SPECIAL ASSESSMENT ON VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010054-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: May 24, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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SUBJECT Special Assessment on Vietnam
A,draft Special Assessment on Vietnam, which I saw briefly,
made the following points:
1. The allies are making progress, especially against
larger units, but "formidable obstacles" are in the way of
further progress.
2. North Vietnam has the capacity to continue fighting
for a long time.
3. War in the South:
a. US has achieved "statistically impressive
.results" in men killed and stores destroyed, and
has seriously damaged the Headquarters and logisti-
cal structure of the VC, especially Corps Areas 2
and 3. Desertions were up to 20,242 in 1966, but:
b. These results may be misleading. North
Vietnam claims the US has touched only a fraction
of their supplies in Tay Ninh; a large part of the
military defectors in 1966 were local force guer-
rillas; the VC seem able to maintain the strength
of their main force units.
c. The main threat to the allies is that
posed by the four, possibly five, Nor h Vietnamese
divisions in the south and the DMZ.
4. Pacification:
a. Progress Is "appallingly slow"; efforts to
restore government administrative contrdl are encoun-
tering "great difficulties"; and
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b. South Vietnamese troops are unable to pro-
tect the Revolutionary'Development Teams.
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a. The chief allied objective is to make the
war seem unprofitable to North Vietnam.
b. Though the effectiveness of the bombing
cannot be quantified, it has slowed the movement
of men and troops and has caused a large-scale
diversion of men (possibly 300,000) and materials
to repair and construction.
c. The economy has been "seriously affected,"
but morale seems to remain "very high." Indeed,
the bombing has strengthened morale and unified the
country as nothing else would have.
a. The allies probably can keep main.force
enemy units on the defensive.;
b. Increasing enemy emphasis on guerilla.
tactics is likely;
c. North Vietnam can expect only "ephemeral"
military successes in 1967;
d. There is "no sign whatever" of any North
Vietnamese interest in talks leading to a cessa-
tion of fighting; and
e. North Vietnam probably calculates the. war
can be kept at present level at least until the
November 1968 US elections.
a. In the.South, allied action has disrupted
.major North Vietnamese/VC'units and kept the rest
on the defensive;
b. VC logistics and communications have
suffered some damage;
c. Slow allied progress is likely;' and
d. North Vietnam, with Bloc aid, has the
will and the resources to continue fighting for a
long time.
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The above differs at several points with the previous
(January 27) Special Assessment on Vietnam:
1. War in the South: The earlier assessment emphasized
the "very heavy" casualties inflicted on North Vietnam and
VC main force units, while the current assessment distinguishes
the actual from the statistical results (see 3 above).
2. The North: The January assessment noted evidence of
a decline in morale associated with the bombing, but also
mentioned the possibility that will and unity would be strength-
ened by.it. In the current assessment the latter result has
hardened into an estimate. (See 5c above.)
3. Outlook: The earlier assessment said it was "reason-
able to suppose" disagreement between Hanoi's hawks and doves.
It further implied Soviet pressure pro negotiation and Chinese
pressure against; hence, it was estimated that if China seemed
about to collapse, North Vietnam might decide to negotiate.
Neither of these propositions is contained in the current esti-
mate. (See 6d above.)
In other important respects, the two assessments seem to
be reasonably close.
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