WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010600020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 23, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Navy review completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
23 November 1973
No. 0397/73
Copy N? 60
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CONTENTS (23 November 1973)
WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday rnorrinq by
ttae Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
icant deve:opments of the week through noon on Thursday.
It frequen"ly includes material coordinated with or prepared
he Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Techrofogy.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there.
;rjre published separately as Special Reports are Isted in the
:on tents.
ing the national security of the United States, avithin
WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified nforrnation
eanirq of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US
as am ended, Its transmission or revelation-of it, con-
:o or = eceiot by an unauthorized person is pr3hibi?:ed by
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
1 The Middle East
7 Europe:-Preparing for Less Oil
8 Greece: Government Challenge
10 Yugoslavia: The Kiev Document
11 France: Looking East
12 Finland: An EC Agreement
13 Spain: Church-State Troubles
13 Brezhnev to India
14 Burma: Countering the Insurgents
15 Cambodia: Another Near Miss
16 South Vietnam: Palace Squabbling
16 Thailand: Off to a Good Start
17 Indonesia: Remembrance of Things Past
18 South Korea: Quieting the Students
19 South Asia: Repatriation
19 Oman: The Sultan's War
21 Sudan: Trying the Terrorists
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
21 Foreign Ministers Meet
22 Cuba: The Revolution Regroups
23 Trinidad-Tobago: Searching
24 Venezuela: An Uneventful Campaign
25 The Dollar Stays Strong
26 Law of the Sea Conference
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Middle East
I Egyptians and Israelis were cooperating on
some issues this week. The exchange of prisoners
of war was carried out with only minor snags, and
Egyptian soldiers and civilians surrounded by Is-
raeli forces got a steady flow of essential supplies
?Egypt has now turned its attention to Arab sum-
mitry, and Israel continues to prepare for next
month's elections, but in spite of these distrac-
tions and problems, the interest of the two parties
Israeli POWs go home ...
in addressing the basic issues of a settlement re-
mains alive'
I rrhe Syrians are most unhappy about being
left out of Egyptian arrangements, but so far have
confined themselves to just grumbling about it.
Moscow, also feeling a little left out, has been
emphasizing its support of the Arab cause and is
examining the Palestinian potential in talks with
fedayeen leader Arafat in Moscow -1
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Military Situation
I Occasional small arms, artillery, and mortar
fire broke the cease-fire this week on both fronts.
Most of the firing was along the Suez Canal,
where at least one Israeli aircraft was downed by
Egyptian surface-to-air missiles. Firing on the
Syrian front was primarily in the nortiern sector;
little damage and few casualties were eported on
either front- The disposition of Egyptian, Syrian,
and Israeli forces changed little in the past week.
Each continues to reinforce its positions, how
ever, and to outfit their forces with substantial
quantities of new weapons obtained at:road.
I [Egypt, meanwhile, has protested to the UN
about Israel's efforts to construct a causeway
across the Suez Canal, charging that such activity
constitutes a serious violation of the cep-fire
and a major engineering change of the -anal
1 There was no significant change in Soviet
naval forces in the Mediterranean during the
week. Most of the Soviet ships remained at an-
chorage or in port with only eight war ships
trailing the US Sixth Fleet. The squadron now
includes submarines, 26 warships, and 31 sup-
port ships
Diplomacy
112 fYhis week, the Egyptian-Israeli prisoner ex-
'change proceeded with only minor complications,
and all captives were scheduled to be home by 22
November. Non-military supplies for the Egyptian
Third Army and for Suez city moved unimpeded
through the UN and Israeli checkpoints. All but a
handful of wounded civilians have beer evacuated
from the city
1,$ TTalks on the more troublesome questions of
a return to the 22 October cease-fire lines and the
disengagement of forces got off to an inauspicious
start. On 18 November, Egypt cancelec! a meeting
at Kilometer 101, apparently in reaction to Israeli
calls for a return of Egyptian and Israeli forces to
their own sides of the Suez Canal and for the
establishment of a ten-kilometer buffer zone on
each bank. Later, the Egyptians publicly rejected
the proposal. Little information has been released
about subsequent meetings, but statements from
each side attest there is considerable disagreement
between them. The meetings are continuing, but
it is unlikely that these questions will be resolved
quickly?
1 g The UN Emergency Force for the Egyptian
iron grew to nearly half its prescribed strength of
7,000. No progress was made toward securing
funds for its maintenance, however, as efforts to
gain approval of a financing resolution were
stalled. An Arab proposal to exempt Egypt, Syria,
and Jordan from assessments on the grounds that
they are the victims of aggression threatened not
only to delay the necessary funds, but also to
raise the explosive issue of accountability for the
war. An effort to fix responsibility for the hostili-
ties also seemed to underlie a Soviet proposal for
an entirely new scale of assessments that would
increase the contributions of the developed states,
including Israel, while reducing those of the East
European states.?
New Reality in Israel
),VfPrime Minister Meir has again affirmed Is-
rael's desire to talk peace with the Arabs, but is
suggesting that it would not be desirable to hold
formal peace talks prior to the Israeli election set
for 31 December. This position reflects the
dilemma in which Mrs. Meir finds herself. On the
one hand, she heads a government that is under
fire at home for its allegedly negligent conduct of
the war; on the other, she is under strong inter-
national pressure make meaningful concessions
to Israel's enemies
l Fin an effort to put to rest the apprehensions
of most Israelis about the government's perform-
ance and to turn their attentions to thoughts of
peace, Mrs. Meir has proposed that a commission
be established to inquire into the armed forces'
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preparedness for and conduct of the war. Israel's
political parties differ greatly over what would
constitute a viable peace settlement, and Mrs.
Meir will need a new mandate before her govern-
ment can confidently move forward in negotia-
tions
3 (The Israeli public may be ready to accept a
f' peace settlement with Egypt. The US Embassy
describes the signs pointing in this direction as
"fragile," but a clear change from the widespread
attitude that Israel should not surrender one inch
of the territory taken in 1967. Anxieties about
tj US intentions and deep suspicions about Soviet
and Arab objectives remain, but a number of
commentators are exhorting the government to
abandon its post-1967 "immobilism.'7
t TDefense Minister Dayan, in a number of pub-
lic appearances, has stressed the "new reality"
theme: that Israel's international political posi-
tion has changed dramatically as a result of the
late war; that the pace of events is beyond Tel
Aviv's control; and that Israel must, therefore,
reconsider all its positions'
I The Israeli press is hinting that government
team are busy formulating an Israeli position for
the negotiations. A well-placed journalist has
echoed what is probably an official worry. It
would be difficult, he wrote, for Israel to discuss
"secure borders" without the prior resolution of
several other issues:
? an end to the Arab oil embargo;
? a US-USSR agreement to limit arms
shipments to the area;
? Big Power guarantees of Israel's security
and navigation rights;
? a way to prevent the inundation of Israel
by Palestinians.7
Israeli General Yariv (hatless) and Egyptian General Gamazy
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Pace -~ WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Nov 73
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I Veneral Aharon Yariv, who has headed the
Israeli team in the cease-fire talks with the Egyp-
tians, apparently will be replaced soon. Yariv is a
candidate for the Knesset and, according to Israeli
law, must end his army service if he wants to
campaign. There has been some speculation that
Mrs. Meir, displeased with Foreign Minister Eban,
is considering making Yariv the top nE!gotiator at
any future peace conference
[General "Arik" Sharon, one of Israel's new
military heroes, is also seeking politicai office and
is on the list of Likud, a right-wing group severely
critical of the Meir government. Sharon, unlike
Yariv, has said that he will stay in the army if the
election law cannot be changed to let him be a
candidatel
The Egyptians
1,$ (Cairo is having almost as much difficulty
with its Arab allies as it is with Israel. As negotia-
tions with Tel Aviv turned to controversial ques-
tions, Cairo appeared as concerned about trying
to convince its Arab neighbors of the merits of
dealing with Israel as it was about furthering the
negotiations themselves.
4 President Sadat is under publi-- fire from
ibya and Iraq and private censure from a variety
of other Arabs for accepting the cease-fire, agree-
ing to the truce arrangement, and sitting down in
talks with the Israelis. Concerned that these criti-
cisms might broaden Arab disunity zit the forth-
coming summit conference and hopeful that
negotiations with Israel can begin with some
degree of Arab solidarity, Sadat has dispatched
emissaries throughout the Arab world to mobilize
support l
18 [Where quiet persuasion has not worked, as
with Libya, Sadat appears to be trying carefully
tuned public criticism. Last weekend, a leading
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Cairo columnist mounted an indirect but pointed
attack on "the country" that talked most about
war and contributed least when war came, an
unmistakable allusion to Libya. At the same time,
the writer emphasized that Sadat cares more for
building effective Arab unity than for asserting
his own authority or Egypt's hegemony over the
Arab world-a clear attempt to ease Arab fears,
including those of President Qadhafi, that Sadat
will ride roughshod over his neighbors to achieve
Egypt's ends?
S jsome off Egypt's maneuvers in talks with
Israel this week may have been designed in part to
demonstrate to other Arab states that Cairo will
not bend to Tel Aviv's demands. Cairo's cancella-
tion of the Egyptian-Israeli meeting on 18 No-
vember, for example, may have been intended to
emphasize to Israeli and Arab alike that Egypt
will reject any pl ~nrs that call for the cession of
Egyptian territory.!
9 Similarly, War Minister Ismail's long exposi-
tion, in an interview, of Egypt's planning and
preparation for the war was probably intended
out other Arab leaders about a proposal to resolve
the sticky Palestinian question. The King is sug-
gesting that Jordan first negotiate the return of
the West Bank and East Jerusalem at a peace
conference, then-following an Israeli with-
drawal-allow the UN to hold a plebiscite to de-
termine whether Palestinians want union or fed-
eration with Jordan, or complete independence"t
) Q Lebanon's President Franjiyah and Syria's
President Asad have reportedly responded favora-
bly to the idea. Saudi Arabia's King Faysal and
the Emir of Kuwait, who were consulted last
Sunday, are unlikely to raise serious objections.
Amman has not been able to obtain the all-im-
portant reaction of President Sadat, who has been
holding Husayn at arm's length since the cease-
fire. Husayn, who hopes to appear flexible on the
issue, reportedly intends to make his proposal
public, but probably not until after the Arab
summit in Algiers.,
Libyans and Others
for Arab as well as Israeli consumption. This was rp Libya's President Qadhafi is on a nine-day
the first public acknowledgement that Egypt and visi to Belgrade and Paris-his first trip outside
Syria initiated the fighting and, although it con- the Arab world since his military junta took
tained no obvious threats of renewed action, re- power in 1969. Qadhafi apparently is shopping
minded the Arabs of Egypt's fighting ability at a for military equipment and assistance in exchange
time when many are criticizing Cairo for talking for oil, but his hard line on the cease-fire agree-
ment has dominated discussions in both European
The Syrians capitals. The Libyan leader considers Yugoslavia
and France to be Europe's most independent
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam visited states and may believe they will be rece tile to
p
Cairo last weekend, reportedly to air Syria's com- his arguments against Great Power imposition of a
plaints and to work out a coordinated strategy for settlement. Qadhafi reportedly will wind up his
next week's Arab summit. Privately, the Syrians stay in France with a press conference this week-
are still bitter about not being informed of end, just prior to the Arab summit in Algiers. He
Egypt's intentions, but a serious falling out be- may hope to divert attention from the meeting,
tween Cairo and Damascus does not seem likely'r which he recently denounced as a facade for
rubber-stamping what has already been decided in
The Jordanians Cairo. Qadhafi has said that he will not attend the
summit, but a last minute change in his travel
rKing Husayn, with the occupied West Bank plans suggests that he wants to keep his options
still uppermost in his mind, has been sounding open
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1)$ JArai foreign mini3ters are scheduled to meet
in Algiers on 24 November to prepare for the
Arab League summit that is to begin on Monday.
A majority of member states have agreed to par-
ticipate, although at least two important leaders
have said that they will not-Qadhafi of Libya
and Bakr of Iraq. Their expected absence will
make it considerably easier for the mcderate Arab
leaders to dominate the session.1
1)2 rWith the cease-fire holding, Moscow has
turned its attention to the "pull-back" elements
of the agreement and preparations for a peace
conference. An article in Pravda on 15 November
insisted that Israel must withdraw to the lines of
22 October, but took the rather optimistic view
that "new political factors" have crE!ated "more
favorable conditions than ever" for the resolution
of Arab-Israeli problems. Soviet conci:rn that it is
being left out of political developrrents in the
area still comes through clearly. Moscow has also
mobilized communist parties in the Middle East
and responsive newspapers there to play up the
Soviet role in Arab successes and to stimulate
distrust of the US and those Arab leaders willing
to work with Washington's
)prAs one step to get back on center stage, the
Soviets finally got Yasir Arafat and the leaders of
most of the major fedayeen organizations to Mos-
cow on 19 November. The delegation's visit had
been postponed several times while both Arafat
and the Soviets worked hard to convince the
heads of the more radical organizations to attend.
George Habbash, chief of the militant Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine held out,
although his or anization is represented by one of
his key advisers
)t The trip is designed to hammer out a com-
fnon position on Palestinian participation in a
peace conference. Moscow has been urging crea-
tion of a Palestinian state centered on the West
Bank, but fedayeen leaders have been reluctant to
abandon their long-standing objective of a return
of displaced Palestinians to Israel. The Soviets
apparently hope that support of the Palestinians 25X1
will strengthen what Moscow would see as a "pro-
gressive" force at a peace conference and, more
generally,jn the area.
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Europe: Preparing for Less Ofl
(N & r SOM Q0bb
The Arabs' scheduled 5 percent reduction in
December oil production will not be applied to
EC members. The Arabs were reacting to the EC
resolution supporting their position. Of the nine
EC members, only six will be directly affected:
the UK and France are on the Arabs' favored
countries list and already exempt from cutbacks,
while the Netherlands remains embargoed. The
six remaining members were expecting to lose
180,000 barrels per day of Arab oil in December.
The French have made their point that "helpful"
declarations for the Arabs bring results.
The selective restoration of the cutback
compounds the dilemma of EC members who give
lip service to European solidarity while refusing
help to the embargoed Dutch. The new Arab
statement presumably will still permit "informal"
oil sharing by the international companies and
may even marginally increase what is available for
such shifting of supplies to the Dutch and others
damaged by the embargo. Nevertheless, the dis-
tinction between the Netherlands and the other
EC members is heightened, and the Dutch-while
themselves hoping to convince the Arabs of the
Hague's "even-handed" policy on the Middle
East-are talking increasingly of abandoning the
pretense of community solidarity. The com-
munity has called off a council session on energy
policy scheduled for 26 November. The Nine will
address the Middle East and energy questions at
their summit in Copenhagen on 14-15 December.
Even with the Arab exception, Western
Europe will face serious problems. The area is
dependent on Arab sources for over 70 percent of
its crude oil requirements; the proportion is closer
to 80 percent for France and Italy, and is over 80
percent for Spain. Despite stocks of between two
and three months, West European countries are
taking steps to conserve energy. All consuming
countries have urged voluntary energy conserva-
tion, but have been reluctant thus far to impose
rationing. If the Arab oil cutbacks continue, how-
ever, rationing may be necessary in a number of
countries early in 1974. The piecemeal restric-
tions differ from country to country.
West Germany On 9 November, the Bundestag
gave Brandt sweeping powers to restrict consump-
tion. The law empowers the government to im-
pose specific measures concerning production,
transport, storage, and distribution of energy
sources. Earlier this week, Bonn announced a ban
on Sunday driving.
France The government has urged Frenchmen to
curtail automobile use and lower household ther-
mostats. The sale of gasoline in containers has
been prohibited.
Italy Rome has placed controls on the export of
petroleum products.
United Kingdom The government has ordered an
immediate 10 percent reduction in all petroleum
product deliveries. It has urged the public to stop
driving on Sundays and to reduce speeds to 50
miles per hour. The sale of gasoline in containers
has been banned. Several weeks ago, London
placed controls on oil exports outside the EC.
Netherlands The Dutch have introduced an ex-
port licensing system on most petroleum prod-
ucts. Oil companies have agreed to reduce deliv-
eries of most petroleum products (excluding gaso-
line) by 15 percent. Sunday driving has been
banned. The government has urged voluntary ob-
servation of a 60-mile-per-hour speed limit and
lower household temperatures. Authorities esti-
mate that these steps could yield a 10 percent
saving in petroleum products.
Belgium An export licensing system has been set
up for most petroleum products. The government
has placed the country's petroleum business
under its control.
Austria On 14 November, the government raised
the price of motor fuel and heating oil by 22 to
35 percent to discourage hoarding and compen-
sate for higher crude prices. The Austrian parlia-
ment has given the government authority to ra-
tion petroleum products. The sale of gasoline in
containers has been prohibited.
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Spain Export of petroleum products has been
curtailed.
Portugal The price of gasoline has been raised and
service stations ordered to close on Saturdays and
Sundays.
Denmark The government has taken steps to re-
duce oil and gasoline consumption by 25 percent.
Price controls have been waived, and sulfur con-
tent regulations have been eased. The sale of
high-octane gas is prohibited, and speed limits are
reduced to 50 miles per hour.
Greece Gasoline and electric power consumption
have been restricted. Speed limits have been re-
duced and the sale of gasoline in containers pro-
hibited.
GREECE: Government Challenged
l ( ~reece's experiment in more open democ-
racy received a setback last weekend when the
government had to call in the army to put down
large-scale rioting in Athens. Prime Minister
Markezinis subsequently promised to go ahead
with his plan to return Greece to political nor-
malcy, but the task will be m ch more difficult
following the weekend's events
cq fhe concessions that the government had
made-the lifting of martial law, the meeting of
some student demands, the talk of elections-
emboldene both the students and the political
opposition Earlier this month police clashed with
t nment demonstrators following a
n
over
25X1
25X1
i g
a
memorial service on the fifth anniversary of the
death of former prime minister Geo'ge Papan-
1(? Another outbreak began on 14 November
when students barricaded themselves in the
Athens Polytechnic Institute and issued demands
for more academic freedom, "Americans out,"
and immediate democracy. Violence came two
days later. The demonstrators attempted to take
government buildings by force and were beaten
back by police. As a result, 12 were dead, 350
injured, and over ' ,000 arrested. A large number
of workers were among those arrested, indicating
that a student call for worker support had met
some successl
I q Martial law was declared on 17 November,
and army tanks knocked down the gate of the
Athens Polytechnic Institute; the students left
peacefully. By 19 November order had been re-
stored[
14 (The government has claimed that the trouble
had been caused by anarchist elements who were
trying to prevent the government from announc-
ing its plan for elections. Security forces claim
that supporters of Andreas Papandreou's Panhel-
lenic Liberation Movement started the trouble
and that Communist and other labor elements
later took over the leadership of the demonstra-
tors. The government has closed the universities
for three weeks and arrested many known or
suspected regime opponent?
15'CPresident Papadopoulos, disturbed by the
situation, tried to salvage his efforts to restore
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political normalcy. At first, he gave orders that no
non-Communist politicians be arrested; he later
placed three prominent politicians under house
arrest, including ex-prime minister Kanellopoulos.
All three have been outspoken opponents of the
regime. Kanellopoulos had issued a statement in
support of the demonstrators, and on 19 Novem-
ber he called for the government to resign and
make way for a government of national unity.
Papadopoulos has ordered Prime Minister Marke-
zinis not to make any public statements about
future elections, which he says will not be held
until order has been fully restored. "I
2.0 (The US Embassy says that the government
may have to try a new approach to get its "politi-
calization" program back on track. Given the
visibility of the army in putting down the dis-
orders and the strong criticism of politicians by
the government, it is even more unlikely that
politicians such as Kanellopoulos would agree-or
perhaps even be allowed-to participate in elec-
tions. Most army officers are strongly opposed to
these old-line politicians, and Markezinis has the
army looking over his shoulder to make sure that
any initiative he may take does not lead to new
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YUGOSLAVIA: THE KIEV DOCUMENT
7_3 Pito's very friendly talks with Brezhnev in
Y Kiev last week will heighten concern at home and N
'
abroad about Belgrade
s rapprochement with
%AMoscow. Such concern will not deflect Tito, who
is determined to pursue both improved ties with
the Kremlin and a strongly pro-Arab policyl
?y~ The exceptionally warm language of the
communique exceeds anything Tito has signed
with the Soviets since the great schism of 1948.
The Kiev document twice refers to "trust" and
l specifically describes the talks as taking place in a
spirit of "mutual understanding." Although Tito
has privately stated that he trusts Brezhnev, he
has never before used the word in a formal docu-
men _!
23 The document lacked any of the familiar
,Yugoslav references to the right of socialist states
to differ on domestic and foreign policy. Simi-
y4larly, Belgrade's standard list of basic principles
guiding good bilateral relations-respeci. for inde-
pendence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity
along with non-interference in domestic affairs- such rumors by blaming them on psychological
was also omitted. Tito did tick off these princi- warfare against Yugoslavia conducted by the US
pies at a welcoming reception, but he signally and its friends''(
failed to insist on their inclusion in the communi-
que7
%h rThe visit to Kiev will increase public appre-
ension over Tito's eager cooperation with Mos-
cow during the Middle East war. Tito's militant
support of the Arabs placed Yugoslavia, for the
first time since the Tito-Stalin break, squarely on
the Soviet side in a major international crisis.
Moreover, Belgrade's strident pro-Arab stand
simultaneously underscored Yugoslavia's estrange-
ment from Washington. It also put Tito on the
outs with his Balkan colleague, Ceausescu.1
3 `An official campaign to counter the jitters rAlthough the Soviets almost certainly paid a
over this unfamiliar and unpalatable role is al- 3, price for Tito's concessions in the Kiev document,
ready under way. It has not had much effect yet; the quid pro quo has not yet emerged. There has
"indeed, public uncertainty has reached the stateZ?ibeen little Yugoslav press commentary on the
that rumors alleging a US-Soviet agreement to visit since Tito's return, suggesting that Yugoslav
partition Yugoslavia are fairly widespread. This leaders are waiting for a briefing by Tito before
week, Todo Kurtovic, the party executive bureau taking a stand on the real meaning of the Kiev
member in charge of the press, tried to discourage visit.
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Looking East
2.5 he French have been busily making contact
with Eastern Europe this fall. French officials
visited Warsaw, Prague, and Bucharest in October,
and more exchanges are in the offing. Paris' im-
,L(mediate aims are largely economic, but it hopes
to reap political benefits that will improve its
position throughout Europe
2$" cParis regards Economics and Finance Min-
ister Giscard's talks in Warsaw with Polish party
leader Gierek as the major event, believing that
the visit underscored France's key place in
Poland's relations with the West. The French also
sent a high-ranking Quai official to Prague to
breathe new life into that relationship, strained
since the Soviet invasion in 1968. Both sides hope
that the visit of a French minister to Prague later
this month will be a large step in that direction.
Paris has sent a high official to Bucharest to help
prepare for the visit to Paris next year of
Romanian Foreign Minister Macovescu.7
ZL
%.S he French now plan to dispatch an ambas-
sador to East Germany, almost a full year after
negotiations opened. The next item on the agenda
is the arrival in Paris next week of the Bulgarian
foreign minister. Last September, France pro-
posed that Bulgaria be included in the EC scheme
of generalized preferences for developing nations,
and Sofia apparently is anxious to pursue the
matterl
chafe over what it regards as the US-Soviet effort
to monopolize detente %
2 rThe French are, of course, attracted by the
market potential of Eastern Europe, and they also
hope their involvement there will to some extent
2c rThis activity does not point a new directionlb take the play away from West Germany's Ostpol-
in French policy, but it does underline Paris' itik. Moreover, the French regard ties with East
continued interest in developing a political European countries as an important element in
Europe that extends at least to the Soviet border, maintaining their "special relationship" with
if not-as deGaulle had it-to the Urals. While Moscow. At the same time France feels it is
French attention is currently centered on building competing with the Soviets for influence in the
the unity of the EC, in the long run Paris still region, and the current strains in Franco-Soviet
hopes that the EC will act as a magnet, drawing relations over the management of detente may
Eastern Europe toward it. With detente essential encourage Paris to be more active in that re-
to these ambitions, Paris has another reason to gard.
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FINLAND: AN EC AGREEMENT
34 rThe most significant event in Finnish foreign
policy over the past decade occurred last week
when parliament ratified the free-trade agreement
,with the EC. It came after nearly 17 months of
on-again, off-again deliberations, and despite a
last-minute flurry of Soviet criticism. President
Kekkonen was expected to countersign the ac-
cord this week, just days before the deadline
ending Finland's special trade arrangements with
its former European Free Trade A ociation
partners that have already joined the EC.
ttff With a nod in Moscow's direction, the Finns
a lt%c ed a rider stating that if the EC accord with
Brussels disrupts Finnish-Soviet cooperation,
Helsinki could terminate the agreement. The
ambiguous language of the clause could cause
Finland trouble if the Soviets decide their neigh-
bor is drifting tco far toward the West. The Finns
will probably try to placate Moscow on other
issues in order 1o redress the balance in its rela-
tions with East and West.
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SPAIN: CHURCH-STATE TROUBLES
I7VThe government is moving to reduce ten-
sions with the Catholic Church over the practice
of putting priests convicted of political crimes in
special prisons. With the Roman Catholic Church
trying to dissociate itself from the Franco regime
and a new concordat between the Vatican and
Madrid being discussed, the prison issue has taken
on a special significance
'%>% (This week, the seven priests who began a
hunger strike two weeks ago at a special prison
were transferred to the hospital of a regular
prison outside Madrid. The priests-of whom six
are Basques serving 10 to 50 years-had pre-
viously set fire to their special jail to dramatize
their demands to be placed in a regular one. They
argue that the special prison, which is permitted
under the Concordat, shows that the church has
surrendered its independence to the state. The
hunger strike occurred shortly after the visit to
Spain by Monsignor Casaroli-the Vatican equiva-
lent of foreign minister. He was in Madrid to
discuss the possibility of negotiating a new con-
cordaf
39 [several other clerical demonstrations fol-
lowed Casaroli's visit. Some 50 Basque priests last
weekend began a sympathy sit-in at the bishop's
palace in Bilbao. At least 150 clergy staged a
similar sit-in at a seminary in San Sebastian, an-
other Basque city. In Madrid about 150 priests
and laymen held a 20-hour sit-in at the Vatican
Nunciature7
41'b TThe tension aroused among the priests re-
flects the three-way differences over church-state
relations among the bishops conference, the Vati-
can, and the Spanish Government. Cardinal
Tarancon, who heads the bishops conference,
takes a tougher attitude than the Vatican on the
need to separate the church from the Franco
regime and on the right of the church to speak
out on political and social problems. The Vatican
is interested in a nearly complete separation of
church and state and is willing to renounce most
or all of its special privileges. The Spanish Govern-
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25X1
ment reportedly does not want to abandon its
veto power over the appointment of bishops in
Spain and wants to exclude the church from
political and social matters that the regime re-
gards as its exclusive preserve. Negotiations are
like) to be r)rotracted.
BREZHNEV TO INDI yrJ
Soviet party lead Brezhnev arrives in New
Del i on 26 November, hoping to burnish the
USSR's credentials as a moving force behind
Asian detente. He also hopes to demonstrate that
Moscow's pursuit of better relations with the
West has not been at the expense of Soviet ties
with clients like India. Brezhnev doubtless would
like to restore some of the warmth that Soviet-
Indian relations had during the Indo-Pakistani
war in 1971.
The Indians, who have been preoccupied
with domestic problems and relations with Wash-
ington, are grateful for Brezhnev's visit, which
demonstrates the continuing Soviet interest in
India. Basically, they are really interested in what
they can get out of him in the way of new
economic and military aid.
Talks between the two sides will range over a
number of international and bilateral issues. As
always, China looms large. Brezhnev will probably
solicit Indian support for as many anti-Peking
schemes as he can, particularly his own Asian
collective security idea. He will also encourage
Indian detente efforts in South Asia, and press for
closer Soviet-Indian military cooperation.
The Indians probably are prepared to en-
dorse Soviet detente efforts in Europe and vari-
ous Soviet disarmament schemes. The Indians
seem anxious to avoid the question of exclusive
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agreement on military and economic aid ques-
tions. India is interested in more advanced fighter
aircraft and has ambitious plans to expand and
modernize its navy. Moscow probably will be
willing to provide some of what the Indians want
eventually. At least some progress will be made
on economic problems, particularly if Moscow
offers to help India meet its energy needs and
The two countries are expected to sign a ease credit terms on outstanding debts.
consular convention. There probably also will be 25X1
BURMA: COUNTERING THE INSURGENTS
rRangoon has been moving with unusual
vigor in recent weeks against the well-established
Communist insurgency in the northeast, but it is
doubtful that the Burmese military can long sus-
tain the momentum of its offensive, now two
months oldi
It ? Ttung by the Communist seizure on 1
November of Mong Yang, the last major garrison
between Kengtung and the border, the Burmese
Army moved quickly to take diversionary action
farther north. With insurgent attention focused
on the Mong Yang area, the government suc-
ceeded in capturing a town only five miles from
the border. The army is now moving against other
long-time Communist depots and strongpoints in
this area. The insurgents, supplied and directed in
part by the Chinese, had enjoyed relatively undis-
turbed sanctuary along this stretch of the border?
14L in spite of the government gains in the
north, the situation around Kengtung is worri-
some. The Communists have followed up their
seizure of Mong Yang by moving reinforced units
to within 20 miles of Kengtung. Anticipating this,
the government has sent reinforcements into the
Kengtung area to defend the town and Route 4;
the army is making plans for a counterattack?
44 r supply problems, plus the heavy casualties
sustained by Burmese forces since the offensive
began, raise questions about Rangoon's ability to
sustain operations on two fronts. Moreover, the
rout at Mong Yang took its toll on troop morale,
and some unit commanders are new and inexperi-
enced. Rangoon has assigned its deputy defense
minister as regional commander, reflecting the
seriousness with which it views the situa-
tion.
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ANOTHE~~NEAR MLS,S1
CAMBODIA: Many of Lon p
Nol's s i rstitiouss countrymen
must by now be convinced that the President
leads a charmed life. For the second time this
year, Lon Nol escaped unharmed when a dis-
affected Cambodian Air Force pilot bombed his
residence in Phnom Penh on 19 November. The
wayward pilot's motives for staging the raid are
unknown, but he apparently acted alone and pre-
sumably has sought refuge in a Khmer Commu-
nist - controlled area of Cambodia.
The capital quickly returned to normal after
the incident. The government reacted in familiar
fashion by temporarily grounding the air force's
fighter aircraft and by arresting the pilot's family.
It is possible that the attack may also result in the
removal of the chief of the air force.
For his part, Lon Nol appeared to be taking
the incident in stride. At midweek, there were no
signs that the President was preparing another
widespread crackdown against anti-government
elements in the capital similar to the one con-
ducted in March-when the first attack occurred.
The repressive actions at that time were largely
the work of Lon Nol's impetuous younger
brother, Lon Non, who has been in the US since
July.T
Military Mire
Typhoon rains struck the Phnom Penh re-
gion this week, bringing military activity to a
temporary standstill. South of the capital, the
flooding of the Prek Thnaot River has disrupted
government resupply operations and has forced
elements of two government divisions to halt
their advance along Routes 2 and 201. Flooding
in the marshy area ten miles northeast of the
capital has slowed the government effort to re-
lieve the market town of Vihear Suor.
In other areas, the Khmer Communists kept
up the military pressure. There are signs that a
major Communist push is developing against the
provincial capital of Takeo, 40 miles south of
Phnom Penh. The city has been subjected to a
series of ground attacks since late last week, and
the government commander there estimates that
his 2,000-man garrison faces as many as seven
Communist battalions.
Elsewhere, sporadic fighting continues along
the Communist-controlled four-mile section of
Route 4 west of Kompong Speu City
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25X1
SOUTH VIETNAM: PALACE SQUABBLING
714CPresident Thieu may be fcrced to curb or
j-dismiss two of his most important aides-presi-
~jdential assistant Nguyen Van Ngan and Infor-
mation Commissioner Hoang Duc Nha-who have
Ir been vying for influence for some time. Earlier
510 this month at a meeting attended by Thieu and
the cabinet, Ngan and a large group of pro-gov-
ernment legislators recommenced that Nha's
Information Commission be abolished because it
was ineffective, corrupt, and incompetent. Ngan
has since persuaded the Lower House to vote
down a large supplementary budget request for
Nha's commission. Ngan and his followers are also
calling for a reduction in the political powers of
the country's military region commanders,
5"4 The country's senior military commanders
r
Sw
surtace, and they hope Thieu will fir
nave little use for either n.
mos of-the
semor lcers are pleased that the dispute be-
tween the two civilian aides has bubbled to +t,-
25X1
25X1 J
(There is no indication what Thieu will do,
u LI M r I CSIUVr1 L S GOSest
c~'?civilian adviser; Ngan has achieved a lesser, but
JJ still important, role. Thieu depends heavily on the
backing of the military establishment; if it came
to a showdown between his civilian advisers and
the senior commanders, the President would be
unlikely to go against the military. Although
there are few signs that the rivalries have impaired
government effectiveness, they could become a
threat to stability, particularly if combined with
Communists.
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THAILAND: OFF TO A GOOD START
57 rPrime Minister Sanya's government, despite
its caretaker status, has turned in a creditable
performance during its first month in office. It
has handled the immediate problems of restoring
order and establishing confidence by:
? getting the army to promise publicly to
stay out of politics;
? giving the students an indirect voice in
government affairs;
? shaking up the police department, best
known for is venality;
? sacking several notoriously corrupt of-
ficials;
? seizing the assets of exiled leaders
Thanom, Praphat, and Narong, and bringing
criminal charges against them',
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5-1 P ost important from the students' point of view,
the Sanya government has moved expeditiously
to draft a new constitution. There is also evidence
that Sanya has plans to turn the military-domi-
nated National Assembly into a civilian body
,O fThe degree to which real civilian rule will be
allowed to develop remains an open question. In a
country that has known little but military rule for
the past 40 years and a strong monarchy before
that, it is not surprising that the new set of actors,
lately thrust upon the political stage, are unsure
of themselves and their future. The student move-
ment, for example, has split into factions over
c$ what part, if any, students should play in politics.
Although the military has agreed to stay in the
background, Prime Minister Sanya is troubled by
continued student criticism of the police and mili-
tary. Fearing that such complaints could trigger a
move by the army to restore the status quo ante,
Sanya has publicly cautioned the students to
avoid further provocative acts']
51 rif the students and military are unsure of
what part they should play, the bureaucrats are
not. Long-frustrated civil servants are now being
given the decision-making power previously re-
served for the military-dominated cabinet. The
general public will probably judge the civilians on
their performance on bread and butter is ues,
f such as the cost of rice and other necessitieThe
IM"' military will doubtless be watching closely to see
if the bureaucracy can provide the same stability
that military rule imposed. While all the returns
are not yet in Prime Minister San a is off to a
good start.
Indonesia
s\
REMEMBRANCE OF THIN PAST
The recent success of ai students has re-
kindled the political ambitions of Indonesian stu-
dents. The students have played an important role
in Indonesian politics in the past, and the govern-
ment is keeping a close eye on the situation, wary
that the students may be able to exploit latent
discontent among segments of the population.
Thus far, however, the students are still groping
for a slogan or issue that can crystallize feeling
against the government.
Student leaders are thinking in terms of mass
demonstrations focused on government economic
shortcomings or on Suharto's plans to enact a
secular marriage code. The latter is particularly
offensive to Islamic students.
By themselves, the students probably cannot
seriously threaten the government. Ambitious
men within the regime or among those who have
been pushed out in recent years, however, could
try to capitalize on the unrest. One such possi-
bility is General Sumitro, who heads the state
security apparatus. He has been unusually promi-
nent of late, politicking in the countryside and
talking with students. Sumitro says he is just
pouring oil on troubled waters, but it is clear that
he would like to be in position to pick up the ball
if President Suharto fumbles.
A potentially serious complication for the
government is the involvement of an army-spon-
sored youth group in the antigovernment plan-
ning. Located in Bandung, with its history of
student radicalism, this group is the youth arm of
the army's Siliwangi Division-a former elite corps
long involved in politics at the highest levels.
Under Suharto, ambitious officers of the Sili-
wangi have been quickly retired or exiled to un-
important positions, and the division's former
autonomy has been severely curtailed.
Although troublesome ingredients are
present, the mixture has not yet reached a critical
stage. Moreover, there are no signs of serious
cracks in the solid front that the military leader-
ship presents to the public. The army high com-
mand is not without its opportunists, such as
Sumitro, but the students will have to prove that 25X1
they can get a real anti-regime movement going
before any important military man will make
common cause with them against Suhart.
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SOUTH KOREA: QUIETING THE STUDENTS
(pq('Although the South Korean Government is
capable of dealing with domestic opposition in
uncompromising terms, it has shown a certain
moderation in handling campus unrest over the
past few weeks. The persistence of the unrest,
together with growing support for the students
among Christian organization.; and intellectual
groups, has prompted the government into a
stronger response?
rOn 19 November,universitiss were advised to
discontinue classes and hold final exams by the
end of November-in effect, closing the schools
several weeks before the customary three-month
winter vacation. At the same time, the regime is
intensifying pressure on schcol faculties and
individual students to conform. The Ministry of
Education, for example, has tightened control
over government scholarships, making political
rectitude a requirement for financial ~issistancel
~q he early closing of most colleges will ease
.he immediate problems on the campuses, but the
students' activities have stirred up other segments
of society, and this disgruntlement seems likely to
persist on a small scale for the next several
months. There are some indications that Seoul is
considering measures-such as lowering the profile
c)f the hated Korean CIA-which it hoes will
help defuse the situation.
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SOUTH ASIA: REPATRIATION
7) f the three-way repatriation on the sub- 7 r"ndia has deliberately kept the repatriation
continent continues, despite charges of bad faith of the Pakistani prisoners of war at a relatively
by Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. So far, about 'y slow pace. It has told Islamabad that it will speed
35,000 Bengalees have arrived in Bangladesh from 26p the release of prisoners only when the repatria-
Pakistan, about 15,000 non-Bengalees have tion of non-Bengalees is accelerated. Recent
moved in the opposite direction, and India has Pakistani explanations of the difficulties and mis-
released over 2Q,000 of the 95,000 Pakistani understandings involved appear to have satisfied
prisoners of war. r the Indians, however, and the prisoners may soon
begin returning home in greater number
?0 Pakistan appears to be sending home Ben- ?0 IT he issue of Kashmir has also cropped up
galees as quickly as it can, despite accusations by again. Although public reaction in India has been
Dacca and New Delhi that it is holding back. k' restrained, New Delhi is clearly annoyed by some
India claimed, for example, that Islamabad was?)Zof Prime Minister Bhutto's recent statements.
'7Zrefusing to repatriate 203 senior Bengalee civil These included a call to be prepared for an
servants and was holding them hostage for 195 eventual general strike in Kashmir, and also im-
Pakistanis whom Bangladesh still threatens to try plied support for guerrilla warfare to free the
as war criminals. The International Red Cross, disputed state from Indian ru
however, said that almost all of these senior Ben-
galees had already been repatriated. Dacca may
have greater cause for suspicion in the future, '1 b INone of the parties seems willing to press
because some 175,000 Bengalees had been ex- their grievances to the point of endangering the
pected to leave Pakistan, but Islamabad claims repatriation process. The movement of all three
that only about 126,000 have applied for re- groups appears likely to continue, but at a slow
patriation( .) 2 pace and with continuing charges of bad
')0 (India and Bangladesh also suspect that Pak-
istan does not intend to honor the promise it
made last August to take a "substantial" number
of the quarter million non-Bengalees in Bangla-
72desh. Islamabad's original low estimates on the
number of Pakistanis in Bangladesh was seen as an
attempt to set an arbitrary ceiling. Pakistan has OMAN: THE SULTAN'S WAR
since denied such an intention, but it has turned
down many applicants for entrance on the
grounds that they do not qualify as Pakistanis. , 3 (Fighting between the 7,000-man Omani
Some in Bangladesh see this as another arbitrary armed forces and the rebels in Dhofar Province
move to limit the number of non-Bengalees to bea, has taken its normal seasonal upsurge. Since the
admitted. For its part, Islamabad claims that one end of the monsoon in late September, small
reason for the low number admitted so far is7$fgroups of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
inefficiency in Dacca. Bangladesh has, for Oman and the Arab Gulf have stepped up mine-
example, been unable to locate some non- laying operations as well as ambushing govern-
Bengalees whose a plications for repatriation ment forces and shelling strongpoints. The
have been approved Omanis have countered with air strikes against
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(Aden)
__ Muscat
the Popular Front continues to get arms and
provisions through to its scattered units. In recent
months, a variety of Soviet weapons have been
delivered, including the Katyusha 122-mm. rocket
that has been fired against targets near the coastal
town of Salalah and against the nearby air base
that supports the air war against the insurgents-
both times without damage or casualties. The
rebels have managed to bring in a number of
anti-aircraft machine guns, in an attempt to dis-
courage government helicopter operations
3 he Sultan is hoping for outside assistance
to shift the military balance in his favor. Thus far,
411ran has been the most receptive to his appeals.
Next month a fully equipped airborne brigade
with subordinate medical and engineering units
will join an Iranian special forces unit already on
the scene. The first mission of the 1,300-man unit
will be to clear an important truck route from the
interior to Salalah. The UK has contributed about
150 officers, who lead the Sultan's army and run
his air force. A limited number of Jordanians and
Pakistanis hold middle-level positions in training,
logistic, and technical-support units
7 3 TFor their part, the rebels can count on con-
tinued support from the Marxist-oriented Adenis,
who view the Omani sultanate as an obstacle to
Zoo the revoluti'nary goals of the Popular Front.
7Since Aden gained its independence in 1967, it
ha served as a conduit for arms to the insurgents
rebel bases in Dhofar and search-and-destroy
operations. They have tried to cut rebel supply
routes from Yemen (Aden). A modest civic action
program has been established n the backward,
h
in Dhofar and has provided safe havens and bases
for training. The Dhofari rebels could very well be
receiving training from Cuban advisers assigned to
the Adeni militia school. Earlier this year, Aden
underscored its commitment to the rebellion by
sending in 200 "volunteers."7
westernmost province in an effort to win t e r
loyalty of the mountain tribesmen. Still, the rug ~~ IT he Omanis are not now capable of crushing
ged terrain gives the guerrillas great advantages ` the Dhofar insurgency, and their financial re-
and they get substantial support from across the d sources are strained to the limit by war-related
border in Aden. No end is in sight in this decade_r expenditures that absorb about two thirds of gov-
long guerrilla wart ernment revenues. Thus, the past pattern of the
guerrilla warfare seems likely to continue, with
33 fThe Omani Army has tried in various ways
to intercept supplies from Aden to the rebels, but
t? 5
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SUDAN: TRYING THE TERRORISTS
'79 TPre-trial inquiry into the assassination last bility. The terrorists may be using this ploy to
March of one Belgian and two US diplomats be- strengthen their argument that they were acting
gan last week after a seven-week postponement. as agents of an "internationally recognized"
.1 From the outset, the accused Palestinians dis- body, to give the operation an aura of respecta-
41, the proceedings by shouting pro- bility..
Palestinian and anti-US slogans. The magistrate's ((
p d highly unusual decision to allow the terrorists to '7Y rAt the next session, on 24 November, the
address the court directly will permit them to air defense is expected to argue that Sudan has no
their political justification for the killings." jurisdiction because the crimes were committed in
p the Saudi Arabian Embassy, a contention that the
-7 rUnexpectedly, the Palestinians' spokesman court will probably rejec In spite of the ter-
asserted that the murders were ordered by the ?.Prorists' outbursts, the US mbassy believes the
Palestine Liberation Organization-a contradic-y inquiry is generally proceeding in accordance with
ti
f th
'
on o
e organization
s own denial of responsi--7 accepted Sudanese legal procedure.
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET
00? Representatives of 23 Latin American and canal treaty that will satisty Panama's "just aspi-
English-speaking Caribbean nations-including 16 rations," bu it was watered down from the origi-
foreign ministers-met in Bogota from 14 to 16 nal proposal.
November to discuss US - Latin American rela-
tions. They endorsed a broad but generally Vo CAmong the topics agreed upon for discussion
moderate agenda for an expected meeting with with the US are:
Secretary Kissinger early next year in Mexico
? greater hemispheric cooperation for de-
87 rThe idea for a meeting of American foreign velopment;
ministers dates from early October when Secre-
tary Kissinger visited the UN and talked with ? the international monetary system;
Latin American representatives about increasing
high-level contacts. Foreign Ministers Rabasa of ? the role of multi-national corporations;
Mexico and Vasquez of Colombia appear to have
been behind the decision that the Latin foreign ? the transfer of technology;
97 ministers should meet first, without US participa-
tion, and seek a consensus. Rabasa later explained ? the revitalization of the inter-American
to the US ambassador in Mexico that the prepara- system.1
tory meeting would allow the Latins to "let off
steam" and g'+ unreasonable proposals "out of f)elegates expressed confidence in the special
their systems." OAS commission on reorganization currently
meeting in Lima, but many apparently feel that
16 The Colombians, together with Brazilians, there should be more regular consultations out-
Chileans, and several Central Americans, domi- side the OAS and without US involvement. In
nated the proceedings at Bogota. Peru, Venezuela, their closing addresses, however, Rabasa and
Mexico, Jamaica, and Panama unsuccessfully96Vasquez made it clear that they and many of
g7 sought to inscribe several contentious proposals their colleagues desire direct and frequent com-
th
on
e agenda. Panama did win support for a munications with Secret y Kissinger.
resolution that calls on the US to conclude a
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CUBA: THE REVOLUTION REGROUPS
Cf I 'Fidel Castro's speech closing the National
Labor Congress on 15 November reversed a num-
ber of policies his regime had long defended.
3Pleading "revolutionary inexperience," Castro
admitted having tried to go too far, too fast in his
efforts to bring communism to Cuba. He ac-
knowledge that that communism "cannot be applied
by decree.'
and the practice of retiring exemplary employees
on full pay will be terminated. To soften the
impact, Castro hinted at the possibility that
luxury items such as cars and color television will
become available. He also revealed that work is
already under way on the drafting of Cuba's first
five-year plant
41 '[The policy changes reached so deeply into
41 [-These admissions, which received an implicit
stamp of approval from other key figures of the
regime, recognize the validity of the criticisn'~j
3heaped upon him, not only by his Soviet and East""((
European benefactors, but also by adherents of
the pre-Castro Communist Party who had been
purged for opposing his political and economic
theories. His pledge to terminate some measures
that have enjoyed wide public approval indicates
that he is serious about changing many of the
utopian but impractical schemes that have
hobbled his administration7
qZ? [The policy changes wer-~ not unexpected;
the regime's "mass organizations" had been
priming the population for many of them for
almost a year. Some of the measures undoubtedly
g1)drew considerable opposition, and the govern-
ment was at some pains to demonstrate broad
public support for the policy shifts. Of the 1.7
million workers eligible, 88 percent took part in
"overwhelmingly"; those abstaining or signifying FAs if to underscore the latter point, an "old"
disapproval allegedly constituted no more than communist, Lazaro Pena, was elected secretary
one percent of the vote on any specific item. This general of the Central Organization of Cuban
display of Cuban "democracy" may impress a few Workers, replacing "new" communist Hector
of the more unsophisticated, but the majority ofq; Ramos Latour. The 62-year-old Pena had helped
those who will suffer from the change will look form the federation of labor unions in 1939 and
upon the statistics with skepticisnl7 had served eight years as its first secretary general,
93
CH Castro touched on a broad range of topics.
He ade it clear that material incentives, for
example, are no longer anathema and that some
forms of overtime pay will be authorized. So-
called voluntary work, often mismanaged and
uneconomical, will be curtailed and organized in a
more orderly fashion. On the other hand, utility
rates, which were reduced si-arply after Castro
came to power, will be increased; premium pay
the regime's ideological underpinnings that Castro
apparently felt it necessary to have his brother
Raul and President Dorticos on hand with him for
all sessions of the congress. Seven of the eight
members of the Political Bureau-the party's high-
est policy-making body-and the entire party
CASTRO SAYS HE HAS TRIED TO GO
TOO FAR, TOO FAST IN BRINGING COM-
MUNISM, TO CUBA.
Secretariat were present during his closing speech.
By their presence, they signified their approval of
the measures being adopted and their recognition
of the rising influence, if not predominance, of
Cuba's "old" communists'?
but he played no significant role in aiding the
Castro revolution. Ramos Latour, on the other
hand, is about 12 years younger than Pena and is
a brother of a dead hero of the Castro revolution.
He himself served in Castro's underground and
helped organize union support for the rebel
movement. His replacement by Pena is symp-
tomatic of the gradual shifts in Cuba that are
drawing it ever more closely into the Soviet or-
bit. 25X1
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SLL:KI= I
TRINIDAD-TOBAGO: SEARCHING
FFormer W o ney general Karl Hudson-
Phillips has emerged as the most probable succes-
sor to Prime Minister Eric Williams as leader of
the ruling People's National Movement. The party
has set a national convention for 2 December and
if Hudson-Phillips wins as expected, he will be-
come prime minister shortly thereafter.
Since Williams announced his intention to
retire from public life, the battle for control has
crystallized the party's racial divisions. The former
attorney general has the solid support of the
party's black majority, while his chief rival, Minis-
ter of Health and Local Government Kamaluddin
Mohammed, commands the loyalty of its East
Indian minority.
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1950s.
Under the present system, elections must be
held by 1976, but Williams' successor probably
will feel compelled to seek a popular mandate
within a year. Before the election takes place, the
new prime minister will have to convince the
electorate of his ability to head an honest and
effective government, promote racial harmony,
and lessen unemployment. If he does not succeed
in at least some of these objectives, the party
could be ousted for the first time since the
25X1
25X1
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VENEZUELA: AN UNE NTFUL CAMPAIGN
(7 J q8/
IThe campaign for th ~na ional election on 9
Dece}~ber is moving into its final stage with a
winner not yet in sight. Some strong political
rhetoric has stirred up an occasional disturbance,
but there are not enough substantive differences
between the two major parties to enlist the real
passions of the Venezuelans.
Of the 14 presidential hopefuls, only Lor-
enzo Fernandez, running for the governing Social
Christians, and Carlos Andres Perez, the Demo-
cratic Action candidate, hav,: a chance to win.
The lead in public opinion polls has been see-
sawing between them. With considerable fanfare,
President Caldera has inaugurated a wide range of
industrial and public works projects in the hopes
of giving a boost to Fernandez.
Thus far, the focus in the campaign has been
on domestic issues. Anti-US themes and com-
plaints about foreign investment by US oil com-
panies have been generally avoided. Democratic
Action is portraying its candidate as a man of law
and order who will control the spiraling cost of
living and deal with other bread-and-butter issues.
Until recently, the governing party concentrated
on presenting Venezuela as an international
leader. The party tried to appeal to the left with a
pacification program at home and a call for rela-
tions with socialist countries abroad.
After recent polls showed that the left was
cool to this tactic, however, party leaders turned
to basic domestic issues that appeal to the poor.
Fernandez' present poor showing in the polls has
spurred speculation that President Caldera may
try some dramatic last-minute acts to strengthen
the pro-government vote. Mcst mentioned are
moves against the oil companies and efforts to
stabilize the cost of living and end shortages of
staple commodities.
The election may be marred by a large-per-
haps even a record-number of null presidential
votes. The followers of the exiled ex-dictator,
Perez Jimenez, who have no candidate of their
own, may try this tactic. Abstention, although
illegal in Venezuela and carrying stiff penalties,
may be popular with others as a means of ex-
pressing displeasure with the poor choice of can-
didates.
Either the Social Christian Party or Demo-
cratic Action will win the presidency, but the
composition of the next national congress re-
mains uncertain. Venezuela's proportional repre-
sentation system favors small-party representa-
tion, which has encouraged a multitude of groups
to offer congressional slates. The new congress
could therefore represent a further fragmentation
of political power with no party receiving more
than 20 percent of the seats. The marxist Move-
ment To Socialism is expected to do well, largely
as a result of the popularity of its presidential
candidate, Jose Vincente Rangel, a socialist inde-
pendent, who is expected to come in third.
Although there are occasional rumors of25X1
coup plotting, there appears to be little danger
that extremists of either the far left or riaht wi1125X1
guarantee the results of the election, and both 25X1
major r i to abide by the out-
come. 25X1
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THE DOLLAR STAYS STRONG
n, or sowia.CEE0
After makin~ strong gains in early Novem-
ber, the dollar was steady on major foreign ex-
change markets over the past week. Profit taking,
a sharp rise in British lending rates, a flurry of
speculation related to the revaluation of the Nor-
wegian crown on 15 November, and the Arab
announcement that December oil cuts would not
be applied to "friendly" European nations all
contributed to a slight easing after the high point
on 12 November. An announcement the next day
that major central bankers had agreed to permit
free market sales of official gold had little impact,
and the dollar showed its underlying strength by
coming back later in the week.
The dollar's upward surge in the early part
of November was set off by fear that the econo-
mies of Europe and Japan were vulnerable to the
Arab oil boycott. The groundwork for the abrupt
rise had been laid earlier by the improvement in
the US balance of payments. Many who had spec-
ulated against the dollar earlier in the year were
encouraged to reverse their strategies.
The oil price hikes and production cutbacks
by the Arabs make money market predictions
hazardous, but prospects for further dollar appre-
ciation appear reasonably good. The US balance
of payments will probably continue to improve, a
delayed effect of the substantial dollar devalua-
tion since 1971. This will add to commercial
demand for dollars and will encourage firms and
individuals to build up their dollar holdings.
The exchange market demand, in turn, will
require increased dollar sales by foreign central
banks. Japan has sold over $2 billion in recent
weeks and West Germany almost $400 million.
PERCENT CHANGE SINCE 2 JANUARY 1973
IN THE VALUE OF THE US DOLLAR
RELATIVE TO SELECTED FOREIGN CURRENCIES
Change in the Trade Weighted Average
Value of the Dollar*
-30
19 23 30 6 13 20 27 4 11 18 25 1 8 15 22 29 6 13 20 27AU3 G 10 17 24 31 (i 14 21 28 5 12 19 26 2 9 1621
MAR APR MAY JUN JUL
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SECRET
Tokyo has already taken steps to slow the drain
on the dollar. Bonn is less concerned, at least for
the moment, and reportedly will use dollar sales
to prevent too abrupt a depreciation of the mark$
The other European capital! probably will be
similarly inclined, although they welcome the im-
provement in trade competition associated with
the stronger dollar,
World gold markets have been quiet since
the end of the two-tier gold pact on 13 Novem-
ber. Commercial users had already purchased suf-
ficient stocks to last into early 1974, while specu-
lators are awaiting a move by central bankers who
apparently have not yet decided whether to trade
in gold on the open market. Central banks will be
tempted to realize profits on the increased value
of their gold holdings, especially if faced with the
need to borrow money for intervention pur-
poses.
LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE
1** 4* he UN General Assembly last week voted
a-virtually unanimously to convEne a second Law
of the Sea conference in Caracas from 20 June to
29 August 1974. A preparatory session will take
101 place in New York on 3-14 December of this
yeaarr'1
?-t 1The preparatory session will consider a num-
er of procedural questions, and a few thorny
issues such as seating the Provisional Government
of South Vietnam and Sihanouk's Cambodian
exile government at the 1974 conference could
come up. Prior to the General Assembly vote last
week, a group of communist and nonaligned
states planned to press for an invitation for both
he Provisional Government and Sihanouk's
group, but these plans were scuttled at the last
minute when the Chinese backed off and urged
the nonaligned states to do likewise
TOnce over the arrangements hurdle, the con-
rice next summer will face the very tough
substantive issues involved in drafting an interna-
tional Law of the Sea treaty. Among the contro-
versial questions are'
,CA clusive territorial waters;
? the area to be included in a wider area of
more limited national control;
? the status of deep seabed resources;
a the sharing of ocean resources between
The lack of progress in the UN Seabeds Commit-
tee, which earlier this year failed to develop an
agenda for the conference, bodes ill for quick
action. Nothing happened at the current General
Assembly session to lessen speculation that a
third Law of the Sea conference might be neces-
sary in 1976.
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Secret
Secret
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