THE NASSER- HUSSEIN 'ALLIANCE'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000800020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 23, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
The Nasser-Hussein "Alliance"
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
23 December 1968
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 24-68
SUBJECT: The Nasser-Hussein "Alliance"*
Since the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, two leaders often
seen as symbols of the radical and conservative camps in Arab
affairs, Nasser of Egypt and Hussein of Jordan, have put aside
their bng-standing hostility to enter into an alliance of con-
venience. This has been important in permitting them greater
flexibility in dealing with Israel than either would have alone,
and it strengthens each against those who would oppose any nego-
tiations. Furthermore, their cooperation serves to mute inter-
Arab tensions and promote the flow of subsidy payments from the
rich Arab nations, For Nasser, this working arrangement is a
means of sharing to some extent in the benefits of Hussein's
special standing with the West. Good relations with Nasser
help Hussein blunt challenges by radicals in the fedayeen move-
ment and in the Palestinian and Jordanian populations at large.
The alliance will remain uneasy and brittle., but it probably
will endure as long as the two principals retain power and while
circumstances persist that make cooperation serve their differing
special interests.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of the
Office of Current Intelligence and of the Clandestine
Services, who are in general agreement with its judgments.
GROUP 1
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1. For the first 15 years of Hussein's reign in Jordan,
relations between the Hashemite kingdom and the republican
regime in Egypt ranged from polite to vitriolic, with the
latter condition usually prevalent. Nasser made repeated
attempts to bring about Hussein's downfall, directly or in-
directly; anti-Nasser Arabs could almost always count on a
friendly reception in Amman. In the period immediately after
the June 1967 war, however, the two patched together a mutually
advantageous cooperative arrangement; they have since been
working together in surprising harmony. And, the seemingly
incongruous coalition of Egypt and Jordan, temporary though
it probably is, forms a radical/conservative core that lies
at the heart of current inter-Arab relations.
2. Jordan, although small and impotent by itself, has
assumed considerable importance in the Arab and Arab/Israeli
equations. The principal disputed territories involved in
any Arab/Israeli settlement -- the West Bank and Jerusalem --
lie in Hussein's bailiwick. The vast majority of Palestinian
refugees are citizens or residents of Jordan. The Palestinian
liberation groups that are the main outlet for Arab frustrations
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operate largely from Jordan; Jordan bears the brunt of Israeli
reprisals against Arab raiders and terrorists. Hussein and
the Jordanians can win sympathy and support from Western powers,
especially the United States, that the radical Arab regimes
cannot begin to match. Moreover, Hussein's fellow conservatives
in the Arab world will make some concessions to Hussein and Nasser
together that they would not make to Nasser alone.
3. Jordan has become a focus of Arab and world attention and
concern, but the center of Arab nationalism and power -- however
weakened -- still rests in Cairo. In this situation, Egyptian/
Jordanian relations have a considerable bearing on Middle Eastern
developments. The crucial nature of this relationship is apparent
to both Cairo and Amman, and Nasser and Hussein are taking great
pains to keep in step. At the Khartoum Conference in the fall
of 1967, Nasser overrode objections from the Palestinians to
insist that Hussein was at liberty to work out a unilateral deal
with Israel if he could do so within the limits of the Khartoum
resolutions.* Radio Cairo has told its correspondents that
No peace treaty, no direct negotiations, no diplomatic
recognition.
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Egyptian policy completely supports King Hussein and his
government. The Egyptian and Jordanian officials dealing
with UN emissary Gunnar Jarring and with representatives of non-
Arab governments are punctilious about consulting each other
before undertaking any commitments.
4. Nasser and Hussein are acting out of self-interest, not
out of altru i:n or brotherly love. For the moment, at least, each
sees the other as a necessary ally and any challenge to their
solidarity as a threat to himself. Hussein's need for Nasser is
based on fairly obvious considerations: Nasser is the shield
against accusations (or suspicions) that he is willing to sell out
the Palestinians and the Arab world for the sake of narrow Jordanian
interests. Without Nasser's expressions of sympathy and support,
Hussein would be even more vulnerable to internal challenges,
principally from the fedayeen, and to verbal blasts from radicals
throughout the Arab world. Thus, Hussein sees Nasser's attitude
as a valuable prop to his own power at this juncture.
5. The relationship is not entirely one-sided, however;
Nasser also derives benefits. Hussein was the closest thing
to an Arab hero to emerge from the six day war. His image has
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since been somewhat tarnished by his complicated relationship
with the fedayeen and by his army's obvious vulnerability to
Israeli attack, but the Brave Young King confounded his detractors
during the war. He put his Arabism first, losing half his
country in a futile but glorious gesture; in defeat, he neither
whimpered nor tried to shift the blame to others. During the
first few months after the war, identifying himself with Hussein
was one of the few ways that Nasser could attempt to regain some
of his own lost prestige. The close relation between the two was
as essential element of the Khartoum summit, which provided Nasser
with the financial means to remain intransigent toward Israel. And,
for Nasser as well as for Hussein, the aura of Arab solidarity was
critical to the argument that there was still hope that a favor-
able turn of events might emerge from either diplomatic or military
initiatives.
6. Nasser has continued to work with Hussein in the ensuing
months, despite numerous occasions for dispute, for a number of
reasons. Nasser's dependence on subsidies from Saudi Arabia,
Libya, and Kuwait makes him highly sensitive to the possibility
that the funds might be cut off if Egypt double-crossed Jordan.
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Nasser detests the Baathi movement and thus finds the regimes
of both Syria and Iraq uncongenial. His long-standing feud
with Feisal of Saudi Arabia has been set aside but not for-
gotten. Cairo's relations with both Yemens are poor, and Egypt
has little in common with any of the North African countries.
Jordan, therefore, is at the moment Egypt's only partner in the
Arab world.
7. In addition, Jordan is Nasser's only tangible link to
the Western power that matters -- the United States. While
Egypt and Jordan remain united on external matters, the Arabs
retain some hope that they can play off the Great Powers for Arab
benefit. Nasser has long feared that the United States seeks to
destroy him, but he also believes that the United States seeks to
maintain Hussein in control of Jordan. Under these circumstances,
he probably hopes that US attitudes toward Jordan will temper US
policies toward Jordan's Arab friends and perhaps lead the US
to apply some pressure on Israel for Hussein's sake.
8. To some extent, Nasser also seems likely to see Hussein
as "the devil you know" -- not, perhaps, the ideal ruler for Jordan
but preferable at the moment to the unknown and imponderable -
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alternative. The domestic situation in Jordan is so complex
(what with fedayeen groups of varying political affiliations,
Israeli attacks, units of the Iraqi and Saudi array, Syrian
forces on the border, Palestinian refugee camps bristling with
weapons, Jordanian military units with questionable or divided
loyalties, and a host of other considerations) that no one can
predict with any assurance the sort of regime that might replace
the Hashemite monarchy. It probably would be a far more radical
and militant one than Hussein's but could as easily be dominated
by Nasser's foes as by his friends; it probably could not maintain
Jordan's role as the Arab world's link to the West, and it might
not be able to maintain Jordan as an independent entity. If
dominated by the fedayeen, it would pose particularly severe
problems for Nasser, both as a rival for leadership of the Arab
world and as the possible source of a new outbreak of war on a
large scale. The doubtful outcome of a Jordanian upheaval, therefore,
is probably one reason why Nasser has avoided words or actions that
would encourage Hussein's actual or potential oppositionforces.
9. A loss of confidence on Nasser's part in his own grasp
on power may be a further consideration. In particular, he sees
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impending danger in any concessions to the Israelis; for example,
he seems to fear the reaction of the Egyptian public to an
Israeli flag vessel in the Suez Canal beyond anything that seems
reasonable to more distant observers. In the context of Arab/Israeli
negotiations, therefore, Nasser appears to be using Hussein as
something of a stalking horse. The calculation in Cairo presumably
is that Hussein should remain one or two steps in front; if he
missteps and loses his throne, Cairo can disavow him. If he
survives each step, however, Nasser can follow gingerly in his path.
10. The durability of the Nasser/Hussein combine is, of course,
linked to the future of the two principals and complicated by all
the considerations that bear on their longevity in office. Nasser
appears to be in fairly firm control in Egypt, but there are many
uncertainties in both his domestic situation and his foreign relations;
he could fall from power at any time. Hussein's position is notably
precarious and subject to a variety of pressures, including dia-
metrically opposed demands from the fedayeen and from the Israelis.
Even with Nasser and Hussein in office, moreover, the alliance
remains primarily tactical and opportunistic, and mutual trust
is lacking. Hussein is unlikely to have any reason to abandon
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Nasser in the foreseeable future. Nasser, on the other hand,
probably is prepared to jettison Hussein at any time that the
king moves too independently vis-a-vis Israel or precipitates
an open conflict with the fedayeen.
11. On balance, the Cairo/Amman alliance probably will
endure as long as Nasser and Hussein retain power and the
circumstances of the Arab world's relations with Israel continue
to make the alliance mutually advantageous. With the passage
of time, it may even become somewhat closer. In particular,
strains between Nasser and Hussein would be diminished somewhat
by a more cordial atmosphere between Washington and Cairo.
Expressions of Jordanian goodwill toward the USSR, such as the
imminent visit of a Jordanian economic delegation to Moscow, also
could help.
12. The Nasser/Hussein coalition is fundamental to Arab
willingness, even grudgingly, to risk serious negotiations
toward a settlement with Israel. Concomitantly, such an alliance
especially if both felt fairly secure at home -- would be as
strong a negotiating team as the Arabs could hope for, and the
least desirable negotiating situation the Israelis can envisage.
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ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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