WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010900210001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

r.- 9
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`' NNW Secret
Weekly Summary
DIA review completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
No. 0051/74
20 December 1974
COPY No
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
icant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published, separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents.
CONTENTS (December 20, 1974)
1
Egypt-Israel: Tough Talk
3
UN Ends Controversial Session
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
4
Japan: Reactions to Miki
5
South Korea: UN Victory
6
Cambodia: UN Finale; Realignment
6
South Vietnam: Communists' Campaign
7
Philippines: Home for the Holidays
13
Turkey: No Break in the Impasse
14
France: Chirac's Power Play
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
15
Venezuela: An Emerging Power
16
Bolivia: Access to the Sea
17
Latin America: Ties With EC
18
Chile: Courting the Christian Democrats
MIDDLE
EAST
19
OPEC: Higher Revenues
20
Rhodesia: Hard Bargaining Ahead
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Egypt-Israel lr; -_s1
he language of diplomatic stalemate be-
camd more shrill last week as Egyptian Foreign
Minister Fahmi laid down harsh terms for a final
peace settlement. Fahmi was responding to Israeli
proposals for a long-term interim agreement that
would effectively limit Egypt's military options
and political clout.
On December 13, Fahmi announced a list of
what he termed "conditions" for a final settle-
ment. These included demands that Israel com-
pensate Palestinians for lost property and the
Arab states for damage inflicted in all past wars,
pledge formally to renounce "expansionism," and
promise not to accept any Jewish immigrants for
the next 50 years.
sented in Washington last week. During a British
television interview on December 13, Rabin reit-
erated the theory, which he had aired in an inter-
view published by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz
on December 3, that Egypt's leadership position
in the Arab world is waning. He again seemed to
imply that Israel could accelerate this process and
take Egypt out of the fray by appeasing it with a
separate agreement. He offered the Mitla and Gidi
passes in the Sinai and the Abu Rudays oil fields
in return for Egypt"s signed agreement. to a full
peace.
Earlier last week, according to an Israeli
newspaper, Allon presented in Washington a pro-
posal for an interim Sinai withdrawal that did not
include the return of the strategic passes or the oil
fields. The proposal reportedly demanded from
Egypt:
A Cairo news service reported that Fahmi
had also demanded that Israel either agree to the
formation of a "democratic secular state" in
Palestine-a euphemism for the dismantling of the
state of Israel-or return to the Palestine partition
plan of 1947. A summary of the Fahmi statement
by Cairo radio, however, did not include this
stipulation with the rest of Fahmi's so-called con-
ditions.
Israeli leaders have termed the demand for
an end to immigration "absurd." It has become
clear that the Egyptians themselves recognized
this and intended the demand primarily as an
answer to conditions recently floated by Israel
that they regard as equally intolerable. An aide to
Fahmi has said that the demand has now been
shelved and should be forgotten. Cairo media,
apparently on the basis of official guidance, ex-
pounded on the immigration issue only briefly
last weekend and have since ignored it.
Fahmi's statement was prompted by recent
public interviews given by Israeli Prime Minister
Rabin and probably also by a proposal for a
second-stage Sinai withdrawal that an Israeli
newspaper claims Foreign Minister Allon pre-
? A signed agreement terminating belliger-
ent activities that would be in force for at
least 5 years, and possibly as many as 12.
? Further commitments to refrain from
joining other Arab states in warfare and to
withhold support for guerrilla activities
against Israel.
? Passage rights through the Suez Canal
for Israeli cargoes and crews in non-Israeli
ships.
? A pledge to cease economic and propa-
ganda warfare on Israel.
? A commitment to reopen the Suez Canal
and rehabilitate canal cities before the new
agreement takes effect. The Israelis believe
that reconstruction along the canal will be a
sign of Egypt's intention to refrain from fur-
ther warfare.
In return for this Egyptian agreement, ac-
cording to the newspaper, Israel would withdraw
30 to 50 kilometers farther in the Sinai but would
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VLVI IL_ I
retain control of both the passes and the oil
fields.
sources, only fedayeen training centers and of-
fices were bombed.
This Israeli proposal, if accurate, is clearly a
maximum bargaining position that is negotiable.
As outlined, however, it is undoubtedly as intoler-
able to Egypt as Egypt's no-immigration demand
is for Israel. It asks, in effect, for Egypt's agree-
i-nent to a semi-permanent peace while giving
other Arabs and, in fact, Egypt itself almost
nothing in return.
The harsher demands being advanced by
both sides can be scaled down, but the fact that
they were made at all brings the situation closer
to stalemate. The demand for an end to immigra-
tion could strengthen Israeli suspicions that Egypt
is not, after all, ready to co-exist with Israel. More
significantly, Egypt and the other Arab states will
be convinced, even if Israel drops explicit refer-
ences to a time element in the Sinai withdrawal
agreement, that the Israelis actually mean to
make no additional moves in negotiations beyond
the next partial Sinai withdrawal.
The issue is made more urgent by Egypt's
growing edginess. Sadat is impatient for a further
Sinai withdrawal before Soviet party chief Brezh-
nev arrives in Cairo next month. Sadat told an
interviewer on December 14 that he still has hope
for the step-by-step approach to negotiations
favored by the US, but he criticized the lack of
progress thus far. He asserted that if the step-by-
step procedure does not produce progress in the
""very near future," "we shall be going to Geneva
according to the Soviet theory." Sadat has never
before so openly raised the Soviet alternative to
the US method of negotiating.,
ISRAELIS BOMB BEIRYT
Israeli aircraft bombed at least three, and
possibly four, Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut
last week in retaliation for continuing terrorist
activity inside Israel. According to Israeli military
surface-to-air
missiles--presumably SA-7s-and conventional
antiaircraft weapons were fired at the attacking
aircraft. The fedayeen claimed to have downed
one plane, but Israeli military sources reported all
aircraft returned safely. Last summer, Syria sent
some SA-7s to the fedayeen in Lebanon to pro-
tect the refugee camps against Israeli air attacks.
Throughout the week, Israeli troops and
fedayeen guerrillas exchanged fire across the
Lebanese border. On December 18, Israeli troops 25X1
crossed the border in western Lebanon, blowing 25X1
up the homes of several alleged fedayeen sympa-
thizers and taking a few civilian prisoners.
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UN Ends Controversial Session r 7i
!The recent 29th UN General Assembly ses-
sion was one of the most controversial in the
UN's history. The actions of the assembly pro-
voked sharp reactions and have raised serious
questions about the organization's future course.
The depth of concern was reflected in the
assembly debate on "Strengthening the Role of
the UN." Responding to what they interpreted as
an attack on their behavior during the session,
Third World spokesmen expressed dissatisfaction
with the current UN structure, which they main-
tain is intended to assure its domination by the
industrial countries. They argue that the princi-
ples of equality of states and majority rule should
not be invalidated because the composition of the
majority has changed since the founding of the
UN.
The Palestinian and South African debates
provided the drama of this session. The recogni-
tion accorded Yasir Arafat, chairman of the
Palestine Liberation Organization in his address
before the full assembly equaled that usually
reserved for heads of state and was among the
major precedent-setting events of the session. The
granting of observer status at the UN to the
PLO-which was voted by the assembly at the
conclusion of the debate-has more serious
implications, however, since by according this
recognition to a group lacking any attributes of a
state, the UN has opened the door to demands for
similar treatment by representatives of other
"liberation" movements.
On this and numerous other occasions dur-
ing the session, Algerian Foreign Minister Abdel-
aziz Bouteflika exercised his prerogatives as
assembly president to push Third World positions
and influence the outcome of the debate. His
action on South Africa was a usurpation of Secu-
rity Council powers. Following a veto in the
council by the US, UK and France of a resolution
to expel South Africa, Bouteflika on his own
authority-but with the full backing of the Third
World-suspended South Africa's rights as a UN
member and ruled that it was ineligible to par-
ticipate in the rest of the session.
The major work of the session was, as usual,
conducted in the seven subsidiary committees of
the assembly and here, too, the shift in the polit-
ical focus of the UN's membership was evident.
The Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of
States was passed in the Second Committee after
months of negotiations in Geneva failed to resolve
important differences between the developed and
developing countries. The usual resolutions on
decolonization and apartheid were passed with
overwhelming support-a barometer of the sensi-
tivities of the smaller and newer members of the
UN to discussions of the sovereignty and equality
of states. The disarmament discussion produced
more than the usual desultory debate on the
subject, as the developing countries sought to
maintain pressure on the major powers to disarm
while seeking to assure themselves some of the
benefits of nuclear technology, particularly in the
field of peaceful nuclear explosions. In one of the
potentially more significant votes of the session,
the Legal Committee moved to set up a commit-
tee to consider possible revision of the UN's basic
charter.
There have been a few signs of worry on the
part of some of the developing countries that the
use of the "automatic majority" that charac-
terized much of the work of this session-ending
in resolutions that are unenforceable-may have
gone too far and could damage programs benefit-
ing them. Nevertheless, the Third World countries
are unlikely to abandon the steamroller tactics
that have produced a few notable political "suc-
cesses." Not all of them, however, are eager to see
the UN deadlocked by sterile debate; if many are
unwilling to counter the extreme demands of the
more radical Third World states, they also would
welcome signs that the developed countries are
not only interested in meaningful discussion of
the issues of greatest interest to the Third World
but that they do not intend to wash their hands
of the international organization. The 29th
assembly session has, at least, made clear the
choices confronting both the developed and
developing countries.
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JAPAN: ASIAN REACTIONS TO MIKI
1) ul
4apan's Asian neighbors-the U
SSR, the
People's Republic of China, Nationalist China,
and South Korea-have reacted cautiously to the
new Miki government in Tokyo. Miki's general
views on foreign policy are well known to all, and
more definite reactions might have been ex-
pected, but the weakness of his political position
and the potentially strong role that might be
played by Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda-
leader of the Liberal Democratic Party's conser-
vative wing-are complicating factors that have
created uncertainty about the likely directions of
Japanese policy.
USSR-The Soviet press has treated Miki's selec-
tion in a low-keyed, mildly favorable way, and
Premier Kosygin has forwarded a congratulatory
message. In a conversation with a US official on
December 9, a Soviet Foreign Ministry officer
noted Miki's pro-Peking reputation in passing, but
concluded that it was difficult to determine what
Japanese policies would be. He affirmed the
Soviets' standing invitation to the Japanese for-
eign minister to visit Moscow for a discussion of a
formal peace treaty.
A Japanese embassy officer in Moscow,
meanwhile, has said that he does not expect the
new Japanese foreign minister, Kiichi Miyazawa,
to visit the USSR next month because of sched-
uling problems. He was also uncertain that such a
visit would accomplish anything because of the
deadlock over the northern territories issue-and,
by extension, the peace treaty.
I n any event, Premier Kosygin accorded V I P
treatment to former prime minister Sato, a recent
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, during his
stopover in Moscow this week. Aware of Sato's
pro-Taipei orientation and his close association
with Deputy Prime Minister Fukuda, the Soviets
apparently are intent upon honoring those Japa-
nese least amenable to Peking.
China-Premier Chou En-lai has officially con-
gratulated Miki upon assuming office, and the
Chinese press has replayed some of Miki's pro-
ion in o yo that Miki's election will lead to a
slowdown in improving Sino-Japanese ties. The
first test will come soon when formal negotiations
begin on a peace and friendship treaty. Pre-
liminary discussions have already been held, and
both sides have publicly called for agreement on a
pact.
Nationalist China--The Chinese Nationalists do
not regard Miki as any particular friend of their
government, but they feel he is a far better choice
than Tanaka or Ohira, the team that established
relations with Peking. And they are mollified by
Miki's alliance with Fukuda-whom they do con-
sider a friend. Taipei still believes, however, that
it is up to Tokyo to take the first step in
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re-establishing the civil air routes that were
broken earlier this year, and it is waiting to see if
a newly appointed semi-official representative
from Tokyo brings a fresh proposal with him.
South Korea-Seoul is hopeful that the change
will help improve its badly strained relationship
with Tokyo. South Korean officials are well
aware of Foreign Minister Miyazawa's notably
more conciliatory line on relations. But they also
believe that the general weakness of the Miki
government will make it difficult for the new
foreign minister-however well-intentioned-to
make a significant, favorable impact on Japanese-
Korean relations.
Foreign Policy Directions
These initial uncertainties should not last
long, in view of the likely developments under the
Miki government.
There will be little change in the pace or
tone of Tokyo's political relations with Moscow.
The Soviet position on the northern territories
issue has hardened since Brezhnev agreed to dis-
cuss it last year. In Japan, meanwhile, there is a
strong consensus that the USSR must relent on
the territorial question before a peace treaty can
be signed. Economic cooperation, on the other
hand, will continue to develop in view of the real
mutual benefits involved.
Tokyo will be forthright in pursuing a peace
treaty with Peking. Miki has long advocated rela-
tions with Peking and would undoubtedly be
pleased to preside over the final step to full nor-
malization. It is highly doubtful that Miki would
allow Fukuda to meddle with this process; in-
deed, it is questionable whether Fukuda would
attempt to delay what must now be considered an
inevitable development.
Relations with Taipei remain more problem-
atical. There is economic pressure to resume the
mutually lucrative air links between the two
countries, and the demise of the Tanaka govern-
ment might eventually allow Taipei an excuse to
soften its position. But it remains for Taipei to do
so in the absence of any notable change in official
Japanese policy on the China issue.
Seoul's hopes for better relations may be
fulfilled, at least to some extent. The change in
Japanese foreign ministers has removed one
immediate obstacle, and the conservative wing of
the ruling party-now politically stronger than
before-also is favorably disposed toward Seoul.
SOUTH KOREA: UN VI TORY
,I I t31
tThe US and other backers o South Korea
have blocked North Korea's attempt to win UN
support for its campaign to get US troops out of
the peninsula.
On December 17, by a comfortable margin,
the General Assembly accepted the resolution of
its Political Committee calling on the Security
Council "in due course" to consider the question
of the UN-and, by implication, the US-military
presence in South Korea. The opposing, pro -
North Korean resolution, which called outright
for US troop withdrawal, had been defeated in a
tie vote in the Political Committee, and Pyong-
yang's backers made no move to re-introduce it at
the plenary session on the 17th. Nor were Pyong-
yang's backers receptive to a last-minute Nordic
effort to work out an assembly compromise in-
corporating elements of both resolutions.
The outcome in New York is a setback to
North Korean hopes of marshaling Third World
support against the US military presence in South
Korea. Pyongyang, however, made effective use
of the months of backstage diplomatic prep-
aration and the week or so of committee debate
on the issue to call attention to the dual legal
status of US forces in Korea. One recent result
has been a_Japanese request for details of
the structural relationship between the UN Com-
mand and US forces stationed in South Korea-
US bases in Japan serve UN as well as US military
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SOUTH VIETNAM: COMMUNISTS' CAMPAIGN
ilJ
The Communists' dry-season campaign, now
beginning its third week, is producing scattered
but intense fighting in the southern half of South
Vietnam. Losses on both sides have been heavy,
but thus far the South Vietnamese have been
successful in limiting Communist gains to areas on
the less-secure periphery of government control.
The northern delta has been the scene of the
heaviest sustained fighting, as South Vietnamese
forces continue to interrupt the movement of the
Communist 5th Division into Military Region 4
from Cambodia. Reporting from the field shows
that parts of two Communist regiments have suf-
fered large numbers of casualties. Although they
are now attempting to hold on to some fair-sized
chunks of land, some of these units may eventu-
ally be forced to give up and return to their
Cambodian sanctuary. These units could regroup,
however, and return to fighting west of Saigon or
in Tay Ninh Province as they did last year, when
they were unable to get past the South Vietna-
mese and move deep into the delta provinces.
The Communists picked off two district
towns during the week, but both were in sparsely
populated areas where the Communists already
had strong control. Although the loss of a district
town is a serious psychological blow to the gov-
ernment, the towns seized this week do not pro-
vide the Communists with any significant new
gains in territory or control of population, two
avowed goals of their current campaign. The most
significant impact of the loss of Duc Phong dis-
trict town is the effective isolation of the pro-
vincial capital by cutting the only road access.
The other lost town, Hung Long in the central
delta, is in a district formed earlier this year in an
attempt to create administrative and military con-
trol in an area with a strong Communist presence.
Communist efforts to increase their population
control have been equally unsuccessful so far
because many refugees have fled to government-
controlled areas.
Communist attacks in Tay Ninh Province
have shifted from the northern government
outposts to the main roads connecting Tay Ninh
city with Saigon. New attacks against isolated
government positions and highways east of Saigon
also developed during the week, but most have
been contained by defending territorial forces
with some assistance from Saigon's regulars
I>"201
Phnom Penh's international backers easily
turn d aside a last-ditch effort by Prince Siha-
nouk's side to discredit the Lon Nol government
during the closing days of the UN General As-
sembly. The prince's allies tried late last week to
have the UN credentials committee reject Phnom
Penh's credentials, but lost by a vote of five to
four. A Syrian attempt this week to amend the
committee's final report was defeated on the as-
sembly floor by a comfortable eight-vote margin.
This final vote sealed Phnom Penh's earlier as-
sembly victory and will provide the government
with ammunition to counter any future chal-
lenges to its right to a seat in UN-affiliated agen-
cies and conferences.
...May Prompt Try at Political Realignment
Prime Minister Long Boret has apparently
been waiting for final resolution of the UN issue
before attempting any potentially unsettling gov-
ernmental shake-ups at home. Although Boret
had earlier stated his intention to purge and re-
organize his cabinet, he now appears to be pre-
paring to push for fundamental and far-reaching
changes in the relationship between the military
establishment and the civilian government.
Boret has grown increasingly frustrated with
the military's continued independence and im-
munity from civilian policy decisions. He prob-
ably views increased civilian control over the mili-
tary as essential to his plans for tackling the
related problems of economic deterioration and
corruption. Boret is as yet undecided about the
best means of increasing civilian powers, and his
caution probably reflects his awareness of the risk 25X1
of a confrontation with President Lon Nol and
senior army officers.
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PHILIPPINES: HOME FOR THE HOLIDAYS
P2. -J
President Marcos has recently come under
heavy fire from his critics for the continued
detention of political opponents without trial. In
an effort to counter foreign and domestic allega-
tions that his regime is repressive, last week he
announced the release of several hundred "poli-
tical" detainees and promised trials for some
others. He also promised to relax the govern-
ment's "rigid exercise of authority."
Two of the most famous prisoners-former
newspaper editor Eugenio Lopez, and Sergio
Osmena, son of a prominent Philippine politi-
cian--conducted a well-publicized hunger strike in
November to protest Marcos' treatment of prison-
ers. The archbishop of Manila publicly accused
the government of torturing some prisoners. Both
events attracted widespread attention from for-
eign officials and journalists, and Marcos feared
Page 7
that this could adversely affect foreign investment
and economic assistance programs.
The prisoner release brought immediate
praise from the Manila archbishop and will un-
doubtedly 'be enthusiastically received by the gen-
eral public. Once the initial euphoria dies down,
however, other questions may be raised. It is still
not clear how many political detainees the Marcos
regime holds; many of those released were appar-
ently ordinary criminals. Moreover, many of the
most important student activist leaders and op-
position politicians have not been released. Lopez
and Osmena have been promised trials in civilian
courts, but nothing was said of former senator
Aquino, perhaps the most famous and popular of
the detainees. Nor has the regime ceased arresting
people for political subversion; one important
church critic of Marcos was picked up after the
December 11 announcement, as were
more students.
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JCI.KC I
THE SOVIET UNION
JJ "y
SOVIET LEADERS GATHER IN MOSCOW
Vhe Soviet party's Central Committee and
the Supreme Soviet met this week to approve the
economic plan and budget for the coming year.
All members of the Politburo and party secre-
tariat were in attendance except KGB chairman
Andropov, who is apparently ill.
The traditional reports, delivered by plan-
ning chief Baybakov and Finance Minister
Garbuzov at the first day of the Supreme Soviet
session on December 18, revealed that the econ-
omy grew at a brisk rate for the second year in a
row. Industrial production rose by 8 percent com-
pared with the 6.8 percent planned, and grain
output was the second highest on record, al-
though below the plan. Major five-year plan goals
(1971-1975) will not be met, however, largely
because the economy was thrown off pace in
1972 by the poor agricultural year. Moreover, by
the end of next year, the consumer will not have
achieved the standard of living promised in 1971.
Planning chief Baybakov admitted that the orig-
inal 1975 consumer targets have "proved
unreachable."
In presenting the annual budget for 1975,
Garbuzov announced that, for the second year in
a row, planned defense spending will decline. The
USSR claims that defense spending for 1975 will
amount to 17.4 billion rubles; the 1974 budget
figure was 17.65 billion rubles.
In sharp contrast to the announced budget
figure, we project Soviet defense spending in
1975, including military research and develop-
ment and space, to be 28.7 billion rubles, some
4-5 percent higher than 1974. The published de-
fense figure serves primarily as a political and
propaganda device at home and abroad. Brezhnev
reportedly has expressed concern lest the Soviet
people learn the true magnitude of Soviet military
expenditures.
The Central Committee met earlier in the
week to give preliminary approval to the plan and
budget before its presentation to the legislature.
General Secretary Brezhnev delivered a major
speech that was not published, but a lengthy
Pravda editorial on the plenum the following day
suggests that his speech was a fairly routine treat-
ment of domestic economic problems and foreign
policy matters.
The Pravda editorial, probably reflecting
Brezhnev's speech to the plenum, recounts the
usual economic problems-low productivity, slow
completion of construction projects, poor eco-
nomic management, and a failure to introduce
quickly the latest scientific and technical achieve-
ments. The editorial indicates that dramatic re-
forms are not imminent. It spoke only of "a
search for new approaches and new solutions"
while trying to "wrest oneself from the grip of
inertia."
Brezhnev's remarks on foreign policy were
apparently equally pro forma. The Pravda edi-
torial on the plenum simply says that successful
completion of CSCE has important significance
for Soviet efforts to make detente "irreversible."
It praises the recent summits with the heads of
government of the US, France, and the FRG for
their "fruitful results" and the "positive influ-
ence" they exerted on the development of "the
whole international situation."
The plenum accomplished the minimum in
terms of personnel actions when it removed Petr
Demichev from the secretariat, but failed to
choose a successor. Demichev's removal was fore-
cast by his recent appointment as minister of
culture. He remains a candidate member of the
Politburo.
The failure to announce a new party sec-
retary to fill the vacancy created by Demichev's
departure suggests either that an incumbent sec-
retary has picked up Demichev's cultural port-
folio or that the leadership is undecided on whom
to choose. Whoever gets the job will have a direct
impact on the implementation of cultural policy,
and thus on the USSR's image abroad during a
time of detente.?
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3? --3 )J
IA large number J the leading figures in the
Soviet scientific and technical community are
getting old and may well be gradually replaced
over the next several years. An estimated 60 per-
cent of the full members and nearly 55 percent of
the corresponding members of the Soviet Acad-
emy of Sciences, for example, are over 65 years
of age. Statistical information is limited, but the
academy is probably fairly representative of the
leadership of the USSR's scientific and technical
community as a whole.
Many of the candidates available to replace
these leaders have had broad exposure to Western
scientific, technical, and managerial ideas during
their apprentice years. Their assumption of lead-
ership positions will therefore likely result in a
new stimulus in some fields of Soviet research and
development, as well as a lessening of opposition
in the Soviet scientific and technical community
to the adoption of Western methods.
An example of an able new leader in the
Soviet technical industries is P. S. Pleshakov, who
was named minister of the radio industry after
the death of D. P. Kalmykov. Pleshakov, a very
energetic person, tends to be liberal in histechni-
cal thinking and would relate well with executives
of large Western electronic firms. A second recent
example of a very capable individual assuming
new responsibilities is V. S. Burtsev, who took
over as director of the Institute of Precision
Mechanics and Computer Techniques upon the
death of the previous director, S. A. Lebedev.
This institute is the leading Soviet facility for the
development of large high-speed digital com-
puters. Burtsev, an extremely able computer de-
signer, is much more progressive in his technical
thinking than was Lebedev.j
GORSHKOV IN YEMEN AND SOMALIA
im7in7ster of de-
[Admiral Gorshkov, deputy3
fense and commander in chief of the Soviet navy,
is scheduled to return to Moscow on December
21 following a nine-day visit to South Yemen and
Somalia. Gorshkov's tour includes stops in Aden
and Mogadiscio.
This part of the world is of special interest
to the Soviet navy. Ships of the Soviet Indian
Ocean contingent receive much of their logistic
support and on-station maintenance in the Gulf
of Aden area. Aden's port is visited frequently by
Soviet auxiliaries for water, food, and occasion-
ally for fuel. In addition, Aden's nearby interna-
tional airfield may provide naval units and person-
nel with transport service to the USSR. Soviet
warships also visit Aden, but are supported
mostly by auxiliaries in a nearby anchorage.
Across the Gulf of Aden at Berbera, Soma-
lia, Soviet naval personnel have direct control
over some facilities. Most Soviet warships oper-
ating in the Indian Ocean routinely put in to
Berbera for resupply, minor repairs, and short-
term crew rest. Repairs are performed alongside a
Soviet barge that has been docked there since
October 1972. The Soviets reportedly control a
storage area on the pier and operate a naval com-
munications station outside the town. Gorshkov's
tour may include a side trip to Berbera to inspect
the Soviet facilities there.
Moscow's increased diplomatic attention to
this area is in part related to the anticipated
reopening of the Suez Canal. The Soviets prob-
ably want to ensure their access to port facilities
in the Gulf of Aden in the face of the increased
competition for these services after the canal re-
opens.
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NATO'S INCONCLUSIVE MINISTERIAL
IL 3 _- SO
'Few blueprints for action emerged last week
from NATO's ministerial discussions in Brussels,
but many of the defense and foreign ministers
were pleased by the depth and frankness of the
exchanges and the wide range of subjects covered.
The deteriorating economic situation in
many NATO countries was very much on the
mind of the ministers. Although they took note
of a number of scheduled improvements in mili-
tary equipment as well as a 4 percent real increase
in West European defense budgets in 1974, they
recognized that inflation and escalating costs
could seriously weaken Western defense programs
in the future. The ministers heard reports from
several countries in which this has already begun
to occur, notably Britain, Italy, and the Nether-
lands. Britain's defense cutbacks came in for very
little specific criticism, however, since most of the
other allies seem relieved that the cuts leave
London's NATO commitment largely intact. The
allies are nevertheless uneasy that some of the
announced British moves may adversely affect the
security of NATO's northern and southern flanks.
In searching for ways to deal with the prob-
lem of rising defense costs, virtually all of the
ministers supported increased standardization of
weapons and specialization of military tasks in
NATO. Few, however, were inclined to go much
beyond the studies NATO is already conducting
of areas in which this "rationalization" might be
beneficial.
The defense ministers endorsed the US pro-
posal that NATO force planning be oriented to a
"long-range defense concept." Several of the min-
isters insisted, however, that all three elements of
the NATO strategy of flexible response-strategic,
tactical nuclear, and conventional-be given equal
emphasis in the long-range concept. They had felt
that an earlier US draft put too much emphasis
on conventional forces.
The ministers spent much of their time on
East-West issues. The discussion of the Vienna
force reduction negotiations revealed the frustra-
tions of many West European governments caught
between domestic pressures for reducing defense
spending and the lack of progress at the talks. The
Belgian, Dutch, and Canadian foreign ministers
favored re-examining the Western negotiating
position. The Belgian foreign minister said that
his government was finding it difficult to reject
out of hand the recent Soviet proposal to freeze
forces in central Europe for the duration of the
negotiations. Brussels does not think such a freeze
would have an adverse impact on agreements to
be reached later in Vienna.
Most of the force reductions discussion
focused on a possible offer by the West to reduce
tactical nuclear weapons in the context of the
Vienna talks. Several foreign ministers agreed
with Secretary Kissinger that perhaps it would
not be a good idea to introduce such a nuclear
element so soon after the Vladivostok agreement
on SALT principles, but some thought that
NATO should begin studying the matter so as to
be ready when the time seemed right.
When the ministers discussed the European
security conference, the French came in for some
thinly veiled criticism. Although Paris has been
claiming that the Brezhnev-Giscard communique
only gave conditional approval to concluding the
conference at summit level, many other NATO
members feel that Paris has gone further toward
putting its stamp of approval on a summit than
most of them are prepared to go. Several min-
isters made the case that allied unity was largely
responsible for whatever progress had been made
so far and that the French should not jeopardize
chances of obtaining future Soviet concessions.
Greece's future relationship with NATO was
not addressed directly, although this question will
have to be dealt with now that the Greeks have
formally requested discussions regarding the with-
drawal of the Greek armed forces from the al-
liance's integrated military structure. There was a
good deal of talk about the need for a settlement
in Cyprus, however, and for stabilization in the 25X1
Middle East generally. Several ministers pointed
with concern to the growing Soviet naval strength
in the Mediterranean.
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TURKEY: NO BREAK IN THE IMPASSE
sl -3
Turkey is now entering its fourth onth
with only a caretaker government at the helm,
and there are no immediate prospects for a break
in the political stalemate. Amid signs of growing
dissatisfaction within the military over the bicker-
ing among civilian political leaders, Justice Party
leader Demirel has renewed his efforts to form a
center-right coalition. Armed forces leaders are
reluctant to become embroiled in strictly political
matters, but if the Demirel effort falls short and
no other alternative is immediately available,
prospects for some type of military involvement
will rapidly increase.
The caretaker Irmak government has coordi-
nated its Cyprus policy with the major political
parties. Despite the general consensus, there is
widespread doubt that a caretaker government
can take any new initiatives to help move the
Cyprus problem toward a settlement. Now that
Turkey has been given a reprieve until February 5
on the cut-off of US military assistance, there is
likely to be increased pressure on civilian politi-
cians to form a government that can make sub-
stantial progress on Cyprus and avoid the halt in
aid.
There is a growing sentiment in the armed
forces, particularly among junior officers, that the
military will have to force a solution on the
politicians. This sentiment does not favor a direct
military take-over, but rather the installation of
former prime minister Ecevit at the head of a
minority or coalition government to lead the na-
tion into new elections. Ecevit's performance
through the Cyprus conflict reportedly has con-
vinced the military that he is the politician most
capable of dealing with Turkey's pressing prob-
lems.
majority. He will have difficulty picking up the
remainder, however, as the Democratic Party has
already rejected his offer to join in an "anti-left
coalition" that would exclude Ecevit's Republi-
can People's Party. Democratic leader Bozbeyli
has charged that Demirel is now trying to split the
Democrats in order to obtain a majority.
If Demirel's effort has not succeeded by the
time the Turkish holiday period begins on Decem-
ber 23, he may well give it up, claiming that at
least he has made a serious effort. Ecevit has
come out of the Republican People's Party con- 25X1
The armed forces could, however, accept
Justice Party leader Demirel if his current efforts
to form a center-right coalition are successful. So
far, Demirel has been pledged 218 votes in the
national assembly, only six short of an absolute
gress with a strengthened hand and might make
yet another efforrt to form a government after
the holiday period ends in early January.
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FRANCE: CHIRAC'S POWER PLAY
French Prime Mini ter~Jacq es' Chirac's
abrut take-over of the Gaullist Party last week-
end was a power play that has brought simmering
divisions within the party to a boil. In the long
run, however, it could strengthen the ailing move-
ment.
The party bosses or "barons," who domi-
nated the movement under De Gaulle and Pom-
pidou, were caught off balance by the speed of
Chirac's move. Most of them vehemently opposed
his election and, unless he can win their support,
the party may split at the national congress sched-
uled for late February.
Chirac has been considered an opportunist
and a traitor by orthodox Gaullists since he de-
serted the party candidate, Chaban-Delmas, for
Giscard prior to the first round of the presidential
election last May. Chirac has gradually consoli-
dated his position in the party and evidently feels
he is now strong enough to make his move.
During the next two months, the baro s will
have to decide if they should swallow their\pride
and work with Chirac to restore the party's lost
prestige and influence. Their alternative is to try
to bring about his removal from the government-
if they could undermine his support within the
party, his usefulness to President Giscard would
be limited--but they would risk splintering the
Gaullist movement in the process.
Acceptance by the barons of Chirac's leader-
ship would put the party firmly under the prime
minister's thumb. Even if the barons oppose him,
however, Chirac will probably emerge in control
of a leaner, more unified party. Chirac has the
support of an enthusiastic majority of the Gaullist
National Council-they gave him a standing ova-
tion last Sunday-and as prime minister he con-
trols important financial resources. Gaullist funds
have been drying up since Giscard's election cut
off the flow of government money into party
coffers. Chirac reportedly used the prospect of
partial restoration of financial support to ensure
his election as secretary general last weekend.
Moreover, by assuming the leadership, Chirac has
apparently isolated the barons from the party
apparatus. His chances of consolidating his con-
trol over the Gaullists appear good, and the day
of the barons may be over.
Giscard's attitude to the coup is unknown,
but he was consulted by Chirac and presumably
gave him the green light. Giscard, who has re-
cently been leaning over backward to placate the
Gaullists, may feel that he will be in a stronger
position to implement his policies with the
Gaullists firmly under Chirac's control. There is
some speculation that Chirac's take-over rep-
resents an interim step toward "Giscardization"
of the Gaullist Party, but the move also serves
Chirac's own personal ambitions.
Stronger representation in the cabinet could
increase Gaullist influence on Giscard's policy,
at the same time it could give the President more
latitude to cooperate with the US. Although the
Gaullists do not trust Giscard-the barons call him
"Giscariot" because he turned against De Gaulle
in the crucial 1969 referendum--and are espe-
cially wary of his reputed "Atlanticism," they
might be more flexible if they felt they had some
control over his policies.
Chirac's action last weekend may have been
triggered by efforts to undermine his position in
the party. Recently, disaffected Gaullists have
been wooed by former foreign minister Michel
Jobert. Jobert has never been a member of the
movement, but his appeal to nationalism closely
mirrors that of De Gaulle. He has organized a
movement of his own which is gaining support
from many Gaullists.
Prior to Chirac's power play, there were per-
sistent rumors of a comeback by the Gaullist
barons-Chaban-?Delmas, Maurice Couve de
Murville, Michel Debre, and Olivier Guichard.
Guichard in particular was touted as the man who
could lead the Gaullists out of the wilderness.
Unless the barons can unseat Chirac in the next
two or three months, which is unlikely, Guichard
is probably the only one with a political future. If
he can reach an accommodation with r
hr-ac~~
will probably appear in the cabinet.
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001 JCI,IRC I
Benefiting from massive oil revenues aa
under the ambitious leadership of President a
Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela is extending its
economic and political influence in regional af-
fairs and has arrogated to itself a role as leader of
the less-developed countries.
One of the major goals of the Perez adminis-
tration is a summit meeting in Caracas of all Latin
American chiefs of state-including Fidel
Castro-in mid-1975. Within the past two weeks,
Perez has garnered significant backing, including
support from the seven nations officially re-
presented at the Ayacucho anniversary celebra-
tions in Lima and from the Central American
chiefs of state who met with him last weekend. A
meeting of Caribbean leaders tentatively sched-
uled for January in Caracas is expected to lend
additional support for Perez' proposal.
An agenda has not yet been circulated, but
official Venezuelan statements indicate that Perez
intends to focus on at least three main areas of
interest to Latin Americans:
? restructuring the OAS;
? establishing a permanent forum where
Latin leaders meet and discuss Latin Amer-
ican problems;
L} 7, SKI S4, , IJ
? arranging for Latin raw material produc-
ers to be guaranteed a fair price for their
exports and access to foreign technology.
Perez disclaims any personal intention to
assume a role of leadership in Latin America, but
Venezuelan leaders privately are pleased with the
new-found source of power and influence that
their massive oil revenues are bringing. To further
strengthen Perez' position, Venezuela is expand-
ing its political and economic influence in the
Caribbean littoral with investments, loans, and a
multimillion-dollar aid fund for Central America.
Further, Caracas has indicated that similar oil-aid
programs could be extended to larger Latin coun-
tries.
Perez has also pledged Venezuelan financial
assistance for the less-developed Caribbean islands
that are vital to Venezuela's security and attrac-
tive in terms of economic potential. Last May,
Venezuela announced its intention to set up a
$25-million trust fund within the Caribbean
Development Bank to be used specifically for
"regional integration." In August, Perez gave an
interest-free loan of $1.5.7 million to Guyana for
budget stabilization.
Cuba has not been overlooked in all this
activity. Perez believes his country is no longer
bound by OAS economic and political sanctions
directed against the island, and he has indicated
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he will resume diplomatic relations "when it is
convenient." In a startling reversal of position,
the governing Democratic Action Party and its
elder statesman, former president Romulo Betan-
court, have given their approval to Perez' efforts
to re-establish relations with Cuba. In Lima, Perez
personally invited Fidel Castro to his summit
meeting next year; press reports claim Raul Roa,
on Castro's behalf, invited Perez to visit Cuba in
January to coincide with his proposed trips to
Mexico and Central America.
The local press has covered Perez' activities
to the virtual exclusion of the opposition political
parties, which are still in considerable disarray
more than a year after the elections. Support for
Perez cuts across party lines and reflects the gen-
eral public enthusiasm for his flamboyant style
and his policies. For 1975, Perez is carefully pre-
paring a full round of activities that will keep him
in the limelight. These include several projected
trips outside the country.
The emergence of the Venezuelan President
as a major leader in Latin America will not be
viewed indifferently by other Latin powers. They
already see Venezuela's new-found wealth and
ambitious leadership as a challenge to their tradi-
tional spheres of influence. Nevertheless, more is
likely to follow, as Perez will probably use the
traditional New Year's Day address to the nation
to provide further details of the foreign policy
objectives of his government during the coming
BOLIVIA: ACCESS TO THE SEA
President Banzer is claiming that he scored a
major diplomatic triumph at the meeting of Latin
American leaders in Lima last week when he got
Chile and Peru to focus on Bolivia's land-locked
status. Government propaganda has taken up his
line, calling a paragraph in the "Declaration of
Ayacucho" on Bolivia's lack of an outlet to the
sea a major foreign policy achievement.
The "Declaration" only recognizes Bolivia's
right to pursue the issue, however, and does not
commit either Chile or Peru to support Banzer's
goal of regaining the outlet to the sea his country
lost during the War of the Pacific in 1881. Bolivia
is allowed to use the ports of Arica in Chile and
Matarani in Peru, but Banzer finds this arrange-
ment unsatisfactory because of Chilean and
Peruvian tariff charges on Bolivian imports.
Traffic: congestion in the Peruvian port is also a
problem.
Banzer's chances of obtaining a major con-
cession on an outlet to the sea at this time are
slight because, in spite of the "Declaration,"
tensions between Chile and Peru prevent either
country from making a special deal with Bolivia.
The issue is an emotional one in Bolivia, however,
and may temporarily bolster his sagging popular-
ity. Although Banzer has recently strengthened
his dictatorial control over the country, and still
retains military backing for his policies, his sup-
port among the people has eroded seriously dur-
ing the past year.
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-l"0101 NMwe
LATIN AMERICA: TIES WI H EC
6q- -677
The EC is seeking to expand its formal ties
with Latin America, now limited to trade pacts
with Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. The Latin
Americans themselves have been pressing for
years for more attention from the EC, which only
recently has begun to look beyond its African
associates to other underdeveloped areas.
The EC Commission has begun negotiations
with Mexico on a new type of non-preferential
agreement intended to serve as model for other
Latin American countries. Mexico had requested
an agreement with the EC covering commercial,
financial, investment, industrial, and technical co-
operation. Lacking the legal standing and com-
petence to negotiate such a broad agreement, the
commission has proposed a commercial agree-
ment that establishes a mixed committee whose
jurisdiction over trade matters would gradually be
extended as the EC achieves unified policies in
other areas. The community has meanwhile ex-
tended its existing bilateral trade agreement with
Argentina for one year in order to allow time to
negotiate a broader arrangement along the lines of
the Mexican model.
Relations with Latin America have been hurt
by serious community restrictions on Latin
American exports. Last June, the EC unilaterally
imposed a ban on meat imports that has resulted
in a loss of more than $100 million for Latin
America. Community barriers to imports of
wheat, coffee, and bananas have also led to Latin
American demands for a more stable trade rela-
tionship as well as guaranteed access for some
exports.
The Latin Americans have always been wor-
ried by the trading preferences granted by the EC
to its associates in Africa. Expansion of such
preferences to other African, Mediterranean, and
Commonwealth countries has reinforced Latin
American fears of exclusion from EC markets. If
the Latin Americans do not gain equal access to
community markets, their export opportunities
will be restricted to the Western Hemisphere,
resulting in continued trade dependence on the
US.
The EC now acknowledges that there is little
it can do to ease the beef problem for the Latin
Americans or to give them equality in community
markets with other developing countries that now
enjoy associate status. As a result, the EC has
been concentrating on trade promotion measures
to increase Latin American sales in Europe. Sev-
eral new promotional activities were discussed in
Brussels at the latest semi-annual meeting of Latin
American ambassadors and the permanent EC
representatives of the Nine. The EC also pledged
at the ambassadorial meeting to continue its de-
velopment cooperation activities, to provide im-
proved trade opportunities through the com-
munity's system of generalized trade preferences,
and to support Latin American regional integra-
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} _701
JA decree was issried on December 17
elevating General Pinochet from the presidency of
the military junta to the constitutional presidency
of the nation. The move is not only the culmina-
tion of his growing personal power, but may also
be an effort to de-emphasize military rule in an
appeal to the Christian Democratic Party.
Since taking power in September 1973, the
military government has tried repeatedly to coax
Christian Democrats to join the administration,
because this would do more than anything else to
enhance the government's legitimacy. Much of
the Christian Democrats' distaste for the regime
and some of its policies have been lost on Pinochet,
who apparently views the problem as one of form
more than substance. By assuming a more con-
stitutional posture, Pinochet may hope to give the
Christian Democrats a face-saving entry into the
government if his effort to win their acceptance
proves successful.
The timing of Pinochet's nod to constitu-
tionality is interesting, as the Christian Democrats
appear to have emerged unscathed from their
most recent clash with the government. Last
week, just days after left-wing party leader Renan
Fuentealba was expelled from the country for
engaging in political activity, Interior Minister
Benavides met with party president Patricio
Aylwin and vice president Osvaldo Olguin.
Benavides reportedly expressed the government's
concern over its poor relations with the party and
asked how the situation could be improved.
Aylwin and Olguin suggested that an improve-
ment in relations could begin only after Fuen-
tealba is allowed to return and Claudio Huepe,
another left-wing party leader, is released from
detention. They also pointed to an anti - Christian
Democratic campaign within the government's
right wing as a major source of friction. Un-
ruffled, Benavides asked the Christian Democrats
to prepare a memorandum outlining their differ-
ences, and went on to request once again the
party's help in improving the government's image
abroad.
There can be no question that Pinochet
would prize the effect, both domestically and
internationally, of Christian Democratic partici-
pation in the government. It also appears evident
that he is prepared to make some concessions to
win them over-as well as to accomplish as much
image polishing as possible without them. It
remains doubtful, however, that Pinochet ap-
preciates the full extent of the Christian Dem-
ocrats' estrangement. The human rights issue,
which is probably the party's underlying basic
concern, is obviously viewed with much less
urgency by the government. On economic policy,
a considerable liberalization of government
programs would be required to meet the Christian
Democrats even half-way.
Pinochet would probably find that the
easiest concession to make would be to mute
anti-party polemics within the government and
military hierarchies. Having become president, he
could also quite easily suggest the possibility of
elections, perhaps at the local level. Whether such
a modified approach would suffice to draw the
Christian Democrats closer is an open question,
but their decision at such a juncture could only
be made after intra-party soul-searching, possibly
resulting in the alienation of the party's left
wing
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OPEC oil ministers
OPEC: HIGHER REVENUES c -7 / _ 7,Yj
OPEC oil ministers concluded their meeting
on ecember 13 with a communique that was
deliberately vague. The meeting's only apparent
substantive result was the adoption of a new
pricing system. Under this system, the govern-
ment take will be $10.12 per barrel for the light
Saudi crude that serves as a benchmark for all
OPEC oil prices. This take represents an increase
of 38 cents or 3.9 percent above the level estab-
lished by OPEC for the fourth quarter of 1974.
The revenue levels are effective for nine months
beginning January 1. If all members apply this
measure uniformly, the consumers' oil import bill
for that period will increase by about $3 billion.
Some non - Persian Gulf OPEC members
may not hike their revenues by the full 38 cents.
The African members, who already receive over
$11 per barrel, are encountering heavy consumer
resistance. Faced with declining production, the
African producers may use the elimination of the
posted-price system to establish more competitive
prices. Venezuela, on the other hand, is likely to
demand an increase of more than 38 cents per
barrel.
Iranian Minister of Interior Amouzegar says
that the benchmark price for sales of govern-
ment-owned oil to third parties will be $10.46 per
barrel. Competition presumably would force the
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producing companies to adopt the same price.
According to Amouzegar's figures, company prof-
its would amount to 22 cents a barrel after sub-
tracting government revenues ($10.12) and pro-
duction costs (12 cents). The companies maintain
that production costs will be close to 23 cents a
barrel in 1975, reducing profits to a meager 11
cents a barrel. Amouzegar's arithmetic-which
apparently applies to Iran plus other countries
that obtain 100 percent ownership of their in-
dustries next year-has not been confirmed by
OPEC officials or by other oil ministers.
The important issues of production cuts and
the linking of oil prices to inflation in the indus-
trial countries have been put aside for future
discussion. These issues, as well as consumer reac-
tion to the new prices, are likely to be discussed
at a meeting of oil and foreign ministers to be
held in Algiers on January 24.
In administrative matters, the OPEC minis-
ters appointed Chief M. O. Feyide of Nigeria as
secretary general effective January 1. Chief Fey-
ide will replace Dr. Abderrahman Khene of Alge-
ria, who held the office for two years. The next
ordinary meeting of OPEC is scheduled for June
9. 1975 in Libreville, Gabon.
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otzUrAC I
RHODESIA: HARD BARGAINING AHEAD
~ - 7`)
Prime Ministe'r Smith has taken the first step
toward implementing his truce agreement with
Rhodesian insurgents by allowing long-imprisoned
rebel leaders to resume political activity in
Rhodesia. The first round of public statements by
both sides, however, shows that Smith and the
insurgents are not yet ready to compromise on
the critical issue of how a transition to majority
rule can be accomplished. In fact, no agreement
has even been reached on when settlement talks
can begin or where they will be held.
Late last week, Joshua Nkomo, head of the
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, and Ndaba-
ningi Sithole, head of the Zimbabwe African Na-
tional Union, appeared together in Salisbury after
returning from Lusaka, Zambia. They had made
the trip to meet with exiled Rhodesian insurgents
and try to formulate a common bargaining posi-
tion for dealing with Smith. The public appear-
ance of the two leaders, their first in a decade,
followed Smith's announcement that he was
releasing all black nationalists under detention in
Rhodesia in return for a cease-fire agreement.
Nkomo and Sithole were accompanied by
Bishop Muzorewa, head of the non-insurgent
African National Council, the only nationalist
group Smith has allowed to function openly in
Rhodesia. In a joint statement, the three leaders
confirmed that Nkomo and Sithole had agreed to
merge their organizations with the African Na-
tional Council under Muzorewa's chairmanship,
and that they would implement a cease-fire as
soon as Smith agreed to a date for a constitu-
tional conference. Muzorewa subsequently
implied that guerrilla operations were already
being suspended in anticipation of an early release
of all political detainees, numbering about 400.
Early this week, Rhodesian government officials
said that some 200 detainees were being released
immediately.
It is not yet clear, however, whether the
cease-fire will be honored by the exiled nation-
alists who have been directing guerrilla operations
inside Rhodesia since late 1972 from bases in
Zambia. During the Lusaka talks, Herbert
Chitepo, head of the Zimbabwe African National
Union's guerrilla base in Zambia, opposed accept-
ing a cease-fire until Smith had guaranteed an
early transition to majority rule. Chitepo argued
against giving up the tactical advantages gained by
his group-which has fielded most of the guerril-
las-and stated that the insurgency was the key
factor in forcing Smith to make concessions.
Although Sithole, Nkomo, and Muzorewa
appear more open to compromise than Chitepo,
their joint statement last week asserted that a
constitutional settlement must provide for an
early transition to majority rule. Smith said in a
subsequent radio interview, however, that he was
opposed to any franchise that might result in
majority rule within five years.
Smith is probably asserting a hard-line posi-
tion in order to convince white Rhodesians that
any concessions he makes in the course of a
constitutional conference will be unavoidable.
Smith is fearful that allowing the long-imprisoned
nationalist leaders to resume public appeals for
early majority rule may arouse such expectations
among black Rhodesians that a prolonged impasse
in settlement negotiations could bring about
popular demonstrations and possibly provoke
civil disorders.
Smith's security forces depend on a limited
pool of white reservists. Without substantial
external support, they could have difficulty
coping with extensive rioting or a resumption of
guerrilla activity. South African Prime Minister
Vorster announced last week that the 1,400
South African police who have been serving in
Rhodesia will be withdrawn as soon as terrorism
actually ceases. Vorster apparently is warning the
white Rhodesians that South Africa will not back
them in any die-hard resistance to maiority
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