GHANA: OUTLOOK FOR THE RAWLINGS REGIME

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Directorate of . 25X1 Secret
AA Intelligence Assessment
Secret
ALA 82-10106
July 1982
6-61
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Ghana: Outlook for
the Rawlings Regime
This assessment was prepared b
with a contribution from both of
the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, West and East Africa
Division, ALA,
This report has been coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Operations.
Secret
ALA 82-10106
July 1982
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Ghana: Outlook for
the Rawlings Regime
Key Judgments Lt. Jerry Rawlings's regime, which came to power in December 1981, in
our estimation offers a greater opportunity for Communist countries and
Libya to nurture a radical, anti-Western regime in Ghana than has existed
at any time since the overthrow of leftist President Nkrumah in the mid-
1960s. We believe the consolidation of radical control in Ghana could
enable Libya, Cuba, and the Soviet Union to gain a sufficient foothold to
use the country as a base for subversion of Ghana's moderate neighbors at
the expense of Western interests.
We see Rawlings as a transitional figure in a chaotic regime that is beset
by ideological, personal, and structural problems and has few results to
show after six months in power. In our view, Rawlings-a populist
visionary and professed admirer of Qadhafi-has exploitable weaknesses:
no clear idea of how to achieve his aim of an equal and prosperous society,
dependence on radical advisers, and preoccupation with his personal
security. We acknowledge that at this juncture, however, Rawlings
remains basically in charge because he has a larger following in the
military than does any other leader or faction making up the disparate
regime.
Although we detect no united opposition or immediate threat to the regime,
the situation remains unstable. We know that Ghanaian exiles in neighbor-
ing countries are trying to put aside differences and attract foreign support
for a coup attempt.
the economy continues to deterio-
rate. The few economic policies articulated by the regime are unlikely to
have much positive impact because they fail to address underlying
structural problems. Shortages of food, consumer goods, and industrial raw
materials are as serious as Western observers can remember. We believe
the armed forces, whose organization and discipline have deteriorated
sharply, are a source of anxiety for Rawlings because his regime can count
on the support of only a radical core within them.
In our view, radicals in Rawlings's entourage are ascendent over moder-
ates. We believe they will try to align Ghana more closely with Communist
states and Libya, with the aim of eventually having Ghana adopt a socialist
Information available as of 12 July 1982 25X1
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Secret
ALA 82-10106
July 1982
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economic system. Kojo Tsikata, the most influential radical and one with
leadership ambitions, is the man to watch, in our estimation.
the radicals, though still lacking a broad power
base, have succeeded in taking over the internal security apparatus and
government media, are busily implanting "people's defense committees"
throughout the country as the revolution's eyes and ears, and are deter-
mined to bring; students and labor under their domination.
Despite its professed nonalignment, we believe that the regime has kept
relations with the West cool and sought closer ties with Libya and
Communist states. There is circumstantial evidence of Libyan involvement
in Rawlings's coup, and we believe Ghana has received some arms,
ammunition, and military advisers from Tripoli in addition to Libya's
publicly announced gifts of food, medicine, and oil. Rawlings's progress in
eliciting Communist aid has been limited thus far. We cannot verify
allegations that Cuba will provide military training assistance. The Soviets
and East Europeans, however, have promised to reactivate old development
projects. Communist aid and influence probably will increase as Ghanaian
radicals consolidate further.
In conversations with the US Ambassador, Rawlings professes to wish to
continue cooperative relations with the United States. Nevertheless, he has
not curbed the anti-Western slant of Ghana's radical-dominated media.
What leverage the United States has with Ghana at present derives largely
from Washington's influence with the International Monetary Fund, which
Accra may approach for assistance, and from the modest US aid program,
mainly food.
In looking ahead, it is our assessment that Ghana is likely to shift further
to the left as radicals in the regime consolidate power and most likely
relegate Rawlings to a figurehead role. We also believe the regime could
easily drift into increasing anarchy. In our view, such a development could
impede short-term gains for the Libyans and Communist states, but in the
longer run it probably would afford them new opportunities for exploita-
tion. In our judgment, more repressive rule-whether dictated by growing
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economic discontent or by an abortive exile attack-would accelerate a
consolidation of power by the radicals and encourage them to turn more
sharply toward Libya and Communist states for aid.
We believe Rawlings's elimination in the near term, either by an overly ea-
ger radical faction or by a moderate-led countercoup, would increase the
risk of anarchy in the absence of an alternative figure capable of attracting
widespread support. In our view, the armed forces could easily collapse into
factional fighting and that Americans and other expatriates could become
targets of lawlessness.
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Internal Rivalries and Radical Drift 5
Opportunities for the Libyans, Cubans, and Soviets 8
West African Concerns and Vulnerabilities 11
Outlook and Implications for the United States 12
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Ghana: Outlook for
the Rawlings Regime
Introduction
US Embassy reporting since Rawlings's coup on 31
December 1981 has consistently portrayed Ghana as
a floundering and nearly bankrupt state. We believe
Rawlings is the only force holding the fragile regime
together at present, but his lackluster, indecisive
leadership has allowed the radical faction to gain the
upper hand and make inroads in key areas, including
internal security and the media. In our estimation, the
country appears to be drifting leftward, most notably
in its foreign policy stance and attempts to engender
public support through leftist "people's defense com-
mittees." Accordingly, this paper examines the eco-
nomic and political instability stemming from the
regime's indecision and drift, the growing influence of
the radicals in the regime, the opportunities for
Libyan and Communist inroads in Ghana and in its
moderate and pro-Western neighbors, and the impli-
cations for the United States of these developments.
The Regime's Major Worries
US Embassy reporting portrays head of state Rawl-
ings as preoccupied by security concerns growing out
of his fear of an attack by Ghanaian exiles, the
shattered state of the military, and the country's
continued economic decline. A US Embassy assess-
ment in July noted that at least one group inside
Ghana was plotting against the regime. Embassy
sources claim the regime's radical dominated security
services receive a near-constant stream of rumors and
reports of externally based coup plotting and internal
opposition. These sources say that security officials
are not above exaggerating such reports and rumors
to play on Rawlings's anxieties in attempts to manip-
ulate the regime in directions that serve their inter-
ests.
Ghanaian Exiles. Embassy eporting
from the region indicates that a sizable but ineffective
community of Ghanaian exiles exists in all states
bordering Ghana as well as in Nigeria and London
and that disparate opposition groups have sprung up
composed of ex-military and civilian officials of previ-
ous Ghanaian regimes. Neighboring countries have
given safe haven to Ghanaian refugees and political
asylum to ranking officials of the deposed Limann
government, but in our view they are wary of Ghana-
ian exile leaders seeking Rawlings's overthrow. In our
opinion, they do not wish to risk retaliation by giving
the exiles open support
Ghanaian
exiles are divided by tribal and regional rivalries with
no single leader or significant source of military or
financial support. Nonetheless, we would expect these
groups to strive to close ranks and sooner or later to
attempt a coup. Based on recent trips into the interior
of the country by the US Ambassador, the Embassy
reports that the populace in northern Ghana and the
Ashanti tribe in central Ghana-which feels under-
represented in the Rawlings's regime-wouk' ?"a?-,
The Economy. Even before the coup, Ghana's econo-
my was on a downhill slide, according to US mission
reporting:
? There has been no real economic growth since 1978.
? Exports of cocoa and gold-the two leading revenue
earners-have been falling because of depressed
world prices and declining production.
? Ghana amassed an external debt of more than $1
billion by 1981. 25X1
? Inflation-nearly 120 percent last year and 80
percent this year-has averaged an annual rate of
70 percent since 1975.
Under Rawlings's leadership, the government contin-
ues to have severe foreign financing difficulties be-
cause of reduced export revenues and international
banker reluctance to extend further credit. The US
Embassy estimates the lower cocoa production-the
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The coup on 31 December 1981 that brought former
Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings to power for the second
time in less than two and a half years represents the
latest attempt to rescue Ghana from some 25 years of
intermittent political and economic decay. Since be-
coming the first country in black Africa to win
independence from European colonialism in 1957,
Ghana has experimented with a variety of civilian
and military regimes. At first, the new nation ap-
peared to offer a model for emergent Africa with high
hopes for parliamentary democracy and economic
vitality. It was the spokesman for African liberation
and unity and aspired to build a modern industrial
state that would dominate Africa.
Today, Ghana labors under the heritage of internal
antagonisms and economic ruin bequeathed by the
late Kwame Nkrumah, its f first President and fore-
most leftist. Nkrumah, who was ousted by the Army
in 1966, managed to turn Ghana away from its
traditional friends and orient it toward the Commu-
nist world. In the process, he added a burden of some
$1 billion in external debt, and moved from parlia-
mentary democracy to increasingly corrupt one-man
rule.
Successive regimes returned Ghana to the Western
camp, but they were unable to stop further economic
deterioration. Unpopular economic reforms contrib-
uted to several coups, while mismanagement and
corruption took their toll. Like many other LDCs,
Ghana also suffered from the effects of sharp in-
creases in oil import prices and dampened demand
for exports of nonoil commodities. Ghana's key diffi-
culty, however, remained its inability to devise a
workable, lasting political system that would foster
economic recovery.
Jerry Rawlings previously ruled Ghana from June to
September 1979 as the chairman of the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council, a government made up
of junior officers and enlisted men. His 1979 coup
was a direct response to the economic mismanage-
ment and corruption that marked the previous eight
years of military rule. He quickly became a folk hero
to Ghana's military and civilian have-nots by cham-
pioning a populist "revolution" to stamp out corrup-
tion, extravagance, and malpractices that had
brought the country to the brink of collapse.
In practice, Rawlings produced few results. His popu-
larity eroded, and the regime became increasingly
bogged down in tribal infighting. His government
barely held together long enough to meet the Septem-
ber 1979 target.datefor return to civilian rule-a
date set by an earlier military regime that Rawlings
decided to honor. Months later, Rawlings confided to
a visiting Western journalist that he had come to
regret this decision, fearing that his "mistake" had
resulted in worsening economic conditions and more
hardship for the country's have-nots under Limann's
lackluster rule. By late 1981, US Embassy reporting
indicated that Limann had come under growing pub-
lic criticism and that active plotting had begun that
resulted in Rawlings's takeover.
a This background assessment of Jerry Rawlings's rise to power is
based on analysis provided by the US Embassy in Accra and by
academics who have observed Ghanaian politics firsthand while
teaching there.
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Leading Ghanaian Exiles
the following are the leading Ghanaian exiles
Former Maj. Boake Dian, a Brong tribesman from
west central Ghana, was the second-ranking member
of Rawlings's 1979 regime and now resides in Lon-
don. According to US Embassy reporting, he served
as Rawlings's principal spokesman and theoretician,
but broke with him by leading the regime's Akan-
speaking members into resisting Ewe domination.
The Embassy notes that Djan was primarily respon-
sible for pressing Rawlings to turn power over to
former President Limann. We regard Djan as having
mildly socialist views,
Former Gen. Joshua Hamidu is a northerner and a
former Chief of Defense Staff who has been in
voluntary exile since 1978. He is now regional direc-
tor in Nairobi for World Vision, a private voluntary
organization.
Former Maj. Gen. Emmanuel Erskine is a 55-year-
old southern Fanti tribesman residing in Jerusalem,
where he serves as Chief of Staff of the United
Nations Truce Support Organization. A British-
trained officer, he briefly commanded the Ghanaian
Army in the early 1970s before being assigned to
Lebanon, first in charge of Ghanaian peacekeeping
troops and later as commander of all UN forces until
1981.
1981-82 crop is the lowest since independence and the
second-smallest in more than 50 years-will reduce
total export earnings to $600-650 million in 1982,
about half the 1980 level but only slightly below last
year. Ghana had run up $590 million in overdue bills
by the end of February, according to the US Embas-
sy. Banks are refusing to issue new letters of credit
until some of the debt is repaid, and overseas suppliers
will not step in with their own financial arrangements.
Openly available international financial statistics
show that, at the end of April, Accra had about $200
million in international reserves available to offset its
debts 25X1
The US Embassy reports that severe shortages of
foodstuffs and other essential items are common in
most areas because of a lack of imports, the imposi-
tion of price controls, and increased enforcement of
antismuggling decrees. The period from June to
August is traditionally a lean one, as the harvest of
staple foods does not begin until September. To
ensure that available goods reach the market, Rawl-
ings has set up an agency to distribute 15 essential
items and has ordered house-to-house searches for
hoarded goods. 25X1
In our judgment, Rawlings so far has displayed only a.
little more aptitude for solving Ghana's economic
problems than he did during his short-lived regime in
1979. It took the current regime five months to
announce plans to tackle its domestic financial prob-
lems and to appoint a secretary for finance and
planning. The regime has adopted a new budget in
order to cut the deficit in half, but the Embassy
doubts that the roughly $350 million owed by the
cocoa marketing board to the Bank of Ghana is
included in it. Measures to control public expendi-
tures include a freeze on nonessential government
spending, the closure of a third of Ghana's foreign
missions, and the delay of all new public sector
construction. Any savings in public spending associat-
ed with these moves, however, will be more than offset
by costs associated with the tripling of cocoa producer
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GHANA: Ethnolinguistic Groups
505182 4-82
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Ethnolinguistic Groups
Akan Mole Dagbane
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The US Embassy believes, and we concur, that the
government's economic program will have only limit-
ed impact because it does not address the central
issue-the country's overvalued currency. Currency
devaluation is the principal measure prescribed by the
International Monetary Fund before an agreement
can be signed that would give Ghana access to $275
million in balance-of-payments support and pave the
DIA
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assassination plot against Rawlings in early March
involved several enlisted men plus some junior offi-
cers. The plot also included members of Rawlings's 25X1
fellow Ewe tribe, indicating that discontent is rising
even among his own ethnic group.
We believe Rawlings almost certainly will
continue to resist any hint of devaluation because of
the close linkage between currency reform and the
overthrow of previous Ghanaian regimes
The Military. The US Embassy reports that within
the military a core of enlisted men probably supports
Rawlings or at least his "revolution" with its promise
of economic betterment. But according to the Embas-
sy, the regime does not trust the majority of the
uncommitted and leaderless troops who remain idle in
barracks or wander the streets often abusing the
civilian population. We believe that as time passes
with no noticeable economic improvements, conditions
in the military are likely to deteriorate further and
the organizational integrity an alrea y imrte
combat capabilities of the armed forces have deterio-
rated considerably. The chain of command and disci-
pline have largely disintegrated and there is a scarcity
of uniforms and other basic equipment. Enlisted men
are in charge of most units and many officers-
especially those who are Western trained and hold
middle class values-have fled, retired, or been ar-
rested. Mutinies last February of a naval unit in
Sekondi and an Army battalion in Sunyani served to
Internal Rivalries and Radical Drift
The outstanding characteristic of the Rawlings re-
gime, in our view, is its lack of coherent structure and
policy direction. This has resulted in a chaotic system
of government which, in our estimation, cannot long
endure as presently constituted. According to US
Embassy reporting, the regime consists of disparate
elements that differ on government goals. These
elements include a core of enlisted men and lower
ranking officers who share Rawlings's vision of a
more equal and prosperous society, a few moderate
senior military officers who see a chance to eradicate
corruption and revitalize the armed forces, and lead-
ers of radical civilian fringe groups and student
activists who see the coup as an opportunity to move
Ghana leftward. (Key personalities are discussed in
appendix I.) 25X1
The US Embassy reports that a cumbersome govern-
mental structure, together with ideological and per-
sonality differences among regime members, have
hampered policy formulation and frequently para-
lyzed decisionmaking. The seven-member Provisional
National Defense Council (PNDC) chaired by Rawl-
ings is the supreme policymaking body. Aside from
Rawlings, only Chief of Defense Staff Brigadier
Nunoo-Mensah-the lone moderate-is widely
known and politically experienced, according to Em25X1
bassy sources. These sources regard the other five
members, three of whom are civilians, as radicals of
intensify officer apprehensions, according to
reported that new disturbances erupted in May, in-
volving shooting incidents inside Army encampments
in Kumasi and Koforidua
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paong
\;Kantankufri
.Sokodd
Togo
February 1982
mutiny
Major cocoa
producing area
Major road
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Rawlings's Position. We believe that Jerry Rawlings,
a 34-year-old former Air Force pilot and son of a
Scottish father and Ewe mother, came to power with
a "Robin Hood" reputation in Ghana. Though indeci-
sive and not a deep thinker, Rawlings is regarded by
the US Embassy as the sole force capable at this time
of holding the disparate regime together. The Embas-
sy believes his charisma and public recognition give
him more of a following than anyone else in the
government. Recent Embassy reporting suggests that
Rawlings may be near physical and mental exhaus-
tion from overwork and excessive worry
We regard Rawlings as a relatively nonideological
populist dedicated to creating a more egalitarian
society through his ill-defined revolution. His stated
aim is to take power away from the country's West-
ern-oriented middle class, which he blames for Gha-
na's difficulties, and to return the country to the
"people," thus eliminating corruption, bribery, and
mismanagement. In his speeches, Rawlings betrays an
underlying distrust of capitalism and Western motives
Ascendent Radicals. US Embassy
reporting indicates that Rawlings is heavily dependent
on a "kitchen cabinet" of advisers dominated by
radicals who aim to align Ghana more closely with
Communist states and Libya. The US Ambassador
characterizes the radicals as doing their best to keep
Rawlings isolated from other influences. According to
the US mission, the leading radical is Kojo Tsikata, a
self-professed Marxist revolutionary and a former
Army captain, followed by Chris Atim, a former
leftist student leader.
In his public remarks, Rawlings frequently acknowl-
edges his gratitude to Tsikata, who befriended Rawl-
ings after he surrendered power in 1979 and who
Rawlings says helped to protect him from prosecution
by ex-President Limann's security services.
CTsikata's aspirations to become head of state
make him a potential rival to Rawlings
Radicals have become influential in the regime in
several key areas. Within days after Rawlings's coup,
according to the US Embassy, radicals took complete
control of the government media. Press articles, punc-
tuated by periodic allegations of Western-backed
invasion plots, have appeared attacking Washington's
policies toward Libya and Central America. In our
view, radicals see control of the media as an opportu-
nity to marshal wider public support and to reclaim
Ghana's place-recalling the Nkrumah era-as a
self-proclaimed progressive African state in the fore-
front of the struggle against neocolonialism and rac-
ism)
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Rawlings has embraced the radical-initiated people's
defense committees as a means of establishing a broad
political base and has publicly declared that they will
be used to restructure society. In our view, these
committees-constituting the Ghanaian version of
similar bodies found in Libya, Ethiopia, and Cuba-
will serve as the revolution's "eyes and ears." The
committees' tasks-laid out in their charter-include
exposure of corruption, exposition of national issues as
the regime sees them, consideration of local problems,
and implementation of regime decisions. A reading of
the Ghanaian media suggests that the defense com-
mittees are gradually appearing in workplaces and
trade unions, government facilities, campuses, local
communities, and the military
Kojo Tsikata has
succeeded in gaining de facto control over Ghana's
internal security apparatus. Embassy sources say that
the radicals have also succeeded in removing the
elected moderate leadership of Ghana's Trades Union
Congress and its constitutent unions. Nevertheless,
Embassy reporting indicates radicals failed in their
efforts to continue to dominate student organizations,
losing a key election in June to antigovernment-
backed moderates.
Beleaguered Moderates. We believe that the few
moderates in the regime are isolated by radical
maneuvering and that they fear becoming scapegoats
for the regime's failures.
We have observed that Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Obed Asamoah, though moderate in his personal
views and married to an American, dutifully echoes
the regime's foreign policy line. According to the US
Embassy, Asamoah's appointment was opposed by the
leading leftist student organization, which has dubbed
him a "counterrevolutionary."
Nevertheless, according to Embassy reporting, the
moderates are searching for ways to strengthen their
position. In June moderates began taking pro-Western
public positions and Embassy sources indicate they
are ready to counter radical efforts to discredit the
West by publicizing Western economic assistance.
We believe moderates may have helped arrange the 25X1
US Ambassador's long-awaited meeting with Rawl-
ings in late June. While the Embassy reported the 25X1
tone of the meeting was cordial, we have not observed
a marked improvement in relations. In our estimation,
the moderate faction remains weak.
use Ghana as a base for regional subversion.
Opportunities for the Libyans, Cubans, and Soviets
In our estimation, Ghana's current instability and its
proximity to several moderate states provide exploit-
able opportunities for the USSR, Libya, and Cuba to
score new gains in their longstanding efforts to under-
mine Western influence and to install radical regimes
wherever possible in West Africa. In our judgment,
the ouster of pro-Western President Limann (who
displayed open hostility toward Tripoli and Moscow),
the emergence of the shaky Rawlings regime, and the
potential for its replacement with an even more leftist
one could over time allow Communist states and
Libya to develop a strong enough position to be able to
From our perspective, the Soviets, Libyans, and Cu-
bans can hardly be displeased with current trends in
Ghana. Rawlings's ostensibly nonaligned foreign poli-
cy has been characterized by the establishment of
relations with Libya, a gradual expansion of ties with
the USSR and other Communist countries, and un-
derlying suspicion of the West. US Embassy reporting
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indicates that Rawlings-though still basically in
charge-is an ineffective leader surrounded by leftist
advisers who dominate the inner circle and are mak-
ing inroads in key areas. In our estimation, these gains
for Moscow, Tripoli, and Havana have thus far come
with minimal expenditure of effort and money on
their part.
Libyan Involvement. In our view, Ghana's quick
restoration of diplomatic relations with Libya-an-
nounced by Radio Accra only 11 days after Rawl-
ings's coup-has been the key development in the
regime's foreign policy. Former President Limann
severed ties with Tripoli in November 1980 after
publicly accusing Libya of subversion
he US Embassy portray Rawlings
and many of his radical advisers as having great
admiration for Libyan leader Qadhafi and his "revo-
lution."
the Libyans at
least have provided Ghana with modest quantities of
food, drugs, and munitions. Tripoli has agreed to 25X1
supply Ghana with eight months' worth of its oil
needs-two months free and the rest on delayed credit
terms, according to US Embassy reports. In our view,
any effective implementation of joint economic pro-
jects that Tripoli has pledged to undertake will de-
pend upon the speed of Libya's financial recovery
from the adverse impact of the world oil glut. We also
believe that Qadhafi may calculate that he can make
inroads in Ghana with only token aid offers, especially
if this were to contribute to Rawlings's downfall anc25X1
his replacement by an even more radical regime.
Western diplomatic missions have reported their in-
ability to verify or deny allegations of a Libyan
military presence whether in an advisory, training, or
bodyguard capacity. In the absence of verified sight-
ings, we estimate that Libyan military personnel are
Qadhafi moved quickly to take advantage of Rawl-
ings's coup. He immediately recognized the new
regime and in a Radio Tripoli broadcast described
Rawlings as a friend. Not long afterwards, US diplo-
mats observed the arrival in Accra of Libyan trans-
port aircraft, which Tripoli publicly claimed were
delivering gifts of food and medicine. The regime's
public expressions of warm feelings for Libya and the
continuation of Libyan flights on a sporadic basis to
Accra have given rise to considerable speculation
among Ghanaian, other African, and Western obser25X1
ers over the extent of Libyan presence and involve-
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present only in small numbers because a large pres-
ence presumably would be difficult to conceal. The
US Ambassador believes that at any given time there
probably are no more than 50 to 60 Libyans in the
country. His estimate includes civilian and military
advisers, visiting Libyan delegations, reserve flight
crews for Libyan transport aircraft, and about 15
members of the Libyan "People's Bureau," that is, the
diplomatic mission. 25X1
We believe one barrier to the expansion of Libyan
influence over the longer run in Ghana is the absence
of a large Muslim community to respond to Qadhafi's
vision of pan-Islamic unity. According to the last
reliable census in 1970, only 12 percent of the popula-
tion professed to be Muslim while some 70 percent
claimed to be influenced by Western education and
Christianity. The census revealed that Ghana's Mus-
lims are concentrated in pockets in the thinly populat-
radical-dominated official media, where the US Em-
bassy has noted an increasing use of Soviet-supplied
propaganda materials. We are unaware of any offers
as yet from the Soviet Union to provide arms and
military training to the Ghanaian armed forces.
At the time of Rawlings's coup, according to informa-
tion available to the US Embassy, the Soviets had a
62-man mission in Accra, while approximately 650
Ghanaian students were in the USSR and 350 more
in Eastern Europe. In 1980, according to the latest
available USSR trade data and Ghanaian cocoa
export figures, the Soviets purchased about 23 percent
of Ghana's total export of cocoa, one of its principal
foreign exchange earners
25X1
ed north and in the southern cities
Cuban Involvement. A Ghanaian delegation headed
by one of Rawlings's radical advisers journeyed to
Cuba last March. According to the US Embassy in
Accra, the visit resulted in a Ghanaian decision to
reopen its long-closed Embassy in Havana and in
promises of Cuban technical assistance for Ghana's
ailing sugar industry, for some modest industrial and
fisheries projects in Ghana, and for training some
Ghanaian youths in Cuba. The US Embassy in Accra
also reported that Cuba and Ghana signed an air
services agreement in June.
Soviet and East European Involvement. Although
favorable TASS commentaries after Rawlings's coup
attest to the positive view Moscow takes of the new
Ghanaian regime, in our view the Soviets have so far
moved cautiously and slowly to develop links to the
new regime. Nonetheless, we believe that the Soviets
are seeking low-cost ways of exploiting the situation in
Ghana over the longer run to gain influence there, and
possibly to obtain the use of Ghanaian military facili-
A Ghanaian delegation, led by a radical member of
the ruling council, visited Moscow last March seeking
economic aid. On their return home, Radio Accra
made various conflicting claims about new Soviet aid
promises, but Moscow has not made any pubic com-
mitments. At most, we believe that the Soviets seem
to be considering resuming work on some of the 10
Soviet aid projects that were abandoned when Presi-
dent Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966. In our view,
this would be fairly cheap for Moscow and would
provide a cover for introducing Soviet personnel into
the country for other purposes. The same Ghanaian
delegation also sought aid from East European coun-
tries and Cuba, but only Cuba has since been reported
by US diplomats to be moving to reactivate an old
project.
Looking Ahead. We see the regime's political, eco-
nomic, and military weaknesses offering considerable
potential for Soviet, Libyan, and Cuban inroads in
Ghana. Continued economic deterioration, in our
view, could compel the regime to adopt more repres-
sive measures to ensure its survival and encourage the
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25X1
25X1 .
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radicals around Rawlings to solicit more security,
technical, organizational, and propaganda assistance
from the Soviets, Libyans, and Cubans. Other cata-
lysts that we believe could encourage the same result
would include the regime's continued inability to
reestablish viable security and military services or the
traumatic effect of any future attempted coup by.
Ghanaian exiles or disgruntled soldiers
Reporting from the US mission since Rawlings's coup
indicates that radical advisers around Rawlings have
succeeded in gaining control over the country's inter-
nal security apparatus and government-controlled me-
dia. According to the Embassy, the radicals, mindful
of their need to develop a broader power base, are
actively attempting to implant "people's defense com-
mittees"-similar to those found in other radical
Third World states-as a mass political organization,
and to extend control over student and labor organiza-
Academic studies of the Nkrumah era suggest what
could happen again if Ghana continues to drift left-
ward, as seems likely to us. There is the potential for
the USSR, Libya, and Cuba to become more deeply
involved in regime efforts to rehabilitate Ghana's
shattered military and security services through the
provision of equipment, training, and advisers. We
believe small amounts of financial and technical
assistance could be forthcoming-possibly via inter-
national Communist front organizations-for assist-
ance in molding the regime's control over political,
youth, and labor groups, along with scholarships for
ideological indoctrination of a new generation of
Ghanaians.
West African Concerns and Vulnerabilities
Officials in Ghana's neighboring states have repeated-
ly expressed concern in conversations with US diplo-
mats about the country's radical turn under Rawlings.
They are especially uneasy about the danger that
Ghana could become-like Benin-a base for Liby-
an- and Communist-trained subversives. These offi-
cials have urged that the West do nothing to drive
Ghana closer into the embrace of Libya and the
Communist states. From our perspective, events in
Ghana have served as an unwelcome reminder to most
African governments of the consequences of failing to
deal effectively with their own longstanding economic
and political problems 25X1
To date, we have not seen any evidence that suggests
the Rawlings regime is engaged in subversive opera-
tions against Ghana's neighbors, or that Libya or th25X1
the 25X1
Rawlings regime is primarily concerned with fore- 25X1
stalling external coups against itself and putting its
own house in order rather than trying to foment
trouble abroad. 25X1
Libya, the USSR, and Cuba, however, may soon have
more incentive for establishing a foothold in Ghana
for regional subversion. The US Embassy in Benin
reports preliminary indications that the Cotonou gov-
ernment is moving to reduce its dependence on Libya
and Communist states and improve ties with the
United States. If this trend continues, we believe that
Libya and the Communist countries may be more
inclined to see Ghana as an alternate base for stirring
up trouble in the area. However, it is our analysis that
such a regional role would be secondary in Soviet
thinking to obtaining influence and possibly military
facilities, such as landing rights for naval reconnais-
sance aircraft, in Ghana itself.
25X1
From Libya's perspective, Ghana's immediate neigh-
bors-Ivory Coast, Togo, and Upper Volta-are all
inviting targets. Each has a minority Muslim popula-
tion, a moderate orientation, close ties with France,
and good relations with the United States. Embassy
reporting from posts in the region suggests that
Togolese President Eyadema is most nervous of all.
As a northerner, he has long faced hostility from the
southern Ewe tribe, which spills over into Ghana;
Rawlings and his leading radical associate, Kojo
Tsikata, are Ewe tribesmen. Moreover, according to
the US Embassy in Lome, the brother of the Togolese
leader of a Ewe dissident group in Accra allegedly
serves as an economic adviser to Rawlings.
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Upper Volta's influential Muslim minority, chronic
economic problems, and agitation by leftist labor
leaders make President Zerbo particularly sensitive to
potential Soviet and Libyan threats, according to US
Embassy reporting. In the Ivory Coast, the possible
turbulent succession when aged President Houphouet
dies would, in our estimation, increase the country's
vulnerabilities despite the sizable French presence and
interest there)
US Embassy reporting from Lagos indicates that
Nigeria, West Africa's dominant state, distrusts
the Rawlings regime. According to the Embassy,
Nigerian President Shagari was personally close to
deposed President Limann and he regrets the setback
to civilian rule and the resulting potential for in-
creased Libyan meddling. Authorities in Lagos ac-
knowledge that Nigeria has resumed crude oil sales to
Ghana after suspending them immediately after
Rawlings's coup because of payments arrears of over
$120 million. Ghana has since agreed to repay its debt
over an 18-month period in exchange for future oil
shipments with 90-day credit terms,
Although Nigerian oil is less ex-
In our view, however, the radical-dominated regime
probably will continue to eschew significant involve-
ment with the West and gamble on its abilities to
indoctrinate and repress the populace with Commu-
nist and Libyan support. Our suspicion is that Ghana
may be set for some time on a course of radical
experimentation to solve its problems. We believe,
therefore, that Ghana is likely to be marked by
political and economic instability for the foreseeable
future
Our assessment of scenarios which may evolve in
Ghana in the future suggests to us that prospects are
bleak for US interests. We see four possible outcomes;
continued consolidation of power by the regime's
radicals; a radical-led coup; a drift into anarchy; or a
short-lived countercoup by moderates.
The most likely scenario, we believe, is for the radicals
to continue their gradual consolidation of power under
Kojo Tsikata, with Rawlings to be eased aside within
two years or so, or retained in a figurehead role. In
our estimation, Ghana will continue to move leftward
as the radical faction becomes more dominant.F___1 25X1
pensive than that supplied by Libya, Tripoli's repay-
ment terms are more advantageous for the financially
strapped Rawlings regime.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
Ghanaian moderates in conversations with US Em-
bassy contacts have repeatedly urged Washington to
be patient and understanding with the regime. They
believe that sooner or later the regime will be
forced-out of economic desperation-to renew coop-
eration with the West in order to obtain support for
new economic stabilization measures. If the moder-
ates are right, the areas of leverage that the United
States has in dealing with the Rawlings government
are the US aid program and Washington's influence
with the International Monetary Fund. In June 1982,
Ghana presented a formal request to Washington for
continuation of the PL 480 food program and made
informal soundings about possible US military train-
ing assistance.
We judge that the USSR, Libya, and Cuba will wait
in the wings for the time being pending further radical
consolidation before becoming more directly involved
in Ghana. In our view, an abortive coup by Ghanaian
exiles and their moderate friends in the country would
accelerate radical efforts to consolidate power and to
involve Communist states and Libya more deeply in
Ghanaian affairs. We believe that a radical consolida-
tion of power and growing Ghanaian dependence on
Communist and Libyan support would make it diffi-
cult over the longer run for authorities in Accra to
resist pressure from these benefactors to use the
country as a staging base for regional subversion.
A radical-led coup that overthrew Rawlings, in our
judgment, would yield the same results as would a
gradual consolidation of power by this group. But the
US Embassy believes, and we concur, that the abrupt
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elimination of Rawlings in the near term-before the
radicals have establishd a broader power base-would
risk plunging the country into anarchy. We do not see
Tsikata or any other radical figure on the horizon as
having sufficient stature or popular following now to
retain power without substantial foreign support. In
our estimation, however, an ill-timed radical coup
remains an ever-present possibility if frustration
grows among these avowed leftists in Rawlings's
entourage who are dissatisfied with the regime's
frequent policy paralysis and the slow progress of
social and economic change.
A drift toward chaos could come in other ways. We
believe that growing economic hardship-as the radi-
cals attempt to solidify their hold, drive moderates out
of the regime, and transform society-could lead to
more mutinous eruptions in the military. Any future
effort to build up a "people's militia," particulary if it
received favored support over the regular armed
forces, would also be a likely source of rebellion in our
estimation. In our view, outbreaks of factional fight-
ing within the armed forces, unless quickly controlled,
could spread throughout the country and result, we
believe, in the regime's loss of control. Ghana's col-
lapse into anarchy, we believe, could frustrate short-
term gains for the Soviets, Libyans, and Cubans, but
almost certainly would yield exploitable opportunities
25X1 over the longer term.
Even if a moderate-led coup is successful, we would
have serious doubts about the survivability of the
government that would emerge. In our judgment,
most Ghanaian exiles and professional military offi-
cers of a moderate bent are part of Ghana's largely
discredited middle class. They would have little pros-
pect of rallying the widespread support among
Ghana's have-nots that would be required to establish
a stable and lasting new regime. Ghanaians over the
last decade and a half have witnessed abortive efforts
by a succession of moderate regimes seeking to re-
dress the country's economic problems with Western
and international financial help and politically unac-
25X1 ceptable austerity programs.
The United States supplied Ghana with $23.5 million
worth of assistance in 1981, 80 percent of which was
food. Thusfar in 1982, more than 3,000 metric tons
of food have been delivered to Ghana under the
PL 480 program. The Peace Corps maintains 104
volunteers throughout the country.
Trade turnover between the two countries amounted
to $153 million in 1981. Ghana ranks fifth among
Sub-Saharan African states as a purchaser of US
imports. Food makes up 20 percent of these imports.
The book value of US investments in Ghana totals
about $170 million, with 70 percent of it in the
aluminum processing industry. There has been little
new US investment in recent years except in an
offshore oil operation that provides 10 percent of
Ghana's minimum domestic requirements.
Several of the scenarios we have outlined above could
imperil the approximately 2,600 American citizens
and diplomats in Ghana. The assassination of Rawl-
ings could be blamed on the United States by surviv-
ing authorities and, in our judgment, Washington in
any case would be immediately suspect. His death, an
attempted coup, or an exile attack might easily
precipitate rioting, looting, factional fighting in the
military, and acts of violence against expatriates.
Under such circumstances, there would be a danger
that the Ghanaian left would demonstrate against or
attack the US Embassy.
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the ruling council, and is a southern Ewe tribesman like Rawlings.
Rawlings to adopt Cuba and Ethiopia as models for Ghana. Tsikata, 45
years old and a retired Army captain, holds the title of special advise
Appendix I
Key Personalities
Radicals Around Kojo Tsikata. Reporting from the US Mission in Accra has consistently
Rawlings portrayed Kojo Tsikata as the leader of the regime's kitchen cabinet of
radical advisers, who has gained de facto control over the country's internal
security apparatus and is a key influence on Head of State Rawlings. A
self-styled Marxist and African revolutionary, he is an advocate of close
ties with the USSR, Libya, and Cuba. F_ :D he
maintains especially close ties with Cuba and in the past has urged 25X1
25X1 25X1
Chris Atim, Member of
Provisional National
Defense Council
he is close to Kojo Tsikata and influential with Rawlings. Atim was 25X1
identified in the Ghanaian press as the leader of delegations the regime
sent last February and April to solicit aid from Libya, the USSR, Eastern
Europe, and Cuba. The US Embassy speculates that he probably was
responsible for drafting the guidelines for Ghana's people's defense
committees, which are similar to security and propaganda organizations
and leftist member of the ruling council.
Chris Atim. The US Embassy regards Chris Atim as the most pro-Libyan
found in Libya, Cuba, and Ethiopia. Atim, 30 years old and a northern
Builsa tribesman, was the leader in the leftist National Union of Ghanaian
Students before his graduation in 1979 and subsequently became an editor
of a pro-Rawlings newsletter that had an anti-Western and anti-American
slant. 25X1
Tsatsu Tsikata. Kojo's cousin or brother, Tsikata is an intellectual mentor
to the radical faction, according to the US Embassy. He is a Marxist-
oriented law instructor at the University of Ghana. During the Limann
regime, Tsatsu was frequently observed by members of the US Mission on
the lecture circuit, propounding Rawlings's populist and "revolutionary"
virtues.
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Internal Affairs
25X1
Johnny Hansen. As Secretary for Internal Affairs, Hansen is officially in
charge of Ghana's internal security apparatus and works closely with Kojo
Tsikata, He is a longtime radical with 25X1
extreme leftwing views and ties to the Soviets, according to the US
Embassy. He was formerly head of the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary
Guards, a radical fringe group, which, the Embassy notes, strongly
endorsed the Rawlings coup and has pushed for the formation of people's
defense committees. 25X1
Ato Austin. As Secretary for Information, Austin is responsible for the
media. Two prominent lawyers with access to the ruling council have
characterized Austin as part of Rawlings's inner circle of radical advisers
in discussions with Embassy officials. Only in his twenties and of obscure
background, he was a member of ex-President Limann's ruling party until
he was dropped in November 1981, according to the US Embassy. He led a
Ghanaian delegation to North Korea last April.
Kwasi Amoako-Atta. Amoako-Atta is a leading member of the National
Economic Review Committee responsible for reviewing economic policy
alternatives for the regime; US Embassy sources consider him the most
radical member of the economic council. Amoako-Atta served as Finance
Minister under Nkrumah, favoring a planned socialist economy and closer
ties with Communist countries, according to our biographic information.
Moderates Around Chief of Defense Staff Brig. Joseph Nunoo-Mensah, Army Commander
Rawlings Brig. Arnold Quainoo, and Secretary for Foreign Affairs Obed Asamoah
are the most prominent moderates associated with the regime, according to
US Embassy sources. Nunoo-Mensah, a 43-year-old Fanti tribesman,
served as chief of the defense staff during Rawlings's 1979 regime and he
was forcibly retired by Limann, according to US Embassy reports. DIA
, he was not involved in Rawlings's 25X1
1981 coup, but was brought ac by Rawlings because of his earlier
popularity with enlisted men. 25X1
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Obed Asamoah, according to his official
biography, is a 46-year-old Ewe tribesman and a lawyer with advanced
degrees from British and American universities. During former President
Limann's rule, the US Embassy reported that Asamoah served as secretary
general of the All People's Party, which was a coalition of five major
opposition parties. In the late 1960s, he served as a member of the
Ghanaian parliament.
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Quainoo, of mixed Ewe and Fanti origin, received military training in the
United States,
he is popular with enlisted men, who consider him honest and intereste in
their welfare, but not with fellow officers. Quainoo was Army Commander
durin Rawlings's first regime and was forcibly retired by Limann. DIA
uainoo feuded in the past with Nunoo- 25X1
Mensah and we believe it is likely that problems between the two will arise
again to weaken further the moderate faction.
Arnold Quainoo,
Army Commander
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Secret
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