RESPONSE TO MR. WEBB'S REQUEST FOR VIEWS ON SOVIET MANNED LUNAR LANDING INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030037-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: September 2, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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2 SEP 1965
Copy_ _of_j
SUBJECT: Response tol Request for Views 25X1
on Soviet Manned Lunar Landing Intentions
1. Information which has become available since the
preparation of NIE 11-1-65 has been examined and old information
reevaluated in terms of the question of the existence of a Soviet
manned lunar landing program competitive with Project Apollo.
We have concluded that this information is generally consistent with
the considerations given and conclusions reached in the estimate.
2. In summary, these conclusions state that Soviet intent
to land men on the moon sometime in the future seems certain
(para. 59). It is not possible on the basis of technological
considerations to rule out entirely a possible Soviet attempt to
do this in the 1968-1969 period (para. 60). We do not believe,
however, that a manned lunar landing competitive with the present
Apollo schedule, i. e., aimed at the 1968-1969 period, is a Soviet
objective (para. I).
3. The principal specific gain which might be made by the
Soviets in beating the United States to the moon would, of course,
be one of prestige and the significant enhancement of the technological
and military image of the Soviet Union in the world at large. A
competitive lunar program also has the advantage of providing a
focus and animus for rapid and extensive technological development.
The effects of this development will be widespread and ultimately
involve many sectors of the economy. We are not best equipped
to consider Soviet need for this sort of pump priming.
4. The development of Complex J at Tyuratam appears to
have given the Soviets a facilities base for the development of a
booster capable of supporting a manned lunar landing. Construction
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SUBJECT: Response tol Request for Views on Soviet
Manned Lunar Landing Intentions
visible at this area still does not provide, however, unequivocal
indication of the size of the booster for which it may be intended.
The development of the complex in the period since the preparation
of the estimate has strengthened our belief that it will function as
the point of final assembly and static testing of launch hardware.
Presumably, the static test facilities will also be used as launch
pads. The estimated date of full completion of the large building
at Complex J has not changed substantially from that of mid-1966
as given in the estimate. If assembly and static testing of a very
large booster are to occur subsequent to this date, the first
flight test is not likely to occur before 1968, as the estimate now
states. If a prototype has been built and static tested elsewhere
in the USSR, for which there is no evidence, a first flight test
might occur by mid-1967. The earliest possible date of mid-1966
given in Table 1 should probably be moved to the 1st quarter of
1967 and the probable date to the start of 1968. Manned flight
test dates should be slipped at least one quarter.
5. The technological requirements associated with the
full development of a very large launch vehicle suitable for a
manned lunar landing mission are such as to make it unlikely
that a sudden allocation of greatly enhanced resources to the
project can have substantial effect within the next few years. The
estimated date for a first flight test in 1968 assumes adequate
manning and full support of this effort. If projected development
time extends beyond this period to any great extent, however, it
may well be shortened to this limiting period through the
adoption of a more intensive program involving greater allocations
of men and materiel.
6. It appears most likely that the Soviets will utilize
an earth orbital rendezvous mode in attempting a manned lunar
landing and that this may be undertaken as an extension of
earth orbital operations. The conclusion reached in the estimate
that the Soviets will probably engage in an extensive manned space
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25X1.
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SUBJECT: Response to Request for Views on Soviet 25X1
Manned Lunar Landing Intentions
station program during this decade has been given support by
continuing Soviet statements in this tenor and by the characteristics
of recent Soviet manned flights which appear best related to the
development of a capability for prolonged earth orbital operations.
We continue to believe that the Proton-1 booster will be utilized for
the early establishment of a small space station. This could occur
in 1966 without actually man-rating the booster if a rendezvous and
docking capability is added to the Voskhod spacecraft. These
developments suggest that the Soviets will rely upon an earth orbital
rendezvous mode for any manned lunar landing attempt, possibly
as a step integrated in this program of extensive earth orbital
operations.
. If the Soviets have not chosen to "race" to th'e moon,
we expect that they will endeavor to soften the impact of a successful
Apollo mission by the achievement of other goals of their own choosing.
They have openly questioned the scientific significance and necessity
of a manned lunar landing and will probably substitute goals to which
they can attribute greater meaning. Extensive earth orbital operations
and the establishment of a system of major space stations in a
period when the United States cannot follow a comparable program
because of its commitment to Apollo would enable the Soviets to run
their own race and limit the effects of a successful landing on the
moon by the United States. A vigorous Soviet program of instrumented
lunar exploration is also indicated by Soviet statements which
emphasize the necessity for extensive activity of this type prior to
any attempts at a manned landing. An early Soviet manned circumlunar,
flight is considered in the estimate as an additional mission aimed
at offsetting the effects of a successful Apollo mission and reinforcing
the association of the Soviet Union with the early exploration of the
moon. We still have no firm evidence of the existence of such a
program but consider it to be a possibility warranting consideration.
The time estimate given in NIE 11-1-65, still appears valid.
8. No specific indications exist as to Soviet projects following
marin d lunar lanolin /though the stated abjective of exploring all the
lo serk planets'- has been i-na(ntaii% The Soviets have additionally stated
Q' "1 I their intention to establish a lunar base subsequent to manned lunar
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SUBJECT: Response to Request for Views on Soviet 25X1
Manned Lunar Landing Intentions
landing but no significant details or meaningful timetables have
been revealed. If Soviet manned lunar landing is undertaken as
a follow-on to extensive earth orbital operations and instrumented
exploration of the moon, it is likely that they will enjoy some
advantages in the establishment of a lunar base. Such an approach
would allow for the concurrent development of the technology of
lunar transportation and that of maintaining man in space for
extended periods. It is possible that a late lunar landing may be
followed fairly rapidly by the establishment of a Soviet base on
the moon.
9. In conclusion, it must be stated that while we continue
to support the estimate that the Soviets probably do not intend
to attempt a manned lunar landing in the 1968-1969 period, we
expect them to pursue a vigorous and expanding space program
generally competitive with that of the United States. In making
this effort, the Soviets will establish their own goals in space and
make the most of their accomplishments in enhancing the prestige
of the USSR relative to that of the United States in space exploration.
DONALD F. CHAMBERLAIN
Director of Scientific Intelligence
TI SECRET
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