EAST ASIA BIWEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
Foreign
Assessment
Center
East Asia
Biweekly Review
10 January 1978
State Dept. review completed
RP EABR 78-002
10 January 1978
Copy f,30
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010002-3
EAST ASIA BIWEEKLY REVIEW
10 January 1978
Indonesia: Present State of
Dissidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
North Korea: Domestic Political,
Economic Concerns Dominate 19
Legislative Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . .
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the East Asia/Pacific Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the National Foreign Assessment
Center. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors
of the individual articles.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
Iq
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
SECRET
Indonesia: Present State of Dissidence
President Suharto's New Year's address reflected the
significant degree of attention his government has given
to domestic dissent. Suharto referred to recent student
demonstrations on Java as a threat to national stability,
although persistent guerrilla movements outside of Java
undoubtedly concern him also. The'President stated that
last month's release of 10,000 political detainees would
not threaten the nation's security, however, and pledged
to continue the scheduled release or trial of the remain-
ing detainees who now number approximately 21,000.
Suharto's generally moderate tone toward opposition to
his regime and the emphasis on the government's commit-
ment to equitable distribution of development benefits
are probably designed to quiet his critics pending his
expected reelection this March.
Suharto and his family have been the subject of much
criticism. The most recent accusation which surfaced in
the highly publicized Sawito political trial alleged that
Mrs. Suharto was involved in smuggling activities.
Suharto's response to these and other attacks has been
relatively restrained, despite the advice of some military
officials that he adopt tougher measures. His government
has neither closed to the public nor inhibited the press
from reporting on the Sawito trial; it has arrested
students, but released them quickly; and although it has
harassed notable critics such as retired General Nasution
and former Vice President Hatta, it has never detained
them. This moderation probably stems from Suharto's
belief that harsh measures would only stiffen opposition
at home and diminish the goverment's recent gains in its
human rights record abroad, both of which Suharto wants
to prevent as he prepares for his reelection.
The President nonetheless professed concern in his
speech that the student protests in Jakarta, Bandung, and
Jogjakarta could damage Indonesia's continued political
and social development. Suharto said that the military's
warning of 15 December, in which it promised to take firm
10 January 1978
9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
action against elements undermining the authority of
national leadership, was issued to prevent heightened
tension in the future. This warning, and a later ad-
monition to students to refrain from taking to the streets,
appears to have met with at least temporary success.
Students have lately confined their activities to quiet
discussions of issues on campus and reasonably polite
meetings with government officials. However, the recent
detention of a well-known university professor for crit-
icism of the government could spark fresh outbreaks of
student demonstrations.
Suharto has had a more difficult time subduing dis-
sidence outside of Java. In East Timor, the Revolutionary
Movement for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) continues
to mount effective resistance against the better equipped
and more numerous Indonesians. In a very candid state-
ment to the US Ambassador, the General responsible for
the Timor operations conceded that the Army lacks adequate
manpower, supplies, and expertise to root out a guerrilla
force now estimated at about 600. Nonetheless, Suharto's
extension of amnesty to those who will side with the
government--an appeal aimed more at villagers probably
aiding FRETILIN than the guerrillas themselves--and in-
creased food and clothing supplies to the villagers will
probably hamper operations of FRETILIN.
In North Sumatra, members of the fanatic Muslim
National Liberation Front for Aceh (NFLA) shot two
Americans at the US-owned Mobil gas site last November
and has promised to continue attacking foreigners employed
by overseas corporations. The NFLA's actions are ultimately
aimed at the Javanese, who are resented for exploiting
Sumatra's wealth in natural resources for Java's benefit.
By frightening off foreign investment, the NLFA hopes to
deprive the Suharto government of important development
funds. Although Jakarta has increased security forces
there, while being careful not to send too many Javanese
soldiers, the still limited forces and the forested
terrain work against complete suppression of NLFA ter-
rorism.
In Irian Jaya, the Organization for Papuan Indepen-
dence (OPM) continues to harass Indonesian soldiers and
cultivate latent anti-Indonesian sentiment among villagers.
The OPM successfully sabotaged the US-owned Freeport
10 January 1978
10
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010002-3
,SECRET
Minerals copper mine last summer, and has threatened kid-
napings and hijackings. Suharto's success in neutralizing
the OPM will depend on the government's ability to gain
the support of village tribes and maintain friendly re-
lations with Papua New Guinea in order to limit the OPM's
use of that country as a sanctuary.
Suharto's assertion that the overall security situ-
ation is under control and his apparently genuine desire
to ease the detainee problem suggests that the schedule
for future releases might be accelerated. He undoubtedly
hopes that such a move would dampen criticism at home
and enhance Indonesia's human rights record abroad, al-
though skepticism exists among many Indonesian officials
disappointed over the lack of praise the Western press
has accorded the government for the December release.
If security worsens, and this is possible given the
volatility of the students and the militancy of devout
Muslims angered over the government's attempt to recog-
nize mysticism as an official religion, then Suharto
could delay further releases.
10 January 1978
11
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
Iq
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
SECRET
North Korea: Domestic Political, Economic Concerns
Dominate Legislative Assem ly
At its mid-December meeting, North Korea's newly
elected legislative assembly formally approved changes
in the central government and the scaled down goals for
the new seven-year economic plan. The delegates also
heard North Korean President Kim Il-song launch a hard-
hitting attack on the evils of bureaucratism. The speech
may be the opening shot of a new long-term political cam-
paign aimed at middle-level managers and party cadre.
In keeping with its basic domestic orientation, the
three-day gathering provided no new insights into Pyong-
yang's policy toward reunification or general trends in
North Korea's foreign policy.
New Government Appointments
According to the state constitution, elections for
the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) are. supposed to be
held every four years. Pyongyang is relatively relaxed
about meeting such requirements; the last elections were
held five years apart--1967 and 1972. The first meet-
ing of the new SPA usually is an occasion for unveiling
new government appointments and the first session of the
sixth-SPA, held 15-17 December, was no exception.
Three of the top seven officials in the Administra-
tive Council (North Korea's cabinet) are newly appointed,
and. about half of the 28 central government ministries
and committees have new leaders. The new premier, Yi
Chong-ok, is a veteran economic specialist who has a
background in heavy industry. Named as a vice premier in
late 1976, Yi's promotion to premier is the clearest sign
yet of the regime's desire to reinvigorate the country's
lagging economy. Yi replaces Pak Song-chol, who is more
of an administrator and a foreign policy specialist.
The two new vice premiers are Kang Song-san, a party
specialist in transportation, and Kim Tu-yong, who has
served in the Ministry of Public Security. Kang, in his
10 January 1978
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010002-3
SECRET
speech to the SPA on 17 December, seemed to put special
stress on matters affecting the "people's livelihood."
There has been no recognized spokesman in the cabinet
for consumer affairs since the death in I-larch 1976 of
Vice Premier Nam I1.
The list of cabinet appointments revealed some
structural changes as well. Three ministries (Commerce,
Higher Education, and Common Education) and one committee
(Heavy Industry) were evidently abolished, and one new
committee (the State Scientific and Technological Com-
mittee) was established. A new emphasis on technology
was evident in President Kim Il-song's keynote address
on the opening day of the SPA. He called for a three-
point policy of "making the national economy chuche-
oriented (self-reliant), modernized, and scientific at
an accelerated pace." Despite the emphasis on self-help,
Pyongyang will have to continue to look for outside as-
sistance in scientific and technological fields. An ed-
itorial in the party daily on 20 December explicitly en-
dorsed the use of foreign technology.
New Economic Plan
As usual at these affairs, the speechmaking pro-
vided a lot of general statements about the goals of the
seven-year plan (1978-84), but few concrete details on
how North Korea hopes to achieve the goals. Originally
scheduled to begin in 1977, the plan was postponed to
make economic "adjustments," probably needed because of
the delay in meeting the targets of the previous plan.
North Korea first outlined its 10 prospective
goals" in 1974, but several important industrial tar-
gets have been substantially reduced (see table). Al-
though the plan calls for more than doubling the present
manufacturing output by 1984, it still indicates a
significant lower annual growth rate than in the past.
Even allowing for some exaggeration, Pyongyang's own
published growth rate figures reveal its lowered ex-
pectations; the rate for industrial production for the
1971-76 period is given as 16.3 percent while that for
the new seven-year plan is forecast as 12.1 percent.
10 January 1978
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
North Korea: Seven-Year Plan Goals
Sector
February December
1974 1977
(Goals stated in million tons unless otherwise specified)
Coal
100
70-80
Steel
12
7.4-8
Cement
20
12-13
Non-ferrous metals
1
1
Machinery
5
5
Fertilizers
5
5
Fish products
5
3.5
Grain
10
10
Electric power
50
56-60
(billion KWH)
Tideland reclamation
100,000
100,000
(Chongbo--approx. 2.5 acres)
Despite the lowered goals, some of North Korea's
targets still appear to be out of reach. Imports of
machinery and equipment necessary to meet the electric
power, steel, cement, and fertilizer goals would require
an outlay from $3 billion to $4 billion. Considering
Pyongyang's poor trade and payment record in recent years,
it is doubtful that goods of this magnitude could be
imported from any source. In what .is apparently an ex-
ercise in wishful thinking, North Korea is saying that
it is going to meet the 12.1 percent growth goal largely
on its own efforts. In his speech, Kim coined a new
slogan--"Let us display the revolutionary spirit of self-
reliance more fully"--and he called for the slogan to be
the regime's guide "throughout" the seven-year plan. He
asserted that the plan targets could be achieved."with-
out large investments" if North Korea makes effective
use of "the existing economic foundation."
Kye Ung-tae, North Korea's longtime Foreign Trade
Minister and now the ranking Vice Premier, echoed Kim's
emphasis on self-reliance in a speech to the SPA on 17,
December. He called for greater domestic production of
machinery "which we have been importing from other
countries." Nevertheless, the promotion of Kye Ung-tae,
who has also moved up recently in party status, suggests
10 January 1978
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010002-3
that Pyongyang intends to continue to pursue active trad-
ing with the West and the Third World.
On the question of consumer welfare, the seven-year
plan calls for raising the people's material well-being
"a step further." There was no mention, however, of a
general wage increase such as occurred in 1970 just be-
fore the beginning of North Korea's last long-term plan.
The new plan indicates that improvements in living
standards will come primarily from lower prices on state
goods and increased state funding for housing, medical
care, cultural facilities, and the like.
Antibureaucracy Campaign
Although the seven-year plan was the centerpiece
of the SPA session, Kim's speech was directed primarily
toward "strengthening the people's government." In the
speech, Kim sharply criticized the tendency of some
cadre to act in a bureaucratic manner and to abuse their
power. Kim charged that such practices paralyze the
creativity of the masses, dampen their enthusiasm, and
alienate them from the system.
Attacks against the evils of bureaucratism in North
Korea are not new by any means. Indeed, as a partial
remedy Kim once again urged the cadre to go out among
the masses, study local conditions, and solicit the
opinion of the masses. What is new, however, is the
heavy emphasis on legal measures to correct such abuses.
Kim called for a tightening of regulations and an in-
crease in the role of what he termed the "socialist
law-abiding life guidance committee."
The organizational affiliation of this so-called
life guidance committee is unclear. It could be a
purely party organ, but more likely it is a subordinate
arm of the Central People's Committee, an organization
unique to North Korea and perhaps best described as an
inner cabinet. According to Kim, the duty of the com-
mittee is to heighten the cadres' awareness of legal
norms and to combat violations by applying appropriate
sanctions.
10 January 1978
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
The functions of the guidance committee are some-
what analogous to those of another secretive North Korean
organization, the "State Control Commission," which ap-
peared briefly in 1975. At that time Yang Hyong-sop, a
member of the party's elite Political Committee, was
identified as its chairman. Yang dropped from public
view in early August 1977, and his failure to be men-
tioned as taking part in the recent SPA proceedings in-
dicates that he probably has fallen into disfavor.
Whatever the precise functions of the socialist law-
abiding life guidance committee are, it would appear that
the antibureaucracy movement will be slow to unfold. Most
of the speakers at the SPA and at follow-up rallies in
the provinces on 19 December gave it only perfunctory
treatment, perhaps because they had no detailed guidance.
An editorial in the party daily on 17 December character-
ized this portion of Kim's speech as the "struggle plat-
form" for 1978 and urged party members to study the speech
carefully, "not hurriedly," and to make an orderly plan
for carrying it out.
Kim also stressed the need to maintain rigid disci-
pline and strict political controls in North Korea. In
part Kim was seeking to refute Western criticism of human
rights violations by declaring that strict controls are
necessary to protect the interest of the masses. The
stridency of his remarks suggests, however, that some in
the party hierarchy are advocating a relaxation of polit-
ical controls in order to enhance worker incentive and
hence improve the country's economic performance. This
seemed to be the message behind one particularly striking
passage in the speech on 16 December by the public se-
curity minister, who is rarely seen in public in North
Korea. He criticized unnamed proponents of "opportunist"
theories who would "dull the blade of dictatorship" by
calling for "so-called democracy for citizens."
Because of the lack of hard information on conditions
in North Korea, there is no easy way to determine if there
is any substance to these charges. Nevertheless, the
themes of bureaucratism and opportunism are sufficiently
vague and all-encompassing to cause widespread apprehen-
sion and mistrust within the party and government appara-
tus and make nearly everyone fearful of losing their
jobs.
23
SECRET
10 January 1978
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
No Word on Succession, Party Congress
Contrary to speculation within the diplomatic com-
munity in Peking--some forty ambassadors accredited to
North Korea but residing in the Chinese capital got an
expense free trip to Pyongyang--the SPA did not address
the succession issue. Kim I1-song is grooming his son,
Kim Chong-il, as successor, but the regime has kept the
37-year-old son out of the public limelight even though
he has been given increasing responsibility in party
and state affairs in recent years. Frequent favorable
references by the speakers at the SPA to political and
economic campaigns associated with Kim Chong-il and
the repeated emphasis on adhering to Kim Il-song's pol-
icies "from generation to generation" indicate that the
son almost certainly played an important behind-the-
scenes role in orchestrating the proceedings.
Long-term economic plans are usually given the stamp
of approval at a party congress. The last plan (1971-
76) was unveiled at the Fifth Congress of the Korean
Worker's Party (KWP) in November 1970. For the current
plan, the sixth SPA in effect served as a substitute
party congress. Newly appointed Premier Yi Chong-ok in
his speech on 16 December spelled out the authority be-
hind the plan. He said the plan was drawn up in accord-
ance with Kim Il-song's suggestions (in North Korea, Kim's
suggestions carry the weight of law), discussed at the
KWP plenary session (the 15th plenum held on 13 Decem-
ber), and legally adopted at the SPA.
The KWP sixth party congress is now two years over-
due, but nothing at the SPA or in Kim Il-song's New
Year's address suggests that a congress is coming soon.
Although the regime will celebrate its 30th anniversary
in September 1978, it will be 1980 before the party marks
another prominent anniversary--the 35th. It is possible
that Kim will convene a party conference, which could
serve as a forum for important policy initiatives with-
out formally designating a new Central Committee. In
its relatively short history, the KWP has held two party
conferences: in March 1958 to mark the victory by Kim
over the last of his domestic challengers, and in October
1966 to signal the shift to more militant tactics against
the US and South Korea.
10 January 1978
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
 Secret Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/08/14: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02200010002-3