BOOK THREE: COUNTRY BRIEFINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000600030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 111
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

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PACOM review completed.
State Dept. review completed
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BRIEFING PACKAGE
January 1967
BOOK THREE: COUNTRY BRIEFINrS
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ASIA:
Korea ..................... 5
9
Pakistan ..........foesoe 9
MIDDLE EAST:
Cyprus .................... 12
Turkey .................... 16
Iran ..................... 22
Egypt.................... 26
Syria .................... 29
Yemen .................... 33
AFRICA: "White Southern Africa"...... 35
Portuguese Africa 36
South Africa 38
"Radical Africa"............. 43
Congo(Brazzaville) 44
Mali 45
Guinea 47
Nkrumah's Ghana. 50
Tanzania 53
Algeria 56
Nigeria ...................... 58
Spain .................... 66 25X6
LATIN AMERICA: Cuba ...............o.o.o. 70
Dominican Republic....... 79
Haiti .................... 83
Guatemala. ............... 87
Panama ................... 90
Venezuela................ 95
Ecuador .................. 99
Bolivia.... ........ ...... 102
Brazil .................. 105
Argentina ............... 108
Uruguay.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 112
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A. In addition to the effect of the election
on the respective strengths of the major
parties, and of their competing factions,
a new element has been added.
1. For the first time, the Komeito Party,
the political arm of the militant
Buddhist Soka Gakkai sect, is seeking
lower house seats.
2. The mass base of Soka Gakkai and the
fanaticism it imbues in its followers
could produce a volatile, unpredictable
swing vote in the Diet.
3. One critical question is whether the
Komeito vote comes from the normal
Liberal Democratic following, or from
the united opposition of the Left.
4. Since the war, population trends favored
the elements which normally produce votes
for the Left. The long-range growth rate
of the Leftist vote declined in 1963,
however.
.3. Continued setbacks for the Leftist growth
rate probably depend on the electoral
performance of the Buddhist sect.
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January 1967
BRIEFING PACKAGE
(MAP, KOREAN DEMILITARIZED ZONE)
I. The North Koreans raised the tension along
the Demilitarized Zone between North and
South Korea last fall with a series of armed
incidents, but the pressure was maintained
only for a few weeks.
A. A flurry of attacks between mid-October
and November 2 brought casualty figures
for 1966 to 6 American and about 30 South
Korean fatalities in 40 incidents. The
36 deaths compare with 20 South Korean
soldiers killed in 1965, and only four
in all of 1964
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2. This year, the North Koreans have been
sending larger teams, more heavily
armed, on operations in the DMZ.
Uniformed patrols on sev-
eral occasions deliberately sought
out and attacked South Korean forces.
C. The South Koreans retaliated. They mounted
a raid on October 26 which inflicted about
30 casualties, and may have. penetrated all
the way through the DMZ into North Korea.
D. Up to this point, the North Koreans had
centered their harassment in sectors not
manned by U.S. troops. On November 2,
however, they ambushed an American patrol,
killing six Americans and one South Korean
who accompanied the Americans.
E. The South Koreans carried out another
strong reprisal raid the next day. Three
teams made four separate attacks on
North Korean installations in the DMZ.
The North Koreans did not retaliate.
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II. The Military Armistice Committee met at Panmunjon
on November 4, and the UN senior representative
delivered a stern warning against further North
Korean raids.
A. The Communist representatives made no mention
of the South Korean operations, and there
have been no serious incidents since that time.
B. The UN commander and the U.S. Ambassador also
privately warned the South Koreans against any
further attacks on the Communists.
1. The South Korean army, however, will probably
try to undertake carefully concealed repri-
sals if they continue to take casualties
from North Korean harassment.
III. We can not say for sure just what the intention
of the North Koreans was.
A. They may have been testing the effectiveness
and reaction of South Korean troops which
had only recently been deployed to the
Demarcation Line.
B. If their intention was to show the South
Korean government that the Communists could
retaliate for Korean participation in the
Vietnamese war, the Communists appear to
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have given up early, after a minimal effort.
1. A major policy statement by,Kim Il-song
on October 5 contained the customary
offer to send North Korean volunteers
to Hanoi, but there was no threat to
open a "second front" in Korea.
2. Pyongyang has made little or no effort
in its propaganda to claim that the
DMZ clashes show Communist support for
the Viet Cong.
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January 1967
PAKISTAN
I. In Pakistan, the tension arising from the hostilities
with India over Kashmir has eased. President Ayub
Khan is still in full control, and apparently
able to deal with any threat to his rule.
A. The military appears solidly behind Ayub,~__
B. Most members of Ayub's political party remain
loyal to him. There is some dissatisfaction,
partly led by the pro-Chinese former foreign
minister, Bhutto.
C. A seven-year ban against political activity,
imposed by Ayub on most of the country's leading
civilian politicians of the 1950s,expired on
December 31st. To the extent that these men
resume political life, at least as many will
support Ayub as oppose him.
D. East Pakistani separatists are less active
than last spring and summer, but are still
vocal.
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II. No progress is being made toward negotiating
Pakistan's problems with India.
A.
off arms aid, and for not backing Pakistan against India.
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the I:ndians:rejected the perennial
Pakistani demand that the Kashmir dispute be
included in talks.
B. Indian plans to build a dam which would divert
a. large part of East Pakistan's water could
become a serious problem.
C. Neither country appears willing to push the
disagreements:.to.open hostilities again in
the near future.
III. Ayub continues to try to maintain a balance between
East and West in his foreign policy.
A. Relations with China are still good, although
Peking apparently can spare no more-arms.
The Chinese Communists have already supplied
nearly 70 jet aircraft, and more than 100 tanks.
B. Relations with the USSR have warmed, but neither
country has gotten anything significant from the
other.
IV. Many ?akistanis are upset with the US for cutting
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there has
been some speculation that Pakistan might
withdraw from CENTO and SEATO; and the
Pakistani press is featuring a number of
anti-American articles.
B. Ayub realizes that he needs food and economic
aid from the US to keep Pakistan going, and so
will be extremely cautious about risking any
cpen break with Washington.
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January 1967
BRIEFING PACKAGE
CYPRUS
I. The Cyprus dispute is still with us, and there
is no solution in sight.
A. Conversations between the Greek and Turkish
governments have caused some cautious optimism,
but there has been no agreement on substan-
tive differences. Athens still insists
that any solution must not rule out even-
tual enosis, meaning union with Greece.
Ankara demands some form of Turkish presence
on the island as,an adequate guarantee of
the safety of the Turkish Cypriot community.
B. As long as Greece is under a caretaker gov-
ernment, the negotiations can hardly lead
to any solid decisions, but both countries
will probably try to keep the talks going.
II. If the Greeks and the Turks should reach some
agreement on the future of Cyprus, they will
still face the major job of selling their
solution to the President of Cyprus, Arch-
bishop Makarios.
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A. Makarios has given the talks his unen-
thusiastic endorsement, but his actions
continue to undermine chances for success
by raising the tensions on the island.
B. His latest move of this kind was the ac-
quisition of weapons from Czechoslovakia.
1. Athens controls the Cypriot National
Guard, Makarios wants a military
force independent of Greek control,
and ordered the Czech arms to beef
up the Cypriot national police force.
The first Czech shipment reached
Cyprus before the Greeks were even
aware that Markarios was dealing with
Prague.
2. Athens had tried to take possession
of the weapons, but Makarios has re-
fused to turn them over to the Cypriot
National Guard. He agreed only to let
the UN Peace Force inspect them, and
says they will remain in storage at
least until February.
B. The Turks have also raised a strong protest,
and as a result Prague suspended an addi-
tional shipment, which was to have included
CYP-2
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C. The incident points up how little lever-
age Athens has with Markarios. Greece
has kept about 10,000 mainland troops on
Cyprus since 1964, and General Grivas com-
mands the Cypriot National Guard, but
Markarios still manages to go his own
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way. With a
caretaker government and
a political crisis, Athens has even less
chance of controlling him.
III. The United Nations Peace Force, which has
the task of heading off serious confronta-
tions between the rival forces of Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, now numbers
about 4,500 men. Its mandate at present runs
to June 26, 1967, and there is financial
pressure-in the UN to reduce the strength.
Most observers believe that any substantial
reduction would seriously downgrade the ability
of the UN Force to keep the peace.
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IV. Makarios obtained some SA-2 surface-to-air
missiles from the Soviet Union, but to date
only some of the support equipment is on
Cyprus. The Greek Government managed to
prevent delivery of the missiles, which are
still stored in Egypt.
V. The Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL), with a
membership of about 12,000, is the largest
and best organized political group on the
island. Makarios apparently believes he
can control AKEL by exploiting its tacit sup-
port for Cyprus' policy for self-determina-
tion and territorial integrity.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE January 1967
in power for one year, and retains wide public
support. It has strengthened its control of
parliament, bolstered the confidence of the
business community. and solidified its relations
with the top military command.
A. The military leaders were wary and suspicious
a year ago when government passed to Demirel's
Justice Party. They considered it a re-grouping
of the elements which had. supported former
Premier Menderes.
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I. The Government of Turkey continues to affirm
that Turkey is aligned with the West and loyal
to NATO.
A. Jr the wake of the Cyprus crisis, however,
there is a new attitude of independence in
Ankara; there is less cooperation with the
United States; there is a growing desire
for trade with the Communist countries;
and leftist elements have been able to
mount an active campaign of anti-Americanism.
II. The government of Sulevman Demirel has now been
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is
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B. At the same time, however, they recognized that
it had the strongest popular backing of any
party, and offered the best chance of stable
is
and effective government. Demirel's
responsible leadership over the past year
has justified the almost reluctant decision
of the military command to let the Justice
Party take over.
1. There are still junior military officers
and retired military personnel who either
oppose the justice party, or question
whether any democratic government can
put through the social and political
reforms which they feel Turkey needs.
C. Demirel probably has enough opposition to
keep him busy without the military. The
educated urban elite and important segments
of the press and the government bureaucracy
are traditionally aligned with the main
opposition group, the Republican People's
Party of former Premier Inonu.
to
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D. Leftism, which was vigorously suppressed before
the military revolution against 1,1enderes in 1960,
has gained a new respectability in Turkey.
The Republican People's Party has been giving
greater stress to leftist themes, and the Turkish
Labor Party, a Marxist group, has a solid
representation in the National Assembly.
1. These leftist elements are doing their best
to exploit American activities in Turkey, and
incidents involving Americans, to create
anti-American sentiment.
2. They then use the demonstrations of
anti-Americanism they have instigated to
bring pressure on the government to reduce
or restrict the American presence in Turkey.
3. Most of the demonstrations of anti-Americanism
in Turkey in recent months have either been
promoted or exploited by elements connected
with the Turkish Labor Party.
III. The government has, in fact, been much less forth-
coming in its cooperation with the United States,
although this should be attributed much more to
the Cyprus problem--and the desire to improve relations
with the Soviet Union--than to the workings of the
leftists.
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A. One of our two most important problems at
present is a reappraisal, at Ankara's request,
of some 55 U.S.-Turkish bilateral agreements.
B. The other is the continuing Turkish restriction
of a number of U.S. Government activities within
or originating in Turkey--for example, the use
of Turkish territory by our Sixth Fleet for
amphibious exercises.
C. The Cyprus question, with its inherent strains
on Turkish relations with both Greece and the
United States, remains a dilemma for Ankara.
Public interest in the dispute has waned.
but the Turkish Government remains firmly
committed to support and protect the
Turkish Cypriot community--by military
intervention if necessary.
2:. Intervention on Cyprus would be a major
military operation for the Turks, almost
certainly running the risk of war with
Greece in view of the 10,000 regular
Greek troops on the island.
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3. It would require the use of NATO-committed
forces, and weapons subject to U.S. Military
Assistance Program restrictions. The Turks
may be considering the creation of additional
military forces not committed to NATO, and
not subject to restrictions on US-supplied
armament.
IV. Turkish moves toward a detente with the Soviet Union,
except for economic relations, have been cautious
and restrained.
A. Soviet Premier Kosygin was given a cool and
at times hostile reception by Turkish crowds
on his recent visit to Ankara.
B. The Turks have, however, cited concern for
their relations with the Russians in such
moves as turning down U.S. naval visits to 25X1
Turkish Black Sea ports,
C. The Turks have accepted Soviet economic aid,
and a small but increasing share of Turksih
trade has been swinging to the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe.
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1. There have also been unofficial economic
contacts with the Chinese Communists, but
there appears to be little likelihood of
any substantial development there in the
near future.
V. The Turkish economy has shown increasing signs of
health in the past year, due in part to a bumper
agr::cultural crop.
A. Turkey still faces serious economic problems,
including the threat of inflation, due largely
to rising production and investment based on
slender capital reserves.
B. There is a general consensus, however, that
Turkey's economic program for the coming year
is more reasonable than those of past years.
Balance-of-Payments estimates are generally
fair, and Turkish leaders have indicated
their readiness to take all necessary measures
to ensure economic stability.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE January 1967
IRAN
I. Iran maintains a close relationship with the
United States, but the Shah has been actively
purst,ing more independent policies.
A. The Shah is convinced that the ambitions
cf Egyptian President Nasir are a greater
threat to the security of Iran than any
objectives the Soviet Union may have.
1. fie feels that the United States
underestimates the Egyptian threat.
2. fie was badly shaken, furthermore,
when the United States cut off rilitary
assistance to Pakistan during the conflict
over Kashmir in 1965.
3. This has apparently made him wonder whether
he can rely on our military assistance if
he were to find himself at war with the
Arabs over conflicting interests in the
Persian Gulf area.
4. Against this eventuality, the Shah is trying
to diversify the sources of his military
equipment.
B. The Shah may also have concluded that a more
independent policy would give his regime a
progressive, "non-aligned" image.
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1. "Non-alignment," after all, is very fashionable
in the Asian-African world today, and the
image would be useful at home too. The
first steps toward a more independent policy
have been well received in Iran, bolstering
the Shah's personal popularity.
2. Coming down to brass tacks, the rapid social
and economic progress in Iran has the country
stable politically and doing well economically.
This means that for the first time the Shah
is in a position to reduce his dependence
on the United States for support.
II. The most significant aspect of the Shah's new
approach internationally is a growing rapprochement
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 25X1
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B. The Soviet Union agreed in January, 1966, to
build a steel mill in Iran. With related projects,
this will probably-cost nearly a billion dollars.
The Russians are going to provide a credit of
$280 million.
C. There have also been persistent reports that
Iran is working on an oil deal with the Soviets.
1. The Shah is not satisfied with the performance
of the Western consortium which markets
most if Iran's oil. Late last fall he
threatened to expropriate part of the
concession area if the consortium didn't
increase the oil output.
2. The Shah was talking in terms of an increase
of about 17 percent, to give Iran more
foreign exchange for defense costs and
development programs.
3. The consortium finally agreed to try to
increase its marketing by about 12 percent a
year for the next two years. It also returned
about a quarter of the concession area to
Iran, and agreed to provide low-cost oil
which Iran could sell to Eastern European
countries.
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D. The Iranians say that Soviet seismologists
have located potential oil reserves in the
Caspian Sea. The Shah says he feels the
Soviets would be the logical partners to
develop Iranian off-shore oil in the Caspian.
1. lie says the Soviets have offered to buy
Iranian oil, and he obviously hopes that
Eastern Europe will become an important
market too.
E. Ile visited Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Hungary
and Yugoslavia during the past year.
1. Iran has concluded a significant trade
agreement with Rumania, and other satellite
deals are in the works.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE January 1967
EGYPT
I. The prestige of Egyptian President Nasir in
the Arab world is at its lowest point of
recent years, and he has severe economic
problems at home, but there is no indication
that he will moderate any of his policies.
A. Nasir would like to destroy Israel and
establish Egyptian hegemony over the entire
Middle East, but for the moment his principal
concern is getting enough for the Egyptians
to eat.
B. The U?S.-Egyptian agreement for Public Law 480
wheat has not been renewed.
1. Egyptian foreign exchange holdings are
very low, so that Cairo can seek only
small quantities of wheat in the open
world market.
2. The Soviet Union has promised to help,
and can do so from its record crop, but
there are conflicting reports on how much
has been promised. Egyptian papers talk
of 650,000 tons
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3. Egypt has to import about two and a half
million tons a year. In the past, PL 480
shipments have run as } .igh as 1.5 million,
but in the last full crop Year they fell
short of one million tons.
C. Nasir is bitter. In a speech just before
Christmas, he charged that the United States
had cleverly made Egypt dependent on PL 430
wheat and thus induced Cairo to put the
resultant savings into development.
1. Then, Nasir charged, we began to impose
conditions on the agreement, calling for
restrictions on Egyptian missile and
nuclear research and other defense
expenditures.
2. When Nasir rejected these strings, he
says, the United States began what he
calls a "war of starvation."
3. I would anticipate a rash of tirades of
this nature from various non-aligned
countries as they learn that there is
no longer enough cheap surplus wheat
to satisfy everybody's desires.
II. To cope with Egyptian economic problems, Nasir
is curtailing the development program, even
cutting ;back on Aswan Dam expenditures.
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A. Shcrtages in a number of goods are increasing.
There is growing discontent in the middle
class.
B. The army, the mainstay of the regime, is still
being pampered , and gets what it wants.
III. In all fairness, the Egyptian Army could point out
that it. is entitled to some priorities with about
40,000 men still bogged down in the Yemen civil
war.
A. As a result, Egypt is actually in poor shape
to back up its calls for a more challenging
Arab posture toward Israel.
B. Nasir's immediate target, however, is not
Israel, but conservative King Hussein in
Jordan.
C. Cairo is carrying on a fierce propaganda
campaign against both Hussein and King
Faysal of Saudi Arabia, the two moderates
who are bucking Nasir's plans for a united
radical Arab world.
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January 1967
SYRIA
I. In Syria, members of the radical Baathist clique
which seized power in February 1966 continue to
be split into factions.
A. Last September the regime crushed a coup at-
tempt by one of its members, Major Salim
Hatum, who subsequently fled to Jordan.
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II. Meanwhile, the regime as presently constituted
continues to take a radical posture.
A. The Soviet Union has extended Syria $135 mil-
lion in Soviet credits for the construction
of Syria's long-planned dam on the Euphrates
River,
B. A mutual defense pact was signed with Egypt
last November, and both countries are con-
cEerting their strident campaign against
Jordan since the Israeli raid into Jordan
in November.
III, The Syrians last December nationalized the pipe-
line of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in re-
taliation for the company`s refusal to double
the transit fee and pay $100 million in retro-
active increases.
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A. Syrian demands on the company have been
totally unrealistic, and the shutdown is
likely to have adverse economic consequences
not only for Syria, but for other Arab coun-
tries as well.
B. The Syrian move may have been designed in
part to put pressure on the more moderate
Iraqi Government. Both Cairo and Damascus
have been putting pressure on Baghdad to
nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company.
C. IPC royalty payments account for 70 percent
of Iraq's annual $270-million oil income and
40 percent of the Iraqi national budget.
IV. IPC, a partnership of Mobil Oil, Standard Oil of
New Jersey, British Petroleum, Compagnie Francaise
des Peetroles, and the Gulbenkian interests, feels
that it cannot pay appreciably more to Iraq and
Syria without being priced out of the market.
A. I:?C offered an extensive expansion of the oil
fields in southern Iraq if the Syrians keep
the pipeline from the northern fields to the
Mediterranean shut down.
B. Lebanon's oil needs, normally covered by
IPC's Iraqi-Syrian pipeline, are now being
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filled through the pipeline from Saudi
Arabia.
1. The Lebanese, however, stand to lose
about $4 million a year in transit fees
if the IPC pipeline remains shut down.
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January 1967
I. In Yemen, an agreement signed by Egypt's Nasir
and Saudi Arabia's Faysal in August 1965 stopped
the four-year-old- war, at least temporarily,
but there has been virtually no progress beyond
the cease-fire toward a solution.
A. The Saudis stopped their arms aid to the
Yemeni royalists and have not renewed it.
B. The Egyptians, who in the past have backed
the Yemeni republicans with up to 60,000
troops, have reduced their forces to about
40,000 men.
C. Efforts by Kuwait to mediate a conclusion
of the war and establishment of a joint
Yemeni government have come to nothing.
II. Meanwhile, Yemen became a virtual Egyptian
colony in August, 1966, when Nasir sent Yemen's
President Sallal back from Cairo to resume control
of the government.
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A. All Yemeni republican leaders not subservient
to Egypt have been jailed, dismissed from the
government, or forced to flee to safety in
the hills or in Saudi Arabia.
B. Royalist and :republican Yemenis have not yet 25X1
been able to unite, however, against the common
foe--Sallal and the Egyptians.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE January 1967
WHITE SOUTHERN AFRICA
40
0
I. The British showdown with Rhodesia in recent
months has to some degree shifted the spotlight
away from the areas which over the longer run
will maintain or lose the so-called "white
redoubt" in Southern Africa-- the Republic of
South Africa, and Portuguese Angola and Mozam-
bique.
A. In South Africa, the new regime which took
over when Ilendrik Verwoerd was assassinated
is as dedicated as he was to the. continuation
of undiluted white rule and Apartheid.
B. Portugal is managing to contain increased
insurgency in Angola and Mozambique.
C. The new African nations are hoping that the
sanctions which the United Nations voted
against Rhodesia can be extended to hit
South Africa and Portuguese Africa as well,
if Rhodesia gets help from her neighbors in
surmounting the sanctions.
D. At the moment, however, the existing regimes
appear to be securely in control of their
"white redoubt."
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Portuguese Africa
II. Portugal should easily retain control in Angola
and Mozambique for the foreseeable future,
notwithstanding the recent increase in rebel
activity.
A. In Mozambique on the East coast, improved
Portuguese equipment and military tactics
have enabled the government to confine
the insurgency, based in Tanzania, to
remote bush areas along the northern border.
1. Even that area is at best a no-man's-land.
The capabilities of the insurgents have
improved, but they do not have the
strength to establish administrative
control in any areas.
2. They are too weak to challenge the
Portuguese in any areas Lisbon wishes
to defend.
III. The resurgence of rebel activity in Angola is
of far greater concern to the Portuguese at
present.
A. Angolan nationalists, raiding from bases
in the Congo,-made a strong attack in
December on an important railway center
on the border. Angolan press reports
claim that 1,000 insurgents took part,
and 500 were killed.
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B. The Portuguese, who expect the Congo
government to enforce some restraint on the
Angolan exiles, promptly announced that the
rebels had damaged the railroad, which is
the main outlet for the Congolese mining
industry.
C. The Angolans in the Congo are split and
disorganized. Thus far, their uncoordinated
raids and sabotage show no signs of developing
into a serious military threat to political
control, even in areas where Portuguese
forces are as yet small and scattered.
D. Portugal is in the fortunate position of
controlling the trade routes of most of the
countries which can offer bases for the
insurgents--the Congo, Zambia, and Malawi.
1. Lisbon takes a cooperative attitude
toward these countries as long as it
encourages restraint in support for
anti-Portuguese nationalists.
2. Whenever the cooperative policy fails
to produce results, Lisbon can squeeze
down on the trade routes by graduated
degrees until the desired response is
obtained.
33. As soon as the Portuguese announced
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that rail traffic from the Congo through
Angola had been disrupted, the Congo
Foreign Minister expressed his regrets
over the raid and said that the government
in Kinshasa would take every possibly
action to prevent further incidents.
4. Even insurgent chief Holden Roberto, who
lives in Kinshasa and doesn't want to be
thrown out by the Congolese, said that
the attack was against his orders, and
that his insurgents are supposed to confine
their efforts to minor harassment.
South Africa
IV. Johannes Vorster, the new Prime Minister of South
Africa, is continuing the foreign and domestic
policies of Verwoerd, whose assassination last
September had no political overtones.
A. The two top foreign policy issues for South
Africa today are Rhodesia, and the old
League of Nations mandate of South-West Africa.
1. South Africa would prefer to avoid a
direct confrontation with Britain and
the United States over the United Nations
sanctions. Pretoria hopes that the British
and Rhodesians can reach some kind of
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settlement before the point where there
might be effective pressure to extend
the sanctions to South Africa.
2. South Africa, however, almost certainly
will continue to support the Rhodesians,
giving them outlets to circumvent the
sanctions in addition to continuing the
direct trade between the two countries.
3. South Africa itself is a potential target
for UN sanctions, and the Vorster govern-
ment would like to help Rhodesia demon-
strate the ineffectiveness of such meas-
ures, particularly against so-called
"white southern Africa."
B. South Africa continues to assert its right
to govern South-West Africa without UN super-
vision.
1., The International-'Court of Justice ruled
last summer that Liberia and Ethiopia
lacked a proper "legal standing" as
plaintiffs for their suit to have the
League mandate transferred to the United
Nations.
2. Pretoria claims that this decision confirms
South Africa's legal position in the area.
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3. To reinforce the decision, the South:Afri
cans may soon launch an international
public relations campaign to emphasize
its accomplishments in South-West Africa,
such as the schools, hospitals, housing
and roads which serve the African popu-
lation.
C. It is highly unlikely that UN sanctions will
be taken against South Africa over these or
other issues. The major powers which would
have to enforce them almost certainly would 25X6
refuse to do so.
2? UN sanctions against South Africa also
would have serious consequences for sev-
eral black African states.
3? Nonetheless, South Africa is continuing
contingency plans which would allow it
to survive total sanctions for several
years, even in the unlikely event that
such sanctions would get universal com-
pliance.
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D. The Vorster regime is continuing the in-
creased sophistication Verwoerd began in
South African relations with other African
Countires.
1. Pretoria, for instance, has shown some
willingness to accept as equals the
leaders of the newly independent coun-
tried of Lesotho and Botswana--formerly
British Basutoland and Bechuanaland.
2. It is helping the conservative govern-
ment of nearby Malawi with some develop-
ment projects
3. As far as we can determine, South Africa
has been wary about associating itself
with the schemes of various adventurists
to return Tshombe to power in the Congo.
V. Within South Africa, the ruling Nationalist Party
is continuing to expand its apartheid policy of
racia:_ separation
A. The economic demands of a booming economy
arid a scarcity of white labor has produced
some opposition from businessmen in the rul-
ing Afrikaner group to a doctrinaire appli-
cation of apartheid in job restrictions.
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B. Some labor unions and white militants, in
turn, have objected to any modification of
apartheid, such as "lowering" job racial
qualifications to permit non-whites in cer-
tain employment.
C. The ruling party faces no political threat
from these small groups, however, .ok_ from
the almost politically extinct white liberal
parties.
D. The South African Communist party has been
crushed.
E. The disorganized non-white population offers
no threat to the government's effective
security laws and forces.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE January 1967
RADICAL AFRICA
I. The influence of the more radical nations of
West Africa---Brazzaville Congo, Mali, and
Guinea--declined in 1966, and one of the
prime movers dropped from the ranks when
Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown in Ghana.
A. The heady political exuberance of
independence has given way to the
sobering discovery that there isn't
very much pie in the sky.
B. In other words, the new governments
have found out that independence is
not just a matter of taking over a
bonanza from the colonialist powers.
1. They are all having trouble keeping
their economies on an even keel.
2. There is_ an increasing dependence
on foreign aid.
3. In particular, those who looked to the
Communist world for economic aid have
found that it is limited in scope,
slow to pay off, and has to be repaid.
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(Congo-Brazzaville)
II. In the former French Congo ---Congo(Brazzaville), as
it is called---President Alphonse Massamba-Debat
is having trouble keeping control of a radical
regime which is at odds with its military forces.
A. The government is dominated by left extremists
who have made little headway in either improving
the economy or. resolving ideological, tribal,
and personal disputes.
B. The regime follows a Marxist line in interna-
tional policy, and relies heavily on foreign
Communist support.
1. After an army mutiny last June, however,
the government expelled not only the French
but the Soviet and Chinese military advisors
of the army, --- presumably to keep the army
from getting any more efficient.
2. The mutiny was put down by-the Presidential
Guard, which has a strong cadre of Cubans.
3. Cubans are also training the government's
important paramilitary forces. There are
already somewhere between 300 and 700 Cuban
advisors and technicians in the country,
with more expected.
III. French interests still control most of the
Brazza.ville-Congo economy,
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A. The French aid program is still the largest
and most significant in the country. (In
1965, it amounted to $11 million.)
1. Brazzaville has remained in the French
franc zone, and extremist pressures have
not yet forced the nationalization of
industry.
2. The growth of Communist influence has
eroded the French position, however,
and harassment of French diplomatic
personnel led to the recall of the
Ambassador (quote)"for consultations."
3. (The United States has had no diplomatic
representation in Congo-Brazzaville since
August 1965, when we withdrew our personnel
after similar harassment.)
B. The Chinese Communists share in training the
paramilitary forces. Peking extended a'$25 million
aid agreement in 1964.
C. Soviet aid amounts to only $8 million, and Soviet
influence has been declining since the Soviet
military advisers were sent home last July.
(Mali)
IV. Mali, which has been relying on Communist hand-outs
to keep its economy afloat, has started informal
negotiations to get back into the French franc zone.
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A. The Communist countries may yet outbid the
French for influence in Mali, but President
Mobido Keita reportedly is willing to accept
considerable French control over the monetary
pclicy of Mali to get back on good terms with
De Gaulle.
1. Mali still takes a public stand with the
Communists on international issues, but
has toned down its propaganda attacks
on the west.
2. United States relations with Mali are
friendly, and we have a modest aid
program there.
3. If Mali reaches financial agreement with
France, this will probably also mean better
relations with the moderate pro-French
nations of Africa such as Ivory Coast
and Senegal. Keita has made overtures in
this direction, and his relations with the
radicals, particularly Guinea, have cooled
correspondingly.
B. Mali's main problem has been a series of recurrent
foreign exchange crises which threaten to cut off
essential supplies and transport lines.
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C. The Chinese Communists helped Mali out with
a $3 million loan in hard currency last June,
and may have promised more this year.
1. Chinese credits of $38 million have been
pretty well used up, but a Chinese dele-
gation has been in Mali discussing new
aid projects.
D. There are still outstanding Soviet credits of
about $25 million, and a Soviet delegation has
been in Mali discussing possible projects.
1. The Soviets apparently agreed to provide
$2 to $3 million in commercial credits
last year, and also provided Mali with
jet aircraft, tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and arms and ammunition.
(Guinea)
V. In Guinea, President Sekou Toure and his regime
are zigzagging back and forth as though they,were
riding a pendulum.
A. For instance, the regime sounds like Peking
in its calls for a revival of the country's
"revolutionary militancy," but at the same
time Toure has soured on his now thoroughly
unwelcome guest, former President Nkrumah
of Ghana. Toure proclaimed Nkrumah "co-President"
of Guinea when he was first overthrown; now
Nkrumah is no longer allowed to make broadcasts.
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B. Similarly, Guinea apparently will depend
in:reasingly on Chinese help in a drive
for greater economic self-sufficiency, but
at the same time Toure is trying to patch up
his quarrels with the United States.
1. You will recall that last October, when
the new Ghana regime took a Guinean dele-
gation headed for an international meeting
off a Pan-American Airways flight in Accra,
Guinea blamed the United States.
2. The Peace Corps was ordered out of the
country, five embassy officials were
expelled, Pan-Am's landing rights were
cancelled, and U.S.I.S. activities were
suspended.
3. We recalled our Ambassador, withdrew some
AID personnel, and cancelled some AID projects.
4. On December 14, President Toure apologized
for the incident, explaining that he had
been mis-led by some of his advisors and by
foreign powers. Now a new modus vivendi is
being worked out gradually.
5. Guinea apparently is not asking for U.S.
food shipments, but does want certain technical
aid projects continued, and would welcome
U.S. investment to develop bauxite deposits.
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C. Guinea has used up most of a 1960 Chinese
credit of $25 million, but last November
Peking agreed to a number of new aid
projects.
D. The Soviets
have shown no eagerness to match
new Chinese offers, but Moscow relations with
Guinea remain fairly stable.
E. The outlook is for Toure to remain in power, but
the leadership he used to exercise among the
radical African states has been eroded by his
economic and political problems at home.
A. He has a one-party system, but there are
competing factions within the single party.
1. The high-handed behavior of party
paramilitary groups irritates the
regular security forces.
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((',hana)
Kwame N::crumah, as I said, no longer constitutes
much of a threat. Ile appears occasionally at
public :Eunctions in Guinea, but he has only about
100 followers with him, and President Toure has
pointedly stated in public that they can go home
to Ghana any time they want to.
I want to take this opportunity of a classified
briefing to make sure that you are aware of what
a fortunate development the overthrow of Nkrumah
proved to be for countering the Communist threat
all over Africa.
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A. The coup in Ghana closed down a guerrilla
training camp where Chinese Communist
instructors had been training insurgents
from a number of African countries.
B. The coup also exposed--and put out of
business--an espionage headquarters which
the Soviets had established and equipped
for Nkrumah ona scale which could only
have been intended for operations all over
a good share of the African continent.
C. The guerrilla training center was located
in an abandoned goldmine about 140 miles
up-country from the capital. More than a
dozen Chinese instructors and specialists
worked there for about a year and a half,
in the course of which they trained several
hundred so-called "freedom fighters" for
insurgency in African countries.
1. As you might expect, the largest indi-
vidual contingents came from Portuguese
Africa, and there were also contingents
from Rhodesia and the Republic of South
Africa.
2. But there were also elements from newly
independent African countries---from
Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroon, Niger,
and the. former Belc'ian Conan
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3. That is a good indication of the
long-range plans Nkrumah had for
exercising his leadership in Africa.
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(Tanzania)
VIII. The principal remaining center of Communist
activity now is in East Africa, at Dar es Salaam,
the capital of former Tanganyika.
A. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania is
no Communist, nor is he a willing or conscious
Communist stooge.
1. Tanganyika became Tanzania, in fact,
when Nyerere merged his country with
Zanzibar in an attempt to undo the Communist
take-over of that island country.
B. Nyerere is obsessed, however, with the liberation
of the remaining countries of white Southern
Africa.
1. lie has not only afforded. Tanzanian sanctuary,
and operating bases, for militant insurgent
movements.
2. Nyerere has turned bitter and mistrustful
against nations which he considers reluctant
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to exert every possible pressure against
such nations as South Africa, Portugal,
and Rhodesia.
3. He broke relations with London over the
Rhodesian issue, which cost him a $21 million
loan already negotiated with Creat Britain.
4. He is giving in to mounting pressure to
exclude Western teachers from village schools,
particularly those near the sensitive Mozambique
border. Last November, for instance, Dar es
Salaam turned down 150 Peace Corps volunteers
who were already in the pipeline.
C. As Nyerere chokes off his relations with the West,
he becomes increasingly dependent on Communist
assistance. Last June Tanzania had to seek
more economic assistance from China, and signed
its first development credit with Moscow.
D. Tanzania is training and arming nationalists from
all over southern Africa, with priority for Mozambique
first, Rhodesia second.
1. Chinese instructors have been helping at
some of the camps for Mozambique nationalists,
E. Tanzania is understandably nervous about the
possibility of Portuguese retaliation, and is
expanding its own defense fnrres.
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Even before Nyerere turned to the Communists for
help in his campaign against white southern
Africa, Dar es Salaam was a center for Communist
recruitment and subversion in East Africa.
G. Nyerere came to power as one of the promising,
British-trained African moderates, but his desire
to re-make Africa around him is making him a
captive of Communists and other extremists.
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(Algeria)
IX. In North Africa Algeria is obtaining significant
' 25X1
military strength from the Soviet Union.
B. Algerian Premier Houari Boumedienne, however,
says his purpose is limited to creating a
deterrent force in the face of Moroccan and 25X1
Tun::sian territorial claims.
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1. The army is probably also too preoccupied
with civil administrative chores and with
domestic political considerations to have
serious aggressive intentions at present.
2. Boumedienne is running into severe economic
problems, and looks to the army as the
mainstay of his regime. In part, the
arms build-up is his payoff to keep the
Algerian armed forces contented and loyal.
D. Algerian relations with the United States remain
strained by Boumedienne's strident propaganda
support for North Vietnam and the Viet Cong.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE ,January 1";6,7
I. Nigeria is a separate problem in Africa. Deep
tribal and regional antagonism has ripped up
an artificial national unity that rested
precariously on more than 250 separate and
often quarreling tribes.
A. Two military coups in the past year swept
away the main political leaders and
institutions of the federation which the
British had created. These coups were
basically a reflection of the division
between the more numerous Moslems of the
North, and the more advanced tribes---
some of them Christian --- of_ the coastal
regions.
B. At present there is a stalemate; the four
principal regions have found it virtually
impossible to conduct negotiations, let alone
reach agreement.
1. The federal military government, since
the second coup last summer, has been
headed by a northerner, Lieut.Colonel Cowon.
Gowon wants a strong central government,
and more small states instead of the four
regions. AF-24
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2. The oil-rich Eastern region is dominated
by the Christian Ibo tribe. Ibos, under
the federal regime, had.many of the better
civil service jobs in the North because of
their better education. During the second
coup, undisciplined northern soldiers began
slaughtering Ibos in the North. Now the
Ibos insist on a loose federation in which
the four regions would become virtually
sovereign states.
C. Gowon and his associates are becoming increasingly
impatient with the leaders of the Eastern region,
and may try to restore unity by force. The result
would almost certainly be an immediate Eastern
declaration of secession, and civil war.
1. Otherwise, the immediate prospect is for a
continuing drift by the Eastern region toward
de facto independence.
II. The United States has no military commitments in
Nigeria, but we must perforce be interested in
developments in the most populous country in Africa,
with some 50 million inhabitants.
A. The largest AID, Peace Corps, and U.S.I.S.
programs in Africa are all located in Nigeria.
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1. All told, there are about 7,000 American
nationals in the country, including about
350 official personnel and more than 800
Peace Corps volunteers.
2. In addition to the Embassy in Lagos and
consulates in three regional capitals,
A space-tracking
station at Kano is phasing out.
3. The U.S. AID program is based on a commitment
made several years ago to contribute
$225 million to Nigeria's Six-Year
Development Plan.
4, American commercial interests and annual
trade with Nigeria each amount to about
$100 million. Most of the direct U.S.
investment is in the rapidly expanding
oil industry, with five American companies
competing for a share.
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January 1967
SPAIN
I. Generalissimo Francisco Franco has finally dealt
with the problem of his succession.
A. The Spanish people in a: referendum on December
14 gave overwhelming approval to the
constitutional law which he devised.
B. It provides some cautious changes which do
not immediately affect Franco's authoritarian
rule, but will permit some liberalization after
he goes.
1. It reaffirms that Spain is a monarchy, and
outlines the procedure for choosing
Franco's royal successor as chief of state.
It also permits designation of a non-
royal regent who could continue the present
authoritarian regime.
2. One major innovation is a provision that
the chief of state can appoint a premier. This
makes it possible to separate Franco's dual
positions as chief of state and premier.
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C. Among the few measures of political liberalization
are: direct election of about one fifth of the
(tortes; voting privilege for married women; religious
liberty for non-Catholics as a legal right; and termi-
nation of Falange control over labor syndicates.
1.. Political parties are still outlawed.
II. Franco is likely to continue in office until he
dies or is incapacitated.
A. In spite of rumors of health problems, Franco
is in good health for a man 74 years old.
B. Be may not even take advantage of the new law
permitting him to name a premier.
C. There is no threat to his tenure from the three
power groups in Spain.
1. The security forces remain loyal.
2. In the other two pillars of his support--
the business interests and the Catholic
Church--whatever discontent there is looks
for changes after Franco goes, not for
his removal or restriction.
D. O;?position groups are illegal and disorganized.
1. Most opposition leaders are also more con-
cerned with changes after Franco goes than
with trying to oust him now.
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III. The army will control the succession.
A. No successor to Franco is expected to exercise
for long the authoritarian powers Franco wields.
IV. US-Spanish relations face some minor problems in
the next two years.
A. Madrid is pressing the US to support its bid
for closer economic and defense relationships
with Western Europe.
1. It wants to be included in readjustments
of western defense arrangements which result
from French withdrawal from NATO.
2. It also wants US support in its current
effort to regain Gibraltar.
B. Madrid continues to forbid overflight rights
for aircraft with nuclear weapons, as a re-
sult of the January 1965 crash at Palomares.
C. Spain may be inclined to bargain for addi-
tional benefits when the US-Spanish defense
agreement comes up for review and possible
renegotiation in 1968.
V. Spain's economy continues to prosper.
A. GNP shows a 9.2 percent annual average growth
since 1960.
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B. Per capita national income rose sharply in
:1.965 to $595, the first year above the $500
:_evel which is generally considered the divid-
ing line between an underdeveloped and a de-
\reloped economy.
C. Inflationary pressures which were cause for
concern in 1965 showed signs of tapering off
in 1966.
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?
BRIEFING PACKAGE January 1967
0
I. In Cuba, Fidel Castro remains in firm control.
A. His power position is based on tight se-
curity controls, and on the loyalty of key
military officers and security officials.
B. There were some reports early in 1966 that
Castro was ill or slipping, because he was
not making his usual public appearances.
Since June, however, he has been as active
as ever.
1. The British Ambassador in Cuba tells us
that Castro is in robust health, and
appears to be "as strong as an ox." The
Ambassador sees no reason to expect any
health problems for Fidel in the near
future, in spite of his hours and his
habits.
II. We have reported from time to time on one of his
favorite pastimes--all-night bull sessions with
university students. In December, Castro had
another long session. with the students, but this
time it was apparently business, not pleasure.
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A. It was time for elections at Havana Uni-
versity, and the students reportedly
nominated some candidates who were not ac-
ceptable to the government.
1. The controlled Federation of University
Students complained that the candidates
suffered from what was called "untested
political reliabilities," and there were
strong protests from high regime off i-
cials .
2. The maverick students didn't withdraw
their slate, however, until Castro
himself paid a visit to the campus.
B. This was the first significant dissent at
the University since Castro came to power in
1.959. As it turned out, it was a tempest in
a teapot, but it seems to have caused Castro
deep disappointment,
1. In a speech soon after the incident, he
criticized what he called "factors that
conspire against the Cuban educational
system."
2. Later he delivered a stinging rebuke to
students who--he said--"are divorced from
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p
reality, and now feel that they don't
have to work since they are doing
society a favor by studying."
III. The economic situation is still Castro's biggest
problem.
A. Troubles arising from mismanagement, inef-
ficiency, and low labor productivity have
'been aggravated by a series of natural dis-
asters--mainly hurricanes.
:L. Some of the recent Caribbean hurricanes
have been taking not just one, but two
or three cuts at Cuba; I am surprised
that Castro hasn't accused the CIA of
steering the hurricanes.
The basic problem, however, was that the
early plans of the Castro regime, under
the influence of the missing Che Guevara,
put too much influence on industrial ex-
pansion.
3. These plans have been sharply revised
in the past three years to restore the
emphasis to agriculture, with the great-
est stress on sugar production.
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4. A number of personnel shakeups and re-
organizations have improved management
in several important sectors of the
economy.
B. The 1966 sugar harvest, at four and a half
million tons, was one and a half million
tons below the planned goal, principally be-
cause of the drought.
1. Increased mechanization, greater use of
fertilizer, more acreage planted to sugar
cane, and favorable weather should give
Cuba one of the best sugar harvests in
its history in 1967--probably between 6
and 7 million tons.
C. Nevertheless, per capita income will remain
below the pre-Castro levels.
L. Basic foods are still rationed, and food
distribution is poor.
~'.. The lack of spare parts has affected a
wide range of activities, from the repair
of household appliances and automobiles,
to sugar mill equipment and industrial
machinery.
IV. Castro's increasingly bellicose foreign policy
actions and statements probably reflect frustration
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over the continuing critical economic and ad-
ministrative problems.
A. Despite rumors to the contrary, there is
no evidence that Cuba's relations with the
Soviet Union have suffered serious damage.
The USSR has shown its willingness to help
Cuba overcome the effects of last year's
:poor sugar harvest, and has continued its
large-scale economic support of the Castro
:regime.
B. Since early 1.966 when.,the Chinese: cut.
back on planned rice deliveries, Fidel has
been exchanging public insults with Chinese
:leaders. The deterioration in. relations is
not expected to reach the point of complete
rupture, however.
C. Recent statements by Castro and other high
regime officials make it clear that Cuba
would like to become more actively involved
in the Vietnam war.
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V. Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders have re-
emphasized the extreme revolutionary hard line
in :Latin America since the January Tri-Continent
Con:Eerence.
The Cuban military establishment is one of the
largest and best equipped in Latin. America. Morale
is good--especially among the officers. The troops
are loyal to the regime. The armed forces are
fully capable of maintaining internal order and
defending the island from anything short of a
large-scale external assault supported by the
United States.
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A. For air defense, Cuba has 24 surface-to-
air missile installations with 162 launchers,
290 transporters, and an estimated 600 SA-2
Guideline missiles. These are backed up by
almost 1,500 antiaircraft artillery pieces,
some of which are radar-controlled. These
'weapons are highly mobile and can also be
used for infantry support.
B. There are still four coastal defense cruise
missile sites, with eight launchers which
Dan fire on ships about 40 nautical miles
at sea.
:1. The cruise missile system, however, is
presently undergoing extensive change.
All four sites have recently been aban-
doned, and we have not detected replace-
ment sites.
They may be switching the coastal de-
fense missile assignment to ship-borne
missile systems.
3. Cuba has recently added four to six boats
to the original force of 12 Komar-class
patrol boats which fire a cruise missile.
4. There is also a ground forces version of
the cruise missile used by the coastal
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defense system, and the Cubans have 41
mobile launchers for this weapon, with 25X1
about 100 missiles.
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January 1967
BRIEFING PACKAGE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
I. In the Dominican Republic, the regime of Presi-
dent Joaquin Balaguer has made a generally en-
couraging start,-but that is all. A firm basis
for Dominican political stability has not yet
been developed.
A. Balaguer has a number of factors working
for him.
1. He received a clear election mandate in
June 1966.
2. The President has been relatively effec-
tive in handling major problems.
3. Many Dominicans realize that there is no
satisfactory alternative to the present
government. There will be chaos if
Balaguer falls.
4. Firm US backing for Balaguer has probably
discouraged potential plotters.
B. The fact remains that the country has no his-
tory or tradition of constitutional and demo-
cratic rule. This is something that is going
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td have to be built from scratch--and not
only by those who run the government, but
by the people who are governed.
1. The government's popular image is not
good--many Dominicans fear it is as-
suming neo-Trujillo overtones.
2. But the image of the public is not very
good either. Those who want a change
are still inclined to seek it by intrigue,
by plotting, or by force, not by legisla-
tion or by voting.
3. Balaguer runs the risk of seeing his elec-
tion mandate seriously eroded over the
coming months.
II. Balaguer has put special emphasis on his relations
with -:he military.
A. Before the Inter-American Peace Force was pulled
out last September, Balaguer made changes in the
military organization and leadership aimed at
strengthening his control of the armed services.
B. The President now appears to have widespread
acceptance among the military. At present
there are only relatively minor irritants in
the civil-military relationship.
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0
I. The military elements are determined to
protect their position, however, and
Balaguer must take these interests into
account when he advocates reforms, or
when he is dealing with the left.
C. The traditional right-wing civilian allies
of the military have been quiet recently.
III. Relations between Balaguer and the non-Communist
left are not satisfactory. They have been char-
acterized by mutual suspicion and tension.
A. The left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary
Party (PRD), the leading opposition group,
seems somewhat uncertain of its future course.
1. The departure of Juan Bosch in late Novem-
ber on an extended European trip has con-
tributed to this uncertainty.
In his absence, there is a danger that radical
elements in the PRD leadership will be able to
dominate the party, and throw it into all-out
opposition to the government.
1. Such action could lead to PRD cooperation
with the Communists, a move that would
greatly enhance the influence of the
country's badly divided Communist groups.
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C. The government may be tempted to employ re-
pressive measures against the PRD, a move
certain to increase political tensions.
IV. Numerous economic and social problems pose a
serious danger to long-term stability.
A. There is a continuing threat of labor dis-
turbances, and severe unemployment.
B. The country has an international payments
gap which could become critical.
C. r
.'he economy in 1967 is expected to show im-
provements over 1966, but the US Embassy
feels it will remain below pre-revolt levels.
D. Many of Balaguer's economic policies appear
headed in the right direction, but his cen-
tralized control of most economic decisions
has slowed down implementation of an emer-
gency investment program financed by the
united States.
E. Substantial sums of-foreign assistance will
continue to be needed if the country is to
attempt to solve its problems.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE
January 1967
I. In Haiti, President Duvalier remains in firm control
of the country.
A. "Papa Doc" hit hard and fast in November when
he had reason to suspect a military plot
against his regime.
1. On November 10 and 11 he fired a number
of high-ranking officers, waited a few days
to make sure this did not trigger a revolt,
and then ordered the officers to present
themselves in Port-au-Prince for courtmartial.
2. Duvalier thus benefited three ways from this
suspected plot:
--fie got rid of a number of officers he
didn't trust;
--Fie replaced them with handpicked, loyal
supporters; and
--by firing men at the top, he created openings
for a wave of promotions to reward his
adherents in both the army and the security
B. This is typical of Duvalier's shrewd operations.
So is the legislative election to be held January
22. His handpicked slate is supposedly taking
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any substantial opposition bloc.
its chances with the electorate, but no one
expects that the new legislature will have
A group of Cuban and Haitian exiles based in
Miami planned an invasion in November, but
their publicity and their finances proved
to he better than their execution.
1. The prime mover was Rolando Masferrer,
a former Batista thug.
2. The plan was poorly organized; it
lacked widespread support among Haitian
exiles; and it hinged on the unlikely
condition of at least tacit agreement
of the U. S. Government.
3. The plan collapsed in mid-November without
even a feint toward Haiti. There are
still rumors of a new target date for
invasion, but these rumors probably stem
from Masferrer's efforts to avoid having
to account for the 350-thousand-dollar
war chest raised for the November attermpt.
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II. While Duvalier's political grip remains firm, the
Haitian economy keeps on going downhill.
A. Per Capita gross national product is about
$70--the lowest in Latin America.
B. In the past, solvency depended to a large
degree on U. S. loans and grants. There
haven't been any since 1963.
C. 1964, 1965, and 1966 were all had "ears,
and the outlook for 1967 is not favorable.
Hurricane Inez in September caused severe
damage in an area that produces about
40 percent of Haiti's coffee, Haiti's chief
product.
D. A recent agreement with the Dominican
Republic promises that Duvalier's own
finances will stay in better shape. A
Migrant Labor Agreement calls for 20,000
to 24,000 Haitian cane-cutters to work in
the Dominican sugar harvest.
1. Duvalier will make his own arrangements
with the Haitian workers.
2, The Dominican payment for their services--
estimated as high as $400,000--will he
paid into Duvalier's so-called "non-fiscal
funds," which he uses to maintain his
power structure.
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III. There is practically no active opposition worthy
of the name left in Haiti. The few politically-
minded people who are against Duvalier are cowed
by his oppressive policies and unorganized.
A. Ile watches the army like a hawk, and keeps
a good share of their weapons and ammunition
locked up in the Presidential Palace.
1. His own.private goon squads, the
Ton Ton Macoutes or "boogeymen,"
amount to a private army which keeps
tabs on the military among other duties.
B. There are no longer any significant opposition
political parties out in the open. There is an
underground Social Christian movement called
the Personalistes, which may have one or two
hundred adherents, mainly in Port-au-Prince,
but it appears to have little organization.
C. There are two rival Communist parties, which
may have as many as 500 members combined,
but they are lacking in discipline, poorly
indoctrinated, and inclined to compete rather
than cooperate. What's more, at least half
of this membership is in exile in Europe or
Mexico.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE January 1967
GUATEMALA
I. Guatemala is confronted with guerrilla warfare
in the countryside and terrorism in the capital
city, with the guerrillas expecting help soon
from Fidel Castro.
A. The government has scored some successes
since it began large-scale field operations
against the guerrillas in earl, October,
but police have not been able to stem
the urban terrorism. 25X1
At least eight policemen have been killed
since mid-November.
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III. Guatemalan President Mendez was criticized when he -
first took office because-he appeared to be addressing
his warnings only to the extremists on the right who
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had opposed his election and inauguration.
A. Now he has begun to concentrate his fire
an the leftwing extremists..
I.- An order of December 2, placing the
country under state of siege for 30
days, specifically referred to Communist-
oriented guerrillas as the main targets.
An earlier order which expired on
that date had not been specific.
2.. The president announced that the
government is going to crack down on
student elements involved in subversive
activities.
?. The state of siege decree also warns that
information media which publish news
furnished by the guerrillas will be
punished.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE January 1967
PANAMA
I. Relations with Panama are approaching a new and
crucial stage.
A. Maneuvering for the 1968 presidential elec-
tions already has started, and the canal
treaty negotiations with the US are the ma-
jor issue.
B. The heat of an election campaign will put
pressure on the Robles government to obtain
a treaty settlement as early as possible.
C. :[f I am going to talk about Panama elections,
minute to explain some
of the terms our Panama experts love to use.
1. Most of the time, politics in Panama is
controlled by a number of well-entrenched
families. These families lead a handful
of political parties which, with a few
scattered interruptions, have either
shared or taken turns at running the
country.
2. The families and the parties operate more
or less on the principle that democracy
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is all right as long as the elite are
allowed to run things.
3. To avoid having to repeat this identi-
fication every time that the ruling
elements are men.tion.ed, we generally
refer to the "oligarchical parties."
The term is not a happy one, but it
saves a lot of words.
D. President Marco Aurelio Robles leads a
coalition of the oligarchical parties. The
perennial challenger is Arnulfo Arias, who
heads the mass-based Panamenista Party.
7.. Arias became President by coup in. 1941,
and by election. in 1951, but the oligarchy
threw him out before he could finish
either term. He may very well have won
the 1964 voting, but he lost when the
government counted the ballots.
2. He is a very effective demagogue who needs
only a good issue, and that is why the
negotiations for the new canal treaty
are so important.
E. If no agreement can. be reached, or if the
agreement is unsatisfactory to Panama, Arias
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will make a strong run in 1968 on. the plat-
form that the oligarchy cannot defend
Panamanian interests against the United
States.
II. Robles is firmly convinced that his government
at present has the strength to obtain ratifica-
tion if the draft treaty meets the long-standing
aspirations of Panama.
B. One of the sticking points is United States
insistence on having the directorship and a
majority of the seats on. the joint canal
authority which is to administer the present
canal.
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1. An example of this was the incident in
early December when a Panamanian. aircraft
made an. emergency landing at the US-con-
trolled Rio Hato training area.
2. Our requests that the pilot identify him-
self led to charges that US military
authorities were violating Panamanian
sovereignty.
3. The allegations were blown out of all pro-
portion by Panama?s sensationalist news
media, most of which are owned or con-
trolled by the oligarchy.
D. :Extremist-led student groups have already staged
some "sovereignty" demonstrations, and more can
be expected with the approach of the anniversary
of the anti-American riots of January 9th to 12th
::n 1964.
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1. Government security forces probably will
be able to control demon.stration.s, but
there is always the danger that an in-
ciden.t could touch off new rioting.
2. Pan.ama's small, fragmented Communist move-
ments are making plans for agitation. over
the anniversary period, and there is more
tension this year than last because of
the Rio Hato affair.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE
?
January 1967
VENEZUELA
I. Venezuela is calm again following a government
crackdown on terrorism in December,
A. A :_esurgence of urban terrorism culminated
in an attempt on December 13 to assassinate
the army chief of staffs The reaction of
the military leaders was so strong that
President Leoni had little other choice but
to suspend constitutional guarantees,
Bo On December 14, police and military forces
occupied the Central University in Caracas,
long a hotbed- of Communist and terrorist
activities,
Co Reaction to the government's moves among
the public and the political parties has
been generally favorable. The Communists
so far have been lying lows. but they may
try some countermove when the students re-
turn fromvacationin January.
D. If the urban terrorist organization is able
to survive the government's current campaign,
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it may once more put a strain on relation-
ships between the military and the civilian
government.
E. Now that the government has once yielded to
military pressure for a strong hand against
the terrorists, it may find the military dif-
ficult to deal with in the future.
II0 The Communist Party of Venezuela is divided into
a hard-line group, a soft-line group, and the
orthodox group:. The soft-line is opposed to all
armed action. The orthodox PCV wants to de-empha-
size guerrilla and terrorist activities and con-
centrate on political work among the masses along
traditional, nonviolent lines. A faction of the
Marxist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
is apparently cooperating with the hard-line
Communists.
A. Rural insurgency, carried out by the hard-liners,
remains a problem, but it is not an immediate
threat to the stability of the government,
Bo In July about 20 hard-line guerrillas landed on
the coast of Venezuela after training in Cuba,
Since then they have carried out a series of
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40
raids and ambushes, working with perhaps
50 to 75 guerrillas already on the scene,
III. Maneuvering for the 1963 general elections is
beginning to exert a strong influence on po-
litical activity.
A. There are four major political parties and
several minor ones, mainly left of center
in their political orientation and volubly
devoted to social reform. The Communist
Party is barred from political activities.
B. Leaders of the political parties have been
meeting to discuss the formation of coali-
tions or to make deals for the coming elec-
tions.
IV, Oil continues to dominate the Venezuelan economy,
despite some diversification through increased
agricultural output, expansion of light industry,
and development of the Guyana iron industry,
A. The government's petroleum policy has been
aimed largely at increasing tax revenues
and making clear Venezuelan control over the
operations in Venezuela of the foreign oil
companies.
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B. Weak spots in the economy include a mild
slump in the construction industry and
continuing high unemployment,
C. The Venezuelan economy has grown at an
average annual rate of six percent since
1962, and prospects for the continuation
of this rate of growth are good,
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?
January 1967
BRIEFING PACKAGE
ECUADOR
I. Ecuador at the moment is involved in the delicate
process of trying to shift from military back to
constitutional government.
A. A constituent assembly last November chose
Otto Arosemena as provisional president,
1< He may serve for as much as a year before
a constitutional successor emerges.
? B. The primary functions of the assembly, which
is also acting as a legislature, are to pro-
duce a new constitution to replace that of
1946, and to lay the groundwork for general
elections,
1. The assembly has decided on direct popu-
lar election of the next president, but
has set no date,
2. The assembly has done little else. Ses-isions have been so disorderly that the
delegates are not expected to complete
their work before April 1967,
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Co The new interim president is a hard-driving,
:?ersonable professional poli-
tician. Arosemena is a member of a long-
established Guayaquil banking family, and is
backed by conservative elements, He is
therefore looked upon by the center-left op-
position as a respresentative of the vested
interests
:L, Otto Arosemena is a cousin of Carlos
Arosemena, the former president whose
irresponsibility and leftist tendencies
led the military to oust him in July
1963. Unlike Carlos, the new provisional
president is friendly to the United States.
2 The center-left opposition is beginning to
accept the idea that it may have to live
with Arosemena for a while, but will un-
doubtedly try to depose him if the op-
portunity presents itself.
D. Arosemena has reached a modus vivendi with
the military by promising that no major
changes will be made in the command structure,
and that his government will not support any
measures adopted by the assembly that are re-
pugnant to the armed forces.
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1, Most military leaders are reluctant to
take on governing responsibility again.
A military coup would probably provoke
considerable popular unrest,
20 Should the assembly bog down for several
months in political bickering, however,
the military might feel compelled to in-
tervene to prevent the collapse of public
order.
Ii. While the political situation remains uncertain,
the most immediate problem facing the government
is the worsening financial and economic situa-
tion,
A. Encouraging progress has been made in slowing
the loss of foreign exchange reserves.
I. There seems to be little likelihood, how-
ever, of dealing with the long-range fi-
nancial and economic problems in the near
future, given the caretaker nature of
the government and the size of the prob-
lems.
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January 1967
BRIEFING PACKAGE
BOLIVIA
I. The Bolivian political scene has been relatively
quiet since the inauguration last August of Pres-
ident Rene Barrientos Ortuno. This condition
will probably continue for the short run, punc-
tuated at times by periods of uneasiness.
A. Barrientos is a popular presidents He won
62 percent of the vote in the July elections.
His ruling political coalition, the Bolivian
Revolutionary Front or FRB, also enjoys an
overwhelming majority in both houses of
Congress. In spite of the statistics, how-
ever, the Barrientos government is not
strong.
1. The FRB--a patchwork combination of four
minor political parties and two interest
groups--lacks unity, central control, and
a common political doctrine.
2,, It is already falling-apart and Barrientos
has been looking for some alternative or
substitute. He will probably be able to
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reorganize his political base eventually,
but in the meantime Bolivian politics and
government is going to be pretty much a
personal one-man show,
B. Barrientos? real base of power is the armed
forces. Without their support, his govern-
ment can not survive
1? His relations with the military have
been good so far. As long as Barrientos
clearly favors the interest of the armed
forces, his overthrow is improbable,
C. The chief rival for power is the armed forces
commander, General Alfredo Ovando Candiao
1? Ovando is an ambitious, but cautious man.
He will probably not seek a direct con-
frontation with Barrientos in the immedi-
ate future, for fear of splitting the
armed forces' loyalties.
2. Instead, Ovando will try to keep pressure
on Barrientos in hopes that he will stumble.
Ovando would then be in a position to take
over,
D. The political opposition to Barrientos is too
badly fragmented and internally disoriented to
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;pose a serious threat at this time,
II. Bolivia. has enjoyed a measure of economic stability
under the military junta and the Barrientos govern-
ment, but many problems remain.
A. These include a large budget deficit, a rising
cost of living, and heavy foreign debt. The
Bolivian Government is counting heavily on the
US to help alleviate these burdens,
B. The major source of economic difficulties for
the government continues to be the mining in-
dustry, which accounts for nearly all of
Bolivia's export earnings,
1. In 1966, COMIBOL, the nation's mining in-
dustry, was put on a paying basis for the
first time since 19520
2. The government expects some labor trouble
in the tin mines at the beginning of the
year over the issue of wages.
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January 1967
BRIEFING PACKAGE
BRAZIL
I. Brazilian President Castello Branco will turn
over his office on March 15 to former War Minis-
ter Arthur da Costa e Silva, a retired army
marshal.
A. Costa e Silva has not yet announced any
specific policies. He is expected to con-
tinue most of the present lines. He may
try some relaxation of the stringent eco-
nomic austerity measures.
B. His primary base of support, as with Castello
Branco, will be the armed forces.
II. The Castello Branco government has made an im-
pressive effort to alleviate the chaotic con-
ditions inherited from its predecessors, but
many critical problems remain,
A. The current annual rate of inflation is
substantially less than the 1964 rate of 87
percent, but it remains near the 1965 level
of 45 percent.
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B. Real wages have declined steadily, contribu-
t:-ng to the substantial dissatisfaction among
u::ban labor,
C. Restrictive credit policies have drawn pro-
tests from business leaders.
D. Agricultural output in 1966 was probably
down from the bumper 1965 harvest,
III. The government has effectively reduced the threat
of subversion, but there are still potential
threats to stability.
A. The only legal opposition party, the Brazil-
ian Democratic Movement, has been unable to
exploit the widespread popular dissatisfac-
tion with the government; in the November
congressional elections the pro-government
party successfully defended its large majori-
ties in Congress.
B. A political alliance between ex-President
Kubitschek and conservative leader Carlos
Lacerda has been formed in hopes of captur-
ing popular support. It may, however, fail
to qualify as a political party under the
requirements of the new constitution now
being considered in Congress.
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C. Some hard-line military elements continue
to press for stronger action against corrupt
or subversive elements,
D. Ex-_reme leftist exiles--such as Miguel
Arraes and Leonel Brizola--continue to plot,
al-:hough ineffectively.
E. The Communist Party, in considerable dis-
array after the revolution, is still fac-
tionalized but beginning to reorganize and
to reassert its influence, particularly in
labor and among students and intellectuals,
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January 1967
BRIEFING PACKAGE
ARGENTINA
I. In Argentina, the authoritarian regime of Presi-
dent Juan Carlos Ongania remains in firm control
despite public grumbling over its initial efforts
at economic and labor reform.
A.. Ongania retains the support of the armed
forces, which brought him to power after de-
posing the Illia government in June 1966.
1. The generals have apparently yielded--
at least for now--to Ongania's insistence
that they concern themselves only with
military affairs and leave policy-making
to the cabinet.
.
'?o Ongania appointed Julio Alsogaray, an
ambitious and outspoken officer, as com-
mander in chief of the army. This may
give the generals a forceful spokesman if
they continue to disagree with government
policies, and the deliberate pace of reforms.
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B. The Argentine economy suffers from budgetary
deficits, a large external debt, and chronic
inflation. The government's initial reform
moves alienated business and labor interests,
1. Some business interests welcomed the
coup last summer, but were quickly dis-
enchanted when it became clear that there
would not be a crackdown on organized
labor, that foreign exchange restrictions
would continue, and that tax laws would
be enforced,
2. Organized labor had accepted the new gov-
ernment grudgingly. A compulsory arbitra-
tion law and new work rules for port and
railroad workers have now given labor
leaders the issues they needed to rally
support for antigovernment strikes,
3? The government has not yet completed the
budget plan originally promised before
the end of 1966. Disagreements within
Ongania's economic team have prevented
the development of an effective stabili-
zation program.
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II. The Ongania regime has indicated that it plans
to stay in power until its reforms are completed.
Even then it will not permit a return to the for-
mer political system,
A, Several key figures in the government, in-
c:Luding the Interior Minister, have often
voiced their approval of a political system
drawn from Mussolini?s and Franco?s con-
cepts of the "corporate state."
B. Ongania, however, has stated that he would
prefer to see the development of a two-party
system of liberals and conservatives which
would absorb both the Peronists and the Radi-
cals,
III. At present, there is no subversive threat to the
government from either the Peronists or the Com-
munists, and there seems little likelihood that
the two groups could ever join forces,
A. The Peronists, who once had a reputation for
subversion and terrorism, have been split.
The moderates in the movement seem to be
gaining control,
I. The moderates, led by labor leader Au-
gusto Vandor, dominate the General
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Confederation of Labor, and have lately
supported negotiations with the regime
to end labor disputes,
2? Vandor has also talked of eventually
leading a labor party which would be
Peronist-based,
B. The Communist Party, although the second
largest in Latin America, is weak and in-
effective, and closely watched by the gov-
ernment,
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January 1967
URUGUAY
I. Uruguay has dropped its Swiss-style plural ex-
ecut:.ve system, and Oscar Gestido will take
office in March as the first one-man president
in 16 years.
A. In November 1966, largely because of dis-
satisfaction with deteriorating economic
conditions,-the voters decided to do away
with their cumbersome 9-man executive and
end eight years of Blanco Party dominance.
B. Gestido, a Colorado Party member, has not
divised any comprehensive plan to deal with
the country's ills, but he has promised a
government of "national unity," and is
attempting to form a competent economic
team.
C. His job will be difficult because his elec-
toral alliance will control less than half
of the Colorado congressional majority.
1. Unless all of the Colorado factions
support Gestido's programs, the Commu-
nists may have an important swing vote.
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They increased their congressional rep-
resentation from 3 to five or six seats
in the 99-seat Chamber of Deputies and
1 or 2 in the 30-seat Senate.
II. The new constitution, which was approved by
the voters in the November elections, will im-
prove the government's ability to deal with
problems.
A. It increases presidential powers and provides
for much-needed organizational improvements
throughout the executive branch.
III. Uruguay has serious economic problems.
A. The rate of inflation in 1967 could match
the 1965 rate of nearly 90 percent unless
the new government takes energetic action.
B. Industry and agriculture are stagnant, and
both imports and exports are down.
C. Unemployment, estimated' between 12 and 20
percent, is rising.
D. The budget deficit and foreign debt are also
increasing.
E. Workers are being hit hardest by the economic
pinch. The serious strikes which plagued
Uruguay in late 1966 are likely to be repeated
in 1967.
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IV. The Communist Party, with 18,000 to 20,000 mem?
bers7 has a demonstrated ability to exploit po-
litical and economic issues.
A. The Party's electoral front, FIDEL, doubled
its 1962 vote to six percent. in recent elec-
tions, although it was unable to make sig-
nificant gains outside of Montevideo,
B. The Communists dominate a newly formed labor
confederation which represents most of or-
ganized labor.
C. The party will continue to exploit labor's
grievances, both legitimate and artificial,
although no major labor agitation by the
Communists is likely until after the new gov-
ernment takes office.
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