THE OAU: PROSPECTS UNDER QADHAFI S CHAIRMANSHIP

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Intelligence
Qadhafi's Chairmanship
The OAU: Prospects Under
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review completed
Secret
ALA 82-10101
July 1982
Copy 312
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The OAU: Prospects Under
Qadhafi's Chairmanship
This assessment was prepared by
the Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, West-East Africa Division,
ALA,
Directorate of Operations
Secret
ALA 82-10101
July 1982
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Secret
The OAU: Prospects Under
Qadhafi's Chairmanship F_
Key Judgments Libyan leader Qadhafi seems certain to become chairman of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU) at its summit in Tripoli in August despite the
fact that he is widely distrusted by his fellow African leaders. Qadhafi is
eager to host a successful summit and gain the chairmanship, and he
probably will react strongly to anything he sees as an attempt, by other Af-
ricans or the United States, to deny him this goal.
Some African moderates, disturbed by the prospect of Qadhafi's chairman-
ship and by the recent admission of Western Sahara to the OAU, are
considering a boycott of the summit to deny Qadhafi a quorum needed to
conduct business. We believe they will fail. Statements by other African
leaders suggest that their dislike of Qadhafi and opposition to his
chairmanship are outweighed by concern for preserving OAU integrity and
the facade of African unity.
Contentious debate at the summit over such issues as Western Sahara is
likely to intensify a traditional split between OAU radicals and moderates
that in our view has the potential to jeopardize the OAU's future. Beyond
this, we project that increased radicalization of the OAU under Qadhafi's
chairmanship will further erode the organization's already limited effec-
tiveness as a constructive regional institution. With these difficulties in
prospect, we believe that the OAU's moderate members are likely to
minimize the importance of the summit in August and defer discussions on
many sensitive issues to other forums, such as the Franco-African summit
scheduled to be held in Kinshasa, Zaire, in September.
Despite the limits of the OAU's regional power, Qadhafi's chairmanship
will adversely affect US interests in Africa. Qadhafi's past behavior leads
us to believe that he will be a more active chairman than his predecessors,
seeking opportunities to use the OAU to advance his highly personalized
Islamic ideology, meddle in the affairs of other African states, enhance his
own prestige and influence as a Third World leader, and attack US policy
in Africa and the Middle East.
Information available as of 12 July 1982 has been used in
the preparation of this report.
iii Secret
ALA 82-10101
July 1982
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Soviet interests in Africa will be served by Qadhafi's exploitation of the
OAU to denounce the West, especially the United States, as the source of
Africa's problems. Qadhafi's suspicions about Soviet intentions in Africa,
however, preclude Moscow's ability to manipulate him.
Qadhafi's dominance of the OAU could kill the faltering OAU efforts to
settle the conflict in Western Sahara. In the absence of a settlement, we
believe Morocco's King Hassan will continue to seek increased US military
assistance.
In Chad, Qadhafi is likely to undermine any possible future OAU efforts to
achieve a reconciliation in the civil war by trying to further Libyan
influence there. He will seek opportunities to blame prolongation of both
the Chad and Western Sahara conflicts on the West.
Qadhafi probably will try during the summit to manipulate scheduled
elections of senior officials in the OAU Secretariat. He would like to
guarantee the placement of supporters of his policies after he turns over the
chairmanship to Guinean President Toure in 1983.
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Secret
Implications for the United States 9
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Secret
The OAU: Prospects Under
Qadhafi's Chairmanship F_
Introduction
The 19th annual summit of the 51-member Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU) is scheduled to take
place in Tripoli in August 1982. According to custom,
the meeting's host, in this case Libyan leader Mu'am-
mar Qadhafi, will become chairman until the next
summit in mid-1983. Despite apprehension among
Africans that Qadhafi will attempt to use his new job
to pursue Libyan subversion in Africa, we believe that
OAU members, concerned primarily about OAU
unity, are unlikely to deny him the chairmanship.F_
Reports from US embassies throughout Africa indi-
cate that Qadhafi has been vigorously pursuing the
OAU chairmanship. The position will give him an
opportunity to speak for Africa on a wide variety of
issues and will provide another mechanism for med-
dling in regional affairs and for advancing his pan-
Arab, pan-Islamic ideology. We believe Qadhafi
hopes that the prestige attached to the office will give
him the opportunity he craves to end his isolation and
enhance his credibility as an international leader.
There is no direct precedent by which to predict
Qadhafi's performance as head of a large internation-
al organization. Qadhafi's past behavior indicates that
he is erratic, aggressive, and rash, pursuing his goals
with zealous determination and little regard for con-
ventional diplomacy. Qadhafi, however, is also aware
of OAU members' hostility toward his chairmanship
and has taken steps in the past year to demonstrate a
spirit of cooperation. He complied with a Chadian
request to withdraw Libyan troops from that country
late last year, and he agreed to halt Libyan aid to the
Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara. But rather
than signaling a permanent swing toward tempered
behavior, we believe such measures are merely a
temporary shift in tactics intended to allay criticism.
As chairman, Qadhafi will become a leading partici-
pant in OAU efforts to resolve inter-African disputes.
We believe Qadhafi will inject his own pan-Islamic
and anti-Western policies into OAU involvement in
25X1
25X1
the conflict in Western Sahara. He will try to under-
mine the newly installed, anti-Libyan Habre govern-
ment in Chad. He is likely to attempt to turn to his
benefit a renewal of OAU debate of African-Israeli
relations prompted by Zaire's recent restoration of
diplomatic ties with Israel.
The OAU and African Disputes 25X1
In our view, the OAU has over the years achieved
firm solutions to relatively few inter-African disputes.
Generally, the OAU is content with trying to avert
open conflicts by encouraging negotiations among
disputants, sometimes under the auspices of OAU-
appointed mediators. In some cases this formula
works, as in the 1978 reconciliations between Angola
and Zaire and among Guinea, Ivory Coast, and 25X1
Senegal. Other mediation attempts, however, have
been less successful, as, for example, in the efforts to
settle the Chad and Western Sahara conflicts and the
1978 peace initiatives in the Ethiopia-Somalia and
Ethiopia-Sudan disputes.
The OAU's preoccupation with preserving the facade
of African unity makes it reluctant to intervene 25X1
formally in disputes which threaten to aggravate
political cleavages among members, as in the brief
war between Libya and Egypt in 1977. The heteroge-
neity and competing interests of OAU states increase
the difficulty of reaching a consensus on controversial
issues. According to academic studies, coalitions have
been fluid over the 19 years of the OAU's existence,
forming in response to a particular issue and reform-
ing as the issues, country or regional interests, or
national political orientations change.
At the time of the OAU's formation, Africa was
divided in two main political camps: the so-called
Casablanca group of radical states, which subscribed
to nonalignment and opposition to neocolonialism, and
the Monrovia group, largely composed of former
French colonies, which generally favored close associ-
ation with the West. This division, modified by two
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OAU Membership, June 1982
Algeria
1963
Guinea
1963
Saharan Democratic Arab
1982
Bi
i
G
1973
Republic
Angola
1976
ssau
nea-
u
C
1963
Sao Tome and Principe
1975
Benin
1963
oast
Ivory
K
1963
Senegal
1963
Botswana
1966
enya
h
1966
Seychelles
1976
Burundi
1963
Lesot
o
i
ib
1963
Sierra Leone
1963
Cameroon
1963
er
a
L
Lib
1963
Somalia
1963
Cape Verde
1975
ya
d
M
1963
Sudan
1963
Central African Republic
1963
agascar
a
i
M
l
1965
Swaziland
1968
Chad
1963
aw
a
li
M
1963
Tanzania
1963
Comoros
1975
a
i
i
M
1963
Togo
1963
Congo
1963
tan
a
aur
iti
M
1968
Tunisia
1963
Djibouti
1977
us
aur
M
1963
Uganda
1963
Egypt
1963
orocco
bi
M
1975
Upper Volta
1963
Equatorial Guinea
1969
que
ozam
Ni
1963
Zaire
1963
Ethiopia
1963
ger
i
Ni
1963
Zambia
1964
Gabon
1963
a
ger
Gambia, The
1965
Rwanda
1963
Zimbabwe
1980
Ghana
1963
decades of political change, has evolved into the
current radical/ moderate split, reflecting broad dif-
ferences in members' political ideologies and interna-
tional alliances. This split is complicated by other
divisive forces that impede cooperation and consensus
and affect voting patterns: Arab versus non-Arab,
ethnic rivalries, geographic separation, competing
economic interests, linguistic differences, and colonial
heritage.
Institutional factors also have limited the OAU's
ability to deal with African problems. The OAU has
no authority to impose its collective will on disputants.
Resolutions are not binding, and there is no mecha-
nism for enforcing sanctions against recalcitrant
members. According to a report by the secretary
general at the Council of Ministers meeting in Febru-
ary 1982, the OAU also is in financial straits-the
result of an increasing budget and the failure of many
members to pay their dues. This constraint has made
it impossible to finance certain operations, such as the
peacekeeping force in Chad, without outside support
and has helped prevent the OAU from establishing a
permanent defense force charged with protecting the
territorial integrity of members.
The OAU Charter's guiding principle of noninterfer-
ence in the internal affairs of member states further
limits the group's effectiveness, in our judgment. This
provision was used, for example, to justify OAU
refusal to intervene in the Shaba rebellion in Zaire in
1977. It also has allowed Africa's more notorious
leaders-Uganda's Amin, Central Africa's Bokassa,
and Equatorial Guinea's Masie-to escape condem-
nation despite general African antipathy toward
them.
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Secret
OAU Purpose and Structure
The OAU was established in 1963 in Addis Ababa by
31 charter members after several years of attempts to
create an inter-African organization. Its purposes, as
stated in the Charter, are:
? To promote African unity and solidarity.
? To coordinate and intensify efforts to achieve a
better life for African peoples.
? To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
independence of Africans.
? To eradicate colonialism.
? To promote international cooperation with due
regard to the United Nations Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The OAU Charter provides for three principal bod-
ies-the Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment, the Council of Ministers, and the General
Secretariat-as well as a Commission of Mediation,
Conciliation, and Arbitration, and other specialized
commissions as needed.
The Assembly coordinates policy and reviews OAU
structure and is the main organ of the OAU. Resolu-
tions require a two-thirds majority of the member-
ship, except for procedural questions which need only
a simple majority. The annual meeting, referred to as
the summit, is customarily held at midyear at a site
selected during the preceding summit. In practice, the
choice is made informally about two years in advance
with an effort to rotate the site to reflect political,
geographic, and linguistic differences among mem-
bers. By custom, the head of the summit's host
government serves as Assembly chairman and princi-
pal OAU spokesman until the next ordinary session.
The summit venue and chairmanship are prestigious
and keenly sought, partly because the summit at-
tracts worldwide media attention. Extraordinary ses-
sions are convened by the Secretariat at the request
of two-thirds of the Assembly members.
The Council of Ministers, composed of the foreign
minister or other designated minister of each member
state, meets twice a year and is chaired by the foreign
minister of the state whose head is the Assembly
chairman. One meeting immediately precedes the
summit and is concerned with preparing the summit
agenda and drafts of proposals for consideration by
the Assembly. The other session, usually held in
February, is devoted primarily to budgetary and
administrative matters.
The Secretariat, with headquarters in Addis Ababa,
carries out the daily administrative activity of the
OAU. It assists the Assembly and the Council in
implementing their decisions, prepares the annual
budget, and provides administrative and technical
staff to all meetings. Its director, the secretary gener-
al, and five assistant secretaries general are elected to
four-year terms by the Assembly. Candidates for
these positions are proposed by their national govern-
ments; selections are made with careful attention to
regional balance. The assistant secretary responsible
for political affairs holds the most significant of the
five portfolios and frequently acts as OAUspokesman
before the press. Current staffing of senior Secretariat
positions includes Secretary General Edem Kodjo of
Togo and Assistant Secretaries General Peter Onu of
Nigeria for political affairs (representing West Afri-
ca); A. N. Chimuka of Zambia for administration
and conferences (southern Africa); Paul Etiang of
Uganda for economic development and cooperation
(East Africa); Noureddine Djoudi of Algeria for
science, education, social, and cultural affairs (North
Africa); and Sylvestre Nsanzimana of Rwanda for
finance (Central Africa).
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The conduct of OAU business is occasionally frustrat-
ed by the lack of a clear delineation of the responsibil-
ities of the OAU Assembly and the Secretariat and
conflicts of interest between the chairman and mem-
bers of the Secretariat. According to State Depart-
ment reporting, disharmony between current Chair-
man Moi and senior Secretariat officials, for example,
has hampered OAU efforts to secure United Nations
assistance for the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad.
In addition, several OAU members have challenged
current Secretary General Kodjo's authority to seat a
delegation from the Saharan Democratic Arab Re-
public at an OAU meeting in February 1982 in-
dependently of a ruling by the Assembly.
Qadhafi as OAU Chairman
The chairmanship of the OAU-despite the limits of
the Organization's power-will give Qadhafi a more
legitimate means of influencing the affairs of other
African countries, a forum from which to spread his
idiosyncratic political-religious ideology, better access
to other African heads of state, and an opportunity to
play the role of a world leader. We believe Qadhafi is
likely to be a more active chairman than his predeces-
sors as he exploits the OAU to achieve his own goals.
In our judgment, Qadhafi will probably use the OAU
as a vehicle for promoting his views on African
relations, including his vision of a pan-Islamic state,
Afro-Arab solidarity, opposition to Arab accommoda-
tion with Israel, and noninterference in African af-
fairs by the United States and France. Qadhafi may
try to concentrate summit discussion on southern
Africa or Israel in an effort to draw attention away
from the divisive issue of Western Sahara. Although
the chairman has no authority to develop OAU policy
independently of the Assembly, the history of the
Organization suggests that the chairman's, style and
approach can influence OAU deliberations, and that a
dynamic chairman can guide and influence execution
of OAU decisions. Judging from his past behavior, we
believe Qadhafi will use the United States, as a
scapegoat for African problems and will blame failure
of OAU peace initiatives in Chad and Western Saha-
ra on alleged US meddling. We believe that strident
anti-Western bias in his rhetoric may embarrass some
moderates, and a pronounced emphasis on Arab
affairs would draw criticism from black Africans.
The attention the OAU receives from the world
media, non-African governments, and other interna-
tional organizations will feed what we judge to be
Qadhafi's psychological need to be in the internation-
al limelight. He has long sought to assume the
preeminent role Egypt played in the pre-Camp David
era as the main Arab voice in African and nonaligned
organizations and to earn recognition as a leader in 25X1
the Arab, Islamic, and Third Worlds. We expect
Qadhafi will use his office to try to ease his interna-
tional isolation by meeting with and gaining at least
the tacit acceptance of other African heads of state
who have rejected him in the past.
Qadhafi almost certainly will try to influence the
election of the OAU secretary general and the five
assistant secretaries, scheduled to take place during
the Tripoli summit. Placing someone sympathetic to
Libyan interests or susceptible to Libyan influence in
these positions would give Qadhaffi a voice in OAU
affairs during the next four years. At present, no
Libyan holds any of the senior Secretariat offices. The
slate of candidates is not yet definite, but according to
US embassy reports Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister
Abdulai Conteh seems to be the front-runner in the
campaign for secretary general. Press reports indicate
that incumbent Secretary General Edem Kodjo of
Togo, who has a history of creating controversy in the
OAU, is not being offered for reelection by his
government. We believe that Libya may favor the
candidacy of Malian Foreign Minister Blondin Beye
who, according to embassy reports, defended Libyan
involvement in Chad,
In our view, Qadhafi's behavior as head of the OAU
will fluctuate from brashness and aggression to mod-
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OAU Issues Facing Qadhafi
Chad. OAU efforts to end Chad's civil strife led to the
establishment of a transitional Chadian government
in 1979, pending national elections. Nevertheless,
renewed factionalism quickly eroded the government's
veneer of unity, fighting resumed, and Chadian Presi-
dent Goukouni in late 1980 turned to Libya for troops
to push forces led by Chadian rebel leader Habre out
of N'Djamena. Last year's OAU summit in Nairobi
called for a cease-fire in Chad and the establishment
of an OAU peacekeeping force. Qadhafi withdrew his
troops in November 1981 under OAU and other
international pressure, and the OAU deployed a
multinational peacekeeping force to act as a buffer
between Goukouni and Habre. A committee headed
by OAU Chairman Moi continued to pursue a settle-
ment, but failed to convince Goukouni to negotiate
with Habre. Habre decided to take matters into his
own hands with a series of steady military advances
that culminated in the takeover of N'Djamena in
early June 1982. By mid-July, the peacekeeping force
Habre is trying to ease factional tensions in Chad and,
if successful, may be able to stave off a renewal of
civil war. In our judgment, Chad's deep-seated ani-
mosities and economic problems will make longer
term stability tenuous
We believe Qadhafi would be unlikely to pursue with
any real enthusiasm further OAU efforts to ensure a
lasting reconciliation in Chad. Qadhafi wants any
solution in Chad to favor clients over whom he has
influence and is not interested in representation for all
parties. Past behavior suggests that Qadhafi will
continue covert efforts to maintain Libyan influence
in Chad-by bribing officials and providing arms,
training, and money to certain of the country's fac-
tions. Habre's suspicion of Qadhafi's motives will, in
our view, limit whatever constructive role the OAU
might play. 25X1
We believe Qadhafi may decide that his own interests
are best served by maintaining, at least for the near
term, the appearance of promoting peace in Chad.
Such a move could help him deflect criticism from his
detractors during the next year while running little
risk, in the long run, of thwarting his efforts to
strengthen Libyan influence in Chad. At the same
time, Qadhafi almost certainly will continue to look
for ways behind the scenes to encourage the emer-
gence of a Chadian government amenable to Libyan
influence. 25X1
Western Sahara. Until last year the OAU showed
little enthusiasm for tackling the Western Sahara
imbroglio. We believe this was a reaction to the
traditional African view that Western Sahara was an
Arab problem and to Moroccan threats to withdraw
from the OAU should it recognize the Polisario-
backed Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR).
Morocco's King Hassan provided the first break- 25X1
through at the Nairobi summit last year when he
agreed in principle to an OAU-supervised referen-
dum. We believe Hassan may have counted on being
able to control the mechanics and outcome of the
referendum and also may have hoped that his cooper-
ation would encourage the OAU to back down on its
move toward accepting the SDAR as a membera
An implementation committee set up during the 1981
summit drafted a resolution calling on the unnamed
"parties in conflict" to cooperate with the committee
in establishing a cease-fire. In early 1982 Moi as-
sumed responsibility for negotiating a cease-fire date
and terms for a referendum
The search for a diplomatic solution has in effect been
pushed aside while OAU members decide how to
handle the membership question. At the Council of
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Ministers meeting in February 1982 Secretary Gener-
al Kodjo seated the SDAR as the OAU's 51st mem-
ber, sparking a walkout by Morocco and 18 other
countries and throwing proceedings into confusion.
According to US diplomatic reports, Kodjo argued at
the meeting that his action was required by the
Charter because the necessary simple majority of
states had recognized the SDAR. Opponents, accord-
ing to the same reports, contended that the SDAR is
not an independent and sovereign state and pointed
out that the OAU-proposed referendum in Western
Sahara had not yet been held. Embassy reports
indicate Qadhafi is widely assumed by Africans to
have engineered the SDAR's admission. Although
these allegations are unsubstantiated, we believe they
have reinforced longstanding moderate opposition to
Qadhafi's chairmanship. The membership issue has
upset several OAU ministerial and committee sessions
since February and is almost certain to erupt again at
the summit
We believe that Qadhafi's support of the SDAR-an
outgrowth of his attraction to the SDAR's revolution-
ary rhetoric, his opposition to Arab monarchies, and
his desire to see the establishment of another radical
Muslim state-may be sorely tested in the next few
months. Qadhafi's discussions with representatives of
other African governments, according to embassy
reports, reveal his concern that opposition to the
SDAR admission does not prompt a large-scale boy-
cott of the summit. We believe this concern might
motivate him to support a compromise on the SDAR
admission that would accommodate attendance by
both radicals and moderates, perhaps involving tem-
porary suspension of the SDAR's membership or
deferral of the issue to another meeting. But, to
maintain his credentials with other radical Arab
states, Qadhafi will eventually have to reaffirm his
support of the SDAR. We believe that Qadhafi's pro-
SDAR bias probably will prevent any significant
progress during the next year on the OAU proposals
for settling the Western Sahara conflict.
African-Israeli Relations. Most Sub-Saharan OAU
states maintained diplomatic relations with Israel
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with the Africans
benefiting from Israeli technical assistance and trade
and aid programs. In return, Israel was able to count
on black African support to prevent Arabs from
turning the OAU and the UN into anti-Israeli fo-
rums. Relations were deteriorating by the early 1970s,
however, due to Arab offers of financial aid and cheap
oil to the Africans and African unhappiness over
Israeli ties to South Africa. A dramatic change
occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war when
almost all African countries severed formal relations
with Israel. An OAU resolution in November 1973
called on member states to maintain the severance
pending Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab
territory and the Palestinians' recovery of their na-
tional rights.
Efforts by Arab states, led by Qadhafi, to strengthen
the show of anti-Israeli, Afro-Arab solidarity during
OAU proceedings have met with limited success.
many black African
leaders are disillusioned by the paucity of Arab aid,
increasingly resent the Arab states' emphasis on Arab
issues in the OAU, and are reluctant to support harsh,
Libyan-backed condemnation of Israel. Moreover,
openly available data indicate that Israel has contin-
ued to develop its commercial interests in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa since the 1973 break. Official Israeli
statistics reveal that Israeli-African trade has grown
to a larger volume than before 1973, and that Israeli
firms will be involved in various projects totaling
$2 billion over the next three years
Despite Zaire's announcement in May 1982 that it
would join the three other OAU members-Malawi,
Lesotho, and Swaziland-that have formal diplomatic
relations with Israel, no other OAU state has restored
full ties. In our judgment, Israel's military action in
Lebanon in June 1982 will further inhibit any African
states from taking such a move. Africans probably
fear an Arab withdrawal of economic assistance or oil
supplies. Moreover, some OAU members may agree
with Nigerian President Shagari that a resumption of
diplomatic relations should be accomplished through
an OAU initiative, in view of the Organization's
resolution in 1973.
Both Zaire's move and the recent Israeli invasion of
Lebanon are likely, in our judgment, to provoke
renewed-and heated-discussion at the Tripoli sum-
mit of the OAU's stance toward Israel. Based on
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Secret 25X1
analysis of his past behavior, we believe Qadhafi will
lead some Arab members in a strong condemnation of
African recognition of Israel, broadened to include
expressions of solidarity with the Palestine Liberation
Organization and radical Middle Eastern states and
attacks on US policy in the Middle East. Qadhafi
may hope that diverting attention from the divisive
SDAR admission problem to the Israeli issue will
reduce chances for a moderate walkout at the summit.
But Arab denunciation of African-Israeli ties could
intensify the OAU's internal discord by resurrecting
the Arab/non-Arab split.
African Maneuvering Before and After the Summit
Opposition to Qadhafi's chairmanship and dissatisfac-
tion with the handling of the SDAR's admission to the
OAU have generated talk among moderates of a
boycott of the summit. Support for a boycott, howev-
er, appears to be waning, according to reports from
US embassies in Africa, perhaps due to concern for
the OAU's future and fear of Libyan reprisals. In our
judgment, summit attendance will be adequate to
ensure a quorum (two-thirds, or 34 of the members)
barring any serious misstep by Qadhafi. We believe
.some moderate heads of state are likely to express
their disapproval of the SDAR seating or of Qadhafi's
chairmanship by sending lower ranking delegations to
Tripoli. Qadhafi would be angered if other African
leaders fail to attend and is likely to view low
attendance as a deliberate slight.
Attendance could be substantially higher if OAU
members are able to settle the SDAR problem before
the summit. Several of the moderates still favoring a
boycott have indicated, according to US embassy
reports, that they will send delegations if the seating
issue is resolved before the start of the summit. State
Department reports indicate that both moderates and
radicals have been working to find a settlement. But
time is running out, and none of the proposals has
thus far generated widespread support. Some OAU
members, according to embassy reports, have suggest-
ed postponing the summit to allow more time for
resolving the SDAR issue.
In the unlikely event of failure to achieve a quorum,
Qadhafi's accession to the chairmanship could be
complicated. OAU rules do not govern selection of a
new chairman under extraordinary circumstances.
We believe moderates would challenge any attempt
by Qadhafi to claim the office in the absence of a
quorum. If the summit is postponed, as has been
suggested by some members, Moi might be persuaded
to continue as chairman, but reportedly he is anxious
to divest himself of the OAU office. In our judgment,
Qadhafi would agree to a postponement if he were
confident about becoming the next chairman
If the OAU fails to reach a satisfactory resolution of
the SDAR issue, we believe continuing debate over
the legality of the SDAR's membership would encour-
age radical/moderate polarization and make it diffi-
cult for Qadhafi to maintain a position of neutrality.
Attempts by Qadhafi to steer the OAU toward the
radical camp could prompt some moderates to leave
the organization, but we believe that OAU members'
concern with unity will motivate the majority of them
to tolerate all but the most egregious behavior by
Qadhafi. Moderates may simply choose to weather
Qadhafi's chairmanship as they did Idi Amin's in
1975-76. Some Africans may look to other forums
such as the Franco-African summit in Kinshasa in
September as an alternative setting for discussing the
OAU's future. Traditionally an annual gathering of
leaders of former French colonies and France, the
Franco-African summit has expanded in recent years
to include non-Francophone African countries,
The Soviet Role
We believe that whatever benefits the Soviets receive
from Qadhafi's chairmanship will derive largely from
his use of the OAU to denounce the United States.
Moscow does not have the ability, however, to manip-
ulate him. The Libyan leader is particularly sensitive
about superpower involvement in African affairs, and
we expect that he will react strongly to any Soviet
attempt to dictate specific foreign policy actions
Moscow, in turn, is concerned about Qadhafi's unpre-
dictability and adventurism, according to US assess-
ments, as well as his long-term goal of fashioning a
pan-Islamic bloc of nations, with Libya at the core,
that would challenge the superpowers. Heretofore,
Soviet initiatives in its relationship with Libya have
been confined largely to providing arms, and we 25X1
believe that Moscow prefers to maintain a certain
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OAU Members'Alignment on SDAR Admission
and Expected Summit Attendance
Prior to Secretary General Kodjo's seating of a
delegation from the Saharan Democratic Arab Re-
public at the Council of Ministers meeting in Febru-
ary 1982, 26 states had recognized the SDAR: a
Algeria Madagascar
Angola Mali
Benin Mozambique
Botswana Rwanda
Burundi Sao Tome and Principe
Cape Verde Seychelles
Chad Sierra Leone
Congo Swaziland
Ethiopia Tanzania
Ghana Togo
Guinea-Bissau Uganda
Lesotho Zambia
Libya Zimbabwe
Nineteen states withdrew from the meeting in protest
of the seating:
Cameroon Mauritius
Central African Republic Morocco
Comoros Niger
Djibouti Senegal
Equatorial Guinea Somalia
Gabon Sudan
Gambia, The Tunisia
Guinea Upper Volta
Ivory Coast Zaire
Liberia
a Leaders of the recently elected government of Mauritius indicated
prior to their election that they support the SDAR, and we expect
that Mauritius also will recognize the SDAR.
Five other states do not recognize the SDAR:
Egypt Mauritania
Kenya Nigeria
Malawi
Some of the states that opposed the SDAR's admis-
sion have proposed a boycott of the Tripoli summit.
Morocco and Egypt hoped to maintain the solidarity
of the countries that withdrew and to pick up backing
from other moderates. But support for a boycott has
waned, and our analysis
indicates that a quorum (two-thirds, or 34, of
the members) probably will not be blocked. We expect
that at least 35 countries (other than the SDAR) will
send delegations to the summit:
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Congo
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Upper Volta
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Secret
Nine countries are expected to boycott if the SDAR
seating remains unsettled:
Cameroon Liberia
Djibouti Morocco
Equatorial Guinea Senegal
Gambia, The Zaire
Ivory Coast
Four are expected to boycott under any
circumstances:
Egypt
Gabon
Somalia
Sudan
We have insufficient information to determine the
intentions of Comoros or the new government in
Chad.
distance from Qadhafi to avoid being associated with
any diplomatic gaffes he might make. We also expect
the USSR, which is concerned about accusation by
African moderates of meddling in regional affairs, to
do little more than extend rhetorical support to radi-
cal efforts to make the OAU an anti-US forum.
Implications for the United States
In our view, Qadhafi's chairmanship of the OAU will
work against US interests in Africa, though-over-
all-the impact of this development will be tempered
by the organization's limited power. We believe the
ways in which a Qadhafi chairmanship will work
against US regional interests are both direct and
indirect. The direct impact will be through his con-
scious and eager exploitation-often with Soviet and
Cuban support-of opportunities to discredit US for-
eign policy in Africa and the Middle East. The
indirect impact will occur mainly through the diminu-
tion of the OAU's ability to act as a constructive-if
often irresolute-agent of peaceful conflict resolution.
25X1
Qadhafi is in a position to seize on several anti-US
propaganda issues at the outset of his chairmanship.
Thus, we believe he will use the OAU to attack US
policy in southern Africa. He will probably also
accuse the United States of meddling in the Chad and
Western Sahara conflicts. The precise formulation of
a suitable posture on US Middle Eastern policy for
OAU consumption may take a bit longer to evolve,
but he is not likely to pass up that opportunity either.
We believe that Qadhafi is unlikely to make any
effort to revitalize the OAU peace effort in Western
Sahara or to spearhead any possible future OAU role
in promoting a lasting, anti-Libyan coalition of the
several Chadian factions. In our judgment, continua-
tion of the fighting in Western Sahara may lead
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Morocco's King Hassan to turn to the United States
for additional military assistance. In Chad, we believe
Qadhafi will use covert action to undermine any anti-
Libyan government
that post would be attacked by most other African
states as blatant interference in Africa's internal
affairs. Qadhafi would fully exploit the propaganda
value of any such initiatives as evidence of US
meddling, thus damaging US efforts to gain African
Any open attempt by the United States to become
actively involved in the efforts of some moderates to
derail the summit or to prevent Qadhafi from acced-
ing to the chairmanship or exercising his authority in
backing of Washington's Africa policy
Secret 10
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Secret
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