WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011400090001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 20, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
On file Department of Agriculture release instructions apply.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
CI WS 76-034
No. 0034/76
August 20, 1976
Copy N2 1421
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rnents of the week through noon on Thursday, it
ncludes material coordinated with or prepared
Current intelligence, reports and analyzes signifi.
SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
nd the Directorate of Science and Technology,
CONTENTS
t "slit . qe F. t - Africa
E , ,anon; Rhodesia
Turkey; Spain;
International
OEC
Wes'rn Hemisphere
Ar:ientina
6 Fast Asia - Pacific
North Korea; Thailand
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly
Summary,
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LEBANON /
The fall of Tall Zatar refugee camp to
Lebanese Christian forces late last week
sparked an immediate upsurge of violence
in Beirut, but most areas of the country
have experienced an uneasy calm this
week as all sides consider their next
moves.
Although the Christian take-over of
Tall Zatar was a major psychological blow
to the Palestinians, the camp had become
a strategic liability, and its fall has now
freed Palestinian forces of the burden of
defending fixed positions in predominant-
ly Christian areas. Other refugee camps
are protected by surrounding
Muslim-held territory. The Palestinians
apparently now intend to fight a more
mobile war, using terrorist and other hit-
and-run tactics.
.Tripoli
oE1RU
Tall Zatar
Despite their bitterness over Tall Zatar,
Yasir Arafat and other less radical
Palestinian leaders still seem prepared to
negotiate. They told the Christians this
week that they remain willing to evacuate
Christian villages in the mountains east of
Beirut voluntarily, but only as part of an
overall agreement including a country-
wide cease-fire enforced by Arab League
troops and guarantees for the security of
certain Muslim and Druze villages in
Christian areas.
Since the fall of the camp, both the
Christians and the Syrians have shown
greater sensitivity to charges that they are
conspiring to liquidate the Palestinians.
For the moment, the Syrians and
Christians seem reluctant to undertake
any dramatic new moves against their
adversaries and apparently have delayed
plans to launch a joint offensive against
Palestinian and leftist positions in the
mountains. Although the Christians an-
nounced early this week that an attack
was under way, there has been little
significant military activity in the area.
The arrival late last week at the
southern port of Tyre of Iraqi rein-
forcements for the Palestinians and left-
ists-which may have included as many
as 2,000 Iraqi militiamen-has prompted
the Christians and Syrians to send fresh
troops to their southernmost position at
Jazzin.
The arrival of the Iraqis appears also to
have prompted the Israelis to step up their
RHODESIA
Most military action in Rhodesia
remains centered along the country's
border with Mozambique, but Rhodesian
security forces are giving increasing atten-
tion to the Zambian and Botswanan
borders, along which small bands of
guerrillas have become more active in re-
cent months. This activity has added to
the difficulties of the security forces,
whose manpower resources have already
been stretched by rebel attacks along the
Mozambican border.
Zambian support for the guerrillas has
been increasing. Small guerrilla units
began infiltrating northwestern Rhodesia
from Zambia last June. President Kaunda
probably still intends to restrict Zambian
military involvement in the hope of
avoiding Rhodesian retaliatory raids, but
earlier this month a Zambian soldier
reportedly was killed as Zambian troops
provided cover for guerrillas retreating
across the border from an ambush by
Rhodesian security forces.
Rhodesian troops apparently have
crossed into Botswana in search of Zam-
bia-based guerrillas who have been enter-
ing Rhodesia through Botswanan
territory. The Botswanan government has25X1
charged that Rhodesian forces entered
Botswana three times recently to in-
terrogate local villagers and look for
guerrillas. There were no reports of
casualties.
Most of the insurgent activity along the
Zambian and Botswanan borders is
probably the work of Joshua Nkomo's
Rhodesian nationalist faction. Guerrillas
loyal to Nkomo have deserted from in-
surgent bases in Mozambique, which are
dominated by a rival faction.
Paae 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Auci 20. 76
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f aperatiart;J ro~z,
/";V1,, jp Dardanelles
GREECE-TURKEY 2
Greece and Turkey traded charges at
the UN Security Council last week over
their policies in the Aegean, but the
chances for a clash over Turkish seismic
exploration in contested areas of the sea
appear temporarily to have diminished.
The return of the Turkish research ship
Sismik I to port on August 15 for
maintenance and resupply had prompted
speculation that the third leg of the ship's
itinerary would take it into even more sen-
sitive areas, thereby increasing the
chances for an incident. In fact, however,
the ship's new area of operation, as an-
nounced on August 17, is in and around
Kusadasi Bay.
The area includes a zone outside
Turkish territorial waters, but appears to
avoid any of the overlapping
50 Miles
50
50 Kilometers
Greek-Turkish oil concessions that stirred
controversy over the Sismik's second
region of operation farther north. The
ship set out for the designated area
August 19 amid indications its journey
might be limited to four days owing to a
need for additional repairs.
Ankara's dispatch of the ship to a less
sensitive area may be the result of
backstage negotiations at the UN, where
some of the major allies of the two coun-
tries are attempting to formulate a resolu-
tion acceptable to both.
Such a resolution would presumably
call for restraint and for a peaceful settle-
ment of the dispute by a combination of
bilateral negotiations and international
adjudication. The Turks may also have
concluded that they have made their point
and do not want to test further the limits
of Greece's resolve to defend its claims.
The Greeks, for their part, seem to be
concentrating on securing a favorable UN
resolution; they are also preparing to de-
fend formally their unilateral appeal to
the International Court of Justice next
TURKEY
Sismik J area of operation
beginning August 19
week. They apparently intend in the
meantime to continue the surveillance of
the Sismik to which the Turks earlier ob-
jected.
Both Greece and Turkey are apparently
reducing the alert status of some of their
armed forces, although key units are still
at a high state of readiness.. The Greeks 25X1
have reduced the air force alert, and
Turkish forces may respond by reducing
SPAIN 3/- 33
The new Spanish government has ap-
parently made progress toward winning
the support of the democratic opposition
for its liberalization program.
Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez has
made a point of consulting opposition
figures-notably Socialist leader Felipe
Gonzalez and Christian Democrat Joa-
quin Ruiz Gimenez-on the shape of the
proposed constitutional referendum. Both
opposition leaders have recently told US
embassy officials that they were im-
pressed by Suarez' good will and by his
commitment to hold democratic elections.
The Prime Minister told Gonzalez that
the government's current thinking on the
referendum is to present to the voters
several basic, largely philosophical
questions asking whether they want a
democratic system, a parliament elected
by direct universal suffrage, and free trade
unions-an approach similar to that ad-
vocated by many opposition groups.
Suarez hopes that the general questions
will be more easily approved by the
rightist-dominated parliament than the
specific proposals advocated by former
prime minister Arias. Armed with a
strong popular mandate on the basic lines
of reform, the government will proceed to
carry out the details by decree law, and
parliamentary elections will be held, as
promised, by next June.
Gonzalez believes that Suarez intends
to continue with his consultations and that
the opposition should decide on a
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negotiating team of 10 to 12 represen-
tatives empowered to deal with the
government. Government resistance
would preclude Communist participation
on the team, but Gonzalez is confident
that the Communists would accept the
proposal as long as they were consulted
regularly by the opposition negotiating
group.
The Socialist leader expressed concern
about the government's apparent lack of
full control over the security forces and
the possibility that ultra-rightists in the
military hierarchy might take it upon
themselves to try to halt these steps
toward reform.
Rightist military intervention could be
precipitated, for example, by a general
referendum-which would be contrary to
constitutional practice under Franco,
when only specific laws were submitted to
the people. Die-hards in the military could
read this-correctly-as a move by the
government to free itself of holdover in-
stitutional restraints and gain a free hand
to initiate wide-ranging reforms.
Another possible cause for military in-
tervention would be widespread labor un-
rest this fall, but Gonzalez is optimistic
that there will be no serious challenge to
order because the workers will likely be
too concerne with keeping their jobs in
the o r~j 9 economic slump.
i
u
E
I
es
s Mews
r
c
o
economic package announced
1 recently by Spain's new cabinet will
aggravate inflation, increase the budget
deficit, and worsen trade problems. The
only measure not likely to add to the
already high rate of inflation is a subsidy
program designed to hold down food
prices. We do not believe that the
program is expansionary enough to cut
unemployment.
Under the new package, Madrid has
authorized extraordinary budget expen-
ditures of $353 million, financed by Bank
of Spain credits, to prop up employment,
agriculture, and investment. Unemploy-
ment benefits will be extended from 12 to
18 months, but will be partially offset by
lower accident compensation. New in-
dustries are to be created in areas of high
Adolfo Suarez V Q1
unemployment. A three-year housing con-
struction program, at a cost of $118
million the first year, will be financed
jointly by government and private funds.
Home buyers will receive mortgage
subsidies and tax credits. A corporate tax
credit is to be offered to spur investment
in economically depressed regions and in
mining, iron and steel production, ship-
building, and agriculture. Taxes will be
suspended on stock and insurance
purchases to tap private savings and in-
crease the flow of investable funds to in-
dustry.
Farmers
assistance
will receive government loan
and increased subsidies to
purchase seed, cattle, and feed and to
offset recently hiked fertilizer prices. All
these measures will fuel inflation, making
ultimate stablization more difficult.
The governor of the Bank of Spain has
indicated that anti-recession measures are
unlikely before the referendum on
political reform and the election promised
by June. As a result, he believes the
economic situation will worsen.
USSR 4z-
Soviet grain prospects remain good as
of early August, and we continue to es-
timate production at 195 million tons.
The US Department of Agriculture's
estimate, released last week, also
remains at 195 million tons. This would
approximate the 1974 harvest-the
USSR's second largest grain crop-and
represent a strong recovery from last
year's disastrous 140-million-ton harvest.
As a result, Soviet grain purchases this
calendar year are likely to be only half of
what they were last year. The forecasts
assume normal weather through
harvesting.
Two events have occurred, however,
that may require a reduction in the es-
timate when further information becomes
available. Rain in European Russia dur-
ing the critical flowering and filling stage
of spring grain development may have cut
yields in some areas, and dry conditions in
the northern Caucasus and southern
25X1
ields
t corn
h
h
y
ur
ave
Ukraine may
. By early this month, wet weather had
delayed the start of the winter grain
harvest by 10 to 14 days in many areas,
and harvest operations are just beginning
in Belorussia and other areas of northern
150 million tons, second only to the
25X1
record 1973 spring grain harvest.
Confirmed Soviet purchases of grain
for delivery during the coming marketing
year total about 10 million tons-plus 2
million tons of soybeans; an additional 2
million tons of grain purchases are as yet
unconfirmed. Of the confirmed amount of
grain and soybeans, 8.6 million tons will
come from the US, 2 million from
Canada, I million from Australia, and the
remainder from New Zealand and Brazil.
Under the US-USSR grain agreement,
Moscow must import at least 6 million
tons of US grain from October 1976
through September 1977. So far, 4.4
million tons are scheduled for that time
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tinue the process of lessening tensions and
normalizing relations with Bonn.
West German Chancellor Schmidt is
caught in the middle. The opposition
Christian Democrats have criticized the
government for its failure to protect the
interests of West Germany and West
Berlin. The Chancellor has defended his
policy of seeking better relations with
East Germany, asserting that "only
negotiations, not torch processions"
promise to improve life in divided Ger-
many.
The closeness of the election contest
will tempt opposition leaders to keep the
issue in the forefront. Chancellor-can-
didate Helmut Kohl has already called for
economic sanctions against the East Ger-
mans and is urging Foreign Minister
Genscher to dramatize the border in-
GERMANY,,/* 4 I ` 1
17 ug
East Germany continues its t
stance on border inviolability and the
"realities" of the German issue, despite
the resulting strains on relations with
West Germany. The Honecker regime is
embarrassed by international reaction to
recent border incidents involving fatal
shootings by East German border guards
but is determined to assert its right to de-
fend its frontiers.
East Berlin marked the 15th anniver-
sary of the Berlin Wall on August 13 with
a dress review of militia units by
Honecker and most of the Politburo. In
an anniversary speech, East Berlin party
boss Konrad Naumann stressed East Ger-
many's readiness to defend itself against
the increasingly frequent border
provocations. The ceremonies contrasted
with the low-key observance of the an-
niversary over the past several years.
Later the same day, East German
border guards turned back several
busloads of West Germans on their way
to a Christian Democratic rally in West
Berlin to protest the Wall. Bonn has
protested this action, which violates the
1972 East-West German agreement on
transit traffic.
After basking in the Olympic spotlight
last month, East Germany now finds itself
on the defensive and assailed as a
trigger-happy nation and violator of inter-
nationally guaranteed human rights. Un-
comfortable as the situation is, party
leaders in East Berlin have little choice
but to reaffirm their determination to
prevent provocations from the West.
At the same time, they have stressed
that East Germany is prepared to con-
Routine traffic and control on the Heinrich Heine Street
checkpoint in Berlin on August 13
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cidents when he presents the government's
proposal for the creation of a human
rights commission at the UN this fall
We expect oil exports from members of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries to rise by I million barrels per
day this quarter-the same as during the
first two quarters of 1976. The increase
from October to December may be even
greater as importers attempt to build
stocks in anticipation of another price
hike in December.
Earnings from oil for the year will
probably total $124 billion, almost $20
Excesses committed in Argentina's
drive against leftist subversion have
drawn strong reactions from foreign
governments, possibly jeopardizing
needed foreign financial assistance, and
are seriously eroding the good will
which Argentines have generally dis-
played toward the military junta that
took power in March.
A number of friendly governments have
been highly critical of the arbitrary arrest
or disappearance of dozens of foreign
nationals in the past several weeks. Some
foreigners have been arrested and charged
with subversive political activity; others
have simply dropped out of sight.
Italy, France, and West Germany have
tried in vain to secure the release of or at
least obtain information about the status
of more than 50 of their citizens.
Israel and the US have been more
successful. Tel Aviv, after prolonged
heavy pressure, secured the release of five
of its nationals, who have remained in
Argentina with no further apparent
problems.
The US embassy lodged a formal
protest over its inability to gain consular
access to a US priest. A consular official
billion above the 1975 level. OPEC's
current-account surplus totaled $11.6
billion in the January to March period, up
$2.7 billion from last year's quarterly
average. This was due in part to reduced
expenditures for imports.
Preliminary data for the second quarter
also indicate a hefty increase in the value
of OPEC imports; shipments to all the
major oil producers except Kuwait are ris-
ing rapidly. Saudi, Iranian, Venezuelan,
and Nigerian purchases seem to be pick-
ing up most rapidly.
was finally permitted to see him this week,
and the priest has now left the country.
Domestic concern is also growing for
the hundreds-perhaps thousands-of
Argentines who have vanished without a
trace since the coup. There is also in-
creased pressure for the government to
settle the cases of Peronist labor and
political leaders arrested immediately
after the take-over.
Failure to settle such cases is difficult
for the junta to explain, since it has long
claimed to have ironclad evidence of
criminal wrongdoing against virtually all
those in custody.
As rightist excesses have mounted, the
government has become steadily more
defensive. A recent example of its sen-
sitivity was the brief arrest of former
president Lanusse. He had criticized the
government's treatment of a university
professor who had served in his cabinet
and now is accused of having leftist sym-
pathies.
Neither domestic nor external pressure
is expected to alter the aggressive thrust of
the junta's countersubversive program.
The successes against terrorists in recent
weeks only tend to convince the tough-
minded officers that their way is correct.
The so-called "hard-line" critics of
President Videla's moderate preferences
are, at least temporarily, being in effect 25X1
vindicated. The President is not likely to
challenge the advocates of the harsh ap-
proach at this time.
For 1976 as a whole, we expect the
aggregate OPEC current-account surplus
to total about $41 billion, compared with
$34 billion for 1975. This should increase
the foreign assets held by OPEC members
from $100 billion on January Ito perhaps
$135 billion by the end of the year.
Reserves held by member countries
would then be nearly half again as large
as the combined reserves of the seven ma- 25X1
jor developed countries-the US, West
Germany, Japan, the UK, France, Italy,
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NORTH KOREA 63
The excessive violence of North Korean
guards near Panmunjom on Wednesday
seems intended to accomplish two objec-
tives:
? To underscore North Korea's
general diplomatic case that the US is
the major source of tensions in
Korea-an argument being made now
at the nonaligned meeting in Sri Lanka
and one that will be made later at the
UN this fall.
? To arouse US public opinion
about the US troop presence in Korea
in the midst of the election campaign.
Since early this spring, North Korean
propaganda has charged almost daily that
the US is introducing new weapons into
the South, conducting provocative
military exercises, and keeping South
Korean armed forces on a war footing. In
an unusually high-level statement on
August 5, Pyongyang alleged that the US
and South Korea had "completed" war
preparations.
North Korean President Kim 11-song
almost certainly does not intend to
resume the confrontation policy of the
late 1960s, in which the North Koreans
staged hundreds of armed violations of
the Demilitarized Zone. Nor is he likely
to undertake high-risk military
provocations, either in the zone or against
South Korean garrisons on islands in the
Yellow Sea, which might result in serious
clashes with South Korean forces.
Should Pyongyang perceive the begin-
ning of a debate in the US over the ad-
visability of maintaining US troops in
Korea, however, further controlled acts of
violence can be expected.
The North Koreans respect the South's
military capabilities. Blatant North
Korean military provocations would un-
dercut Pyongyang's political strategy of
portraying the US and the South as the
aggressors. This strategy is intended to
discredit the government of South Korea
and to build international pressure for a
withdrawal of US forces.
Pyongyang radio has called the Pan-
munjom incident a "US provocation" and
warned that any future incidents would be
met forcefully. On August 19, one broad-
cast, taking note of the "emergency alert"
of US forces in Korea, announced that
North Korea was ordering its armed
forces into "combat readiness."
At a meeting of the Military Armistice
Command called by the UN Command to
discuss Wednesday's incident, the North
Koreans did not elevate the level of invec-
tive or make additional threats.
THAILAND (Q - ~ 2-
The Seni Pramot government, already
under attack in the press for its lack of
leadership, had its image further tarnished
this week by its inept handling of the un-
authorized return on August 15 of exiled
former military strong man Field
Marshal Praphat.
Prime Minister Seni confirmed
Praphat's surprise arrival one day, denied 25X6
it the next, and finally admitted that
Praphat was indeed in Thailand.
Praphat,
was the focus of
e s u ent uprising in 1973 that brought
down the military regime. His surrep-
titious re-entry, ostensibly for medical
attention but obviously assisted by some
of his former military colleagues,
galvanized the fragmented student move-
ment into holding rallies demanding his
expulsion or arrest.
According to a government statement,
Praphat agreed August 19 to leave within
a week "for the sake of the country's
peace and order," and this should defuse 25X1
the situation. The episode nevertheless has
left the government concerned over the
implications of support for Praphat
within the army.
The military has increasing impatience
with what it views as an inefficient civilian
government. It is clear that Praphat could
not have entered the country without the
support of at least some groups in the 25X1
army hoping the turmoil created by his
presence would lead to the government's
collapse.
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Peking is becoming more defensive in its policy toward
black Africa as a result of Moscow's success in Angola and the
consequent receptiveness of other black nationalist movements
to Soviet blandishments. Such Chinese successes as the
Tan-Zam Railroad cannot offset Peking's concern about its in-
fluence in Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and
Rhodesia.
Black Africa, once an area o Chinese
foreign policy success where modest in-
vestments returned fairly sizable
dividends, is now becoming a source of
considerable concern to Peking. Soviet
policy success in Angola has made the
difference.
For Peking, Angola represented a test
of US resolve to resist the expansion of
Soviet influence. China's focus at present,
however, is more narrow. Peking sees
Angola as the reflection of a decision by
Moscow to raise the ante in Sino-Soviet
rivalry throughout Africa, particularly in
the southern tier of black-ruled states.
The Chinese are unsure of their ability to
protect their hard-won gains in the region.
Sino-Soviet competition is nothing new
to the African scene. Even before Angola,
the Chinese had come out second best in
such countries, as Somalia, Guinea, and
Uganda. Given the political isolation of
those governments from the African
mainstream, Peking appeared fairly re-
laxed about the prospect of Moscow's
using such peripheral footholds as step-
ping stones to wider regional influence.
By contrast, the Chinese plainly
recognize Angola's key position and read
ominous implications into the nature and
circumstance of the successful Soviet
efforts there. Peking plainly calculates,
for example, that the vast majority of
African leaders-no matter what their
public position on Angola-have been im-
pressed by Moscow's willingness to assist
friends on a front far removed from
traditional areas of Soviet interest.
Although the Chinese attempted to
rationalize their disengagement from
Angola on "moral" grounds, they
Peking Looks at Southern Africa
probably are aware that thoughtful
African leaders recognize that it was
necessity rather than choice-that China
lacks the basic prerequisites for quickly
and forcefully projecting its influence into
distant areas and is simply outclassed by
the USSR in tests of power politics, such
as Angola.
Even more disturbing to Peking is the
growing attraction to black Africans of
Soviet promises of economic and political
support. The disastrous effect of the world
recession on many African economies, a
related and growing disillusionment with
the returns from African support for
third-world positions, and the heightened
prospects for military confrontation both
with the white minority governments in
the south and between the Africans
themselves have all served to make the
regional black governments more recep-
tive to Soviet overtures.
China itself took advantage of similar
post-colonial political and economic fer-
ment in the 1950s and early 1960s to make
inroads in Africa. Now, however, the
Chinese have vested interests to protect
and clearly view the trend toward regional
instability as creating openings that
Moscow will be better able to exploit.
Black Nationalism
China is particularly concerned about
its interests in Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania,
Mozambique, and the southern African
liberation movements. Support for those
movements has long been central to
China's regional effort, both as a means of
retaining a "revolutionary" aura for its
African policy and of cementing relations
with black African leaders.
Peking believes that historical tides are
on the side of black nationalists and has
also undertaken its policy investments
with an eye toward an eventual payoff in
direct influence with black successor
governments.
China's long-standing links to the
Southwest African People's Organization
in Namibia are directly threatened both
by the new Cuban and Soviet proximity in
adjacent Angola and by the im-
pressionable SWAPO leadership's more
favorable view of Moscow.
Of even more concern to Peking is its
considerably larger and more important
stake in the Rhodesian insurgency. The
Soviets and Chinese have competed for
influence within the Rhodesian movement
since the 1950s, with China giving ex-
clusive and consistent support to the more
militant faction-the group whose
members now constitute the bulk of the
insurgent fighting force.
China's political ties with the Rhode-
sian insurgents have been blurred by the
efforts of black African leaders to mold
the rival guerrilla factions into a unified
force. Peking has maintained direct access
to the insurgent rank and file, however,
primarily through Tanzania, where
Chinese advisers participate in Tanzanian
training programs for the Rhodesian
guerrillas and where Chinese arms are dis-
tributed under the auspices of the Lib-
eration Committee of the Organization of
African Unity.
Were it not for Angola, Peking would
take an optimistic view of the decision by
Rhodesian insurgents to forgo
negotiations in favor of a military solu-
tion. Now, however, the Chinese are
clearly unsure of their ability to prevent
Moscow and Havana from building on
their own Angolan success and achieving
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Julius Nyerere c Rg
major gains in Rhodesia at Peking's ex-
pense.
The Mozambican Experience
Much of the Chinese insecurity in this
regard is related to Cuban and Soviet in-
roads into China's standing in Mozam-
bique-the base for the vast majority of
regional insurgent forces. Until recently,
Peking had the inside track on influence
in Mozambique's FRELIMO liberation
movement. The Chinese imprint was con-
spicuous as late as last summer on the
social and economic programs of Presi-
dent Machel, and a $55-million Chinese
economic development loan is the largest
Mozambique has received.
In the past six months, it has become
increasingly obvious that the "clemonstra-
tion effect" of Angola has been par-
ticularly profound in Machel's case. Even
before the back-to-back visits to Moscow
earlier this summer by Machel and his
defense minister, Chinese officials in
eastern Africa were wringing their hands
over Mozambique's "relaxed attitude"
toward the Soviets and Cubans.
In the wake of the Moscow visits, it is
plain that the Soviets have greatly im-
proved their positions in Mozambique
and have developed a link of their own to
the Rhodesian insurgents.
Under these circumstances, the Chinese
are clearly banking heavily on the
maintenance of continued close relations
with Tanzania to assure them a channel to
the insurgents. Peking was on the opposite
side of the Angolan question from Tanza-
nian President Nyerere, who, along with
Machel of Mozambique, supported the
Soviet-backed Popular Movement.
Nyerere has remained wary, however,
of the Soviets and Cubans, going on
public record as opposing "Angola-type"
foreign involvement in Rhodesia.
Despite having signed a $74-million
Soviet military assistance package in
1974, Nyerere continues to look to China
for the bulk of his economic and military
aid, and it was he who urged the Rhode-
sian guerrillas last year to rely exclusively
on Chinese advisers in their training
programs. Nyerere has apparently in-
sisted on this policy for the training ac-
tivities conducted under Tanzanian aegis.
Zairian, Zambian Problems
Peking clearly perceives the threat of
Soviet gains looming every bit as large in
Zaire and Zambia. As major aid donors
to and political intimates of presidents
Mobutu and Kaunda, the Chinese are
keenly aware that in both countries:
? The once prosperous copper-
based economies are in severe tailspins
under the combined pressures of
depressed world copper prices and the
closure of traditional export routes.
? The national leaderships have lost
prestige as the result both of their
ill-starred Angolan policies and of
politically unpopular domestic cost-
cutting measures.
? The physical proximity of a
still-hostile and well-armed new
government in Angola has bred a new
sense of vulnerability to external
threats.
Peking recognizes that these sobering
new realities have served to limit
Mobutu's and Kaunda's freedom of ac-
tion and to instill a new sense of
pragmatism into their foreign policies.
Both African leaders have found it ex-
pedient, for example, to submerge their
personal enmity toward the new
leadership in Angola in favor of seeking
political accommodation.
As part of this effort, Mobutu and
Kaunda have also begun to mend fences
with the Soviets and Cubans, appreciating
the sway Havana and Moscow have over
Angolan policies and not wanting to be
overlooked in any new Soviet aid.
Defensive Diplomacy
As a result, Chinese policy in Africa is
taking on defensive overtones. Almost
without exception, the Chinese have been
devoting their energies in Africa toward
three objectives:
? Discrediting Soviet intentions.
? Refueling African fears of foreign
domination.
? Strengthening China's existing
ties in the region.
i0c
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SOUTHERN AFRICA
Chinese Agreements in 1963-75 and Technicians Present in 1976
1963-75
ANGOLA
MILITARY
NegI.
ECONOMIC
--
MILITARY
NegI.
BURUNDI
2
20
--
CONGO
10
69
5
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
24
--
ETHIOPIA
86
--
GABON
KENYA
MADAGASCAR
69
MAURITIUS
35
--
MOZAMBIQUE
3
59
3
RWANDA
22
SOMALIA
133
TANZANIA
69
334
--
UGANDA
15
--
ZAIRE
7
102
ZAMBIA
4
304
--
Total
95
1315
B
Economic i Economic technicians
Military * Military technicians
SALAAM
ECONOMIC` O
RHODESIA MAURITIUS
58
--~` rADAGAS AR 135
59 I~AMI61A
Neyl.
-- ~~
--
2
24 rti?r SOUTH
168 ~.~ AFRICA
0 500 MILES
__ o \A/CCIZI V cl IKAKAARV Aua 20. 76
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There have been no major Chinese in-
itiatives in economic assistance, and Pe-
king is focusing its military assistance
grants on such established allies as Zaire
and Tanzania, and on the Rhodesian in-
surgents.
Their campaign for the most part has
been one of public and private impor-
tunings for African vigilance against the
Soviet "threat," coupled with renewed
Chinese statements of support for impor-
tant African objectives.
Ceremonies marking the transfer to
African management of the
2,000-kilometer (1,250-mile) Tan-Zam
railroad-China's largest overseas aid
venture-and several recent state visits to
China by African leaders have provided
Peking with highly visible opportunities to
make policy points.
On the whole, the adjustments in
Chinese policy have been minor. Despite
Peking's genuine concern, its response to
increased Soviet pressure will probably
remain low-key. Material constraints will
continue to limit Chinese ability to com-
pete with the Soviets in arenas that re-
quire significant commitments of
resources, and Peking's flexible, un-
demanding approach to state-to-state
relations has in general been too effective
to be abandoned.
In the present circumstances,
China can only become increasingly un-
25X1
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