DCI BRIEFING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A001000010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1967
• Content Type: LETTER

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Presentation Staff
19 September 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
POST-ELECTION SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. The South Vietnamese election came off suc-
cessfully, but it has ushered in a period
of at least temporary uncertainty. The most
serious problem at the moment is the rivalry
between Thieu and Ky.
A. Thieu feels that, as president, he must
exercise his full constitutional powers.
He says he is willing, however, to respect
the views of Vice President Ky and the
senior military officers.
B. Ky argues that in return for accepting
second place to Thieu on the ticket, he
was promised a strong voice in the new
government, including the right to name
the prime minister.
1. He claims that Thieu is now trying to
squeeze him out of the picture, and
even rigged the Senate elections to
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eliminate Ky's supporters.
C. This feuding could lead to an eventual
complete break between the two top govern-
ment leaders, or require continued collec-
tive military rule behind the scenes to
keep the peace.
ii. The rivalry between Thieu and Ky could create
problems in the provisional national assembly,
which must validate the election results and
has in the past tended to be responsive to
Marshal Ky.
A. We believe that the assembly will event-
ually certify the election outcome, but
the deputies may raise enough fuss to cast
some discredit on the voting.
B. The: new senate, although generally con-
servative
and somewhat narrowly based,
also seems likely to be able to work with
Thieu's government.
III, Some defeated civilian presidential candidates
or their supporters are interested in cabinet
positions and seem inclined to cooperate with
the new government; this should help to broaden
its base.
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A. At present, runner-up presidential can-
didate Truong Dinh Dzu, the so-called
"peace candidate," is bidding loudly for
the leadership of the opposition. His
questionable financial past, however, may
limit t1le amount of support he can attract
over the long term.
B. The militant Buddhists are unhappy with
the election outcome, but seem unwilling
to risk further loss of influence by
joining forces with Dzu
1. Instead, the militant Buddhists, fol-
lowing familiar tactics, appear to
have launched a cautious campaign
centering on religious issues, in the
hope of gradually winning a cause and
enough support to challenge the government.
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19'September 1967
DCI B't?I:;FIdG FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
BACKGROUND NOTES: BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
I. Our air strikes in the Hanoi area in August
damaged two important bridges which link the
capital both with China and with Haiphong.
A. Two spans of the Doumer Bridge were
dropped.
1. Restoration for rail traffic will
take an estimated six weeks.
the Vietnamese installing temporary
spans for limited truck crossings.
B. The Canal Des Rapides bridge was still
unserviceable
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trucks were cross- 25X1
ing this bridge in limited numbers,
but that rail service has not been
restored.
II. U.S. bombing efforts in September have been
concentrated on North Vietnamese port
fir
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facilities, in an attempt to interdict
transport to the interior.
A. At Haiphong, an effort was made to
isolate the city by knocking out a
complex of five bridges surrounding
the western borders of the town.
1. Four of the five bridges have been
struck at least once, and two of
the four have been rendered un-
serviceable.
2. A railroad yard one mile west of
Haiphong was bombed on September 11.
The yard was extensively cratered,
but is probably still serviceable.
B. Hong Gay, the country's second most
important port, accounting for 18 percent
of national port capacity, is on the
target list, but so far weather has
prevented strikes.
C. Port facilities at Cam Pha, the third
ranking port, were struck on September 10,
with some damage. The port will probably
be hit again.
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Soviet Military Re-Supply
VI. We estimate that the Soviet Union so far has
probably replaced about one third of the total
Arab military hardware losses during the fighting
in June.
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A. The Arabs were obviously disappointed with
the support they got from the Soviet Union
during the crisis. The major Soviet airlift
in three weeks following the cease-fire was
designed to offset this feeling.
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VII. At the same time, the Soviets are increasing
the numbers of advisory, training, and techni-
cal personnel, particularly in Egypt, where
we now estimate there are more than 600.
A. On the one hand, this may be intended to
see to it that the Arabs would make better
use of Soviet equipment in the future
than they did in June.
B. On the other hand, it increases Soviet
influence in Arab countries, and helps
to cut down the risk of new provocative
moves against Israel.
Briefly, I want to note some of the other develop-
ments we should keep an eye on in the Middle East.
Egypt:
VIII., First, in regard to Nasir's domestic situation,
there is continuing evidence of political tur-
moil in Cairo.
A. Nasir still appears to be the dominant
figure, despite reported maneuverings
among his subordinates, and the. antagon--:"'
ism of military figures who have been
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given the entire blame for the debacle.
B. In the wake of the coup plot led by
former First Vice President Abdul Hakim
Amir, and Amir's suicide--if it was
suicide, there is going to be even
stronger disaffection among the military
leaders.
C. The Egyptian public is grumbling over
short food supplies, higher prices, and
growing unemployment as imports and develop-
ment projects are cut back. The present
belt-tightening in Egypt goes beyond any-
thing recommended by the International
Monetary Fund.
1. Nasir's popularity is still high,
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South Arabia:
X. The present Middle Eastern situation practically
guarantees chaos for South Arabia, the Federation
which is supposed to replace the British presence
in Aden. 'Nasir and Faysal are too busy .to take
a firm hand, and the British want out as soon
as possible.
A. When the proposed Federation government
fell apart, the British initially hoped
that the tribal-based South Arabian army,
as the only group capable of imposing
order, could be persuaded to take over.
The army, however, rejected the offer.
B. The British then announced their willing-
ness to open negotiations with rival
nationalist groups, long engaged in a
terrorist campaign against the British and
each other: the anti-Egyptian National
Liberation Front (NLF) , and the Cairo-
backed Front for the Liberation of Occupied
South Yemen (FLOSY).
1. Neither group has as yet responded to
the British offer. They are busy battl-
ing--with strikes and terrorism--for
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control of the various states in the
Federation.
2. Ultimately the Army will probably have
to step in as the deciding factor between
the two organizations.
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19 September 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
SIKKIM
I. The recent fighting in Sikkim in the Himalayas
resulted from a disagreement between Chinese and
Indians about who owned a few square yards of
territory.
II. Fighting appears to have stopped, but there are
always incidents all along the border, any of
which could flare up at any time.
III. The Indians outnumber the Chinese along the border.
A. The Indians have 26,000 men in Sikkim; the
Chinese probably don't have more than 2,000
in the comparable area on their side of the
border.
B. On or near the Sino-Indian border, there are
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over 200,000 Indian troops; the Chinese
probably have about 80,000.
C. The Chinese have no combat aircraft in the
area--although they could move planes.'-in
quickly. The Indians have about 500 combat
planes at normal duty bases--almost all their
air force--within striking distance of the
border.
D. The Indians have almost three times as many
troops in the area as they did before the
1962 war with China; the Chinese have about
half as many as they:'_d.id. ih .1962 .
IV. The rugged terrain and poorly developed trans-
portation routes in the border area make it
difficult for either side to mount any major
offensives.
A. In China, the nearest railroad ends about a
thousand miles from the border, and the few
roads are often cut by landslides and floods.
B. The Indians are much closer to railroads
in most areas, but would still have to
move supplies through extremely difficult
terrain.
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19. September 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
COMMUNIST CHINA
I. The situation in China is extremely fluid, and
has never been more precarious since 1949.
A. Steadily worsening disorders this summer
have brought China to the most serious
crisis since the Communists seized control
of the mainland.
II. There have been reports of violent conflict from
every province.
A. Groups of fanatic Red Guard extremists are
fighting one another.
1. Savage and bloody clashes are reported
between Red Guards and organized workers,
in some cases incited by local authori-
ties to resist Mao's Cultural Revolution.
B. For the first time in the Cultural Revolu-
tion, regular military weapons are being
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used on a wide scale.
1. Previously only fists, stones, and
sharpened poles were used in most
clashes.
2. Now, however, rifles and machine guns
and even tanks and artillery are being
used.
3. Many civilian groups have been armed
on the authority of Peking itself.
Others have managed to acquire weapons
by raiding government arsenals, which
seem to be lightly guarded these days.
C. During the past two weeks, local authori-
ties have been trying to recover these weap-
ons, but with only limited success.
1. Most Red Guard factions are unwilling
to render themselves defenseless by
surrendering arms. Some have been turn-
ing in pistols while retaining machine, guns,
III. Peking's control over the situation appears to
be weakening steadily.
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A. The central committee has repeatedly ordered the
army to intervene to stop the fighting.
1. These directives have not been vigorously
enforced, however. In general, the army
seems to be reluctant to get involved,
B. Maoist leaders in Peking may be getting more
confused and desperate. Their latest directive,
publicized last week, urged workers to "make
revolution" only after working hours. It
promised stern punishment for those who fight
on government time.
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IV. Whatever the various roots of China's domestic
turmoil, its effects are becoming daily more'
evident and now the economy is beginning to
feel the pressure.
Trains run haphazardly.
B. Key industrial centers have suffered
sporadic shut-downs,
V. In short, the outlook for Maoist leaders
and Maoist ideas has never been bleaker.
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A. There is little question that if Mao and
company do not call off or moderate their
Revolution--which they would be most re-
luctant to do--the result will be greater
chaos, and perhaps a state of complete
anarchy.
B. Beyond this, it is impossible to predict
the outcome of the crisis with any con-
fidence.
C. One possibility is that the situation
might be resolved by fragmentation of
China into a number of "independent }viwey-
1. This would leave China far from
stability, even after new political
organizations were set up. In all
likelihood, it would mean a repetition
of China's history during the 1920s,
when warlords contended for power and
the people suffered.
D. A somewhat more likely outcome is the
creation of a truly organized opposition
to Mao, which will force him to moderate
the present disasterous policies.
E. The formation of such an opposition would
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be a desperate business, requiring a nearly
unanimous decision by a large body of
powerful and ambitious men if civil war
is to be avoided.
i. Given the situation in China today,
even a rough prediction of timing is
impossible.
2. It seems likely, however, that new
and more serious domestic problems
could drive the military and the
moderates to act.
3. The upcoming fall harvest, and the
crucial distribution time immediately
following, might be a time when such
problems could develop.
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19 September 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
HONG KONG
I. There is a relative lull at present in the
disorders which have been shaking the British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong.
A. The Chinese Communists, who have had very
few successes in foreign policy over the
past couple of years, are trying to humble
the British in Hong Kong the way they forced
the Portuguese to kow-tow in nearby Macao.
B. The British are convinced that the best way
to retain their existing rights is to take
a strong stand against the disorders and
against any humiliating Chinese demands.
II. The confrontation grew out of local labor problems,
indicating that the timing was not chosen by Peking,
and Communist China has been letting the local
Communist leaders in Hong Kong set the pace most
of the time.
A. Firm police action is keeping violence to a
manageable level. There are still sporadic
bombings and occasional mob outbreaks, but
incipient mass demonstrations have been
broken up quickly.
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B. Public services are functioning, and shipping
in Hong Kong harbor has not been seriously
delayed.
C. Food supplies from neighboring Kwantung Province
have been disrupted by the Cultural Revolution
turmoil, but there are no serious shortages so
far.
III. For the moment,. the Communist leaders in Hong Kong
are apparently trying to restrain their more militant
followers.
A. They want to improve the Communist image among
Chinese of all inclinations in the colony, in
hopes of a successful celebration of Chinese
Communist National Day on October first.
1. They may well try to avoid violence and
major provocations until after that date.
B. Peking's propaganda commentary on the Hong Kong
issue has dropped off, and Chinese Army units
along the Hong Kong border are exercising better
control over militant civilian gangs.
C. We expect, however, that the Chinese Communists
will continue their long-term effort to undermine
British authority in the colony whenever the
occasion and the circumstances suit them.
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