COMMUNIST POLICY AND THE NEXT PHASE IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: April 12, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A00110030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
6
TS 186015
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
12 April 1967
SUBJECT: Communist Policy and the Nb;tt Phase in Vietnam
We have been asked to estimate the likely Communist reactions
to various US courses of action over the next several months.
These are dealt with in Section II. But since these reactions
will necessarily be based on the Communists' view of the current
situation and the state of the war, we have discussed this
topic in Section I.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Dowxgredg and
Declassification
?v10..I/CDF F'~ 1 } ~:
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
I
T-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T
I. COMMUNIST VLIS OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION
1. Hanoi's release on 21 March of private correspondence
between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh apparently marked the
end of a period of diplomatic probing that began last fall. This
unusual act has been accompanied by other signs that North Vietnam's
position is hardening. Communist forces have become more aggressive
in recent weeks; there are indications that, after a lull, infil-
tration may be picking up. Hanoi may also be reinforcing the
DMZ area. Some new weapons have been introduced in South Vietnam.
In short, recent North Vietnamese actions seem to assume a further
period of heightened military effort, and probably also further
American escalation.
2. Recently captured documents throw some light on hour the
North Vietnamese probably view their general position and the
course of future development. Almost a year ago, General Vinh,
the Deputy Commander of Communist forces in South Vietnam, out-
lined three phases of future development: (a) fighting, (b)
fighting while negotiating, and (c) negotiating and signing of an
agreement. It is possible that the first phase lasted through the
offensive in the DMZ last summer. Subsequently, heavy infiltration
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A00110030030-4
slackened and more emphasis was placed on improving guerrilla capa-
bilities. It was during; this period that certain hints were dropped
about the possibility of negotiations. By the end of Tet, however,
it was apparently concluded to Hanoi that no political concessions
were in sight, and that another round of righting was called for.
3. If this interpretation is correct, then Hanoi probably
has not yet seen any need to moderate its main objectives, but does
intend topursue more varied and flexible tactics. The present
shift toward heavier combat and reinforcements in the South would
be viewed as necessary to condition the enemy to take a more forth-
coming approach to negotiations on the next occasion. Hanoi would,
as the Vinh document indicated, still reject the extreme Chinese
view of fighting "seven years", until China was prepared to join
in an "all-out, borderless war." At the same time, it would not
yet be prepared to accept what the document alleged to be the
x General Vinh asserted: "Fighting continues until the emergence
of a situation where both sides are fighting indecisively.,.
A situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted
simultaneously will unmistakably emerge."
 Approved For Releaa2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
Soviet/East European appreacrh: to negotiate an immediate end to
the war and work for power by essentially political tactics after
a US withdrawal.
4+. The Military Situation. Amon;; the many elements in-
fluencing Hanoi's outlook, the military situation in the South is
probably still the prime factor. It seems fairly certain that
Hanoi concluded some time ago that a purely military solution
was impossible. The result, however, seems to have been a grouting
uncertainty and confusion over proper tactics in the military
effort. On the one hand, some North Vietnamese leaders seem to
regard guerrilla activities and the war of attrition as the basic
line to follow. On the other hand, there appears to be an obsession
to win a "decisive" battle that would suddenly alter the entire
relationship of political and military forces. Of course, these
two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and in recent weeks
there seems to have been a compromise of sorts which emphasizes an
across the board military effort.
5. The major current question is whether the North Vietnamese
appreciate the realities of the military scene. Does the current
intensification of combat mean a last, desperate effort to in-
flict a major defeat on the US, or is it one more campaign in the
- 3 -
 Approved For Rele02006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A00* 0030030-4
T-O-P S E-C-R-E-T
protracted war of attrition? The evidence suggests that the latter
is the more likely, Even so, this is a course of considerable
risk. Throughout the past year, the Communist forces have suffered
heavy losses, recruitment in South Vietnam has been increasingly
difficult, and there have been accumulating signs of deterioration
and lowered morale in the VC military-political apparatus. It may
be that the top command in Hanoi is to some extent deluded with
respect to the progress achieved thus far in the war of attrition;
captured documents suggest that Communist field commanders are
reporting far greater US and ARVN casualties than they are in fact
inflicting. Thus, the Hanoi war planners may over-estimate their
prospects.
6, The Attitudes of Peking and Moscow.. The events of the
last few months, including the upheaval in China, have driven
Moscow and Peking even farther apart on all issues and on Vietnam
in particular. Even if new arrangements to expedite Soviet supplies
through China have been made Hanoi must remain concerned about how
the state of Sino-Soviet relations may affect the war effort.
7, The Chinese for their part seem far from reassured that
Hanoi can be trusted to fight indefinitely. This suspicion is
reflected in Chinese handling of the diplomatic maneuvering of
 Approved For Release2 06/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
the past several months. The Chinese have ignored statements
from Hanoi which set forth the latter's terms for beginning
discussions with the US. Moreover, at the conclusion of a high
level North Vietnamese visit to Peking (11-151 February), the
Chinese publicly denounced the idea of starting negotiations
with the US if bombing ceased, even though this very formula
had just been reconfirmed in the Ho Chi Minh letter.
3. The net result of this exchange has been to introduce
another abrasive into Sino-Vietnamese relations. China is intent
on persuading Hanoi that a long war of attrition will end with
complete victory. And to this end new pledges of assistance
and possibly some aid agreements have been made. Yet the Chinese
public commitment has been hedged somewhat. Hostility to any form
of united action with the USSR in Vietnam is as strong as ever.
And the entire course of the cultural revolution thus far points
The latest pledge is to "fight shoulder to shoulder with the
Vietnamese people and completely wipe out the US aggressors
as soon as the situation requires, the Vietnamese people
require, and Chairman Mao, our great supreme conmiander, gives
the order."
T-O.-P S-E-C-R-E-T
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
0
to an increasingly Sino-centric outlook and to possible long-
term political instability, which also must be a source of con-
tinuing concern in Hanoi.
9. The suggestion of a move toward negotiation by Hanoi
contained in the Burchett-Trish interview led, on the occasion
of Kosygin's February visit to London, to a flurry of Soviet
diplomacy. After many months of flat refusal to engage in mediating
activity, Kosygin pressed the British to use their influence in
Washington to get a response to Hanoi's move. There is no evi-
dence that Moscow was at the same time pressin Hanoi to offer
anything in response to the US demand that cessation of the bombing
must have a meaningful quid pro quo. So far as is kuaown, Kosygin
stayed within the letter of the brief which the Burchett-Trinh
interviews provided: the possibility of talks if the bombing
ceased.
10. Hanoi, however, ignored the Kosygin-Wilson byplay;
after the Soviet Premier departed, Hanoi viciously denounced
Wilson. Subsequent speeches by Kosygin seemed to indicate an
effort to fall in line with Hanoi's position. At the same time,
the Soviets have been at pains to indicate that despite the pub-
lication of the Johnson-Ho letters, Hanoi's position for negotiations
has been consistent and does not constitute a total rebuff to the US.
- 6 ..
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
11. The Soviets probably concluded from the February
episode that no mediating; initiative by there would be effective
at the present stage. All signs continue to indicate that their
influence on Hanoi is limited, and that they are unwilling to risk
applying real pressure in an attempt to move Hanoi toward nego-
tiations. For the present, new appeals to the Soviets to be helpful
in getting talks started would probably bring only stonewalling
responses that the boribin must stop first.
12. In a larger content, the Soviets are probably of two
minds about the situation in Vietnam. They must see it as
extremely advantageous to them in many ways. It diverts most US
political and strategic attention away from areas of primary
interest to the USSR, and it employs a substantial proportion of
US military forces-in-being. Furthermore, the war has alienated
many US allies and associates, and it is a divisive factor within
the US itself. On the other hand, the conflict holds embarrassing
and potentially dangerous aspects for Moscow. The bombing of
North Vietnam constitutes a continuing reproach to the Soviet
Union, unable as it is to protect its small ally. There is the
prospect that the US may undertake new courses of action which
would pose more direct and ,:.;elicit challenges to the USSR.
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
There is the chance that it could expand into a larger struggle,
involving China directly and placing the USSR in a grave dilemma.
In short, there must be many excellent reasons why the Soviet
leaders would like to see the war come to an end, and many very
good reasons why they would like to see it continue, as long as
it does not get much worse.
13. In this situation the broad courses of action open to
the Soviets are all unpromising and some are dangerous. If they
attempt to force Hanoi into negotiations -- e.g., by threatening
to stop supplies -- they may fail, for Hanoi can fight on if it
wishes, without Soviet aid. Such a failure would effectively
end all Soviet influence in Hanoi, throw North Vietnam entirely
back on China, and diminish Soviet prestige in the Communist world
as well as in many "uncornnitted" countries. The same calamities
'could follow if Moscow simply withdrew its support of Hanoi in
order to escape the risks of deeper involvement. On the other
hand, Moscow cannot undertake any serious military participation
in the conflict, with its own combat forces, without becoming in-
volved in a most disadvantageous location, far from the sources
of Soviet power, and at the end of lines of communication passing
through the dubiously friendly territory of China, Finally, if
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
S
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Moscow tried to influence the US by heavy pressures elsewhere in
the world -- Berlin, for example, or the Middle East -- it would
risk provoking a partial US mobilization and a major international
crisis. We see no indication that W scotr'believes its interests
in Vietnam to be great enough to justify such a risky confrontation.
14. Considering everythin>, then, it seems to us that the
Soviets see no feasible alternative but to follow their present
policy of continuing the current level of support to Hanoi,
while avoiding any great pressure on either North Vietnam or on
the US to end the war. The Soviet leaders probably hope that the
conflict will indeed come to an end without any further substantial
escalation. If they could only be sure that there would be no
such escalation they would probably be content to have the
struggle continue indefinitely. It remains to consider their
probable reactions to the postulated courses of US action, which
in themselves represent a further escalation.
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
II. REACTI01'E TO ESCALATION
COURSE A - ASSUNF2IOI5: A substantial increase in the scope
and intensity of attacks on military., industrial, and trans-
portation targets. Current restrictions on operations near
the Chinese border and on attacks on population centers as
such remain in effect. Mining of harbors and bombing the
dike system or airfields are excluded. We also assume that
the war in South Vietnam becomes more intense.
15. The Economic Consequences. A successful bombing attack
against modern industry and an intensive effort to interdict the
land transport system would create serious problems for the North
Vietnamese. During the short-run adjustment period the disruption
of internal distribution systems might be severe. The flow of
essential military and economic goods to North Vietnam, however,
could almost ceitainl;,r be sustained, as could the onward movement
of supplies to Laos and South Vietnam. Over a longer period, the
cumulative effects of the bombing on morale and distribution
could increase, but we cannot say at what point they might be-
come significant factors affecting the regime's policies.
1G. The major effect of industrial destruction would be to
increase annual import requirements from the present level of
about 4100 tons per day to about 5500 tons. There are several a s
the North Vietnamese could make up the increased requirements:
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A00110030030-4
by land transport, by sea imports, or by some combination.
During 1966 about 1200 tons per day were imported by rail. If
the requirements resulting from the destruction of industry were
added to the present burden on the rail lines, the new level
would be less than 2600 tons per day. This is still well under
the capacity of the lines, at present levels of moderate inter-
diction, which we estimate at 3600 tons per day.
17. If, however, the bombing of the LOCs were successful
in greatly reducing the capacity of the rail lines, then the port
facilities at Haiphong would have to handle not only the increased
requirements generated by the bombing but some of the imports
currently brought in by rail. Haiphong is theoretically capable
of handling the entire increase resulting from the destruction
of industry. This would raise total daily tonnages to about
4200 compared with the current level of over 2800 tons. In this
situation, however, Haiphong could only assume about 25 percent
of the tonnages currently moved by rail, even by operating the
port facilities at their theoretical capacity of 4500 tons a day.
Maintaining the port's activity at this level would be a highly
difficult and confused operation.
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
0 0
15. Thus, the port of Haiphong, could not assume North
Vietnam's entire inipoi L burden. The remainin; imports, par-
ticularly those military supplies normally moved by land transport,
could be transported by truck and by rail shuttle service in spite
of the increased attacks on highways and railroads.
19. North Vietnam. In these circumstances, we would not
expect to see radically different moves from Hanoi. Ho's re-
jection of reciprocal actions was taken in full recognition of the
likelihood that it would be followed by stepped-up US air attacks'
on North Vietnam. Indeed, Hanoi's strate; y of prolonginE; the war
implies acceptance of further substantial US escalation and a
willingness to escalate its own effort in the South.
20. Hanoi's aim would be to further reinforce its defenses
and its capabilities for keeping essential supplies flowing into
the North and to the South. To this and, Hanoi would seek
additional military and economic assistance from both China and
the USSR. In fact, many of the measures that might offset the
effects of intensified bombing have already occurred or are in
process. Further Chinese assistance was apparently one of the
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
0
purposes of the high level meeting in Peking in February, and new
Chinese contingents of AAA troops were on the way even prior to
these talks. An expanded bombing pro3ram might require an
additional 50,000 - 65,000 men for repair and maintenance and the
Chinese might supply some portion of them.
21. The level of Soviet shipping to Worth Vietnam has risen
in recent months. Some airfields in the DRV have been improved.
Some new deployments of the SAM system have been noted in the
southern part of the DRV. Strengthening of coastal defenses
is underway, and this could include the deployment of a coastal
defense missile with a range of 25-50 n.m. and a 2,200 pound
warhead.
22. To support the war in the South, a record level of
supplies apparently is being put through the infiltration corridors.
Some medium artillery has apparently been moved down to the DIM
area. There are continuing indications of a further movement of
regiments or divisions into this area and into the northern pro-
vinces of South Vietnam. A new rocket launcher has appeared in
South Vietnam. Recent tactics of the Communist forces su est
that heavier mortars or artillery may be deployed with the main
force units.
-13-
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
 Approved For 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001~0030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
23. As a more demonstrative retaliation to the intensified
US bombing, Hanoi might consider air or naval attacks on US
carriers., an air attack on South Vietnam, an intensification of
the Communist military action against government forces in Laos.
We think these are unlikely because the anticipated gains would
appear to be marginal and the probable US reactions could be very
damaging.
24+. China. Peking would surely be willing to increase its
support of North Vietnam in both men and material, though we have
no way of knowing what ceiling if any the Vietnamese might fix
on the size of Chinese manpower support. Presumably the Viet-
namese would want more AAA and engineer units as the bombing of
LOCs is stepped up. If Hanoi and Peking believed that a US
invasion had become more likely, they might consider introducing
some Chinese combat troops. Some construction activity in North
Vietnam and other intelligence suggests contingency planning for
a larger Chinese role, but the evidence is not conclusive. In
any case, the size and composition of Chinese forces in North
Vietnam is likely to be determined by Hanoi's general policy,
rather than its specific reaction to a given level of bombing.
- lk -
 100030030-4
Approved For Release02006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A0010
25. The USSR. The Soviets would also increase their aid to
Hanoi in response to the increased US bombing. Among other reasons,
they would not wish to appear laggard at a time when further
Chinese aid was forthcoming. There are a number of weapons the
USSR could provide which would materially help the Vietnamese
without greatly increasing the direct risks to the USSR. If
the Soviets anticipated a US naval blockade, mining, or new
troubles in China, they might provide some of these weapons quite
promptly and try to build up a stockpile of weapons already in
use.
26. Without offering a complete list, we note below
certain sorts of weapons or equipment that Moscow might furnish:
A. Air Defense
1. An SA-2 of improved effectiveness, such as is
currently used in Soviet forces but not yet
provided to North Vietnam.
2. A mobile SAM (the Ganef), with a minimum effective
altitude of 1000 feet compared to an estimated 3000
feet for the SA-2s now in North Vietnam. (This system
may not yet have been distributed to Soviet forces,
however.)
- 15 -
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
 Approved For Releas 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A0010030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
3. The ZSC-23-4, a self-propelled 23mm AAA gun, with
a rate of fire 2-4 times that of guns in North
Vietnam.
4. The Yak-28, a fighter aircraft with greater intercept
range and low altitude attack capability in all
weather conditions than the MTG-21D, the best fighter
now in North Vietnamese hands.
B. Ground Weapons
Antitank missiles, antitank artillery, heavier
conventional artillery (100 mm and 122 mm howitzer,
heavier mortars, some chemical munitions). Some of
these could be used in South Vietnam as well.
C. Coastal Defense
1. Coastal defense missiles.
2. KOMAR guided missile patrol boats, carrying an
armament of two 20 n.m. surface-to-surface missiles.
Several of these weapons could not be used by Vietnamese without
extensive training, but some might be operated by Soviet personnel.
- 16
 Approved For Rele.2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A0000030030-4
T"0-P S-E-C -R-E-T
27. Surmary. We would not anticipate great change in the
policies and reactions of the Communist powers in response to a
Course A bombing program, beyond the furnishing of some new
equipment and manpower. Defending North Vietnam and maintaining
the war effort in the South would continue to be the principal
concerns. As long as these two objectives seemed to be met, resort
to more drastic measures or supply of radically different types of
equipment would not seem likely. At the same time, this course
would probably not bring about negotiations, unless there were
some developments in the war in South Vietnam which Hanoi judged
made negotiations seem expedient or precipitated a favorable
moment for talks.
 Approved For Releas 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001 10030030-4
COURSE B - ASSU}4PT CtS: Course A, plus the mining of North
Vietnam ports.
28. This action would threaten Hanoi's ability to support
the war and maintain its own internal situation, thus perhaps
forcing a new decision about the nature and extent of outside
assistance. It would also directly test the extent of Soviet
willingness to support Hanoi. Finally, it could put China in
a commanding political position, since it would have control over
the only remaining supply lines to North Vietnam.
29. The USSR. An effective mining operation would place
Moscow in a particularly galling dilemma. The Soviets would not
wash to accept the humiliation or the political disadvantages of
stopping seaborne shipments to North Vietnam. Yet it would take
a major military effort to reopen the shipping routes; they would
at a minimum, have to bring in minesweepers, other naval ships
for protection, probably. some air cover from North Vietnam, and
be prepared to risk having some ships sunk. This would be a
hazardous venture, since the US could continue to sow mines by
air and the Soviets could not prevent it unless they were prepared
to begin a major naval and air war in an area where they would be
at a great disadvantage. We think they would recognize the problems
and dangers and would avoid such a course.
18
 Approved For Releas2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A00~0030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
30. In these circun.stances, the Soviets would be thrown
back on greatly increased use of Chinese transportation facilities.
This would underline the fact that continuing Soviet support of
Vietnam was dependent on Pekingts pleasure. Some supplies might
be airlifted from the USSR but the amounts delivered would
be small.
31. If transportation facilities permitted, the Soviets
might send Hanoi weapons and equipment of the sorts suggested
under Course A. In addition, the range of weapons could include
medium jet bombers, fighter bombers, short-range missiles, and,
in an extreme case, MRBMs manned by Soviet crews. Moscow might
calculate that these would pose such a threat to South Vietnam
that the US would have to consider a cease-fire or a political
bargain to halt the war. But the Soviets, in our judgment, would
be more lilcly to consider that the US would not desist merely
because of the threat posed by such weapons and that their use
would provoke even stronger US attacks.
32. The Soviets have held out the possibility of sending
volunteers to North Vietnam, and the mining program might provide
the occasion. They might, for example, send personnel to operate
- 19 -
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
 Approved For Releas~006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001 0030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Soviet furnished equipment, perhaps even some pilots to fly
combat missions. But, in general, we believe that the Soviets
would still avoid a serious confrontation with the US in South-
east Asia.
33. If the Soviets could or would do little in the immediate
area, they might consider some action in other places where the
US or its allies could be put under pressure. Greatly heightened
tensions in Korea is a possibility, though a dangerous one.
Turkey and Iran could be candidates,, or the Middle East in general.
34+. But the most likely place would be Berlin, where US
interests are directly engaged and vulnerable, and where the USSR
could be surer of controlling the action. The Soviets might put
only minor pressure on access routes, to create an impression of
impending crisis and to lead European opinion to blame the US
rather than Soviet policy for causing the trouble. We think
the Soviets would be unlikely to risk any major crisis. It
would threaten the gains Moscow is seeking at US expense in
Europe by pursuing the line of detente. The Soviets could not
be sure of how vigorously the US might respond in Berlin, nor
could they have any assurance that the US would choose to make
any concessions in Vietnam.
 Approved For Releasg2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A00W 030030-4
35. There would be a good chance that the Soviets would at
this juncture begin to exert greater efforts to bring about peace.
They would have to weigh the risks of some level of confrontation
with the US against their reluctance to put real pressure on Hanoi
for a political solution. They would almost certainly urge the
course of negotiation more vigorously than they have heretofore.
But they would probably not be willing to make Hanoi's acceptance
of talks an explicit condition of continued material support. If
negotiations did get under way, they would, of course, still bend
every effort to obtain terms which gave Hanoi some hope of
achieving its aims eventually.
36. Of one thing only can we be fairly certain: that the
USSR would respond to the mining with across the board hostility
toward the US. They would demonstrate this by interrupting any
on-going conversations, such as the discussion of A;ts , non-
proliferation and a freeze on strategic weapons. In addition
they might interfere with various exchanges, and delay ratification
or implementation of the consular treaty and air agreement.
They might even go so far as to abrogate existing agreements,
the test ban and the outer space agreements, though this seems
much less likely. Finally, the USSR would probably take the mining
issue to the where it could expect to receive considerable support.
- 21 -
 Approved For Releas 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001140030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
37. China. If the mining proved effective against Soviet
shipping, China would then be in complete control of military
and economic deliveries to North Vietnam. Peking would almost
certainly seize the opportunity to reduce Soviet political
influence in Hanoi and to discredit the USSR if the Soviets took
no military action to open the ports. But there is a limit to
how far the Chinese could go in forcing the Russians out of
Vietnam. Hanoi would almost certainly insist that priority
military items from the USSR be dispatched without interruption.
And the Chinese would probably have to do so, if they feared that
Hanoi would react by deciding to stop the war. On the other hand,
Hanoi would have to recognize that it was greatly dependent on
the political and military support of China and could not expect
to continue the war or negotiate from a strong position without
Peking.
38. it is possible that the mining of the harbors and the
anticipated effect on North Vietnam would cause the Chinese to
intervene in the war with combat troops and air power. Both
Hanoi and Peking could calculate that the US was determined to
apply military pressures until North Vietnam capitulated; they
might also conclude that this meant an eventual invasion. Under
-22-
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
? T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
?
such reasoning, the Chinese might decide that intervention at
their own choosing was preferable to waiting for a US landing
or entering the war in stages.
39. We continue to estimate that China'would probably enter
the war if North Vietnam were invaded, or if the Hanoi regime
appeared about to collapse. But it should be noted: first
that the impending collapse of the regime would be an event most
difficult to judge in advance, and second, that when and if this
moment approached, Hanoi might elect to negotiate with the US
rather than be occupied by the Chinese. In any case, we do not
believe that the bombing and mining programs would reduce North
Vietnam to so critical a state that Peking would unilaterally
decide on such a course.
40. North Vietnam. It might be that the weight of US
attacks on North Vietnam, especially if coupled with political
pressure from Moscow, would bring Hanoi to negotiate. But we
believe that the critical element in the decision of North Vietnam's
leaders would be their view of Communist prospects in the South. They
might, at this stage, still have hopes that US willingness to
continue could be 'sapped by Communist success in a few well-
publicized battles, or by a stepped-up campaign of .sabotage,
- 23 -
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
0 T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. They might consider that,
even at a substantially lower level of logistic support, Communist
forces in the South could increase their harassment of US military
installations and their attacks on US civilian personnel through-
out the country, and could disrupt such pacification efforts as
the Revolutionary Development program. Our own judgment is that
Hanoi's leaders would be likely to continue the struggle, at the
very least until they had weighed the responses, in the US and
in the world at large, to the escalation signalled by the mining.
And at this stage we do not think that they would seek a major
Chinese intervention.
24 -
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A0000030030-4
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
COURSE C: Bombing North Vietnamese Airfields
41. Attacks on the airfields could confront China with
the question of defending North Vietnam with fighters. In fact,
the question could be raised earlier, if the North Vietnamese
decided to make a heavy commitment of their fighters against the
US bombers. Whenever the issue did arise, the Chinese might
allow North Vietnamese planes and pilots to operate out of China
or might intervene with Chinese planes from Chinese bases. These
two responses seem unlikely. They would involve a high risk of
hot pursuit or direct retaliation against the Chinese bases.
An air war over South China is definitely not to Peking's advantage;
it is probable that China would not want to enter such an engage-
ment without using its main power, a ground attack. We doubt
that the air defense of Vietnam with fighters is regarded by
Peking as so vital as to start a Sino-US war.
42. We would not rule out some variations in the use of
Chinese bases and fighters, depending on the status of North
Vietnam's airfields. It might be possible to create a semi-
sanctuary by shuttling Vietnamese fighters and pilots back and
forth from China to Vietnam as the airfields were repaired. Or
- 25 -
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19: CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030030-4
9 4P
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Chinese fighters and pilots might be deployed into North Vietnam
and operate from there. The Chinese might even do this before
the fields were attacked in the hope of forestalling such an
attack. Peking might view the risks in these kinds of operations
as more acceptable.
43. In any case, we can be fairly confident in ruling out
any significant Soviet intervention in response to attacks on
the airfields. The Soviets would probably be willing to resupply
Vietnam with fighters as a gesture of support, and even offer some
pilots. But they would probably regard this as essentially futile,
once US policy had embraced attacks on all of Vietnam's military
airfields.
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
- 26 -
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
 Approved For Release 2006/09/19TG- RE7R990967A0011000300
SEN ER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICA TOP AND BOTTOM
W
I UN LASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
D/ONE 7 E 62
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks: Please note DDCI's comment:
"I think this is a fine paper - thoughtful
and lucid.
"Like all of us, though, I continue
worry the question as to what course of action
would bring Hanoi to negotiate on terms
acceptable to us.
"Is an estimate of this sort feasible
and reasonable for us to make?"
25X1
/s/ T
FOLD H
TO SENDER
FROM: NAME,
E NO.
DATE
EA/DDC
13 Apr 6
UNCLASSIFIED
ENTIAL
SECRET
 W lap
UNCLASSIFIED when blank - TOP ET when attached to Top Secret Docun* - Automatically downgraded
to SECRET when filled in form is de d from controlled document.
v_ -- CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
C
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOUR
E
TaO P $.1 -?.RC~L-':..T
..i7
sift 7.,
CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.
~q
2S 160$5
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE
32 31 196
COPY NO.
=
J I -T L F. AX T
* 1
FLOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
q
4
PRIM, To
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
?
CYO iM cs d 27 b~
Y
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will s:gn and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
r
Ap
p 1967
'`N
25X1
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
FORM 26 TOP SECRET GROUP
USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. EXCLUDED FROM A UTOMATIC
6-64
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
Annrnvarl Fnr Ralaace 2flfl6J11g11A CIA- _ _ _ __O110003OO30-4