LEBANON: CONFESSIONALISM--A POTENT FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00854R000100100009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
Lebanon:
Confessionalism
A Potent Force
ON FILE Dept of Commerce RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
State Dept. review completed
Confidential
NESA 82-10438
August 1982
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*F Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
Lebanon:
Confessional ism
A Potent Force 25X1
An Intelligence Assessment
25X1
This assessment was prepared by 25X1
the Office o ear Last-
South Asia Analysis. It was coordinated with the
National Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be addressed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli 25X1
Division, NESA,
Confidential
NESA 82-10438
August 1982
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Confidential
Lebanon:
Confessionalism- 25X1
A Potent Force 0
Key Judgments The massive Israeli invasion will alter the political complexion of Lebanon
in ways that are not yet clear. The outcome will be strongly influenced,
however, by sectarian ties which, despite nearly 40 years of statehood,
remain the dominant force in Lebanon. These ties have been reinforced by
the confessional system under which the Lebanese have been governed for
generations. Although designed to minimize sectarian strife by apportion-
ing power and prerogatives among the main sects, the system has
discouraged the development of political forces cutting across sectarian
lines.
The system has periodically come under intense strain in recent decades.
Internal problems, particularly the feeling among Muslims that their
interests were not adequately represented in the power structure, have
usually been the root of the trouble. But factors such as the Arab-Israeli
dispute and Jordan's expulsion of the Palestinians in 1970-71 aggravated
the internal differences.
In the 1975-76 civil war the system broke down completely, and the
authority of the central government has never been fully restored. The
strife brought into Lebanese politics a new generation of leaders who seem
less inclined to accept the rules of political compromise that the country's
founding generation considered essential to the working of the system.
The decline of Lebanon's formal institutions has encouraged the Lebanese
to strengthen their confessional ties. The Maronites increasingly look to the
Phalange, the Druze to the Junblat family, and the Shia to Amal and to
their Imams for their social and security needs rather than to the
government.
The increasing role in Lebanese politics of outside actors-the Syrians, the
Palestinians, and the Israelis-has added another complicating dimension
to the problems of confessionalism. Through their ties with Lebanese
factional clients, these outside elements have been able to manipulate
sectarian differences and advance their own interests. While the PLO at
Information available as of 28 July 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Confidential
NESA 82-10438
August 1982
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least temporarily seems to have been largely removed from the equation,
the influence of Israel and Syria will persist even if both withdraw their
forces from Lebanon.
While a growing number of Lebanese have become opposed to the concept
of confessionalism, we believe some form of government in which the
various sects are represented on a proportional basis remains the only
workable alternative for Lebanon in the near future. There is no secular,
nationalist alternative and no one faction or sect-even the Phalange-
strong enough to prevail over the others, unless it is imposed by an outside
power.
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Lebanon:
Confessionalism-
A Potent Force
The Setting
Confessionalism was fashioned into the Lebanese
political structure under the French Mandate in the
1920s and 1930s. The 1932 census (table 1), which
showed a slight Christian majority, became the basis
of the mandate's governmental system, in which
Christians were represented in Parliament on the
basis of six seats to every five for Muslims. To
strengthen France's Maronite Christian allies and to
allay Christian fears of being engulfed in the Muslim
Arab world, it was agreed that the powerful presiden-
cy, based on the French model, should be held by a
Christian. It became, and has remained, a Maronite
preserve. The dominant Muslim sect at the time, the
Sunnis, was given the prime minister's position, and
the speaker of the Parliament was allocated to the
Shia. The concept of confessionalism was also applied
to the civil service and the army, with the Maronites
receiving a disproportionate share of the key positions.
Nurtured by the French, the confessional system was
formally acknowledged in 1943 by the leading Maro-
nite politician, Bishara al-Khuri, and his Sunni coun-
terpart, Riad Solh, in the so-called National Cove-
nant. Representing their respective religions, the two
men reached an understanding on Lebanon's political
character that they hoped would restrict the excesses
of sectarianism and provide a framework for the
newly independent country. Khuri, reflecting Chris-
tian fears of being a minority in the Arab world,
agreed to forswear Christian demands for ties to the
West. In return, Solh, reflecting Muslim concerns
that Christians would always serve Western interests
first, acknowledged Lebanon's need to remain inde-
pendent within the Arab world.
The confessional system worked for more than a
decade, despite the corrupt nature of Khuri's presi-
dency and his manipulation of the Constitution to
extend his term. Khuri's eventual downfall in 1952
and other early political challenges to the system were
contained by maneuvering within the loosely based
structure of parliamentary alliances.
Lebanese Politico-Religious Groups-1932 Census
Arab Muslims
333,165
Sunni
178,130
Shia
155,035
Arab Christians
364,754
Maronite
227,880
Greek Orthodox
77,312
Greek Catholic
46,709
Protestants; Syrian Catholic/ Orthodox
12,853
Druze
53,334
Non-Arabs
41,973
Armenians
31,588
Jewish
3,588
Others
6,393
Residents in Lebanon
793,226
Lebanese Expatriates
254,387
Total
1,047,613
Under Khuri's successor Camille Shamun the system
came under considerable strain. Muslim enthusiasm
for Egyptian President Nasir and the lure of pan-
Arab socialism gave rise to new fears among Chris-
tians that Muslims would abandon the pledges made
in the National Covenant. The growth of pan-Arab
influences among Muslims prompted heavyhanded
attempts by Shamun to manipulate the political proc-
ess and led to civil strife and the threat of wide-scale
civil war. Shamun's successful plea to the West to
intervene in 1958 was interpreted by many Muslims
as a betrayal of the promises Christians made in the
National Covenant. 25X1
Still, the confessional system survived the 1958 crisis
and even regained some ground during the regimes of
Presidents Shihab and Hilu, whose retreat from Sha-
mun's overtly pro-Western stance and acknowledge-
ment of Lebanon's Arab character and regional role
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Figure 1
Lebanon: Distribution of Religious Groups
Maronite
Greek Orthodox
Greek Catholic
--T Mixed Maronite and
Greek Catholic
7577" Shia Muslim
Sunni Muslim
Druze
Mixed Druze and
Greek Orthodox
Population shifts caused by the June 1982
Israeli invasion are not depicted.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Confidential
helped mollify Muslims. Both Presidents also nur-
tured conditions in Lebanon under which the coun-
try's economy grew rapidly and the population began
migrating to the cities-particularly Beirut-in large
numbers
Although the complex system for sharing power
seemed to foster social change and economic expan-
sion, it did not allow for the concurrent growth of
modern political organizations. In fact, the confes-
sional system did pretty much the opposite, reinforc-
ing the largely sectarian political strength of tradi-
tional Lebanese powers like the landlords and the
extended families and encouraging the growth of
exclusive sectarian groupings. Because the route to
political power and spoils was a function of religious
affiliation, the confessional system inhibited the de-
velopment of a nationalism that cut across sectarian
lines.
By the mid-1960s, the lack of political modernization
in Lebanon was leading to strains in the confessional
system. Young Muslims were turning away from the
traditional Muslim political establishment toward
radical and pan-Arab political themes based on secu-
larism. Young Christians, particularly Maronites,
were being attracted to the Phalange which, while
vigorously defending Maronite interests, looked with
some disdain on traditional semifeudal Maronite poli-
tics and was organized along the lines of a mass party
determined to play more than a parochial role. These
trends gave traditional leaders practiced in the art of
confessionalism in both religions cause for concern
Moreover, the confessional system came under in-
creasing pressure in the late 1960s and early 1970s
from external actors and events, such as the 1967
Arab-Israeli war, the advent of Palestinian-Israeli
clashes along the Lebanese border, the growth of a
large Palestinian community in Lebanon, and the
Jordanian civil war. As Lebanon became increasingly
drawn into Arab-Israeli disputes, the country's pre-
cariously balanced system was unable to respond to
events and the central government lost control. This,
along with the economic problems presented by large
migration to the cities, hastened the growth of sectari-
an politics outside the bounds of the old confessional
system, led to the collapse of Muslim and Christian
adherence to the tenets of the National Covenant, and
brought on the civil war in 1975-76. FI 25X1
The Effect of the Civil War
The war destroyed or scarred most of the country's
carefully balanced institutions, led to the disintegra-
tion of the army along religious lines, and substantiat-
ed long-held Christian and Muslim suspicions of one
another. It also gave rise to a new generation of
leaders who were younger, more militant, and less
willing to accept the need to compromise than their
elders. Most of all, however, it unleashed the very
sectarian energies and rivalries that Lebanon's found-
ing fathers had tried to harness in the National
Covenant. 25X1
As the confessional system disintegrated, political and
military factions that had grown up outside of it
began to flourish. This, in turn, encouraged political
groups that had functioned within the system to
develop new organizations, particularly militias, that
also functioned outside the system. The weaker the
government became, the more powerful forces acting
outside the system grew until, in effect, the politics of
de jure confessionalism established under the man-
date and acknowledged by the National Covenant
became the politics of de facto confessionalism en-
forced by arms.
Since the civil war, Lebanese politics have evolved
almost entirely along sectarian lines. Even though
several secular parties, such as the Communists, also
have grown rapidly since the war, the country's two
most dynamic politico-military organizations, the
Maronite Phalange and the Shia Amal, are almost
exclusively dedicated to the pursuit and protection of
sectarian interests. 25X1
The Christians
The Maronites are the largest of the Christian com-
munities (table 2). They are a Uniate sect affiliated
with the Vatican. Making up less than 20 percent of
Lebanon's population and slightly more than half of
its Christians, the Maronites have always played an
important role in Lebanese politics) 25X1
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Lebanese Politico-Religious Groups-1981
Estimates a
Maronite
Greek Orthodox
Greek Catholic (Melkite)
Protestant
390
240
52
68
190 7
151 6
Armenian Orthodox/Catholic 150
Jewish 1
Palestinians (roughly one-third Arab 400 15
Christian and two-thirds Arab Muslim)
Residents in Lebanon
Lebanese expatriates (people holding 1,250
Lebanese citizenship or dual citizenship
abroad, mostly in Western Hemi-
sphere)
a US demographers derive these figures from the Lebanese Govern-
ment's 1969 population estimate based on the 1932 census with
adjustments for births, deaths, and emigration. The individual
politico-religious groups have customarily inflated their population
statistics to such a degree that US officials do not accept even
"official" Lebanese Government figures without reservation. The
Christians frequently report their population figures to include many
of the Lebanese expatriates, many of whom are Christians, in order
to maintain the traditional ratio between Christians and Muslims.
They migrated to the mountains of north Lebanon
from present-day Turkey in the seventh century to
avoid persecution from Orthodox Christians. Today,
Maronite territory encompasses the region known as
Mount Lebanon, which runs from East Beirut north
along the coast to Batrun and extends inland toward
the Sannin ridge line. The towns of Zgharta, Bsharri,
and Bikfayya are traditionally Maronite as are the
Beirut quarters of Ashrafiah and Ayn Rummanih
Maronite politics have traditionally been dominated
by a number of prominent families who have rivaled
one another for leadership of the community. Most
notable among them are the Jumayyils of Mount
Lebanon, the Shamuns of the Shuf, and the Fran-
jiyahs of Zgharta. Each has established its own
political party and militia 25X1
The Greek Orthodox sect, which is the second-largest
Christian community, representing a third of the
Christians, have for the most part remained outside
Maronite sway. With a more decentralized church
structure and coreligionists living elsewhere in the
Arab world, the Greek Orthodox have historically
been more sensitive to Arab and Muslim concerns.
Unlike other religious groups in Lebanon, the Greek
Orthodox are not identified with one geographic
region or one political group; they reside in almost all
regions and are affiliated with a wide spectrum of
political organizations ranging from the far right to
the far left. A large number of Greek Orthodox
belong to the Lebanese branch of the Syrian Socialist
National Party and the Communist Party of Lebanon,
both of which are secularist.
Lebanon's 52,000 Greek Catholics, who make up
about 2 percent of the population, have some in-
dependent political power bases, but usually ally with
the predominant Maronite factions
The Armenian community has generally tried to steer
a neutral course on Christian-Muslim issues, but
largely supports the Maronites because of the commu-
nity's proximity to Maronite territory held by the
Phalange. The approximately 150,000 Armenians ad-
here strongly to their cultural origins and have chosen
to maintain their own language and customs as a
means of self-identification.
With the exception of the Greek Orthodox, Lebanon's
Christian community has, for the most part, been
driven closer together since the civil war both by its
collective fear of Syrian and Muslim domination and
by the rise to power of the Phalange. Founded in 1936
by Pierre Jumayyil as a youth organization, the
Phalange became a political party after France gave
25X1
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Lebanon its independence in 1945. It has since grown
into a well-organized, disciplined political organiza-
tion that is overwhelmingly Maronite and has a
membership over 54,000.
Led by Pierre and his sons Amin and Bashir, the
party has always held a prominent position in Leba-
nese politics-it controls several seats in Parliament,
and several of its members, including Pierre, have
served in the Cabinet. It also dominates the Lebanese
Front, a loose coalition of Maronite groups, formed
after the civil war to demonstrate Maronite solidarity
against the Syrians and the Palestinians.
Although the Phalange was Lebanon's first major
political entity to be organized along the lines of a
mass party and, to some extent, might have been able
to create the basis for a broader, transsectarian
appeal, it has been almost exclusively directed toward
preserving Maronite hegemony. The party's appeal to
Maronites rests largely on its dedication to the ideal
of an independent, Western-oriented Lebanese nation
and to the prevention of Lebanon's absorption into a
greater Syria or a unified Arab state.
The paternalistic attitude displayed by Phalange lead-
ers toward Muslims is another key factor in the
party's appeal to Maronites. Phalange leaders reflect
the still widely held belief among Maronites that it is
their right to govern Lebanon and to serve as benefac-
tors for their politically and socially underdeveloped
Muslim brethren.
The party's strength within the Christian community
derives to a large extent from its control and protec-
tion of the Maronite heartland north of Beirut, where
it enforces the law and dispenses justice, collects
taxes, and provides administrative and social services
in lieu of or in addition to the central government. It is
difficult to gauge how popular the party would be if
the Maronite community felt less threatened or if the
central government were able and willing to reassume
its civic responsibilities. The party has always been
strongest among the Maronite blue collar and lower
middle class rather than the professional and business
class which, like some semifeudal landowners, has
traditionally viewed it with suspicion
The Phalange's view of reconciliation in Lebanon
rests on a basic faith in the confessional system
defined by the National Covenant and the belief that
Muslims would act in concert to rejuvenate the
covenant if they were free of Syrian and Palestinian
influence. With an eye on the country's tradition of
alliances between the sects, the Phalange has sought
to appeal to conservative Muslim and Druze leaders
by playing on their fears of Syrian domination and
growing radical influence in the Muslim community.
Since the Israeli invasion, however, Embassy report-
ing indicates that Phalange strategists have also
broadened contacts with Shia leaders, particularly in
Israeli-controlled areas, in an effort to forge a politi-
cal alliance with their large and increasingly powerful
sect. 25X1
We believe the Phalange Party leaders would like to
reestablish strong Maronite control over the govern-
ment and the country. The reduction of Syrian and
Palestinian influence as a result of the Israeli invasion
has encouraged attempts to realize this goal. Faced
with the realities of the current Muslim majority,
however, some party leaders may advise splitting off
the heavily Muslim areas of the Bekaa Valley and
northern Lebanon that are still occupied by Syria
from the sectors controlled by the Israelis and the
Phalange, perhaps leading to a partitioned state.
Those who oppose such drastic steps may argue
instead for the creation of a Swiss-style cantonal
system in which each sect would control its own area,
while a weak central government would head the
Druze
The Druze community in the Middle East numbers
around 300,000, divided mainly among Lebanon,
Syria, and Israel with about 190,000 in Lebanon. The
Druze are a heretical and occult sect that is an
extremely secretive offshoot of Islam. They do not
regard themselves as Muslims, nor are they consid-
ered such by Muslims. Only a small minority of the
community is initiated fully into the religion's inner-
most secrets. This group (the Ujjal) is responsible for
guiding the ignorant majority (the Juhal).
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ty that leads a life of relative isolation and self-
sufficiency in the southern mountains of Lebanon.
They are located primarily in the Shuf Region,
although a significant number live around Hasbayya
The Druze are a close-knit, well-organized communi-
and Mt. Hermon near the Syrian border.
Traditionally, the Druze have been an agricultural
community governed by large semifeudal landlords.
Although the economic power of the landlord families
has declined, politically they remain predominant.
The two major Lebanese Druze factions are led by the
prominent Junblat and Arslan families. The Arslans
have traditionally accepted a limited role for the
Druze in the confessional system and have lost some
influence in Lebanese politics. The Junblats, on the
other hand, have provided some of Lebanon's leading
political figures since independence and through their
leadership have attained a larger political role for the
Druze in Lebanon than their numbers would warrant.
The most dynamic member of the family, the late
Kamal Junblat, founded the Progressive Socialist
Party (PSP), the primary political organization of the
Druze community in 1949. Espousing a variant of
socialism similar to West European social democracy,
Kamal frequently attacked the confessional system
and advocated the establishment of a secular state.
He made no secret of his desire to be president of
Lebanon, but knew that as a Druze he could not
aspire to any position higher than minister under the
confessional system.
By the 1970s the PSP had become one of the most
prominent leftist parties in Lebanon, largely because
of Kamal Junblat's charismatic leadership. Junblat
himself became leader and spokesman for the Nation-
al Movement, an umbrella organization of all impor-
tant Lebanese leftist parties, which emerged as a
major protagonist during the civil war (table 3). When
Kamal was assassinated in March 1977-presumably
by the Syrians whose policies he opposed-his son
Walid assumed the leadership of both the Junblati
Druze and the PSP. He later became the President of
the National Movement.
25X1
Although Walid does not have the charismatic appeal
or the intellectual dynamism of his father and has
Figure 2
Lebanese Politico-Religious Groups'
Percent
Greek Catholic
2.0
Protestant
3.0
Armenian
Druze
8.0
Greek Orthodox
11.0
Maronite
17.0
Shia
27.0
Sunni
25.0
become more of a spokesman for his community than
for the Lebanese left, he continues to vehemently
oppose sectarianism and the confessional system.
He has repeatedly stated that he would prefer the
establishment of a secular state and the election of a
president by popular vote, but we believe he would
probably accept a continuation of the confessional
system if modifications were made giving Muslims
parity with Christians and a greater role in the army
then they have. He supports a strong central authority
and opposes partition or other cantonal schemes that
would strengthen sectarianism.
Shia Muslims
The approximately 600,000 Shia constitute Lebanon's
largest single sect (figure 2). Long neglected by the
central government, they are the least prosperous,
least educated, and most resistant to change of the
major religious communities. Most are low-income
farmers, and those who have emigrated to the cities
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Independent Muslims
Al Amal
Imam Musa Sadr, missing since September 1978, and
Nabih Barri; Shia
Islamic Coalition
Sa'ib Salam and Rashid Karami; Sunni
Islamic Grouping
Shafiq Wazzan; Sunni
Democratic Socialist Party
Kamal al-Assad; Shia
National Movement (primarily Muslim left)
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
Walid Junblat; Druze
Independent Nasirite Movement (Murabitun)
Ibrahim Qulaylat; Beirut Sunni
Communist Action Organization
Muhsin Ibrahim; extreme left Shia
Communist Party of Lebanon
Nicola Shawi and George Hawi; pro-USSR Greek Orthodox
Christian
Baath Party-Iraqi Wing
Abd al-Majid Rafai; Sunni
Nasirite Corrective Movement
Isamal-Arab; extreme left Sunni
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (PPS or SSNP)
Inam Raad; left Greek Orthodox Christian
Popular Nasserist Organization
Mustafa Sa'ad; Sunni
Baath Party-Syrian Wing
Assam Qansu; Sunni, pro-Syrian
Arab Socialist Union
Abd al-Rahim Murad; Sunni
National Front (pro-Syrian left)
Nasirite organization
(Union of Working Peoples Forces) Kamal Shatila; Sunni
National Confrontation Front
Talal Marhabi and Ali'Id; Tripoli-based Alawites
lack skills. The bulk of the Shia population is located
in physically isolated regions of southern Lebanon and
in the northern Bekaa Valley.
The Shia community has traditionally played a minor
role in Lebanese politics. Dependent on the political
leadership of a small group of feudal ruling families,
Moderate Christians
Independent Parliamentary Bloc
Sim'an al-Duwayhi and Butrus Harb; Maronite
Pro-Syrian Christians
Zgharta Front
Sulayman Franjiyah; Conservative northern Maronite
Lebanese Front (pimarily Christian right)
Phalange Party (Kataib)
Pierre Jumayyil and Bashir Jumayyil (Lebanon Front Militia
Commander); Maronite and Greek Catholic
National Liberal Party
Camille Shamun (President of Lebanese Front); Maronite
Kaslik Front
(Order of Maronite Monks) Bulus Na'man; Maronite Clergy
extreme right
Guardians of the Cedars
Etienne Saqr AKA Abu Arz; extremist Maronite
Al Tanzim
George Adnan; extremist Maronite
Independent Christian Right
Maronite League
Shakir Abu Sulayman; Maronite
National Bloc
Raymond Edde; Maronite, anti-Syrian
Free Lebanon Movement
Major Sa'ad Haddad; Maronite/Shia, pro-Israeli
and respectful-in accordance with Shia traditions-
of the religious authority and teachings of their
Imams, the Shia had a rigid, conservative, and back-
ward outlook that tended to reinforce their low level
of political activism. 25X1
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In the last decade, however, the Shia community has
gradually become aware of its potential for influenc-
ing developments in Lebanon. A major catalyst was
the emergence of Iman Musa Sadr, a religious leader
and proponent of Shia self-development who opposed
the traditional landowner leadership and began to
unify and mobilize the community in the late 1960s.
He organized the Higher Shiite Council in 1969 and a
few years later established the "Movement of the
Deprived."
25X1
Musa Sadr's disappearance in August 1978 while
visiting Libya-never fully explained-provided a
focus for the Shia community and another catalyst for
its political mobilization. Moreover, the growing Shia
role in Lebanon was given a major boost by the rise to
power of a Shia theocracy in Iran.
25X1
The largest Shia organization in Lebanon is Amal,
the military and political wing of the Higher Shiite
Council. Since it was founded in the early 1970s by
Musa Sadr, membership in Amal has grown rapidly,
giving it increasing control over the Shia community.
It recruits primarily among Shia concentrations in
southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley as well as
from areas in West Beirut where Shia refugees from
the south have settled.
25X1
Amal was established largely to give Musa Sadr a
base from which to challenge the traditional leader-
ship of the community, thus creating differences that
continue to divide the community today. As the Shia
have grown more politically aware, however, the role
of the traditional semifeudal landowning families in
the community's political leadership has declined.
Although the community's official representation in
the Lebanese Government is still in the hands of the
traditional leadership, largely because there have
been no parliamentary elections since 1972, the Shia
now look more to Amal leaders like Nabih Barri and
Shaykh Shams al-Din of the Higher Shiite Council
for guidance. The Shia also are increasingly attracted
to Lebanon's two Communist parties, the Lebanese
Communist Party and the Communist Action Organi-
zation.
The traditional Shia leadership clings to the confes-
sional system despite its inequities toward their com-
munity because they would stand to lose most of their
political power if changes were made. The Speaker-
ship of Parliament, for example, reserved for a Shia
under the National Covenant, is one of the most
powerful positions in the Lebanese Government, par-
ticularly during presidential elections. In this sense,
the traditional Shia leadership are natural allies for
the established Sunni elite and the Maronites in
defense of the confessional system.
The emerging Shia leadership in Amal and the High-
er Shiite Council is split between the proponents of
secularism-like Nabih Barri and those who favor a
strong religious role-like Shams al-Din. Perhaps
more than any other group of leaders in Lebanon, the
emerging Shia leadership favors a strong central
government and opposes partition schemes. Although
it is not clear how strongly some support secularism,
even those who limit their views to favoring some
adjustments to the confessional system would want
their community to have a larger institutional role
than it has had, one that would be commensurate with
their status as the most populous sect
the rising 25X1
tide of Shia politicization has prompted fears among
other Lebanese sects, particularly the conservative
Sunni elite and some Christians, about their potential
role in spreading Islamic fundamentalism. This per-
ception has been bolstered by the support Amal
receives from Iran and from Syrian President Assad's
minority Alawite regime as well as the group's will-
ingness to confront Iraqi-backed Lebanese factions on
behalf of Iran. It has also been underscored by Amal's
general combativeness, which gives it the aura of an
unguided missile. According to the US Embassy in
Beirut, such fears have recently prompted radical
Sunni_Nasirite militias to combine forces to guard
Sunni areas of Beirut as well as to join Palestinian
and Lebanese leftist groups battling Amal.O 25X1
If such perceptions continue and if secular Shia
leaders like Nabih Barri are unable to persuade
leaders of other Lebanese sects that the Shia desire to
work within some type of balanced confessional sys-
tem, the rise of Shia power will add yet another factor
to Lebanon's already complex Christian-Muslim rift.
Rising Shia power may also make for further sectari-
an and inter-sect strife. For now, the Shia remain
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largely an unknown factor that is likely to play an
increasingly important role in determining Lebanon's
future
Sunni Muslims
The approximately half million Sunni Muslims, who
reside mostly in the coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli,
and Sidon, are the most urbanized and modernized of
the non-Christian groups. Although they have tradi-
tionally been the dominant Muslim sect in the coun-
try, their status has been eroded in recent years by the
growing population and political activism of the Shia.
Sharp differences between older, conservative politi-
cians and a new generation of leaders that emerged
from the war have also split the community-possibly
making it now the most internally divided of all
religious sects in Lebanon. The Sunnis have not been
able to develop a consensus on the appropriate means
to achieve national reconciliation.
The Sunni conservative elite's power base was ground-
ed in patronage dispensed both within and outside of
the government's institutions. This base was eroded
during the civil war and supplanted to a large extent
by the growth of the leftist militias. Because of their
weakened position, the old elite, like former Prime
Minister Saib Salam, advocate retaining the confes-
sional system established by the National Covenant,
fearing that any change in that system will further
reduce their personal power and Sunni representation
in favor of the Shia. As is the case with the traditional
Shia leaders, the conservative Sunni elite continues to
be heavily represented in Parliament largely because
there have been no elections since 1972.
The new generation of Sunni leaders represents a
wide variety of leftist political parties that embrace
Baathism, Communism, and Nasirism among other
ideologies. Most of these groups are members of the
leftist Muslim National Movement, which is opposed
to confessionalism and advocates the establishment of
a secular state. Some Sunni member groups like the
Murabitun have insisted on a restructuring of the
political system that would destroy the privileged
positions of both the Christians and the traditional
Muslim leadership.
We believe Sunnis of both conservative and leftist
stripes are becoming increasingly concerned, however,
about growing Shia politicization and the threat of
Islamic fundamentalism. Recently this fear has mut-
ed calls for radical change among even leftist Sunni
groups and, although most continue to claim publicly
that the Israeli-supported Phalange constitutes their
greatest danger, several Embassy reports suggest that
many believe that the Shia threat looms larger in the
long run. 25X1
Moreover, the Sunnis no longer have the kind of
aggressive, proselytizing foreign patron that the Shia
have in Iran. During the 1950s and 1960s, Nasirism
provided such a force for Lebanese Sunnis, and Egypt
served as the beacon for pan-Arab sentiment. Since
then, however, leftist Sunni politics have fragmented
into smaller, frequently competing groups. They re-
ceive foreign support from countries like Iraq and
Libya, which are less interested in advancing their
own ideologies than in offsetting Syrian, Palestinian,
and Iranian influence among Lebanese Muslims. This
factor, in addition to the continued allegiance of many
in the Sunni elite to the Palestinian movement and to
the Syrian presence in Lebanon, restricts the Sunnis'
room for political maneuvering and inhibits their
willingness to promote independent reform initiatives
and entertain reconciliation schemes.
25X1
Foreign Actors and Confessionalism
The Syrians have frequently taken advantage of
Lebanon's sectarian politics to advance their own
goals, but the Assad regime supports the concept of
confessionalism in Lebanon and would like to see the
reestablishment of a balanced Christian-Muslim gov-
ernment with equal representation for Muslims. Da-
mascus would oppose the establishment of a Maro-
nite-dominated, Israeli-supported regime and
probably will reject any formal partitioning of the
country into sectarian regions. Syria's leverage has
been weakened, however, by the Israeli invasion, and
it is not clear whether Syrian troops will even be
allowed to remain in the Bekaa Valley (figure 3).L
25X1
Even if it is forced to withdraw its troops, we believe
Syria will retain its influence with some of the
factions. Damascus has long maintained ties with
each Lebanese sect, particularly the Greek Orthodox,
which dominates the leadership of the Syrian Socialist
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Figure 3
Sea
I Golan
J Heiahts
l (Israeli
( -occupied)
I
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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National Party in Lebanon, and the Maronites led by
former President Sulayman Franjiyah in northern
Lebanon. The Shia, however, have emerged over the
last few years as Syria's most important Lebanese ally
and Damascus
has not only provided Amal with military aid but has
used it frequently to carry out Syrian initiatives
toward the PLO, other Lebanese Muslim and leftist
factions, and Iraqi interests.
We believe the minority Alawite Assad regime also
perceives the Shia and fellow Alawites in northern
Lebanon as natural allies against the Sunnis in both
Lebanon and Syria and as another factor in currying
Iranian favor. Nonetheless, the secular Syrian regime
would be wary of any upsurge of Islamic fundamen-
talism in Lebanon for fear that it would encourage
fundamentalist Sunni opponents of Alawite rule in
Syria
The Iranians play an increasingly important outside
role in Lebanon because of their special ties to
Lebanon's Shia community. The relationship between
the two predates the Iranian revolution. Imam Musa
Sadr was Iranian and a relative by marriage of
Ayatollah Khomeini. Iranian leaders opposed to the
Shah lived in Lebanon and worked with Amal during
their exile. Since the revolution Lebanese Shia have
identified themselves with Iran not only because of
their sectarian relationship, but also because of the
ideological and social principles on which the Iranian
revolution is based. Individual Iranians donate money
to Lebanon's Shia, and the government supports the
community both financially and politically. Several
Embassy reports indicate that Tehran has also provid-
ed Amal with light arms, funds, and limited military
training and uses Amal to carry out actions against
Iraqi-backed Lebanese groups and Iraqi interests in
Lebanon. 25X1
The Iranian regime would probably like to see the
advent of a Shia fundamentalist government in Leba-
non in place of the old confessional system and can be
expected to work to undermine efforts to place sectar-
ianism in Lebanon back into a confessionally bal-
anced harness. The Iranian Government has taken
advantage of the Israeli invasion to send troops into
Lebanon and Syria, and its support for the Shia and
the encouragement it probably will give to Lebanese
Shia who advocate a religious state may well catalyze
further sectarian strife. 25X1
Moderate Arabs like the Saudis have favored a return
to the old confessional system in Lebanon, with
adjustments permitting greater representation for the
Muslims. In the aftermath of the Israeli invasion, we
believe they will be primarily concerned about the
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possible imposition of a Christian-dominated, pro-
Israeli government. They will exert what limited
influence they can muster on behalf of the Lebanese
Muslims and will encourage hardline Maronites to
reach all accommodation possible with Muslims and
the Syrians. Radical Arabs would strongly oppose
partition or any scheme that gave broad powers to the
current Maronite leadership, but their ability to influ-
ence events in Lebanon will probably be quite limited
while negotiations on the removal of foreign forces
from Lebanon are taking place.
The influx of Palestinians into Lebanon after the
Jordanian civil war in 1970 put increasing pressure on
the country's already fragile confessional balance and
their role in politicizing Lebanese Muslims was a
major catalyst in bringing about the 1975-76 civil
war. Although the PLO generally sought to stay out
of Lebanese internal politics, radical factions saw the
confessional system as a convenient target and played
an active role in supporting the attempts of their
Lebanese leftist allies' to overturn it.
The subjugation of the PLO in southern Lebanon and
Beirut and the expulsion of its most effective leaders
will reduce the Palestinians as a political factor. Even
if they leave Beirut, however, we expect Palestinian
leaders abroad will try to use their substantial finan-
cial assets and the large Palestinian community re-
maining in Lebanon, particularly in the north and the
Bekaa Valley, to try to stage a gradual political
comeback.
Outlook and Implications
for the United States
Lebanon's old confessional system has been battered
by the 1975-76 civil war, by the growth of factional-
ism in the six years since, and by the Israeli invasion.
Nonetheless, while a large number of Lebanese have
become opposed to the concept of confessionalism,
some form of government in which the various sects
are represented on a proportional basis remains the
only workable alternative for Lebanon in the near
future. There is no secular, nationalist alternative.
And no one faction or sect-even the Phalange-is
strong enough to prevail over the others, unless it is
There are, however, several factors that will make
finding a workable new confessional balance difficult.
Muslims will resist any new confessional agreement
that appears to have been dictated by the Israelis and
will be reluctant to cooperate with Phalange leader
Bashir Jumayyil if he appears to be doing Tel Aviv's
bidding or if he seems bent on riding roughshod over
their concerns. They will look to moderate Arabs like
the Egyptians, the Saudis, and the Jordanians to press
the United States to guarantee fair treatment for
them from the Phalange and are likely to interpret
any US reticence in doing so as a sign of Washing-
ton's approval for Israeli-Phalange designs to isolate
Lebanon from the Arab world by establishing a
Christian-dominated state allied with Israel.
Jumayyil and other hardline Christians will look to
the United States to accept the realities of whatever
confessional power-sharing arrangements they decide
upon, including, if necessary, a Christian-dominated
regime that has little or no Muslim participation.
Jumayyil will argue, as will the Israelis, that it is
ultimately more important for Western interests in
the region to have a strong authority in Beirut that
can guarantee an end to Palestinian activity in Leba-
non and cast its lot with the Camp David process than
to face the prospect of a weak government that
continues to be paralyzed by confessional squabbling.
Moreover, the Israeli invasion and the subsequent
diminution of Palestinian and Syrian influence in
Lebanon, while encouraging the Phalange to reestab-
lish the old, Maronite-dominated order, may give rise
to aspirations beyond the former structure by other
groups, like the Shia. The realization of these hopes
would have to come at the expense of the other two
major sects, the Maronites and the Sunnis, and could
therefore lead to new sectarian wrangling, particular-
ly between Sunnis and Shia.
Another factor that could inhibit efforts to reharness
confessional ties into a workable governmental struc-
ture is the continuing role of outside actors like Syria,
Iran, and possibly the PLO, who will retain some
imposed by an outside power.
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influence in Lebanese politics. While their ability to
play a major role has been diminished by the Israeli
invasion, they-particularly Syria-will be capable of
disrupting the political basis for any settlement that
does not take their basic interests in Lebanon into
account.
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