[CIA/DIA JOINT ANALYSIS GROUP - SUGGESTED OUTLINE FOR A LECTURE ON 'THE LONG RANGE THREAT']

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000500080057-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: February 3, 1964
• Content Type: OUTLINE

Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000500080057-9 - "~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/ DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
JOINT ANALYSIS GROUP
3 February 1964
Suggested Outline for a Lecture on "7'he Long Range Th#?eat" .
1. Open with a review of certain major factors which will be operating
to determine the Soviet and to a lesser extent the Chinese Communist threat
over the next decade or so. This could include among other points the following:
a. The Communist view of the world--whether peaceful competition is
to be the guiding line.
b. The extent of the split in the Communist world and if it continues
find widens, what effect on Communist parties around the world.
e. The US view of the world, especially the vigor with which the US
is using armed force to pursue its foreign policy goals. Also the size
and developmental trends in the Department of Defense.
d. The nature of political and military developments around the
periphery and especially in the NATO areas.
e. The economic rate of growth of the Soviet Union and Communist China.
2. The above factors tend to determine in particular the size of the major
components of the Sino-Soviet forces, and the missions assigned to them. But
the base against which these factors must operate will be the investment in
hardware in being or being built in the next two or so years. This leads then
into a discussion of the present situation -- ICBM's, bombers, IR/MRB'ts, sub-
marine missiles, etc. Draw some conclusions also:
a. That over the next decade AaPPearA that missiles, primarily ICBM's,
will be the major component strategic forces.
b. That the Soviets will continue to have large elements of bomber
and missile forces with range capability which restricts them to periphery.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY //DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
c. That ground forces will continue to be large and unless unusual
amount of money expended the major elements of equipment will be either
present or the next generation, the technology of which is now known.
3. Talk then a little about new developments about which little if
nothing can be estimated with assurance. Discuss here:
a. Space
b. CW/BW
1~.
c. Lasers
d. ABM
e. ASW
Then return in a closing section to speculate some on the effect of
change in the major items suggested in 1 above on the military posture of
the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000500080057-9