leased a cow from middle peasant
Chung Lung-t'an, and the cow threw two calves. After the revolution,
Chung Lung-t'an wanted to collect one of the calves. The township govern-
ment told him: "We must wait and see how the other townships handle such
matters. Only if they permit the original owners to do so will you be able
to collect a calf. At present you cannot do so." Therefore, the cattle
still remained with Chung En-chiang. After the two brothers received land
allocations, draft animals and tools were no problem, because their uncle
had them.
Here we will discuss middle peasant Chung Lung-t'an. He is in his 30's,
his mother in her 60's, and his wife in her 20's, a total of three mouths
to feed. He owned over 10 ku of land and leased 30 or 40 from others.
After paying the rent, he had more than enough for the family, and he sold
the surplus. He leased three cows to three poor peasants, collecting
1.5 tan of grain per cow per year as rent. The calves were divided half
and half. He had money to loan out. In the land division in the 2d month,
his family of three received a total of 24 ku of land (6 tan per person) [sic],
which was more than what he owned before, but he was not permitted to lease
land from others. Therefore, he had no surplus grain to sell. The cows
leased out by him and the money loaned out were all cancelled and gone.
He is very honest. He does not oppose the revolution, but nor has he
undertaken any important work. He now works as a cook in the Red Army
reserve in his home village.
The hired help have not gained political power after the revolution. The
middle and poor peasants always find them "illiterate, inarticulate,
unenlightened, ignorant of official affairs," and incapable. No hired
help is among the committee members of the district and township governments,
and only one serves as a team leader of the township Red Guards.
Handicraft workers in the district included carpenters, masons, tailors,
iron workers, barbers, bamboo workers, mill workers, coir workers, stone
workers, painters, tin workers, weavers, silversmiths, dye workers,
trough workers, lacquer workers, kiln workers, and paper workers, a total
of 18 categories. Carpenters, masons, tailors and bamboo workers were
more numerous; barbers, iron workers and trough workers (fetching-oil)
next; and the remaining.categories the least in number. The district did
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not have coppersmiths, cotton ginners, shoemakers or tanners. The first
township had one oil trough; the second, two; the third, 11, and the fourth,
12, each trough attended by one trough worker.
The wages per man-day of labor in the past were: carpenter 0.20 yuan,
mason 0.20 yuan, tailor 0.15 yuan and bamboo worker 0.15 yuan. The barbers
in the first, second and fourth townships received 1 peck of grain per year
per person, in the third township they were paid 0.15 yuan per year per
person, and all meals were provided free by the boss. Iron workers were
paid 0.25 yuan. In regard to trough workers, they are paid 10 coppers
for each catty of oil produced in the second township, 3 coppers each
catty in the third, and 2 catties of oil for each picul (100 catties)
produced in the fourth. The situation in the first township, which produced
less oil, was not clear. The oil in the third township was the cheapest
because of the large output. In regard to mill workers, each mill was
0.60 yuan, requiring 3 man-days of labor. Coir workers were paid 0.22 yuan,
and stone workers 0.45 yuan. Painters were paid according to the pictures.
They painted the portraits of rich gentry and landlords and images of gods.
Tin workers were paid according to the tin utensils. Weavers were paid
0.10 yuan for every 10 feet of summer or spring cloth. (Summer cloth is
hempen fabric; spring cloth consists of 80 percent hemp and 20 percent
cotton.) The district had no cotton textile weaver. Silversmiths were
paid according to the silver utensils, "suffering a big disadvantage." The
situation of the dye workers was unknown. Lacquer workers were paid by the
piece, and so were the kiln workers. Paper workers were paid 0.15 yuan
(making durable paper from mulberry bark, only in the third township).
In the past, carpenters, masons, tailors and bamboo workers performed from
over 100 man-days of work to 200 per year. After the revolution, the work
days of the masons and tailors have been greatly reduced, amounting to
only about several dozen man-days per year. Carpenters and bamboo workers
are doing a little less work than before, but not noticeably so. Barbering
is more popular than before, because the women have all cut their hair.
After the revolution, tin workers, painters, lacquer workers, and paper
workers have all disappeared, because there is no more need for them.
(Paper workers made fuses for firecrackers used in celebrations. Now that
such firecrackers are not used, there is no longer need for paper workers.)
The "order from above" provided that handicraft workers would receive a
half-share of land, but the handicraft workers demanded a full share,
on ground that they were either unemployed or their work was reduced and
insecure, and that only by getting land would they have security. The
peasants said: "The order from above provides that you get half a share.".
The-workers said: "If so, then wages will have to be raised." The peasants
did not want the wages to increase, because the poor peasants and hired
help needed to employ the workers to make farm tools to farm their land.
The rich and middle peasants already owned farm tools; therefore, they
had no need to employ the workers. Only the poor peasants had such need;
therefore, they opposed higher wages. The poor peasants said:? "Alright,
you can have the land, but you must not raise the wages." The workers
said that, after receiving their land allocations, if they still performed
100 man-days of work a year, they would be willing to give 2 tan of grain
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to the public. The barbers were not allocated land, because they stayed with
others all day long and had their meals free. The workers of Kan-hsien re-
ceived land and had their wages decreased. The wage of masons was reduced
from 0.20 yuan to 0.15, and that of bamboo workers from 0.15 yuan to 0.12.
Seventy percent of the handicraft workers had wives, and 30 percent did not.
After the revolution, most of the single men acquired wives by free choice.
As the handicraft workers have a wide contact, possess a special skill
and are relatively intelligent and articulate, and many among them are
literate, they are in a better position than the hired help.
The handicraft workers have a general labor union in the district, branch
unions in the townships and branch departments in the villages. The 20 or
more workers of various occupations in Ling-yuan in the first township, for
instance, have organized a branch union.
Rural handicraft workers always farmed on the side while pursuing their
major occupation of handicraft. There were very few of them who did not
farm at all--less than 10 in 100.
Eighty percent of the handicraft workers were in debt.
Merchants in the district operated grocery and variety goods stores, rice
and fruit stores (further divided into several dozen categories), tea
shops, restaurants, butcher shops, beancake shops and opium dens. Those
who operated small stores exclusively without farming on the side constituted
3 percent of the population (three families in 100).
Among, the four townships in the district, there were, in the past, only three
small merchants with 500 yuan in capital, all located in Yung-feng Market,
and none in other townships. The small stores in the district were dis-
tributed as follows: five in the first township, 35 in the second (all
in Yung-feng Market), six in the third and none in the fourth, totaling
46. Out of the 46 small stores, four had capital of 500 yuan. (Three of
them were in Yung-feng Market: A medicine store, owned by someone from
Chang-shu, and two imported goods stores, branches from Hsing-kuo City.
None of the owners was a landlord in the district. They all fled when the
revolution started. The stores were seized and the goods given to the poor.
The fourth store was in Shan-k'eng, owned by a landlord of the township.
The whole family fled, and the store was boarded up.) One store had a
capital of 400 yuan. (Located in Shan-k'eng, it was a variety goods store,
operated by two partners, Han Li-t'ao, who farmed 20 shih of land, and
Han Li-tung, who farmed 60 shih. After the revolution, Han Li-t'ao fled.
Han Li-tung infiltrated the revolution, served as the land section chief
in the government, and was accused of belonging to the AB League and
detained by the district government.) Three stores had capital of 300 yuan.
(All were located in Yung-feng Market: two were variety goods and fabrics
stores, operated by individuals from Hsing-kuo City. Both were counterrevolu-
tionary, and both fled. The stores were converted into tea shops. One was
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a butcher shop. The owner also had 60 ku of land. He joined the revolution;
continues in business; serves as chairman of the village government; is honest).
Two stores had capital of 100 yuan. (One was in Shan-k'eng, selling variety
goods and serving also as an inn. The owner had no land; counterrevolutionary;
was killed; the store closed. The other is in Hsi-chiang, selling variety
goods and also making silverware. The owner farms several ku of land;
not counterrevolutionary; store still in business). Two stores had capital
of 50 yuan. (Located in the third township, the one in Chu-k'eng is a
medicine store. The owner has 20 ku of land; not counterrevolutionary;
store still in business. The other, located in Shang-ching-yao, was also
a medicine store. The owner had land; counterrevolutionary; fled; the
store closed.) There were 24 stores with capital of 20 yuan. (Two in
Wu-niang-miao and two in Chiao-t'ien-chiang, totaling four in the first
township; 20 in Yung-feng Market in the second township.) There were
10 stores with capital of 10 yuan. (Nine in Yung-feng Market in the second
township; one in Chi'i-ling-ai in the third township.) The above specialized
in small stores, without any sideline.
There were many people in the villages whose main occupation was farming,
with commerce as a sideline (deriving 80 percent of their income from
farming and 20 percent from commerce), constituting about 40 percent of
all the households (40 households in 100). The majority of them were poor
peasants and a minority were middle peasants. As they did not have suffi-
cient income for their living, they did some porterage to supplement it,
such as going to Chiang-k'ou, Han-chou and Hu-k'ou-mien and carrying along
some oil as capital to bring back salt. Or, they might carry eggs to sell
in Chia-ying-chou (Mei-hsien) and bring back salt.
Merchants in the district with capital of 50 yuan or more numbered 12. Of
the 12, 9 were counterrevolutionary and 3 were not.
Among the 12, only the 4 with capital of 500 yuan hired clerks, 3 of them
hiring 1 each and the remaining one hiring 2. The 8 remaining ones did
not hire any help.
There were 34 stores with capital of 20 yuan or less. Those operating them
are called store owners, but actually poor people; therefore, there is
no counterrevolutionary among them. All the stores are still in business
[except the opium dens].
The 34 so-called "stores" with capital of 20 yuan and 10 yuan included:
9 inns (4 in the first township; 5 in the second, all located in Yung-feng
Market).
4 opium dens
2 candy stores
4 butcher shops
4 rice shops
1 woodenware shop
1 ironware store
4 variety goods stores (above all in Yung-feng Market)
5 tea shops (4 in Yung-feng Market; 1 in the third township).
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In the land division this time, except those who were killed or who had fled,
merchants with capital of 50 yuan or more whose stores were sealed or closed
were given land. Only three stores whose owners are not counterrevolutionary
are still in business. One is a butcher shop in Yung-feng Market with an
original capital of 300 yuan. The owner was assessed a donation of 220 yuan,
leaving him only 80 yuan. He has 15 mouths to feed and is not counter-
revolutionary. Originally he owned 60 piculs of land. In the land division,
the owner, Chi'en Shao-lin received half a share and the 14 members of his
family each received a full share. Thus, he has a little more land now than
before. His brother Ch'en Shao-ying served as a company commander in the
Third Army (formerly the Second Regiment); therefore, his family is
revolutionary. He serves as the chairman of the village government. The
second establishment is a medicine store in Chu-k'eng with a capital of
50 yuan. The owner received half share of land and the members of his
family each received 1 share. The third is a variety goods and silverware
store in Hsi-chiang with a capital of 100 yuan. The owner is not counter-
revolutionary. The township government assessed him a donation (amount
unknown). The owner received half share of land and his family members
each received one share. In regard to the 34 small stores belonging to the
poor, as the business of the four inns in the first township and one candy
store in the third township has always been bad and the owners have always
relied mostly on farming for their living, they and their family members
each received a full share of land. As for the 29 stores in Yung-feng
Market, in the past, the owners had no land but operated their small
business exclusively. After the revolution, aside from the four opium
dens which closed down, the candy, butcher, rice, woodenware, ironware,
variety goods and tea shops, and the inns have not only continued in
operation, but the business has not dropped. Even so, they still received
land allocations, the owners getting half shares and their family members
full shares. Those without draft animals or farm tools borrow them from
relatives.
In general, that the stores with capital of 50 yuan or more (actually they
were mostly small stores) suffered severely in the revolution was a result
of the excessive leftist policy of the area. The poor operating stores
with capital of 10 or 20 yuan were greatly benefited. Besides receiving
land allocations, they have reduced the expenses for social obligations,
can acquire a wife easily, do not have to spend money on the dead, and have
gained political recognition,. All these benefits are the same as the
poor peasants. Such poor people and small peddlers belong to the same
class as the poor peasants. Therefore, the benefits gained by them are
not much different.
a 8. Vagrants
There were the following categories of vagrants in the district.
(1) Gamblers: About 50 or more in the entire district, including about
10 in the first township, about 20 in the second, all in Yung-feng Market,
6 in the third and about 20 in the fourth. In the past, 9 out of 10 gamblers
smoked opium, but they do not do so anymore. There is not one counter-
revolutionary among the 50 or more gamblers in the district. When they
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heard about knocking down the local tyrants and dividing the land, they were
very pleased. In the past, they had no clothes in cold weather and were
dressed in rags, but now they have good clothes to wear. In the past, they
would have fish and meat when they had money but starve when the money ran
out, but now, though they do not have delicacies, they can eat rice every
day. Eight out of 10 of them had no. family. Now, with the land allocated
to them, they borrow draft animals and tools from their relatives to farm
the land. As gamblers were always generous, it is easy for them to borrow
things now. Among the 10 in the first township, one of them originally
served as a finance committee member in the fourth township government.
He was an honest gambler, had good credit and performed well as a finance
committee member after the revolution. Among the 20 in the second township,
four of them are working in the township government: Tien Shang-jen
serves as propaganda department chief in the district government; had a
house; no family; joined the revolution the year before last; house
burned down by the pacification force. Ch'en Kun-t'ung joined the revolution
the year before last; served as judge in the district government; subsequently
became commander of the Third Company in the Reserve Army. Yang Ta-hu
joined the revolution the year before last; became chairman of the township
government in the revolution in the 2d month this year; performed well;
subsequently joined the district government. Ch'en-Shao-chi'i joined the
revolution the year before last; became land section chief of the township
in the 2d month this year. Among the six in the third township, Lei Yung-
huang has a family; used to gamble and sell opium; joined the revolution
in the second month this year; serves as finance section chief in the
township government; very loyal and honest.
(2) Beggars: There were four beggars in the first township, five in the
second, four in the third and four in the fourth, totaling 17. They were
people entirely without a future. Most of them had no family; only 4 out
of the 17 had families. The entire families of these four begged. Now,
after receiving land, they borrow draft animals and tools from their
relatives. None of them has done any government work after the revolution.
(3) Water-pipe tobacco sellers: There were two in the second township and
one in the fourth, totaling three. The two in the second township both had
wives. and sons. Their wives leased farms from others to farm, but they
themselves did not pursue any proper occupation. They sold water-pipe
tobacco in gambling dens. The one in the fourth township had no family
and did not farm. Now they have all been allocated land. None of them
has worked in the government since the revolution.
(4) Horoscopists: There was only one in the fourth township; no family;
did not farm; specialized in fortune-telling; received land allocation.
(5) Kuan-yin [Goddess of Mercy] pickers: There was one in the first
township; land was allocated to him.
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(6) Taoist priests: three in the first township; all had families; did not
farm; performed religious work: two in the second township; neither had
family; did not farm; one in the third township; had family; did some
farming. All six priests were allocated land. Tseng Yun-chang was a
priest; joined the revolution the year before last; no family; no farm;
became general commander of Hsing-kuo-Kan-hsien-Wan-hsien guerrilla force
in the 2d month this year; "most resourceful; able; never defeated in
battle"; now assigned to the 22d Army.
(7) Monks: Two in the fourth township, each occupying a temple; collected
rent to live on. Originally from Kao-hsing Market. After the revolution,
they returned to Kao-hsing Market where land was allocated.
(8) Entertainers: They gave puppet shows. One in the third township;
had family; farmed; now serving with the 20th Army. Two in the fourth
township; had families; farmed; now working in the village government.
All three were allocated land.
(9) Fortune-tellers: One in the first township; single; has brothers;
joined the revolution last year; has been serving as propaganda section
chief in the township government since the 2d month this year. Two in the
second township; one of them blind; both had families. Their wives farmed
and they told fortunes. Land was allocated to them. Blind man Ch'en Hsin-po
was "a famous fortune-teller." For his accuracy in telling the fortune of
a magistrate, the magistrate gave him 10 yuan." As he was blind, he
received a double-share of land--14 ku. There were four fortune-tellers
in the third township; all had families. Three of them farmed and one did
not. The families did the farming while they told fortunes. Now, three
of them work in the government. Tseng Ch'ing-lung, one of them, joined
the revolution in the 2d month last year, "most articulate," has been
serving as land section chief in the district government and performing well.
He formerly had several ku of land which he rented to his uncle; unmarried.
Chi'iu Ta-yang, the second one, joined the revolution in the 2d month
this year; no farm nor family; now serving as judge in the third township
government; very honest. The third one, Ch'iu Po-ch'eng, had several
shih of land; married; joined the revolution in the 2d month this year;
now serving as propaganda officer in the township government. There
were 17 fortune-tellers altogether.
The nine categories of vagrants discussed above, totaling 90 persons,
generally welcomed the revolution. Not only did none of them resist the
revolution, but 10 of them have joined the district or township government
in leadership work and one has become a guerrilla commander. This is
noteworthy.
The vagrants have gained many benefits in the revolution. Aside from the
nine categories discussed above, the district has no other vagrants.
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(1) Unit of division: All four townships used the village as the unit to
divide the farmland. As the townships are large and have many mountains,
it would have been difficult to take each township as one unit, because the
great distances would make it impractical to farm. The peasants preferred
to get a little less land in their own village rather than going to
another village. In villages where the farmland was less and the hills
more, each person received a little less farmland and a little more hills,
and vice versa. The result was "not much difference."
(2) Method of division: The "order from above" was to complete the
division in 3 days. Actually, it was completed in the first and third
townships in 7 days, and the second and fourth in 8 days. (The time was
too short.)
The first township has 15 villages, the second and fourth 7 villages each,
and the third 8 villages. At the beginning of the division, the district
government sent propaganda officers to the villages to hold mass meetings.
Notice was given half a day in advance to call the people together. The
men came, but not the women and children under 10 years of age. The
propaganda officers explained to the people the benefits and methods of
burning the deeds and dividing the land. One propaganda officer could
hold mass meetings in two different villages in a day. At that time, the
reaction of the people attending the meetings was: "It certainly sounds
good, but we don't know whether the regulations are stable or not." Some
said: "The documents (contracts) are burned; the debts are cancelled.
While land division, thanks to the Red Army, is good, it may not be
reliable. Now that the land is divided, most likely we will have to pay
rent." At the mass meetings, a village government chairman, a secretary,
a finance section chief, a land section chief and two executive secretaries,
an organization section chief, a propaganda section chief, a grain
section chief, a military affairs section chief, and a communications
officer were elected. The Yang-fang village government of the first
township was elected at the mass meeting in the forenoon of the 25th day
of the 2d month, lunar calendar. The propaganda officer left for another
village. The masses (60 or 70 out of the total population of over 180 in
the village attended the meeting) adjourned for lunch. Returning in the
afternoon, the village government called a meeting. Chairman Chung En-ming
(an independent laborer; no farm; worked as cook; made beancakes to sell;
made rice candies to sell at shows in other areas) served as chairman of
the meeting. The following items were decided on:
(a) Ask the wealthy families for donations for use as village government
expenses. This matter to be handled by the finance section.
(b) No grain may be shipped out of the village. This matter to be handled
by the grain section.
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(c) Concentrate all weapons of the village. This matter to be handled by
the military affairs section.
(d) Make land surveys and divisions. This matter to be handled by the
land section.
The 4 days between the 26th and the 29th were devoted to land survey. Land
section chief Fu Chi-t'ing (a member of the survey committee) led land
executive secretaries Chung En-sheng and Chung En-jen (both poor peasants)
and the four unit chiefs (the village was divided into four units, every
10 households per unit) to check the farmland by households and record
the locations and sizes of the farms. The survey was completed in 4 days
and the total area of farmland ascertained. Dividing the total by the
number of population in the village, they obtained the area per person.
c Fu Hua-lung owned 230 tan of land, completely farmed by himself; 10 mouths
to feed; owed over 300 yuan in debts; hired one cowherd; had one large
buffalo. His land was inferior; actually could only harvest over 140 tan.
He needed half of that to feed the 10 members of the family, leaving the
remaining half as surplus. After paying interests on the debts and rent
on the land (a part of which was not very productive) amounting to over
40 tan, he had around 30 tan left over. He was, therefore, a middle
peasant with some surplus. Chung Hsien-hui farmed his own 70-odd tan of
land, feeding three. In the past, he had money to lend, but last year
he used up his money to build a house. He hired a regular help for 6 months
out of the year. Besides feeding his family, he had a surplus of over
30 tan every year. He was also a middle peasant. He had four brothers,
not living together. Besides him, one of them could make a living, but the
remaining three had a hard time. Now, Fu Hua-lung and Chung Hsien-hui com-
plained that the survey was unfair, and that their farms were over-rated.
The several dozen poor peasants, hired help, and workers all objected to
their complaint and declared the survey of the land section correct. The
three rich peasants at the meeting all obeyed the dispositions and kept
quiet. Everyone approved the results of the survey and immediately wanted
to "shovel out" so much from a certain household to be given to a certain
other household and to "shovel in" so much by a certain household from a
certain other household. Those households which had to surrender land
decided on the part to be surrendered; therefore, they surrendered the
inferior portions. As the struggle was not yet intensive at that time,
those who obtained inferior land were so pleased to get land at all that
they did not complain. The meeting on that day did the work of "taking
the surplus to supplement the shortage." After division, the village
government secretary recorded it in books, without posting. From the
25th day of the 2d month to the 1st of the 3d month, the land division
? was completed in 7 days.
After division, "immediate transfer" or "fall transfer" became a struggle
between the poor and rich peasants. At the time of land division in the
2d month, it was after seeding, before transplanting and in the midst of
plowing. Most of the transfers were done immediately. However, some rich
peasants wanted to see which way the wind blew and hoped that the pacifi-
cation force would return and nullify the division. They told the poor
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peasants: "I have already fertilized and plowed. Let us not transfer this
year. Let me harvest before transfer, and I will give you 40 percent of
the harvest." Some of the poor peasants accepted the proposal, feeling that
it was a good deal to get 40 percent without doing anything. Some of the
hired help and workers actually could not immediately take over the land to
farm. Therefore, about 10 percent in the district followed the "40 percent"
method and did not take an immediate transfer.
2. Division of Hills
Land was divided between the end of the 2d month and the beginning of the
3d month. The hills were not divided until the end of the 5th month.
In Yang-fang Village, the hills began to be divided on the 27th day of the
5th month, because the order from above did not arrive until then. (Note
how great is the effect of the order from above!) The township government
sent propaganda officer Liu Ta-lun (intellectual; eager in work; but was
discovered, on the 17th day of the 8th month, to be secretary of the AB
League; killed by the district government; 11 persons of the AB League were
killed on that day. Probably a mistake to kill someone like Liu Ta-lun)
to the village to hold a mass meeting and propagandize the method of
dividing the hills. Seven new land executive secretaries were elected and
hill division was decided on. On that day, the propaganda officer reported
on the matter of the poor people's loan office. It was decided that it would
be carried out.
Hill division was even more difficult than land division. As there were big
and small hills, more or less firewood, big or small trees, or no tree at
all, it was difficult to divide. The land section chief and the seven
executive secretaries went out together, covered all the hills in the village,
and decided on the method. Instead of dividing by area, the hills would be
divided according to the amount of oil-bearing tea plants therein contained.
One tan of "t'ao" (1 tan of tea-seed worth 2 strings of coppers, is known
as 1 tan of "t'ao") was taken as the unit. Thirty big plants, 60 medium
ones, or 120 small ones were considered as 1 tan of "t'ao." The hills of the
entire village were converted into "t'ao," then evenly divided among the
population and marked by stakes. In Yang-fang Village, it took 4 days to
divide the hills clearly. The eight men of the land section had the
authority to do the division, "not according to the opinions of the
individuals, because the matter would never be settled if everyone had his
say."
In Ch'ang-chiao Village in the third township, the village government issued
2.10 yuan to the five men of the land section (one chief and four executive
secretaries) for. meals, and it took them over 30 days to complete the
division. "One can see how difficult it was!"
Though the hills were divided, only the branches of the trees could be cut,
not the trunks. Government approval was required to cut down trees.
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With the village as the unit and according to the size of the ponds, the
people were formed into teams to stock the ponds with fingerlings. Five
households formed one team for a big pond and three households for a small
pond. One team took charge of one pond. All the households would do the
stocking at the same time with the same number of fingerlings, and the
fish, when caught, would be divided evenly. Water for the ponds in the
district was no problem; the problem was fish. Some few mountain ponds had
a water problem. Thus, mountain ponds which could support fish were divided
according to the above method. For those which could not, they were
assigned along with the farms, and whoever owned the farm owned the pond.
The fingerlings stocked before the revolution would not be divided when grown
and caught, but belonged to the persons stocking them. When the ponds
became dry in the winter this year, the original owners would catch the
fish. Only then would the new owners stock the ponds.
4. Division of Houses
In principle, houses should be divided. Many poor peasants with families
of 10 or more members lived in two or three rooms. Generally speaking,
the housing of 60 percent of the poor peasants was inadequate; the good
houses were all occupied by the rich peasants. The poor peasants all
clamored for division of houses, but the government said: "No official
communication from above." So, the poor peasants did not dare to go and
live in the rich peasants' houses. At the mass meeting in Yang-fang
Village, the poor peasants demanded division of houses. The land section
chief said: "Those with more rooms should give up a few to those not
having enough." But there was no resolution. The rich peasants refused
to yield, and the poor peasants did not dare to force the matter. (One
can see the importance of "communication from above!"
The division of houses should be done with each village taken as a unit.
For adjacent houses, those with more rooms should give some to those
with less rooms.
In the district, only the houses of landlords, rich peasants and unscrupulous
merchants who had been killed or expelled due to their reaction--if such
houses had not been burned (burning was not right)--were occupied by the
poor peasants, but there was no formal allocation. As for those who had
not been killed or expelled, even if they had extra rooms, such rooms
were not given to those with less rooms.
In regard to the houses of counterrevolutionary landlords and rich peasants
which were burned (burned by the guerrillas), there were 1 in the first
township, 2 in the second, 5 in the third and 4 in the.fourth, altogether
12, including the houses of three landlords and nine rich peasants. In
regard to houses of revolutionary workers and peasants which were burned
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(burned by counterrevolutionaries), none in the first township, 7 in the
second, 8 in the third and 8 in the fourth, altogether 23, including the
houses of 1 middle peasant, 20 poor peasants, 1 small merchant and 1 vagrant.
In the land division in the 2d month, public land was reserved in every
township and every village. In the first township, over 10 tan of land
were reserved in Yang-fang Village and over 30 in Ch'an-kan Village. In
the second township, 11 tan were reserved in Chih-ko Village. In
Ch'ang-chiao Village of the third township, as land was scarce and 16 persons
had not been allocated land, no public land was reserved. All other villages
reserved public land. In Hou-ching Village in the fourth township, over
100 tan of land were reserved, the entire parcel suffering from flood. Why
was public land reserved? First, the remainder after division was hard
to dispose of; thus, it was reserved. For example, if everyone received
7 tan, with a remainder of 10-odd tan, if divided, it would not be enough
to let everyone have 1 t'ung [2729] each; therefore, the remainder was
reserved as public land. Second, it helped pay government expenses. Third,
it was in anticipation of sons to be born next year. There would be a
re-division in the 8th month, because official communication from above
ordered thorough division, including the public land.
Actually, it would have been better not to reserve public land. First, as
there are deaths as well as births, there is no worry of giving birth to a
son without a farm. Second, the government will get its revenue by land
taxes; it does not have to rely on public farms for its expenses. Further-
more, as shown by the examples in the 2d month, all the public land reserva-
tions are inferior and not very useful. Therefore, it is better to divide
all the land so that the peasants can get greater benefit.
The villages varied. In Yang-fang Village of the first township, for
instance, each person received 5-6 tan of land (8 tan in the 2d month, but
actually only 5-6 tan of grain could be harvested). In Ch'a-kan Village,
each person received 8 tan. In Chih-ko Village in the second township,
each person received 7 tan. In Ch'ang-chiao Village in the third township,
the amounts in the 2d and 8th months were different. In the 2d month,
there were four different allocations, 7 tan, 6 1/2 tan, 5 1/2 tan, and
4 tan 1 t'ung. The division was initially done on the basis of surnames.
and people with more land refused to yield their land to people of different
surnames. Not until the 8th month was the land divided with each village
considered as one unit, each person receiving 6 tan. In Hou-ching of the
fourth township, each person received 8.5 tan in the 2d month. When the
land was re-divided in the 8th month, inferior land which was previously
counted as 2 tan but produced 1 tan was considered as 1 tan only. There
were also people returning from out-of-town. As a result, each person
received only 7.5 tan.
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Hsing-kuo produces only one crop a year. According to the amount of land
discussed above, there was barely enough .for everyone. By planting miscel-
laneous grains and raising pigs, the people could supply themselves with
oil, salt, cloths and sundry goods.
The major miscellaneous grain of the district is sweet potato, constituting
40 percent of the staple food of the people. The first township produces
relatively less sweet potato, because of the soil. It constitutes only
20 percent of the staples. The second and third townships are entirely
different, the percentage of sweet potato consumed by the people as staple
food amounts to from 50 to 70 percent. Shredded potatoes mixed in rice
are eaten all year round. The people of the fourth township eat an
average of 40 percent sweet potatoes.
V. Land Tax
Known as "public welfare fund," land tax began to be collected at the
beginning of the 8th month (lunar calendar): 1 percent on 6 tan of land
(6 sheng per person), 1.5 percent on 7 tan of land, 2,5 percent on
8 tan of land (2 tou per person), and 3.5 percent on 9 tan of land (3,15 tou
per person). No one in the district has 9 tan of land; therefore, the
highest rate of public welfare fund is 2.5 percent.
Yang-fang Village of the first township has a population of over 180, each
allocated 8 tan of land (according to the figures of land division in the
2d month). At 2.5 percent, the total collection was 36.4 tan. The
397 population of Ch'a'-kan Village each received 8 tan of land, and the
total tax collection was 79.4 tan. No tax was collected on the 5.5 tan of
land per person in Ch'ang-chiao Village in the third township. (Tax
was collected on 6 tan of land or more.) This year the district will
probably collect around 1,000 tan in taxes.
The taxes collected in the 8th month are mostly deposited in the villages.
A portion was delivered to the township government, but none to the district
government. During tax collection in the 8th month, the county government,
in its official communication, permitted the people to pay in grain or cash
by converting grain into cash at the conversion rate of 30 wen [2429] for
1 catty of grain. As the market price at that time was only 20 wen per catty,
no one wanted to pay in cash.
When the public welfare fund was first collected, 10 percent of the people
objected to it. When the officials came to their houses, they said:
"You said before that we were to resist rents and taxes, but now you are
collecting taxes again!" When collecting the public welfare fund, the
order from above was very urgent, allowing 3 days to deliver the grain
to the township government. The township government summoned the land
section chiefs of the villages for a meeting. The first township was
divided into nine Red Guards brigades, and one member of each brigade
(land section chief) attended the meeting. It was decided that the
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responsible persons of the villages should hold meetings and collect the
taxes after the meeting. No mass meeting was held. Each brigade was taken
as a unit for tax collection. The 8th brigade, for instance, was organized
by Yang-fang, Ling-yuan and Li-yao villages. The brigade leader, land
section chiefs, three team leaders and nine unit leaders proceeded to the
three villages and collected household by household (each village consti-
tuting a team). They measured the grain.at each household, at 90 catties
per tan, and the particular household delivered the grain to the township
government. The brigade collected almost 400 tan of grain in public welfare
fund. In Ch'a-kan Village of the 1st township, written notices were sent
to the households 2 days in advance, requesting them to deliver the public
welfare fund to the public granary. On due date, the households carried
the grain to the granary (formerly known as the public granary), and it
was received by the responsible person (five men) of the township. It took
them less than a day to complete the job, receiving a total of more than
70 tan of grain. It was announced in advance that whoever did not deliver
the grain on time would have to be responsible for the meal expenses of the
five responsible persons. To avoid such expenses, everyone delivered his
grain on time.
VI. Soviets
1. District Government
Committee members of the district government (2d to 6th month):
Chairman Liu Shao-piao: From the second township; did not farm; studied
Chinese boxing; could read a little; worked as a tailor but subsequently
quit; professional gambler; joined the revolution the year before last;
house burned by the pacification force; became judge when chairman was
replaced in the 7th month.
Military Affairs Officer Hsiao Chih-ch'un: From the second township; did
not farm; traveled to Kwangtung to sell eggs;.gambled; caretaker at
ancestral hall; no house; could not read much; joined the revolution the
year before last; became chairman of district government in the 7th month.
Treasurer Hou Li-hsin: From the second township; tailor; literate; became
district labor union committee chairman in the 7th month.
Organizer Liu Shao-ming: From the second township; a doctor; no other
occupation; well-to-do in the past, but subsequently the four brothers
separated; worked as doctor; owed debts; joined the revolution the year
before last; house burned by the pacification force; became treasurer in
the 7th month.
Propagandist Tsou Li-san: From Kan-hsien; rich peasant; six brothers;
middle school graduate; served as propaganda section chief; left for
Kan-hsien in the 7th month.
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Wang Chen-jen: From the second township; alias Tien Shang-jen; no occupa-
tion; lived by gambling; joined the revolution the year before last;
house burned by the pacification force; still serving as propaganda officer
in the 7th month.
Fang Kung-shu: From the 11th district; a scholar; occupation unknown;
house burned by the pacification force; returned to 11th district in the
7th month,
Hsiao Chih-ch'eng: From the second township; professional gambler; could
read a little; joined the revolution the year before last; suffered at the
hands of the pacification force; still with the district government in the
7th month, position unknown.
Ch'en Fang-pao: From the second township; tailor and gambler; illiterate;
joined the revolution the year before last; arrested in the 8th month
on suspicion of belonging to the AB League.
Judge Tseng Li-pang: From the second township; Taoist priest; no other
occupation; family poor; joined the revolution the year before last; general
commander of Hsing-Kan-Wan Guerrillas; now assigned to the 22d Army.
Culture Officer Tsou Li-tung: From the second township; once owned 600 to
of land; sold most of it for studying, leaving 100-odd ku; owed over
300 yuan in debts; a bankrupt big landlord; college graduate; joined the
revolution last year; still in charge of culture after reorganization in the
7th month.
Secretary-General Hsieh Ying-shan: From county seat; scholar; 50 years old;
remained in same position after reorganization in the 7th month.
Youth Vanguard Political Commissioner Hsiao Shao-wen: From the second town-
ship; professional gambler; could read a little; joined the revolution the
year before last; left for southwest Kiangsi after reorganization in the
7th month.
Youth Vanguard Director Ch'u Ch'ang-han: From the first township; rich
peasant; a "graduate"; last year the guerrillas assessed him a donation
and he joined the revolution; arrested in the 8th month on suspicion of
belonging to the AB League.
Huang Kuan: Scholar; background unknown; whereabouts unknown after reor-
ganization in the 7th month.
Ch'en Kun-t'ung: From the second township; father was a local rascal,
decreased; middle peasant and gambler; illeterate; joined the revolution
the year before last; farm seized by the pacification force; remained
in government after reorganization in the 7th month.
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Yang Ta-ch'eng: From the second township; was once.a tailor, but subse-
quently became a professional gambler; joined the revolution the year before
last; slightly literate; served as propaganda officer in the second town-
ship government after reorganization in the 7th month.
Women Section Chief Liu Ch'ao-ying: From the first township; laboring
woman; illiterate; left for southwest Kiangsi after reorganization in the
7th month.
Of the 18 persons above, there were 6 professional gamblers (2 were
previously tailors), 1 tailor and gambler, 1 tailor, 1 doctor, 1 Taoist
priest, 1 bankrupt big landlord, 2 rich peasants, 1 middle peasant, 3 scholars
of unknown background and 1 laboring woman of unknown background.
Among the 18, Liu Shao-piao, Hsiao Chih-ch'un, Liu Shao-ming, Wang Chen-jen,
Hsieh Ying-shan, Ch'en Kun-t'ung, Tsou Li-tung and Tseng Li-pang were most
authoritative and powerful.
The district government is located in Yung-feng Market.
Between the 2d and 9th months, there were held over 20 district mass meetings
and 2 district delegates' meetings (delegates elected at mass meetings of
the villages). There were few district mass meetings before the 6th month.
After the 6th month, as the struggles became intensified, many mass meetings
were held. After the 4th month, women and children all attended the mass
meetings.
2. Township Government
Goverment of the first township as an example:
Chairman Hsieh Chin-ming: Poor peasant and porter; owned very little land.
Treasurer Chung Kuo-ch'un: Middle peasant.
Military Affairs Officer Yang Ting-jung: Poor peasant; owned very little
land.
Propaganda Officer Hsieh Chung-k'ai: Poor peasant; owned land but in debt.
Propaganda Officer Hsieh Chung-mei: Owned land; farmed; made business
trips to Kwangtung; middle peasant.
Propaganda Officer Hsieh Hua-huan: Rich peasant; graduate of Hsing-kuo
county school.
Propaganda Officer Chen Fang-po: Poor peasant; tenant farmer; fortune-
teller.
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Secretary I Yung--hung; Father was a barber; impoverished; studied.
Judge Ch'en Yu-shu: From Lien-t'ang; studied.
Fu Chi-t'ing: Poor peasant.
Of the 10 persons above, there were 6 poor peasants, 2 middle peasants,
1 rich peasant and 1 scholar from outside,
Mass meetings in the township were much less frequent than the district--
less than 10 times.
Before the 4th month, women and children did not attend meetings, but they
did after the 4th month.
Some six or seven township delegates' meetings were held, attended by 30 to
40 persons per township, with one to two delegates from each village. Some
non-delegates from villages near the township government also attended.
Each meeting lasted 3 to 4 hours. The delegates expressed themselves quite
fully. The chairman was elected pro tempore.,
3. Village Government
There were village governments between the 2d and 5th months, because they
were needed for land division. Once the land was divided, it was no longer
necessary to have a village government. Furthermore, money would be needed
to run a government. Even if no meal was provided, there had to be some
operation expenses. After the revolution intensified and the land divided,
every 10 households were organized into a group, and there was also the
Red Guards brigade. Therefore, it was alright not to have a village govern-
ment.
4. Shortcomings of Government Personnel
(1) The first is bureaucraticism, putting on airs, and aversion to associat-
ing with the masses. When the people ask for information in the government,
the officials will say something when they feel like it, but when they don't,
they will ignore them altogether, or even accuse them of "making trouble.
(2) They sell the things belonging to the reactionaries which have been con-
fiscated instead of giving them to the poor. People without connections
in the government cannot buy them; only those with contact and who are
articulate can buy them. Furthermore, as the things are for sale, only
people with some money can buy them, and the hired help and extremely poor
peasants naturally have no share.
(3) They assign women to work in the government, always one or two in the
township government, and three or four in the district government. It is
a good thing for women to work in the government, but the choice is not
proper. If a woman is not pretty, even if she is articulate and capable,
she is not selected. On the other hand, if she is pretty, even if
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inarticulate and incapable, she is selected. It is the same when the
officials of the township government go to the villages to hold meetings.
They will talk to the pretty women and ignore the plain ones.
(4) This is the major point. It is the violation of the people's will.
Government committee members are decided by a few, and elections at the
delegates' meetings are mere formalities. In one instance, the chairman
asked the people to raise their hands if they approved of a certain person.
Some people did not raise their hands, and the chairman accused them of
belonging to the AB League. Another time, the chairman glared at those not
raising their hands and demanded to know why. Furthermore, only communist
party members may work in the government. The non-members, even if they
are mass leaders, cannot work in the government. (I told the people
attending the meeting that such bad things only happened in the early stage
of the land revolution, that one of the reasons was that the components
of government were not very good, and that there would be changes in the
future, because such bad things were not right.)
There were nine brigades in the first township, three in the second,
four in the third and four in the fourth. The method of organization was
as follows: 8 to 12 persons constituted a unit, 3 units a team and 3 teams
a brigade. Generally, a brigade consisted of 80 to 90 persons in the town-
ships of this district. The 8th brigade in the first township, for instance,
included the 1st team of Yang-fang, the 2d team of Ling-yuan and the 3d
team of Li-yao, totaling over 90 persons.
Members of the Red Guards were between the ages of 23 and 50.
All members of the Red Guards were men.
At the beginning, it was divided into regular and reserve Red Guards. Sub-
sequently, they were combined, without distinction of regular or reserve.
The tasks of the Red Guards were patrolling day and night in every village.
A patrol shed was required at the main entrance to every village. In
ordinary times, the Children's League and Young Pioneers patrolled in the
day time. The regulation called for five persons in one day, two from the
Girls' League, two from the Boys' League, and one from the Young Pioneers
doing the checking. The Young Pioneers must be literate, able to read the
passes. A pass was required of everyone, regardless of who, and it was
required even for traveling from village A to village B. Night patrol was
handled by the Red Guards, generally four persons a night, two persons per
shift, one shift taking the first half of the night and the other shift the
second half. When the situation became tense (as when the pacification
force advanced close to Chun-ts'un on the 7th day of the 7th month), the
Red Guards patrolled both day and night, and additional personnel were
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assigned patrol duty. Though still 4 or 5 in day time, they were increased
to 10 or more, or even 20 or more, at night.
Each Red Guards brigade had a commander, who must be the most earnest person
in the township and had some knowledge of military affairs, and a political
commissar, who must also be the most earnest person in the township and able
to read official documents.
Drills were previously required of the Red Guards. After organizing the
Red Army reserve in the 7th month, they were abolished.
The Red Guards was divided into men's and women's Red Guards. The 8th brigade
jointly organized by Yang-fang, Ling-yuan and Li-yao villages in the first
township, for instance, consisted of men's Red Guards 8th brigade and women's
Red Guards 8th brigade. The age limits for women were the same as for men,
but there were fewer members, because the number of women was smaller than
men, and the pregnant and nursing women were excluded. Generally, each con-
sisted of 40 persons (the third brigade of the second township) to 50 persons
(the 8th brigade of the first township; the 3d brigade of the third township).
Sometimes, it could be less than 40 or more than 50. Women Red Guards
ordinarily did not perform patrol duty. In emergencies when the men Red
Guards sallied forth (going out on combat duty was called "sallying forth"),
the women would handle the patrolling. The women Red Guards must also drill,
once a month, lasting 2 or 3 hours. The brigade leader and political commis-
sar were both women. Drilling was conducted by a member of the men's Red
Guards. When the able-bodied men in the Red Guards were organized into the
Red Army reserve in the 6th month, leaving some 10, 20 or 30 old weak per
brigade, drilling was abolished. For the men's Red Guards, there were a
commander and a political commissar in each township. They were not
stationed in the township government, but remained in their own homes. When
the occasion arose, they were assigned wherever needed. They must attend
the township-wide drills. The Red Guards of the various townships had held
township-wide drills twice.
2. Young Pioneers
Wherever there was a Red Guards brigade, there was a Young Pioneer brigade.
The members included both male and female, age 16 to 23. There were a
brigade commander and a political commissar. Each brigade consisted of three
teams, and each team three units. But the number of members was less than
that of a Red Guards brigade, ranging from 20 (Chi-ko village in the second
township, 30 (Ch'ang-chiao village of the third township), to 50 to 60 (the 3
villages in the first township including Yang-fang). Groups of 20 to 30 were
called teams; groups of 50 to 60 were called brigades. Since the 6th month,
courageous elements were selected and organized into the Red Army reserve
and the district Special Service Battalion. The remaining members of the
pioneers still had to drill, twice a month. Only the men's Red Guards no
longer had to drill since its able-bodied elements were organized into the
Red Army reserve.
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After the pioneers were organized into the Red Army reserve and district
Special Service Battalion, very few members were left. Some places did not
have a Young Pioneer at all (such as the three villages in the first
township, including Yang-fang; and Chih-ko village of the second township).
3. Children's League
There was no distinction of male or female. The age limit was 8 to 15.
Where there were Red Guards and Young Pioneers, there was a laboring
Children's League. Each village had a league leader, none in the townships
but one in the district.
The work of the Children's League was first, patrolling, next, checking on
opium smoking and gambling, and last, eliminating superstition and knocking
down buddha idols. The Children's League was most ruthless in checking
on opium smoking and gambling and in knocking down idols, They gave no
quarter, "truly handling public affairs in a public way." They attended
mass meetings. Their weapons consisted mainly of wooden guns, with a few
lances.
All members of the league were students of the people's school. The people's
school was started in the 7th month, five in the first township, three in
the second, seven in the third and one in the fourth, totaling 16. The
district government provided for three such schools in every township and
paid for the food of three teachers, 0.10 yuan, large currency, per day,
and 2 yuan, large currency, for expenses per month, totaling 5 yuan, large
currency, per month. As the area of the first township was large, it was
permitted to have five schools. The third township had many hills, and
three schools were not enough; therefore, they had four additional ones,
totaling seven, but the expenses were still limited to 15 yuan, averaging
2.10 yuan per school. The number of enrollment ranged from 20 or more to
120, usually over 40. The people's school jointly established by Yang-fang,
Ling-yuan and Li-yao villages of the first tonwship, for instance, had over
120 children between the ages of 8 and 15.
The housing was insufficient, and one teacher could not handle all of them;
therefore, many could not attend school. Only around 60 of the 120 were in
school. Originally, the three villages wanted to have three schools, but
they had no teachers in the villages, nor did they have the money to pay
for outside help. Therefore, they could not have three schools. The school
in Chu-chao-an Village in the third township had only 21 students.
Every village had a people's night school. Each school had one teacher,
who was someone in the village who could read a little. He received no pay,
pursuing his own occupation at home during day time and teaching at night.
Fu Chi-t'ing of Yang-fang and Chung Te-wu of Ch'ang-chiao were both night
school teachers. The number of students varied. The school in Yang-fang
had 40 students. The students were of all ages, old, adult and young.
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Most of the night schools had women students, about one-third. Some did not
have women students, such as Ch'a-kan Village of the first township and
Hou-ching Village of the fourth township. The Children's League was drilled
three times a week, under the direction of the people's school, "drilling
well."
4. Picket Units
The Picket Unit was organized by workers, one company per township, with
a company commander and a political commissar. The Picket Unit of the second
township consisted of 105 men. Yang-fang, Ling-yuan and Ch'a-shih (Ch'a-kan)
villages of the first township together had one platoon, consisting of 26 men.
5. Red Army Reserve
The Red Army reserve was organized from the strong and courageous elements in
the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers, two companies per township, totaling
eight companies in the district. Each company consisted of several dozen
to over 100 men. The two companies in the first township had over 100 men
each. For the Hsin-yu campaign this time, all the eight companies of the
10th district participated. After its formation in the 7th month, the
reserve was responsible for the advances on Ch'i-fang, Lang-ch'uan and Kan-chou,
and on Hsin-yu this time. When the reserve was away on a campaign, the Red
Guards, the Young Pioneers, and the Children's League were responsible for
village patrolling. Upon its return, the reserve again joined the patrol.
The eight companies of the district formed a regiment, with a regiment
commander and a political commissar. In ordinary times, there was no
battalion. The 1st and 2d companies belonged to the first township, the
3d and 4th companies to the second township, the 5th and 6th companies to
the third township, and the 7th and 8th companies to the fourth township.
For the Hsin-yu campaign this time, three battalions were formed, with the
1st, 2d and 3d companies as the 1st battalion, the 4th, 5th and 6th companies
as the 2d battalion, and the 7th and 8th companies as the 3d battalion, led
by battalion commanders and political commissars. Each company had four
porters, eight cooks, one to two messengers, one orderly, one bugler (unable
to bugle), but no horse. Each company also had two propaganda officers, with
the duties of talking and writing slogans. The battalion headquarters had
no propaganda officer, aide or messenger. The regimental headquarters had
three propaganda officers, one aide and two messengers. Members of the three
battalion headquarters lived together with those of the regimental head-
quarters, sharing their meals. Weapons were lances and shotguns.
6. District Special Service Battalion
It consisted of three companies, beginning to be organized in the 7th month,
also selected among the Red Guards and Young Pioneers. Organized from the
younger and more courageous elements, it was better than the Red Army
Reserve. The members had organization and training, but were not regularly
concentrated. Ordinarily they remained at home pursuing their own occupation.
Three large drills were held every month, on the 2d, 12th and 22d days.
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When needed, they were mustered to go out on campaigns. Currently, the
1st and 3d companies were out fighting in Lang-ch'uan; the 2d company remained
at home. Their weapons were mainly shotguns, native rifles, native cannons,
some lances, but no regular rifle. The battalion headquarters was at the
district government. The battalion had a commander and a political commissar.
7. Red Army Independent Regiment
Hsing-kuo organized a total of three independent regiments, all presented to
the Red Army. Also selected among the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers;
they were the same in excellency as the Special Service Battalion. They
were all young people and volunteers. Each regiment consisted of over
1,000 men. The regiments, battalions and company all had commanders and
political commissars. The regiments underwent concentrated training at
the county seat, and the members awaited assignment to the Red Army. They
were all unarmed.
o "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," Vol 1, 1947 edition
* "Rural Survey," Liberation Press, July 1949
Footnote: This article "Rural Survey"
Page 186 At the end of the Introduction in "Rural Survey," there
is the following notation: Mao Tse-tung, 26 January 1931, at Ning-tu
Hsiao-pu-yu, recorded after editing.
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DUTIES OF GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RED
ARMY POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS AND COMMISSARS
Order No 6 of the Revolutionary Military Commission, 17 February 1931
[Text] To organize a revolutionary war, a war to destroy the warlords, is
currently the central task of the revolution. To carry out this task, we
must create an iron Red Army, and win over the broad masses of the people;
accordingly the strengthening of political education in the Red Army, so
that commanders and fighters will understand their tasks and resolutely
carry them out, and at the same time intensified propagandizing and
organization of the masses, and mobilization of the broad masses within
the war zone to arise and struggle, have become our most pressing tasks.
These tasks are performed by the Red Army's political commissars and
political departments. To oversee these tasks for Red Army units in all
areas, a General Political Department is necessary. At present the Red
Army units throughout the country have made great progress; but unifying
and strengthening their political direction have become a pressing need.
To meet this need, we have set up a General Political Department in this
Commission under the chairmanship of Mao Tse-tung. Out of practical
necessity, this. Commission's General Political Department will also serve
temporarily as the First Front Army's General Political Department.
The General Political Department will direct the Red Army's political de-
partments and guide the political work of the political commissars. The
Red Army political departments must give absolute obedience to the
General Political Department's orders. Orders relating to political work
must likewise be accepted and obeyed by the political commissars. Every
Red Army political department must make reports to the General Political
Department regularly and through channels. Political commissars may make
reports to political commissions at higher levels, but in addition they
must make reports on political work to the political department at the next
higher level. Organizationally, the Red Army political departments and
political commissars have their own individual organization systems, but in
their work the lower-level political departments take orders from the
upper-level political departments, and at the same time they must also
follow the orders of the political commissars at the same level; the
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lower-level political commissars take orders from the upper-level political
commissars, but in political work they also follow the orders of the upper-
level political department.
Chairman Hsiang Ying
Vice-Chairmen Chu Teh, Mao Tse-tung, 17 February 1931
o Collected Documents of the Red Bandits (8)
Printed at office No 2, Nan-Ch'ang Military Headquarters of the Chairman
of the Military Affairs Commission, People's Government April, 1934
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NO INVESTIGATION, NO RIGHT TO SPEAK, NO PROPER INVESTIGATION AND NO RIGHT TO
SPEAK
Notice of General Political Department on Social Investigation No--2 April 1931
[Text] All Red Army Political Departments and Local Governments at All Levels
We have now drawn up population and land investigation forms. In the main,
these call for statistics on the proportions of land and population by class,
so as to answer more concretely and with ironclad facts many of our current
questions.
In the past, investigation of the actual facts was frequently scorned in
many localities, and work plans were drawn up and used to direct the work
of lower levels merely on the basis of things thought up out of thin air.
As a result the plans could not be carried out and leadership went wrong.
If we can now fill in these forms with correct statistics, arrived at by
close attention to reality, we will be able to solve many of our problems.
In particular, there are a number of practical land distribution problems
in connection with which we hope that Red Army political departments will
carefully fill in information for all localities and local governing organs
will fill in information for each township. We especially hope that every
responsible person in the Red Army and the government will at all times and
places perform these investigations and do these statistics.
Just what is needed to make the data from these investigations really correct?
First, it is necessary to have a deep understanding of this work and a clear
idea of its importance before one can undertake it in earnest.
Second, it the investigators must investigate a village painstakingly; they
must seek out the records of population and land surveys made for land
distribution; they must seek out the members of the land committee that
carried out the land distribution and people who are well acquainted with
the situation in the village; they must begin by clearly distinguishing the
class nature of each family and each field (whether it belongs to a landlord,
rich peasant, middle peasant or poor peasant...), and then calculate things
out strictly, filling in the form with the actual numbers.
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Third, the comrades sent out by the higher government levels to direct the
survey, or the responsible persons of the political departments, must explain
clearly to the persons assigned the investigation work the content of the two
forms and the points for attention when investigating. In particular they
must explain that: the standard for a rich peasant is that he depended upon
exploitation for a sizeable part of his income; those who are engaged in extend-
ing credit or lending money to others are still classed as middle peasants,
and those who were hired laborers (before the revolution) and have rented
some land to cultivate are poor peasants; those none of whose family does
any farming but who rely upon their independent labor (tailors, carpenters,.
etc.) to make a living are called independent laborers; those who do some
farming and some artisan work are classed as poor peasants, middle peasants
and rich peasants according to their economic status; free tradesmen and
vagrants are distinguished by the fact that free tradesmen practice some
specific trade (as doctor, teacher), while vagrants have no fixed occupation
or mode of life, but all do a good deal of mischief.
If all of these items are not clearly understood during the investigation, the
investigators will not know how to do their jobs properly, and will surely
get the class composition wrong and get wrong values in the statistics.
When these two forms, for land and population, are filled out in close
cordination, care should be taken that the individual or group fills them
out correctly. They should then be mailed directly to the General Political
Department of the Central Military Commission. Our slogan is:
1. No investigation, no right to speak;
2. No correct investigation, also no right to speak.
Chairman, General Political Department, Central Military Commission,
Mao Tse-tung 2 April 1931
o Direction on Social Investigation Notice--2 April 1931
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QUESTION OF OPPOSING RICH PEASANTS
Notice Number 2 of Central Revolutionary Military Commission, 1931
[Text] 1. Reasons for Opposing the Rich Peasants
First, rich peasants are rural semi-landlords and capitalists, and an exploit-
ing class. They support feudal power and want to be capitalists, and are
entirely in opposition to the interests of the workers, hired farm laborers,
poor peasants and the mass of middle peasants. In order to guard the
interests of the workers, hired farm laborers, poor peasants and middle
peasants, we must oppose the rich peasants.
Second, the rich peasants are an exploiting class. They are constantly in
close collusion with reactionary power in an attempt to undermine the
revolution. To consolidate the soviet governments and protect the victory
of land reform, we must oppose the middle peasants.
Third, the rich peasants are taking the capitalist road. We are taking the
socialist road. Therefore, they are completely opposite to us, and in order
to make the revolution advance to the road of socialism we must intensify
the struggle to oppose the rich peasants.
2. Errors in Opposing the Rich Peasants
In an examination of opposition to the rich peasants in the past, four major
errors appear:
First, opposition to exploitation was not taken as the test, and opposition
to the rich peasants was treated as a speical form of fund-raising. Rather
than exploitation, possession of money was used as the test. Money tests,
in which for example people with less than 100 yuan were not beaten, but
those with more than 100 yuan were beaten, were used by brigades, and in a
minority of places it got to the point that people with more than 20 cash or
an old sow got beaten, which terrified the masses and made them think the
revolution was. to make everybody poor instead of making everybody rich and
improving their lives.
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Second, there were encroachments on the middle peasants. The second fault,
of encroaching on the middle peasants' interests, grew out of the first
fault. Middle peasants are those who have enough land and enough food and
are not exploited by anyone, but also do not go out and exploit anyone else.
Not only should these people not be encroached upon, but we should link up
closely with them instead and all oppose the rich peasants together. Since
the middle peasants will only join a revolution led by the proletariat,
our revolutionary power can only reach its full force and the revolution
can only develop rapidly when we unite with them.
Third, the rich peasants' lands were not thoroughly redistributed. In many
places the land distribution was conducted just by taking away excesses and
making up deficiencies rather than by taking away from rich lands and
compensating poor lands. When the rich peasants held such things as good
lands, woodland, dwellings and ponds, these were not thoroughly distributed.
As a result the rich peasants were in a favored position economically and
got hold of political leadership. The soviets' governments and the revolu-
tionary groups were captured by the rich peasants, who then used their
political and economic power to exploit and oppress and impoverish the
peasant masses.
3. The Correct Method of Opposing the Rich Peasants
a. Politically
First, consolidate proletarian leadership. The soviet governments and Red
Army and Red Guards units should prevent rich peasants from acting as
committee members in the soviet governments or representatives to the soviet
assemblies. They should elect leaders of the workers, farm laborers and
poor peasants and the most activist elements of the middle peasants to
deliberate and take action; they should also organize poor peasants'
associations and unite the broad masses of poor peasants and the middle
peasants in a good alliance to oppose the rich peasants. All those who
have encroached on the middle peasants' interests or fined them or taken
money from the poor peasants must make restitution, and the lawless exactions
of brigands, which have no class nature and are divorced from the masses
must be opposed. If these things continue to happen, they will assuredly be
punished by the authorities.
Second, put down rich peasant reaction. The rich peasants are an exploiting
class, and are sure to use every available means to oppose and subvert the
revolution. Accordingly, in the soviet areas, constant and strict attention
should be paid to preventing rich peasant reaction; as soon as any rich
peasant counterrevolutionary organization, such as the Ya-pi-t'uan, etc.,
is found conspiring with the White bandits, plotting reactionary activity,
trying to subvert the revolution, etc., the government must punish it
strictly as being counterrevolutionary. The rich peasants will be allowed
to live and pursue their livelihood only if they obey all laws of the
soviets and refrain from counterrevolutionary conspiracies or activities.
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b. Economically
First, oppose exploitation by the rich peasants. At present, opposition to
the rich peasants is not destruction of the rich peasants, but chiefly a
resolute opposition in the economic sphere to all their exploitative acti-
vities, because these activities have increased the hardships of our
workers and poor peasants. The rich peasants will be allowed to hire
laborers, so long as they treat them in accordance with the Laws for
Protection of Labor. They may not treat them harshly. They may also engage
in business, but will not be allowed to hold back on buying or selling or
to lend money at high interest. These more specific methods should be deter-
mined by the county government and preferably by the county assembly, in
accordance with local conditions. A program of this sort is not meant to
eradicate capitalism but to oppose cruel exploitation by capitalists and
to stimulate the vigorous development of social economics. In the cases
where exaction of money from the rich peasants is unavoidable, this should
be done only for revolutionary needs. The rich peasants should bear what
they can afford. But at present we are not eradicating the rich peasant
economy. As to the rich peasants' lands, they should all be distributed
evenly.
Second, an economic policy should be carried out. The limiting of rich
peasant exploitation discussed above is still a passive method. But merely
passive opposition to poor peasants is not enough; we must also carry out
an economic policy, in accordance with the social situation, to actively
oppose the rich peasants. For instance, the government should lead the
masses in running loan cooperatives that lend money to the impoverished masses
at low interest, in running production cooperatives to develop products, and
in running trade cooperatives so as to lessen the exploitation carried on
between businessmen and rich peasants. Such organizations actively oppose
exploitation by rich peasants. If we help the broad impoverished masses
take this step toward liberation, we are preparing social economics to
develop toward socialism.
4. Guard Against Lingering Evils
Our earlier pointing out of errors in opposing middle peasants, and the
statement that we are not now eradicating the rich peasants, should not lead
people to take opposing the rich peasants lightly. On the contrary, everyone
should understand the policy of opposing the rich peasants and should oppose
them even more intensely. In rectifying policies, we should prevent rich
peasant elements and their helpers hidden in the revolution from easing up
on the work of opposing the rich peasants. Even more important, the rich
peasants should be prevented from taking the opportunity to oppose the government.
Chairman Hsiang Ying
Vice Chairmen Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, 1931
0 Secret Red Bandit Documents, Correction # 5
Printed by Organization Department of First Bandit Extermination Pro-
paganda Office, Army and Navy GHQ.
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