WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 20, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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%0101 w4w
Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
20 July 1973
No. 0379/73
Copy N2 48
State Dept. review
completed
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CONTENTS (20July 1973)
1 Argentina: Peron'sLast Chance
2 Rhodesia: Guerrillas Settle In
4 Libya: Qadhafi's Crusade
5 Cambodia: All Fight, No Talks
Indochina
7 Australia: Good Show
7 Japan: The Soybean Crunch
3 Iceland: Smoother Sailing
') USSR: Gas; Grain
10 Yugoslavia: Talks With Tito
I Eastern Europe: More Debts
11 Bulgaria: The Changing Mood
12 The Germanies: Pankow Backs Down;
Fesiival
France: Pompidou Beset
14 EC-Africa: Association Questions
15 Portugal: Atrocity Charges
16 Greece: Getting Out the Vote
17 Egypt-USSR: Strained Relations
18 India: Nuclear Setback
18 Nepal: After the Fire
19 Iraq: A Regime in Ferment
20 India: The Arms Trade
21 Afghanistan: Now a Republic
22 Chile: No Improvement
23 Cuba: Holiday Atmosphere
24 The Americas: Changing the OAS
24 Guyana: Elections
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MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
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Argentina
PERON'S LAST CHANCE
9' he resignation of the Campora governnnent
has paved the way for populist leader Juan Peron
to resume direct rule of Argentina. Campos has
been succeeded by Raul Lastiri--the son-in-law of
a close Peron aide-who will serve as provisional
president until elections are held, possibly within
45 days. Such an election, which he will win
handily, will do little more than give formal sanc-
tionto his decision to return to powers
RAr?l I rThe newly installed provisional president
said elections would take place in accord with the
old practice rather than under the revised laws
decreed by the military government. However,
some believe that the laws will be
amended to allow for a direct election on the
basis of a popular vote. The presidential term, if it
follows the old system, would be six year,. but
some uncertainty also remains on this point.
1 ?Speculation centers on who will be Peron's
vice president-a key spot since the incumbent
would be next in line to succeed the aging P=aron,
whose health is deteriorating. Peron's choice
appears to be Radical Party leader Ricardo
Balbin, who ran against Campora last March. The
Radical Party, split over Balbin's possible can-
didacy, will meet. in a national convention, pos-
sibly at the end of July, to settle the issue crr an
alliance with the Peronists. There are also objec-
tions to Balbin within the Peronist movemeril. A
Peron-Balbin ticket would pool the support of
most of the nation's voters?
JIn announcing his availability for the op
y post following Campora's resignation, Peron
emphasized his respect for constitutionality,
probably to alleviate military fears that lie /vas
~r preparing to take over in a patently illegal rnan-
ner. Army chief General Carcagno told Pero,a he
could expect full support for any governmental
changes as long as they were made within the law,
The army high command reportedly believes that
there is only slight opposition within the military
to Peron's take-over. Peron has been curr,ving
favor with armed forces leaders since he retur,ied,
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:)c~,rAr- 1
rleferrinq to their wishes on several occasions and
,howine an intent to forge stronger ties v,i'.h th e
military establishment from which he has lun a
been estranged.?
fn policy matters, Perori appears tU, be bo -
rowing heavily from former president .__nusse s
econernir- and ~r,Iitic1 sistin(j that Peron undertake a tull-scale frontal
Grand National Accord. Pr)ron secros tr :varit an
alliance of the nation's major political 'vices- lienated leftist groups may yet join forces
Peronists, Radicals, and the mil tarv. F'laris t) with Marxist terrorists in a campaign of violent
,r-hieve stability through "national orrcih~ opposition to the government. These elements
f on'' are eliciting support from soiri tanner could well run up against the combined weight of
enemies, but Peron has a long way to go :,iir>rr7 he the S its
3Z prospects JDuring the conference, Whitlarn em- -Sq/ VIhile lining up new suppliers, Tokyo will
phasized is government's cordial yet independ- press Washington to fulfil existing contracts for
ent stance toward the US. He criticized both the J" the shipment of grain and soybeans. The Japanese
hostility of leftists in his party toward the had contracted for delivery during the third quar-
ANZUS alliance and the tendency of the prey ous '1 ter of this year of 660,000 tons of soybeans,
government to see every issue as falling within the about two months' consumption; this amount has
ANZUS framework.1 been cut in half as a result of the US export
3S" normal cabinet approval of a long-starding
decision to withdraw Australian ground troops
from Singapore, 'which had been announced the
week before, forestalled leftist-inspired debaic on
the stationing of Australian troops overseas. 'n-
controls announced on 2 July. Japan will require
a resumption of normal US soybean shipments
sometime in late September or early October if
serious shortages are to be avoided,
berra has not, however, withdrawn from the 1 ive 1/( IrTo secure supplies, Japan already has altered
Power Defense Arrangement covering Singa ore its agricultural buying practices. In the past,
and Malaysia and maintains its air squadrer; in Tokyo purchased wheat in small amounts-for
Malaysia 2shipment within 30 to 60 days and kept stocks at
a minimum level. Recently, Japan has been sign-
3Y ton domestic matters, the party leaders nip
won endorsement of a resolution for exclusive
central government control over the exploitation
of minerals and fuels, an issue that figures promi-
nently in the sensitive relations between Canberra
and the states. State party leaders lobbied ag,;i nst
the proposal, which could lead to a considerc.ble
paring down of the extensive rights the states now
hold under the loose federal system.
ing larger contracts for shipment within six
months and apparently plans to increase
markedly its stockpiles of wheat. In June, Tokyo
received a commitment from Australia for deliv-
eries of 730,000 tons in 1974-about half the
normal amount that Japan imports from Australia
in a year. Japanese traders reportedly also began
negotiating with US commodity dealers for much 25X1
years.
larger than normal amounts of corn and soybeans
from the 1973-74, and even the 1974-75 crop
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1)L_' T
j r,re ign IV,r, ister Ac ;istss(rn ) i, l i et-
ned his goverriment'5 c,:rer ing p,)rsi' r ill
ti r
Forthcoming necotia' offs river the rrtr,r
US-manned NA I Cr nase H Krrflnvii I n - ~; ti
rI--isonahle ~,t.7temen' Oil that sut)I, r i t,J rI
d.Hanc c official it nearly two rnr nth, i he r eg,r-
rtions remain linked in Icel,nrl c ml try tl
rnresorved fishing disprrt-, hrit orc,sp- t: f~, r
amino thr. ha,,c in .-, n~,di~i?rrf to r, (-n, if i-
rreved.f
fAqustsson proposed that soirri < f tf,.: ~,_,r_r
-r~s n- the defr:nse force no idctTI ant ,p t- ,r
. h i n d r , f the r , i ( ; t a r y nersnnrit, ( ) v - nd,~ tf
nerrotiaofe. and the miiifaty r,r-rS r 1"1,31 r, r, tr ,
rri-nteri by Anern:an anrf Icr 1-1-1 c
,sci.:ai it , the Foreign Min ote' - (-rer. - i - t.;
,'IL; in The novernrr.ent to riciud,t thei
h,' Ice end;, nenntiatinc t~~anr
fl, st Jlugur,t, the For'tigo %i r is ter
grrrrrjght NATO) interventi,in ruain>t tr , Hritostart in September, an(] Acustsson, wishing to get
t ,rr , th,, nrec?tinq ()i NA, TO 'on~i,tn r:ist,-rs if srrrnr- of the spadework out of the way, has asked
iar,rl-June, thrrutcninn t invoke tf,e ,n;ratir rrS7 'r r r;formal talks next month.
'base (r'-'vrticle Kill ref its deter amre1,~ ;,-nt
rRET
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OCUric I "''
The Soviets have come forward with various
proposals for expanding Iranian deliveries, in-
cluding the construction of a pipeline parallel to
the existing 687-mile line to Astara or another
line from the giant Sarakhs field in northeast Iran.
Construction of a new gas pipeline will take a
long time, and Tehran probably will insist on
better payment terms prior to undertaking any
major expansion in gas output for the USSR.
Tehran is in a strong bargaining position as it has
a number of prospective buyers reportedly willing
to pay 30 cents per 1,000 cubic feet for gas as
compared with the USSR's 19 cents. The two
countries have been discussing the matter for
some time, and there is speculation that an agree-
meit setting higher prices will be signed during
Prime Minister Hoveyda's visit to Moscow on 19
July.
rThe USSR faces the prospect of paying more
for its natural gas imports; both Iran and Afghan-
istan are pressing for higher prices in current
negotiations. Moscow relies on Iran and, ?o a
lesser extent, Afghanistan for all of its natural gas
imports, which last year totaled 388 billion cubic
feet, valued at $79 million. Deliveries from Iran
and Afghanistan, in repayment for Soviet credits,
have helped overcome regional shortages in the
USSR and offset Soviet exports of gas to Western
Europe. Last year the Soviets earned about; $23
million in hard currency from exports to Austria
alone. This year, the Soviets need to import more
because they plan to export gas to West Germany
and Italy, and supply shortages are developing
within the USSR. Depletion of the USSR's major
gas fields at Stavropol, Krasnodar, and the
Ukraine has left the European USSR badly in
need of additional gas supplies.
The Afghans, who are in a weaker bargaining
position, began negotiating with the Soviets for
Major Natural Gas Pipelines in the USSR, Iran, and Afghanistan
-? Pipeline
- -? Pipeline under construction
Gasfield
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higher prices on 14 July - Last dear, Karbui re-
ceived only 16 cents per 1,000 cubic `ccet for i s
natural gas. In June 1973, President Podgorny
reportedly offered to rase prices to 19 cents, brit
this apparently did not satisfy Afghan star. t
ehran gets a price increase, Moscow probably
will have to adjust Afghan prices too, regardless
of the coup in Kabul.
43 11 it, 's talks with Romanian President Ceau-
sescu on 15-16 July demonstrated anew the wide
Srange of common interests between the two lead-
ers. This, their seventh meeting since the Soviet
irivas on of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, was
held at Tito's Brioni Island retreat, where the
Yugoslav leader has been resting,)
3 jtvloscow can take little consolation from the
H:gher prices and larger deliver tr, would eet ng. The final communique stresses the
arise the USSR's natural gas import b ll to well J, equality of all states, regardless of size, and ap-
over last year's $79 million. Most o~ the impor.s a,plauds nonalignment as a struggle between the
probabiy will not involve cash outla?;s by tt el
USSR, and Moscow undoubtedly will try to pass
part of the price increase on to its West Luropean
customers. Gas sales to Western Luropc this year
could be affected by the USSR's proti sins with
natural gas output and with the --onsti u, ti(in r,t
export pipelines)
"haves' and "have nots" the Soviet Union, of
course, being one of the "haves." The communi-
que's treatment of the talks on European detente
is designed to counter Soviet claims to hegemony
in Eastern Europe and to ensure Romanian and
Yugoslav participation as independent and equal
in future talks.I
j din bilateral issues, Tito and Ceausescu
SOVIET HARVEST PROGRESS pled6ed even more frequent party and govern-
*tni t' siilet~ nient meetings, and economic cooperation was
E ,. 16 July the Soviets h3b cut 14.5 million stressed?
hectares of grain, 11 percent of the arcs., sown to
grains this year. Only 8 million hectares of the cut
area had been threshed. It has rot bci,ri oossib e
64 [in contrast, Tito's session earlier in the week
to thresh the remainder of the (train dirr:ctly b - , with Hungarian party leader Janos Kadar was
cause of wet weather. Heavy rains and winds more pleasing to the Soviets. It was the first
lodged grain in large parts of the Ukraine, Belo- (pcmeeting of the two leaders since 1967, and put
russia, Moldavia, and the North Caucasus, causing relations between the two parties
considerable delay in threshing, compared with
last year. Accordina to a 13 July ra ti.) report
from the Ukraine, 2.5 million hectares we e
lodged: this is one third of the rapubl c. s winter
grain area and could amount tea r'nn,rc than 6
million tons of grain. Lodged grain ~s difficult to
harvest without loss and retains much rioistur,,
reducing its milling quality. [his week the
weather cleared over most of the Ukmine an d
North Caucasus and harvestinq picking
25X1 up.
keel. Tito suggested that the two leaders might
resume the frequent meetings that had earlier
marked their relations. I
COY budging from the communique, the two de-
voted special attention to economic cooperation,
an area where ties had already been improving.
SHungary and Yugoslavia have much in common in
their shared spirit of economic
tism
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P:rgr i!~ WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jul 73
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SECRET
EASTERN EUROPE: MORE DEBTS BULGARIA: THE CHANGING MOOD
astern Europe's debt to th ndustrial \Ni!st C,h,Concern in official circles over the possible
rose about one fourth last year and reacth~d k nega-:ive consequences of detente may be well
nearly $5 billion by year's end. Most of the -i-~~ founded. The US Embassy reports a distinct un-
crease resulted from a surge in purchases of n a- dercurrent of feeling that change is in the wind
chinery and equipment by Poland and Roman 3.411` and that new openings to the West lie ahead. This
The outlook is for more of the same. With IE(_ ,02 impression is strongest among those Bulgarians
possible exceptions of Romania and Bulgar a, who have kept up with Brezhnev's visit to the US.7
none of the East European countries has a seri,>,is
debt servicing problem. The United States is pic