THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002000010060-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: May 29, 1967
• Content Type: IR

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
The Situation in South Vietnam
(Weekly)
Secret
29 May 1916475
No. 0352/67
USAID review
State Dept. review
5?
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WARNING
This document contains intormation affecting tfhe national
defense of the United States, within the meamug of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the U S Code, is amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
r GROUP i
t XCLUIIED FROM AUTOMATIC
[NJN'N(1 AUINC. AND
ll, CLA951#ICATION
SECRET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(22 May - 28 May 1967)
POLITICAL SITUATION I
Former premier announces presi-
dential candidacy; Ky to remain
a candidate; Chief of State Thieu
delays announcement; Directorate
requests electoral law changes.
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT II
Revolutionary Development and se-
curity in III Corps; Other Revolu-
tionary Development Activities;
"New Life Development" Activities:
urban development, rural rgconstruc-
tion, and refugees.
ECONOMIC SITUATION III
Prices; Currency and gold; "Rice
bonus" for GVN employees; Joint ec-
onomic committee.
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices (graph)
Saigon Cost of Living Index (graph)
South Vietnam Money Supply (graph)
South Vietnam Foreign Exchange Reserves (graph)
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I. POLITICAL SITUATION
The leading civilian contender for the
presidency, Tran Van Huang, made his candi-
dacy official on 25 May. On the 26th,Pre-
mier Ky told reporters that he will remain
a candidate even if Chief of State Thieu of-
ficially enters the race. Thieu's ultimate
intentions concerning the presidency are
still unknown. Meanwhile, the ruling Direc-
torate has sent a request to the Constituent
Assembly that it alter the electoral laws so
that the presidential and upper house elec-
tions are held on the same day.
Former Premier Announces Presidential Candidacy
1. Former premier Tran Van Huong announced on
25 May from his residence in the coastal city of Vung
Tau that he will be a candidate in the presidential
election. He has not yet designated a vice presiden-
tial running mate. Although Huong's entry in the race
had been widely assumed, he had previously hedged
somewhat by declaring that his formal announcement
would depend upon the fairness of the presidential
electoral law. Huong has expressed some dissatisfac-
tion with the law as it now stands, but apparently
considers it no major obstacle.
2. Earlier, Huong indicated to US Embassy offi-
cers that he had found a running mate, whom he des-
cribed as a civilian, a Buddhist, and a man known for
his integrity. There are indications that Huong's
choice might be southern Buddhist lay leader Mai Tho
Truyen. When contacted on 20 May by a US Embassy of-
ficer, Truyen indicated that he was seriously consid-
ering offers to run as a vice presidential candidate.
During the conversation, Truyen also spoke out em-
phatically against the current involvement of the
military establishment in the government and in poli-
tics,
3. A Huong-Truyen ticket would most likely prove
very attractive to ethnic southerners, but would offer
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no regional appeal to residents of central Vietnam.
In light of the qualities and reputations of the
two men, "integrity instead of corruption" is likely
to become the theme of their campaign.
Ky to Remain a Candidate
4. On 26 May, Premier Ky told newsmen that he
intends to remain a candidate even if Chief of State
Thieu does formally enter the race.
y is
clearly off to the fastest an strongest start of any
of the potential presidential aspirants. He has been
soliciting the support of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai
religious sects and of a prominent faction of the
VNQDD (Nationalist Party) in I Corps with apparent
success, and claims that he can depend on them for at
least one million votes.
5. Ky has also been stumping in the provinces
for some time, taking advantage of his frequent cere-
monial functions to woo diverse elements among the
religious sects, the montagnards, the peasantry in
general, and more recently, the sizeable Chinese com-
munity. Additionally, in a step fraught with politi-
cal overtones, he was instrumental in granting a rice
bonus on 17 May to the military and civil servants.
On the other hand, Ky's recent firm reproach to the
Saigon press community concerning the need to exercise
more accuracy and loyalty to the country may have been
politically expedient, but is not likely to garner
him many friends among newsmen or among the civilian-
oriented members of the Constituent Assembly, which
will draft press regulations, probably prior to the
presidential election.
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Chief of State Thieu Delays Announcement
8e Chief of State Thieu has still not officially
announced his candidacy, and predictions regarding his
intentions range from a future public committment to
run to a political "deal" with Premier Ky for the re-
moval of Police Director Loan in return for Thieu's
withdrawal from the contest. One of the latest indi-
cations of Chief of State Thieu's still unofficial
intention to oppose Premier Ky for the presidency ap-
peared in the Vietnam press on 21 May. Thieu's press
officer reportedly said that Thieu "has decided to run
for the presidency" and that he will "officially an-
nounce his decision on a convenient dates"
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Directorate Requests Electoral Law Changes
10. On 26 May, the Directorate submitted a
letter to the Constituent Assembly outlining its
recommendations for changes in the presidential and
upper house election laws. The proposals include a
rescheduling of the upper house election from 17
December to early September, simultaneous with the
presidential election, and deletion of the provision
stipulating that presidential candidates must be
introduced by 30 elected representatives.
11. The government is apparently so annoyed
with the delay in upper house elections that it was
reportedly prepared, as of earlier in the week, to
induce the resignation of enough deputies to discredit
the assembly and give the government sufficient cause
to dissolve it and call for immediate National Assembly
elections. In the opinion of several deputies, how-
ever, such drastic measures may be avoided by the sub-
mission of the Directorate's letter.
12. The Directorate's decision to reject part
of the Assembly's electoral laws apparently reflects
a number of views held by Chief of State Thieu, and
this minor victory may well encourage him to pursue
his presidential ambitions in earnest. Although Thieu
may have won a consensus within the Directorate sup-
porting his views of the electoral law, he must still
win over the Ky group of some ten influential generals
before he can pose any decisive threat to Ky's present
control of important government vote-getting machinery.
Most of these generals have opted for Ky in the past
few weeks, but some of them could still possibly switch
their loyalties or deoide not to support either man
openly.
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The Revolutionary Development (RD)
program in III Corps has made little
progress thus far in 1967; no extensive
breakthrough has yet been made in the
security situation and the local popula-
tion remains generally apathetic. Among
the recent successes of RD cadre are the
assistance being provided by Truong Son
teams to refugees in Lam Dong Province,
the establishment of the first New Life
Hamlet Farmers' Association in Tay Ninh
Province, the voluntary relocation to an
RD area of villagers in Kien Hoa Province,
and the elimination of two important Viet
Cong cadremen in An Xuyen Province.
In the field of urban development,
self-help projects are moving ahead in
Saigon and in Qui Nhon city. US advisers
have apparently headed off a haphazard
distribution of weapons to recently elected
village and hamlet officials. Another sig-
nificant step has been taken in the use of
Hoi Chanh (Viet Cong ralliers) to meet gov-
ernment manpower needs, this time to work
in mobile refugee teams. In the period
14-20 May, 538 persons rallied to the gov-
ernment under the Chieu
Hoi (Open Arms)
program. The returnee
total so
far
in
1967
is now 72 percent of the total
for
the
cal-
endar year 1966,
Revolutionary Development and Security in III Corps
1. The Revolutionary Development program in
III Corps has made little over-all progress in 1967.
Despite the presence of large numbers of South Vietna-
mese and allied forces in the corps area, no extensive
breakthrough has been made in the security situation
that would enable RD to take hold and develop on a
broad scales Almost equally important factors in the
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lack of RD progress, however, are the apathetic at-
titude of the Vietnamese populace toward the political
and military situation, and the inertia and apathy of
local government officials, who have been additionally
tasked this year with the responsibility of conducting
the village/hamlet elections.
2. Security around province and district towns
in III Corps has improved somewhat in the past 16
months, but there is a considerable disparity between
the number of people under some degree of government
control and the small amount of land over which the
government holds sway. Large allied sweep operations
have disrupted Communist lines of communication and
supply channels, and have forced them to relinquish
certain areas at least temporarily. But in spite of
such setbacks plus the heavy casualties suffered by the
enemy, the over-all Communist threat to the III Corps
area remains essentially undiminished.
3. South Vietnamese forces in III Corps--reportedly
comprising the worst combat units in the Vietnamese Army
(ARVN)-.-are very much involved in RD, with 17 of the 34
battalions in the corps committed to the direct support
of RD. At least seven of these battalions are under the
operational control of various province chiefs, while
the remaining battalions are operating under the con-
trol of their parent unit commanders.
4. Lack of RD Progress in III Corps can perhaps
be partially attributed to poor leadership by the RD
councils of the ARVN 18th (previously the 10th) and
25th divisions. On the other hand, the 5th Division RD
council has reportedly been doing an excellent job.
Paralleling the initiatives taken by the 22nd Division
in Binh Dinh Province of II Corps, the 5th is selecting
suitable ARVN soldiers to be utilized as ad hoc develop-
ment teams in hamlets that are not scheduled to be
worked under the 1967 RD program but nevertheless afford
a fertile development ground.
5. Several months ago, the III Corps commander
issued a directive that placed the RD teams under the
operational control of district chiefs and limited the
role of local RD councils to administrative and logis-
tical support. This move was heartily endorsed by ad-
visory personnel who apparently have been seeking ways
to by-pass what have been--except in Binh Long and Long
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An provinces--ineffective provincial and district RD
councils. Apparently, however, the district chiefs
have only recently been informed through their own
channels of authority that they are, in fact, now
operationally responsible for the teams.
6. As of 1 May, III Corps had 62 RD teams, 14
Truong Son teams, and 965 hamlet Static Census Griev-
ance Cadres (SCG) in the field. The average strength
of the RD teams as of 1 May was 43 whereas the Truong
Son teams had an average strength of 42. The total
strength of RD workers in the corps was 4,784, with
approximately 1,000 more in training at Vung Tau.
7. Only one province in III Corps--Tay Ninh--
has reported that it is ahead of its 1967 RD schedule.
The program in Tay Ninh has received good support from
provincial officials, and the 2,100-man Philippine
Civic Action Group had aided immeasurably. US officials,
however, do not feel that provincewide there has been
any improvement in security thus far this year.
8. Three provinces--Long An, Long Khanh, and Phuoc
Long--have reported their RD programs on schedule. In
Long Khanh, however, the lack of security, the miscon-
duct of ARVN forces, the ability of Communist forces to
come and go at will in several hamlets where RD teams
are operating, and local public contempt for government
leadership--due to the apparently high degree of cor-
ruption and graft--indicate that much of the RD effort
in Long Khanh may only be a "paper exercise."
9. In Long An Province, in spite of a continued
high level of enemy-initiated activity, and a generally
unimproved security situation, there have been positive
accomblishments by the RD and SCG teams
A-L---
though coordination between province agen-
cies leaves something to be desired, the RD program
receives support from most of the provincial officials.
10. In spite of the Communist domination of Phuoc
Long Province--the government controls only 41 of 90
hamlets and there are, practically speaking, no secure
roads--the somewhat limited RD effort is on schedule
and the RD and Truong Son teams are performing satis-
factorily. Public attitudes toward RD and the govern-
ment are favorable although there has been little
interest in the recent village/hamlet elections.
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11, Bien Hoa Province is apparently the only
province in'III Corps where the security situation
is noticeably deteriorating. Failure, like success,
has a snowballing effect: the RD council has per-
formed unsatisfactorily, the teams are reportedly not
properly deployed, the SCG have devoted themselves
to collecting tactical intelligence rather than socio-
political intelligence, and there is inadequate coor-
dination between all efforts in the RD programs.
ficials show neither interest in nor understanding of
the role of the RD teams. Moreover, the residents of
the province apparently do not respond to RD per se
but only to projects that are designed for their eco-
nomic betterment.
13. Ithe basic security
balance also remains unchanged in Binh Duong Province.
The general attitude of the people of Binh Duong toward
RD is one of apathy, and this is reflected in the chronic
difficulties experienced in getting them to contribute
labor to projects for which they have requested and re-
ceived materials. The morale of the RD teams in Binh
Duong has not been good, but'provincial officials--
who give good support to RD--have made or proposed
changes in RD team leadership to alleviate this problem.
14. Binh Long Province is apparently the only
really "bright spot" in III Corps. Primarily as a re-
sult of the increased operational presence of US troops,
over-all security in Binh Long has improved and pro-
vincial-officials have been quick to implement the RD
program. Morale in the heavily populated areas of the
province appears to be excellent and the people seem
to be showing more than average responsiveness to the
government. The opening of Route 13 in Binh Long has
alleviated some of the past economic hardships, and
this has no doubt contributed to the populace's good
morale. The RD and Truong Son teams in Binh Long are
performing adequately, although
the Truong Son teams would perform even better with
more logistic and advisory support.
he provincial of--
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15. In Gia Dinh Province, inadequate coordination
continues between the various segments of the RD program,
and official inertia and misuse of the RD teams persists,
despite the efforts of advisers to bring:about change.
Despite, or perhaps because of, Gia Dinh's proximity to
Saigon, government leadership in the province is poor
and the local populace is about the most indifferent in
all of III Corps to the political and military situation.
The Communists reportedly can enter 65 percent of the
hamlets in the province with comparative impunity even
though several long-term US/ARVN security operations
are under way.
16. In Hau Nghia Province, Communist influence
has traditionally been strong, and rapport between US
and ARVN forces has lagged. The 1967 RD program is
at least two months behind schedule, although officials
feel that 75 percent of the RD program can still be
accomplished.
17. Due to the conflicting attitudes among the
residents of Phuoc Tuy Province and to a lac1 of in-
formation on allied and government activities, a mean-
ingful assessment of RD progress is difficult. Local
security has apparently improved over the last year,
but unsatisfactory RD progress as well as misuse of
the RD teams has been reported. Phuoc Tuy is the only
province in III Corps to make an unfavorable report on
the SCG cadres, whose performance elsewhere in the
country has been one of the most outstanding and suc-
cessful areas of the RD program.
18. In the Vung Tau Autonomous Area, the RD
effort has suffered from the inertia of local officials
and the improper employment of the understrength RD
teams, The SCG cadre, however, have had a "highly
favorable" impact in the area. Security is primarily
the responsibility of the National Police and the
Popular Forces, who apparently have responded satis-
factorily to the task.
19. US officials have indicated that in spite
of apathetic provincial officials in Binh Tuy Province,
the RD teams there are performing adequately. The only
other RD program in Binh Tuy about which information
is. available is civic action, in which one ARVN bat-
talion and the local forces have performed satisfactorily,
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Other Revolutionary Development Activities
20. In an effort to deny the growing Communist
force in Lam Dong Province access to the rural populace,
two Truong Son teams are helping 572 residents of a
montagnard settlement to move to a more secure area.
The new province chief--who has earned a measure of
respect by staying aloof from the alleged corruption
of other provincial officials--is trying to resettle
the people in a model hamlet and to demonstrate to
other montagnards in the province that the govern-
ment can and will take care of them. In addition to
using the Truong Son teams, the province chief is
encouraging civil servants in the province to help
by donating time to the relocation project.
21. In Tay Ninh Province, the first New Life
Hamlet farmer' association has been established
through an RD teams efforts. The team encouraged
and helped the farmers to set up the organization and
to conduct an election of three officers to head the
128-member association. The association's first
project has been to lend water pumps and sprayers--
supplied by the provincial agriculture service--to its
members.
22. In Kien Hoa Province, RD teams have been
working in an area of Giong Trom District, adjacent
to the province capital. The population in this area
has grown over the last several months from 300 to
1,900 people, the majority of whom reportedly moved
from areas of the province that are in Communist con-
trol. Most of the people have settled on government-
owned land that has either been loaned to them for
their use or else has been rented to them for a nominal
sum.
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"New Life Development" Activities
24. Urban Development: According to a survey
conducted By JUMZ-,-TWe-people of Saigon continue to
have negative attitudes toward the municipal govern-
ment and the services provided by it. Over the past
several years, municipal services have been overbur-
dened by the growing population and, because of the
low salaries offered, the city has been unable to hire
the needed additional personnel.
25. The Saigon city council recently approved
its first self-help program, providing 25 million
piasters for approximately 300 planned projects that
were submitted by the municipal district chiefs after
consultations with their constituents. In certain
.areas of Saigon--such as District 6--the residents
have shown a good deal of civic cohesiveness. In the
6th District, the residents elected a flood relief
committee preparatory to the oncoming rainy season,
which always causes serious flood, conditions in their
area.
26. 'In Qui Nhon city, Binh Dinh Province, con-
struction of streets, sidewalks, drains, and related
public facilities is under way. Residents of the city--
which is subdivided into 15 hamlets and has a total
population of approximately 120,000--have established
voluntary associations to clean up the beach area,
reduce juvenile delinquency,and conduct sanitary in-
spections of restaurants and bars. Civic action by
military units--particularly US units--is being co-
ordinated by the USAID municipal adviser and integrated
into town planning.
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27. Rural Reconstruction, US advisory efforts
have apparently prevented he Special Commission for
Administration (SCA)--a subordinate of the Ministry
of Revolutionary Development (MORD)--from implementing
a rather ineffective plan to provide weapons to village
and hamlet officials. The SCA, through MORD, had re-
quested weapons and ammunition for elected or appointed
village and hamlet officials other than members of the
village councils. Weapons instruction was to be in-
cluded in the training courses that the SCA is to
conduct in June and July for the village and hamlet
officials, and the weapons were to have been distributed
in August.
28. Under the SCA plan, 5,600 Smith and Wesson
.38 caliber revolvers would have been issued to the of-
ficials and 12 shotguns would have been issued to each
village that conducted an election in the period 2 to
30 April. Apparently the SCA made no provision for
consideration of the local security situation--in many
secure villages the weapons are not necessary and in
others a dozen shotguns and a few pistols would be
inadequate. Moreover, the SCA did not take into con-
sideration what other government forces were in the
village area to augment the light defensive capability
that these weapons could provide. US officials were
also concerned that many of the weapons would find
their way into the hands of Communist forces.
29. The security of the village/hamlet officials
after the election has now been made the firm respon-
sibility of the National Police, and they are apparently
working on an integrated security plan.
30. After initial reports of difficulties in
recruiting personnel to be sent to the Philippines for
community development training, MORD has apparently suc-
ceeded in filling its quota. Ten participants from MORD
and five from the Ministry of Youth--another subor-
dinate agency of the MORD--have been processed for the
course, which should begin in late May or early June.
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31. Refugees: The Special Commission for Refugees
(SCR) has reached an agreement with the Catholic Relief
Service whereby the latter will provide 15 teams to
work in refugee centers. Each team will be composed of
five specialists--a nurse, a child welfare worker, a
community development worker, and two additional speci-
alists as required. Funding will be jointly provided
by USAID and the Catholic Refugee Service.
32. Dr. Que, the chief of the SCR, and Colonel
Pham Anh, under secretary of state for information and
Chieu Hoi recently concluded an agreement whereby 32
Hoi Chanh will participate in Refugee Mobile Team
programs. This is another significant step forward in
utilization of the Hoi Chanh by the government. Prior
to joining the mobile teams, the new recruits will
receive training at a center operated by the Community
Development Foundation for the SCR.
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III. ECONOMIC SITUATION
During the week ending 15 May the
weekly retail price index for Saigon rose
to its highest level since 13 March. Cur-
rency'and gold prices declined on 15 May
after having risen on 8 May for the first
time in many weeks. Premier Ky has an-
nounced a monthly cash bonus and rice-pur-
chasing plan for all government employees
and servicemen. The new joint US-GVN eco-
nomic committee established by Governor
Hanh on 4 April reportedly is off to a
promising start.
1. During the week ending 15 May the USAID
weekly retail price index for Saigon rose by two
percent to its highest level since 13 March. The
increase resulted largely from higher prices for
fish, chicken, and some vegetables. Most rice
prices also rose, but the price of the type of rice
used in calculating the index was unchanged from
8 May at 27 piasters per kilogram. This price is
ten piasters higher than the price at the beginning
of the year. The embassy feels that the rising
price of domestic rice during recent weeks may re-
sult from the fact that imported rice is not reach-
ing the market in sufficient quantities although
stocks are adequate. Prices of some nonfood items
such as charcoal, firewood, and laundry soap in-
creased, while the price of cloth declined slightly.
(A table of weekly prices in Saigon is included in
the Annex.)
2. Wholesale prices of certain US-financed
imported commodities generally edged downward dur-
ing the week ending 16 May. The over-all index
was unchanged from the previous week, however, as
the price of cement rose slightly for the first
time since 4 April.
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Currency and Gold
3. Currency and gold prices declined on 15 May
after having risen on 8 May for the first time in
many weeks. The price of dollars fell to 152 pias-
ters per dollar, or five piasters below the previous
week. The price of gold fell by eight piasters to
200 piasters per dollar. The rate for MPC (scrip)
fell by four piasters to 108 piasters per dollar,
or ten piasters below the official rate. None of
the rates, however, declined to the level reached
on 2 May. (A graph on monthly and weekly currency
and gold rates is included in the Annex.)
"Rice Bonus" for GVN Employees
4. On 17 May, Premier Ky announced a cash bonus
and rice-purchasing plan for all government employ-
ees and servicemen to become effective 1 June. This
plan is a modification of the cash "rice bonus" re-
ported earlier. Each civil servant and serviceman
will receive 200 piasters per month regardless of
position or rank. Civil servants and regular mili-
tary forces, who now receive a family allowance,
will also receive 200 piasters per month for each
of their dependents. The bonus will also be granted
to ex-servicemen, widows and orphans of men killed
while in the armed forces, RD cadre, retired civil
servants, and all local officials. In addition, the
GVN will undertake to make 12 kilograms of imported
rice per month available to all of these groups
through selected retail outlets at a price of 16
piasters per kilogram. Until now the GVN has been
subsidizing the sale of rice in special commissaries
to military personnel at 8 piasters per kilogram
and to civil servants at 11 piasters, while imported
US rice is sold to all purchasers in the retail
market at 16 piasters per kilogram, still about one
third below the actual cost. Even with the increase
in the price of rice to GVN employees, the bonus
will result in fairly sizable net wage increases,
especially for those in the lower income classes
and those with large families. The combined effect
of the bonus and the rice plan is to make the en-
tire amount of salary prior to the increase avail-
able for expenditures other than rice.
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5. Ky also announced a US grant of $42 million,
or about five billion piasters, to the Vietnamese
military supply service for purchasing foodstuffs
for resale at low prices to families of soldiers. The
US will stipulate, however that no rice be purchased
with this grant and that, in view of the bonus, all
rice sold in commissaries be sold at the prevailing
market price.
6. The GVN calculates that the total of em-
ployees plus qualified dependents who will receive
the cash bonus is roughly three million, resulting
in a yearly cost of 7.2 billion piasters. The
embassy believes, however, that the number of re-
cipients may be underestimated. By raising the
price of imported rice to GVN employees, however,
the government subsidy on rice imports will be re-
duced. The net effect of the bonus on GVN spending
will thus be somewhat less than the actual cost of
the bonus, but embassy officials are not now able
to fix this amount or the total impact on purchasing
power. Any increase in the GVN budget adds to in-
flationary pressures, but GVN officials apparently
felt that some form of wage increase for government
employees was necessary in order to improve their
morale as well as their real income position rela-
tive to that of employees in the private sector of
the economy. Undoubtedly, the coming presidential
election provided an additional motive, and the US
is concerned that Ky's speech marks the beginning
of piaster spending as part of his election strategy.
Joint Economic Committee
7. The new joint US-GVN economic committee
established by Governor Hanh on 4 April reportedly
is off to a promising start. Hanh is the presiding
officer and USAID Director MacDonald acts as chief
US representative. The work of the committee is
carried out by ten joint subcommittees, chaired by
Vietnamese, covering various problem areas in the
economy. US officials cite four factors as the
basis for their initial favorable evaluation:
1) the committee has forced the two governments to
arrange staff coordination on major problems at
lower levels than had formerly been the case; 2) it
has forced systematic treatment of problems that
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N%WV SECRET
too often in the past were handled in piecemeal
fashion; 3) it has put considerable pressure on
GVN officials to perform and to exert leadership;
and 4) it has successfully solved certain policy
and operational problems.
8. Performance of the subcommittees has been
uneven, with most activity and initiative coming
from the subcommittees on security stocks and on
rice and pork. Both of these are chaired by Pham
Kim Ngoc, who came into office with Hanh as his
deputy. Subcommittees responsible for public de-
velopment projects, fiscal reforms and customs,
and ports have not yet met. The performance of
the agriculture subcommittee under Secretary of
Agriculture Tri has been disappointing since Tri
has shown little interest in pushing for action
programs.
9. The complex committee structure with sub-
committees and working groups within subcommittees
reflects the fact that US economic relations with
the GVN touch a great number of areas. US offi-
cials hope that at some later date the organization
can be simplified. The US would like to see the
subcommittees gain enough stature so that by this
fall when an elected government comes into being
the joint economic committee will be an accepted
institution recognized as promoting the development
of sound economic policy for South Vietnam.
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 Approved For Release 2007/08/29: CIA-RDP79T00826AO02000010060-7
Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon
13 June
1966 J
16 Aug.
1966 /
24 Apr.
1967
2 May
1967
8 May
1967
15 May
1967
Index for All Items
173
211
254
260
260
266
Index for Food Items
190
216
282
289
289
298
Of Which :
(In Piasters)
Rice-Soc Nau (100 kg.)
1,250
1,450
2,550
2,600
2,700
2,700
Pork Bellies (1 kg.)
90
100
150
150
130
130
Fish-Ca Tre (1 kg.)
130
170
150
150
_50
170
Nuoc Mam (jar)
70
85
150
150
150
150
Index for Nonfood Items
140
190
202
206
207
208 /
Of Which:
(In Piasters)
Charcoal (6o kg.)
46o
600
64o
650
660
670
Cigarettes (pack)
10
14
14
14
14
1%
White Calico (meter)
27
37
31
31
31
3C'
Electricity (kwh)
4.2
N.A.
5.2
5.2
5.2
a. Data are from USAID sources. For all indexes 1 January 1965 = 100-
b. Price levels just prior to and two months after the 18 June devaluation.
c. Preliminary.
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1%wi *40W
Saigon Cost of Living Index *
(For Working Class Family)
South Vietnam Money Supply
South Vietnam Foreign Exchange Reserves
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Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
R
30 APRIL
15M
201
2
157
15
1966
GOLD: Basis gold leaf worth $35 per troy ounce
US $10 GREEN
US $10 MPC Military Payment Certificates (scrip).
MAR APR MAY
E 96'7
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 Approved For Release 2007/08/29: CIA-RDP79T00826AO02000010060-7
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/08/29: CIA-RDP79T00826AO02000010060-7