REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000600020124-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 124
• Content Type: REPORT

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day one of the great con ions of history. The
o live is being changed by strong curreats o
ling -- currents released by the American and Frich
Revolutions in the 18th Centery0 by the Industrial Revolution in the
19th and by two destructive wars and the Rueeian Revolution in our
own time. This lei) no longer the world into which most of rs were
born. We may be sure that it will be a far different world before
we die,
time of crisis and stross, the American nation has
ew role. We may speak of this role without vanity or
ems because we did not seek it but rather tried to
O'er role, as we have now expressed it in our national
4 is to help lead the nations through this time of turmoil
h a Iry that in the end there shall be an eepmesion -e nea
t of the areas of freedom and knoWledge. Thcpreseed in
s our role is to build a bridge over the abyss of confasion
ation so that hmmanity may safely cross. If we can succeed
role, the peoples of the world may be spared the sacrifIce of
re and adhievement which accompanied other great convulsions
and each nation may find release for its energies and genius
peace end human dignity.
not be easy for us to play this role. For apart from
flow of historical forces, we know that the leaders of
eat power have determined to exploit the trials of this
od to the full. Tears ago the men in the Yremlin sensed the
approach of. this turning point in human affairs. Today they are
working, scheming, to intensify the strains, compound the chaos mul
Ads the currents of nationalism, social unrest and despair to their
ultimate goal of a world serving the ends of the Kremlin. Their
strategy might be condensed into three meads: Ruin and rule.
Our reaction to this drive for world power was slow i but when
it came, it took the form of an idea. This idea at first ex.
pressed in the Truman Doctrine and the Harahan_ Plan .- was
basically as simple as this: America will help those who, believing
in freedom, help themselves and help each other. Behind the force
of this ides- we put our economic and industrial streagth. To the
countries wVich showed a will to survive and to cooperate we sent
food, maelelites to grow more food, and still more machines to produce
everything from shoes to electricity. We sent them our technical ell*
parts to raise production in their factories and on their farms,
* Demotes deletion from original text
** Denotes zebstitution or contraction of 0
NSC review completed.
t.
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te game, to dam rivers, to drive out malaria and other
disees4s# to teen the three rls. iehan the allies and dupes of
the gremlin spread lies about this effort, we launched a campaign
of th over the air wave, in newspapers, in films, in public
Then we helped our friends in the free world to raise
shield over this peaceful effort.
eacoomic help, our information program., our defaiee
if vively used -- are indispensable parts of the AmeriCsn
=gram for bridging this period of vpheaval. But the relentless
eassult of the Eremlin upon the bridge has demonstrated the need of
smother elemnnt. This missing element is an integrated psychological
strategy .
al and compelling reasons why we should make
resources in ideas and imagination, wil7 we
that all our sacrifices are toward
of clearly defined ends. We hunt tbjflJji terms of
ozt7ts economic, as well as mo leer en order
uccessfU34 our role of leaderstetp.
is peace = not war. Though a protective shield is
o peace in a world threeemeduith war, we cannot in?
m' out our resources for economic mad military aid,
ve our own strengths We must use our ingenUity to find
ewes to produce situations of strengthetio'h will reduce
ties of war and simultaneously serve to shorten the
onflict.
30, we must make it clear to those who are our Mends,
and to those who would be our friends, tha we not only abhor mill.
tuhistic imperia3iam, but also that we disclaim cultural and intele
'actual erialism as wells The only rule we seek is the Golden Rule,
2
h.
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- .11?0,
of the f
idea of
t leader
ventually
amp alt
world knows the meaning
etops short of geL ie',earned out under the
That assault began, in fact, before the second leorld War s
As the armies of the Western Allies advanced, the forces of intentiona
Communism set to work in their rear to poison the minds of the liberated
against the liberators, to turn the free nations against each other, to
seise positions of power, and to break down the prestige of the Dhited
States. And while the victorious nations of the Veet were disbanding
their and farces, the Kremlin's in in every country were moving to
battle stations in preparation for the final struggle" so long foretold
in Communist song and fable.
In blaming ourselves for what caneafter, we often o rlook
that the leaders of Bolshevism had l'ecal trnlning themselves in this
of ooMbat for a good half-century. With n their own country, the
graduated from the hard school of conspiracy and revolutioe. After their
seizure of power in 7.useia, their instituters of political warfare had
schooled foreign fanatics in the techniques or infiltration, subversion
and the conquest of power. Throughout the world they had built up net-
works of agents who eould novo at the word of comeand to
fitment a civil ear.
There was no great element or
that effort had is and momentum and a
although Communi had lost nuah of ita power to co
still retained ample power to confuse. The classic rule (5
"Divide and conquer" guided nmah of what they did. Nation against nation,
raoe against race, man against nane-thie was their etock in trade. They
lame of course, how to take advantage of eon's vices, but they found it
just as profitable to appeal to men's virtues. They twisted honest labor
**and lured unuarY dhurchmen
into furthering their strategy of oonfusion. They even reeled a 1447 to
use the word, "peace," as a weapon of assault.
The advantage in warfare eccruce to the aggreesor,
ioument? the weariness, a oonrusion of the post-dear uor
of Communism alvanced confidently toward the ultimate goal se
Soviet leaders.-..a world ro$ponsivo to the Kremlin.
Inevitably the
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blys the leadership of the aaaulted
upon the United Statee, for we were the one grea
out of the wer with reaervea of moral and material s
and by tradition, we Americans were illef
We fight wars the way we play football.
ts and then go home. We found it
to comprehend that peace nay be made an to
We ealled back our fighting men and returned
We all but diemantled our
services, thus opening the world to the Soviet lie.
d to reverse time and rediscover the peaceful existemoe
re the mar.
us nearly two years passed before we began to: face up to the
y of leadership 'which had come upon us.
d react, we moved one -tap at a tire. First, we pledged
our sup o Greece a Turkey, tee nations which were holding the gates
of the Naar East in the face of increaaing pressure from Communism.
Then, when the Kremlin srategiats shifted the weight of the Communist
assault to Western Turope, we lavmdhed the Marshall Plan and brought
together 16 nations to work for European recovery. With the eld ef these
nations we set Western Germany on the road to rehabilitation, ansi when the
Soviets set siege to the free city of Berlins we and our British allies
improvised the airlift and saved that outpost of freedom. Next, we noved
to the aid of Yugoslavia, whose government had defied the Kremlin, and we
were euccessful to this metent in rolling beak the iron curtain. In the
following years, together with our European allies we began to raise a
,protective shield over the work of reoovery.
Though we haa started out without a long.-range plan or blueprints
the net result of all these efforte era* a solid piece of cone
A well against Comnunist aggression was erected from the Black Jea to
the Werth Cape of Norway. Even more important for the long reN we and
our allies had set great ideas in notion.?the ideas of the Atlantic
COManitys of Nropean Union, of a coal-steel pool for WesternEreeltie
and of a European arm.
Balked in Europe and the Wear East the Communist atrn
the in force of their assault to Asia. Bven there, where
wee great and the old order in decay, the power of COMMUnISM as a
had to be backed by the force of arms and a spurious appeal to nation
The Chimes Co unit armies advanced across China until they had conquered
the nainland and stood at the gates of Southeast Asia. At the same times,
Conneniet foroeas ranging from guerrilla bands to mass armies, brought
terror to Indochina, Magya, Duroa erel the Thilippinee.
Then the
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4.1????.`
te launched an open attack upon
United rations. This was a challenge
awe, and to the free world as a
faced, it would have opened the flood.
ted States faoed it and, backed
omens and the Mines. Comm?
? This iilitary AuoceSs may well have been a
supplemented by a great diplorratiti aollemenient in
loviet opnosition.the oonolunion of a peace treaty
ored that key nation of Asia to the community of
which followed the socond World War, vs cloulli
look back upon none ueos and some failures. We could also look
eorward to further?Red possibly greater.?trials. Our economic and defense
programs, pursued in cooperation with our friends, were motoring esionomic
health and raising (madame that peaoe could be maintained.
a
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NEW
01,041 AL S OY
* A feelingdemeloped within the U. S. Government that we ha
sore than we had done in the past to win and hold the confiee
friends abroad and weaken the will of our ememies.
do
Thie feeling wa$ the result of an evolutionary process. In the
departments and agencies of the government a great deal of reflection
bad been given to the lessons we had learned in the etruggle and a general
desire had developed to concert our efforts to better effect.
In the years which followed the war, a number of oondttees hnd been
est up to coordinate the work of different departments and agencies in
the information and propaganda fields, These oormettees had no authority,
however, to deal with matters of broad policy or strategy. They could
not, for example, challonee decisions which might be economically or Mil-
t-artier sound but psychologically harmful. They worked some distance below
the top in the chain of leadership and had little infleencs on policies
and decisions. No committee or agency had the power to develop broad
strategic ideas which would bring forth the hjbeat oapabilities of ell
agencies of goverment.
Furthermore, there was a diffusion of national power depart-
mute, conscious of traditional comnartmentation of interests and. authority
amd on guard against intrusion in affairs felt to be their exelueive
concern. The interdepartmental difficulties and lack of emitted leader-
ship denied to the United etetes the fell valve and impact of her bold
acts in recent years.
But what was the answer to the problem? Was it possible to d ee OD
a strategic concept which woeldnut nore eider ane drive into all phasee
ur effort? And could we present our policies and acts in such a light
that they would strike a responsive chord in the hearts and mei", of men
and make them feel that their cause was our cause?
In seeking an answer tcqueet one like these high offieiale of the
zent-becarla oonvinoed that there was an urgent need for better and
unified leadership for our eefort. After fell coneideratioe of the
proposals which were advanced for the solution of this problem,
ident issued a directive ordering some of the: eehest officials
Government to provide for "the: more effective planning, eoereina-
A and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies,
of psychological operatiousel The issuance- of the Presidential Directive
was announced to thepUblie on or about June 20 1951.
To accomplish this purpose, the President directed that the Under
Seoretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, ena the Director
of Central_ Intelligence should serve as a Psychological Strategy Board.
Under them
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Tinder them there would be a Direct or appointed by the President. The
Director would have a permanent staff to help him carry out his reepo
sibilities. A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would sit with
the Board as its principal military adviser.
The President's order made the Board responsible for he "formula?
tion and promulgation . . of overeall national psychological objectives,
policies, and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the
national psychological effort." It was to report to the National Security
Council on its awn activities and on the activities of all agencies engaged
in the effort to influenoe men's minds and wills.
This was a broad mandate. In setting 'over?all national psyohologie
cal objectives," the Board would identify ' * what we were trying to
aocomplash. Then it would draw up policies and programs to achieve those
objectives. It would bring together all the governmert agencies which
could play a part in such programs and find out what they could contribute.
It would follow through and make sure that ell the agencies were working
together and doing their part. It would constantly study the progress of
these programs to influence other people in favor of our work for peace
and freedom. It would report to the National Security Council on thane
programs and the over?all effort in the field of psychological strategy.
The Board would have an acute realization that every significant
action in the field of foreign affairs by any governmental agency has an
effect upon the minds and wills of men. To maximize that effect the
government must act in its different spheres according to a common plan
which relates all actions together.
The first Director went to work on Jay 2, 1951. The Department
of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central in elligenoe Agency
lent him enough help to set up the nucleus of a staff. This staff was
organized in this way!
1. An Office of Plans and Policy. This staff group works
on broad strategic problems, defines the objectives which we
should aim at in our psychological effort, and draws up, in
cooperation with other agencies, the programs to aohieve those
objectives.
2. An Office of Coordination. This staff group helps tie
together the efforts already under way in the psychological field
and fellows through on plans and programa approved by the Board.
3. in Office of ?valuation and Review. This staff group
obtains from other agencies of the government the intelligence
estimates which
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which the staff needs for its work and prepared
feet veness of American psychological operations"
An Pmecutive Office for administrative matters'
recruiting the permanent staff, the Director was handicapped at
start,, 4ot only by the normal difficulties of recruiting able men in
rnment, but also by the shortage of experts in psychological
and operations. Within the government there were able adminis-
nd specialists for the normal problems of peace. In the armed
could be found many able officers trained in the arts of war.
re within the government?nor, for that matter, in the nation,.
e any eonsiderable number of men trained to cope with a situation
which was g'neither war nor ream." *
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*MO'
e course of ti
onalusions on
Mg coNcErr
work, the Director and his staff reached, a
se matters,
first place, they quickly made up their minds that the Board's
?oared a great deal more than word warfare. The tank of the Board
4, wae not to explain?or explain ausere.evente but to help
For this reason, they felt that the Board, though not pri.
=rily a policyemaking body, should strive to obtain vise policies and develop
sound programs which would, establish an identity between our aims and those
of other free nations.
On the other hand, the Director and
that the Board should concern itself with "
did not accept the view
t everything."
As they saw it, if the Board became entangled in day-to-day dc1iiousand
tried to intervene in all fields of government activity-, it would on cease
to be a stretegy board and would becone a 'Eoard of Improvised es."
in the third place, the Director and his staff became convinced, that
only Is possible but imperative to plan our efforts to
inlueno
minds and wills. When a nation projects its budgetary outlaye at
te of $200,O00,000 or more a day, it can afford to make up its poll-
d programs as it goes along. And when it is fleeing a ruthless
t who has given half a century of thought to this kind of conflict,
buckle doen to the grim buniness of trying to think elesio of him,
Director anti hi staff did not share the view
eticiemice rule out effective psychological activity..
In the fifth elect), the Director and staff rejected the view that
effective actions to rally our friends and confound our enemies must await
the nary build-up. They recalled that the Truman Dootriee, the Mar-
shall Plan, the Berlin airlift, and other eucceosful programs had been
carried out when we had barely one effective fighting division in Europe.
As they saw it, the task for psychological strategy was to help create
situations of strength, not to wait for their creation.
Sixth, the Director and the staff recognised that pliy strategy
matter for the military., and they welcomed military participation in
?easement of possible repercussions from our activities designed to
nos the minds and wills of other neoples. But, they pointeCout,
in a struggle in which we hope that the application of military
will not be the decisive factor. :;trategic planning nuet go for.
n the broadest has if we are to succeed in our
national effort to preserve peace and extend froedom4
on
rtnally, all the
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law
icunsion within the staff DGiflted
usion tMt this i ot a cold war
useful in a rous
cause it conveys
we are powerless
within our pownr
d that leadership c
the people to turn events
orIrkiig for poem. Perhaps.
contribution, of he Psychologicaltrate
oint of such a collective will within the governmen
These were some of the convictions which gTew out of the work of
the Director and his etaff?
/0
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Al, 5
F
By the end of igI, a large part of the staff bad been gathered.
The Director had at his disposal an able and dedicated group of
women from the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
trel Intelligence Agency, the Nhtuel 3ecurity Adlenistrationand from
private enterprise. It was 'contemplated that the staff would remain
small by governmental standamds. Altogether it would number about
seventy-five persons, including professional, clerical and administre.
tive personnel,
of comee, rerrnins to be done Directo
censor problems of staff
biers of poiicy and strata
Strategy Board is definitely e
a year's time, the concept of comb
mint conserting their efforts toward a common
Mash work, which might not have been undertaken
* has been started and some concrete results
/1
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e world the situation
the e
say to nake
the world with a
It is working to t
gets better.
power in the vo
It can. It is working
nese, futility, awl deepera
against us, to make men feel that we Americans are the real
of the peace, that we are deliberately Plotting a new war. It Lu using
the armed form of its ? ts and the threat of its own military power
to aeoompliah what it c d never hose to accomplish by the force of its
ideas.
nmst meet this *hallo meet it in our own way.
Basically, this is not a conflict between the United States and the
Soviet Union as nations, It Is one of the great convuleione of history
whist .a band of conspirators in the Kremlin is seeking to =Plat for its
own ends. Our role, as we have seen, is to lead the peoples who prise
freedom through this period of convulsion so that each nation, in its
own way, nay be free to enrich our common heritage in an era of peace
and human dignity.
This role of leadership cannot be net by lomplfuneed Improvisation.
We most remenher that in the field of international affairs no major
deoision at action can he ten by our government wIthout some effoot--
favorable or unfavorable--on the hearts, the minds ana the wills of men.
Thus it is imperative that the policies we oke, the plans we adopt,
the acts we porforn should be part of, and confora to, an enlightened
Porehological strategy desisned to establish a community of in in
the differing aspirations of America and the peoples who have the al
to be free.
Our role of leaderahip calls for the best la the character of the
American people. It. requires of our people a spirit of resolution, a
willingness to sacrifice, an effort of understanding and a flow of generosity-
generosity of the heart oven more than generosity of the purse. Perhaps
the truest psychological strategy is that we Should so conduct ourselves v
as a nation that we shell appear worthy of the role of leadership which
has cone upon us.
/
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