COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001400020033-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: March 13, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
13 March 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action
I. COMMUNIST VIEWS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION
Hanoi and the VC
1. It is clear that the Vietnamese Communists are engaged
in a major and. continuing offensive. They are currently making a vig-
orous effort to replace their losses, form and train new VC units,
resupply and re-equip their forces and reposition large units
in preparation for another more intensive phase sometime within
the next few months. Their principal objectives are to destroy
the GVN's authority in much of the country; also to reduce the
ARVN's effectiveness and to inflict defeats on US forces in battles
in the northern I Corps. The net result, they hope, will be a
political and military situation which will destroy the political
basis for the US presence and thus lea V1 I/ .'c _ ~ A ""l ions
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for a settlement of the war on terms favorable to the Communists.
While they are not likely to be committed to specific timetables,
they clearly hope their effort will yield decisive results this
year.
2. Judging from Hanoi's overt propaganda, it has allowed
for the possibility that the US response to the offensive will
be to increase its own troop strengths, to intensify bombing of
North Vietnam, and possibly to exert further pressures such as the
mining of Haiphong harbor. Hanoi apparently believes that none
of these measures is likely to prevent Communist forces from
sustaining their offensive and expects that before US counter-
measures can be fully implemented the political base in South
Vietnam will have disintegrated beyond retrieval.
3. Peking. China has more or less openly warned that Hanoi
must still be prepared to persist in a prolonged war, since the
US, facing ultimate defeat, will react viciously and intensify
pressures in both South and North Vietnam. The Chinese have
also displayed some nervousness that Hanoi will negotiate pre-
maturely. At the same time, the Chinese have reiterated their
pledges of assistance, though without making any specific
commitments.
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The USSR
4. Since the end of 1964 Moscow has supported the Communist
effort in South Vietnam. At times there have been indications
that Moscow preferred to see greater reliance on a political
rather than a military route to victory, but there is no persua-
sive evidence that the Soviets ever attempted to bring strong
pressure to bear on Hanoi over this. They have felt that they
would lose more from failing to support Hanoi than from the
deterioration in Soviet-US relations that such support involved.
And they have argued, for American ears, that it is US and not
Soviet policy that has inhibited constructive developments in
these relations.
5. What appears more recently to be some hardening in
Moscow's attitude on the Vietnam situation probably results from
the war's intensification, but, more important, reflects a view
that Hanoi's success is becoming more certain. The Soviets would
wish to manifest fullest identification with Hanoi in that case.
It may be also that for purposes of any role they may play in
future negotiations with the US they would wish to establish a
tough position. While they probably recognize that the likelihood
of their involvement may rise as the struggle approaches a climactic
phase, it does not appear that they have ever rated this risk as
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very high, primarily because US objectives have been so clearly
limited to the defense of South Vietnam. When and if US actions
impinge more severely on North Vietnam, Soviet attitudes may
change. These circumstances are dealt with in Part II.
II? US COURSES OF ACTION
Course A
The US would make an early announcement of
reinforcements for Vietnam on the order of 2 additional
coupled with reserve calls and other measures to (a) make
an additional 75,000 men available later, or (2) make an
additional 175,000 men available.
In either case, bombing of North Vietnam would be
stepped up as the weather improved and would include some
new targets, but not the mining of Haiphong or major attacks
in the urban areas of Hanoi or Haiphong.
Hanoi's Reaction
a. To US Reinforcement
6. North Vietnamese leaders expect to confront larger US
forces and current Coimuunist strategy Probably allows for it. As
long ago as the summer of 1966, they predicted that US troop levels
would eventually reach 600,000 or even 750,000. Thus, the North
Vietnamese would regard an immediate US reinforcement of 25,000
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men as little more than a token gesture. By heavy infiltration,
Hanoi has already increased the number of Communist maneuver
battalions in South Vietnam from about 150 last fall to about
190 at present.* North Vietnam still has the capability to meet
the additional US combat battalions included in any total
reinforcement of 100,000, and would probably deploy the additional
forces necessary to do so.
7. Hanoi would recognize, however, that a total US reinforce-
ment of 100,000 and especially 200,000 represented a deeper
political and psychological conmitment,since either would involve
call-up of sizable reserves and a partial mobilization. Hanoi
would have to consider that, if its current efforts to gain a
decisive advantage failed, the war would probably continue for
some considerable period and at higher levels of combat and
losses. The North Vietnamese might in such circumstances give
more serious thought to early negotiations, calculating that the
political situation in the US and uncertainties in Saigon in
the wake of the Tet offensive provided favorable auspices for
negotiations. They might think also that a peace move at this
This does not include all the independent companies and
platoons in South Vietnam.
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juncture would be enough to collapse the GVN. On balance, however,
we think it more likely that Hanoi would continue the war,
providing what additional forces in the South seemed M-~,cesoary
to maintain or intensify its military effort.
8. The proposed US troop increases would be implemented
between now and December. Within 90 days Hanoi could deploy two
divisions to South Vietnam, thus adding 18 maneuver battalions.
By December at least one more infantry division (9 battalions)
could be added. Such movements are within current capacities of
the infiltration corridors and supply routes. A US reinforcement
of 200,000 men would add 27 maneuver battalions to allied strength
and bring the US total to 133 as against a possible 208-217 for
the NVA/VC in South Vietnam.* Given its present estimate of
ARVN"s likely effectiveness, Hanoi would probably regard this
ratio as sufficient to prevent the US from significantly improving
on its present situation. It is unlikely that Hanoi would regard
the dispatch of 2-3 more divisions to South Vietnam as involving
unacceptable risks to home defense.
US Army battalions have about 900 men and USMC 1350; NVA
battalions average about 400-500.
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To Increased Bombing
9. An increased weight of bombing attacks on North Vietnamese
industrial and transportation targets would have no significant
effect on North Vietnamese capabilities or determination, given
the assumption that this course does not include major urban
attacks in Hanoi and Haiphong, or the mining of the latter. We
believe that North Vietnam would still be able to support the
war in the South, even at the higher levels caused by the
postulated US reinforcements.
10. China and the USSR. We do not see that these courses
of action would have any major effect on Soviet or Chinese policy.
Neither would regard the commitment of additional US troops as
a development to which it had to respond directly. If requested,
Peking would be willing to provide additional manpower for various
tasks in North Vietnam. As for the USSR, it might provide some
more sophisticated types of defensive equipment (coastal defense
missiles, new type of fighters, SAMs, and AAA).
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Course B
Troop increases as indicated in Course A would be
accompanied by the mining of Haiphong and/or significantly
intensified bombing of urban targets in the Hanoi and
Haiphong areas.*
11. General. Mining of Haiphong and intensified bombing
would ultimately magnify the problems of maintaining the flow
of military and economic goods to North Vietnam. An effective
mining program could put the major burden on the road and rail
systems from China which would, in turn, become more lucrative
bombing targets. For Lit least the next several months, there
would be little impact on the military situation in South Vietnam.
But given a considerably higher level of combat in the South, the
deployment of more NVA units and the commitment of more US troops,
there might be some point at which Hanoi's ability to provide
essential military support in the South would decline. We
cannot foresee when this might occur, especially in view of
Hanoi's demonstrated capability to improvise its logistical support
and its ability to modify its own tactics to conserve or expend
There are about 46 targets not yet attacked in the Hanoi
area, including railway yards, the Hanoi Machinery Plant and
some other industrial facilities. There are about 22 poten-
tial targets in the Haiphong area, including the rail yards,
docks and warehouse areas near the port.
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resources. In any case, logistical 1imitatirn6 are not likely
to be such that Hanoi would be compelled to change its general
military strategy.
12. Intensified bombing alone would not be likely to lead
to a major change in Hanoi's strategy or the direct involvement
of China and the USSR. There is a risk in these circumstances
that the North Vietnamese Air Force might become more dependent
on the use of China as a sanctuary. In addition, of course,
bombing in the Hanoi and Haiphong area would cause greater
civilian casualties and therefore much more international
criticism and opposition.
13. Hanoi. If in addition Haiphong were mined, the major
immediate impact on Hanoi would be psychological. Especially
in combination with a 200,000 troop increase, it would convey a
US determination to persevere despite possible political reper-
cussions at home and abroad. Hanoi would probably expect that
the United States, having accepted the risks involved in
challenging the USSR by mining Haiphong, would sooner or later
expand the war to Laos and Cambodia and perhaps ultimately into
a ground attack on North Vietnam. It would seek more assistance
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from Moscow and China, and would maintain its pressures in Laos.
But it would probably still believe that the GVN/ARVN could be
virtually demolished before all the US actions could become
totally effective. Accordingly it would probably continue and
if possible intensify its military effort in the South in order
to accomplish this end. As long as it saw a chance of success,
we believe Hanoi would not elect to begin serious negotiations.
14. Sino-Soviet Relations. Mining would impose a greater
burden on the rail lines from China which already carry the bulk
of military supplies and would thus test anew Sino-Soviet
cooperation in maintaining the movement of supplies to North
Vietnam. Apparently, the movement of Soviet goods across China
has been proceeding fairly well since last year's agreement,
under which Hanoi has assumed some responsibility for trans-
shipment once Soviet goods reached the Chinese frontier. The
mining would increase Hanoi's dependence on China, but Peking
would be unlikely to disrupt transit of Soviet military supplies.
15. China would probably also assist in developing alterna-
tive means of delivery for North Vietnam. For example, the port
of Changehiang (Fort Bayard) might be expanded to receive supplies
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destined for overland movement to Hanoi. And China would
provide smaller vessels to use in coastal shipping to North
Vietnam.
16. The USSR. The most critical question is Moscow's
response. It would greatly lessen the risk of trouble with the
USSR if the mining were concentrated on blocking the Canal
Maritime,which would only prevent entry to the docks. In this
case, lightering would still be possible from ships anchored
in the roadsted, and Soviet seaborne supplies would not be denied
to Hanoi. The port would not be put out of commission, though
its operation would be greatly complicated. Politically, however,
the challenge would still appear much the same.
17. The Soviets would probably provide and if necessary
operate minesweepers. This would be intended as a political
demonstration to deter the US from continuing this course, as
well as an attempt to assist in maintaining a flow of at least
some traffic. Soviet merchant ships calling at Haiphong would
probably be armed with AAA in these circumstances. Soviet ships,
however, would not deliberately risk running the minefield. The
Soviets would probably also provide still more air defense
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equipment for Haiphong (perhaps the SA-3 system) not only to
protect against the intensified bombing but to make it as
costly as possible to maintain the minefields. We do not believe,
however, that there would be any offensive action by Soviet
military forces in the area, though in actual practice Soviet
personnel might be manning defensive systems.
18. The mining of Haiphong would offer a clear challenge
to the Soviet Union. Moreover, in the course of this operation
or the bombing of the Haiphong docks there would be considerable
likelihood of damage or destruction of a Soviet ship and killing
Soviet personnel. Therefore, of all actions other than invasion
of North Vietnam,mining would be most likely to cause the Soviets
to consider serious acts of retaliation against the US. Such
acts would be most likely to be effective in areas outside South-
east Asia. If the mining proved effective the pressures on Moscow
to take some counteraction might grow.
19. We still estimate, however, that the Soviets are
likely to stop short of precipitating a major confrontation
with the US. Their stake in the outcome in South Vietnam is
not so great that they would deliberately run extremely high
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risks. There is no readymade situation, including Berlin, where
they could have much assurance that their action would force the
United States to give way in Vietnam.
20. But this does not mean that the Soviets would not react
in other ways. Their stance would become tougher in general and
on specific issues. They might retaliate by freezing certain
issues or suspending certain negotiations in order to demonstrate
against the United States. They would certainly try to add to
international criticism and exploit it against the United States.
In short, as a consequence of the mining of Haiphong, US-Soviet
relations would almost certainly be characterized by an air of
crisis.
FOR THE, BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMA.TTES:
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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