WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 18, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
18 May 1973
No. 0370/73
Copy N?_ 47
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office rrf iurrent fntelligerscereports and analyzes signif-
icant developments of the week through noon on Thursday.
It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Off ice cif Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science- and Technology.
Topics-,r
equirinrg more comprehensive treatment and there-
fore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents.
CONTENTS (18 May 1973)
1 USSR: Brezhnev; Grain Crop
4 Middle East: Lebanon
5 Indochina: Control Commission; Politics
in Command; Cambodia
9 Korea: Limited Talks
10 China: Economic Problems
10 Japan: A Small Opening
11 Australia: Labor's Hold
12 Ireland: New Broom
13 Europe: Force Reduction Talks
13 Yugoslavia: An Old Soldier
15 Money and Gold
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
16 South Asia: Inching Backward
16 India: A Problem of Money
17 Bangladesh: Food Shortages Ease
18 Burundi: The Hutus Again
19 Third World: Arms Customers
20 Changes in Sudan
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
21 Chile: No End in Sight
21 Peru: Mundane Concerns
22 Argentina: All Systems Go
23 Mexico: The Students Again
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Brezhnev Meets Honecker in East Berlin (L); with Young Admirer and Gierek in Warsaw (R)
USSR
?, ,The past week saw action on several fronts
in preparation for Brezhnev's arrival in West Ger-
many on 18 May. Last weekend the Soviet party
chief made 24-hour visits to Poland and East
Germany. These were hand-holding sessions de-
signed to reassure the two allies that he will not
sacrifice their interests during his talks with the
West Germans. As a further sop, Brezhnev heaped
lavish personal praise on Gierek and Honecker
and awarded each of them the Order of Lenin:
1 During the Warsaw stopover, which officials
of both countries said "went well," Gierek asked
Brezhnev to encourage Bonn to be more con-
ciliatory on compensation for Nazi war crimes
and economic matters, and less demanding on the
resettlement of ethnic Germans.
In East Berlin, where his hosts strained to
get a huge turnout, Brezhnev stressed the gains
that East Germany has made on the international
scene, as if to remind his listeners that their past
concessions were worthwhile. Brezhnev had an
implicit warning, aimed possibly at both Ger-
manies. He observed, "If we put our signature to
a treaty, it means we are determined to imple-
ment the letter and spirit strictly and fully.... We
expect the same approach from our treaty part-
ners. "r
14 fthe East Germans, like the Poles, were well
aware that Brezhnev's visit was mainly window
dressing. Despite the kind words and pledges from
Moscow, Pankow no doubt fears that closer So-
viet relations with West Germany will lead in the
end to new pressures to speed up the inter-
German negotiations.?
(Meanwhile, the West Germans and Soviets
were briskly trying to ensure that Brezhnev's visit
will be marked by specific accomplishments. Bi-
lateral agreements on cultural exchanges, eco-
nomic cooperation, and civil aviation were ini-
tialed in Moscow this week after compromises
were reached on their Berlin clauses. Brezhnev
granted a two-hour interview to Stern Sunday, his
first formal meeting with reporters from a non-
Communist Western publication. While the bulk
of the media treatment on both sides has been
optimistic, the West German press has been
aroused by Soviet tactics at the USSR's recent
trade fair in West Berlin. The Soviets used a
variety of petty methods to strengthen their basic
contention that West Berlin is a separate political
entity. It thus appears inevitable that despite
Brezhnev's desire to concentrate on the larger
political and economic picture, the status of the
West German Government's ties with West Berlin
will come up at his meeting with Brandt. I
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AN EARLY LOOK AT THE GRAIN CROP
P ra c tic KCE5
Favorable weather for planting and a massive
sowing campaign, backed by a special decree
authorizing the transfer of men, materials, and
machinery from other sectors of the economy to
agriculture, have improved the outlook for the
Soviet Union's grain harvest this year.
It was very dry in the USSR's winter grain
belt last year, and fall sowing fell 20 percent short
of the plan. Thus, despite only a normal winter-
kill, the surviving grain area is somewhat less than
the 23.5 million hectares that made it through
last year's very heavy winterkill and far less than
the average of 31 million hectares harvested
annually in the 1966-70 period.
In response to the expected shortfall in the
winter grain harvest, a record-breaking spring
sowing campaign is being undertaken, especially
in the Russian Republic. Aided by an early spring,
the enormous amount of field work required in
Area Sown to Spring Grain
(million hectares)
1970-71
Actual
1972 Actual
1973 Plan
USSR
88
99
1041/2
RSFSR
54
61
68'/2
Kazakhstan
21
22
23
Ukraine
8
11
7
this effort has so far gone smoothly. By 7 May 53
million hectares had been sown to spring grains,
compared with 47 million sown at this time a
year ago. If the Soviets are able to keep up the
pace, the grand total for the year could exceed
125 million hectares-some 4 million above the
average sown to grain for the last five years. The
effort to increase the area sown to grain, however,
is likely to exact a penalty in terms of lower
Major Grain Growing Regions in the U.S.S.R.
Bertic
2%_
Belorussia
2%
Ukraine
20%
L.1 Northwest
Central
5%
North\
Caucasus
10%
Volga-
Vyatka
3 %/
Volga
14%
Caspian
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Ural
9%
West Siberia
8%
Kazakhstan
12%
"7u Percentages show region's share of grain production 1966-70.
,. --- .,1,4 +^ o1?/ of total oroductlon.
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Grain Production in the USSR
(Million metric tons)
Official Claims of
Gross Production
Estimate of
Net Production b/
Average, 1961-65
1:30
106
Average, 1966-69
163
131
1970
187
150
1971
181
148
1972
168
134
1973: Plan
197
160
Preliminary
forecast
190
154
.gj Including pulses.
Jj Estimate of usable grain. Net usable grain is estimated as the
officially claimed gross output minus excess moisture, unripe and
damaged kernels, weed seeds and other extraneous materials, post-
harvest losses incurred in loading and unloading grain between the
grain harvesting combine and storage facilities, and suspected biases
in the official reporting of grain production.
average yields, since some of the area added will
be of marginal worth.
Despite this effort, the USSR still may not
be able to cover domestic requirements of bread
grains (wheat and rye). The Soviet strategy in
response to an acreage shortfall in fall-sown bread
grains is to plant more feed grains (barley and
oats), which promise higher yields than spring
wheat. The feed grains will be used in Brezhnev's
livestock program.
Taking into account the soil moisture and
the area, we estimate that the winter grain crop
will be about 37 million tons of usable grain-
about 8 million tons more than the poor crop last
year but still more than 12 million tons below the
average for 1970-71. It is too early to project
spring grain yields at other than their long-term
trend values, but these would give a spring grain
harvest of about 117 million tons-12 million
tons above last year and 17 million tons above the
average for 1970-71. Taken together this would
produce a record combined harvest of 154 million
tons of usable grain. At this stage in the develop-
ment of the 1973 crop, there is still a wide range
of uncertainty around such a projection.
Even if the Soviets were able to bring in a
bumper harvest, Moscow would still need to im-
port large amounts of grain to meet domestic and
export requirements in the 1974 crop year. So far
in 1973 the Soviets have contracted for or are
rumored to have purchased about 9 million tons,
much of which is elivery by this
fall.
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Middle East
I IThe heavy fighting that broke out on 2 May
between the Lebanese Army and the fedayeen
tapered off this week, and a cease-fire appears to
have taken hold. The question now is the extent
of the controls that will be put upon the feda-
yeen, and talks on this nagging problem are get-
ting under way)
15- At present, President Franjiyah is trying to
enlist broad support for his tough bargaining
`7
stance with the guerrillas in the negotiations that
began on 15 May. At a minimum, he wants all but
light weapons removed from Palestinian refugee
camps, he wants army access to the camps for
inspection and control, and he wants fedayeen
movement outside the camps to be closely
regulated.]
I.S IFranjiyah's desire to curb the Palestinians
has the support of the Christian community and
the army. An important segment of the Muslim
community is sympathetic to the Palestinians,
however, and Franjiyah has not had much luck in
bringing Muslim political and religious leaders
around to his point of view. If the pressure on the
fedayeen increases, the confessional split in
Lebanon could worsen and lead to civil strife.)
1;-) ,In view of various pressures on him, Fran-
,- jiyah will probably be forced to accept fewer
7 restrictions than he would like. The important
business community is eager for a resumption of
normal commercial activity. The army performed
effectively against the fedayeen, but it wants to
avoid an all-out confrontation. The 14,000-man
army is not adequate to sustain a prolonged,
country-wide campaign which would be necessary
to crush the estimated 6,000 guerrillas supple-
mented by 10,000 lightly armed militia from the
refugee camps.]
I'S ~he fedayeen are on the defensive. They are
aware that they cannot regain the considerable
freedom of action which they had before the
fighting. They will probably work toward a for-
mula which allows them some freedom of move-
ment in the countryside and leaves them in con-
trol of the refugee camps. In any case, their loss
of the Jordan base in 1970 severely narrowed
their operating options against Israel, and they are
now intent on preserving a measure of operational
capability in Lebanon. If Franjiyah can impose
more rigorous controls on them, they may be
forced to rely even more on foreign terrorism.]
is Other Arab states, particularly Egypt, played
a useful role in arranging the cease-fire and dis-
suading Syria from open interference. The Arab
states are likely to argue against the imposition of
tighter controls. Syria has permitted a modest
number of fedayeen to infiltrate into Lebanon,
but might open the gates if a harsh settlement
were imposed. The Syrians, fearing Israeli retalia-
tion, would even in this case probably stop short
of sending in regular troops.
Left to Right: Mediation Meeting in Lebanon
Egyptian Envoy Al Khuli, Saiqah Leader Muhsin, Yasir Arafat, Socialist Leader Jumblatt, Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam
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INDOCHI NA
The Control Commission
Canada has promised an announcement on
whether it will remain on the International Com-
mission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam
by the end of the month. It could come sooner.
The arguments are running heavily for a pullout,
and, barring a drastic change in the current point
of view, Ottawa will decide to withdraw its con-
tingent by the end of June.'
,'From the outset, Canadians of all political
colorations have been uneasy about the Canadian
role in Vietnam. When the minority Trudeau gov-
ernment agreed on 27 March to remain on the
commission, it did so chiefly in response to pres-
sure from Washington. Since then, parliamentary,
press, and public opposition to Canadian involve-
ment has grown considerably.'
- " The public considers the commission in-
effective and fears for the safety of the Canadian
members. In addition, there is concern over the
level of military activity in Indochina, including
US bombing. `Even if the commission were op-
erating efficiently, Ottawa would probably stick
to its belief that the commission is an unnecessary
adjunct to the Paris agreement. Canadians doubt
that the commission is contributing to a lasting
peace in Vietnami
The press has begun to suggest that the
Watergate affair will have an effect on the Cana-
dian decision and that a pullout now would not
unduly harm bilateral relations with the US. One
influential columnist who may be reflecting of-
ficial thinking contends that the Watergate dis-
closures have struck a severe blow to the adminis-
tration's influence on Congress. He reasons that,
as a result, the administration's trade legislation
will fall victim to a protectionist Congress, leaving
President Nixon little leeway in his dealings with
Ottawa on the economic matters so important to
the Canadians. With the administration thus af-
fected, Ottawa no longer has any reason to be
apprehensive about the consequences of with-
drawal because the Congress would have already
set a harsh tone for future Canadian-US economic
relations. J
THE VIEW FROM JAKARTA
1,With Canadian withdrawal from the com-
mission an increasing possibility, Indonesia's will-
ingness to stay on is of growing importance.
Jakarta shares much of Ottawa's concern over the
performance and effectiveness of the commission,
but the Indonesians are reluctant to end their
participation. Indonesia views its role on the com-
mission as serving several important foreign policy
interests that, for the time being at least, out-
weigh the frustrations and costs of membership.
7a; `,A number of factors will have a bearing on
Ottawa's decision. A positive Communist re-
sponse to Washington's efforts to secure adher-
ence to the Paris accord would be very important.
Less obstructionism from the Hungarian and
Polish members of the commission would go a
long way toward placating domestic critics. The
fast-approaching rainy season in Indochina, which
should contribute to a slower military tempo in
Vietnam, will help.
Beyond its oft-stated desire to help ensure
peace and stability in South Vietnam, Jakarta sees
its membership as an important step toward es-
tablishing Indonesia's credentials as the future
leader of Southeast Asia. The Indonesians see
their role as that of spokesman for regional inter-
ests in an otherwise non-Asian body.
The role of a disinterested regional spokes-
man has proved a frustrating one for the Indone-
sians. During his tenure as commission chairman,
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the Indonesian represenl:ative acted in typical
Javanese fashion-stressing areas of agreement
while postponing discussion on divisive issues.
The Indonesians believe that their efforts to serve
as an unbiased mediator were constantly misinter-
preted by both the Canadians and the Communist
delegations. The Indonesians strongly object to
being lumped with the Canadians as the "West-
ern" or pro-US faction on the commission. The
Indonesian members have also become resentful
of what they consider the tendency of the Cana-
dians to treat them as "younger brothers" with-
out the right to an independent view.
Still, Jakarta is unlikely to pull out. Barring
a total collapse of the supervisory effort in South
Vietnam-which might occur if Canada is not
replaced or if there is a major breakdown in the
Vietnam cease-fire-Jakarta's own commitment to
the commission will probably endure.)
Opposition Wins A Round
[The President's supporters in the Lower
House last week tried to restore provisions in the
Senate election bill that give the President's
F-Democracy Party a big edge in August elections.
The Thieu backers failed to muster the necessary
two-thirds vote to override Senate amendments
eliminating the party's special privileges. The Pres-
ident's only recourse now is to make amendments
of his own which he must do before the end of
next week.
)Some legislators expect Thieu to go back to
the original version of the bill. They think he will
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get his way since the Assembly has rarely rejected
presidential amendments. If so, it seems likely
that only the Democracy Party will be able to run
senatorial candidates)
(Some opposition figures are also becoming
more outspoken about the government's position
in the peace talks. A 30-member anti-government
bloc in the Lower House issued a statement last
week. indicating that they preferred some,/ pro-
visions of thelatest Viet Cong proposal to Saigon's
plan. The statement also disputed recent govern-
ment assertions that there is no "third segment"
in South Vietnam. The anti-government bloc
represents a small minority in the 159-member
Lower House, but it does include members of the
An Quang Buddhists and supporters of Big Minhj
fter lengthy bargaining and bickering, the
J A
P
ruling High Political Council has finally formed a
new government. Late last week, the impasse over
the selection of a prime minister was broken
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when council member In Tam was tapped for the The Military Situation
post. The council subsequently approved his slate
of cabinet appointees, and on 16 May the cabinet rKhmer Communist military activity was at
was officially installed generally reduced levels for the second week in a
row, suggesting that the Communists may be rest-
ing and refitting after several months of fighting.
3/ /Thirteen of the ministers are holdovers from The Communists kept up their pressure in the
the previous cabinet; ten are newcomers, but Phnom Penh area, however, with a series of at-
f
most o
them have had some type of ministerial tacks on government positions south of
experience. The able Long Boret remains as for-
eign minister, and Major General U Say, currently
ambassador to Laos, has been named minister of
PRIME MINISTER IN TAM HAS DE-
CLARED THAT THE PRIMARY TASK OF
THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS TO RE-
VITALIZE AND REFORM THE ARMY.
defense. About half the cabinet positions went to
members of Lon Nol's Socio-Republican Party,
the remainder were divided) up by the republican
and democratic parties and political independ-
ents.J
t JPrime Minister In Tam has declared that the
primary task of the new government is to revi-
talize and reform the army. Much of the respon-
sibility for that enterprise apparently will fall to a
commander in chief of the armed forces. The
commander in chief will be outranked militarily
only by Lon Nol, who will retain his title of
"supreme commander." On the problem of
ending the war, In Tam reiterated Cambodia's
demand that all foreign troops be withdrawn and
ruled out any negotiations directly involving
Sihanouk. The new prime minister, however, re-
portedly hopes to set up contacts with Com-
munist leaders in various iregions of Cambodia,
apparently to induce them to stop fighting. He
may also try to enlist the services of Son Sann-
who served as a prime minister in the Sihanouk
era-to woo some of Sihanouk's camp followers
in Paris.I
ital along Route 3.
ciearing operations a ong sections of Routes 1 and
5 registered little or no progress.
On the government side,
Cambodian Troops
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KOREA: LIMITED TALKS(( ll
Jrhe unification talks between Seoul and
Pyongyang are entering their second year with
little progress to show. The opening of a dialogue
between the two adversaries has been important,
if only because it gives each a more realistic
appreciation of its limited ability to influence the
other's policy and political processes. The dia-
logue has also contributed significantly to the
general reduction of tension on the peninsula.
The talks have probably been more advanta-
geous to Pyongyang, boosting North Korea's legit-
imacy and moving it into the international diplo-
matic arena. More than a dozen countries have
recognized North Korea since the talks began, and
Pyongyang now has a chance to secure observer
status in the UN this year or certainly in 1974.
Pyongyang is working to exploit its im-
proved status to develop additional international
backing for a mutual reduction of forces in Korea
and the withdrawal of all US troops. Although
the North Koreans have little hope at present of
forcing a US withdrawal, they may believe they
can complicate US - South Korean relations over
the troop issue; a major propaganda campaign is
being directed toward this end.
Pyongyang's objective is to weaken the mili-
tary and political underpinnings of the South
Korean Government, but this does not mean that
the North Koreans plan renewed military aggres-
sion against the South. There are indications that
Pyongyang believes a reduction in Seoul's armed
strength would allow the North to reduce its own
military spending and devote more of its re-
sources to the development of heavy industry.
For its part, South Korea has derived benefit
from the talks, but at the expense of its former
position as the sole representative of Korea in the
free world. Seoul's goal was to develop a relation-
ship with Pyongyang that would preclude a North
Korean attack. The South was motivated, at least
initially, by uncertainty over what the Nixon doc-
trine meant for US forces in Korea.
There was also a domestic factor. President
Pak Chong-hui used the talks to justify his re-
shaping of South Korean life along more authori-
tarian lines. He told the people that it would be
necessary to tighten national discipline in prepara-
tion for political contacts with the Communist
North. These domestic objectives are largely
accomplished; he is more confident about the
presence of US forces and thus less fearful of new
North Korean military action. His interest in the
talks has therefore diminished.
Despite their differences, both Seoul and
Pyongyang recognize that the big powers want
detente on the peninsula and are capable of ap-
plying military and economic constraints to pre-
vent backsliding. For this reason alone the talks
are likely to continue, though the pace may be
slowed. They may yet produce some lowering of
barriers to non-political contacts and cooperation,
but lar achievements are unlikely in the near
future.
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CHINA: ECONOMIC PROBEMS
(:51)
/China's task this year is to restore momen-
tum to an economy that has been plagued by
declining growth rates since the Fourth Five Year
Plan was launched in 1971. Although weather has
been favorable thus far this year, lagging agricul-
tural production is still at the forefront of China's
economic problems. In the face of an inadequate
harvest last year, China has contracted this year
for imports of grain, cotton, and vegetable oil,
worth a record $900 million.
Increasing the volume of farm imports is a
short-term palliative. China's leaders apparently
have concluded that low-grade fertilizer and other
semi-modern products of small rural factories
cannot raise agricultural production fast enough
to meet China's growing needs. In recent months,
Peking has been curtailing the construction of
these small ventures and has signed contracts
worth $300 million with western firms for four
huge chemical fertilizer plants and four man-made
fiber facilities.
Industrial production appears to be in-
creasing moderately. Peking claims that produc-
tion of mining equipment, agricultural machinery,
and light industrial products made from non-
agricultural raw materials increased in the first
quarter of the year. Peking has not released any
claims for nationwide output of major industrial
commodities like steel, coal, petroleum, or elec-
tric power. Official media have carried only a
handful of first-quarter claims for provinces and
major cities.
Although the expansion of basic industries
seems to have a lower priority than the expansion
of agriculture, Peking is also looking to imports
for industrial growth. Firms in West Germany and
CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7
Japan are competing to sell China a $300-million
steel complex, which would add 3 to 4 million
tons of finished steel to China's current annual
output of about 17 million tons. In the electric
power field, the Chinese have been negotiating
with several countries for conventional and nu-
clear generating equipment that might be worth
as much as $500 million. Peking also is seeking to
improve its transportation and communications
systems. Most of the recently purchased industrial
facilities, however, will not become operational
until the late 1970s and thus will not accelerate
economic growth during the remainder of the
current five-year plan.
JAPAN: A SMALL OPENING
[The foreign investment liberalization pro-
gram, which became effective on 1 May, is the
broadest yet, but it is unlikely to generate large
amounts of investment from abroad. Although
foreign investment will increase significantly in
some industries where 100-percent foreign owner-
ship is being permitted for the first time, invest-
ment will be restricted in many firms that would
be most attractive to the potential investor. These
include the firms dealing in computers, food
processing, and large retail sales operations. 1
3`? }The liberalization program increases from
228 to about 800 the number of industrial
branches where 100-percent foreign ownership of
new firms is permitted. Most of the 22 industries
remaining under restriction are scheduled for
liberalization within the next three years?
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Foreigners also are being permitted for the first
r even to
t
, o
time to own more than 25 percen
buy out completely, existing Japanese firms. Such
actions, however, will require the approval of the
Japanese firm, and obtaining such approval could
be a complex and difficult matter(
Vin' )Tokyo's attitude and interpretation of the
new regulations will determine the level of foreign
r investment the new regulations will attract. In the
past, the Japanese Government has used tactics
such as delays in processing applications, exces-
sive requirements for reports, and guidelines on
production and sales set by Japanese industry
associations. Foreign firms ignoring such guide-
lines have in many cases been unable to use the
most efficient marketing channels or to obtain
credit locally. Such market sharing arrangements
are technically illegal, but the government has
chosen to ignore the law and allow industry as-
sociations to operate in such a manner.?
31y l lthough the industries scheduled for grad-
ual liberalization over the next few years hold
} attractive possibilities for investment, these indus-
tries already are girding to resist foreign encroach-
ment. The Japanese computer manufacturing
industry, for example, is-with the government's
blessing-working out plans to standardize the
production of peripheral equipment and the
development of software. Other industries are
likely to take similar actions o e for
new foreign investment.
AUSTRALIA: LABOR'S HOLD
43- 'After only six months in office, Prime Min-
ister Whitlam's government is considering new
national elections in the hopes of putting Labor
in a commanding political position for years to
come. A developing parliamentary stalemate over
trade union legislation could provide the opening.
The government has introduced bills that will
reduce union liability in strike actions and de-
emphasize arbitration in favor of collective bar-
gaining. The opposition Liberals see these bills as
confirmation of their fears that the Labor govern-
ment will cater excessively to union interests. The
government's proposals have passed the Labor-
controlled House of Representatives, but appear
headed for almost certain defeat or unacceptable
amendment in the opposition-controlled Senate.)
141 IPrime Minister Whitlam looks on these bills
as a test of his ambitious domestic legislative
program and has implied that he will dissolve
both houses and call elections if the bills are
blocked. Under Australian law, legislation must
fail on two separate occasions before Parliament
can be dissolved in this manner. This is a time-
consuming process so Whitlam will probably not
be making a final decision until late this year or
possibly early 1974.1
u;Z, (The opportunities new elections offer the
Labor government make the gamble attractive.
Although a recent Gallup Poll showed a slight
slippage in the government's public following, it
did not indicate a corresponding jump in the
standing of the divided and colorless opposition.
Labor has a majority of nine in the House that it
is unlikely to lose in an election in the near term.
In the Senate the government has 26 seats, the
opposition coalition 31, and independents 3.
Labor would need only a moderate increase in its
vote to gain control of the Senate. If that were
achieved, Whitlam's domestic program would be
ensured. The government would also be in posi-
tion to reapportion electoral constituencies and
amend other procedures which now favor the
opposition. These steps would dramatically
change the Australian political landscape.;
Whitlam's decision will be influenced by the
outcome of the Victoria State elections on 19
May. The national elections last December pro-
duced a 6.2-percent swing to Labor in Victoria.
Although Labor is unlikely to pick up enough
seats to form the next state government, many
observers believe that the trend toward Labor in
Victoria will continue and that the party will cut
deeply into the Liberal majority. If this proves to
be the case, Prime Minister Whitlam will be
encouraged move for national elections later
this ear.
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' 5 ~ few weeks after Garret Fitzgerald took
25X1 over Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs
SU
First he summoned all 19 Irish ambassadors
and the senior officials in the department to a
four-day policy conference. Such a meeting was a
y~ novelty in Dublin, and it must have been a taxing
experience for the ambassadors. Prime Minister
4 Cosgrave, in his opening remarks to the diplo-
mats, stressed his desire to make an Irish contri-
bution, "necessarily small, but never negligible, to
peace and progress in the world." He told the
diplomats that their primary task was to promote
vital economic and trade relations with other
countries. Although he did not put it in so many
words, Cosgrave's long-term goal is a lessening ofS
Ireland's economic ties with Britain.(
J )Fitzgerald followed up the conference with a
peech on 9 May outlining the foreign policy of
the new coalition government. He reiterated the
government's moderate approach to the unifica-
tion of Ireland, took note of the "openness" of
British views on the problem of a divided Ireland,
and reaffirmed support for London's white paper
on Ulster's future
H (> )Fitzgerald emphasized Dublin's new role as a
member of the EC. He believes that the way for
Ireland to get maximum economic benefits from
its membership is to put great stress on maintain-
ing the common agricultural policy. Fitzgerald
acknowledged Ireland's continuing need for
large-scale_US investments, but he served notice
that Dublin would oppose any efforts to modify
the common agricultural policy in a way that
would undermine its value to Irish farmers. Fitz-
gerald also wants the EC to adopt a strong re-
gional development program-of which Ireland
would be a prime beneficiary.
tf )The new look in Dublin can be directly
traced to Fitzgerald, a dynamic and innovative
foreign minister. His energy is likely to make him
the most visible man in the Cosgrave govern-
ment-a situation that at times will create friction
between him and the more conservative prime
minister. Fitzgerald's political views appear to fol-
low the main trends of European social democ-
racy. This makes him somewhat of a radical in
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EUROPE: FORCE REDUCTION TALKS
>.~ [After 100 days of informal negotiations, the
participants in the preliminary talks on force
reductions in Europe have gotten around the
knotty problem of Hungary, the issue that oc-
cupied the diplomats almost since they assembled
in Vienna on 31 January. That country has been
placed, at least temporarily, in the "observer"
category just as the Soviets desired. NATO retains
the right to reopen the question during the actual
negotiations, but a precedent has been established
that will be difficult to overcome:?
. \The delegates resolved other procedural
matters with relative ease, although a number of
issues remain that will require informal talks be-
tween now and the anticipated starting date for
the substantive talks in October. One of the issues
still unsettled is the agenda for the later talks.']
'1 , The plenary sessions this week gave the del-
egates an opportunity to comment generally on
force reduction. Representatives of the Warsaw
Pact states praised detente generally and charac-
terized the force reduction talks-for which they
took credit-as an important contribution to the
further relaxation of tension. The speakers gave
nothing away on the future pact position on
substantive aspects, though they did stress that
Participants in Force Reduction Talks
"Full" or "Direct"
Participants
Belgium
Canada
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
West Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland
USSR
UK
US
"Special" Participants
(observers)
Bulgaria
Denmark
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Norway
Romania
Turkey
reductions should not endanger any country's se-
curity. The pact speakers also left open the possi-
bility of inviting additional European countries-
meaning France and the neutrals-to take part in
the formal talks and raised the prospect of similar
talks later on other European regions)
5-). IThe hassle over Hungary led to some prob-
lems among the Western allies, and the strain on
allied unity may well reappear. The British, in
particular, felt that the West was too quick to give
in to the Soviets.?
liZ The preliminary talks could conclude this
month. The Soviets, however, will have no trou-
ble finding ways to drag them out if they so
desire. In this regard, there is at least an implicit
connection between the force reduction talks and
a Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. The Soviets are not likely to agree to set
a date for force reduction talk until one has been
set for a security conference.
YUGOSLAVIA: AN OLD SOLDIER
571Y )The ravages of time, fatigue, and possibly ill
health seem to be catching up with Tito, and
party secretary Stane Dolanc is taking over some
of the functions of the aging leader.)
7 !After the conference, Dolanc announced
that Tito will no longer perform "unnecessary
protocol duties" because of his advanced age.
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Dolanc said that other leaders will help Tito so
that he can carry on as party chief and president
of the country for "as long as possible."?
This announcement will advance Dolanc's
claim as heir apparent even further. Dolanc
dominated the conference and gained some of the
nationwide attention he will need to establish
himself as the rightful successor. Four years ago,
Tito plucked Dolanc from an obscure post in
Slovenia and he has come a long way since. At 47,
his style closely resembles that of the younger
Tito. Like Tito, Dolanc is a straight-talking, no-
nonsense man of the people, totally dedicated to
preserving Yugoslavia's federal system.j
G, )His self-assured performance at the confer-
ence set the tone for future appearances. Dolanc
= k predictably gave unstinting support to Tito's drive
for tougher party discipline, but he also spoke of
the need for "creative Marxism," presumably to
reassure Yugoslavia's dispirited liberals that he
can be pragmatic. Dolanc focused on economic
problems and courted the workers by demanding
an end to the recent decline in their standard of
living. He did not say how this is to be done, but
urged party and government leaders to correct the
situation.(
`-i Y )As Tito had arranged in advance with the
republic party bosses, Dolanc was re-elected
unanimously as secretary of the Executive Bureau
at a presidium meeting after the conference. This
puts him in an ideal position to influence the
party congress due next spring and gives him a
chance to show whether he can deal with the
manifold problems facing Yugoslavia.
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,r,W J [_ L t % I
uropean money markets have come under
The weakening of the dollar in Europe
abruptly halted the Bank of Japan's heavy dollar
selling in the Tokyo market. Foreign exchange
banks and other private sources have replaced the
central bank as dollar sellers in the Tokyo market.
Continued strong demand for dollars to finance
imports and foreign investment has resulted in the
dollar losing only moderately against the yen.
their first severe speculative pressures since the
joint float began on 19 March. The dollar was
under strong attack for the first time in more
than two months, and although it firmed on
16-17 May it remains substantially below its early
May levels. The Bank of England is the only
European central bank reported to have provided
dollar support. If the run on the dollar were to
resume, the European participants in the joint
float may well attempt, through limited interven-
tion, to prevent too rapid an appreciation of their
currencies against the dollar in order to minimize
the impact on their foreign trade.
Many traders attribute the dollar's problems
primarily to the Watergate issue, but Watergate
has only added to an already pervasive uncer-
tainty about the dollar in the wake of two deval-
uations. The New York Stock Exchange's poor
performance, worries about the US balance of
payments, and inflationary pressures in the US
are other contributing factors.
The free market price of gold soared to a
record last week. The price on the London
market, which had stabilized at about $90 an
ounce between late March and early May, reached
$112 on 15 May before dropping back somewhat.
The attack on the dollar clearly contributed to
the rise in the price of gold. Tight exchange
controls on the continent, which have made it
more difficult and expensive for money managers
to shift funds among currencies have added to the
attraction of gold. Other factors are: reduced
South African sales, reflecting reduced output;
rumors that President Nixon will discuss new gold
price arrangements with Soviet party chief Brezh-
Middle East.
London Gold Price
1973
January February March
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SOUTH ASIA: INCHING BACKWARD
)April saw some slight progress toward a
South Asia settlement, but the movement has
been in the opposite direction this month
)India and Bangladesh offered Pakistan a
package deal in April; it called for the return of
90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (except 195 to
be tried for war crimes), the release of about
150,000 Bengalees from Pakistan, and the trans-
fer to Pakistan of some 260,000 Biharis from
Bangladesh. Islamabad rejected the offer, but did
suggest discussions with India on mutual prob-
lems..;
)On 5 May, several hundred senior Bengalee
civil servants resident in Pakistan were rounded
up by the authorities. The move-ostensibly in
preparation for their repatriation-was designed
to convey two messages from Islamabad to
Dacca: that Pakistan had senior Bengalees it could
try for treason if Bangladesh went through with
the war crimes trials, and that the delay in send-
ing the prisoners-of-war home was worsening the
situation of the Bengalees in Pakistan~1Reaction in
both India and Bangladesh was adverse, and it
appears to have made concessions by New Delhi
and Dacca less likely-1
W ilndia rejected on 8 May Pakistan's offer to
talk. Two days later, Islamabad reiterated its
rejection of the India-Bangladesh package and
announced it was taking its case to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to prevent India from
transferring the prisoners to Bangladesh for war
crimes trials.!
1Despite the May events, both India and
Pakistan want a settlement. President Bhutto is
expected to make a formal reply to the Indian
message of 8 May, and in so doing he could make
further proposals. New Delhi still appears anxious
to settle its differences with Pakistan, but remains
unwilling to act without Dacca's concurrence.
The Indians have not yet been able to shake
Dacca's insistence that Pakistan accept the Biharis
and that r crimes trials be held.
and PL-480 agricultural sales to India that were
repayable in rupees, rather than hard currency.
Another $5 billion in rupees will be added over
the next 35 to 40 years as outstanding principal
and interest on other loans by the US to the
Indian Government become due. 7
position of the large sum in rupees held by the US
in India. Some $900 million in rupees have piled
up over the past 20 years as a result of US loans
INDIA: A PROBLEM OF MONEY
- Negotiations are slated to begin on the dis-
{ New Delhi became quite concerned with the
US balance since PL-480 aid repayable in rupees
was all but halted. Until 1968, India enjoyed a
surplus from the arrangement. After 1968, how-
ever, US rupee expenditures from the fund
exceeded India's local earnings from sales of
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PL-480 commodities and New Delhi became con-
cerned that the funds might give the US influence
over India's economic policies. The concern is
exaggerated since aid agreements stipulate that
most uses of these funds by the US must be
approved by the Indian Government.f
US-owned rupees have been spent in India
for a variety of purposes. Some $450 million have
been used to finance the expenses of US govern-
ment agencies in the country; almost $2 billion
went into development loans to India; $150 mil-
lion were made available as loans for US business-
men; and $75 million bought Indian goods as aid
for Nepal until New Delhi halted the practice last
year./
New Delhi most likely will try to write off as
'muc as possible of tha rijr p halanrn and d k+
will probably allow the continued use of rupees
to operate the US Embassy during this period.
New Delhi may agree to use the rupees to help
finance the country's development budget. Pro-
tracted negotiations may be necessary before an
agreement can be reached. Future use of US
rupees in any event will continue to
restricted.
BANGLADESH: FOOD SHORTAGESS~ ASE
(Deliveries of food grain to Ban desh from
9
abroad since January have filled more than half
the projected food deficit for 1973 of 2.7 million
tons. The spring rice harvest now under way is
expected to yield a record 2.3 million tons. This
crop accounts for about 20 percent of annual rice
production. Food graiins have been distributed
more efficiently this year than last because many
bridges have been repaired and more river vessels
are in service. As a result, no serious food short-
ages have been reported.
SECRET
Dacca has purchased 1.1 million tons of
food grains on the world market since January
and has received aid pledges for another 800,000
tons-mainly from Canada, the US, the European
Community, Japan, and Australia. Deliveries have
been running slightly ahead of domestic dis-
tribution, resulting in an increase in government
food grain stocks from 200,000 tons in January
to 500,000 in early May. This is approximately a
two-month supply. To fill the remaining gap of
800,000 tons for the last quarter of 1973, Dacca
has requested 400,000 tons of food grains from
the US under PL-480 and has approached other
donors for the rest. In addition, Dacca has asked
the US for another 450,000 tons of food grains
for the first half of next year./
Bazaar Day in Bangladesh
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(-?1-' 79)
The distribution of food is gradually being
taken over by the government. The UN mission is
beginning a phased withdrawal and plans to end
its operations by December. The government
maintains ration shops throughout the country;
these sell food grains at low fixed prices and
provide one third of the country's population
with a minimal 15 ounces per day. The remainder
of the population relies on its own crops or the
free market.
Despite the large food grain imports, free
market prices on rice have risen more than 60
percent since December and 80 percent since
April 1972. Normally, rice prices are stable during
the first half of the year and increase moderately
before the major rice harvest in December. Ben-
galees normally eat rice, but wheat has been the
primary import because rice on the world market
is higher priced and in shorter supply. Since al-
most all wheat is imported and sold in ration
shops, the price has remained stable and low. The
25X1 spring rice harvest probably will reduce rice prices
temporarily; but a sustained price decline is un-
likely-
t until next December.
BURUNDI: THE HUTUS AGAIN
`] ` J ) Hutu rebels in the remote southern border
region appear to be ready for another attempt to
overthrow the Tutsi government. The Hutus may
be better organized than last year when tribal
hatreds led to the deaths of hundreds of
thousands.
T$ JIn the early morning hours of 11 May a rebel
force of perhaps 100 men attacked a number of
villages and army installations in southwestern
Burundi near the border with Tanzania The reb-
els had some automatic weapons and 'their at-
tacks were well coordinated. The army's key gar-
rison at Nyanza Lac on Lake Tanganyika was
easily overrun.']
Two days later the Burundi radio announced
that government forces had crushed the dissi-
dentsJlalthough the US Embassy reported that the
74 rebels faded away before army reinforcements
Page 18
arrived. The Burundi Government is accusing
Rwanda and "trade union circles" in Belgium of
supporting the rebellion, but so far has refrained
from implicating Tanzania:j
\In a separate action on 12 May, about 1,000
Burundi refugees living in a camp in Rwanda
responded to reports of the attacks and launched
forays of their own into northern Burundi. Scat-
tered fighting was still taking place three days
later, but the south is the greater problem area for
the government.
)Southern Burundi long has been a target for
kutu dissidents intent on overthrowing the op-
pressive Tutsi regime, which represents only
about 15 percent of the 3.7 million population.
Just over a year ago in the same area, a rebel
attempt to spark a general Hutu uprising was
quickly put down by the government. The rebel-
lion led to a summer-long campaign of reprisals
against the Hutus in which perhaps as many as
200,000 were killed and another 100,000 forced
to flee into Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire.?
1 [This year, the Hutu rebels seem to be organ-
izing for an extended insurgency, and this would
severely test Burundi's weak 3,000-man
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THIRD WORLD: CUSTOMERS FOR AR1YS
(: ;)
)Arms shipments to Third World countries
have averaged about $3 billion annually in the
past three years. Since 1966, the US has ac-
counted for approximately half of the arms
reaching this market each year. In the previous
ten years the US accounted for more than 60
percent of the total. About one third of the
current flow comes from
Communist countries,
mainly the USSR; the re-
mainder comes from West-
ern Europe.
The demand for arms
has been generated by con-
tinuing regional animosities
and a felt need to improve
military inventories. The
main recipients have been
the countries directly in-
volved in the Arab-Israeli
conflict (Israel, Egypt, andl
Syria), India and Pakistan?
and the contenders for
dominance in the Persian
Gulf (Iran, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia).
Almost all types of
arms, except nuclear weap-
ons and strategic missiles,
have been provided. During
the last three years, more
complex weapons systems
have been supplied, includd-
ing advanced surface-to-air
missile systems, supersonic
jet fighters, guided-missile
patrol boats, radar-con-
trolled antiaircraft guns,
and sophisticated tanks.
This equipment not only
has a high initial cost, but
also requires extensive and
continuing technical sup-
port.
Agreements concluded
in the past few years be-
tween suppliers and Third World customers assure
a substantial growth in deliveries over the next
several years. The types of arms will become even
more sophisticated, raising questions about the
ability of the recipients (with the notable excep-
tion of Israel) maintain and use the equipment,
effectively.
Arms Exports to Third World Countries
Total trade
Million US $
34,140
Million US $
3,500 r-
-A
I I I l
o
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
The ten major arms recipients are Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey.
suthe
US data do not include some $15.7 billion of arms prodesigned under
pport
Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program, to
foreign forces engaged in combat in Indochina or some $700 million in
naval equipment made available under the Ship Load and Lease Program.
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CHANGES IN SUDAN
d ~ )President Numayri last week signed Sudan's
first "permanent constitution" which incorpo-
rates the terms of the peace accord reached last
year ending the 17-year-old southern rebellion. At
the same time, Numayri named a new cabinet,
released a number of political prisoners, and an-
nounced several reforms designed to improve gov-
ernmental efficiency. He is still struggling with
the problem of the Arab terrorists who killed
three diplomats in Khartoum last March-1
' I lThe cabinet has fewer faces but virtually no
r. new ones. Significantly, Arab sympathizers and
f leftists lost their last prominent spokesmen in the
shuffle. Several former army officers were ap-
pointed to key provincial posts with the rank of
deputy minister. Otherwise, the changes simply
increased the power of men already close to the
President.(
I jNumayri reportedly tried to inject some new
blood into the government; somewhat sur-
prisingly he was unable to do so. Although the
President is personally popular, many Sudanese
intellectuals and businessmen apparently remain
opposed to the authoritarian nature of his rule.?
~f Among the most important detainees re-
leasdd was former prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi,
head of the banned Umma party, and the Ansar
Muslim sect. Because of his large following, Sadiq
represents a potential source of serious opposition
to the regime. Numayri may have extracted some
quid pro quo from the Umma party learipr
return for his free
President Numayri
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CHILE: NO END IN SIGH
s the newly elected` congress prepares to
convene on 21 May, government and opposition
forces are hardening their positions. Internal divi-
sions still nag both camps, particularly the efforts
of extremists to promote violence.
The reduction of the opposition majority in
congressional elections in March has strengthened
Allende's resolve to override obstructions raised
by the congress, the judiciary, and the comptrol-
ler general to a broader implementation of his
program. A showdown seems imminent on the
expropriation of over 100 businesses, on wage
readjustments, and on the division of power
between the executive and congress. The predilec-
tion by some on both sides to postpone, side-step,
or accommodate is not in evidence at this time.
reinforce the officers' nearly obsessive fear of civil
war, a fear that is a major factor in the reluctance
of even the most adamant of Allende's military
opponents to move against him.
Moderates within the government are again
attempting to curb the ultra-leftists, whose taste
for violence has set off numerous recent disturb-
ances. Even a word of caution from visiting
Cuban Vice Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rod-
riguez did not deflect the revolutionaries. In their
latest outing, the ultra-leftists invaded the meet-
ing of the leftist Latin American Students' Organ-
ization in Santiago to protest their exclusion from
the administration-controlled gathering.
The Christian Democrats, although they
have not yet decided to join the conservative
National Party in an effort to impeach the entire PERU: MUNDANE CONCERNS
cabinet, have elected a new directorate that repre-
sents the least compromising wing of the party. `i fhe country has been shaken by labor unrest
The shift does not seem to have alienated the for much of the past month, and opposition
more leftist Christian Democrats, possibly be- .,i groups, emboldened by strikes, by President
cause outright opposition is proving politically Velasco's illness, and by the apparent absence of a
popular-and effective-even among workers who,/, strong hand at the helm, are taking advantage of
have in the past supported Allende. the situation?
The sudden widespread police raids on the
ultra-rightist Fatherland and Freedom group
brought it little sympathy, particularly since one
of its leaders was calling for civil war from safe-
haven in Buenos Aires. Indeed, the group's antics
provided convenient support for the government's
charges that the real aim of its opponents is civil
war.
The armed forces are still involved in many
day-to-day government activities. Allende's
opponents contend that officers in economic
posts, such as the chief of the national distribu-
tion secretariat, are being used to impose contro-
versial socialist policies. The imposition of states
of emergency in two provinces gave the military
greater powers to ensure public order, a primary
concern of senior officers. The government's
exaggerated accusations of opposition plotting
`'jf) JPart of the trouble stems from a policy that
gives the Labor and Interior ministries and
Sinamos, the "social mobilization" apparatus,
overlapping responsibilities. These entities have
been working at cross purposes, hampering the
effort to entice unions into a government-con-
trolled labor confederation where they can be
better controlled.!
J') [The current round of labor trouble began
earlier this year when militant miners' unions
broke away from a Communist-controlled central
labor organization. The Communists have been
struggling to salvage what is left of their favored
status with the government and have been under
heavy pressure from the regime
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made regular mine employees-was taken up by
extreme leftist groups that oppose both the gov-
ernment and the Communists, was added to a
number of local grievances, and was fanned into a
wider read strike in key areas of the volatile
south
illy - (Further issues were provided when the gov-
ernment promulgated an unpopular retirement
law and announced a nationalization of the fish-
meal industry that threatened to cost many
workers their jobs. When students and teachers
joined in to press their demands, the regime
found itself faced with the most serious manifes-
tation of discontent it has encountered in five and
one-half years in power.
`"Jib he government responded by announcing
that implementation of the retirement law will be
delayed and by compromising on other issues in
the south. These steps helped ease the strike situa-
tion this week, but it may turn out to have been
only a lull in the storm.(
U 2 JThe American Popular Revolutionary Alli-
ance, the military's archenemy which has been
semi-dormant since 1968, is stirring. The party is
attempting to organize a one-day nationwide gen-
eral strike to take place today. The party sees
many potential gains from such a venture, partic-
ularly a show of strength that it hopes might
Campora and Peron
secure it a role in the choice of Peru's next again after 18 years on the sidelines, Campora is
president taking a conciliatory line toward his
political
i 2-opponents and appears to be seeking a broad
-1{ JThe party may even believe that the moment "national accord." Even the anti-Peronists in the
of government weakness it has been waiting for is military seem prepared to accept the turnover of
approaching. The strikes may, however, have power to the Peronists on 25 May(
given Peru's military hierarchy a refresher course
in the need for armed forces unity that could help
resolve the continuing struggle over a successor to C,'%
25X1
have issued invitations to a wide variety of Latin
American personalities. In addition to Secretary
of State Rogers and the foreign ministers of many
W
estern Hemisphere nations, Cuban President
ARGENTINA: ALL SYSTEMS GO
Dorticos will attend and Chilean President
r1t tt Allende may come. Such other notables as former
/J fPreparations are under way for the inaugura-r t Colombian dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and
tion next week of president-elect Hector Cam- former Bolivian president Juan Jose Torres will
pora. As the Peronists prepare to take power also be there. Current Bolivian President Hugo
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Banzer, who ousted Torres, is also scheduled to
attend-1
With the countdown entering its final days,
Campora still has not indicated who will fill cabi-
net posts and other executive offices. He has
continued to sound as if he wants to include
representatives of the opposition Radical Party in
his government. His call on all "political and civil
forces" to join in a five-point program of "na-
tional reconstruction" can be interpreted as an
effort to soothe his opponents and attract the
Radicals who have demonstrated an interest in
joining the government. The first few months of
the new administration will be difficult as it seeks
to push through some of its more controversial
programs, such as amnesty for political prisoners,
and the broader the cooperation the better Cam-
pora's chances of preventing things from getting
out of hand-]
he armed forces in
~ particular are going to
take some lumps, but they now seem to have
given up whatever hope they once had of stop-
ping the process. Even the most obstinate uncom-
promising anti-Peronists in the military have seen
their support dwindle and have given up hope of
finding a pretext that would generate enouah
MEXICO: THE STUDENTS AGAIN
1' )Students in Puebla and Mexico City have
quieted down after a week of agitation, but they
have a unifying cause, the government demon-
strates little give, and further clashes could occur.i
The Puebla
rcaen was manifestation of dis-
content that has been simmering-and occasion-
ally surfacing-in Mexico's universities during the
past year or so. Tensions at Puebla University h,.
been running high since the assassination last year
of two leftist professors, apparently by a right-
(!'-wing terrorist group. The culprits have not yet
been caught. In addition to this issue, leftist agita-
tors have for some months been in conflict with
rightist authorities over university and local
questions.
P he situation in Puebla became explosive
when on 11 May student agitators and the con-
servative business community attempted to hold
simultaneous demonstrations. State officials inter-
vened to avert a confrontation. Business leaders,
angry that student "hoodlums" were able to force
the resignation of the rightist state governor,
appear to be following deliberately inflammatory
policies. Student and university groups, elated at
bringing down the governor, are now levying
demands on his successor?
.-. S lEcheverria has for the most part stood back
from the Puebla mess, confining himself to a
doubt sincere in wanting a "dialogue" with stu-
dents, but knows this is impossible without the
true democratization of the political system he
has promised them. J
`i? [He is convinced that leftist rabble-rousers
must be stopped lest they touch off more blood-
shed. Echererria wants no repetition of the vio-
lent student-government clashes of 1968 and
1971. He is known to shudder at the mere men-
tion of the word "halcones," government-trained
toughs used to disrupt student demonstrations in
1971. Yet these right-wing terrorist bands are still
active, either because Echeverria is not strong
enough to challenge those in the government and
the universities who control these groups or be-
cause he does not want to. The Puebla deaths
provided a ready-made cause for unified student
protest. Whether this will lead to a new cohesive-
ness and increase the possibility of large-scale
student-government clashes will depend in great
part on how Echeverria handles the situa-
tion.
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Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7