WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Navy review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
No. 0049/74
6 December 1974
Copy No
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
icant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
25X1 contents.
CONTENTS (December 6, 1974)
1 Tensions Rise on Cyprus
3 The Middle East
5 Palestinians-USSR: The Wandering Arab
6 UK: Labor Party Conference
7 Turkey: Impasse Continues
8 Spain: Regime Moves Cautiously
10 EC: Paris Summit; Trade Preferences
13 The Apollo-Soyuz Program
14 Romania: The Ceausescu Congress
15 USSR: Leningrad Home
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
16 Ethiopia: More Trouble Ahead
17 India-Pakistan: Another Agreement
18 South Asia: Grain Situation
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
Le Duc Tho
21 Cambodia: Maintaining Momentum
22 Laos: Discussing Strategy
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
23 Colombia: Out on a Limb
24 Mexico: Breaking With Chile;
Cabanas Dead
25 Chile: Junta-Party Tensions Grow
26 Brazil: The Congressional Elections
26 Latin America: Meeting at Ayacucho
25X6
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Makarios with Clerides (c) and Karamanlis
Tensions Rise on Cyprus
oncern has mounted on all sides over the
possibility that Archbishop Makarios' scheduled
return to Cyprus this weekend will trigger vio-
lence between pro- and anti-Makarios factions in
the Greek Cypriot sector of the island. Greek
Cypriot security authorities have taken extra
precautions to curb possible hostilities, and
Turkish military forces are prepared to intervene
should the fighting become widespread and
threaten Turkish Cypriot civilians in the south.
Meanwhile, the results of a summit meeting
between Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders have
Page 1
Fi - s- 7
provided a ray of hope for prospects of an
eventual negotiated settlement of the Cyprus
problem.
In a communique released on December 1,
following two days of talks, Archbishop
Makarios, Acting President Clerides, and Greek
Prime Minister Karamanlis noted that agreement
had been reached on a negotiating position and25X1
that written instructions will be drawn up and
given to Clerides so that he may begin substantive
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restated his-intention to return on December 7,
however, although the timing could change for
security reasons.
Pro-Makarios groups in the Greek Cypriot
sector are preparing to give Makarios a rousing
welcome. Once on the island, the archbishop is
expected to limit his movements for security
reasons, holding a series of consultations with
leading members of the Greek Cypriot com-
munity at his residence. Eventually, he is likely to
make some personnel changes in the government
to consolidate his position.
The meetings were
stormy, according to a US embassy source, with
Makarios moderating his position only after
strong pressure from Karamanlis.
Clerides returned to Nicosia on December 2
and two days later held another of his weekly
meetings with Turkish Cypriot Vice President
Denktash. While they continued to focus on
humanitarian issues, Clerides doubtlessly gave
Denktash some hint of what transpired in Athens.
At Denktash's request, however, no date was set
for another meeting pending Makarios' return and
a further clarification of the Greek Cypriot posi-
tion.
In Ankara, Turkish officials warned that
Makarios' return to Cyprus could torpedo the
talks between Clerides and Denktash and could
lessen the chance for a negotiated settlement.
They also warned that Turkish forces on Cyprus
would take "necessary measures" to protect
Turkish Cypriots living in the Greek Cypriot
sector should their safety be endangered by an
outbreak of intercommunal fighting. As a pre-
cautionary measure, martial law was extended
another month in four of Turkey's provinces.
Turkish forces in Cyprus as well as some mainland
air force units were placed on alert.
While the Turkish moves reflect a genuine
concern about the safety of Turkish Cypriots on
the island, they are probably intended to en-
courage Makarios to accede to the more moderate
positions of Clerides and Karamanlis or even to
cancel his return to the island. Makarios has
In the meantime, national guard and police
officials have instituted strict security measures
and are bracing for the possibility of violence.
These officials reportedly believe that EOKA-B,
the terrorist organization that participated in the
July coup against Makarios, has been weakened
and that responsible EOKA-B leaders now realize
that Greek Cypriot unity is essential in the
months ahead in view of the Turkish threat. At
the same time, they do not discount the pos-
sibility that an extremist splinter group or in-
dividual might attempt to assassinate the arch-
bishop.
In the long run, the level of violence will
depend on the willingness of Makarios to seek
reconciliation with his opponents and the extent
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The Middle East
RABIN'S NEGOTIATING STRATEGY
Israeli Foreign Minister Allon, who is
scheduled to hold talks with Secretary Kissinger
in Washington next week, apparently will not be
empowered to make any commitments regarding
the next stage in the Middle East peace nego-
tiations. The Israeli press has referred to Allon's
mission as a "listening brief" to learn the Secre-
tary's assessment of the prospects for another
round of talks with Egypt. The cabinet reportedly
has not held any substantive discussion on Allon's
visit.
Prime Minister Rabin's own concept of
Israel's long-term negotiating strategy with the
Arabs was outlined in an interview published on
December 3 in Israel's leading independent daily.
Stressing that there is no realistic prospect of a
short cut to an immediate, final settlement, Rabin
indicated that the next several years will be par-
ticularly critical because of the growth of Arab
power based on oil wealth. Israel must stall for
time and find a way to live in peace while the US
and Western Europe free themselves from Arab
oil--a process he thought could take seven years.
Rabin believes the only realistic way to
avoid renewed hostilities is to obtain partial set-
tlements in separate negotiations with the Arabs,
a view he says is shared by the US, Egypt, and
Jordan, but opposed by the Soviet Union and
Syria. Rabin thinks, however, that General Secre-
tary Brezhnev's visit to Cairo in mid-January is a
sign that Egypt may shift to a more intransigent
position if President Sadat cannot point to some
progress in the peace negotiations. To give Sadat
his progress, Rabin said Israel is prepared to agree
to another military withdrawal in the Sinai
provided:
spring, and that the renewal period is for
much longer than the present six months.
The Israeli leader seemed to back off from
his earlier insistence that agreements with the
Arabs must be clearly political. He indicated that
in another military agreement with Cairo, Egyp-
tian political concessions for Israel could be con-
veyed to the US.
Rabin did not discuss negotiations with
Damascus and left his interviewer with the
impression that a resumption of hostilities with
Syria is a real possibility sometime next year. He
seemed to suggest that the important thing for
Israel is to prevent Egypt from joining in, at least
initially, thus allowing Israel to fight on only one
front for the first crucial days.
The Prime Minister remained adamant that
Israel will not negotiate with the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization. He had earlier told a group of
Israeli editors that, if Israel persevered in this
opposition for a year or two, it would become
clear that no alternative to Jordan existed for
negotiations concerning Israel's eastern border
and that King Husayn would then return to the
negotiating table.
The Egyptians have so far reacted to Rabin's
remarks essentially with a "no comment."
Rabin's widely publicized statements will make it
more difficult for President Sadat to justify any
separate negotiations with Tel Aviv to the other
Arabs, particularly the Syrians, because he would
be open to charges that he is falling for Israel's
stalling tactics.
? the Egyptians do not occupy the evacu-
ated area;
? the passes in central Sinai remain under
Israeli control;
? the withdrawal does not occur before
the mandate for UN troops is renewed next
Sadat's position will be even further com-
plicated by Foreign Minister Allon's statement to
the Knesset on December 3 that at the time of
the Egyptian-Israeli troop disengagement pact last
January, Cairo gave the US private assurances that
it wo Id allow Israeli cargoes through the Suez
Canal.
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A Syrian spokesman labeled Rabin's state-
ments "provocative" for suggesting that Syria
should be isolated from the negotiations because
it is trying to drag the Arabs into a new war.
\With the blessings of Syria and Israel, the
UN Security Council last week formally extended
for another six months the mandate of the UN
observer forces stationed on the Golan Heights.
Apparently at Syria's behest, the council's re-
newal action included a reference to last year's
cease-fire Resolution 338. That resolution calls on
the concerned parties to begin peace negotiations
under "appropriate auspices," which the Syrians
interpret as a clear reference to the Geneva peace
conference.
The newspaper of the Syrian Baath Party
claimed this week that the extension of the
mandate was directly linked to the immediate
implementation of guarantees concerning Pales-
tinian rights and to the complete and uncondi-
tional withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied
Arab territory. The paper's exaggerations will
serve to justify the renewal of the mandate
domestically and to deflect criticism from hard
liners in the Baath Party and the fedayeen move-
ment.
Having saved face, the Syrians may now be
willing to allow Egypt to negotiate another Israeli
withdrawal in the Sinai. It seems most unlikely,
however, that President Asad would accede to
this without seeking solid assurances that similar
talks would begin at the same time, or shortly
thereafter, between Syria and Israel. In any event,
Damascus will continue to push for an early
resumption of the Geneva talks.
Much will turn on the outcome of Soviet
General Secretary Brezhnev's trip to the Middle
East in January. The Syrians will try to coordi-
nate their strategy with the Soviets during Brezh-
nev's visit. Geneva will be a key topic of discus-
sion, but Asad may also seek Soviet assurances of
support for another war of attrition on the Golan
Heights, perhaps next spring, if negotiations
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Palestinians-USSR: The Wandering Arab
LT he Soviets won some conces ions rom
Palestine Liberation Organization chairman
Arafat during his visit to Moscow last week, but
Moscow made clear that it is not yet ready to
reciprocate with unqualified support for the PLO.
In the final communique, Arafat moved a step
closer to committing the PLO to accept a trun-
cated Palestinian state and, indirectly, to ac-
knowledge Israel's right to exist.
leader. Arafat's apparent failure to meet party
boss Brezhnev, however, was another sign that
Moscow is still keeping some distance between
itself and the PLO. On the plus side, the USSR
and Arafat announced that a previously autho-
rized PLO office will open in Moscow in the
"nearest future." Moscow apparently took a cool
view of a Palestinian government-in-exile, since
the communique made no mention of it.
In a tortuously constructed passage, Moscow
and the Palestinians said that the PLO should
assume responsibility for any Palestinian territory
"liberated by the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from the seized Arab lands, as demanded by well-
known UN decisions." By endorsing this ref-
erence to Israeli-occupied territory, rather than to
Israel itself, Arafat indirectly conceded that Israel
proper will continue to exist. Although Arafat
privately accepts the reality of Israel, he will
probably withhold a more explicit acknowledge-
ment until Tel Aviv offers major concessions.
Arafat's approving reference to "well-known
UN decisions" in the same breath as "with-
drawal" is also a first. He was obviously alluding
to Security Council Resolution 242, which calls
for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in
1967 and guarantees the "territorial inviolability"
of all states in the area.
The Soviets, nevertheless, refrained from ex-
plicitly recognizing the PLO as "sole" representa-
tive of the Palestinians. They again did not spell
out what they meant when they endorsed the
right of the Palestinian people to "statehood." In
the communique, the Soviets called for the par-
ticipation in the Geneva peace conference of the
"Arab people of Palestine," but did not specif-
ically mention the PLO. Undoubtedly upset over
Moscow's continued equivocation, the PLO re-
fused to associate itself with this part of the
statement.
Moscow did accord Arafat some of the
trappings normally given a chief of state. Premier
Kosygin, for example, is the highest ranking So-
The Soviets may be concerned that an an-
nouncement now of the formation of a Pales-
tinian government-in-exile could disrupt progress
toward reconvening the Geneva conference-a
prime Soviet goal. Before showing its hand, the
Kremlin undoubtedly also wants to be sure that
any such government has broad support among
Palestinians and the Arab states. Moscow may
also hope to influence the composition and pro-
gram of any future PLO government.
Arafat laying a wreath at Lenin's tomb
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Pr. Oct,
UK: LABOR PARTY CONFERENCE
``), ?-)~, Q
At the annual party conference last week,
left-wing Laborites pushed through several resolu-
tions designed to limit the government's flexibil-
ity on a number of issues, particularly the EC
membership question. Despite this demonstration
of left-wing strength, moderates led by Prime
Minister Wilson pretty much held their own at the
conference, and the balance of power between
militants and moderates appears essentially un-
changed.
The government's "social contract" came
under fire from trade union delegates who
charged that workers have borne the brunt of
inflation and are entitled to substantial pay raises.
Foreign Secretary Callaghan, acting as conference
chairman, reminded the delegates in his opening
speech that the three main elements of the con-
tract--greater social justice, regeneration of in-
dustry, and wage restraint-are interdependent.
He urged union leaders to moderate their wage
demands.
The conference passed two resolutions
critical of the government's foreign policy. The
first overwhelmingly approved a decision made in
October by the party's administrative organ, the
National Executive Committee, to censure the
government for authorizing joint naval exercises
with the South African navy. The delegates
Wilson and Schmidt at the Labor Party conference
demanded implementation of a resolution
adopted at last year's conference to terminate
military relations with South Africa. Although
this latest resolution is certainly a minor embar-
rassment to Wilson, government officials have
already agreed that the Simonstown Pact, the
agreement providing for the recent naval maneu-
vers, will be allowed to "wither on the vine."
The second foreign policy resolution crit-
icized the government for its policy toward the
Chilean junta and for extending the repayment
schedule on a substantial portion of Chile's debt
to the UK.,
As expected, the conference was the forum
for strong anti-EC sentiment. Apparently fearful
that Wilson or Callaghan might campaign for a
"yes" vote in the coming referendum on EC
membership, the delegates unanimously
demanded assurances that the government would
present both sides of this issue. A second, more
controversial, resolution, passed by a slim margin,
called for "safeguards" before the government
accepts new conditions for continued member-
ship. Some delegates also demanded that a special
party convention be held in addition to the
referendum.
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l7LVI1LI ,~,p
EC supporters at the conference got a
psychological boost when West German Chancel-
lor Schmidt addressed the delegates, urging
Britain to remain in the community in the in-
terest of European solidarity. Despite threats that
anti-marketeers might stage a walkout, Schmidt
was warmly applauded.
Moderate Laborites received additional
encouragement from party elections last week.
Cabinet member Shirley Williams and trade union
leader Tom Bradley, both strong supporters of EC
membership, were re-elected to their posts in the
National Executive Committee despite strong op-
position from the left. The Parliamentary Labor
Party, the influential organization of backbench
Laborites, elected four moderates and only two
militants to the organization's committee respon-
sible for liaison with the government. Tom Dal-
yell, a pro-marketeer, finished first in the com-
mittee election and, as a result, becomes vice
chairman of the backbench organization.
TURKEY: IMPASSE CONTINUES
[ )_ 2 -.jn1
The search continues for a formula that will
break the political stalemate that has existed since
the governing coalition was dissolved on Septem-
ber 18. The most recent effort-a nonpartisan
government headed by the politically neutral Sadi
Irmak-was stillborn when parliament refused
Irmak a vote of confidence last week.
The political parties were nearly unanimous
in rejecting the Irmak government by a vote of
358 to 17. The fact that Irmak's cabinet was in
large part drawn from outside parliament was its
greatest drawback, although former prime minis-
ter Ecevit's Republican People's Party voted
against Irmak because his program offered no
precise language on the timing for new elections.
Negotiations have been in process since the
no-confidence vote, as the political parties try to
narrow their differences and put together a gov-
ernment that can deal with the nation's growing
list of problems. In the meantime, Irmak is con-
tinuing as head of a caretaker regime, and Presi-
dent Koruturk is waiting to see what develops
before designating someone else to try to form a
government.
The principal sticking point still appears to
be the timing for new elections, although person-
ality clashes and political vendettas also play a
role in the continuing stalemate. The Democratic
Party reportedly was prepared to go along with
Ecevit-agreeing to the elections in exchange for
some choice cabinet posts in a coalition govern-
ment-but it appears to be having difficulty in
overcoming some deep-seated hatreds. Such a
coalition would need all the votes of both parties,
but a small Democratic faction controlled by the
son of former prime minister Menderes holds
Ecevit's party responsible for the execution of the
elder Menderes in 1961 and has refused to co-
operate.
The most recent suggestion for breaking the
impasse was Justice Party leader Demirel's call for
a conservative coalition that would include his
party, the Democrats, and the National Salvation
Party. Demirel claims that there would be no
need to hold new elections if such a coalition
were installed, since the parties are in general
ideological agreement and would have a majority
in parliament. In the past, however, the Demo-
cratic Party has refused to join any government
headed by Demirel, who a few years ago expelled
several members from his Justice Party. This
group provided the nucleus for the Democratic
Party, and to this day bears a strong grudge
against the Justice Party leader.
The National Salvation Party has already
signaled its willingness to join with Demirel in a
coalition, but without the Democrats they would
fall short of the needed majority in parliament.
Thus, the Democratic Party is in the position of
power broker-able to give a majority to either of
Turkey's two leading political figures-Ecevit or
Demirel--but so far it has been unable to make a
choice because of old personal and political
grudges. The time for deciding may be fast ap-
proaching, however, as the military is increasingly
dissatisfied with the performance of the civilian
politicians and may begin to apply some pressure
to break the impasse.
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N.r
SPAIN: REGIME MOVES CAUTIOUSLY
i( -3(0
Prime Minister Arias' astute defense this
week of the newly issued draft law allowing for-
mation of political parties in limited form should
stem reports of his resignation or dismissal. There
is, however, considerable disappointment with the
long-awaited draft among many Spaniards who
favor wider public participation in their political
system. This comes at a time when growing labor
unrest is troubling the government.
The draft statute legalizes "political associa-
tions"---a form of political party-but limits their
scope by making them subservient to Franco's
National Movement. The Movement is a collec-
tiion of largely rightist groups that have supported
Franco since the Spanish Civil War. The new law
authorizes the Movement to recognize, suspend,
or dissolve the associations. Approved associa-
tions could take part in municipal elections and in
voting for one fifth of the national parliament.
The Prime Minister wanted a bill that would
permit the associations to be independent of the
Movement, and strong rightist opposition to this
idea led to reports that he would resign or be
fired. Franco himself allegedly amended the
ministerial draft by insisting that the associations
be placed under the control of the Movement.
Arias' decision to acquiesce in the draft law
and remain in office became clear when he de-
fended the law in a nationwide speech earlier this
week, calling it "an agreement with Spanish
reality" and a hopeful new step. The law is not
likely to ease the growing demands for increased
civil liberties. Many opposition groups regard the
proposed legislation as a farce and will refuse to
apply for association status.
Last week, 14 opposition leaders represent-
ing seven Christian Democratic and socialist
groups were arrested at a meeting in Madrid. They
had assembled to discuss the launching of a
"Democratic Conference" as well as the attitude
they should take toward the Communist-
sponsored "Democratic Junta" formed in Paris
last July. All 14 were released the next day. The
participation in the meeting of a former cabinet
member and the son of the ex-chief of the armed
forces general staff has boosted the concept of a
"Democratic Conference.
The inability of the government's syndical
organization to cope with serious labor conflicts
is demonstrated by the rash of illegal strikes,
which has now reached a four-year high. This
month, strikes and strike-related violence have
centered in Barcelona, Madrid, the Basque prov-
inces, and Valladolid, where clandestine labor
groups have clashed with the police.
For the first time, non-Communist clandes-
tine labor groups outside the Communist-dom-
inated Workers Commissions have emerged as the
principal advocates of violence. Efforts of the
Workers Commissions to moderate the violence
may reflect the influence of exiled Communist
leader Santiago Carrillo in Paris. He wants to
create a moderate image in Spain by promoting
the participation of more non-Communists in the
new "Democratic Junta" coalition.
Tension with the government increased with
the intervention this month by top church offi-
cials led by Cardinal Jubany of Barcelona. He
issued a pastoral letter that placed most of the
blame on government authorities for labor prob-
lems in Barcelona and called for recognition of
the right to strike and social justice for workers.
Even the official workers' organization felt
the need to call for various labor reforms, in-
cluding the granting of a modified right to strike,
but the authorities are divided over how to handle
labor and are unlikely to respond. Instead, the
government continues to arrest strikers and is
proceeding with the trials of clandestine labor
leaders. The regime made a concession of sorts,
however, when the trial of five prominent mem-
bers of the illegal socialist labor union-scheduled
for last October 28-was postponed indefinitely,
reportedly because of protests from European
socialists. In this case, moderates concerned with
Spain's image abroad prevailed.
The strikes and labor unrest will probably
continue at a high level at least until next Febru-
ary. Many collective bargaining agreements expire
on December 31, and renegotiations are likely tom
be accompanied by violence.
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 NATO Headquarters
NATO REVIEWS ITS PROBLEMS
137 3`1l
When the foreign and defense ministers of
NATO meet in Brussels next week, they will
debate many of the alliance's most serious prob-
lems, but no dramatic results are likely. At the
heart of their discussions will be the question of
the viability of the alliance itself, as the last six
months have seen two of NATO's members
become less than full participants.
Greece's withdrawal from the integrated
military command has damaged NATO's defenses
on the southern flank. The most important con-
sequence is that the full support of Greek forces
can no longer be counted on in the event of an
attack on the alliance. Beyond that, there remain
innumerable unsettled details arising from the
Greek withdrawal. The NATO ministers will be
assessing the damage already done and deciding
how to deal with Athens in the future.
The Portuguese situation may be only the
first case in which NATO will be confronted with
the problem of how to treat a member with
Communists in its government. For the time
being, NATO has cut off the flow of nuclear
information to Lisbon and has eased the Portu-
guese out of the nuclear planning group, which
will hold a special meeting concurrently with the
ministers' gathering. An anti-NATO reaction in
Lisbon, with possible consequences for Portu-
guese membership, is still a possibility.
The specter haunting the ministerial meet-
ings will be the steady deterioration of the eco-
nomies of the member countries. The national
defense programs of a number of members have
already been affected, and many observers feel
that this is only the beginning. The foreign and
defense ministers will be discussing the danger
that economic difficulties pose to the main-
tenance of NATO defenses, and they may also
give some attention to possible solutions.
One item on the agenda will be the Dutch
suggestion that NATO's defense programs could
be made more efficient if member countries
specialized in certain tasks. NATO has already
begun to take a closer look at the Dutch sugges-
tion, but several members have problems with it.
The ministers are not expected to act decisively
on the proposal.
The ministers' perception of the threat to
NATO's defenses will be colored by reports that
point to a growth in Soviet military strength. The
goals of detente will continue to receive strong
support from the allies, but the West Europeans
remain concerned about US-Soviet bilateral deal-
ings, exemplified recently by the agreement on
SALT principles at Vladivostok. The West
European ministers will be anxious to question
US spokesmen about the principles and will be
especially interested in how developments at
SALT might affect the two negotiations-the
European security conference and the force
reduction talks-in which the West Europeans,
along with the US, are involved. The security
conference has shown some signs of forward
movement within the last few weeks, and del-
egates are talking about finishing substantive
work by spring. The force reduction talks remain
stalled, with both sides holding fast to their basic
positions despite certain new variations.
The NATO ministers will also be mindful of
the threat of renewed conflict in the Middle East,
which could again split the alliance. The West
Europeans will be interested in the US assessment
of the situation and may seek guarantees that
they will be consulted about US activities in the
event of a new Middle East crisis. (SECRET NO
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
PARIS SUMMIT Lf -" yj
Ever since Paris first proposed holding an EC
summit by the end of the year, France's partners
have been markedly unenthusiastic and pessi-
mistic about its prospects for reaching significant
decisions. It is now scheduled to convene next
week, and many still profess to see it essentially
as an attempt by President Giscard to enhance his
prestige. Italy and Ireland openly set a condi-
tion-establishment of a regional assistance fund-
as a price for their attendance, while other mem-
bers demanded and got limitations on the agenda.
The flurry of last-minute consultations
among the principal leaders of the Nine-Chancel-
lor Schmidt, Prime Minister Wilson, and Giscard-
however, testifies to the dangers the European
leaders perceive in another unsuccessful summit
that would merely confirm the stagnation of the
community. The diplomatic activities this week
have made it possible to reduce substantially
chances that the summit might conclude in
disarray.
Bonn's agreement to set up the regional
fund-to which it will be the main donor-re-
moved the Italian and Irish threat not to attend
and represents a sharp turnaround from Bonn's
earlier tough talk against any marked increase in
German EC expenditures. According to a German
Foreign Ministry official, the decision is viewed
by Schmidt as a concession of considerable mag-
nitude, made because it is now "vitally impor-
tant" to show progress in European cooperation.
In return, the Germans probably received conces-
sions-perhaps relating to energy matters-during
the pre-summit negotiations.
For its part, Britain has asked that a mem-
ber's budget contribution be directly related to its
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gross national product. The French are now alone
in resisting this concept, but Wilson and Giscard
may have worked out a mutually face-saving com-
promise during their meeting this week.
Despite the cautious optimism about the
summit outcome generated by these develop-
ments, some EC leaders have publicly cautioned
against expecting dramatic results. French For-
eign Minister Sauvagnargues, for example, said
this week that "what we must avoid is, first, great
expectations and then profound disappoint-
ment." The Nine hope to avoid such recurrent
post-summit disillusionment by holding meetings
several times a year in the future so that the
summits can be treated in more routine fashion.
Beyond its function of promoting a commu-
nity identity, the summit's success will be viewed
by each of the Nine in terms of the degree to
which national objectives are advanced. Thus,
Bonn particularly seeks agreement on common
energy policies, and London a reduction in its EC
budget contribution. The British and the Danes
are not in favor of the development of suprana-
tional institutions, while the Benelux states hope
that the possibility for movement in this area will
at least not be killed.
The French initiative for EC institutional
reforms-including enhancing the political coordi-
nation process-has focused attention on the in-
adequacies of the community's decision-making
process. If the original French proposals have
been greatly watered down, it is not because the
institutional debate is irrelevant, but because it
touches the heart of the community problem:
how much sovereignty the members are willing to
surrender in the cause of European integration.
Giscard told American journalists this week that
France, at the summit, intends to propose fixing a
date for elections for the European Parliament
and that ground rules be set up for future EC
decisions by majority vote. The Belgians have
suggested establishing a working-group-possibly
headed by Belgian Premier Tindemans-to study
institutional reforms and to make definite pro-
posals within a year. Although Schmidt is re-
portedly lukewarm toward the idea, it will prob-
ably be discussed further at the summit.
One of the most serious issues dividing the
Nine is the community's response to international
cooperation on energy matters. France's partners
all want a reconciliation of Paris' and Washing-
ton's views on cooperation among consuming
countries, but they are aware that any such rap-
prochement may have to await the Franco-US
summit in mid-December. The Nine may never-
theless attempt to agree on guidelines to prevent
another, fruitless debate on EC energy policy,
which will be discussed in greater detail at a
council meeting on December 17.
The call for a summit has had the important
beneficial effect of forcing new discussions of
how the critical economic problems can be dealt
with on a community-wide basis. In fact, given
the complexity of the problems and the diver-
gencies in their economies, the Nine are not
expected to reach substantial agreement at the
summit on community-wide measures. The meet-
ing may, however, give an impetus to expan-
sionary policies in certain countries. Chancellor
Schmidt will presumably try to get his partners to
pursue anti-inflationary policies in return for his
pledge to relax West Germany's tight monetary
and fiscal measures]
Meeting last August of EC heads of state
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EXPANDING TRADE PREFERENCES
[The EC is re-examining its trade and aid
policies for developing countries, but a clear
policy line does not seem likely in the near fu-
ture. While the community is expanding the pref-
erential treatment accorded the manufactured
and semi-processed exports of all developing
states, it is also widening the network of preferen-
tial access to the EC market granted the develop-
ing associates in Africa, the Caribbean, the Pa-
cific, and the Mediterranean. Many EC members
believe the oil-producing states should assume a
larger share of the burden of direct financial as-
sistance, even though the EC has made a gesture
toward helping those developing states "most seri-
ously affected" by high oil prices.
In line with its declared intention of further
stimulating the economies of the developing
states, the EC Council recently approved an in-
crease in benefits available under the commu-
nity's system of generalized preferences. EC
tariffs on processed agricultural goods will be
reduced substantially, and the volume of indus-
trial exports for which preferences are given to
developing countries will be increased by 15 per-
cent. Quotas for textile imports, treated sepa-
rately under the system, are scheduled to increase
by 5 percent, while the EC's list of "sensitive
goods"--for which the EC market is protected by
import quotas--was cut from 51 to 16.
In view of Britain's announced intention to
renegotiate the terms of its membership in the
community, EC officials have taken care through-
out these negotiations not to demand terms that
would worsen Britain's economic problems. In
compensation for trade losses resulting from Brit-
ain's EC membership, the new preference agree-
ment will include concessions for Hong Kong and
Asian Commonwealth countries, primarily India.
The expanded system of generalized prefer-
ences will cover products with a total value of
$4,.1 billion in 1975, as compared with $3.6 bil-
lion this year. Latest EC figures, however, indi-
cate that under the existing scheme developing
countries have taken advantage of only 40 per-
cent of the trade preferences offered by the com-
munity. Less than half of the 104 eligible coun-
tries have used the preferences. A lack of under-
standing of the intricacies of the preference sys-
tem-especially the complex rules for defining the
origin of goods in order to qualify for a prefer-
ence-prevent more effective use of the system by
the developing countries. Only relatively ad-
vanced areas such as Yugoslavia, Brazil, Hong
Kong, and Singapore have taken full advantage of
the preferences, and these account for 50 percent
of the industrial goods exported under the
system.
At the request of the Netherlands, which has
recently criticized preference benefits as illusory,
the EC Council has agreed to conduct an overall
review of the system in early 1975. Particular
attention will be paid to measures that would
facilitate and encourage greater participation in
the system and offset the impact of inflation. The
EC is unlikely to extend the scope of its prefer-
ence scheme substantially, however, until the US
adopts a similar system. The pending US trade bill
contains provisions for establishing such a pro-
gram.
Negotiations are scheduled to resume later
this month with 44 African, Caribbean, and Pa-
cific countries for a long-term association agree-
ment to replace the Yaounde Convention, which
expires in January. The new agreement will in-
clude Commonwealth countries who became eligi-
ble for association when the UK joined the com-
munity. The most innovative aspect of the new
arrangement will be a scheme to guarantee export
earnings for 12 basic commodities produced by
developing countries-a concept that the EC may
eventually seek to generalize between all de-
veloped and developing countries. The new con-
vention will also provide financial and technical
aid commitments.
Last month, the EC was able to provide
$150 million through the European Development
Fund for the states most seriously affected by
high oil prices. In January 1975, a decision will be
made to release an additional $350 million in
direct assistance, contingent upon similar efforts
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~CVr I pr"
THE APOLLO-SOYUZ PROGRAM 1-p
i Lfo, L4YJ
IThe Soviets launched Soyuz 16 on Decem-
ber 2--their first manned spacecraft mission
directly related to the joint Apollo-Soyuz project
scheduled for next July.
According to a Tass announcement, the
Soyuz 16 spacecraft is virtually identical to the
one that will be used for the joint mission. The
Soyuz 16 crew is the primary back-up team for
the joint project. A major task of the current
mission is to test the environmental control and
docking systems, both of which have been
modified for the joint venture. In addition, the
cosmonauts are also to carry out a scientific pro-
gram that includes photographing the earth and
biological research. The mission will probably last
six days with deorbit occurring early on Decem-
ber 8.
The environmental control system has been
modified to allow the Soyuz to lower cabin
atmospheric pressure and increase oxygen con-
centration when docked with Apollo so that the
crew members can safely transfer between the
two spacecrafts. Depressurization to the desired
level was achieved during the second day of the
mission.
The current mission will also be the first
flight test of a new type of docking system.
Because the Soviet and US space programs have
used different docking equipment and proce-
dures, a docking system compatible with both
spacecraft has been developed.
The Soviets have conducted a number of
tests of the new docking system. A series of
ground tests were conducted over the past year,
both in the Soviet Union and in the US, to test
the compatibility of the Apollo and Soyuz cap-
sules. In addition, two unmanned Soyuz flights
this year tested the functioning of the new dock-
ing coupling in space. These flights, however,
were limited to simply extending and retracting
the coupling and did not involve actual docking
exercises while in orbit.
The first completely successful Soviet mis-
sion to include docking and internal transfer was
made this July, when the two-man crew of Soyuz
14 transferred to Salyut 3 and returned to earth
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after approximately three weeks in space. The
Soviets still had problems with their docking
techniques, however, because Soyuz 15 was also
intended to dock with Salyut 3 one month later,
but returned tQ earth without accomplishing
ROMANIA: THE CEAUSE CU CONGRESS
5c-5 3
[A confident Nicolae ~eausescurang down
the curtain on the 11th Romanian party congress
on November 28. The congress, which elected
Ceausescu to another five-year term as party boss,
buttressed his personal power and overwhelm-
ingly endorsed his independent path to socialism.
Ceausescu tightened his hold on the party's
top executive bodies-the permanent bureau and
the executive political committee-but made no
dramatic personnel changes. The permanent bu-
reau, created last March to coordinate party-state
activities, was pared down to five of his closest
advisers, including some of the nation's top eco-
nomic experts. Five more staunch supporters be-
came full members of the executive political com-
mittee, and four were named candidate members.
The party Central Committee was expanded
from 319 to 361 members, and Ceausescu engi-
neered a major turnover in its personnel: 35 per-
cent of the full members and 80 percent of the
candidates are newcomers. The changes reflected
Ceausescu's desire to get rid of deadwood and,
more important, to find individuals with the cor-
rect blend of technical expertise and political
loyalty.
The congress, as expected, adopted the
party's new program-a forceful reaffirmation of
Romanian national policies and independence.
Moscow reportedly has "undefined" problems
with the program. The Soviets may be partic-
ularly displeased with the historical section,
which criticizes the Comintern's "mistaken"
orders to the Romanian party in the interwar
period and has some kind words for the monar-
chy and the middle class.
Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav reactions to
the congress reflect their different attitudes to-
ward Romania and the Communist movement:
? The Chinese and Yugoslavs paid tribute
to Ceausescu by name, but the Soviets made
no mention of him.
? Peking praised the Romanians for
"maintaining independence, keeping the initi-
ative in their own hands and working hard."
Moscow stressed that "cooperation" and
"deepening unity" in the Communist move-
ment guarantees the "continual flourishing"
of Romania.
? Belgrade strongly echoed Bucharest's
line that international relations must be based
on "respect for independence, equality, and
noninterference in the internal development
and policy of others."
For the average Romanian, the congress held
out little hope of a better life. Although lip serv-
ice was paid to improving the standard of living
and increasing the availability of consumer goods,
the congress endorsed the continued forced
growth of industry and priority production for
the export market.
Agriculture moved up on the list of eco-
nomic priorities, reflecting Ceausescu's concern
over two bad harvest years. Investment in agricul-
ture for the 1976-80 plan will be 37 percent
higher than during 1971-75 and 25 percent more
than had previously been announced for the next
Five-Year Plan.
With the congress behind him, Ceausescu is
now turning his attention to the government.
Two cabinet posts have already changed hands,
and rumors abound that party secretary Stefan
Andrei will soon replace Gheorghe Macovescu as
foreign minister. The Grand National Assembly
usually meets within two weeks of a party con-
gress, and any further changes in the government
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USSR: THE LENINGRAD COMES HOMES
16-5-3
`The Soviet helicopter carrier Leningrad re-
turned to the Black Sea from the Indian Ocean
this week, ending a voyage that lasted nearly six
months.
The lengthy deployment began in mid-June
when the Leningrad, accompanied by a frigate,
entered the Mediterranean. After a short stop at
the Kithira anchorage near Greece, the group-
now including an oiler---sailed west into the
Atlantic in late June.
Early in July, the Leningrad task force
rounded the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian
Ocean -the first time either of the two Soviet
helicopter carriers operated there. It was then
evident that the ships were heading for the Gulf
of Suez, where the Soviets had agreed to conduct
mine-clearing operatons prior to the reopening of
the Suez Canal. In addition to the Leningrad
group, Moscow sent a number of minesweepers
from the Pacific Fleet to the Red Sea.
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During the remainder of the summer, the
Leningrad and its helicopters participated in the
mine-clearing operations in the Strait of Gubal.
At the conclusion of these operations in Septem-
ber, the Leningrad began a slow return cruise to
its Black Sea home waters, still accompanied by
the frigate and oiler. En route, the group made
short port calls in Mauritius and Equatorial
Guinea before arriving at Dakar, Senegal, on
November 19. After a five-day stay at Dakar, the
ships continued north, re-entering the Mediterra-
nean on November 28. The Leningrad took part
in antisubmarine warfare exercises in the western
Mediterranean before sailing through the Bos-
porus on December 5, thus ending its six-month
(Leningrad
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ETHIOPIA: MORE TROUBLE AHEAD
jrhe ruling military council, already appre-
hensive about its relations with some army units
and fearful of reprisals from its enemies, now is
confronted with what may be the beginning of a
terrorist campaign in the capital.
Four bomb explosions in Addis Ababa dur-
ing the past week prompted the council to tighten
security and alert its forces to expect terrorist
attacks by the separatist Eritrean Liberation
Front. Publicly, the council blamed the bombings
on relatives and supporters of the 59 former offi-
cials executed in the bloodbath of November 23.
Early this week, the council announced the arrest
of an additional 17 persons. Most of them were
associates of old regime officials or of former
council chairman Aman, who was killed resisting
arrest on November 23. Many suspected Eritrean
Front sympathizers in the capital have probably
also been arrested.
only general officers and senior officials felt di-
rectly threatened by the revolution. The possi-
bility of further excesses by the council is appar-
ently encouraging the younger officers to work
toward gaining control of the armed forces.
The outcome of the efforts of these opposi-
tionists is uncertain. If they can gain enough
support among armed forces units in Addis
Ababa, they may well seek an armed showdown
with the council and its supporters. Alternately,
they may try to undercut the council through a
political action program designed to get impor-
tant military units to withdraw their support.
The attitudes of two major units outside
Addis Ababa-the Second Division in the north
combating the Eritrean insurgents and the Third
Division in the east facing Somalia-will be impor-
tant in any attempt to oust the council. They are
Last week, the council chose Brigadier Gen-
eral Teferi Benti as its new chairman, but he is
likely to be little more than a figurehead. At this
time, it is still unclear who the dominant figures
on the council are. Major Mengistu Hailemariam,
the first vice chairman and a member of the
important Amhara tribe, wields considerable in-
fluence, but apparently does not control the
group. He seems to have little standing among the
military as a whole.
The council continues to be rent by complex
divisions based on military rank, tribal affiliation,
and rivalry between graduates of Ethiopia's elite
military academy and of a less prestigious officer
training school. Council members appear united,
however, in no longer considering themselves
mere representatives of the units that qelectpd
them last summer.
Opposition to the council's increasingly
authoritarian rule is widespread within the mili-
tary, but it still lacks leadership, organization, and
purpose. Opposition factions are beginning to
form, however,, drawing their membership mainly
from the ranks of younger officers. Previously,
known to resent- being excluded from the
council's decision making. Although their reluc-
tance to leave their sectors unguarded reduces
their ability to directly influence events in the
distant capital, a declaration by these units that
they no longer supported the council would
strengthen the hand of o osition groups nearer
Addis Ababa. 1
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Shah of India (1) and Naik of Pakistan
The commerce secretaries sign
INDIA-PAKISTAN: ANOTHER AGREEMENT
X97
India and Pakistan agrc d ast week 1to re-
store trade links, broken since their war in 1965.
Although trade between the two countries will
probably be modest, its resumption is an impor-
tant step toward normalizing relations.
Further discussions are to be held early in
January to conclude a formal trade pact covering
specific commodities. The agreement last week
listed a number of possible items for trade, such
as Pakistani cotton and rice and Indian jute
products, manufactured goods, and iron ore. At
present, the Indians seem interested in purchasing
surplus Pakistani cotton, but for the most part
neither country appears able to offer large quan-
tities of goods needed by the other. Prior to
1965, commerce between the two made up only a
small fraction of their foreign trade and was
primarily between India and East Pakistan, now
Bangladesh.
According to the agreement, trade will be
conducted on a most-favored-nation basis, with
payments to be made in hard currency. Initially,
it will be conducted only at the government-to-
government level.
The agreement is the latest in a series of
accords reached by India and Pakistan under the
Simla Agreement of 1972, in which they resolved
to settle their differences peacefully through
bilateral negotiation. Although the two countries
remain wary of each other and differ strongly on
a variety of issues, they have managed to nego-
tiate settlements of many of the problems left
over from their 1965 and 1971 wars.
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In 1972 and 1973, India and Pakistan
agreed to withdraw troops from each other's ter-
ritory and to exchange prisoners of war and
stranded civilian minorities. This fall they re-
stored telecommunications and postal links,
established a liberalized visa system, and began
discussions aimed at restoring air links and over-
flights. The two sides are meeting this month to
discuss resumption of shipping links, and they
may hold talks early next year on restoration of
rail traffic.
The agreement to resume trade could pave
the way for talks on re-establishing diplomatic
relations, broken at the time of the 1971 war.
Pakistan has favored an early restoration of diplo-
matic ties, but India has held that significant
SOUTH ASIA: GRAIN SITUATION
J
[The four major grain importing countries of
South Asia-India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka-face at least another year of serious short-
ages. These countries have arranged for imports of
about 9 million tons of grain in fiscal 1975, and
they will probably seek at least an additional 2
million tons. Practically all of the grain supplies in
fiscal 1975 will be consumed, leaving little to
rebuild depleted stocks. Crops in all four coun-
tries will be extremely vulnerable to adverse
weather during the first half of 1975.
India-The major grain harvest-normally two
thirds of annual grain production-is now under
way. Because the summer rains were below
normal, a harvest. of 58-60 million tons is pro-
jected for the current crop year, compared with
67 million tons last year. New Delhi has already
arranged grain imports of 6 million tons for fiscal
1975 and is expected to seek another million tons
or more. These imports should be sufficient to
maintain government distribution in urban areas,
but grain reserves will be almost completely
depleted.
Even with favorable weather, India will need
further grain imports early in fiscal 1976.
Requirements could increase sharply if poor
weather again hurts the winter grain crops-
harvested in April and May-as it did last year.
Fertilizer consumption, which proved to be a key
element in raising grain output in the last decade,
is expected to remain at about the level of the
past two years.
Bangladesh--The major rice harvest now under
way normally provides 60 percent of annual grain
production. Because of beneficial rains last sum-
mer, this harvest is estimated at 7 million tons,
slightly above the 6.8 million tons of last year.
Bangladesh depends on annual grain imports of
about 2 million tons, largely for urban distribu-
tion. Dacca has already arranged for 1.4 million
tons of imports for fiscal 1975, but acquisition of
the balance is contingent on additional foreign
aid.
Pakistan-While the current rice and coarse grain
harvest-30 percent of annual grain production-is
down slightly from last year because of a poor
summer monsoon, rice exports of nearly 500,000
tons probably will be maintained. Concern is
being voiced over water supplies for irrigation of
the winter wheat crop, harvested in April and
May, because rivers and reservoirs are far below
normal for this season. Favorable rains between
now and February could alleviate this situation,
but Islamabad, anticipating difficulties, recently
raised its fiscal 1975 wheat import requirement
from 1.14 million to 1.5 million tons in hopes of
securing additional aid. Pakistan has arranged
650,000 tons of wheat imports for fiscal 1975.
Aid and commercial purchases will probably total
about 1.2 million tons-short of government
targets but adequate for fiscal 1975 needs.
Sri Lanka--The major rice harvest-two thirds of
annual grain production-begins in February and
is dependent on rains from the northeast monsoon
during N ovember-February. The government
hopes for a repeat of the record harvest of last
year-75,000 tons--which would permit 1975
grain imports to be reduced by 100,000 tons
from the 850,000 tons of 1974. Colombo so far
has arranged for 550,000 tons for 1975.
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LE: DUC THO SEEKS SUPPORT IN PARIS
Politburo member Le Duc Tho has wound up a
ten-day visit to France. During his stay, Tho met
with various French leftist groups and French
Communist officials. On November 27, he held a
press conference in which he repeated recent
Communist denunciations of the Saigon govern-
ment and the US for their failure to implement
the 1973 Paris Accords. While in France, Tho also
reportedly planned to meet with a group of
potential Vietnamese "Third Force" leaders.
Analysis of Tho's statements in France and
Hanoi's commentary on his mission suggests that
he also hoped to use his trip to mobilize Western
public opinion and the overseas Vietnamese
community behind Hanoi's current propaganda
campaign demanding President Thieu's ouster
before the Paris agreement can be implemented.
In his public statements, Tho not only praised
anti-Thieu opposition elements in the South, but
repeatedly called on the French people and the
overseas Vietnamese for "more active" support of
the Communists' struggle to force Saigon's "cor-
While Communist military forces continue
to prepare for a new round of fighting in the
South, a North Vietnamese delegation led by
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Trying to Maintain Momentum
fg - -f )
Government leaders in Phnom Penh have
welcomed the close but favorable vote at the UN
with a mixture of pleasure and relief, and have
used the occasion to renew their bid for peace
negotiations. In an address late last week, Presi-
dent Lon Nol stressed that the General Assem-
bly's ratification of the Asian-initiated resolution
was, above all, a call for peace talks, and he
reaffirmed his government's offer to negotiate
without preconditions. Lon Nol also voiced hope
that the UN would carry out its new mandate to
play an active role in promoting a peaceful settle-
ment, sentiments he repeated in a personal letter
to UN Secretary General Waldheim.
The other side's reaction has been swift and
negative. In a statement issued in Peking on
November 28, Sihanouk denounced the UN ac-
tion and firmly rejected any possibility of nego-
tiations "even under UN auspices." The Khmer
Communist news agency followed with a state-
ment that took oblique note of the UN vote and
reiterated the Communists' refusal to "negotiate
or compromise." Peking and Hanoi supported the
insurgents' position with strongly worded news-
paper editorials.
This new evidence of Communist intran-
sigence toward a negotiated settlement is in line
with other signs that the insurgents are digging in
for the long haul. For the past six weeks, a Khmer
Communist "economic and financial" delegation
headed by "special adviser" leng Sary-whose
innocuous title belies his standing in the Com-
munist hierarchy-has been touring Asian Com-
munist countries with the apparent aim of lining
up nonmilitary aid for the insurgency. Although
no new aid agreements have been announced
leng Sary (1) meeting with Le Duan
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JCL,ru I
from Hanoi or Peking-where the delegation has
spent most of its time--Sary appears to have. had
some success, most probably in obtaining tech-
nical assistance to exploit rubber-20,000 tons
after processing last year-still produced in the
Communist zone of Cambodia.
Sary's delegation is the first of its kind, and
its mission coincides with a noticeable shift of
stress in Communist propaganda from military to
economic matters. Taken as a whole, these de-
velopments suggest the Khmer Communist leader-
ship has concluded that prospects for a military
victory in the near term have diminished con-
siderably and that emphasis must now be placed
on building an economic base within the country
to help sustain the insurgency over the long term.
LAOS: DISCUSSING STRATEGY
(The tempo of political activity quickened
late this week as both the coalition cabinet and its
advisory council met in the royal capital of Luang
Prabang. Prime Minister Souvanra Phouma inter-
rupted his convalescence to chair the cabinet
meeting-his first appearance on the political
firing line since suffering a serious heart attack
last July. Souvanna's half-brother, Lao Commu-
nist leader Souphanouvong, presided over the
council, which will remain in plenary session for
the next month.
Both conclaves came on the heels of an
extraordinary two-week conference of the Lao
Communist Central Committee at Pathet Lao
headquarters in Sam Neua, which was almost cer-
tainly called in part at least to chart Communist
political strategy for the coming months. Al-
though the results of the Sam Neua gathering are
still unclear, its importance was underscored by
the fact that neither Deputy Prime Minister
Phoumi Vongvichit nor Souphanouvong was able
to break away to meet in Vientiane with a high-
level Soviet delegation headed by Deputy Foreign
Minister Firyubin; Moscow subsequently post-
poned the visit indefinitely.
There has been considerable speculation in
Vientiane about the Sam Neua conclave. Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma and non-Communist
Finance Minister Ngon Sananikone have theo-
rized, for example, that the meeting may have
been convened to resolve serious policy differ-
ences between so-called coalition "moderates"
like Phoumi and Souphanouvong and the ardent,
hard-core revolutionaries who remain behind in
Sam Neua. The latter, according to Ngon, are
wedded to the concept of an all-Indochina Com-
munist Party that must remain vigilant and belli-
cose until the conflicts in Cambodia and Vietnam
have been resolved. Phoumi and Souphanouvong,
on the other hand, are-in Ngon's view-national-
ists who believe that with the establishment of
the coalition government, the Pathet Lao should
work toward national reunification and not con-
cern themselves with the problems of other Indo-
chinese states.
For its part, the US embassy in Vientiane
has speculated that in addition to ironing out
possible disagreements within the Lao Communist
leadership itself, the conference may have been
called to address policy differences between Sam
Neua and Hanoi.
There are several possible areas of disagree-
ment between the North Vietnamese and the
Pathet Lao. Hanoi might be displeased with the
Lao Communists' lack of success in securing coali-
tion government recognition of the Viet Cong's
Provisional Revolutionary Government and, possi-
bly, Sihanouk's government as well. Hanoi might
also be pressing the Pathet Lao to take a much
harder line on the presence of US bases in Thai-
land and to link any improvement in Lao-Thai
relations to further reductions in American force
levels and aerial reconnaissance activity.
It is possible that the Sam Neua conferees
focused primarily on internal political problems
facing the coalition government, particularly
Prime Minister Souvanna's health and the ques-
tion of succession. The problem of refugee reset- 25X1
tlement, which will shortly be considered by the
coalition's Joint Central Commission, may also
have been high on the agenda.
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r' J L Li F LL I `.
COLOMBIA: OUT ON A LIMB
N0 --- v-3j
he Colombian Congress is continuing to
review the anti-inflation measures decreed by
President Lopez in September and October, while
violent demonstrations against the measures per-
sist in many parts of the country. Lopez has
placed several cities and towns under modified
martial law, and troops have been called in to
help police quell demonstrations elsewhere.
The President has quietly abandoned the
campaign of television appearances that he and
members of his cabinet were making to rally
public support for his economic moves. There has
been little action on the congressional review as
the legislators keep an eye on public opinion and
the political barometer.
Thus far, Lopez has not wavered from the
stringent economic program his decrees outline,
although the unexpected tension engendered by
the decrees is likely to produce some accommoda-
tion eventually. The President has remained
adamant in the apparent hope that an early turn-
around in cost-of-living statistics would vindicate
his program. The effect of his economic measures,
however, will be felt only in the longer term.
If the combined weight of the demonstra-
tions and the unsavory image of martial law be-
comes a significant factor in the congressional
review process, Lopez can be expected to change
his tack. He can most easily do this without losing
face by throwing his economic team to the wolves
and negotiating with Congress for changes in his
decrees.
A far less likely option would be to declare
another state of economic emergency and bypass
Congress again. In fact, Lopez has asked Congress
for additional emergency powers, but this is a
marked departure from his earlier use of such
powers without even token congressional
authority.
In the midst of this gathering economic and
political storm, Lopez mounted a low-key cele-
bration of his first 100 days. Speaking to Con-
gress and the nation late last month, he was able
to point out the considerable forward movement
his administration has already made in such areas
as women's rights, labor relations, and student
affairs. Nevertheless, these salutary aspects remain
in the shadow of his economic programs, whose
positive values are largely invisible to most
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SCURF I
BREAKING WITH CHILE...
('44 -IQc
The Echeverria administration has said little
to explain why it curtly severed diplomatic rela-
tions with Chile last week. Foreign Secretary
Rabasa noted to the press that sometimes reasons
for foreign policy decisions are "never stated"-a
strong hint that the actual causes of the break
may never be revealed.
Some officials in the Mexico City diplomatic
community believe that the sudden action may
lead to a feeling in other countries that Mexico
acts irrationally. Reaction in the hemisphere has
so far been muted, however. The conservative,
military-dominated regimes of Brazil, Paraguay,
Bolivia, and Uruguay are likely to be the most
annoyed at Mexico.
Even Chilean officials profess to have no
clue as to why the decision came at this time. The
two countries, however, have been sniping at each
other since the overthrow of President Allende in
September 1973. Mexico withdrew its ambas-
sador in April 1974. President Echeverria, who
was friendly with Allende, has been decidedly
cold toward the Pinochet government, but there
was no outward sign of any recent incident that
might have precipitated the break.
Defending the decision, Rabasa said only
that it was not capricious, but came after months
of observing the Chilean situation. He noted that
Mexico had felt it necessary to keep its Santiago
embassy open to receive refugees. Since the coup,
Mexico has accepted nearly 700 Chileans who
wished to leave their country. The Mexicans now
may have concluded that the junta government
was not going to release more Chileans, including
two whore the Mexicans especially wanted freed-
Allende's foreign minister, Clodomiro Almeyda,
and his sister, Laura-and that it was high time to
sever relations.
Some speculation, originated by a right-
wing, sensationalist newspaper in Santiago, cen-
ters on a Mexican scheme to sponsor and then
recognize a "Chilean government in exile" com-
posed of figures from the Allende era. Many
Chileans, especially those with technical skills,
have been given government jobs in Mexico, but
the Mexican government has kept a close watch
on their outside activities. They have reportedly
been warned to stay out of politics. Only a few
exceptions to this rule have been made-Allende's
widow, for one, has been given a loose rein to
express her views.
Other press reports link the break to alleged
CIA involvement in Allende's overthrow. They
suggest Mexico reached the conclusion that the
Chilean military junta was illegal because it had
gained power through foreign intervention.
Rabasa, when queried about it, said this was not
the motive.
More than one local observer, according to
the US embassy, has commented on the possible
role played by Mrs. Echeverria, who is widely
considered to be on very friendly terms with
Chilean exiles and Cubans.
Less than a week after the break with Chile,
security officials announced the death of Lucio
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Cabanas-Mexico's premier rural guerrilla leader-
and some 20 of his followers in a skirmish with
army troops. Cabanas had eluded authorities for
years, but the army began to close in after he
kidnaped a well-known senator last May. The
senator was freed during a gun battle in
September.
Many peasants in the southwestern state of
Guerrero, Cabanas' area of operation, sympa-
thized with him.
Cabanas' death
will be a severe blow to his "Party of the Poor,"
but bitterness over harsh treatment by the army is
likely to linger for some time, and new guerrilla
and bandit leaders will probably attempt to take
up where Cabanas left off. Cabanas' second-in-
command remains alive and commands a guerrilla
band somewhere in the wilds of Hidalgo and
Veracruz states.
CHILE: JUNTA-PARTY TENSIONS GRQW
i o 2 -- o ?
Relations between Chile's military govern-
ment and the Christian Democratic Party again
neared a breakdown last week and continue tense.
The government and the party have been close to
a break before, but former president Frei's direct
involvement in the latest dispute has made it the
most serious.
The controversy began on November 26,
when left-wing party leader Renan Fuentealba
was expelled from the country for violating the
ban on political activity. Frei's signature topped
the roster of Christian Democratic luminaries
from across the party's ideological spectrum who
protested the expulsion in a strongly worded
public statement.
The government responded by declaring that
Fuentealba's statements on human rights to a
foreign news service constituted a "lack of pa-
triotism" that placed him "beyond the limits the
government can reasonably tolerate." The gov-
ernment was clearly in no mood to listen to
criticism. One official spokesman reminded
"politicians" that they were dealing with "an
authoritarian government that will impose its
authority even if it has to be harsh and ruthless,"
and Junta President Pinochet declared that "this
government is strong and will make itself
respected."
There have been no further moves by either
side since the government's verbal blasts, but this
may be only a lull before the storm. Some within
the government, especially right-wing civilian
advisers who would like to see a split between the
armed forces and the Christian Democrats, prob-
ably are pushing for vigorous action, such as out-
lawing the party. Cooler heads have prevailed in
the past, but Frei's participation has given the
party's protest an aura of direct challenge that
comes at a particularly inopportune moment.
Recent international criticism and unfavorable
events, such as Mexico's severing of relations,
have bred a siege mentality in Chile's military
leaders. They may be sorely tempted to strike
back at any critics within reach.
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BRAZIL: THE CONGRESSIONAL LECTIONS
[ I b9, ) 1,of
The electoral victory of the opposition
Brazilian Democratic Movement marks a percep-
tible turning point in the development of the
post-1964 military governments. By encouraging
open campaigning and abiding by the results of
the election, President Geisel has reaffirmed his
commitment to a legalist-if not classically lib-
eral-approach to government. In the process, the
military-backed "revolution" has displayed a new
degree of maturity and self-confidence by resist-
ing the tendency to allow security concerns to
influence the conduct of the election.
By presiding over a freewheeling election,
Geisel has taken a significant step in his policy of
gradually opening the political system. Right-wing
military pressures, however, continue to be a
potentially inhibiting factor. The opposition
party's attitude and behavior, therefore, will have
much to do with how much conservative pressure
is brought to bear on Geisel when the legislative
season opens next March.
Thus, opposition leaders continue to stress
their desire to play a constructive, rather than a
"negativist," role. Clearly, they seek to vindicate
Geisel, whose policies allowed them to contest
the elections seriously, and to deny ultra-conser-
vatives any pretext whatsoever for opposing the
election results. The party leaders also intend
their remarks as guidance-if not a warning-for
potentially outspoken members of their own
party. Exultant, vindictive outbursts could prove
counterproductive. The call for moderation also
stems from the realization that a good many votes
cast for the opposition represent not so much an
endorsement of the party itself as a protest
against economic conditions and government
policies.
Nevertheless, the enlarged representation of
the opposition party increases the prospects for
more substantive debate in congress and state
assemblies. Legislators chosen at least partly in an
expression of economic discontent can be ex-
pected to focus their attention on government
policies in this area. Indeed, party leader Franco
Montoro has indicated that "shadow cabinets"
will be set up to monitor federal and state govern-
ment performance. The party could also follow
up on another of its effective campaign issues, the
need for greater scrutiny of multi-national firms.
In those state legislatures it now controls, the
party may attempt to bargain with the federal
government by offering to help rather than hinder
the work of the state governors, who are, in
effect, chosen by the President.
In the final analysis, the regime has all the
power it needs to ignore or even suppress the
legislatures, if it should choose to do so. The price
in public resentment would be high, however,
now that the election results have been allowed to
LATIN AMERICA: MEETING AT AYACUCHO
-1191
ive chief executives and numerous lower
ranking officials from hemisphere countries begin
a four-day meeting in Lima on December 6 to
commemorate the sesquicentennial of Simon
Bolivar's defeat of the Spaniards at Ayacucho.
The heads of state of Bolivia, Chile, and Ven-
ezuela, along with Panamanian strong man Tor-
rijos, are scheduled to join Peruvian President
Velasco for a discussion of regional problems. The
presidents of Argentina, Colombia, and Ecuador
will send representatives to the meeting.
While Chile reportedly has lobbied against
formal consideration of political problems at the
meeting, preferring instead to limit activity to
protocol and historical discussion, the partici-
pants are likely to debate a variety of general
topics, such as:
? Bolivia's desire to regain access to the
sea;
? a regional arms moratorium;
? structured regional economic coop-
eration;
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? alleged "economic" aggression;
? interference in their countries' internal
affairs by other governments.
In addition, the question of Cuba's inter-
American role is almost certain to crop up in a
variety of circumstances.
President Velasco would like to use the
meeting as a forum to boost his prestige both
domestically and in the hemisphere. The luster of
the gathering already has been dimmed some-
what, however, as a result of the Argentine, Co-
lombian, and Ecuadorean presidents' decisions
not to attend. In addition, the current restive
atmosphere in Peruvian domestic politics is likely
to detract from the statesmanship of the meeting.
Political unrest and terrorist activity in Lima
probably influenced the three leaders who de-
cided not to attend.
The Peruvian government is concerned about
violence during the meeting. Such activity would
come from civilian middle-class dissidents and dis-
gruntled navy officers as part of an effort to
embarrass and weaken President Velasco. Anti-
Chilean leftists might also protest the presence of
Junta President Pinochet. Security during the
conference will be tight, but terrorism remains a
distinct possibility.
The recent charges of CIA interference in
Peru may be raised during the meeting, particu-
larly if the Peruvians need a pretext to seize the
limelight. The presence of US Assistant Secretary
of State Rogers, however, may help to temper the
rhetoric on this issue.
The meeting will also afford Velasco an
opportunity to discuss bilateral problems face-to-
face with Chilean General Pinochet. While no
solutions are expected, the meeting of these two
men is likely to help ease tensions for the time
being.
Venezuelan President Perez' attendance will
complicate Velasco's effort to emerge as a leading
spokesman for hemispheric affairs, since both
presidents view themselves as leaders in this area.
President Perez would like to use the Lima gather-
ing to build support for the planned meeting of
all Latin American presidents next year in Cara
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V190,10, %W
Secret
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