WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011400050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 23, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
OSD review completed
State Dept. review completed
Secret
Cl WS 76-030
No. 0030/76
July 23, 1976
N?_ 938
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LY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligertte, reports and analyzes signifi-
cant developments of the week through iaoan on Thursday. it
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
and the Directorate of Science and Technology,
CONTENTS
1 Middle East
Lebanon; Egypt; Kuwait; Saudi Aid to Syria
3 Europe
Turkey-Greece; Spain; Italy; Poland
5 For East
China-Japan
French Territory of the
7 Vietnam: Flexibility Toward Neighbors
25X1
13 Soviet Dissidents Lament the End of an Era
15 Greece: The Caramanlis Administration
16 World Copper Industry
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LEBANON
After several false starts, Palestinian
and Syrian representatives finally met in
Damascus on July 21, but neither side
appears ready to reach an accommoda-
tion. Syrian President Asad angered
Palestinian leaders earlier in the week by
accusing them in a speech of trying to
create a "North Palestine" in southern
Lebanon. He also warned that Syria
would not withdraw its forces from
Lebanon unless asked by President Fran-
jiyah or "other legal Lebanese
authorities." Although the speech broke
no new ground, it is being widely inter-
preted as evidence that Asad's attitude
toward the Palestinians is hardening.
The Palestinians and their leftist allies
have repeatedly increased their demands
and now insist that the Syrians, as a
gesture of "good will," withdraw com-
pletely from southern and central
Lebanon before negotiations can begin in
earnest. The Syrians, in turn, have in-
sisted that the Palestinians must at a
minimum adhere to their previous
agreements with the Lebanese govern-
ment that sharply restrict fedayeen ac-
tivities.
In an attempt to induce Palestinian
leader Yasir Arafat to enter negotiations,
the Syrians pulled back from Sidon late
last week and agreed to withdraw from
Sawfar-the Syrians' forward position on
the Beirut-Damascus road. Syrian forces,
however, have not relaxed their pressure
on the Palestinians and leftists elsewhere.
Syrian forces continue to shell Tripoli
and the nearby Palestinian refugee camp
of Nahr al-Barid. They are also attemp-
ting to take some Muslim villages
overlooking the Christian stronghold of
Zagharta in the north and have provided
artillery support to a Christian effort to
retake the villages of Aynturah, Tarshish,
Tripor agharta
Mediterranean Sea Nab,:!Baidt
through, and presumably managed by, a
new body to be known as the Gulf
Organization for Development in Egypt.
We do not know how soon Egypt can
get its hands on the mone 25X1
Egypt has only
enough gold and foreign exchange on 25X1
hand to finance two weeks' imports.
Without immediate aid, Egypt would
have to rely heavily on high-cost,
short-term loans at least until November,
when cotton sales should boost foreign ex-
change receipts,
Military Discontent
In a move apparently intended to keep
the military out of politics, the People's
Assembly last week passed a bill that
effectively disenfranchises the military
and the ~police. Presidential and
parliamentary elections are scheduled for
October.
Economic Assistance
Finance ministers from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates met in Cairo last Saturday and
agreed to a draft proposal for a
Saudi-sponsored fund of $2 billion over
the next five years to bolster Egypt's
economy.
The finance ministers approved the new
aid fund despite Egypt's postponement of
economic reforms that had been
recommended by the International
Monetary Fund as a condition for its sup-
port for other international borrowing.
The new Arab fund will be channeled
By depriving military personnel of the
right to vote, the government undoubtedly
hopes to render them a less attractive
target for agitators interested in turning
out a large anti-government vote in the
elections.
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KUWAIT d 11
~s
Kuwait's deputy prime minister, Jabir
al-Ali, last week told the US ambassador
that Kuwait has agreed to purchase $300-
million worth of Soviet weapons.
Negotiations, which began last summer,
may in fact have been concluded early this
year
The status of the arms negotiations has
been difficult for us to pin down. Early in
January, the Kuwaiti finance minister an-
nounced to the press that Kuwait had con-
cluded its first arms accord with the
USSR. A week later, the armed forces
chief of staff told a senior US military of-
ficer that Kuwait had no contract with
Moscow. Reports of an impending
Soviet-Kuwaiti arms agreement persisted
throughout the spring and early summer,
but we could not confirm them.
According to the most recent informa-
tion provided by the deputy prime
minister, the arms agreement includes
Scud and Frog surface-to-surface mis-
siles. We do .not believe Moscow would
provide these missiles because of their
potential threat to Iraq. The ZSU-23-4
Deputy Prime Minister Jabir al-A ii
ZSU 23 4 23mm. self-propelled antiaircraft gun
self-propelled antiaircraft artillery
systems and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles
would be more likely. Kuwait's minister
of defense had indicated in May that sur-
face-to-air missiles would be involved in
the deal.
The deputy prime minister stated that
most of the advisers needed to train
Kuwaitis to use these weapons would be
brought in from Egypt and Syria and that
Soviet advisers would be kept to a
minimum. The minister of defense had in-
dicated earlier that Egyptian and Syrian
advisers would assume a principal role.
Some 90 Kuwaitis went to Cairo in late
April for air defense training.
The agreement would be Kuwait's first
major arms deal with a communist coun-
try. It would also mark Moscow's first en-
trance into the lucrative market of conser-
vative Persian Gulf states that have given
Western arms suppliers about $10-billion
worth of orders since 1973.
The decision to purchase Soviet
weapons, according to the deputy prime
minister, was taken to counter National
Assembly criticism of the concentration
of Kuwait's arms purchases in the West.
He said Kuwait's military would continue
to rely on Western sources for major
defensive weapons systems and military
training. Kuwait has a Hawk surface-
to.-air missile system on order from the
Saudi Aid to Syria
Saudi Arabia has agreed to provide a
$200-million grant and a $100-million
loan to Syria. Syria's willingness to reach
a limited accommodation with the Egyp-
tians at the Saudi-sponsored reconcilia-
tion meeting in Riyadh last month and
Saudi concern that political and financial
pressures may topple President Asad
from power prompted the renewal of
assistance.
Syria will still need $250 million in
assistance this year in addition to the $300
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million pledged by the Saudis,.if it is to
continue a military role in Lebanon and
maintain its economic development
program.
The smaller Persian Gulf
states-which, tike the Saudis, had cut off
aid to Syria during the first half of this
year-will probably provide some of the
needed funds.. For the moment, however,
the Kuwaitis are : still holding back
because of strop Palestinian influence
there.
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TURKEY-GREECE
The Turkish research vessel Sismik I
appears ready to leave Istanbul for the
Aegean within the next few days. Greece
continues to maintain a watchful eye and
remains suspicious of Turkish intentions,
but Greek officials may be looking for
ways to avoid an incident.
In a press interview on July 21, Turkish
Prime Minister Demirel said he was
"hopeful" the ship would sail this week.
Press reports assert the Turkish navy has
announced restrictions on navigation and
aviation in an area at the Aegean end of
the Dardanelles for the periods July 21 to
22 and July 28 to 30. The US consulate in
Izmir reports that the scheduled stop of a
Greek cruise ship there has been canceled
this week, allegedly because of naval
restrictions.
There has been considerable specula-
tion in the Turkish press in recent days
that both Greece and Turkey have put or
intend to put military units on alert.
Public tension in Greece over t e
Aegean question has recently subsided
somewhat, but Greek officials continue to
follow developments concerning the
Sismik I with grave concern. Turkey's
continued vagueness about the ship's ex-
act course once it reaches the Aegean
heightens Greek concern.
The Greek government issued a state-
ment on July 20 outlining its interpreta-
tion of portions of the 1958 Geneva con-
tinental shelf convention relevant to the
current Aegean dispute. The statement
seemed to be phrased to permit Athens a
range of responses depending on Sismik
I's activities. Press coverage of the
statement-following a government
"background" session with
reporters-noted that three areas are of
particular concern to Greece-the waters
around the islands of Limnos, Lesbos, and
Rhodes.
SPAIN
The program announced by the new
Spanish cabinet does not differ markedly
in its major provisions from that of the
previous government, but its tone goes
further toward appeasing the opposition
and cutting ties with the far right.
The statement issued late last week by
Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez and his
cabinet calls for a referendum and a
legislative election before next July. Over-
tures to the left are apparent in the
emphasis on "national reconciliation"-a
codeword of considerable importance to
the opposition-and in the declaration
that sovereignty resides in the people.
The cabinet committed itself to:
? "Accept criticism" and recognize
that "civilized dissidence is a service to
the community."
? Accelerate labor reform.
? Maintain a dialogue with the op-
position.
In an epilogue to its policy statement,
25X1
25X1
the government met a key opposition de-
mand by recommending that King Juan
Carlos grant amnesty to nonterrorist
political prisoners. The opposition has25X1
made political amnesty a primary condi
tion for its cooperation with the
government's reform program.
These concessions to the sensitivities of
the left contrast with former prime
minister Arias' efforts to placate the right.
The new program has been favorably
received by the democratic op-
position-with the reservation that ac-
tions will speak louder than words. A
leader of the major democratic opposition
group, the Socialist Workers Party, told
US embassy officials that the vague wor-
ding of several sections, including the one
on the referendum, is a good sign since it
leaves room for the negotiations that the
government has offered to open with the
left.
Sharp criticism of the program by the
Communist Party indicates that the
government has succeeded, in this in-
stance at least, in isolating the Com-
munists from the democratic opposition.
By appeasing the left Suarez has an-
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tagonized the far right, which has reacted
strongly to the program. In order to avoid
haggling in the rightist-dominated parlia-
ment, where the penal reform bill en-
countered stiff opposition before it was
finally passed last week, the government
may decide to use the proposed referen-
dum to seek broad popular approval for
liberalization. Armed with this mandate,
Suarez could implement the details of the
reform program by decree.
Prime Minister Designate Andreotti is
in the midst of a second round of con-
sultations on a new government. Most
signs point to the formation of a minority
Christian Democratic government to pre-
side at least until autumn.
The Socialist Party, preoccupied with
internal problems stemming from its poor
performance in the election last month,
remains the principal stumbling block to a
new coalition. Late last week, the
Socialists chose 42-year-old Bettino Craxi
as party leader to replace Francesco De
Martino, who had held the job since 1972.
Craxi comes from the Socialist right-wing
faction that lays emphasis on the party's
autonomy from the Communists
It is unlikely, however, that Craxi will
be able in the near term to alter the
Socialists' official policy of refusing to
join the Christian Democrats in another
government unless they agree at least to
include the Communists in the parliamen-
tary majority. The Socialist directorate,
in effect, tied Craxi to that policy by un-
animously reaffirming it just prior to his
election. Thus, it appears the best An-
dreotti can hope for now is Socialist
abstention or support in parliament for a
Christian Democratic minority govern-
ment.
For their part, the Communists are tak-
ing a wait-and-see attitude toward An-
dreotti's effort, refusing to take a position
until he settles on a specific government
formula and program. In putting together
an economic program, however, Andreot-
ti appears to be making a serious effort to
secure a benevolent Communist stance
toward a new government.
One sign of Andreotti's progress in this
respect came from his generally positive
meeting this week with Italy's major labor
organization, in which the Communists
have more influence than any other party.
Largely at the initiative of the Communist
unions, the labor leaders offered a
package of concessions, including a par-
tial wage freeze, and declared themselves
generally satisfied with Andreotti's initial
response to their proposals.
Polish Regime's Price Proposals
The Gierek regime last week sought to
regain the initiative on the issue of price
increases on basic foodstuffs by announc-
ing that meat prices will be raised by
about 35 percent this fall. All other food
prices will remain the same through the
end of the year. The government also an-
nounced an immediate increase in
procurement prices
agricultural items, a
stimulate deliveries.
on a number of
move designed to
Gierek probably believes that by
narrowing the scope and slowing the pace
of the increases, they will be more
palatable to Polish consumers. He is try-
ing hard to convince workers that the
regime does listen to and heed their ad-
vice. He has visited and talked with
workers in Katowice and Gdansk, persis-
tent problem areas, and last Monday he
met party activists from the country's
largest factories. He stated that the new
price package is better than the previous
one because it more precisely responds to
"emotional and psychological" realities.
Gierek added that there would be no rush
to make decisions and that the experience
of the past few weeks had "inclined us to
reflect more deeply."
Gierek will have to mend some of his
fences within the party. A Central Com-
mittee member recently told the US am-
bassador that the leadership had become
infected with more than the usual
"arrogance of power." He said the
debacle last month over price increases
had produced "depression, defensiveness,
and a loss of self-confidence" within the
leadership. The official was obviously
piqued in part because the Central
Committee was not consulted before the
announcement was made on June 24.
Gierek has said his go-slow approach will
be discussed at the next Central Com-
mittee plenum, which will focus on
agriculture.
The regime has tried and convicted 13
persons who participated in the June riots
and demonstrations. Prison sentences
range from 3 to 10 years. There has thus
far been no adverse public reactions to the
trials or to the new proposal
on price increases.
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CHINA-JAPAN
Potentially serious problems are
developing in China's relations with-
Japan, and the prospects for an early
reversal of the trend are not good.
In recent public statements, Foreign
Minister Miyazawa has taken a substan-
tially tougher position on key issues affect-
ing Sino-Japanese relations. In China's
view, perhaps the most troublesome
change is Japan's treatment of Taiwan.
China has formally protested Japanese
Foreign Minister Miyazawa
"backsliding" on this question twice dur-
ing the past month, most recently on
Monday. The issue was Miyazawa's re-
cent statement to Senator Mansfield that
East Asian security could be adversely
affected by any dramatic improvement in
US relations with China. The Chinese
called this interference in China's internal
affairs and a violation of Tokyo's agree-
ment in 1972 to "respect" Peking's claim
to Taiwan.
The official protest reflects China's
concern that Japan may be reverting to a
"two Chinas" approach. The Chinese are
almost certainly also worried about the
level of attention Taipei is getting in other
countries, especially the US, and their
remarks to the Japanese serve to remind
this wider audience that Peking has not
changed its position on Taiwan.
The Japanese, for their part, are con-
cerned about Chinese attempts to nurture
anti-Soviet sentiment in Japan. The con-
clusion of a Sino-Japanese peace and
friendship treaty is hung up on the treat-
ment of an implicitly anti-Soviet clause;
throughout the past year, Peking has
repeatedly rejected Tokyo's attempts to
devise a compromise formula. Last week,
Miyazawa admitted explicitly for the first
time that the Soviet issue is the primary
obstacle to the treaty. Miyazawa has also
criticized China for interfering in Japan's
internal affairs by overplaying demands
for Soviet reversion of the Northern
Territories to Japan.
Tokyo's relations with Moscow are cor-
rect at best, and the changed atmosphere
in Sino-Japanese relations does not
presage a shift by Tokyo from Peking
toward Moscow. Rather, the thrust of
Japanese policy is now directed more at
stressing the status quo in relations with
China than at pressing ahead toward full
normalization of ties.
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FRENCH TERRITORY OF
THE AFARS AND ISSAS
dependence. A referendum on in-
dependence will probably be held next
March. There was serious, politically in-
spired violence between Afar and Issa
tribesmen as recently as June 10, when at
least 13 were killed.
a
Libyan minister of state this week said in
a press conference that Tripoli has provid-
ed "war planes" to Kampala and would
"not stand silent if Uganda is exposed to
an attack."
For their part, the landlocked Ugan-
dans are angered by Kenya's continuing
restrictions on the flow of petroleum and
other commodities. The resulting short-
tages are apparently generating criticism
of Amin among civilians as well as in the
army. The Kenyans charge that any scar-
cities in Uganda are due to Uganda's lack
of foreign exchange-which Kenya now
demands for rail-transit freight charges.
The two governments continue their
acrimonious propaganda exchanges.
Despite occasional calls from Uganda for
better relations with Kenya, the Ugan-
dans assert they are able to bomb Mom-
basa, Kenya's principal port, and
Nakuru, where President Kenyatta
spends much of his time. Uganda also
charged that Kenya is "in the pockets of
the UK, Israel, and the US."
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Ali Aref Bourhan resigned on July 17
as president of the local government of the
French Territory of the Afars and Issas.
Aref faced an almost certain vote of no
confidence in the legislative assembly. His
resignation paves the way for the creation
of a broad-based coalition government in
Djibouti that France hopes will help en-
sure a peaceful transition to in-
dependence.
Aref, an Afar, has held office on
borrowed time since early June. At that
time, the French engineered an agreement
among the three major political groups in
the FTAI that will give a greater political
role to the Issas and other ethnic Somalis,
who constitute a majority of the popula-
tion.
Aref, a long-time French protege,
bitterly opposed the agreement, not only
because he realized it meant his political
downfall, but because he believes Issa
control in Djibouti will lead to the annex-
ation of the territory by Somalia.
The French believe an Issa-dominated
government will be more stable, both in
the coming months and after in-
KENYA-UGANDA
Relations between Kenya and Uganda
remain tense, but Kenya's fears of Ugan-
dan military intentions have declined
somewhat-partly because there have
been no reports of new Ugandan troop
movements. Both armies are still on alert,
and Ugandan troops remain near the Ken-
yan border.
A senior Kenyan Defense Ministry of-
ficial said this week that dwindling food
and fuel supplies in Uganda-a result of
Kenya's economic restrictions-have had
a serious effect on Ugandan army morale.
The official said this has prevented Presi-
dent Amin from lining up sufficient sup-
port in his army to make a move against
Kenya.
The Ken ans nonetheless remain wary
The Kenyans have responded with their 25X1
own tough statements about "crushing"
any Ugandan invasion and have charged
that several Ugandan spies have been
arrested near important Kenyan in-
stallations.
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Southeast Asian governments have been receptive to a
high-level delegation from newly united Vietnam and are ex-
pressing cautious optimism about Hanoi's more conciliatory
foreign policy line.
Vietnam: Flexibility Toward Neighbors
With formal reunification completed,
Hanoi is taking a decidedly more flexible
and conciliatory line in dealing with its
Southeast Asian neighbors.
The joint Vietnamese-Philippine com-
munique issued in Manila on July 12 in-
dicates that Hanoi has tempered, and in
some cases eliminated, demands that have
frustrated past negotiations with
Southeast Asian countries. Remarks by
Vietnamese officials suggest that Hanoi
may even be softening its rhetoric in sup-
port of insurgencies in neighboring coun-
tries.
The Philippine communique-and the
message that Deputy Foreign Minister
Phan Hien is promoting elsewhere on his
current swing through the area-reflects
the "four principles" enunciated by party
chief Le Duan earlier this month in
ceremonies commemorating formal
reunification:
? Mutual respect for sovereignty
and independence.
? Prohibition on use of foreign
bases to attack Vietnamese soil.
? Improvement in economic and
cultural cooperation.
? Settlement of disputes through
negotiations.
The establishment of formal ties
between Vietnam and the Philippines
promises important political dividends for
both countries. President Marcos views
the move as another step toward his goal
of reducing Philippine identification with
the US and promoting some balance in
Manila's foreign relations. He probably
assumes it will help avoid confrontation
over islands in the Spratlys. The com-
munique, for example, pledges that
neither party will permit its territory to be
used for "aggression" against the other.
For their part, the Vietnamese almost
certainly view the provision on the use of
bases as an indication of Philippine
Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Dien signs communique
establishing diplomatic relations with the Philippines
de-emphasis of security cooperation with
the US and as an example for the Thai to
follow if they wish to establish formal
relations with Hanoi.
Hanoi hopes its more conciliatory
negotiating stand will enhance its posi-
tion among the nonaligned countries at
their summit conference next month and
increase support for its admission to the
UN this fall.
Vietnam's moderation and flexibility
will also net some immediate assistance
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from its neighbors to help reconstruct its
economy. The Vietnamese would like to
reduce their heavy reliance on the USSR
and China, and they probably hope that a
more pragmatic approach may eventually
help pave the way for aid from the US.
The Vietnamese delegation visited
Kuala Lumpur before going to Manila,
and it will also stop in Singapore, Jakarta,
and Rangoon. These stops already have
produced commitments for limited
economic assistance; Malaysia has
offered to aid the Vietnamese rubber in-
dustry; Singapore and Indonesia have
said they will explore ways to help Viet-
nam's oil exploration; and Burma plans to
provide some agricultural assistance.
Thailand is the only Southeast Asian
country that has not yet established for-
mal ties with Vietnam, and the only
ASEAN country not included on the
delegation's itinerary. Both Hanoi and
Bangkok have announced, however, that
a Thai delegation led by Foreign Minister
Phichai will visit Hanoi in August. Given
Hanoi's more conciliatory foreign policy
line, the establishment of Thai-Viet-
namese relations in the near future seems
probable.
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The dissident movement in the USSR, having lost
most of the Western-oriented leaders who rose to the fore in
the late 1960s, is in disarray. The next generation of dis-
sidents may be more inward looking and less able to stir
Western sympathy.
Soviet Dissidents Lament the End of an Era
however, may lack the breadth of vision
of a Sakharov or an Amalryk.
New recruits are likely to be inward-
oriented, possibly clustering around the
several antagonistic trends that have long
existed side by side with the waning
Western-oriented democratic movement.
These dissident streams range from
various nationalist groups including
Russian-some of which are anti-Semitic
extremists-to the Marxist reformers of
various shades whose most prominent
The departure last week from the
USSR of the prominent historian, An-
drey Amalryk, symbolized the end of
significant activity by a generation of
Western-minded dissidents who had come
to the fore in the late 1960s. Those who
are left
light is historian Roy Medvedev.
If present trends set the tone for the
next generation of Soviet dissidents, the
"movement" as a whole may become less
vulnerable to official charges of alienation
from Soviet society. At the same time,
such dissidents would be less effective in
mobilizing world public opinion than the
group whose activities now appear to be
coming to an end. Such a result would
reduce one of the few pressures on the
regime for internal change.
reportedly are dis-
pirited and resigned to eventual expulsion
from the country. The lesser lights fear
oblivion, or at least neutralization
through isolation, harassment, or im-
prisonment.
The progressive erosion of political and
cultural dissidence in recent months, un-
derscored by the departure of many
leading figures, does not mean an end to
all dissent. It does mean a significant
weakening of the democratically oriented
core of the movement that generated most
Western sympathy. The regime's relative-
ly sophisticated policy of selective repres-
sion has been successful in virtually
eliminating the highly visible group of ar-
ticulate intellectuals whose criticism of
present-day Soviet realities was rooted in
the Western intellectual heritage of
pre-revolutionary Russia and who appeal-
ed to the West over the heads of the Soviet
authorities.
The official policy of suppressing any
open expressions of unorthodox intellec-
tual, creative, religious, nationalistic, and
political thought ensures that dissident ac-
tivity will continue. Its new recruits,
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Weak and Divided
During the past year, the blood has
been gradually drawn from the primarily
Moscow-based democratic dissident
movement, which has been symbolized as
much as led by Sakharov. While the
award of the Nobel prize to Sakharov last
fall was warmly welcomed by the group,
many of its members see the prize in
retrospect as an isolated event that did lit-
tle to stem-and may in fact have
stimulated-official repression.
Sakharov's international prestige
probably will continue to guarantee him
relative immunity from serious persecu-
tion. He has become less active, however,
Amalryk's name is but the latest in a
long list of emigres from the movement.
In addition to the growing roster of
apolitical cultural figures who have opted
for the West, the relatively recent past has
witnessed the departure of, among others,
mathematician Leonid Plyushch, sculptor
Ernst Neizvestny, painter Vitaly Rubin,
and historians Mikhail Bernshtam and
Aleksandr Nekrich.
Of those remaining in the country,
some have been imprisoned or sent into
domestic exile. Tatar nationalist Mustafa
Dzhemilev, and activists in Amnesty
International-Sergey Kovalev and An-
drey Tverdokhlebov-are among them.
Those who are still at large, such as Tver-
dokhlebov's colleagues in Amnesty Inter-
national, Turchin and Albrecht, reported-
ly are resigned to eventual arrest and trial.
Others, like aged and ailing former
general Grigorenko and members of
Sakharov's immediate circle, have sub-
stantially reduced their activity.
A number of the remaining dissidents
have recently succeeded in gaining some
prominence by organizing an unofficial
group to monitor Soviet adherence to the
Helsinki accords. The group is, to some
extent, troublesome for the authorities,
but its spokesman, Yury Orlov, has no il-
lusions about the group's effectiveness in
ameliorating the lot of Soviet dissidents.
The existence of similar monitoring
groups in several Western countries may
have helped, thus far, to keep the
authorities from moving against Orlov.
A Bleak Future
Most of the dissidents remaining in the
country feel that the meager numbers and
narrow vision of the new generation of
potential dissidents contributes to the
gloomy outlook. In their view, a special
aspect of the isolation of the youth,
whether dissident or not, is the recent
emigration of many Jewish academic
figures and professional educators. Jews
are seen by the older dissidents as among
the few remaining groups in the USSR
with spiritual ties to the West and a
profound respect for the Western intellec-
tual heritage.
The departure of Jewish teachers, the
dissidents say, has not only affected the
quality of Soviet education, but has
helped to cut off more students from the
Western moral values that Jewish
professionals have tried to pass on. From
the official Soviet viewpoint, any diminu-
tion in "cosmopolitan" influences on
Soviet youth is probably a substantial
benefit of Jewish emigration.
Dissidents note that recruits to the
movement tend increasingly to be persons
of middle age, many of whom feel they
have little to lose because of dead-end
careers. These persons have the potential
advantage of pressing for possible reforms
"from within." By remaining essentially
within Marxist-Leninist norms, however,
they may weaken their ability to generate
an echo in the West.
The ability to generate sympathy and
publicity in the West has been both a
strength and a vulnerability among those
dissidents whose time now appears to be
passing. Their current feeling that the
Helsinki accords have lowered rather than
heightened the interest of Western
governments and media in their cause
contributes to their sense of gloom. The
dropoff in Western interest, they believe,
has diminished whatever pressures for
remedy the regime may have felt, as well
as the protection from reprisal such
publicity accords the dissidents
themselves.
The dissidents' mood of depression and
their disarray have been further deepened
by their failure to discern any signs of
change-in whatever direction-in
cultural policy, which might give the
movement some impetus to new life.
Soviet officials apparently see waning
Western interest as a proof of the success
of their policies, which range from rare in-
stances of benign neglect to the more
common harassment, arrests, expulsions,
and encouragement of voluntary emigra-
tion.
Amalryk, who arrived in Amsterdam
on July 15 and who may soon seek a US
visa, has spoken of the future of dis-
sidence in the USSR with poorly disguis-
ed pessimism. While dissidence will con-
tinue to be politically ineffective, he told
interviewers, his hope is that it will con-
tribute to the cumulative "fatigue" of an
aging Soviet regime and thus,
presumably, in some unspoken way
hasten change for the better.
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The strong, effective government Prime Minister
Caramanlis has given Greece for nearly two years may be
challenged by a revival of the kind of political partisanship that
has frustrated earlier attempts to give the country stable
government.
Greece: The Caramanlis Administration
Prime Minister Caramanlis has given
Greece nearly two years of strong, effec-
tive government since he returned to
power in the aftermath of the military jun-
ta's misadventure on Cyprus in July 1974.
His efforts to institutionalize
democratic rule are meeting increasing
resistance, however, and there are signs
that the irresponsible partisanship that
frustrated earlier attempts to give Greece
stable government is again beginning to
emerge.
Caramanlis spent 11 years in self-im-
posed exile before he was called back to
bail out the foundering military junta.
Always convinced that his time would
come, Caramanlis was ready to govern
when he returned.
Courting Western Europe
Caramanlis' most impressive ac-
complishment has been, his rapid
rehabilitation of Greece's international
image, in particular, his strengthening of
Greek ties to Western Europe.. His success
has been underlined by trips to Rome and
London and visits.by the French and West
German leaders to Athens.
Caramanlis' campaign for early Greek
entry into the. European. Community has
led the Nine to approve in principle,
accelerated entry, a move taken as much
to , reinforce Greece's . still fragile
democracy as, to, provide economic
benefits. Negotiations for Greek entry
into the EC will ppenrformally July 27.
The Caramanlis government also .has
made some progress in reviving the coun-
try's economy, despite huge defense out-
lays caused by the tensions with Turkey
over Cyprus and the Aegean. A new
five-year plan sets as its goal the social
and economic modernization., necessary
for successful competition within the EC.
Over the past year, the government has
been able to sustain the economic
recovery by, continuing a mildly
reflationary policy, although this has
resulted in balance-of-payments problems
and double-digit inflation. The govern-
ment hopes that the five-year plan, which
concentrates on stimulating exports and
exploiting domestic energy sources, will
ameliorate these problems.
Military Still a Factor
Caramanlis has recognized that the
military remains a threat,to democratic
government and has sought to retain the
confidence of the officer corps. .
Caramanlis quickly commuted the.
death sentences of the three original junta,
ringleaders despite, strong protests from
opposition political parties. He rescinded
a plan to try an, additional 89 officers for
their association with the junta and. had
the sentences, of others reduced when. their
appeals came up.for review.
Prime. Minister Caramanlis also refus-
ed to try the ringleaders of the, coup
against Cypriot President Makarios that
brought about the junta's collapse. He has..,
appealed to critics of the military to: tone
down their: attacks and directed Defense
Minister Averoff to declare that the purge.
SECRET-
had ended.
The trials that took place and the
political attacks on the military caused
substantial discontent within the armed
forces,, but Caramanlis' efforts on their
behalf, together with . new weapons
purchases and the need for unity in.the
face of tensions with Turkey, appear to
have retained for him the support of a
majority of the officer corps.
Turn to the Right
Caramanlis' broad popular support has
been based on the widely held belief that
only he can restore democracy to Greece.
He played on this sentiment with the cam-
paign slogan "Caramanlis or the. tanks"
in, the 1974 legislative election that his
New Democracy, .Party won by an
overwhelming majority. In, recent months,
cracks have begun to appear in this strong
base.
Caramanlis .had hoped that a clearly
nonpartisan .approach. of evenhanded
treatment for rightand. left would offset
his earlier conservative reputation and
begin to heal the deep political divisions
that have troubled Greece since the civil:
war in the~1940s. Despite :a,respite during
Caramanlis;. first year in office, factions,
on both ends of the spectrum have stepped
up their attacks against each other and the
government as well
The left,. led by the, Moscow-backed
communists and Andreas Papandreou's
radical socialist,party, has charged
Caramanlis with- establishing -.a
parliamentary dictatorship, of. the right,
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through his New Democracy Party's huge
majority.
The right, led by pro junta stalwarts,
has accused Caramanlis of paving the way
for a communist take-over by his legaliza-
tion of communist organizations, his
toleration of leftist activities, and his
diplomatic contacts with Greece's Balkan
neighbors.
Caramanlis at first considered the right
potentially more dangerous than the left
and stuck by his middle-of-the-road
policies. He began to change course when
colleagues expressed growing concern
about communist activities.
Caramanlis' turn to the right was
highlighted in May when leftists
demonstrated against a new labor law and
prevented the landing of liberty parties
from the US Sixth Fleet. Caramanlis con-
demned the Moscow-backed Communist
Party and Andreas Papandreou by name
for their roles and declared that the prin-
cipal danger to democracy now lies on
the left.
Caramanlis may plan to give his
government a more clearly conser-
vative-and political-cast in a cabinet
shuffle that will probably take place this
summer.
The world copper industry is operating far below capacity.
If there are no major strikes or other interruptions to supply, it
will easily cover demand through 1978 and probably through
1980.
Caramanlis' crackdown on the left has
reassured his conservative constituency
and will probably limit the ability of
perennial right-wing plotters to gain much
support. The left was put off balance by
Caramanlis' attacks but seems unlikely to
stand down for long.
World Copper Industry
Despite a strong recovery in demand
this year, the world copper industry is still
operating far below capacity. Barring
strikes and other supply interruptions, the
industry will easily cover consumption
requirements through 1978 and probably
through 1980. Prices nonetheless may
continue to rise in the months ahead.
In 1975, the copper industry faced the
widest gap between supply and demand
since World War II. The recession in ma-
jor developed countries reduced consump-
tion to 5.5 million tons, compared
with 6.9 million tons in 1973. Despite
large production cuts, copper stocks
reached 1.5 million tons toward the
end of 1975.
Prices on the London Metals Exchange
sank to 50 cents per pound, down from a
peak of $1.52 in April 1974. Efforts by
members of the Intergovernmental Coun-
cil of Copper Exporting Countries to
moderate the price decline proved ineffec-
tual, given the magnitude of the fall in de-
mand and their inability to organize supp-
ly. Although demand has rebounded over
the past six months, the industry is still
operating far below capacity.
Present consumption patterns suggest
that requirements for refined copper
could reach about 6.9 million tons this
year-25 percent above last year's low
level but still well below capacity, Copper
demand should reach 7.4 million tons by
1978 if the major industrial countries
follow the same growth patterns they have
in earlier recovery periods.
We expect refining capacity to stand at
8.9 million tons. The industry could
satisfy a demand of 7.4 million tons while
operating at 83 percent of capacity. This
margin of spare capacity should enable
the industry comfortably to handle tem-
porary demand peaks. With no prolonged
interruptions in mining operations,
copper ore supplies should be adequate to
support refinery requirements throughout
the period.
If consumption increases sharply, many
of the expansion plans now shelved can be
revived in time to avoid capacity con-
straints even assuming more rapid growth
in demand. At present, reasonably sure
estimates of additions to refining capacity
between 1978 and 1980 total 420,000 tons;
projects involving another 320,000 tons
have been postponed.
The absence of refining constraints
does not mean prices will remain low.
With demand improving, prices on the
London Metals Exchange have risen from
54 cents in January to 76 cents currently.
The price rise has been helped along by
speculative purchases associated with
declines in the British pound earlier this
year and with expectations of further
price hikes.
Price movements will also remain
highly sensitive to any supply interrup-
tions caused by strikes, transport
problems, or political instability in any of
the major producing countries.
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Secret
Secret
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