WEEKLY SUMMARY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5
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S
Document Page Count:
30
Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
January 9, 2008
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 19, 1974
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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25X1
Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
No. 0029/74
DIA review(s)
19 July 1974
completed.
COPY N2 70
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ce. reports and analyzes signir-
;ek through noon on Thursdav. 't
coordinated with or prepared ny
r? the Office of Strateu c
Science and Technoioav,,.
Fnurehensive treatrnent and therefore
CONTENTS (July 19, 1974)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
4 Portugal: New Cabinet; Africa
6 France: Giscardis Foreign Policy
7 Dutch Equivocate on Defense Policy
Western Europe: Labor Unity
Iceland: Coalition Prospects
Balkan Mavericks Meet
Bulgaria: Leadership Changes
USSR: Defense, Spending Rises
USSR-Somalia:' Friendship Treaty?
15 Israel: The Palestine Question
15 Spanish Sahara: Controversy Rekindled
17 New Look in Arab Investments
17 Pakistan: Neighbor Troubles
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
19 Argentina: Struggle on the Right
20 Chile: A Revamped Team
21 Uruguay: Institutional Solutions?
21 Mexico: The Figueroa Case
22 OAS: Loose Lid on the Cuba Issue
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
24 South Vietnam: Ballots and Bullets
25 Laos: A New Crisis
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summer
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-,. SE(rKL I _
CYPRUS
AFTER THE COUP "i4 _ Gj
The ouster of Archbishop Makarios by the
Gre -led Cypriot National Guard on June 15 has
touched off intensive diplomatic consultations
and raised the real possibility of Turkish military
intervention in the island state. The Turkish gov-
ernment publicly professes to believe that the
Greek junta instigated the coup to bring about
enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece, and
Turkish armed forces have been preparing for a
possible air and sea assault across the 50 miles of
ocean between the southern coast of Turkey and
Cyprus. Ground forces have been moved to the
southern port of Mersin, and ships that could be
used to transport them to Cyprus are in the area.
On July 18, there were reports that a regiment-
sized unit was boarding amphibious ships at a
staging area west of Mersin. In addition,
finds the new government of Nicos Sampson 5X1 ig
totally unacceptable. The Soviet Union alsc, aircraft at two airfields west of Ankara- skisehir
strongly opposes the take-over, and it is likely to and Baliskesir-have been armed with general-
press for the return of Makarios to power. purpose bombs, air-to-air missiles, and air-to-
Makarios' escape from the presidential
palace complicated the task of consolidating the
new government, despite the fact that the Na-
tional Guard has succeeded in establishing control
of the island. Makarios
wants to bring his case
before the UN in an effort to gain broad interna-
tional support for his position as the legitimate
leader of Cyprus. Before traveling to New York,
Makarios held talks in London with British
leaders
London was also the scene this week of talks
between Prime Minister Wilson and Turkish Prime
Minister Ecevit. Ecevit is apparently exploring all
possibilities for either a peaceful resolution or for
joint action with the British to restore the status
quo on Cyprus. Under a 1960 treaty, Britain,
Turkey, and Greece are guarantors of the in-
dependence of Cyprus. Prior to the prime minis-
ters' meeting, some Turkish diplomats had in-
dicated their belief that London was inclined to
accept the situation as it was evolving. If so,
under the terms of the treaty Turkey would be
free to act unilaterally; there are indications that
they are resolved to do so, and that they are
preparing militarily. Parliament was called into
session on July 18 and was asked to give blanket
approval for Ecevit's policies.
While the Prime Minister has been consulting
and waiting for the situation on Cyprus to clarify,
anits at four Turkish airfields are on alert.
ground missiles. A fighter bomber squadron,
which was moved to Incirlik the day after the
coup, is also armed with bombs and missiles.
Although the armed forces of both Greece
and Turkey have been in a general state of
readiness as a result of the recent dispute over the
Aegean seabed, there is no evidence of unusual
activity or war preparations by the Greeks. The
Greek army is, however, going ahead with a
scheduled "rotation" of part of its 950-man force
on Cyprus. Although Athens has denied the
charge, the Turks have accused the Greeks of
using the rotation as a cover to strengthen their
forces on the island. In spite of the overwhelming
majority of Greek Cypriots over Turkish Cypri-
ots, and the presence of the 10,000-man Greek-
led National Guard, the close proximity of the
Turkish mainland would give the Turks the
advantage in the event of hostilities.
On Cyprus itself, the new Sampson govern-
ment is trying to convey the feeling that it is in
complete control. It has lifted the daylight curfew
imposed when it first took over, although the
nighttime restrictions remain in force. The new
government is also seeking to reassure the Turkish
Cypriot leadership. In a conversation on July 17
with newly installed Foreign Minister Dimitriou, a
US official was told that the Sampson govern-
ment will not attempt to achieve enosis and will
welcome the continued existence of British bases
on the island. Despite this seemingly moderate
approach, Sampson is widely remembered as a
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guerrilla assassin of both British subjects and
Turkish Cypriots in the period prior to independ-
ence, and has since then been a right-wing cham-
pion of enosis. As such, he remains totally unac-
ceptable to both Turkish Cypriots and Ankara.
If Sampson is unable to consolidate his
position-and there is growing talk of a possible
25X1 compromise replacement because of the strong
international reaction to the coup-it could
seriously weaken the position of the Greek strop
man, General loannidis.
Sampson with demonstrators in 1964
Balikesir }Eskisehir
T U R K E Y
*ATHENS
r
I
EGYPT - \v
*ANKARA
Incirlik
Mersin Adana
Iskenderun
LEBANON
ISRAEL
On July 17, Moscow issued an official state-
ment which reiterated support for Cyprus' in-
dependence, called for international support for
Archbishop Makarios, and condemned Greek
interference. The statement, however, was mod-
erate in tone, avoiding threats or any assertions
that the USSR sees its security affected by devel-
opments on the island.
The statement does not commit the Soviet
Union to active assistance for any movement to
return Makarios to power, although Moscow's
initial comment on the coup had suggested that
the USSR was holdin such a course open.
It seems unlikely, however, that the Soviets have
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Finike Bay CYPRUS
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made a firm commitment of military backing to
the Turks. 11
DEVELOPMENTS AT T E UN
The Security Cou cil took up the Cyprus
issue on July 16. Secretary General Waldheim
presented a brief report on the situation and
explained his actions in granting Makarios "UN
protection." He added that the mandate of the
UN force on Cyprus did not allow it to intervene
until continued violence ran the risk of involving
the Turkish community. Despite the demands of
the Cypriot representative for a resolution calling
for a cease-fire and for withdrawal of all Greek
National Guard officers from the island, the
Council meeting ended inconclusively and no
resolutions were tabled. 25X6
While awaiting the arrival of Makarios to
address the Security Council-perhaps on July
19-UN activity has centered on informal discus-
sions of draft resolutions. Makarios has already
declared that the final resolution must provide for
recognition of himself as the legitimate head of
government, withdrawal of all Greek National
Guard officers, and a pledge by Athens not to
recognize the Sampson government. The British
are circulating a compromise resolution that pro-
vides for the withdrawal of the Greek officers but
only obliquely recognizes Makarios' legitimacy.
The legal and political consequences of rec-
ognizing Makarios as the legitimate head of state,
meanwhile, continue to cause concern. The non-
aligned members of the Council originally took
the lead in drawing up a proposal that pointedly
avoided the question of Makarios' legitimacy and
called only for largely noncontroversial actions by
the concerned states, but there were later indica-
tions that they intend to take a more active role
in supporting Cyprus, one of the original
members of the nonaligned movement.
Soviet tactics and Chinese intentions remain
largely unclear. The Soviets supported the
Cypriot demands at the Security Council meeting
on July 16 and urged the council to take decisive
steps to end the armed interference in Cyprus.
The Chinese did not speak at the meeting and
appear to have remained in the background in the
discussions regarding the proposed resolutions.'
THE ATTITUDE OF THE WEST-ERN ALLIES
In Western Europe, virtua y all reaction to
the oup stressed the strategic importance of the
island. Condemnation of Greece was almost
universal and popular feeling generally favored a
restoration of Makarios. At the same time, there
is little taste for military intervention and a pref-
erence for solutions being worked out through
NATO and the UN.
25X6
Faced with a crisis between two of its NATO
allies, who-like Britain-are also guarantors of
Cyprus' independence, London has decided to
take a hard line toward Athens. The Wilson gov-
ernment, with strong parliamentary support, has
sent a demarche to Athens calling on it to replace
the Greek officers serving in Cyprus.
The NATO allies have held three special ses-
sions to consider possible steps to ease the crisis.
Most members were highly critical of Greece and
endorsed London's suggestion to replace the
Greek officers now with the Cypriot National
Guard and expressed support for the regime of
Archbishop Makarios. The allies also called on
Greece to consult fully both in the council and
under the 1960 Cyprus agreements.\
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The installation on July 19 of a new cabinet
headed by Colonel Vasco Goncalves as Prime
Minister has ended the political crisis that erupted
ten days ago following the resignation of prime
minister Palma Carlos and four other centrists and
the subsequent dismissal of the rest of his cabinet.
The most striking characteristic of the new cabi-
net is the increased prominence of the organizers
of the April coup. Although clearly in control
since then, they have preferred to avoid the lime-
light. The political coloration of several ministers
is not yet known. The changes, however, appear
to have been made to ensure that the major aims
of the Armed Forces Movement-to restore
democracy and end the wars in Africa-are carried
out.!
Although the new cabinet contains a ma-
jorit of civilians drawn from the parties repre-
sented in its predecessor, the military make up
the largest unified group. The seven officers in the
cabinet, including the Prime Minister, are drawn
mostly from the Armed Forces Movement, which
engineered the coup. In addition to getting two
ministers without portfolio, the military took
over the key ministries of interior, information,
and labor. They retained the Defense Ministry,
which will continue to be occupied by Colonel
Mario Miguel, who was President Spinola's origi-
nal choice for prime minister
The Communists do not seem to have been
especially favored in the cabinet reshuffle. Unless
they gained some of the three ministries filled by
appointees whose political coloration is not yet
known, the Communists may have suffered a real
loss. They did not retain the Labor Ministry, nor
did they gain the interior and information minis-
tries, as they would have liked. Their leader,
Alvaro Cunha], did retain his position as a minis-
ter without portfolio.
IThe Socialists have the greatest number of
hovers. Mario Soares, the Socialist Party secre-
tary general, stayed on as foreign minister, and
party loyalists held on to the justice and inter-
territorial-relations portfolios. The centrists have
only one carry-over, Joaquin Magalhaes Mota,
who moved from interior to minister without
portfolio. Two centrist economists will head the
separate ministries of finance and economy'.
i (Perhaps as a result of the outgoing cabinet's
difficulties in controlling labor unrest, President
Spinola and his military advisers have taken addi-
tional steps to maintain control. A decree issued
last week established a Continental Operations
Command empowered to intervene directly in the
maintenance and re-establishment of order when
normal police forces are inadequate. Although the
command will be directed by General Francisco
d a Costa Gomes, chief of the armed forces
General Staff and a close supporter of General
Spinola, the Armed Forces Movement will be able
to keep close tabs on the new command through
Otelo de Carvalho, one of the leaders of the
Movement who was appointed deputy chief of
the new group and als made commander of the
Lisbon Military District
Now that members of the Armed Forces
Movement are assuming more prominent roles in
the government, their political orientation will be-
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come clearer. From the time the group was organ-
ized several years ago as the "captains' move-
ment," a minority of these officers has been
reported to have leftist leanings. The main orien-
tation of the Movement, however, is considered
to have been reformist and nationalist, and these
ideas likely still predominate, although it is possi-
ble that leftists may be making some inroads.)
~pinola's political problems had little impact
`n the African territories, as the new government
will reiterate Lisbon's commitment to self-deter-
mination for the territories. In Portuguese
Guinea, a final agreement between Portugal and
the rebels is apparently at hand. An upsurge in
rebel activity in Mozambique and racial disturb-
ances in Angola, however, have provided Lisbon
with new reminders that its authority in those
territories is eroding.
`; LL Despite the month-long suspension of talks
between Lisbon and the rebels in Portuguese
passe in negotiations, evidence is accumulating
that Lisbon secretly offered major concessions to
the insurgents before Spinola dismissed his cabi-
net last week. Portuguese officials, including
Foreign Minister Soares and the governor of the
territory, apparently were confident that the
rebels would accept the concessions and that an
agreement could be announced in the near future.
Changes in the Portuguese government are not
likely to affect adversely any pending agreement,
although formal announcement could be delayed.
An agreement probably would be based on Lis-
bon's recognition of the rebels' "Republic of
Guinea-Bissau" in exchange for the rebels' agree-
ment that the Cape Verde Islands be treated as a
separate issue. The rebels have long claimed to
represent the islands, while Lisbon wants to retain
them because of their strategic value]
fin Mozambique, the cease-fire negotiations
were stalled before the cabinet crisis. Soares
claimed that secret talks were taking place, but
this seems unlikely in view of a sudden increase in
guerrilla activity during the past week, clearly de-
signed to press Lisbon at a time of political un-
certainty. Last week, the rebels opened a new
front in Zambezia District in central Mozambique
near the Malawi border, an area where they have
not been active since the late 1960s. The rebels
also increased their attacks on transportation lines
to the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project, a major
rebel target for several years.]
I In Angola, Lisbon faces more problems from
lt',e local population than it does from the insur-
gents, who remain as divided as ever. The murder
of a white taxi driver in Luanda last week sparked
a number of racial clashes and demonstrations.
Authorities eventually restored order but not be-
fore some 30 persons had been killed. Scattered
incidents of looting and vandalism continued to
be reported at week's end. A special mission has
arrived from Lisbon to investigate the disturb-
ances
~he clashes were instigated by vengeful
white taxi drivers, who are well-armed, quick on
the trigger, and notoriously anti-black. Some local
officials suspect that black counter-
demonstrations were spurred by agitators sup-
porting the insurgent Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola?
)Angolans, both black and white, seem more
uncertain about their future relationship with
Lisbon than do people in Portuguese Guinea and
Mozambique, where it is widely assumed that ac-
commodation with insurgents and subsequent in-
dependence is only a matter of time. The absence
of talks with the Angolan insurgents, together
with Lisbon's failure to show support for in-
creased local autonomy is enough to make many
Angolans fear-unrealistically-that Lisbon has no
intention of loosening its grip on the territory.
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SECRE I
FRANCE: GISCARD'S FOREIGN POLICY
Foreign policy, overshadowed until recently
by pressing domestic problems, may receive more
attention now that France has assumed the EC
presidency for the next six months. President
Giscard emphasizes that his foreign policy will
not differ markedly from that of his Gaullist
predecessors. There has already been a lessening
of tensions in Atlantic relations, however, and
this has led Atlanticists and Europeanists alike to
look to Paris for increased flexibility.
[Giscard has made it clear that relations with
the EC will take precedence in French foreign
policy. France has reaffirmed the objective of
European union by 1980, and Prime Minister
Chirac has already promised an early French
initiative to achieve this goal. Some of the meas-
ures possibly under consideration by the Quai
are:
Strengthening the EC parliament, with
the possibility of direct elections.
? Establishment of an EC political secre-
tariat, presumably in Paris.
? Creation of an embryonic "European
executive" through periodic, institutionalized
EC summits/
Giscard hopes to convene an EC summit later
this year, by which time France and Italy are
expected to have stabilized their economies and
the UK will have held its anticipated election.]
wants to participate in the follow-up activities to
the Washington Energy Conference, and that it
would like this to take place in the framework of
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Devel opmentl
3 iscard and other French officials have indi-
cated that they will try to improve relations with
the US. Although the atmosphere has warmed
perceptibly, Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues has
privately urged the US to avoid public statements
concerning improvements in French-US relations,
which could alienate the Gaullists upon whom
iscard depends for his parliamentary majority.
he US embassy in Paris, though optimistic about
the possibility of better relations, warns that
major differences will remain. As reasons, the em-
bassy cites French opposition to links between
the US and the EC, as well as French suspicion of
US-Soviet detente and their insistence on in-
dependence of action in dealing with the Arabs.
I l Trench relations with the USSR will con-
tinbe on a reasonably steady course, but the
"special" nature of French-Soviet political
contacts has lost its luster. The emphasis will in-
lRelations with Germany will be a key factor ) 7creasingly be on economic exchanges and indus-
? ?a+ on GGiscard and Itrial cooneration. Numerous sources of friction
r .._
n
min-
the French
Chancellor Schmidt have already met twice since
taking over their respective governments. Their
remain, however, and in mid-July
ister of economics and finance warned Moscow
that its recent price hike on raw materials may
block development of trade between the two
countries. Another sour note has been sounded
by reports that Michel Poniatowski, Giscard's out-
spokenly anti-Communist minister of the interior,
wants to reduce the Soviet diplomatic presence in
France.
meetings have concentrated largely on economic
issues
Energy policy remains of paramount impor-
tan to Giscard. There are signs that France
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JCL NC I
The Dutch government is attempting to ap-
pease domestic critics who are demanding a re-
duction in the defense budget by hinting that it is
prepared to re-examine The Hague's commitment
to its Western allies to retain current troop levels
if the MBFR negotiations break down. In recent
interviews, both Prime Minister den Uyl and
Defense Minister Vredeling have made it clear
that the Dutch will feel free to cut their troop
levels if the force reduction talks collapse.,
Fin response to queries from their NATO
allies, however, the Dutch have been more equiv-
ocal and heave tried to avoid being pinned down
on the course of action they intend to pursue if
the MBFR talks fail. The original Dutch defense
white paper, submitted to NATO for consultation
on May :21, simply outlined projected force
reductions? The draft ten-year plan would sig-
nificantly decrease the number of active bat-
talions in the Dutch army and reduce air force
and naval strength. The plan also calls for the
replacement of 102 F-104s.1
1 IThe reaction of the Netherlands' NATO
partners to the original white paper was quick and
sharp. Their major objection centered on the pro-
posed reductions in the armed forces. The Belgian
representative, describing the plan as "dis-
astrous," said that it would increase the defense
burdens of the other allies, violate Dutch defense
commitments to NATO, a d could lead to similar
actions by other members,
A. Lin response to this strong criticism, Dutch
that the Netherlands intended to link the reduc-
tions to a successful conclusion of the MBFR
talks. He further clarified the Dutch position in a
statement on June 24, in which he told the al-
liance's Defense Planning Committee that the
ready strength of the Dutch army would not be
reduced as long as the negotiations were stil
going on and had not achieved "desirable results."
\Den Uyl and Vredeling, both political prag-
matists, have been forced to walk a narrow path
25X1
between the three leftist parties in the coalition,
who are pledged to reduce defense spending, and
the two pro-NATO coalition parties, who have
threatened to leave the government if a defense
plan satisfactory to NATO cannot be worked
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he European Trade Union Confederation
decided last week to admit the Communist- -
dominated Italian federation to membership. The
move breaks a 25-year-old ban on Communist
participation in West European regional trade
union affairs. It also means that virtually all major
factions of organized labor in Western Europe are
now represented in a single confederation
ment of their nationals, has also been evident
among those fostering the regional labor group-
ing. Organized labor in countries where migrants
are numerous, however, may be reluctant to press
for effective action.
-I )A favorable decision on the Italian applica-
tion had been building for some months. It
received a decisive boost when the Italians moved
away from total adherence to the pro-Soviet
World Federation of Trade Unions, claiming to
hold only "associate" membership.,
)Separate consideration of the Communist-?
dominated federation of France also helped the
Italians. In early 1973, members of the European
Confederation felt that admitting Italy would
commit them to accepting the French also, a
move they were reluctant to take. The French
federation is less acceptable because it has histori-
cally been more responsive to Soviet direction
and takes a less favorable stand on the EC. In
addition, the relative unity of the Italian labor
movement contrasts sharply with the divisions on
the French labor scene.?
The 17-month-old confederation has de-
voted much of its time to organizational ques-
tions and has been relatively ineffective as a pres-
sure group. Now that the key membership issues
have been decided, however, active programs may
be in prospect. Proponents of a regional labor
organization of Western Europe have had their
eye on a number of possibilities, including coordi-
nated efforts to win concessions from multi-
national corporations, and lobbying for labor in-
terests in the EC, especially on social policy]
[Concern for the protection of migrant
workers, who are being threatened as a number of
governments take steps to safeguard the employ-
ICELAND: COALITION PROSPECTS
The conservative Independence Party seems
to be having difficulty putting together a coali-
tion, despite the relatively strong mandate the
party received in the election last month. Party
chairman Gier Hallgrimsson, named formateur on
July 5, was expected to take several weeks to
form a new government, presumably with the
Progressives, the main partner of the outgoing
three-party, center-left coalition. Developments
have been slow, however, and recent reports sug-
gest that the conservatives are less optimistic now
than they were immediately following the elec-
tion.7
The Progressives, the second largest party in
parliament, probably would be asked to form a
government if Hallgrimsson fails. Such a move
would have an adverse effect on negotiations to
retain the US-manned NATO base at Keflavik.
Nevertheless, Hallgrimsson's position re-
mains basically strong, and he apparently intends
to continue to try to form a government despite
the handicaps he faces. His party won more seats
in the last election than at any time since World
War II. Furthermore, the stand taken by the
Independence Party in favor of retaining the US-
manned NATO base in pretty much its present
form was approved by more than 50,000 citizens
who signed a pro-base petition earlier this year.
Hallgrimsson has recently tried to shift public
attention away from the defense issue, however,
and he is now concentrating on Iceland's pressing
economic problems. He blames the former
government for the soaring inflation which is
running at an annual rate of about 45 percent.
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W I= HN 't
[wit A&k~ 1%00
Ceausescu and Tito meet _h1_1 972
BALKAN MAVERICKS MEET
resident Tito's visit to Romaniafm July
8 to 11 refurbished the image of good relations
between Belgrade and Bucharest and allowed the
two leaders to narrow some areas of disagree-
ment.
At the time of the Arab-Israeli war last
October, for example, Yugoslavia backed the
Arab cause without reservation, while Romania
maintained full diplomatic and economic ties
with both Israel and the principal Arab antag-
onists. In the communique, Tito and Ceausescu
called for Israel's withdrawal from all occupied
Arab territory, but also urged that the sovereignty
and integrity of all states in the region be pro-
tected.
The communique toned down Yugoslav irri-
tation over Romania's efforts to play a greater
role in the Third World. In addition, the two
leaders praised nonalignment as "an important
factor in the struggle against imperialism and
hegemonism." They also smoothed over their
differences about Balkan cooperation by
returning to their earlier position that the coun-
tries in the region should conduct their relations
without outside interference, particularly by the
great powers. The two leaders devoted particular
attention to the sensitive problem of minorities.
Ceausescu, in effect, lined up on the side of Tito
in Yugoslavia's feud with Bulgaria over the
Macedonian problem.
The communique expressed satisfaction with
the development of bilateral party relations based
on the principles of "independence, equality,
noninterference, and responsibility of each party
to its working class." The two sides pledged to
work for greater unity among all parties-
presumably including the Chinese-on the basis of
these principles. The only state-to-state agreement
signed, however, was a long-range economic,
technical, and scientific accord. All the same, the
12th meeting between Tito and Ceausescu in nine
years a ears to have one better than ex
pected.
BULGARIA: EARSHIP CHANGES
Recent p rsonri?el shifts in the party and
stat hierarchy are designed to strengthen the
hand of hard liners who fear detente and to
improve the performance of the economy.
The party changes, announced at a Central
Committee plenum on July 3, include the promo-
tion of two members of the Secretariat to concur-
rent full membership on the Politburo and the
naming of four new candidate Politburo mem-
bers. Three candidate members were removed.
The chief gainers are Aleksandur Lilov, the
party's ideological watchdog, and Georgi Filipov,
an expert economist and planner.
Lilov's promotion confirms his status as a
very promising comer. He also was the spokesman
for Bulgaria's stringent ideological guidelines for
detente.
The most important of the new candidate-
members are Minister of Defense Dzhurov, and
38-year-old Foreign Minister Mladenov, who is
the youngest member of the leadership. The other
new candidate-members are the party first sec-
retaries in Varna and Plovdiv.
The major loser in the party is 44-year-old
Ivan Abadzhiev, who had risen rapidly in recent
years to become the third-ranking man in the
party hierarchy. Abadzhiev may have been the
target of Lilov's accusation in February that there
was ideological weakness in the party itself and
that some people "even in high positions" did not
understand what detente was all about.
SECRET
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AMR% StLI-(t I IT
USSR: DEFENSE SPENDING RISES
;d AF
Soviet defense sperling grew by more than
5 percent in 1973, following a period of little
change between 1970 and 1972.
Based on projections of future Soviet forces,
an increase of roughly the same size should occur
in both 1974 and 1975. Such growth is substan-
tially above the long-run annual rate of increase,
which has averaged less than 3 percent since
1960.
Soviet defense expenditures (not including
-civilian" space programs) are estimated at about
25.5 billion rubles for 1974. The estimated equiv-
alent dollar cost of the 1974 Soviet defense
effort-what it would cost to purchase and oper-
ate Soviet military forces in the US-is approxi-
mately $93 billion.
The increase in spending from 23.1 billion
rubles in 1972 to 26.8 billion rubles in 1975 is
due primarily to the extensive modernization of
the Strategic Rocket Forces. The Soviets are
replacing a large portion of the SS-11 force. In
Estimated Soviet
Defense Expenditures
(Billions of 1970 Rubles)
SOI~%N