WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011500250001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 24, 1977
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
meekly Summary
State Dept. review completed.
Secret
CG WS 77-025
June 24, 1977
Copy 14-? 3
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5 Africa
Sudan-China.
6 Asia
Vietnam; Pakistan
7 Western Europe: Reaction to US Nuclear Policy
9 France: Arms Production and Foreign Sales
10 USSR: Rlilitari High Command
13 Turkey: A Shah r Economic Situation
14 China: A,grotechnologt, Boosts Food Production
ssued every Friday morning by the CONTENTS
1 Middle cast
Geographic and Cartographic Research, Israel
igence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence,
a, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of
ionol and Political Analysis, the Office of ?co-
des -material coordinated with or prepared by the
of the week through noon on Thursday, it fre-
1 Western Hemisphere
Peru
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Menahem Begin speaks at opening of Knesset (parliament)
this month while other members listen
The transition to the first government
not dominated by the Labor Party since
Israel's independence in 1948 was com-
pleted early this week when the Israeli
parliament formally approved a narrow-
based right-wing coalition government
headed by Likud leader Menahem Begin.
The following day, however, the Labor
Party demonstrated that it remains a
strong national force by apparently main-
taining its long-standing control of
Israel's large and important Labor
Federation.
Prime Minister Begin's cabinet at this
point is composed of nine Likud
members, three from the National
Religious Party, and Moshe Dayan, now
an independent. Two small religious par-
ties that support the coalition declined to
join the cabinet, but they have pledged
to vote with the government. Three
portfolios are being held open temporarily
as an inducement to the Democratic
Movement for Change to participate in
the government-on Begin's terms.
Begin probably will deal with his
government in the same autocratic
manner that he has long ruled his own
party. After Begin, the most influential
members of the new cabinet will be
Defense Minister Weizman, who is the
number-two man in Likud, Foreign
Minister Dayan, Agriculture Minister
Sharon, and probably Education Minister
Hammer, the outspoken head of the
National Religious Party's dominant
youth wing. All five men appear to share
generally similar hard-line views on
crucial foreign policy issues.
Many Israelis welcome indications that
Begin will provide strong and unyielding
leadership on peace issues, which they see
as essential to deal with growing Arab
sophistication in negotiating tactics and to
meet anticipated US pressure for
territorial withdrawals. The principal con-
stituents of the new government-im-
migrants from North Africa and eastern
Arab states and the orthodox religious
community-are likely to rally
enthusiastically behind Begin's personal
leadership.
Although the issues and to some extent
the electorate were different in the Labor
Federation election than in the national
election last month, the victory was im-
portant to the Labor Party and its ally,
Mapam. In addition to representing all
but a small percentage of Israel's salaried
employees, the Federation controls many
businesses, industries, and social welfare
programs, and its views must be taken into
account by any Israeli government.
Labor Party leaders are likely to
point to their party's strong show-
ing as evidence that Likud's upset
victory in the national election
represented a one-time protest vote
against Labor rather than a fundamental
shift to the right. Labor may use its
domination of the Federation to enhance
its image with the electorate by presenting
alternatives to possible efforts by Likud to
decentralize the Federation and to under-
take free enterprise reforms in the Israeli
economy.
PERU -'I Z
Reaction has' been growing in Peru to
the tough austerity program recently an-
nounced by the government to meet Inter-
national Monetary Fund requirements for
providing the aid Peru needs to meet
debt-service obligations.
The program includes a 50-percent in-
crease in gasoline prices, a one-third hike
in public transportation fares, and a
$200-million cut in imports this year.
Central government expenditures, in-
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eluding those of the military, will be
reduced by 8 percent, or $160 million. The
Peruvian sol is to be devalued by about 20
percent in a series of steps to be completed
by the end of the year.
The program failed to provoke the
strorg, spontaneous public protest initial-
ly expected by the government. Last
week, however, violent demonstrations
by leftist students in Cuzco prompted of-
ficials to clamp a dusk-to-dawn curfew on
that ancient city. The student
demonstrations since have spread to Lima
and Arequipa. No large-scale worker
protests have as yet materialized.
The stringent internal security
measures in effect and Finance Minister
Piazza's sketchy description of the
prog-am may have helped dampen initial
reaction. The announcement of modest
wage increases probably also contributed.
Mass demonstrations could still occur
once Peruvians feel the pinch of higher
prices for food, gasoline, and transporta-
tion, for which government subsidies were
removed.
Piazza's program meets many, but not
all, or the conditions set last March by the
IMF for a $100-million standby loan bad-
ly needed by Peru. Successful negotiation
of the loan is a prerequisite for another
$300 million in balance-of-payments sup-
port loans from foreign banks. It is not
clear whether the IMF will be satisfied
with the measures.
King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister
Suarez won a clear endorsement of their
moderate, evolutionary political reform
program last week in Spain's first free
parliamentary election in over 40 years.
The result has strengthened their hand in
dealing with the country's pressing
economic problems and mounting
demands for regional autonomy.
Suarez' Union of the Democratic
Center-an alliance of numerous small
centrist groups-took almost 35 percent
of the vote and fell just I I seats short of a
majority in the 350-member lower house
of the Cortes. He has a working majority
in the upper house, where his party won
106 of 207 contested seats; most of the 41
additional senators appointed by the King
are likely to support Suarez. The Socialist
Workers Party ran a strong second, with
about 28 percent of the vote. The Com-
munists and the Francoist Popular
Alliance came next but trailed far behind
with 9 and 8 percent of the vote, respec-
tively.
Since the election Suarez has been
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engrossed in consultations looking toward
the formation of a new government. He
may forgo a formal majority coalition
and rely instead on ad hoc alliances with
different opposition moderates to give
him a majority on key pieces of legisla-
tion. The absence of a no-confidence
procedure in Spanish law and the blurring
of responsibility between the executive
and the legislature make a minority
government quite feasible.
In any event, a coalition between the
Democratic Center and the Socialists is
unlikely. Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez
has indicated that his party prefers to re-
main in opposition and has set conditions
for the party's participation in the
government-including fiscal reforms and
immediate autonomy for the Basque and
Catalan regions-that would be extreme-
ly difficult for Suarez to accept.
Nonetheless, Suarez will have to take
Socialist views into account in for-
mulating his legislative program and in
drafting the new constitution that the
Cortes is implicitly charged with prepar-
ing. Austerity measures that will be
necessary in dealing with Spain's
economic problems will be particularly
difficult to enforce without the coopera-
tion of organized labor, which is
dominated by the Socialists and Com-
munists.
The Communists have professed to be
satisfied with their small share of the vote,
citing the party's long period un-
derground, the long years of anticom-
munist propaganda, and the short time
for campaigning. Party leader Carrillo
did come a long way toward gaining
respectability, and the party now plans to
concentrate on the municipal elections
that may be held this fall. The Com-
munists in fact are likely to do better at
that level.
Newly elected Basque and Catalan
legislators clearly intend to press quickly
on a regional autonomy issue that has
long agued Spanish politics. Major par-
ti the two regions have already made
lVets with the Socialists to push for
substantial and immediate autonomy for
Jfo regions.
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Jack Lynch's opposition Fianna Fail
party overwhelmed the government coali-
tion of Prime Minister Liam Cosgrave in
last week's election for the Irish Dail, or
lower house of parliament. The result was
not hailed in London, where the Fianna
Fail victory was seen as a threat to the
current bilateral cooperation aimed at
achieving a political settlement in
Northern Ireland.
Fianna Fail won an unprecedented 84
seats in the 148-seat Dail. Cosgrave's Fine
Gael took only 43 seats, down 10, and his
Labor Party colleagues won 17, a loss of
2. Independent candidates won 4 seats
and are expected to split their votes
between the Fianna Fail and the old coali-
tion.
Although the government was in
economic trouble during; most of its four
years in office-inflation and unemploy-
ment are still the highest in the EC-the
large margin of the opposition's victory
may be due to other factors as well. The
Fianna Fail ran a modern saturation-style
campaign based on promoting a single
personality-Jack Lynch. The op-
position's success in breaking down
traditional voting patterns may cause the
coalition parties-at least the Fine
Gael-to overhaul their structures to im-
prove campaign tactics before the next
election.
Government-sponsored emergency leg-
islation aimed at curbing activities of
the Irish Republican Army and other
terrorists was not universally popular and
may have contributed to the opposition's
victory. Some critics charged that the
legislation pre-empted civil liberties and
the press scored the government for cen-
sorship based on the new laws. Further-
more, coalition efforts to "modernize"
Ireland through the provision of birth-
control information and the abolition of
compulsory Gaelic-language teaching in
schools may have been an unwelcome
break with tradition for many voters.
British Prime Minister Callaghan's
minority Labor government faces a dif-
ficult period before Parliament recesses in
late July. Callaghan must grapple with the
task of keeping the Labor Party from
dividing along pro- and anti-EC lines
while attempting at the same time to
maintain vital Liberal Party support for
his government. If he fails to fashion an
effective compromise, an election this fall
will be inevitable.
Callaghan has probably chosen the best
available option for threading his way
between anti-EC Laborites and pro-EC
Liberals on the issue of direct elections to
the European Parliament. He has decided
initially to permit both cabinet members
and Labor backbenchers a free vote on
the principle of direct elections as well as
on the type of electoral system to be used.
This suspension of collective cabinet
responsibility is limited; government
members will be required to support all
aspects of the implementing legislation
after the second parliamentary reading of
the bill. To stress this point, Callaghan
declared that ministers who wish to speak
or campaign against direct elections
would have to resign. The US embassy in
London believes this course should pre-
vent any key cabinet resignations and
avoid a critical split among Labor MPs.
Liberal Party leaders will criticize
Callaghan's failure to support a propor-
tional representation system for the Euro-
pean parliamentary election, but the
Liberals are unlikely to withdraw their
support from the government.
The government plans to introduce
legislation for direct elections soon,
although it stands no chance of passage
before the end of this parliamentary ses-
sion. This procedure, however, will reduce
the time needed to obtain final passage in
the session that begins in November.
Callaghan's plans would allow him to
demonstrate to his colleagues at the EC
summit late this month that he is 25X6
endeavoring to fulfill his pledge to them
on direct elections.
On another matter of interest to the
Liberals, the government formally an-
nounced last week that legislation grant-
ing greater autonomy to Scotland is dead
for this session. A new bill will be in-
troduced late this year or early next, but
its chances are not much brighter.
Callaghan's dilemma is that for every
move he makes to satisfy the desires of
Liberals and Scottish Nationalists for
devolution legislation, he risks the anger
of the anti-devolutionists in Parliament,
many of whom belong to his Labor Party.
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SUDAN-CHINA
Sudanese President Niumayri succeeded
during his visit to China in early June
both in obtaining additional economic
and military aid and in putting the Soviet
Union on notice that his government has
alternate sources of assistance. The warm
reception he received in Peking will also
help maintain his credentials among the
nonaligned countries by balancing
Sudan's growing ties with the West, es-
pecially the US.
Numayri used the occasion to criticize
publicly Soviet policy toward Africa. His
statements closely resembled Peking's
own attacks on Moscow and doubtless
pleased the Chinese. In recent months,
Sudanese-Soviet relations have become
increasingly strained because of Soviet
backing for Ethiopia and Libya, both of
which provide support to Sudanese dis-
sidents.
China and Sudan agreed to coordinate e -
forts to counter Soviet influence in Africa
and elsewhere. The two countries also
signed another economic and technical
cooperation agreement, and the Chinese
agreed to provide limited new military
grant aid. The Chinese reportedly will
provide enough small arms and supplies
to equip a 10,000-man Sudanese infantry
force and enough spare parts for
Chinese-made equipment already in the
Sudanese military inventory.
The Chinese aid is estimated to be
worth about $7 million; in its only other
arms deal with Sudan, China provided in
1972 $8 million worth of equipment that
included 60 light tanks and a squadron of
MIG-17 jet fighters.
The Chinese weapons and, especially,
the spare parts will help to alleviate
Sudan's current severe arms deficiencies.
Sudan's largely Soviet-equipped armed
forces have experienced a severe resupply
problem since a coup attempt against
Numayri last July; charges by Sudan that
the Soviets were involved resulted in a
Soviet cutback in delivery of spare parts.
A shipload of military spare parts from
China reportedly is now en route to
Sudan.
Sudan, with large financial backing
from Saudi Arabia, is actively seeking
major arms contracts with Western
suppliers and especially with the US. The
10
Sudanese are also exploring the possibili-
ty of acquiring attack helicopters from
France, West Germany, and other
Western sources
5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 24, 77
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war. The USSR and China covered war-
time food needs of the north; the US
supplied the south an average of over
300,000 tons annually. US deliveries have
ceased and China apparently has been
slow to offer Vietnam the same support as
during the war.
Vietnam has reportedly been able to
obtain promises of substantial amounts
of grain this year. Grants and loans
are probably elements of most transac-
tions because of Vietnam's low level of
foreign exchange earnings. F
Vietnamese soldiers help farmers gather rice
Severe weather has worsened Viet-
nam's chronic rice shortage, prompting
the government to increase imports and
take steps to control consumption. Thus
far, there is no evidence of widespread
famine or popular reaction against the
government because of food shortages.
Late last year, cold weather cut yields
of the main autumn rice crop and
hindered planting of the 1977 spring crop.
During much of this year, drought has
affected up to one-third of the spring crop
area in the north. Dry weather now
threatens subsequent planting for the
autumn crop in the north and possibly
also in the south.
The Vietnamese estimate that this
year's yield of rice will fall short of
domestic need by 1.2 million tons. Such a
shortfall would be one of the worst in re-
cent years, although below the 1.5-
million-ton deficit of 1974. Rice produc-
tion in Vietnam historically ias been from
500,000 to 1 million tons under domestic
requirements. The I1 million people who
live in central Vietnam, which is remote
from food-producing areas, are hardest
hit by shortages.
Hanoi has taken several measures to
ease the effects of this year's shortfall.
The congested port of Haiphong has been
temporarily reserved for food grain
carriers. As in previous periods of unusual
rice shortages, rations of some army units
have been cut and civilian rations
stretched with non-rice grains, flours,
and vegetables. Electric power is being
diverted from urban-areas for irrigation.
The spring harvest nearing completion
will provide some immediate relief if
properly distributed, even though the crop
is smaller than usual. Officials will use im-
ports to cope with the seasonal shortage
expected just prior to the autumn harvest.
Vietnam relies on a large volume of im-
ports of rice, wheat, and flour to maintain
basic food needs. It has had to broaden its
search for food grains since the end of the
PAKISTAN
The possibility of renewed violence in
Qakistan has increased as a result of new
..
difficulties that h
av
between Prime Minister Bhutto's govern-
ment and the opposition.
A compromise agreement reached a
week ago called for new elections to be
held later this year and allowed Bhutto to
remain in office until then. Some impor-
tant details of the agreement, however,
were left to be worked out in meetings
between opposition representatives and
one of Bhutto's ministers.
These meetings have exposed
differences that could cause the agree-
ment to come apart. The most serious dis-
agreements are apparently related to
finding a way to ensure that Bhutto
goes through with his promise to hold
an honest election.
Another disagreement, according to the
opposition's chief negotiator, is over a
date for dissolving the National
Assembly. Bhutto presumably hopes to
put this off as long as possible; under the
constitution, he would have to hold an
election within 90-days of the Assembly's
dissolution.
Opposition leaders-including those
who have been most inclined to
negotiate-are once again threatening to
take to the streets if Bhutto does not give
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Although the West Europeans share US concern about
nuclear proliferation, they express doubt that the new con-
straints proposed by the US would effectively halt proliferation
and they fear the constraints would sabotage their own nuclear
energy programs.
Western Europe: Reaction to US Nuclear Policy
West Europeans are reacting strongly
to US nuclear energy policy statements.
They are particularly opposed to US
proposals to delay the development of
fast-breeder reactors and to seek extensive
new safeguards on nuclear energy
programs abroad-including the right to
veto the transfer of US-origin uranium
from one country to another for
reprocessing.
Officials in many West European coun-
tries agree that the proliferation of
nuclear weapons is a serious danger, but
they argue that the technology needed to
produce nuclear explosives is already
widely available and that technical con-
straints on fast breeders and reprocessing
will not stop proliferation.
In any case, according to the West
Europeans, the possible effect of such
constraints on proliferation must be
weighed against worldwide energy needs.
British Foreign Secretary Owen has
stressed that the Non-Proliferation Trea-
ty includes a commitment to the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy that is just as im-
portant as the commitment against
proliferation. West Europeans believe
nuclear energy is essential, and because
they have very little natural uranium, they
also view as essential the nuclear fuel
reprocessing and fast-breeder cycle that
they say would allow them to multiply the
energy obtained from uranium by a factor
of 50.
West Europeans are uneasy about their
dependence on foreign sources of energy,
whether Arab oil or US, Canadian, and
South African uranium. Besides pursuing
techniques that use uranium more ef-
ficiently, they are also actively seeking
alternative sources of uranium.
West Germany's nuclear deal with
Brazil was aimed partly at gaining access
to potential Brazilian uranium reserves.
French officials have argued that Western
Europe should promote relations with
uranium producers not under US
"domination"-like Gabon and
Niger-in order to avoid the risk of a
blockade by the US, Canada, and
Australia, all of which the French expect
to pursue highly restrictive uranium ex-
port policies.
The West Europeans note that,
although the US, with its large uranium
supplies, may be able to forgo reprocess-
ing and fast breeders, such a "throw-
away" nuclear fuel cycle would cause the
US to consume a large portion of world
uranium production. This would mean,
they say, that there would be less uranium
available for others and that the others
would become even less willing to depend
on the US for supplies and even more
eager to develop reprocessing and fast
breeders themselves.
West Europeans also note that the
Canadians, despite their large uranium
reserves, are considering abandoning their
"throw-away" fuel cycle in favor of
reprocessing as a conservation measure.
Enrichment
The West Europeans are also seeking
greater self-sufficiency in uranium enrich-
ment capacity. Largely through
cooperative enterprises like Urenco,
Eurodif, and Coredif, the West Europeans
hope to meet their own needs for low
enrichment of uranium by the early 1980s.
In fact, the slowdown in reactor con-
struction in the developed countries may
mean that there will soon be excess
enrichment capacity globally. France has
proposed that the US and Western
Europe cooperate in planning the develop-
ment of enrichment capacity and in in-
vesting in enrichment enter-
prises-thereby avoiding competition to
sell enrichment services.
The prospect of competition between
the US and Western Europe underlies the
angry reaction by French officials to US
plans to focus on centrifuge enrichment
technology rather than the gaseous diffu-
sion process the French favor. The French
say that the US, in choosing the cen-
trifuge because it requires less energy,
contradicts its own policy of subor-
dinating energy concerns to nonprolifera-
tion, because centrifuge operations are
more difficult to safeguard effectively.
France probably fears that a US
preference for the centrifuge technology
will discredit French advances in nuclear
research in the eyes of others and could
undercut French sales of diffusion ser-
vices.
The French announcement last month
that France has developed a "new" en-
richment technique that cannot be used
to produce fuel for nuclear explosives was
intended to bolster French nonprolifera-
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tiori credentials and to emphasize
Fraice's intention to export nuclear reac-
tors with supporting enrichment capacity.
Mo -e broadly, the French were reiterating
their intention to pursue an independent
nuclear policy.
The West Europeans' need to supply
enriched uranium for reactors they sell
abroad has created tension between the
Net ierlands and West Germany, partners
with the UK in the prospective Urenco
sale of fuel for the reactors West Ger-
many sold to Brazil.
Fie Dutch would like new safeguards
on Brazil's nuclear activities as a condi-
tion for supplying Brazil with Urenco
enrichment services, but they maintain
that strong US opposition to the Urenco
deal may lead West Germany to try to cir-
cumvent Urenco by constructing an in-
dependent enrichment facility in West
Germany. The Dutch have implied that
they fear that West Germany might some
day develop its own nuclear weapons.
Reprocessing and Fast Breeders
Most West Europeans believe it is es-
sential for them to reprocess spent nuclear
fuel, both because they must conserve
uranium and because storing nuclear
waste is a serious problem in such a dense-
ly populated region. Even Sweden, which
is willing to forgo the fast breeder, still
wants its waste reprocessed. The Swedes
fear that US restrictions on transferring
spent fuel for reprocessing unless spent
fuel storage capacity is critically limited
will simply penalize them for having had
the forethought to develop large storage
facilities.
Nearly all other West European coun-
tries have reprocessing plants and fast
breeders or plan to build them. Most
doubt there is any real alternative to a
"plutonium economy." France and West
Germany have agreed to cooperate in
developing breeder technology.
Reprocessing for foreign clients is es-
pecially important for the UK. In a joint
enterprise with France, it plans to build a
major new reprocessing facility. These
countries have been negotiating with
Japan for a long-term contract to
reprocess Japanese fuel of US origin,
partly in exchange for Japanese financing
of an enlargement to the UK's Windscale
reprocessing plant. The British and
Japanese fear that a US policy requiring
case-by-case decisions on reprocessing
would ultimately sabotage the contract
and make long-range plans for their
nuclear programs impossible.
Technology Transfer
Many West Europeans still argue that
US nuclear policy is aimed largely at
gaining a commercial and technological
advantage over other nuclear suppliers.
US efforts to play down the fast breeder,
according to a West European official,
amount to "a new Concorde affair"
because the US is trying to prevent
Western Europe from cashing in on the
technological lead in breeder technology
the West Europeans claim they have.
The West Europeans fear, moreover,
that the US may gain access to thei*
technology in the course of implementing
safeguards. Thus, France opposes US in-
spection of the French-designed Tokai-
mura reprocessing plant in Japan, and
West Germany dislikes passing informa-
tion to the US to permit the evaluation of
licenses for nuclear sales to Brazil.
Their desire to maintain good relations
with the developing countries leads man.}?
West Europeans to warn that major con-
straints on exports of nuclear technolog
would intensify North-South conflicts.
The West Europeans believe that coun-
tries that have not yet acquired such
technology would view dose constraints
as a new form of discrimination.
West Europeans believe that a restric-
tive policy could split the International
Atomic Energy Agency and lead to defec-
tions from the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which promised nondiscrimination re-
garding peaceful uses of nuclear energy
Thus, West Germany in particular
has urged that the London Suppliers'
Group be enlarged soon to include
purchasers as well as sellers of nuclear
materials.
Within Western Europe, some are con-
cerned that the US may discriminate in
favor of the UK and France, the two
nuclear weapons states, and deny West
Germany the right to develop advanced
peaceful nuclear technology. West Ger-
man officials say this would be in-
tolerable. The Italians are especially sen-
sitive as well to any US policy that would
restrict Italy's potential exports of fast-
breeder and reprocessing technology and
thereby compromise its ability to compete
in technologically advanced activities.
European Community officials view
US policy as jeopardizing the EC's com-
mitment in the Euratom treaty to the free
movement of nuclear materials within the
Community. The EC members are es-
pecially concerned that, in renegotiating
its treaty with Euratom, the US may in-
sist on the right to veto transfers of spent
fuel for reprocessing within the EC.
Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program
Most West European states have
emphasized that they intend to go ahead
with nuclear energy plans. They view the
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evalua-
tion Program, for which preparatory talks
were held on June 8 and 9 in Paris, largely
as a way to stave off immediate US
pressures against their programs. For ex-
ample, a West German official said he was
happy about the prospective evaluation
program because, until a decision
emerges, his country and others would
have freedom of action. A British official
observed with satisfaction that the
program would take a very long time.
EC officials intend to press hard for
participation in the program, perhaps as a
"multinational fuel cycle grouping,"
although the British and French argue
that the EC has no competence in external
nonproliferation policy. Belgium, the
Netherlands and West Germany are the
strongest supporters of an EC role in
nuclear policy.
France is willing to take part in the
program only if many bilateral differences
with the US and Canada are first resolved
and if the participants agree to "respect
each other's choices and decisions in this
field"-a commitment supported by the
UK and West Germany. Disagreements
on this part of the program report will
probably require another preparatory
meeting
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Both economic and political considerations motivate the
French government's keen interest in promoting foreign sales of
the products of France's wide-ranging arms industry.
France: Arms Production and Foreign Sales
The French arms industry produces a
complete line of sophisticated weaponry,
ranging from rifles to strategic missiles.
Essentially all materiel for the country's
armed forces is produced at home, and
substantial quantities are available for ex-
port. This output has made France the
world's third-largest arms supplier after
the US and the USSR.
A reliable French business weekly pro-
jects the total value of 1977 arms output
at $7.2 billion; less than a quarter of this
will be for nuclear forces. The arms and
aircraft industries contribute about 2 per-
cent to gross national product and directly
employ just under 1.5 percent of the
French labor force.
In the past five years, foreign military
sales have totaled $6.1 billion, exclusive of
those to the US, about 13 percent of the
global total. The lion's share of these sales
has gone to Middle Eastern and North
African customers, notably Saudi Arabia
and Libya. Altogether., arms sales in 1975
accounted for about 5 percent of total
French exports and 10 percent of finished
industrial exports. Orders now on hand
could keep the arms industry producing at
current levels for the next five years.
The French government maintains
strict control over all aspects of arms
production and sales. The government
directly produces a quarter of the in-
dustry's output, and nationalized in-
dustries account for another quarter. The
rest originates in the private sector, which
has about a dozen major arms or aircraft
producers. All three sectors tend to share
arms production ventures, testing sites,
and research and development facilities.
Exports must be authorized by a special
interministerial committee, whose chief is
responsible directly to the prime minister.
The committee meets at least monthly to
review export requests. Financing details
are kept secret, but Paris is believed to
offer flexible pricing policies and credit
terms. Cash generally is demanded for
guns and missiles, but credits for up to
eight years are often extended for equip-
ment such as aircraft and tanks.
Arms Industry Components
The largest and best-known component
of the French defense industry is the one
that manufactures aerospace equipment.
This branch employs 106,000 persons and
produces high-quality fighters,
helicopters, and missiles. It ranks third
behind the US and the UK among
Western aerospace industries.
About 70 percent of aerospace produc-
tion is for military purposes. Paris has
sought for years to increase the civilian
share but has experienced repeated
failures, most notably with the Concorde.
Nearly half of the aerospace industry's
production is exported; the industry ac-
counts for 60 percent of France's total
military exports.
The ground materiel industry follows
aerospace in terms of the value of its
production and exports. France has long
offered a sophisticated, comprehensive
line of ground items-including tanks, ar-
mored vehicles, and a full range of mis-
siles-which is promoted abroad by the
semipublic export organization, SOFMA.
Several items, including the Roland
surface-to-air missile, are joint projects
with other West European countries.
Much of the actual production is in the
hands of private companies, such as
Creusot-Loire and Berliet-Saviem. For
most companies, military items consti-
tute a fairly small share of total output.
Naval equipment for the French navy is
produced almost entirely by four
government-operated shipyards that
employ about 35,000 workers. Equipment
for export is constructed primarily at
commercial shipyards. Foreign sales in
the past have been small but now are be-
ing pushed because of the slump in private
shipbuilding. In 1975, the naval equip-
ment share of arms exports apparently
rose to almost 10 percent.
Export Policies
The French have relatively few political
inhibitions about exporting arms. France
became a principal supplier to South
Africa after the British arms embargo in
1964, although extensive restrictions have
since been imposed. Paris also sold air-
craft and submarines to Pakistan after the
US cut off arms sales in 1965 because of
the conflict between India and Pakistan.
France did refuse for several years to
sell arms to active belligerents in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1970, however,
110 Mirage fighters were sold to Libya,
despite possible Libyan participation in
future hostilities.
There is little domestic opposition to
French arms export policy; leftist political
parties and the Church hierarchy criticize
the policy occasionally. Opposition by the
leftists, with their strong labor constituen-
cy, is muted by fear of reduced employ-
ment if arms sales are cut.
The government's accommodating at-
titude toward arms exports in part reflects
a desire to hold down unit costs of arms
for the French military by extending
production runs. This factor has become
Jun 24, 77
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progressively more important in recent
years as the cost of developing new
weapons has increased dramatically.
Although employment in the arms in-
dustry is a relatively small part of the
overall economy, it is nonetheless another
important consideration motivating arms
sales because of France's severe un-
employment problems. Many of the arms
facilities are in less-developed regions,
where there are few other industries to ab-
sorb displaced workers. Arms exports are
Soviet defense policies, as recommended by the Defense
Council and approved by the Politburo, are implemented under
the supervision of the General Staff of the armed forces. The
General Staff plays a pervasive role in strategic arms limitation
matters.
also considered to be crucial to the goal of
re-establishing a trade surplus and also to
be an effective means of extending French
political influence abroad, particularly in
the less-developed countries
USSR: Military High Command
The Soviet military high command is a
highly centralized structure that meshes
the party and the military leaderships of
the USSR. The primary executive organ
of the high command, the General Staff of
the armed forces, provides the apparatus
through which the leadership exercises its
control over the armed forces.
Several significant personnel changes
have occurred in the Soviet high com-
mand during the past year as a result of
the deaths of Minister of Defense
Grechko and Commander in Chief of the
Warsaw Pact Yakubovsky.
? Dmitry Ustinov, Politburo
member and former party secretary
for defense industries, was appointed
defense minister in April 1976 with the
rank of army general; he was
promoted to marshal of the Soviet
Unicn the following month.
? Viktor Kulikov, first deputy
minister of defense and former chief of
the General Staff, was appointed com-
mander in chief of the Warsaw Pact
forcer and promoted to marshal of the
Soviet Union last January.
? Nikolay Ogarkov, former deputy
minister of defense, was appointed
chief of the General Staff, first deputy
minister of defense, and promoted to
marshal of the Soviet Union last
January.
Ultimate responsibility for defense
policy resides with the Politburo, which
currently receives recommendations from
its defense-related arm, the Defense
Council. The Defense Council is the link
between the national political authority
and the military high command. General
Secretary and President Brezhnev and
Premier Kosygin are senior Council
members. Former president Podgorny
was a member until his recent ouster from
the Soviet hierarchy.
The defense minister is a full member
of the Defense Council; the chief of the
General Staff is believed to attend its
meetings. In addition, Foreign Minister
Gromyko, KGB Chief Andropov,
Military Industrial Commission Chair-
man Smirnov, and possibly Ustinov's
successor as party secretary may be
members. In wartime, the Council would
be expanded to direct all political,
economic, and military aspects of the
total defense effort.
The senior leaders in the Ministry of
Defense form the core of the military high
command. Of these, the defense minister,
his three first deputies, the chief of the
Main Political Administration, and the
other deputy ministers make up the
Collegium of the Ministry of Defense.
The chief of the Main Personnel Direc-
torate is also a member of this body.
The Collegium functions under the
chairmanship of the defense minister to
debate questions and make recommen-
dations on defense policy. In the event of
war, most of these officials would
probably become members of the
Supreme High Command and would be
led by the general secretary of the Com-
munist Party.
Ustinov has a party and managerial
background and is the first minister of
defense since 1955 who is not a
professional military officer. As a civilian
with extensive background in defense in-
dustries, Ustinov is a valuable link
between the political and military
authorities at a critical time for strategic
arms negotiations and force structure
decisions.
First Deputy Minister and Chief of the
General Staff Ogarkov is responsible for
implementing the decisions of the high
command. First Deputy Minister
Kulikov, as Commander in Chief of the
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Warsaw Pact forces, is the senior Soviet
field commander. First Deputy Minister
Sokolov is apparently responsible for ad-
ministrative matters.
The chief of the Main Political Ad-
ministration, Army General Aleksey
Yepishev, is the senior party official in the
armed forces structure. He provides direct
party access to the military at all levels via
the Central Committee.
General Staff
The military high command im-
plements the decisions of the Politburo
and Defense Council through its executive
arm-the General Staff. According to
Marshal Kulikov, its former chief, the
General Staff is "the main organ for the
control of the armed forces of the state in
peace and war."
The General Staff chief also has the
statutory authority to report directly to
the political leadership in matters critical
to the defense of the state. Given his
relationship to the Defense Council and
high command, the chief of the General
Staff combines considerable influence in
policymaking with the responsibility of
policy executor, thereby occupying a
pivotal position within the military ap-
paratus.
The responsibilities of the General Staff
can be grouped into three categories: con-
trol, planning, and force preparation.
Through a diversified and redundant com-
mand and communications system, the
General Staff exercises operational con-
trol over the armed forces, both via the
headquarters of the service branches as
well as directly down to the army and fleet
levels.
All aspects of military planning fall un-
der the purview of the General Staff. It is
responsible for collecting and producing
military intelligence, analyzing Soviet
force structure and posture, developing
military doctrine, and supporting state
meetings and international conferences.
Military assistance programs, as well as
recommendations and proposals for force
reductions, strategic arms limitations, law
of the sea, and the prevention of incidents
at sea, are examples of the General Staffs
responsibilities.
In fulfilling its force preparation duties,
the General Staff sets and reviews training
goals and standards. It also coordinates
and supervises the procurement of
weapons and equipment and administers
the mobilization of human and material
resources.
Because of the primacy of the General
Staff, the background and experience of
its chief can have a critical impact on the
Soviet defense establishment. From 1968
to 1974, Ogarkov was first deputy chief of
the General Staff and subsequently held
the position of deputy minister of defense,
reportedly with responsibility for resource
allocations.
Ogarkov also was the senior Soviet
military representative at SALT I in 1969
Main Political Administration
Chief: Army Gen. Aleksey A.
Yepishev
and 1970. His appointment as General
Staff chief under Ustinov, whose
background is in weapons development
and production, indicates growing
high-level concern about resource alloca-
tion, defense management, and perhaps
the impact of arms limitation on defense
programs.
Formulation of SALT Policy
Soviet strategic arms limitations policy
is formulated by the party and military
leadership, subject to the review and ap-
proval of the Politburo. The leading per-
sonalities involved have had many years
of experience working together, both on
SALT matters and in the development of
Soviet strategic systems.
A Soviet Foreign Ministry official
Soviet Military High Command
Politburo
Defense Council
General Secretary and President Leonid I. Brezhnev
Premier Aleksey N. Kosygin
Defense Minister Dmitry F: Ustinov
First Deputy Minister Nikolay V. Ogarkov
Ministry of Defense
'Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry F. Ustinov
First Deputy Minister Marshal Nikolay V. Ogarkov
'First Deputy Minister Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov
First Deputy Minister Army General Sergey L. Sokolov
Deputy Ministers for the Branches of Service and
the Administrative and Support Services
General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces
'Chief: Marshal Nikolay V. Ogarkov
Administrative Services
Main Inspectorate
'Chief: Marshal Kiril S. Moskalenko
Deputy Minister
Armaments
Chief: Col. Gen. Nikolay N. Alekseyev
Deputy Minister
Main Personnel Directorate
Chief: Army Gen. I. N. Shkadov
Page 11
Branches of Armed Forces
Air Defense Forces
'Chief: Marshal Pavel F. Batitsky
Deputy Minister
Ground Forces
Chief: Army Gen. Ivan G. Pavlovsky
Deputy Minister
Air Forces
Chief: Marshal of Avn.
Pavel S. Kutakhov
Deputy Minister
Naval Forces
Chief: Flt. Adm. of Soviet Union
Sergey G. Gorshkov
Deputy Minister
Strategic Rocket Forces
Chief: Army Gen. Vladimir F. Tolubko
Deputy Minister
WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 24, 77
Combined Armed Forces
of the Warsaw Pact Nations
"Commander in Chief: Marshal
Viktor G. Kulikov
Support Services
Civil Defense
Chief: Army Gen. Aleksandr T. Altunin
Deputy Minister
Rear Services
Chief: Army Gen. Semen K. Kurkotkin
Deputy Minister
Construction and Billeting
Chief: Col. Gen. Archil V. Gelovani
Deputy Minister
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recently reported that only five in-
dividuals other than Brezhnev have a
voice in SALT policy formulation at the
highest level: Defense Minister Ustinov,
Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov,
Military Industrial Commission Chair-
man Smirnov, Foreign Minister
Gromyko, and KGB Chief Andropov.
T'he Foreign Ministry official, who was
once a member of the Soviet delegation in
early SALT talks, neglected to mention
the important roles that Premier Kosygin
and-until his recent ouster from the
Politburo-former president Podgorny
have played in SALT policy decisions.
The official gave a personal judgment
that Ustinov, Ogarkov, and the latter's
immediate subordinates make the
strongest military team the Soviets have
ever had in this field.
L Itimate authority for all SALT policy
formulation and key decisions resides
with the Politburo. Since 1973, Politburo
membership has included the leaders of
the national security apparatus-defense
minister, foreign minister, and KGB
chief-who are directly involved in SALT
policy decisions.
The Defense Council, currently under
the Politburo, handles national security
matters involving military programs and
decisions. It is responsible for deliberating
on and reviewing SALT policies in an-
ticipation of Politburo approval. The
General Staff plays the leading substan-
tive role for SALT affairs in the Defense
Council, with detailed technical and
diplomatic support from the Military In-
dustrial Commission and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs respectively.
The two most important leaders in the
Ministry of Defense-Ustinov and
Oga ?kov-have each had nearly a decade
of experience in SALT affairs and in the
development of strategic weapons
systems. Ustinov's lack of a professional
military background is offset by his key
role since the mid-1950s in directing the
development of Soviet strategic forces,
first as chairman of the Military In-
dustrial Commission and then as party
secretary for defense affairs. He became a
non-voting candidate member of the
Politburo in March 1965 and a voting
member in March 1976
Ogarkov, whose General Staff acts as
the focal point for substantive SALT
matters, brings to the Defense Council
deliberations the professional military's
voice as well as his own experience as
senior military representative to SALT
negotiations and as first deputy chief of
the General Staff, where he had respon-
sibility for SALT matters.
The General Staffs work on arms
limitation proposals is carried out under
the overall supervision c f the first deputy
chief of the General Staff, Colonel
General Kozlov. The Main Operations
Directorate appears to formulate
proposals, while the Main Intelligence
Directorate (GRU) apparently analyzes
US deployments and developments.
The General Staff also provides
military-technical experts to the Military
Industrial Commission, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and the party to support
defense-related matters, including SALT
activities. In addition, the two senior
military members of the Soviet SALT
delegation at Geneva are General Staff
officers-colonel generals Beletsky and
Trusov. Beletsky apparently reports
directly to Kozlov.
The defense-industrial establishment
contributes to SALT policy through the
Military Industrial Commission of the
Council of Ministers. The Commission,
which is charged with managing the nine
defense-industrial ministries, apparently
coordinates SALT matters with the
General Staff, which provides represen-
tatives to serve on the Commission.
Chairman of the Military Industrial
Commission Smirnov, who reports to the
party secretary for defense affairs and
sometimes attends Defense Council
meetings, played a key role in the 1972
Moscow SALT talks and was present in
the recent SALT negotiations in Moscow.
Deputy Chairman Shchukin represents
the Commission on the SALT delegation
in Geneva.
Although the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs has the most visible role in SALT
matters, only a few of its key personalities
exercise real influence. Foreign Minister
Gromyko has been increasingly con-
cerned with SALT in his meetings with
US officials since 1974 and appears to
have enhanced his own political standing
steadily over the same period. In addition,
Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, who
is head of the Soviet SALT delegation at
Geneva, Soviet Ambassador to the US
Dobrynin, and Deputy Foreign Minister
Korniyenko, who is head of the USA
department of the Foreign Ministry,
reportedly are all centrally involved with
SALT.
SALT matters are handled in the
Foreign Ministry by the International
Organization Department and Disarma-
ment Staff, which includes representatives
of the General Staff. Soviet SALT in-
itiatives are drafted in the General Staff;
the Foreign Ministry comments only on
the political aspects of these proposals.
Both the General Staff and the Foreign
Ministry draft responses to US initiatives
but, even here, the Foreign Ministry must
rely on General Staff representatives for
military-technical information and
guidance.
The principal intelligence agencies, the
KGB and the GRU, share responsibilities
for monitoring US compliance with arms
control agreements and for collecting in-
formation on US policy and technical
developments. Although they coordinate
their activities to some degree, they
generally tend to operate separately.
The party secretary for defense affairs
exercised a strong influence in SALT
matters between 1965 and 1976, when
Ustinov held the position. The influence
of this office is likely to decline in the near
term, especially since Ustinov, with his
experience in this area, is now defense
minister.
The secretary for defense affairs is one
of 10 party secretaries who assure the im-
plementation of all policy through the
Central Committee Secretariat headed by
Brezhnev. Most of them are full or can-
didate-members of the Politburo and
act as independent channels of infor-
mation to the Politburo.
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The next Turkish government will have to come to grips
early with the foreign exchange problem raised by the fi-
nancing over the past two years of the country's large cur-
rent-account deficit.
Turkey: A Shaky Economic Situation
for the shaky four-party coalition.
The inconclusive election results have
left open the question of who will head the
new government, although opposition
leader Bulent Ecevit is getting the first try
at assembling a cabinet. This week, Ecevit
gained President Koruturk's approval for
a minority government limited to his par-
ty, but it is by no means certain that he
can win the necessary vote of confidence
in parliament. His party is 12 votes short
of a working majority in the National
Assembly.
Whether Ecevit or Demirel is the new
prime minister probably is less crucial to
the shape of economic policy than
whether National Salvation Party leader
The Turkish government that finally
emerges from the current post-election
negotiations will face a critical foreign ex-
change shortage within the next six
months unless it obtains outside help. The
timing of the shortage will depend on how
long Ankara can hold up payments for
imports and how long foreign bankers are
willing to maintain deposits of foreign
currency in Turkish banks.
Turkey has financed nearly half of its
cumulative $4.2-billion current-account
deficit in 1975-1976 through so-called
convertible lira deposits. Deposits totaling
$600 million must be repaid or renewed
before September; Turkey currently has
only $650 million in foreign exchange
reserves. The country narrowly avoided a
balance-of-payments crisis a few weeks
before the June 5 parliamentary election,
largely because of a credit from West
Germany.
Turkey now has exhausted readily
available sources of financing. Creditors
and potential creditors are telling Turkish
officials that Ankara will first have to
begin negotiations for assistance from the
International Monetary Fund. With a
much larger share of its foreign debt in
private hands than ever before, the Turks
are beginning to recognize that conditions
for renewing this debt may be stringent.
Discussions with the IMF will take
time. For more than a year, the old
government headed by Suleyman Demirel
did not permit IMF representatives in the
country, fearing their policy recommen-
dations would be politically unworkable
Erbakan, who has been serving as deputy
prime minister, is once again in the
government. Erbakan is an autarkist and
obstructionist.
Erbakan resents even more than most
Turks outside "interference" in the coun-
try's affairs and would probably resist go-
ing to the IMF. Both Ecevit and Demirel
would attempt to minimize possible con-
ditions for aid; Erbakan's presence in a
cabinet headed by either one of them
would permit that government even less
leeway for negotiating.
Turkey's decision to finance its current-
account deficit, rather than reduce it,
reflects the political circumstances faced
by weak coalition and caretaker
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gove-nments during the last four years.
All parties have been bent on pushing
rapic economic growth and building up
Turkish military forces despite the steep
rise in oil prices and the world recession.
None of the political parties was willing
to jeopardize its position by dampening
import demand. Retail petroleum prices,
for example, are still at 1973 levels. The
US arms embargo put further strain on
the balance of payments as the Turks
begat shopping for weapons in Western
Europe where they cannot get as
favorable terms.
'T'urkish leaders apparently have done
little to prepare themselves or their people
for the austerity measures the new govern-
ment will have to adopt to restore the
country's credit rating. At this stage, the
leaders apparently only envisage con-
tinuing the past practice cf frequent small
currency devaluations.
Ankara probably would accept IMF
recommendations for limits on the growth
of domestic credit and the money supply,
but would strongly reject curbs on
military spending. The government might
accept limits on nonmilitary spending if
they did not involve substantial cuts in
politically sensitive programs such as
price subsidies. Ecevit, who is strongly
supported by labor, reportedly is con-
sidering a "social contract" in order to
restrain wage hikes, but he has not spelled
out any details.
Regardless of what steps Ankara takes,
the country is in for a period of slower
economic growth. Without additional
foreign assistance, Turkey would have to
slash imports-possibly by direct controls
on nonmilitary goods. With foreign
assistance and a moderate austerity
program, the cuts would be more gradual
and less severe. Restoration of US
military aid could partially ease the
foreign exchange shortage but only if the
Turks decided to cut back on purchases of
West European arms.
Inflation and unemployment probably
will increase. Devaluation of the Turkish
lira would immediately raise the cost of
imports and subsequently retail prices. In
addition, wage pressures remain strong
despite very high unemployment. The
West European nations that have been
outlets for surplus Turkish labor are
themselves troubled by high unemploy-
ment and continue to send Turkish
workers home.
Increasing mechanization, irrigation, and use of chemicals
have enabled China to boost food production significantly since
1960, but meeting food needs will become increasingly difficult
unless the. population growth rate is reduced.
(China: Agrotechnology Boosts Food Production
Since the early 1960s, when China
shiftel priorities to favor agricultural
technology, about 30 percent of its
cultivated land has been transformed
from traditional to substantially modern-
ized agriculture. The result has been
progressively higher grain harvests, which
have enabled China to reach near self-suf-
ficiency in food production, to reduce
malnutrition, and at least to keep pace
with the needs of a population of perhaps
900 n-illion people.
Modernization of agriculture will con-
tinue to be given highest priority during
the current five-year plan (1976-1980) and
for the foreseeable future. Although no
breakthroughs are in sight and some over-
ly ambitious goals appear out of reach,
China's agricultural production will con-
tinue to grow with the application of ad-
ditional modern techniques, which are es-
sential for raising yields per unit of land.
It will be a continuing problem, however,
to supply food for China's growing pop-
ulation, which is increasing at the rate of
about 2 percent a year.
Technological developments in China's
agriculture have been in three main areas:
agricultural chemicals, irrigation, and
mechanization. Much of the increase in
China's grain production since 1960, well
over 100 million tons, can be attributed to
an increase in the use of chemical fer-
tilizers and to fertilizer-responsive
varieties of rice and wheat. China's many
small fertilizer factories, which are
located near the agricultural areas, have
played a significant role in these increases.
Further fertilizer-induced increases are
dependent, however, on the output of a
number of imported ammonia-urea
plants, which will not be fully operational
until next year. These plants will double
nitrogen production capability and will be
vital to the rapid increases in grain
production that China is looking for.
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Although complementary additions of
water, improved seed, and a balance of
nutrients may not be sufficient initially for
optimum results, grain production could
reach 300 million tons by 1980, a 10 to 12
percent increase over the 1976 harvest.
Pest Control
The Chinese appear to provide good
crop protection, although in ways that
require a great deal of manpower. They
know what compounds to use, how to
apply them, and how to regulate the
dosage. Their pest control measures save
about 10 to 15 percent of China's total
food crop production. Further
refinements, such as more sophisticated
pesticides, modern application equip-
ment, tractors for deep plowing, and the
expansion of these measures to include all
of China's agricultural areas, could
probably increase crop yields an ad-
ditional 10 percent.
The widespread use of toxic chemicals
against pests, however, has brought the
Chinese the same problems of chemical
residues and insect resistance found in the
US and other major agricultural coun-
tries. One basic weakness in China's pest
control program is its poor capability for
developing new types of agricultural
chemicals, even though the need for such
compounds will grow in the coming
decade as Chinese agriculture becomes
more modernized. Increased demand is
likely to make the Chinese more depen-
dent on the West for technology to
produce pesticides.
Irrigation
The Chinese assert that their
agricultural self-sufficiency is largely the
result of an intensive program started in
1958 that emphasized the leveling and
grading of the Yangtze Delta and the
North China Plain and the establishment
of irrigation systems. The expansion of
irrigation during this period was due more
to China's massive labor force than to ad-
vances in technology.
Certain mechanical improvements,
however, did contribute significantly to
food production. One important
technological advance was the introduc-
tion of power pumps that made it possible
A demonstration of new irrigation equipment
to use ground water on a large scale. By
1974, there were 1.3 million powered wells
in China, mostly in the northern regions,
providing a source of irrigation water that
was virtually nonexistent in the early
1960s. The pumps also assist in the move-
ment of water to the fields and in the
drainage of the fields.
High agricultural productivity in much
of northern China still depends on finding
adequate supplies of water, Even so, the
irrigation inprovements in the North
China Plain in the early 1970s have
created a great potential for increases in
the yields of wheat and corn in the next
decade.
Mechanization
To date, farm machines have had only a
small effect on food production in China.
This effect has not been reflected directly
in higher crop yields per hectare, but in-
directly in the form of a higher multiple
cropping index.
Unlike the situation in the US and the
USSR, where mechanization is designed
to save labor, China's farm machines are
basically time-saving devices that speed
planting and harvesting and permit better
use of the land. The resulting ability to ex-
tend cultivation from one crop per year to
double cropping or to nearly continuous
cropping serves to increase output.
The government is now stressing
mechanization, and the amount and vari-
ety of agricultural machinery produced in
China are likely to rise rapidly over the next
five years. This will continue to have a
small positive effect on food production to
the extent that multiple cropping is ex-
panded and farm labor is freed for other
15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A011500250001-9
 Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A011500250001-9
Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A011500250001-9
 Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A011500250001-9
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A011500250001-9