WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010600050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 14, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
14 December 1973
No. 0400/73
Copy N2 57
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
:e --of Current Intelligence, reports and analy;xe!< signif-
developments of the week through noon on Thursday.
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared
a Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
ch, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
requiring more comprehensive treatment aotd there-
25X1e published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
,.uotents,
CONTENTS (/4 December 1973)
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
1 The Middle East: Toward Geneva
5 Europe: Security Talks Recess
7 Korea: Tensions Ease
7 Canton Fair: Good But Not Great
8 Cambodia: Another Governmental
Shake-up
South Vietnam: More in '74
Laos: Marking Time
Sino-Japanese Trade Increases
USSR-China: Border Gambit Fails
USSR-France: Strains Are Showing
Soviet Auto Servicing Plan-Falters
Soviet Leaders Gather
Communist Parties: Meetings Ahead
21 United ra mlra e
Anniversary
22 Election in Bahrain
22 South Africa: The Oil Boycott
23 Turkey: The Impasse Continues
24 Venezuela: Landslide for Perez
25 Latin America: A United Stand
25 Chile: On Guard
26 Argentina: Protecting Foreigners
25X6
25X1
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summary
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
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The Middle East: Toward Geneva
J [The Arab-Israeli talks on a peace settlement
appear likely to begin in Geneva on 18 December
as scheduled, although problems keep cropping
up that could force a delay or impede the negotia-
tions. As of Thursday, the two main Arab partici-
pants, Egypt and Syria, seemed set for the un;
precedented encounter, having coordinated their
strategy during President Asad's visit to Cairo
early this weeks
[Egypt had been reluctant to start the talks
before the troop disengagement issue was re-
solved, but finally decided to leave this to the
Geneva discussions. Now, Israel is threatening to
ignore the Syrians at the conference unless
Damascus first releases a list of Israeli prisoners.
Jordan remains undecided about whether to send
delegates, despite the fact that in its initial stages
the conference will not treat the Palestinian issue
that the Jordanians find so troublesome. Many
other details of the conference are still to be
worked out, including the precise role of the UN,
the composition of the various delegations, and,
presumably the agendaI
1 [As Secretary Kissinger tours the Middle East
in the final days before the conference meets, all
the parties are looking to him to resolve outstand-
ing issues:
? Israel seeks some assurances on the re-
turn of prisoners held by Syria.
? Syria looks for some promise of progress
toward a withdrawal from all Syrian territory
occupied by Israel.
? Egypt wants a pledge that the troop
disengagement called for in the cease-fire ac-
cord arranged in November by Secretary
Kissinger will be the first item on the Geneva
agenda.
? Jordan requires reassurance that the
Jordanians rather than the fedayeen have the
right to bargain for the occupied West Bank
of the Jordan River)
Egypt on the Eve...
JEgypt announced last weekend, after a series
of meetings with the US and Soviet ambassadors,
that it would go to Geneva despite the breakdown
in the disengagement talks between Egyptian and
Israeli military representatives at Kilometer 101.
The announcement came in the course of a
lengthy government policy statement delivered by
Deputy Prime Minister Hatim before the People's
Assembly.
(Hatim cautioned, however, that the Egyp-
tians will have their "fingers on the trigger" to
prevent Israeli "procrastination" and "treachery."
He outlined three principles that will guide
Cairo's policy at the conference:
? Egypt will not permit the conference to
degenerate into the deadlock that existed
before 6 October.
? Egypt will not bargain over Israeli with-
drawal from all occupied territories or over
Palestinian rights.
? Egypt believes that Palestinian participa-
tion in the conference will be a "firm expres-
sion by the international community of their
legal . xistence" and a recognition of their
rights
I. 'The statement is little more than a reiteration of
long-standing Egyptian policy and, despite its
tough tone, permits the Egyptians some latitude
in their dealings at Geneva]
/ fatim devoted the majority of his address to
dom stic matters, adopting a business-as-usual
attitude designed in part to redirect attention to
the home front as Egypt begins a protracted
period of negotiations. His presentation was prob-
ably also aimed at convincing the Egyptian people
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ARAB DOLLARS
Wealthy Arab states have not responded
to the Arab League's call on 6 December to
withdraw some of their holdings in US and
West European banks to finance development
projects in the Arab world. The bulk of Arab
funds continues to be held in do[ ar-denom-
inated deposits, primarily in Western Europe.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya had failed to
implement an earlier agreement to withdraw
their assets from the US and to convert their
dollar holdings to other currencies.
Arab reserve policies since the October
war have been extremely cautious. To protect
against a possible asset freeze by the US, the
Arab states have shifted some funds to West-
ern Europe without a loss of earnings- Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia have reduced tine deposit
and bond holdings in the US as these invest-
ments mature. Sizable transfers in call ac-
count funds from New York banks to their
European branches have also been noted.
Rhetoric to the contrary, Arab oil pro-
ducers so far have not been willing to use
money as a weapon. In fact, the strengthening [
that their economic grievances will riot be for-
gotten while the government concentrates on
military preparedness and diplomatic negotia-
tions. Hatim touched on government plans for
virtually every sector of the economy, from for-
eign trade to the production of "popular furni-
ture" for local consumption. He reiterated the
plans for "economic openness" and "flexibility"
that Cairo had strongly emphasized in the months
before the war as a means of moving away from
Egypt's socialist, Nasirist economic policies
! C)n 12 December, Egypt conducted a major
military shake-up, removing Chief of S:aff Shazli.
of the dollar since the war has resulted in
some movement of Arab money from other
currencies into dollars.
Despite cutbacks in oil production, Arab
monetary reserves will continue to grow
rapidly because of rising oil prices. Domestic
investment opportunities in the Middle East
will not be enough to absorb more than a
small percentage of oil revenues. The growing
strength of the dollar and the low prices of
US securities will make the US market artic
ularly attractive for Arab investors
He had been credited with masterminding the 6
October attack but more recently was in-
creasingly criticized for failing to exploit Egypt's
initial military successes. Shazli has been replaced
by General Gamasy, Egypt's chief negotiator at
the Kilometer 101 disengagement talks. Among
others replaced in the reorganization were the
commanders of the Second and Third armies,
probably for permitting the establishment of an
Israeli presence on the west bank of the Suez
Canal. Their replacements had been regimental
commanders and leaders of the successful Egyp-
tian crossing of the canal on 6 October:1
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...And Israel
i IPrime Minister Meir's government will attend
the opening session of the Geneva talks in the
shadow of its coming parliamentary elections.
Not prepared to make substantive decisions, Tel
Aviv may still hope to arrange for immediate
bilateral talks with Egypt on troop disengagement
and with Syria on POW releases. It
The politically sensitive issue of Israeli POWs
held by Syria is currently of great concern to Mrs.
Meir and her associates. Defense Minister Dayan
told the Knesset on 10 December that the govern-
ment had decided to have no discussions with the
Syrians at Geneva unless Damascus produces a list
of prisoners and allows the Red Cross to verify
that they are being treated in accordance with the
provisions of the Geneva conventions. If Syria
met these demands, Dayan continued, Israel
would then insist that an exchange of POWs be
the first item on the agenda)
I Israel holds 367 Syrian POWs and lists 102
Israe~is as captured or missing on that front. Tel
Aviv had earlier submitted formal complaints to
the Red Cross alleging that Syria had murdered,
tortured, or mutilated 42 Israeli POWs. This
week, the Israelis submitted another formal com-
plaint to the Red Cross charging Egypt with the
murder and mistreatment of 28 Israeli POWs
With diplomacy now in the forefront, talk of
war ~as abated somewhat, but forces on both the
Egyptian and Syrian fronts remain poised for
action. Deliberate cease-fire violations are a daily
occurrencellFor three days running, for example,
Syria opened fire on Israeli engineering units rein-
forcing positions near the cease-fire line.
~Egyptian forces on both banks of the Suez
Canal continue their attempts to improve and
advance their positions. In an apparent effort to
keep tensions at a high pitch in advance of the
peace conference and to remind the Egyptian
people that the army is still a viable force un-
willing to let down its guard, Cairo media over the
past week have even been repeating UN reports of
Egyptian-initiated incidents in violation of the
truce. These small-scale incidents are generating a
daily influx to the hospital in Suez City of about
20 wounded Egyptian soldiers, most of whom are
from the encircled Third Army
I The Syrians and the Egyptians are keeping
their options open on whether to renew hostilities25X1
if diplomatic efforts bog down; meanwhile, they
are maintaining at least the a earance of instant
readiness to fi ht.
uIn Egypt, news commentators persist in their
strident talk of the inevitability of further fight-
ing if Israeli ""stalling" does not cease. In an
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apparent effort not to seem to be softening, the
Egyptian Government late last week deliberately
suppressed a Western correspondent's interview
with former chief of staff Shazli
Meanwhile, on the West Bank of the Jordan,
terrorism has increased markedly, and Israel has
taken severe measures to counter the upsurge.
The Israelis imposed a curfew in Nablus, the West
Bank's major town, following an attack on the
Israeli military governor. In addition, eight Arab
residents of the West Bank-including a mayor-
were deported to Jordan for alleged cooperation
with Palestinian guerrillas. Demonstrations pro-
testing the deportations have occurred in at least
two villages during the week. On 12 December,
the fifth terrorist incident in a week occurred in
another major West Bank town, where a grenade
exploded in a crowded market place.
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SL KEI
Europe: Security Talks Recess
oth the force reduction negotiations in focus of the first phase on US and Soviet ground
Vien and the Conference on European Security forces. The Soviets have indicated, however, that
and Cooperation in Geneva recess on 14 Decem- Moscow will require at least a firm commitment
ber for the holidays. Discussions in both cities that the two phases will be linked and that na-
thus far have been mainly general; the difficult tional forces will be reduced in the second-1
bargaining on specific issues will begin when the
talks resume in January.? )~ The Western allies have maintained a united
front through this period of negotiations, but
`Vienna In the force reduction talks, the Soviets their cohesiveness has not yet really been put to a
and their allies have t k
a en
a serious approach and test and differences may still surface. The allies
have shown a desire to negotiate a reduction recognize that they will have to pay a price to get
agreement as quickly as possible. The Soviet goals the Soviets to focus only on US and Soviet forces
clearly are to obtain an agreement calling for: in the first phase, but it will be difficult to reach
equal percentage reductions, the inclusion of na- agreement on when concessions will be required.
tional-particularly West German-forces, and the In addition, allied debate on a response to Soviet
inclusion of air forces and nuclear weapons. The demands for reducing air forces and the number
Soviets and East Europeans have argued that any of nuclear weapons will probably be prolonged
advantages they enjo
becau
f
h
y
se o
geograp
y and and difficult)
the strength of their conventional forces ar
e more
than offset by Western superiority in air power
and nuclear weapons. In addition, the Soviet dele-
!,Geneva The representatives of the 35 states meet-
ing to discuss Euro
e
it
.,
p
an secur
y and cooperation
gates have claimed that Soviet security interests' have begun to focus on what should be included
are more directly at stake than those of the US, in final documents. Drafting is expected to begin
and they have implied that these security interests ,-: when the talks resume next month. Very little
justify keeping a larger Soviet military presence in progress has been made toward resolving major
central Europe-the area slated for reductions-1 substantive differences, however, so that the
t--
! 1 1 The Soviets have maneuvered to minimize
consideration of any "associated measures" and
have indicated they prefer to verify any eventual
agreements purely by national means. For their
part, the Western allies this week indicated they
wish to reserve for future discussion certain as-
sociated or "stabilizing measures" that would be
applied to US and Soviet forces. These would
include advance notification of major exercises
and movements of forces into the area covered by
the reduction agreement; limitations on the num-
ber and size of major exercises; and exchanges of
observers at exercises. I
',In formal plenary sessions, the Soviets and
their allies have displayed little inclination to
compromise, but during bilateral meetings the
Soviets have demonstrated a certain amount of
flexibility. Most importantly, they have indicated
a willingness to explore the allied concept of a
two-phased approach to negotiations, with the
drafting stage will be difficult. Moscow's
long-standing goals for the conference have been
to obtain a multilateral ratification of the post-
war borders in Europe and to institutionalize a
continuing Soviet voice in European develop-
ments through the adoption of some type of
post-conference political machinery. The Western
states, on the other hand, have sought to contain
the first of these Soviet objectives by gaining
recognition for the possibility of peaceful changes
of borders and to obtain freer communication
between East and West'
I -~ [Although the Soviet delegates have promised
that they would be forthcoming on freer commu-
nication, they have asked in return that the West-
ern allies agree to a declaration of principles that
would emasculate any specific agreements on
humanitarian cooperation. The key question in
Geneva is whether Moscow's interest in obtaining
a "successful" conclusion of the conference will
lead it to make concessions on this issue. F_
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KOREA: TENSIONS EASE ( -_; 7
,the tensions stemming from North Korean
naval activity in the Yellow Sea eased somewhat
this week. A South Korean ferry and other naval
vessels sailed without incident to islands in the
disputed coastal waters, suggesting that Pyong-
yang does not-at least at this point-intend to
enforce its territorial claims in the area by direct
military action. Nevertheless, the possibility of a
clash between opposing naval forces remains high.
The territorial issue has developed new po-
litical wrinkles. In stating its position on 1
December, Pyongyang seemed to be asserting a
right to control the access of any vessel to the
South Korean islands within North Korea's
claimed 12-mile limit. In a commentary issued on
8 December, however, only hours before the
South Korean ferry sailed, Pyongyang threatened
"punishment" only to ships carrying out "re-
connaissance and other hostile acts." The state-
ment seems to exclude general commercial traffic
from hindrance, though its calculated ambiguity
provides Pyongyang an opening for justifying
action against any South Korean vessel in the
disputed waters.
Propaganda from both sides has intensified.
Both capitals have issued statements accusing the
other of violations of existing North-South ac-
cords. Both are pressing for a resumption of their
dialogue, but only on their respective terms. A
preliminary meeting of the South-North Co-
ordinating Committee is set for next week, and
the issue of shipping in the disputed seas and the
status of the islands there is likely to be
raised.
CANTON FAIR: GOOD BUT NOT GREAT
)The Canton Fair this fall may ve failed to
meet China's high expectations. Although total
transactions probably reached $1.4 to $1.5 bil-
lion, an increase over the record spring fair, this
was largely the result of higher prices. Attendance
was down slightly from the spring fair, at which a
number of traders had been disappointed by
sharp increases in Chinese prices. Traders at the
fall fair encountered some shortages of Chinese
goods, and Peking again rationed available sup-
plies among potential buyers. In an effort to
boost sales, the Chinese were unusually receptive
to buyers' requirements on labeling and packaging.
US attendance and the amount of business
transacted reached a new high. Almost 250 Amer-
icans representing over 100 firms purchased more
than $25 million worth of Chinese goods and sold
almost $15 million. Major US purchases included
gum rosin, fireworks, and cotton textiles. Wood-
pulp and paper, tallow, and petrochemicals made
up the largest US sales. The Chinese continued to
express interest in American equipment and
technology-especially oil drilling and other
petroleum industry equipment. A number of US25X1
firms were invited to Peking after the fair to
continue discussions on the sale of plants and
equipment.
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Another Governmental Shake-up
:'Prime Minister In Tam, who has been un-
happy about his lack of authority since taking
office last May, resigned this week. He also with-
drew from the ruling High Political Council,
which will continue to function as a triumvirate.
Lon Not and the two other counci members
undoubtedly were not sorry to see the tempera-
mental In Tam depart?
' )Lon Nol was
ment.
quick to designate
a replace-
Boret's lack of
an indepen ent political base probably will make
him acceptable to the country's two major polit-
ical arties.
The Military Situation
The first heavy fighting of the dry season
remains centered on Route 4 near the provincial
capital of Kompong Speu, 25 miles west of
Phnom Penh. Elements of a 4,000-man Cam-
bodian Army task force operating just southwest
of Kompong Speu made some progress early in
the week in clearing Khmer Communist troops
from roadside villages. At mid-week, however, the
Communists blew up a bridge midway between
Kompong Speu and the seaport of Kompong
Som, thereby isolating a smaller government force
trying to advance up the road from the south.
Since the road-clearing operation began on 22
November, approximately 500 government
soldiers have been killed or wounded. Kompong
Speu City has been the target of increasingly
heavy Communist shellings and ground probes
since late last week.'
25X1
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The 40-year-old Boret has held :several
im- portant government positions, but his talents have
;;been particularly suited to his Foreign Ministry
assignment. He has won high marks from Lon Nol
for his recent successful efforts to stave off
Sihanouk's challenge at the UN) An early test for
,,the new government appeared in the making late
-'in the week as Phnom Penh's secondary school
teachers began walking out in protest over rising
prices and low salaries.(
Communist units on 10 December cut Route
5 in a new location only ten miles north of
Phnom Penh. Government reinforcements have
been sent in an attempt to prevent the insurgents
from moving closer to the capital. South of
Phnom Penh, the isolated provincial capital of
Takeo remains the target of daily attacks. The
Communists' interdiction efforts have left the
Mekong River as Phnom Penh's only supply line.
The Communists still have not made any major
efforts against ship convoys plying the water-
way
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SOUTH VIETNAM: MORE IN '74
CCommunist military strategy for 1974 re-
portedly calls for some fairly intense attacks but
no major country-wide offensive.
goals set fort in a new
COSVINI directive issued in December are an un-
hindered border supply route from North Viet-
nam to the Mekong Delta and more attacks on
selected targets in government-controlled areas.
The directive says that an offensive like that of
Tet '68 would be "politically unfavorable," but
claims that continual harassment of the govern-
ment's base areas and communications lines will
gradually erode its strength, "tilting" the political
and military balance toward the Communists.]
-. Ct~ 1The Communists already appear to be put-
ting this strategy of increased but limited military
pressure into effect. Their recent attacks against
border outposts in Kontum, Pleiku, and Quang
Duc provinces have brought some temporary suc-
cesses in consolidating supply lines farther south.
The Communists may now be stepping up action
in the delta near the Cambodian border and else-
where.
1 Government leaders are growing increasingly
pessimistic about the prospects for an early for-
mation of the new coalition govern menf.)i_The
Joint Central Commission to Implement the
Agreement has met several times in plenary ses-
sion since it was formally convened on 23 Novem-
ber, but has dealt only with minor procedural
questions. There has been no progress in resolving
such fundamental issues as the neutralization of
Vientiane and Luang Prabang. Lao Communist
strong man Prince Souphanouvong this week rein-
forced Sam Neua's previous position that there
could be no new government until the two
tals are effectively neutralized.
OT the new government, is even more gloomy in
his predictions. He recently expressed discourage-
ment to the US ambassador over the upsurge of
Communist offensive activity in South Vietnam,
concluding that Hanoi would require use of the
Ho Chi Minh trail network until the monsoons
begin again in late spring. The Prime Minister
expects Lao Communist negotiators to stall until
then on the formation of a coalition government
and, hence, on the withdrawal of North Viet-
namese force
/ TThe government's chief delegate to the Joint
Commission estimates that it will be at least three
months before the new coalition can be estab-
lished. Souvanna, who has been maneuvering
behind thin cranes to en
ineer a rapid formation
g
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SINO-JAPANESE TRADE INCREASES
Economic ties between Japan a -d China are banks are
expanding rapidly, led by a near doubling in trade loans for
this year. Tokyo's growing exports to the main-
land, especially of steel products and machinery,
have helped strengthen its position as China's
leading trade partner. During the first three
quarters of the year, sales grew by 64 percent
over the same period last year, reaching $712
million.
Japan has also become China's leading sup-
plier of whole plants, capturing over L'-0 percent
of China's purchases of such facilities since last
December. In that time, China has purchased 15
complete plants from Japan valued at aver $400
million. Petrochemical installations have headed
the list, although two thermal power plants were
purchased in September. Negotiations are now
under way for the largest purchase to date, a
$400-million steel mill complex.
Japan has granted China favorable credit
terms for these plant purchases-five-year de-
ferred payment at 6 percent interest. in most
cases, China puts 10 percent down when the
contract is signed and pays another 10 to 15
percent when final shipment is made. As a result,
payments are stretched over seven or eight years
from the date of the contract. Some Japanese
Japanese Trade With China
(Million US $)
Imports 254
Exports 569
322
3 quarters
435 619
933 491
3 quarters
1 712
T66o
3 quarters
also considering obtaining Eurodollar
two to three years to re-lend to China.
To hold down their trade imbalance, Tokyo
has been encouraging imports from the mainland.
Imports from China during the first three quarters
of the year reached $660 million, nearly double
the same period last year. China has made notable
inroads in the Japanese textile market, especially
in silk fabrics. Textile sales to Japan recorded a
240 percent increase in the first eight months of
this year over the comparable period last year,
growing from $36 million to $121 million. China,
which began its first exports of oil to Japan this
year, is being provided by Tokyo with technology
and equipment for oil extraction, transportation,
and processing.
The prospects are favorable for continued
improvement in the two countries' economic rela-
tions. Trade should approach $2 billion this year,
and a further strong advance in 1974 is likely
when plants already purchased are delivered. In-
creased trade will necessitate additional financial
links between the two countries. China's need for
technical assistance in developing her oil resources
and Japan's need for such oil could lead to fur-
ther cooperation in resource development. A
trade agreement granting mutual most-favored-
nation status has been initialed and is nearing
formal signature; more exchanges of business mis-
sions seem likely.
In contrast to the gains in the economic
field, political rapport has lagged. The agreements
endorsed at last year's Tanaka-Chou summit
meeting still await signature. The aviation agree-
ment, the first topic to be taken up, has remained
stalemated since last March over the Japan-
Taiwan air link. China has demanded that its
aircraft not encounter planes or flags of Na-
tionalist China (Taiwan) at Japanese airports.
Japan, on the other hand, wants to maintain its
profitable Taiwan route as well as placate the
pro-Taiwan members of Parliament. Although
both sides are anxious to reach an agreement,
neither seems ready to make the necessary com-
promises.
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USSR-CHINA: BORDER GAMBIT FAIL.S
tsoviet and Chinese officials have recently
confirmed that Peking rejected a Soviet proposal
made in March to settle the border dispute east of
Mongolia.
Mikhail Kapitsa, chief of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry's Far East Division, told the US charge in
Moscow on 7 December that the Soviet proposal
envisaged the main navigation channel of the
Amur and Ussuri rivers as the Sino-Soviet bound-
ary in the east. Kapitsa indicated that the only
exception to this rule was the Soviet-hold island
of Hei-hsia-tzu (called "Big Ussuri" by the USSR)
opposite Khabarovsk. If the main ravigation
channel became the boundary here, the island
would come under Chinese control.
Given the long-standing Soviet and pre-revo-
lutionary Russian contention that the river border
follows the Chinese banks of the Amur and
Ussuri, the Soviet proposal represents a conces-
sion. Nevertheless, the Chinese rejection could
come as no surprise to the Soviets who are well
aware of Peking's contention that the entire bor-
Sino-Soviet Border: A Disputed Area
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1- )
der-including the area west of Mongolia-should
be negotiated as a single package. The Chinese,
however, have never appeared interested in genu-
ine negotiations on the border problem, prefer-
ring instead a unilateral Soviet withdrawal of
forces that would effectively yield such key areas
as Hei-hsia-tzu to Peking.
This island has been the focal point of the
Sino-Soviet border dispute for the past several
years. I t is important to the defense of
Khabarovsk-the headquarters of the Soviet Far
East Military District-and the Soviets naturally
do not want to bring the border any closer to the
city. The disposition of the island has caused the
failure of the last three annual sessions of the
Sino-Soviet river navigation committee, and has
hindered progress in the higher level border talks
in Peking.
By disclosing the border offer, as well as the
proposal of a nonaggression pact to Peking last
June, the Soviets are trying to persuade an in-
ternational audience of Moscow's interest in
reaching a boundary settlement. The Soviets have
been revealing some of the details of the border
talks over the past two years in order to contrast
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their own conciliatory stand with the alleged
intransigence of the Chinese. Chinese claims to
Soviet border areas-that were never under
Chinese Communist jurisdiction-have been a
serious source of embarrassment to the Soviets,
particularly in the third world and among other
communist parties. The USSR has always found it
difficult to cope with the Chinese charge that by
virtue of the Soviet troop build-up on the Sino-
Soviet border, Moscow has been conducting
negotiations while holding a gun to Peking's
USSR-FRANCE: STRAINS ARE S OWING
(( ~
Despite Moscow ~ssdisdaimers, Franco-Soviet
relations have deteriorated badly since the Middle
East war. The immediate cause is French dis-
pleasure with Moscow's "failure" to consult
during the war, but Paris' emphasis on a Europe
independent of the super powers lies at the heart
of the issue. Soviet assertions that consultation
was indeed adequate have only made matters
worse.
Paris felt strongly enough about Moscow's
alleged delinquency during the October war to
send a written protest to the USSR. Soviet For-
eign Minister Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador
Chervonenko, who has never cut much of a figure
with the French, both tried to soothe Gallic
nerves, but without much success. Last month,
Paris indicated in unmistakable terms that its
quarrel with the Soviets had important policy
ramifications. Foreign Minister Jobert made sev-
eral forceful speeches alleging that during the
Middle East crisis a US-Soviet "condominium"
had been revealed more clearly than ever before.
Jobert suggested that the West Europeans must
quickly upgrade their own political and defense
cooperation.
Brezhnev and Pompidou at talks in June 1973
Not surprisingly, the Soviets expressed con-
siderable apprehension over the developing
French EC policy and its military implications,
especially Jobert's advocacy of a common Euro-
pean defense. Moscow sent a strong warning in
the guise of a public letter by French Communist
leader Marchais. The letter which appeared only a
few days after Marchais had conferred with
Brezhnev in Moscow, attacked President Pompi-
dou by name (a rarity) for moving toward "a
sub-bloc dependent on the Atlantic bloc." Soviet
media have been more discreet, primarily ac-
knowledging "certain differences" in bilateral
relations; they have condemned what is viewed as
a call for new military groupings in Europe.
Despite these rumblings25X1
each side has a considerable stake in maintaining
at least the appearance of special ties. The fourth
Pompidou-Brezhnev summit is still likely to oc-
cur, though probably in March in the USSR
rather than January as earlier reports had indi-
cated. Given the unpleasantness of the past two
months, the dialogue will be even franker than
those of the earlier summits (October 1971, Janu-
ary and June 1973). Neither side is anxious to cut
off these high-level exchanges, but there will be25X1
no easy solutions to the recent problems. The
French appear set on a "European" course that
the Soviets will findd un alatable.
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SOVIET AUTO SERVICING PLAN FALTERS
h?=' The USSR's entry into the automotive age
faces serious difficulties because essential repair
and service facilities are lagging far behind pro-
duction of civilian cars. Output of European-style
cars probably will reach the planned gDal of 1.3
million annually by 1975, but the planned con-
sumer-oriented service system is drastically
behind schedule.
At the outset of the ninth Five Year Plan
(1971-1975), the service network for privately
owned passenger cars was totally inadequate. Pri-
vate cars had to compete for gasoline and oil with
state-owned cars and trucks at 2,000 small, con-
gested, and poorly located service stations-one
for every 800 cars in use. Repair facilities that
admitted private cars were also unbelievably
scarce-about 370 nationwide, or one for every
2,200 cars compared with one repair and one gas
station for each 400 cars in the US. All repair and
service facilities were set up to serve the govern-
ment-owned fleet, and private owners were
treated as second-class customers. The Moscow
city directory listed only 12 repair garages and
100 gas stations, and even many of these facilities
were for the exclusive use of govern merit vehicles.
Thus, the repair of private cars by owners them-
selves-sometimes requiring the fabrication of
spare parts-became a way of life.
The ninth Five Year Plan called for a sub-
stantial investment-on the order of 500 million
rubles-to create an auto repair and service system
designed to serve the rapidly increasing number of
private owners. The backbone of the new net-
work is to be a chain of large, Fiat-designed sales
and service centers in 33 key cities. The repair
shops at these centers would account for about
Facilities Open to the Public
Filling Stations
2,000
6,000
Repair Stations
370
970
Number of Private Cars
800,000
3,000 000
Total Number of Cars
1,700,000
4,700 000
one fifth of all the service bays to be built during
1971-1975, nearly doubling the total number of
bays available for servicing private cars in 1970.
Although designed mainly to provide warranty
and repair service for the Zhiguli, the Soviet-made
Fiat, the centers will service other cars as well.
This entire program is in disarray, however, with
only three of the planned centers in operation-
one on the Warsaw highway near the Moscow
beltway, one in Tbilisi, and one at Tolyatti.
Until the Zhiguli service network is com-
pleted, interim steps are being taken to meet
immediate automotive servicing needs. Some
existing garages are providing factory authorized
service on new Zhigulis, and temporary service
shops are being set up in other areas. In Moscow,
at least half of the official repair stations for
government-owned vehicles are now accepting pri-
vate cars, and most of Moscow's official gas sta-
tions probably are selling to private owners.
A major factor retarding progress is the gov-
ernment's failure to authorize the expenditure of
scarce foreign exchange earnings for needed
equipment and machinery. The USSR is import-
ing some items such as gasoline pumps and garage
equipment (hydraulic lifts, diagnostic machines,
and repair tools) from Austria, Italy, and Eastern
Europe, and now is interested in importing com-
plete stations. Last summer, Moscow invited
Western firms to display their equipment and
technology at Moscow's Avtoservis-73 trade fair,
but sales were small, and US firms were disap-
pointed at prospects for future business.
Time is now running out on the Soviet pro-
gram to meet the needs of the motoring public.
Car output is growing at an annual rate of 28
percent, and the giant Tolyatti plant, now oper-
ating at about 90 percent of capacity, is pro-
ducing about 1,800 Zhigulis daily. Even the
modest service goal set for 1975-to meet 70
percent of the private owners needs-would leave
some areas with inadequate service. As matters
now stand, no more than half of the planned key
centers will be operational by 1975, but the num-
ber of cars will have nearly tripled.
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SOVIET LEADERS GATHER be successful in organizing an international Com-
~E,V tZ c Lai) munist conference in 1974 or early 1975.1
The Soviet part's Central Committee and
the Supreme Soviet met this week to approve the ib .~, The West European gathering will mark a
economic plan and budget for next year. The ,, qualified victory for the notoriously independent
party plenum heard a report by Brezhnev on ?, Italian party. The Italians want the conferees to
domestic and foreign affairs. The speech is unpub- ^ /adopt a coordinated strategy on European social
lished but, among other things, he probably took
credit for the record harvest this year and gave an
accounting of the leadership's handling of the
Middle East crisis.
and economic issues, and to set up a new mecha-
nism to exert pressure on the EC. Preparatory
sessions for the meeting appear to have gone
fairly well, although discussion on the issue of
greatest concern to Moscow-cultural freedom-
Speaking to the Supreme Soviet, planning ( 3has not yet been held. The USSR is keenly sensi-
chief Baybakov said the grain harvest this year
had reached more than 220 million tons, some 5
million tons above the optimistic total predicted
by Brezhnev at the end of October. This amount,
however, must be heavily discounted for excess
moisture and extraneous material The harvest has
tive to any moves that might challenge its leader-
ship of the Communist movement, and the So-
viets appear to be counting on the French Com-
munists to keep the Italians in line4,'
allowed the leadership to bring 1974 goals closer (o the Soviets have taken the lead on an all-
in line with the over-all 1971-75 targets and to European conference, partly because they are
highlight the Five Year Plan's commitment to anxious to get Brezhnev's detente policy endorsed
consumer welfare. 'r before the conclusion of the European security
A defense budget of 17.6 billion rubles was
announced for 1974-a decrease of about two
percent from the 17.9 billion rubles announced
for each of the last four years. Published defense
figures are not regarded as true measures of de-
fense spending because they exclude a variety of
items, most notably military research and de-
velopment. The official figure usually serves a
political purpose, and the decrease this year is
intended to reflect the leadership's commitment
to detente.
talks in Geneva. The timing is not yet set, but a
knowledgeable Italian journalist has said that all
European parties, including the Romanians and
the Yugoslavs, have agreed to attend. Both Bucha-
rest and Belgrade boycotted the last all-European
party meeting in 1967:
" Planning for a world-wide Communist con-
fere)ce is not as far along, but East European
party bosses Zhivkov and Kadar last week became
the first prominent leaders to publicly advocate
I such a meeting. Further endorsements, both East
and West, appear likely this month{
c1 (The Soviet party apparently has assured the25X1
Italian Communists that China will not be the
COMMUNIST PARTIES: MEETINGS AHEAD t focus of either the all-European or the interna-
a' ; tional conference.
3 he odds are getting better that there will be
two, possibly even three, Communist party con-
next year. A meeting of West European
ferences
parties is already scheduled for early 1974 in
Brussels, and Moscow seems to have enough sup- The Soviets
port for an all-European meeting later in the year. apparently believe that they can score points
If these take place without a hitch, and if the against the Chinese-who would almost certainly
/'/ Soviets continue to give assurances that they will not attend-even within the constraints imposed
play down the China question, Moscow may also by the Italians and others.
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EC: FACING THE ENERGY SHORTAI3~
,When the leaders of the Nine meet in
Copenhagen on 14-15 December, enE!rgy prob-
lems will demand most of their attention. The EC
Commission has forecast-in a paper it says may
be too optimistic-that the energy shortage will
lead to a drop of 2-3 percent in real GNP for the
EC in 1974, and an increase in unemployment of
2-4 percent. This would be the most serious eco-
nomic reversal suffered by Western Europe since
the end of World War 11. Even the French and the
British, notwithstanding their "favored" position
with the Arabs, face economic dislocation. The
other EC members, are increasing pressure on
London and Paris to join in a common effort to
cope with the crisis. The French and, perhaps
even more so, the British fear adverse political
effects on the Arabs from any public declaration
of EC solidarity.
EC Commission officials are warried not
only over the economic consequences of the oil
Parisian reads by candlelight because of power cutback
shortage but also about the disruptive effect on
EC unity. In light of the lack of any movement
on energy policy at the council meeting on 3-4
December, the commission has requested the
Nine to approve "political" guidelines for an
energy policy. The commission proposes:
? it be empowered to obtain information
on the movement of oil within the com-
munity;
? member states be forbidden to apply
export controls within the community with-
out commission approval;
? an energy-sharing agreement to be
worked out on a community basis and then
coordinated within an OECD program;
? transforming national conservation
measures into a community-wide program;
? harmonizing petroleum price-control
actions on a community basis.
While the French and the British have been
negative to proposals for sharing oil, France's
search for support of its new uranium enrichment
plant and Britain's pressing need for funding of
the regional development policy may provide
leverage for German and Dutch insistence on a
show of "community solidarity" on the oil ques-
tion. If agreement cannot be reached on common
energy measures, the Dutch-as well as the
Germans, Belgians, and Danes-may seek US as-
sistance.
The shakiness of EC solidarity is further
demonstrated by the efforts of individual mem-
bers to strike bilateral deals with Arab producers:
oil in exchange for the industrial development aid
the Arabs are increasingly demanding. The com-
mission has long proposed putting such producer-
consumer cooperation on a community basis, but
it is not clear that the Nine will be willing at this
time to make other than a very general commit-
ment to such a joint a roach.
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United Arab Emirates
SECOND ANNIVERSARY
INow two years old, the United Arab Emir-
ates is still plagued by leadership rivalries and
organizational problems. Because of his oil
wealth, Sheik Zayid, ruler of Abu Dhabi and
president of the federation of seven largely auton-
omous sheikdoms, has been the dominating per-
sonality in the union-much to the annoyance of
the other rulersl
torial dispute that involves, among other things,
the Saudis' claim to a big chunk of Abu Dhabi.
Under these circumstances, Zayid considers Saudi
funding of Saqr both a slap at him and a threat to
the federation's integrity.1
r `f )None of the federal partners is very happy
about the structure of the United Arab Emirates,
w o
'1)
JZayid has also been looking for an opening functioned l very areffectively. oFor thet pahas not
st six
to make a name for himself in the Arab world, months or so, the seven rulers have been con-
and he seized upon the October war as his oppor- sulting, largely under Zayid's goading, about the
tunity. He was out in front of the other Arab oil reorganization of the federation, and a formal
producers in declaring the embargo on shipments proposal may be forthcoming by late December.
to the US, and for a while he took a threatening Ultimately, a strengthened central government
line toward other US interests in Abu Dhabi. apparatus may emerge, which would mean less
Sheik Zayid has also been spending heavily- authority for the sheikdoms} )This might give
perhaps as much as $200 million-on behalf of r' some satisfaction to those rulers who feel that the
Cairo and Damascus./ central ministries have played a poor second
fiddle to the Abu Dhabi government. In the end,
however, Sheik Zayid's purse will enable him to
continue dominating the union.
IRA N
PERSIAN GULF Rasal ,~O "
Khaimah f
Umm al Qaiwain
Ajman
Sharjah
,!~jFujsirah
Dubai
"I I The Saudis, however, have never given diplo-
matic recognition to the emirate union. Faysal
and Zayid have long been at odds over a terri-
Each of the seven emirates takes its
name from its chief city, shown above.
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ELECTION IN BAHRAIN SOUTH AFRICA: THE OIL BOYCOTT
j An all-male electorate distributed its votes Pretoria's restrained reaction to its recent
widely across the political spectrum last week in inclusion in the Arab oil embargo reflects its
the first parliamentary election on the Persian f confidence that the loss will cause no serious
Gulf island ruled by Amir Isa al-Khalifah. No ' e_problems, at least for some time. A large portion
faction emerged with a dominant position in the of the shortages that are being imposed on South
National Assembly, although the left did far Africa probably can be passed on to neighbors
better than the ruling family had anticipated. The and Western trading partners]
government, which will continue to be headed by
a member of the Khalifah family, will probably
have a majority on most issues'.
Opposition forces in the new assembly prob-
ably will strongly resist any move by the govern-
ment to review its decision, announced during the
Arab-Israeli conflict, to cancel the arrangement
under which the US Navy's Middle East Force
maintains a station on the island. Soma Bahrain
officials had recently hinted to the US Embassy
that the government would like to recoisider the
cancellation.
All of the 115 candidates for the :30 deputy
seats ran without political labels because the gov-
ernment would not permit political or religious
groups to sponsor candidates. Of those elected,
eight are members of the extreme lefti:;t Peoples
Bloc and eight are from the Baathist-clominated
Nationalist Bloc, which has often opposed the
government. Against these elements, the govern-
ment will probably have the support of six reli-
gious deputies, who are believed to havE! the quiet
backing of the Khalifah family, and most of the
eight independents. The government can also
count on the 14 members of the Council of
Ministers, whom the ruler can name as voting
members of the assembly under the new con-
stitution signed on 10 December'
The Peoples Bloc will be the riost vocal
opposition force in the assembly. Formed in mid-
1973, it is led by a communist, Abd al-Nadi Rasul
Khalat. Although the Peoples Bloc campaigned on
bread-and-butter issues, it is expected to take a
much more ideological line in parliament, which
;Prime Minister Vorster's low-key statements
concerning the boycott implied that South Africa
would be able to avert serious economic disloca-
tions because of its long-time efforts to achieve
self-sufficiency as a precaution against possible
UN sanctions. Moderate gasoline conservation
measures were adopted in mid-November, how-
ever, and the government is prepared to ration gas
if necessary.
1% Vorster also implied that the neighboring
states that normally import petroleum products
from South Africa would have to share whatever
privations might occur. Botswana, Lesotho, and
Swaziland depend primarily on South Africa for
petroleum products, while Rhodesia and Malawi
also import some petroleum products through
South Africa
South Africa has no domestic source of
petroleum, but its abundant coal reserves meet at
least 75 percent of normal needs. An effective
Arab oil embargo would cut up to half of South
Africa's normal imports, but the net impact prob-
ably would not compel more than a 10-percent
reduction in energy use. Even this impact could
be softened by drawing on emergency stockpiles
of crude oil; local refinery capacity is well above
normal domestic requirements
r_' 'The government, however, is determined to
apply drastic conservation measures in order to
avoid tapping emergency stores. Before severe
domestic restrictions are imposed, normal exports
of refined petroleum products and bunkering of
foreign ships would be stopped. In any event,
tight rationing appears likely for bunkering,
which usually consumes at least 15 percent of all
the refined petroleum available in South Africa.
The government's recently established oil prior-
could be a source of increased olitical instabilit
in the county .
ities give low precedence to the approximately
while rounding the Cape.
3,000 ships per year that normally are fueled
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TURKEY: IMPASSE CONTINUES
(l' 1_ - IC
iThe longest political stalemate in Turkish
history dragged on this week, with political
leaders still unable to form a government after
nearly two months of trying. On the basis of
preliminary results, the municipal elections on 9
December will not break the deadlock, as the
major parties had hoped. The Turkish Army,
which takes seriously its role as guardian of the
nation's institutions, is concerned but apparently
still willing to give the politicians more time to
work things out.
The left-of-center Republican Peoples Party,
which won a plurality in the inconclusive parlia-
mentary elections in October, had hoped for a
strong showing in the local elections. It would
then have been able to claim nationwide endorse-
ment and been in a better position to go on and
form a government-if necessary, a minority one.
The party did well in the cities-taking the
mayor's office in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir
away from Justice Party incumbents-and also
won in nearly all the smaller industrial centers. It
received only 37 percent of the over-all popular
vote, however, to the Justice Party's 33 percent-
the same margin that resulted from the elections
in October.
The newly formed right-wing Islamic Na-
tional Salvation Party, which could play a key
role in either a right or left coalition, is not well
organized on the local level and emerged with
only 5 percent of the vote. It had taken 11
percent in October. Another rightist group-the
Democratic Party-held its own with 11 percent,
but the centrist Reliance Party dropped to less
than 3 percent of the vote. Independent candi-
dates got 7 percent of the vote and the remainder
was split into small increments.
Under President Koruturk's prodding and
hints of military impatience, the politicians may
now be more willing to abandon their partisan
positions and form some kind of coalition. Such a
government would be unlikely to take new initia-
tives, but it should be able to carry on routine
activities until new elections are held, possibly
next spring or summer.
RIGHT COALITION
LEFT COALITION
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VENEZUELA: LANDSLIDE FOR PEREZ
1' -1 Carlos Andres Perez has won a landslide vic-
tory that may bring his Democratic Action Party
a majority in congress. His election is not likely to
result in any major shifts in domestic or foreign
pol icies.
Perez is expected to continue President
Caldera's firm nationalistic stance on economic
matters, particularly the complex petroleum
problem. He will press for an early take-over of
foreign petroleum concessions, but he will also
try to attract new private investment to join with
state enterprises in developing the country's vast
unexploited energy resources.]
Perez's basic pragmatism and lack of ideol-
ogical restraints indicate that he will be a hard but
practical bargainer in dealings with the US and
the oil companies. Further indicators of Perez'
intentions will be his appointments to handle oil
matters and his willingness to move forward on a
long-term agreement to provide the US with a
guaranteed supply of petroleum in return for
access to US markets for Venezuela's non-oil
exports.
In his first press conference as president-
elect, Perez stated that his administration would
not be influenced by US or other foreign oil
companies. While offering friendship to Washing-
ton, he made it clear that he would use petroleum
resources as a lever to get better treatrrent for his
country. Although Perez is believed to support oil
conservation measures, he has not called for a
cutback in production.'
;Perez's victory over the goverr ing Social
Christians apparently has also carried his party to
majority control of the legislature, an unprece-
dented event in Venezuelan parliamentary his-
tory. The strong backing for the mocerately na-
tionalistic policies of both major parties, which
together received about 85 percent of the presi-
dential votes, points to the possible emergence of
a two-party system and an increasing political
stability for the country.
l in an attempt to salvage what remains of
their influence, several leftist political leaders are
r.urging the formation of a united front of all
leftist parties. This has been tried many times
during the past fifteen years, but it has failed
because the parties and leaders were unable to
resolve personal and ideological differences. The
success of this latest proposal will depend on the
degree to which the marxist Movement to Social-
ism-now the most prominent leftist force in the
country-will join or lend its support. Already,
some leftists are divided over the unity proposal,
and a few extremists are calling for a campaign of
vigorous opposition to the new administration.i
\While the cause of leftist unity may strike a
responsive chord among some Social Christians,
President Caldera and other moderate party
i leaders probably will conclude that the party's
best chance lies in assuming the role of "loyal
opposition" in the new congress. Before the new
president-elect is inaugurated next March, there
will be time for both arties to ex lore the
grounds for cooperation.
Soldier guards voting center
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LATIN AMERICA: A UNITED STAND
1 1 D_ t- 1 1?,>
The third round df. talks on the reorganiza-
tion of the inter-American system concluded in
Lima with few solid accomplishments, but with
the Latin Americans united to an unusual degree
on issues concerning relations with the US. Repre-
sentatives of the 23 OAS member states agreed on
recommendations for a few superficial revisions in
the organization's charter and in the Rio Treaty,
but the sweeping reforms advocated by some of
the more radical delegates were defeated.
A majority apparently favored expanding
the terms of the Rio Treaty to provide for collec-
tive security against "economic aggression"-an
addition intended to limit the influence of the US
and multi-national corporations-but the dele-
gates were unable to agree on specifics. This and
other unresolved matters will be ironed out by
OAS ambassadors in Washington so that final
proposals can be submitted to the OAS General
Assembly in Atlanta next April.
Unlike the earlier, more contentious phases
of negotiations, the latest talks in Lima were
characterized by unusually successful collabora-
tion among the Latins. On primarily economic
issues involving the US, they voted in a bloc. High
on their agenda for future talks with the US are
such topics as the Law of the Sea, the role of
international lending agencies, and the right of
the Latin Americans to control foreign interests
and their own natural resources.
A number of recent developments have
prompted the Latins to seek joint positions in
their relations with the US. The changes of gov-
ernment in Chile and Argentina in September
brought new attitudes in those countries, and the
coup in Chile also caused a few other govern-
ments to moderate or reappraise some of their
policies, at least temporarily. Also, with the Pan-
ama Canal negotiations under way once again, the
Torrijos government is now anxious to maintain
the best possible relations with the US.
These shifts, plus Secretary Kissinger's stated
desire for increased high-level collaboration in the
hemisphere, have raised Latin American expecta-
tions for a general improvement in relations with
the US. At a meeting of foreign ministers in
Bogota last month, the Latins forged joint posi-
tions that will be discussed with the Secretary at a
conclave early next year in Mexico. Although the
Bogota meeting overshadowed and tended to
supersede the proceedings of the OAS commis-
sion, both groups of negotiators reached similar
conclusions. Many Latin American governments
now seem to look toward the foreign ministers' 25X1
meeting with the Secretary as well as the OAS
assembly next April as significant opportunities
to press their nationalistic lines.
CHILE: ON GUARD
1 4 hrs. t 9l
ffhe junta apeais to have the security situa-
tion well in hand, but it is concerned over the
possibility that its opponents will attempt to re-
focus international attention on Chile with head-
line-making activity during the Christmas holi-
days.
Extremists still are far from ready to launch
a concerted terrorist campaign, but probably
could carry out a few spectacular operations.
Strict security measures remain in effect nation-
wide, and the regime has been trying to counter
rumors of a "black Christmas" with assurances
that the armed forces "will guarantee tranquility
and see to it that every child has a to
The junta apparently has also decided to end
the exodus of dissidents. Safe-conduct passes out
of the country will not be granted to persons
seeking asylum in European embassies after 11
December. Asylum can still be secured at Latin
American embassies, but these remain closely
watched and several people have recently been
caught trying to scale the walls. The regime has
struck back at its disaffected diplomats and other
opponents outside the country by withdrawing
their citizenship.
The current wage-price squeeze, putting the
traditional holiday amenities out of the reach of
many, may cause heightened resentment against
the regime and its economic policies. This dissatis-
faction could have more serious consec uences
than the threat of leftist violence.
SECRET
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Oon% SECRET
ARGENTINA: PROTECTING FOREI13NERS
Li President Peron's nationwide mobilization of
police to protect foreign companies and their
personnel has had no immediate effect, and US
.0 businessmen continue to be a major terrorist tar-
get. Following his assurances last week to the
executives of the Ford Motor Company that government could cope effectively with terrorism,
members of the Peoples Revolutionary Army
handily snatched an Esso representative in Buenos
Aires. Anonymous threats have also recently been
made against the Chrysler plant
?- JPeron ordered strong measures to fight vio-
lence when Ford officials moved all their US
personnel out of A^g warred they
The company was
ti group w UALUI L
Ford's US employees. This threat followed the tO
assassination of a Ford executive in Cordoba last increasing support for counter-terrorist organi-
zations could prove more effective. Peron, how-
month ever, ever, may ultimately be forced to make deals with
eeting with Ford leaders, Peron em- the terrorists or suffer major losses of foreign
s multinational companies make
hi
t
s m
a
lIn
phasized his personal concern. He said he was investmen
setting up a council at the cabinet level to co- good on their threats to pull out of Argentina.
%d r
orism A For
:7
t
.
err
ordinate the campaign against
SECRET
by a left-wing Peronist
spokesman later commented that the company
plans to bring its people back to Argentina even-
tually?
)After at least 27 political kidnapings this
year, it is apparent that providing additional
bodyguards for potential victims is no deterrent
to well-armed groups and may only heighten the
t's efforts
chances of bloodshed l The governmen
Yr ind by
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Dec 73
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-400, qwVI
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010600050001-1