WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010900120001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 18, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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qW 'ROW
Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
Secret
No. 0042 / 74
18 October 1974
Copy 59
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
icant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents.
CONTENTS (October 18, 1974)
1
High-Level Visits:
-Gierek Pleased by US Visi
-Meeting at the Mexican Bo
-Portugal's President Stren
-More Tumult in South Ko
t
rder
gthened
rea
5
Italy: Fanfani Weighs In
6
Cyprus: The Rush of Events
8
UK: After the Election
9
Spain: Stirrings of Unrest
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
12
Palestinians Gain UN Bid
13
Israel: West Bank Controversy
15
Kenya: Election Gains and Losses
16
Angola: Decolonization Efforts
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
17 Japanese Fishing: Shrinking Seas
18 Cambodia: UN Maneuvering
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summary
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Gierek Pleased by S Vlsit
r
Polish party leader Gierek as apparently
well pleased with his week-long visit to the US,
which ended on October 13. From Warsaw's
point of view, the most important document
signed in Washington was probably a pace-setting
statement on the further development of eco-
nomic, industrial, and technological cooperation.
The agreement calls for the expansion of
bilateral trade from its 1974 level of $700 million
to $2 billion by 1980. Specific accords dealing
with coal extraction, agriculture, health, environ-
mental protection, taxes, and joint funding of
research projects were also signed. The Polish
leader spent considerable time cultivating the US
business community. At a luncheon in New York
given by Chase Manhattan's David Rockefeller,
Gierek invited American businessmen and US
financial institutions to participate more fully in
the modernization of Polish industry.
In speeches at the UN and in Washington,
Gierek outlined the standard Polish position of
support for detente and called for a successful
conclusion to the European security talks. His
treatment of foreign policy issues was concilia-
tory and carefully phrased to avoid bruising US
sensibilities.
During the trip, his first to the US, Gierek
proved to be a strong and articulate defender of
his regime's policies, fielding reporters' questions
with confidence and humor. Gierek was obviously
pleased with the many efforts to make his stay
enjoyable, notably the establishment of a tele-
phone link between a US Air Force plane in
which he was traveling and his grandchildren in
Katowice.
Meanwhile, Warsaw demonstrated the im-
portance it attached to the visit by extensive
media coverage throughout Poland. Editorials and
commentaries repeatedly emphasized that Poland
is emerging as a valued economic "partner" of the
US and that Warsaw has an important contri-
bution to make in furthering detente. In contrast
to past practice, the media also gave considerable
attention to Mrs. Gierek's separate tours.
The Polish public received a comprehensive
and favorable view of the US that may be
unprecedented for this or any period in US-Polish
relations. One source claimed that a TV docu-
mentary, "American Close-up," was so favorable
that Polish authorities considered toning it down
drastically; instead, they scheduled a second and
somewhat critical documentary to maintain the
ideological balance.
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Meeting at the Mexican o der
trhe chief topic on the minds of I~resident eyes. Even so, the top levels of government re-
Echeverria and his advisers at the border meeting main committed to working with the US to stop
with President Ford on October 21 will be the the flow of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and other 25X6
problem of illegal Mexican immigrants in the US. dangerous drugs across the border.
Alth
ough the Mexicans probably do not expect
an immediate solution, their goal is to get another
bracero program like the one phased out between
1964 and 1966. Under that program, a set quota
of Mexican laborers entered the US legally for
seasonal agricultural work. Over the last few years
Mexican officials have periodically stirred up
public debates in the Mexican press to keep the
bracero issue alive.
In talks with US embassy officials, however,
Echeverria and Foreign Minister Rabasa have
taken a more reasoned approach and have dem-
onstrated that they are fully aware of the objec-
tions raised in the US to such a program. Both
realize the problem has no simple and quick solu-
tion, and that the problem will be ameliorated
only through raising the Mexican standard of
living. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the
Mexican tactic will be to keep the issue in the
forefront of US-Mexican relations through peri-
odic statements to the press and reminders to US
officials.
The illegal immigrants swarm into the US by
the hundreds of thousands each year in search of
better paying jobs, creating serious economic,
political, and social problems on both sides of the
border. In 1973, over a half million Mexicans who
had illegally crossed the border were apprehended
in the US and repatriated. Hundreds of thousands
more have escaped detection. The flow of
laborers in such large numbers dramatically re-
flects Mexico's persistent unemployment woes,
rural underdevelopment, and increasing popula-
tion. Although the illegal flow is embarrassing to
Mexican officials, it is also a safety valve that they
do not want to shut off.
The narcotics issue, though growing in im-
portance to the Mexicans as domestic drug abuse
becomes more of a problem, clearly takes a back
seat to the illegal immigrants issue in Mexican
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Another bilateral issue, but one Mexico
would probably prefer not to talk about, is oil.
President Echeverria is said to be very upset by
US press reports of large oil discoveries near the
Gulf of Mexico, and the subsequent public debate
over national oil policy. The size of the discovery
was being closely held for domestic political
reasons, probably because no decisions have yet
been reached on the level of production and
export.
Two Mexican officials indicated in a press
conference on October 15 that Mexico would sell
its oil at prices set by OPEC and would seek to
join that organization as an observer. These
remarks could signal a change in the government's
oil export policy, but Echeverria may also have
instructed the officials to hint at aligning Mexico
with OPEC in order to deflect domestic criticism
of alleged US attempts to influence Mexico's oil
policy.
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its willingness to try to strike a middle course on
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Officials of the government -petr-oFe-u-m
monopoly have also indicated their belief that
Mexico should go slowly on exports. Powerful
leaders of Mexico's ruling party are pressing to
limit oil sales to the minimum required to earn
essential foreign exchange and cover domestic
Portugal
President Stth ned
resident Costa Gory es' fortune seemed on
these as he made plans for his visit to the US
this week to address the UN General Assembly on
October 17 and to meet with President Ford a
day later.
Centrists and Socialists met at a television
station in Lisbon last week to protest Communist
Party control over the news department. They
were successful in persuading Prime Minister
Goncalves to prevent Communist Party chief
Cunhal's press conference from receiving special
treatment. The government thereby demonstrated
In line with this relatively restrained policy,
the government announced on October 9 that
authority for searches and arrests would hence-
forth be carefully controlled. The decision was
made after two center-left parties-the Popular
Democrats and the Socialists-deplored the abuse
of search and arrest provisions in the period after
Spinola's ouster.
Costa Gomes' position was further strength-
ened by the fact that the religious celebration at
Fatima on October 13 came off peacefully. The
celebration had been expected to turn into a
rightist demonstration and increase the friction
between left and right. The rightists probably
realized that they could not mobilize the massive
support they needed, that failure to do so now
might make any efforts to rally such support
more difficult in the future, and that an unsuc-
cessful attempt would provide the left with a
pretext to move against them. The threat of a
confrontation between the left and the right has
thus receded, at least for the moment.
Meanwhile, the Council of State earlier this
week approved the appointment of new members
to the ruling military junta to replace ousted
President Spinola and three of his conservative
supporters. Foreign Minister Soares, in a meeting
with the US ambassador on October 10, again
insisted that predictipns of a leftist drift in the
Portuguese government were exaggerated. He
pointed to the appointment of known centrists to
the Council of State as evidence of the desire to
maintain a balance among the various forces.
Soares described Spinola's ouster as the result of
general discontent with his "one-man show" and
with his paternalistic, mercurial style.
One of Costa Gomes' aides emphasized to an
embassy officer that the recent change in govern-
ment was not a turn to the left, and that the
selection of Costa Gomes as president would end
the inaction caused by constant bickering be-
tween Spinola and the Armed Forces Movement's
Coordinating Committee.
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bt(. HE I
More Tumult in South Korea
jrhe surge of student and Christian demon-
strations and concerted attacks from the major
opposition party this month have come at an
especially bad time for the Pak government as it
prepares for two important events in November-
a visit by President Ford, and consideration of the
Korean question at the UN.
The Pak: government is using a firm hand to
deal with the unrest, although riot police have
tried to avoid large-scale arrests and serious in-
juries. School administrators throughout the
country have been put on notice that their jobs
depend on how well they maintain order. More
than a dozen universities have already closed.
Pak's opponents are demanding the release
of comrades imprisoned earlier this year under
the emergency decrees, and revision of the consti-
tution, which now gives Pak virtually unlimited
power. Kim Yong-sam, the newly elected leader
of the major opposition party, has been a catalyst
for both student and Christian groups. In a speech
in the National Assembly last week, Kim warned
that he would lead a struggle in the streets if the
government did not meet opposition demands.
Pak personally rebuked and threatened Kim, but
the protesters disregarded the President and took
to the streets the following day. Kim's party
joined the struggle again this week, publicly en-
i 7 ~
d rsing wh t it termed "patriotic" student
actions.
The government should be able to contain
the current round of protests, but it may adopt
more drastic measures if the dissidents carry out
their threat to increase demonstrations between
now and the time of President Ford's visit. Riot-
control forces are being heavily reinforced in
order to contain the anticipated disturbances, and
informant nets are being expanded to provide
timely information of potential trouble.
If his opponents press their attack, Pak is
likely to place a higher priority on maintaining
order than on improving his image for President
Ford's visit or the UN debate. The US embassy
reports that the government might consider
reimposing the harsh emergency decrees of earlier
this year, which brought an outcrv of nrotpstc in
the US
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Italy: Fanfani Weighs In (,l _ D_?)
I-Prime Minister - designate Amintore Fanfani such as easier credit, more public spending, and
began negotiations this week aimed at reconsti- other measures to boost employment.
tuting the center-left coalition of Christian Demo-
crats, Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republi-
cans that collapsed on October 3. To do so,
Fanfani will have to work out compromises on
two issues: economic policy and the question of
relations with the powerful Communist Party.
Fanfani, who heads the dominant Christian
Democratic Party, played a cautious game in the
maneuvering that led up to his nomination. The
wide differences among the ruling parties makes
the "formateur" assignment a risky job for any
politician, but particularly for Fanfani. During
more than 25 years in national politics, Fanfani
has built up more influence than
any other currently active Italian
leader. He also has accumulated
more enemies, however, and-in a
country where prime ministers
do not last as long as party
leaders-Fanfani wanted to pro-
tect his flanks before taking the
assignment.
Consequently, Fanfani ac-
cepted the mandate only after
extracting from his party the as-
surance that he could keep his
post as party secretary. Fanfani
also insisted that President Leone
go through the motions of having
another prominent Christian
Democrat-the president of the
senate-conduct preliminary talks
to weigh the prospects for re-
solving differences. Fanfani's
acceptance, despite a pessimistic
The Socialists' room for maneuver is being
narrowed by the growing militancy of their con-
stituents in organized labor. The unions recently
staged a general strike in Turin after a breakdown
in talks with Fiat over the best means of reducing
the company's production. Meanwhile, the feder-
ation of Italy's major unions is pushing a series of
proposals that closely parallel the changes the
Socialists are seeking in the austerity program. A
nationwide general strike was held on October 17
to back up these demands.
For the moment, there is likely to be more
flexibility on the Communist
question. The Socialists recently
moderated their earlier demand
for some form of governmental
collaboration with the Commu-
nists, although they are still call-
ing for a consultative procedure
that would allow the Commu-
nists to "share responsibility"
for economic decisions. If
forced to choose between en-
hancing their own influence or
that of the Communists, the So-
cialists may back down even fur-
ther, particularly if they can in-
crease their own weight in the
cabinet by doing so. The Social-
ists have their eyes on one or
more of the important minis-
tries-interior, foreign affairs,
treasury, or education-hereto-
fore dominated by the Christian
Democrats.
report from the senate official, suggests that he
sees some room for compromise on the issues
dividing the parties.
The most contentious bargaining will be over
Socialist demands for changes in the two-month-
old austerity program. The Socialists want to fur-
ther lighten the program's impact on lower in-
come groups. The other parties generally agree,
however, that the austerity program would be
sabotaged by many of the Socialist proposals,
Even if the Socialists yield, it will not be a
substantial setback for the Communists. The next
government, whether formed by Fanfani or
another Christian Democrat, would still have to
consult informally with the Communists-Italy's
second largest party-or face stiff parliamentary
opposition. For their part, the Communists have
softened their appeal for more influence, appar-
ently in the belief that continued wrangling
among the coalition parties inevitably strengthens
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JCl.rr 1
CYPRUS: THE RUSH OF EVENTS
)Diplomatic efforts to resolve the Cyprus
3
problem continued to be overshadowed this week
by political activity in Athens, Ankara, and
Nicosia. In Athens, the political parties prepared
candidate lists and stepped up organizational and
propaganda activity for the elections to be held
on November 17. In Ankara, Prime Minister
Ecevit made a second try at forming a new gov-
ernment after party leaders failed to agree on a
nonpartisan government of national unity. In
Nicosia, the authority and negotiating positions
of Acting Cypriot President Clerides and Turkish
Cypriot Vice President Denktash may soon be
undermined because of Archbishop Makarios' re-
ported intention to return soon to the island and
because of demands that Ankara has been making
upon Denktash.
Greece: Elections Affect Cyprus Issue
Foreign Minister Mavros resigned from the
government this week in order to devote full time
to the election campaign of his party, now called
the Center Union - New Forces. In stepping
down, Mavros rioted that "no developments were
foreseen" on the Cyprus issue until after the
parliamentary elections on November 17.
Cyprus will be a major issue in the campaign,
as will the purge of those who collaborated with
the junta. Failure to take strong measures on
"de-juntaizatiori" would draw strong criticism
from the left, but too vigorous a purge would add
to concern on the right. Anti-Americanism does
not appear likely to become a dominant campaign
issue.
Prime Minister Karamanlis has decided to
take a neutral stance on the return of King Con-
stantine. As a result, it is unlikely that the Greeks
will opt for the monarchy in the referendum that
will follow the elections.
An official of the Soviet embassy in Athens
has told a US embassy officer that Moscow hopes
the Center Union will win enough seats to deny a
majority to Karamanlis- F_
cow did not expect to see any extreme leftists or
communists in the government but would be
satisfied with a few Center Union deputies. He
said the Soviets think Karamanlis is the right man
now for Greece, but that he would be unlikely to
heed advice from other leaders if his party won
control of parliament. The Soviets probably fear
that if Karamanlis gained a strong mandate, he
would be less susceptible to leftist pressure.
The Soviet forecast is that Karamanlis will
win 140 seats, the Center Union - New Forces
100, the United Left and Papandreou together a
maximum of 40. The right-wing National Demo-
cratic Union and the independents would split the
remaining 20 seats.
communist Par y, recently legalized for
the first time in more than a quarter of a century,
newly formed United Left alliance that includes
the dissident Greek Communist Party and the
former Communist front, known as the United
Democratic Left. The alliance, which is not likely
to last beyond the elections, probably was joined
by the Moscow-backed party as a result of Soviet
pressure and financial inducement. The Moscow-
backed group previously had refused to cooperate
with the United Democratic Left and was feuding
with the dissident Communist Party over who had
the right to call itself the Communist Party.
A unified campaign by these parties will
enable them to exploit the government's policy of
giving equal time on national TV to all major
political groups. Local observers believe that the
United Left may pull 10 to 15 percent of the
vote.
Meanwhile, new political groups continue to
appear. A monarchist "Royal National Front" has
been formed, and ex - Center Union deputy
Nikitas Venizelos has been floating the idea of
re-establishing the Liberal Party. Altogether,
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will comp a in the election in the
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nineteen political parties will compete in the elec-
tions so far.
Greece's last prime minister before the 1967
coup, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, has announced
that he will not participate in the elections, how-
ever, as has ex - prime minister Markezinis, former
leader of the Progressive Party.
Turkey: Further Delay
Following the failure of the parties to agree
on a nonpartisan government of "national unity,"
President Koruturk this week asked caretaker
Prime Minister Ecevit to make a second try at
forming a new government. Ecevit turned to
Justice Party leader Demirel, offering him nine
possible solutions to the current impasse, accord-
ing to the press. Nearly all the proposals were
linked to elections in either the spring or fall.
Demirel said he needed at least ten days to re-
spond to the proposals.
Cyprus: The Archbishop Again
Possibly in preparation or his re-
turn, Makarios issued a conciliatory statement on
October 13 calling for the forgiveness of all those
who took part in his overthrow on July 15. The
extreme right, which led the coup against Maka-
rios, has been adamantly opposed to his return.
Should Makarios return, Clerides might stay on as
negotiator, but his flexibility and authority to
commit the Greek Cypriot side to an agreement
with the Turkish Cypriots would be reduced.
and may be bypassed by an administration
On the Turkish Cypriot side, Denktash ap-
parently believes that the Turkish government is
undercutting his position. Denktash may feel that
he is very close to losing what little authority he
still has within the Turkish Cypriot community
the prisoner-exchange agreement already reached
Denktash may suspect that Ankara is trying
to force him to back down on certain aspects of
Despite Denktash's anxieties, the two
community leaders held another meeting on
October 14 and announced that the general
release of prisoners and detainees would resume
"very shortly." The exchange is now scheduled
for October 18, but it is still possible that Ankara
may again balk.
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UK: AFTER TH ELECTION
Having won a-6arrow parliamentary majority
in the British elections on October 11, Prime
Minister Wilson has begun drafting the program of
action for his new Labor government.
Wilson's margin of victory was considerably
smaller than most opinion polls had predicted.
Labor took 319 of the 635 seats in the House of
Commons-one seat more than an absolute major-
ity. The Conservatives netted only 276-a loss of
20 seats--while the Liberals lost one seat to finish
with just 13. The various regional parties picked
up seats, but not as many as anticipated.
Economic issues have first priority for the
new government. In a nationwide address on
October 14, Wilson appealed for general support
in the fight against inflation. Cabinet members
subsequently met to work out a program to
stimulate industry and head off unemployment.
The program closely follows the line set forth in
Labor's election manifesto by calling for in-
creased government participation in industry.
In an effort to gain cooperation for his eco-
nomic program, Wilson assured representatives of
the Confederation of British Industry that he
intended to ease the tax burden on businesses.
The Prime Minister also met with leaders of the
Trades Union Congress and urged them to abide
by the "social contract" agreement of voluntary
wage controls. The success of Labor's anti-infla-
tion program will depend largely on the coopera-
tion of rank-and-file workers.
Other major issues facing the new govern-
ment include EC membership and the UK defense
review. According to public opinion polls, odds
are about even that Britons will vote to pull out
of the EC when the expected referendum is held.
Recent press reports listing the defense cuts under
consideration suggest that a reduction in Britain's
NATO-committed forces is inevitable.
In addition, Wilson will need to pay greater
attention to the demands of the various regional
parties, notably the Scottish Nationalists. The
party will have a stronger voice in national affairs
by virtue of its small but respectable parliamen-
tary delegation of 11 seats and the prospect of
considerable wealth flowing into Scotland from
North Sea oil fields.
The Tory defeat in the elections has stim-
ulated speculation about the future of party
leader Heath and increased the possibility that he
will be forced to resign. Aware that his tough
stand against the unions contributed to his defeat
in the election last February, Heath
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SECHE I
tried-unsuccessfully-to project a conciliatory
image in this election. Earlier this week, the Con-
servative Monday Club called for his resignation,
but for the present at least, Heath has given no
indication that he is planning to do so.
Conservative Party chairman William
Whitelaw is a favorite among many party mem-
bers to succeed Heath as shadow prime minister.
Whitelaw was in the public eye during his success-
ful tenure as secretary of Northern Ireland in the
last Tory government. Whitelaw has been a loyal
Heath supporter, however, and may be too
closely identified with him. Other possible candi-
dates include housing spokeswoman Margaret
Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph, who is well
known for his disagreement with the party over
economic policy. This lack of an obvious replace-
ment makes Heath' er as Tory leader less
certain at this time.
SPAIN: STIRRIN S OF UNREST
Serious stri s and labor agitation have oc-
curred across Spain in recent weeks, and con-
tinuing turmoil is likely. The labor unrest and an
apparently coordinated series of hunger strikes by
political prisoners have sharpened the debate on
liberalization of the regime. Prime Minister Arias
reportedly is still pushing for the creation of
political associations; his deputy prime minister-
who is also labor minister-has called for political
evolution and a loosening of restrictions on labor,
such as granting a modified right to strike. The
proposal to legalize strikes is unlikely to be acted
upon, inasmuch as the government has usually
responded to labor agitation by clamping down
hard.
Numerous strikes have already occurred in
Bilbao and Valladolid in the north, and in Barce-
lona and Madrid. Some have involved grievances
over working conditions and some are sympathy
strikes, but economic issues are at the heart of the
current wave. The principal factor is the rapid rise
in the cost of living, which may exceed 20 per-
cent in 1974. Other issues are the abandonment
by the government of mandatory wage increase
guidelines, the renegotiation of most major two-
year bargaining contracts within the next two
months, and the rise in unemployment resulting
from the energy crisis.
Clandestine labor groups have been success-
ful in politicizing many of the work stoppages by
encouraging sympathy strikes and demonstra-
tions. The Communist-dominated Workers Com-
missions had talked of a general strike but are
now calling for a series of "national strikes,"
which are envisioned as a chain reaction of strikes
in different locations. Because of the rivalries
between the Communist and non-Communist
groups, the best the clandestine groups can prob-
ably hope for is to take advantage of individual
strikes whenever they occur.
Last week, the government cracked down by
arresting some 200 workers and supporters at a
church in Madrid, and by picking up 47 alleged
communists who were meeting at a convent in
Barcelona to plan labor tactics. The trial of five
prominent members of the illegal socialist labor
union has been scheduled for October 27. This
trial is certain to draw the attention of West
European socialists and trade union observers,
who will be critical of Spanish justice. The trial
has already been postponed twice, and the gov-
ernment might decide to postpone it again if the
moderates, who are concerned about Spain's
image abroad, prevail over hard liners who want
to make an example of an illegal organization.
The strike situation has once again pointed
up the impotence of the government-controlled
syndical organization, which in most cases has not
been able to act as a channel for worker griev-
ances or to prevent strikes. The labor organization
has been preoccupied with an internal dispute.
Some officials want to liberalize in order to avoid
what happened to the syndicates in Portugal-
which are now dominated by the Communists-
while hard liners believe that the Portuguese ex-
ample can be avoided only by tighter controls
over labor.
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A series of hunger strikes by political pris-
oners in six prisons, including Madrid's infamous
Carabanchel, is a further embarrassment to the
government. The political detainees are demand-
ing that they be segregated from other prisoners
and that they be granted certain privileges. Unlike
past prison strikes, these appear to be well-
organized and well-coordinated efforts by both
the political prisoners-who are largely members
of either the Spanish Communist Party, the
Basque terrorist organization ETA, or more leftist
extremist groups-and their respective organiza-
tions outside the prison walls. Such coordinated
prison strikes could prove an increasingly effec-
tive weapon against the..-government in the
future.
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ROMANIA: NEW CONCERN OVER SOVIETS
:- z -44
he revelation of the c minformist plot in
Yugoslavia-about which Belgrade has kept
Bucharest fully informed-has prompted Romania
to raise again the threat of Soviet intervention in
the hope that this will strengthen its case for
Western support.
At the European security talks in Geneva, a
Romanian diplomat told a US colleague that
Bucharest recently failed to persuade Moscow to
pledge that it would not use articles 53 and 107
of the UN charter as the excuse for Soviet inter-
vention. The Romanian government initially sided
with Germany in World War II, and the phrasing
of these articles permits the victors to intervene in
the internal affairs of the former "enemy states."
The Kremlin's refusal to reassure its ally has
led Bucharest to submit a new proposal on the
implementation of the non-use-of-force principles
at the security talks. The Romanian diplomat
emphasized that his country wants to obtain the
maximum possible multilateral assurances in any
documents adopted at Geneva. He specifically
cited the need to limit the right of one state to
enter or maintain troops in another without the
latter's consent.
Bucharest's fears of Soviet intentions also
surfaced in a detailed briefing that a Romanian
diplomat in Prague volunteered to a US counter-
part on October 4. While the Romanian stressed
that Bucharest is not under any immediate danger
from Moscow, he added that the potential was
clearly there. In an argument carefully structured
to appeal to the West, he asserted that Bucharest
believes direct Soviet military intervention is
likely in a situation where the Kremlin became
convinced that it could invade without paying an
excessive political price to the West. A weak state-
ment on the inviolability of borders at the secu-
rity talks, according to the Romanians, could thus
increase the probability of intervention.
The diplomat admitted that the rumors
earlier this year about Soviet pressure on Ro-
mania for a land corridor from the USSR to
Bulgaria were a related gambit. Bucharest deliber-
ately floated these stories in the hope that the
West, and specifically the US, would press the
Soviets at Geneva for strict guarantees on border
inviolability.
The Romanian concern over the prospect of
Soviet pressures is genuine and may even have
increased because Bucharest anticipates coming
under fire at the current preparatory meeting for
a European Communist conference in Warsaw. It
is not unusual, however, for the Romanians to
raise the specter of Soviet intervention to gain
leverage as important events approach. At the
moment, the US Congress is preparing to consider
most-favored-nation status for Romania, the
question of the non-use of force is coming up at
the European Security Conference, and Secretary
Kissinger is to visit Bucharest early in No-
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PALESTINIANS QAIN UN BID;,'
[The UN GZral Assembly on October 4
voted 105 to 4 to invite the Palestine Liberation
Organization to participate in assembly dis-
cussions of the Palestine question this year. The
vote gave the PLO a new measure of international
respectability and paved the way for it to join the
Arab states that are committed, at least for now,
to seeking a political resolution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
The lopsided vote and the limited number of
abstentions-only 20-were in part the result of
effective diplomatic tactics by the Syrian and
Egyptian UN delegations. Exercising the restraint
promised to Western diplomats by Egyptian For-
eign Minister Fahmi, the Arab delegates produced
a non-polemiical draft, organized more than half
of the assembly's membership to sponsor it, and
lobbied effectively for its passage. The only con-
tentious provision was an invitation to the PLO to
address a plenary session of the assembly. In the
past, the Palestinians had been permitted only to
present their case before one of the assembly's
committees.
Even Jordan voted in favor, acknowledging
the overwhelming support marshaled for the
resolution and relieved that it did not accord the
PLO exclusive representation of the Palestinians.
The Arabs declined to respond to the lone
speech of opposition by the Israeli delegate, who
characterized the PLO as representing "only
10,000 terrorists." Instead, they brought the
resolution to a quick and decisive vote with a
minimum of supporting rhetoric.
A PLO spokesman interviewed in New York
after the vote pledged that the organization
would now actively seek to apprehend Palestinian
terrorists in furtherance of its official opposition
to the use of violence against "third parties." The
PLO, however, probably cannot restrain more
radical Palestinians devoted to armed struggle.
Such groups are even now plotting to disrupt
future international conferences.
Strengthening the moderate leadership of
the PLO and enhancing its stature are part of
Egyptian President Sadat's overall strategy of
building a united Arab front for negotiations with
Israel. The success of the recent diplomatic effort
at the UN should give Sadat and Syrian President
Asad greater leverage in persuading the PLO and
some of the radical Arab leaders of the virtues of
compromise, moderation, and united political
effort in pursuing overall Arab goals.
Sadat will use the UN vote to ease the way
toward implementing his strategy at the Arab
summit that convenes in Rabat on October 26. At
the summit, Sadat intends to press for Arab
recognition of Jordan as the party that must
conduct negotiations with Israel over the West
Bank. He can point to the fact of international
recognition for the PLO-and to Egypt's role in
gaining it-as a guarantee that turning the nego-
tiating role over to Jordan does not signify an
abandonment of the Palestinians or a denigration
of the PLO. Israel will negotiate with no one but
Jordan over the West Bank, Sadat will tell the
Arabs, and the PLO's UN recognition will be
meaningful in the long term only if in the short
term the Arabs accept this role for Jordan.
Although the Israeli government anticipated
the outcome of the vote, it nevertheless appeared
surprised at the overwhelming majority. A For-
eign Ministry spokesman expressed particular dis-
may over the affirmative votes cast by France,
Italy, and several other West European states that
have experienced Arab terrorist acts against their
own officials or on their soil.
Prime Minister Rabin reacted angrily to the
UN action, calling it a surrender to the power of
Arab oil and money. Israel, he said, will only
meet terrorist organizations on the battlefield.
Earlier this month, in a speech to the General
Assembly, Foreign Minister Allon said that Israel
would not consider such a resolution in any way
binding. The opposition Likud bloc, meanwhile,
has called for a special Knesset session to discuss
the UN vote. Former prime minister Meir prob-
ably expressed the feeling of most Israelis when
she said that the vote further put into question
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the value of any UN guarantees of Israel's security
that might be offered as part of the effort to
reach a Middle East peace settlement.
The PLO also received a boost during the
week from Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev. In
a widely reported speech, he included the PLO
leadership along with the Arab states with whom
the USSR is developing "friendly cooperation"
and demanded that "the legitimate interests of
the Arab people of Palestine be met and their
ISRAEL: WEST BANK ONTR77bontrov- Y
he futhe Israeli-
occupied West Bank of Jordan continued to be
the focus of much attention in Israel for the
second week in a row. This time it was fueled by
former defense minister Dayan, who signed a
petition sponsored by the right-wing opposition
Likud bloc calling on the Knesset to oppose the
return of the West Bank to "foreign" rule. Dayan
later defended this position in a television
interview.
Dayan and three of his colleagues from the
Rafi faction of Prime Minister Rabin's Labor
Party, who also signed the Likud petition, were
roundly criticized by some Labor deputies at a
meeting of party leaders and Knesset members on
October 15. No action was taken against them,
however, and party leaders are apparently at-
tempting to avoid a major confrontation, which
could threaten the survival of the Rabin gov-
ernment.
The Likud petition was precipitated by
Rabin's suggestion earlier this month that Israel
should be ready to give up parts of the West Bank
in return for a Jordanian guarantee of non-bellig-
erency. Dayan, adopting an uncompromising
stance, said he would vote for any Knesset resolu-
tion opposing the reversion of the West Bank to
non-Israeli rule, including that of "Jordan, the
Palestinians, or even the British."
Dayan's move again raised the possibility of
a break between his conservative Rafi faction,
which controls seven Knesset seats, and the major
segment of the Labor Party led by Rabin, who
favors territorial concessions. Defense Minister
Peres, Rafi's other principal leader, has yet to be
heard from, but he is likely to try to prevent a
party split, which would bring down the Rabin
government. If the Rafi faction did decide to
break away from Labor and team up with Likud
and the religious parties, such a coalition would
control a slim majority of 61 seats in the
120-member Knesset. That would be the same
number of votes Rabin's coalition now controls,
but Rabin can count on additional leftist votes
that a conservative government led by Likud
would not get. Without more Labor defections,
therefore, a Likud-dominated government would
not be viable for long and new elections would
probably have to be called.
Dayan's signature on the petition and his
public defense of it are, at the least, an embarrass-
ment to Rabin and a shot in the arm for efforts
by Likud and the National Religious Party to
place the Knesset on record as opposing Israeli
territorial concessions on the West Bank. His
actions also serve to strengthen the hand of those
in the Religious Party who oppose joining the
present government, thus further complicating
Rabin's already difficult task of working out a
compromise arrangement to bring the party back
into the coalition.
On October 15, the Prime Minister re-
portedly extended an official invitation to the
Religious Party to join the cabinet, saying that no
decision on West Bank territorial concessions had
been made and that, in any case, national elec-
tions could be held before any Israeli withdrawal
from the area. Most Religious Party leaders are
still anxious to join the government but may find
it awkward to do so while Israeli military and
police units continue to evict groups of Israelis
attempting to establish unauthorized Jewish set-
tlements on the West Bank. The would-be settlers
apparently have been organized by militants asso-
ciated with the party's ultra-orthodox youth
wing.
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KENYA: ELECTION GAINS AND LOSSES
6
lThe general elections o ~ctober 14 offered
Kenyans little chance to pass judgment on the
policies of President Kenyatta's government. The
generally peaceful campaign had centered on per-
sonalities, and Kenyatta's Kenya African National
Union was the only party on the ballot. Neverthe-
less, with several people contesting each seat, over
half of the incumbents in the 158-member Na-
tional Assembly were defeated, and the stature of
two prospective successors to Kenyatta was
enhanced by the election results.
Vice President Daniel arap Moi was given a
boost when his main rival, Foreign Minister
Njoroge Mungai, lost his National Assembly race.
The political future of the capable and well-
respected finance minister, Mwai Kibaki, was also
improved by his effective campaign and landslide
victory in his district.
Some politicians long at odds with Kenyatta
also showed considerable strength. Kenyatta pre-
vented former vice president Oginga Odinga, a
leader of the Luo-the main tribal opponents of
Kenyatta's dominant Kikuyu-from contesting
the election himself, but Odinga's stand-in candi-
date easily defeated a member of Kenyatta's
cabinet. Kenyatta's attempt to stifle the campaign
of J. M. Kariuki, a maverick backbencher from
the President's Kikuyu tribe, also backfired.
Kariuki, long a critic of the government. was
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ANGOLA: DECOLONIZATION EFFORTS
)The decolonizati n of Angola may be mov-
ing ahead on the basis of renewed efforts by the
Portuguese and Zairian President Mobutu. The
Portuguese are counting on Mobutu to promote
a united front among Angola's three rival insur-
gent organizations.
Mobutu, who discussed Angola with former
Portuguese president Spinola last month, met
with a Portuguese delegation in Kinshasa on
October 10. The Portuguese, led by the army's
deputy chief of staff, reassured Mobutu that
Lisbon remained committed to the united front
plan.
The Portuguese delegation also met with
Holden Roberto, leader of the Zairian-based
National Front for the Liberation of Angola, and
with Daniel Chipenda, a vice president of the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
Portuguese officials described the meetings with
the rebel leaders as "useful," but gave no indica-
tion that any agreements had been reached.
The US ambassador in Kinshasa subse-
quently reported, however, that Mobutu has
privately stated that a provisional government will
soon be formed in Angola and will include leaders
Dominican Republic
BALAGUER'S VICTORY
The B
alaggeovvern nt ha
s gained a signi-
fican psychological victory out of its successful
handling of the abduction by terrorists of USIS
official Barbara Hutchison on September 27. The
media have emphasized that the kidnapers
achieved neither of their original goals: the free-
dom of 37 prisoners and a $1 million ransom. In
the end, Balaguer only granted the terrorists safe
passage to Panama in return for the release of the
seven hostages held in the Venezuelan consulate.
As the episode dragged on for nearly two
weeks, a broad spectrum of the President's leftist
opponents disavowed any connection with the
kidnaping and went on record as opposing the use
of the insurgent organizations. Mobutu expects
Roberto to be appointed prime minister. Roberto
had announced shortly after meeting with the
Portuguese that his organization would soon open
an office in Luanda.
Heretofore, a major obstacle to negotiations
between the insurgents and the Portuguese has
been the factionalism within the Popular Move-
ment. Mobutu's comments suggest that the move-
ment's factions will enter the provisional govern-
ment on an individual basis.
Portugal is willing to accept representatives
of the insurgent organizations in a transitional
government for Angola. It is not, however, willing
to discuss a transfer of power to only one insur-
gent group, as it did in Mozambique and Portu-
guese Guinea. The Portuguese, Mobutu, and the
insurgents themselves all realize that no single
insurgent group has the necessary military power
or political support inside Angola to make it a
logical successor to Portuguese rule. Moreover,
Lisbon is under heavy pressure from Angola's
500,000 whites to implement a decolonization
policy that will protect their interests.
of violence as a political tool. The left's action
was taken in part because a substantial segment of
it has been negotiating with the government to
obtain legal status and feared the kidnaping could
sabotage these talks. Thus far, Balaguer seems to
be taking advantage of his favorable situation and
has avoided a general crackdown on the left,
which terrorists could use to justify reprisals.
The Panamanian government is treating its
seven unexpected guests with considerable re-
serve. It accepted the kidnapers on humanitarian
grounds, but almost certainly has no desire to
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JAPANESE FISHING- SHRINKING SEAS
( c
The Japanese fishing industry is being threat-
ened by coastal states that are restricting foreign
fishing and by conservation measures that would
reduce access to the available fish population.
Japan is the world's leading fish-catching nation,
operating a fleet second in size only to the Soviet
Union. Tokyo's total catch last year was about
10.7 million tons-about 16 percent of the world
total. Fish and marine products account for more
than half of the animal protein in the Japanese
diet-about 150 pounds of fish per person were
consumed last year, compared with about 40
pounds per person in the USSR and about 10
pounds per person in the US.
Practically all of the fish caught by the
Japanese fleet is taken from the northern Pacific
and the Bering Sea, where Japan competes with
Korean, Chinese, Soviet, Canadian, and US fisher-
men. Expanding operations into Southeast Asian
waters and the Indian Ocean are bringing the
Japanese into competition with fishermen from
developing countries in these areas.
To help resolve conflicts with coastal states,
Tokyo has negotiated a number of bilateral agree-
ments and is a member of practically all of the
two dozen or so international bodies that control
fishing in various geographic areas. Tokyo is also
extending aid to developing coastal states and has
established a joint government-business "Overseas
Fisheries Cooperation Foundation" to provide
private credits and encourage economic and
technical cooperation.
Serious conflicts with Soviet fishermen have
been a long-standing irritant despite regular meet-
ings to deal with the problems. Soviet naval
vessels have seized hundreds of Japanese fishing
boats operating in fishing grounds near the con-
tested Northern Territories off the coast of
Hokkaido.
Both the Japanese and Soviet whaling in-
dustries are also facing problems. Over the past
decade, the International Whaling Commission,
which regulates the industry world-wide, has
reduced the catch quota by some 80 to 90 per-
cent and has instituted a ban on catching en-
dangered species. Japan and the USSR together
harvested about 85 percent of the approximately
35,000 whales caught last year. Whale meat pro-
vides about 2 percent of Japan's animal protein
and some 10 percent of its meat consumption.
This, according to Japanese claims, saves sub-
stantial amounts of hard currency that otherwise
would have to be spent for imported beef.
Prospects for the continued growth of the
Japanese fishing industry are not bright. The
global catch-about 70 million tons last year-is
nearing the maximum sustainable level of about
100 million tons annually. Tokyo argues that
voluntary restraint by Japanese fishermen has
often been negated by increases by other coun-
tries, notably the USSR and South Korea.
In addition, some countries, alarmed at the
depletion of fish stocks and desiring to foster the
development of their own fishing fleets, are
asserting the right to control fishing within 200
miles of their shores, where most of the world's
fisheries lie. Participants in the Law of the Sea
Conference will almost certainly agree on a 12-
mile territorial sea and an additional 188-mile
economic zone wherein coastal states have some
control over fishing. This would have a serious
impact on the Japanese fishing industry, which in
1972 took about one half of its catch within 200
miles of foreign shores.
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CAMBODIA: UN MA EUVERIN
L7O-7:.,)
The Lon Nol gov rnment continues to focus
atte'ntion on the 29th UN General Assembly it
New York, where Sihanouk's supporters have so
far failed to press for a quick showdown on the
credentials issue. Instead, they are continuing
their efforts to nail down the votes of wavering
nonaligned states such as Nepal. This persistent
lobbying effort reflects the closeness of current
voting estimates and also suggests that the ques-
tion may not be put before the General Assembly
until next month.
In the meantime, the Asian Working Group,
which is spearheading the effort to preserve
Phnom Penh's UN seat, has been given some
much-needed time to tighten its own strategy and
support. The working group has just completed
some last-minute modifications of its resolution
to defer the credentials issue for another year. It
is hoped that these relatively minor changes will
be enough to gain the support of Iran and pos-
sibly some other still-undecided state,
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PHILIPPINES: COMMUNISTS SURRENDER
Ptn a well-publicized cereeony on Oc ober
11, he Philippine government wrote a virtual
finish to the feeble attempt at insurgency by the
moribund Communist Party of the Philippines.
Responding to an offer of amnesty from the
government, leaders of the Moscow-oriented
party formally offered their cooperation to Presi-
dent Marcos, symbolically turned in 19 firearms,
and promised to give up all arms still held by their
military units.
The surrenders, while hailed as a break-
through against subversion and a response to the
effectiveness of the Marcos regime's social pro-
grams introduced under martial law, will have
little impact on the current Communist insur-
gency situation in the Philippines. The party, with
only about 500 active members and 200 men
under arms, has long since been superseded by the
better organized Peking-oriented party, whose
New People's Army is the largest and most dis-
ciplined Communist insurgent group in the coun-
try. Marcos apparently hopes the surrender of the
Moscow faction will spur defections from the
Peking group, but this seems unlikely. The
Peking-oriented leadership has long considered
the Moscow faction to be in the government's
pocket.
The acceptance of the government's amnesty
offer was the result of a series of negotiations
conducted with government representatives last
month. The formal ceremonies were delayed,
however, until after Mrs. Marcos' trip to China in
order not to detract from the publicity given to
her visit. Under the amnesty agreement that was
worked out, those who surrendered were required
to pledge their support for the government and to
renounce subversive activity. Although Marcos
will get the most propaganda mileage he can out
of the surrender, most Filipinos recognize that
the staged affair will make no dent in the more
Communists.
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