WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
NAVY review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
9 March 1973
No. 0360/73
Copy N2 42
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
rrent Intelligence
,
reports and analyzes si
nif-
g
des material coordinated with or prepared
aic Research, the Office of Strategic
of Science and Technology.
ring more comprehensive treatment and there-
CONTENTS (9 March 1973)
1
Good Omens in Paris
FAR EAST
2
Elections: Ireland; France; Argentina;
Chile
9
China: Peking's Siren Song
10
The Philippines: Crossing Swords
With Islam
11
The Germanies: Slowdown on Detente
11
Yugoslavia: Tito Looks Outward
12
UK: The Unions and the Budget
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
13
USSR: Mediterranean Exercise
14
Sudan: Sequel to Black Friday
15
India: Old Problems; Food; Credits
18
Morocco: The Lonely King
18
Turkey: Making of a President
19
Oman: Mainbrace Holds
WESTERN
HEMISHPERE
20
Greece: Continuing Student Problems
20
Nicaragua: Opposition Blues
21
Uruguay: Trouble with Congress
21
Guyana: Election Warm-Up
22
UN: Meeting in Panama
23
International Oil Developments
24
International Money
SPECIAL
REPORT (Published separately)
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summar
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
good omens
from Paris
frhe international conference on Vietnam came off last week with-
out a really serious hitch. There were a few polemical lapses on the
Communist side and a possibility that POW problems might disrupt the
proceedings, but with the US and North Vietnam doing most of the
substantive work away from the conference table, there was never much
real chance of extended controversy at the sessions themselves.
Although some delegations were nonplused that the conference
itself had so little to do, most of the participants were satisfied with the
outcome. The North Vietnamese were clearly pleased with the central
role they played, and the treatment of the final conference document in
their media indicates they think they have an arrangement they can live
with. In particular, Hanoi seems to see worthwhile benefits emerging
from its new relationship with the US.
Although Moscow and Peking refrained from an open airing of
differences, their competition for influence in Hanoi surfaced once or
twice. Foreign Minister Gromyko started the process in his opening
statement when he called on the conferees to recognize the Viet Cong as
a government. According to the press, he subsequently twitted his
Chinese counterpart, Chi Peng-fei, for failing to urge such recognition.
Chi responded after the signing of the final declaration by issuing a
statement describing the Viet Cong as the genuine representative of the
South Vietnamese people.
Moscow welcomed the results of the conference and generally
played down the significance of continuing cease-fire violations. In his
final remarks before leaving Paris, Gromyko emphasized that all sides
must strictly implement the cease-fire accords-a message that was under-
scored to the Vietnamese Communist ambassadors in Moscow when they
presented statements on cease-fire violations to Deputy Premier Mazurov
on 2 March.
The Chinese have also blessed the conference's results. A People's
Daily editorial on 3 March, echoing Chi Peng-fei's endorsement at the
closing session, declared, "The signing of the Paris agreement has put an
end to the war in Vietnam." The editorial restated Peking's promise
never to "hinder or violate" the agreement and again called for its strict
implementation. While the US was lumped with South Vietnam in a
phrase which called for an end to violations, Saigon alone was singled out
for "obstructions" to the agreement. The Chinese delegation in Paris
appeared well pleased with the role they played in the confer-
ence- 25X1
SIGNING THE PACT
? Gromyko
? Nguyen Duy Trinh, North Vietnam
? Nguyen Thi Binh, Viet Cong
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
The Irish Change Horses
I The Fine Gael coalition with Labor
squeaked out a narrow election victory on 28
February, ousting the Fianna Fail party which
had held power for all but six of the last 36 years.
The new Dail will meet on 14 March to install
Fianna Gael's Liam Cosgrave as prime minister.
Brendan Corish of the Labor Party will become
deputy prime minister; the full cabinet has not
yet been announced_i
The coalition won 73 seats in the parlia-
ment; Fianna Fail took 69, and two independents
will probably support the opposition on a number
of issues. Close as it was, the outcome was a signal
Page 2
victory for the coalition, which initially seemed
to have little chance to defeat Jack Lynch and his
Fianna Fail. The coalition seized the initiative and
put the government on the defensive on social
and economic issues. Despite a last-minute effort,
Lynch could not save the day.
The coalition profited from a system that
allowed voters to list candidates in order of their
preference and thus permitted some trading of
votes between the two parties. Moreover, the
presence of many hard-line republican candidates
drew votes away from the Fianna Fail ticket.
Finally, although the government had gerry-
mandered the election districts to favor its own
candidates in 1969, the population had shifted
enough by 1973 to cancel this advantage.
,The stability of the new government will
depend on several factors. The coalition has a
number of internal differences to iron out, partic-
ularly in the realm of economic policy. The
strong personalities in the top echelons of the
coalition could also create friction. Cosgrave him-
self has been a target for younger Fine Gael
members who regard him as too conservative.
These internal problems, however, are actually
fewer than those Lynch successfully faced during
his last years in office, and the coalition, tasting
power after a long stay in the wilderness, will be
strongly motivated to resolve its differences.,
Indeed, the key to government stability may
well, rest with the defeated Fianna Fail. The party
had long seemed to assume that it was entitled to
govern and is ill-prepared for its new role as the
loyal opposition.
SECRET
25X6
25X6
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
Certain coalition members have already out-
lined the new government's economic policy. A
temporary price freeze, a longer term national
wage agreement, a new long range economic plan,
and a reorganization of the tax structure are said
to be involved. The new government is hopeful of
selling an incomes policy to the unions by making
social reform and price controls an integral part
of the package.
A Close Thing in France
(Contrary to many press reports, the gov-
erning coalition did not meet a significant rebuff
in the first round of the French legislative elec-
tion last Sunday. In fact, the round was some-
thing of a setback for the left, which won less
than the opinion polls had predicted. The latest
projections show that Pompidou's coalition can
either win a slim majority on its own in the
second round or retain control by enlisting cen-
trist support.;
Although the coalition went into the race
trailing the leftists by 8 to 10 percentage points in
opinion polls, it in fact trailed by less than four.
It emerged with 38.4 percent of the total vote-
slightly better than its performance in 1967,
while the left alliance with 41.6, dropped two
percent from its 1967 level. Pompidou's candi-
dates won 50 Assembly seats outright in the first
round, the left alliance nine, and the extreme left
one. '
In French legislative election, the percentage
of votes in each district, rather than nationwide
totals, determines the composition of the
Page 3
Assembly. The government has drawn district
boundaries to allow its candidates to be elected
with fewer votes in more districts. Leftist voters,
largely concentrated in highly populated urban
areas, must expend large numbers of votes to
elect a single representative. In the 1967 elec-
tions, for example, both the opinion polls and the
actual voting showed the left leading by a margin
comparable to that shown in the polls last week,
but the government still ended up with 50 more
seats.
The past week has been filled with frantic
bargaining in which the parties agreed to with-
draw candidates in certain districts in return for
backing in others. The governing coalition and the
centrists agreed to withdraw in each other's favor
in races where rivalry between them could ensure
a leftist victory. In about 310 races, there will be
a straight fight between a leftist and a Gaullist or
centrist in the final round on 11 March.`
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
[Within the left alliance such bargaining was
complicated by the failure of the Socialists to
achieve the lead over the Communists predicted
in the polls. This strengthened Communist candi-
dates in their reluctance to withdraw in favor of
Socialists who ran behind but were actually more
likely to win in the second round. Communist
leaders, already wary of the dominant position
Socialist leader Francois Mitterrand has estab-
lished in the left alliance, have been concerned
that the Socialists could emerge from the election
as the major leftist party. The presence of a fair
number of Communist candidates on the second
ballot should in fact benefit the government. Polls
of the crucial uncommitted third of the electorate
have indicated that these voters would swing over-
whelmingly to government candidates opposing
Communists, but that they would split evenly
between a government candidate and a Socialist,'
First Round in Argentina
,f }Argentines will go to the polls 11 March
amidst heavy security measures for the first round
of the first national elections since 1965 and the
first presidential race since 1963. Some 200,000
troops have been mobilized in an effort to assure
orderly balloting,/
JPresident Lanusse is expected to announce
that the state of siege that has been in effect since
1970 will be lifted for 24 hours on election day.
The junta may decide against this action, how-
ever, in light ofJuan Peron's call for "massive and
violent protests," if the election turns out to be a
"trap." Peron's definition of a trap appears to be
any situation in which the Peronists do not wind
Page 4
Hector Campora is expected to lead in the
balloting Sunday. Both Ricardo Balbin, the Radi-
cal candidate, and the conservative Francisco
Manrique believe that Campora will fail to
capture the majority needed to avoid a runoff and
that he can be beaten in the second round due on
8 April. This reasoning is predicated on the belief
that the Argentine electorate is primarily divided
between Peronists and anti-Peronists and that
Campora will be unable to attract much addi-
tional support for the second round.!
This logic has been instrumental in con-
vincing the military to go through with the elec-
tion, despite its reluctance to risk the Peronists
returning to power. The logic probably will hold
up if Campora falls below 40 percent of the vote
in the first round. The Radicals, who are expected
to finish second, would then be able to put to-
gether an anti-Peronist coalition that would have
a good chance of carrying the April runoff/
)3J If Campora exceeds 40 percent in the first
rou d, however, Balbin's chance of overtaking
him in the second round would be slim. The
Peronists should be able to attract another 10
percent of the vote from left-of-center tickets
that did not qualify for round two. If Manrique
should upset Balbin and win the second runoff
slot, that, too, would play into the hands of the
Peronists. Many Radicals would switch to the
Peronists rather than vote for a conservative like
Manrique.
)A strong showing by Campora and by
Perdnist candidates for lesser offices would
severely test the military's undertaking to turn
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Mar 73
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
power over to an elected government. A Campora
majority in the first round or prospects for a
second round victory would put strong pressure
on the generals to take preventive action. If the
way seems open to the Peronists and if serious
violence erupts, the temptation to proscribe the
Peronists or to postpone the runoff may well be
overwhelming.;
Chile: Winning With a Minority
The results of last week's congressional elec-
tions were a psychological victory for President
Allende, and he is prepared to exploit it. The
opposition polled 55 percent of the valid votes,
but they had predicted a much larger majority
and they lost legislative seats. The opposition
majority in the 150-seat Chamber of Deputies was
whittled from 93 to 87 and in the 50-seat Senate
from 32 to 30.'
Allende has contended that he can create a
socialist system by constitutional means and with
public approval, and he seems certain to push
ahead. He has already proven adept at getting
around congress. Even the minimal drop in the
opposition majority will encourage him to greater
use of the presidential "additive veto" powers to
obtain legislation that Congress rejects. He is
likely to renew his calls for a unicameral legis-
lature and executive curbs on the judiciary.?
Allende is also likely to ask the armed forces
11 1 to prolong their active support of his government
by remaining in key administrative jobs, including
cabinet posts. If interior minister and army chief
General Prats decides to stay, even officers
squirming over their identification with an inept
Marxist government would probably follow suit,
seeing themselves as a much-needed moderating
influence.
Moderation will need all the advocates it can
get. `Socialist Party candidates did so well in the
election that this most radical element increased
its primacy in Allende's Popular Unity coalition.
The Communists almost matched their top show-
ing but will still have trouble convincing the
Socialists that the government must slow down its
Allende: The Psychological Vote
drive to socialism if it is to get the outside help
Chile's reeling economy so desperately needs. The
Communists feel the coalition must consolidate
its gains to become less vulnerable. Since the five
small coalition parties did very poorly, the two
Marxist parties-and their differences-now in
effect are the Popular Unity/
!The small opposition parties also fared
badly. The Christian Democrats, with around 30
percent of the vote and the National Party, with
about 20 percent, are as uncongenial as are the
Socialists and Communists. The Nationals' setting
of the unrealistic goal of winning two thirds of
congress in order to impeach Allende probably
damaged the opposition campaign before the line
was muted. The Christian Democrats had hoped
that many low-income Chileans would vote
against shortages and inflation rather than for
their generally improved economic situation
under Allende.;
i " The Popular Unity's additional vote prob-
Aey came primarily from the 40 percent of the
electorate that had not been eligible to vote in a
national election before. The Christian Democrats
will probably now take steps to increase their
appeal to low-income groups and may oppose the
administration less adamantly. This course would
lead to more differences with the Nationals,
whose political appeal, the Christian Democrats
probably calculate, has peaked in the present
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
The South Vietnamese Government is taking
additional steps to comply with the cease-fire
agreement and ease tensions with the Commu-
nists. It has agreed to open substantive talks with
the Viet Cong in France with a view to setting up
the Council of National Reconciliation and Con-
cord and discussing elections. A delegation
headed by Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Luu
Vien will leave Saigon for Paris early next week,
and the talks are to begin on 19 March. The
government has also agreed to release another
quarter of their list of Viet Cong prisoners, as
called for in the agreement, despite their belief
that the Communists are holding back on the
number of South Vietnamese they hold.;
;,President Thieu earlier this week instructed
his general staff to prepare new orders to all
military commanders to reduce the level of
fighting throughout the country, and generally to
stop attacking the Communists; He also issued
new orders to the national police to curb demon-
strations and harassing actions against the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong representatives to the
Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Finally,
the President ordered a study of the effect of a
demobilization of some 300,000 regular army
r- ''-`'4-troopsl He cautioned that such measures should
be ket in line with the demobilization and
withdrawal of Communist units and that the
army must maintain an adequate defensive ca-
pability.
Politicians Oppose Thieu's Tactics
As the Thieu government tries to broaden its
political base through the Democracy Party and a
new "popular front," one prominent Catholic
group chose this past week to maintain its inde-
pendence. The group formed the Freedom Party,
which became the first to apply for provisional
recognition under the presidential decree on polit-
ical parties. It has the backing of influential Cath-
olic bishops, who want to offer the people a
choice between the Communists and the Democ-
racy Party.`
The Freedom Party has an uphill struggle to
meet the stiff terms of the decree on parties. It
will need substantial non-Catholic support to
survive, since Catholics represent only about 10
percent of the country's population and the party
will have to win 20 percent of the vote in the
upcoming senate elections.;'
':i (Leaders of the Freedom Party apparently are
leaving the door open to join Thieu's popular
front at a later date. The Catholic leaders fully
agree with the front's anti-Communist objectives
but are afraid the front will become a hand-
maiden of the Democracy Party. Some Catholics
are considering cooperation with opposition fig-
ures like Big Minh.
I, cL ease-fire violations are occurring in several
areas, notably in the northern provinces, as both
sides continue their efforts to improve their mili-
tary posture. Most of the fighting consists of
Communist shellings of outlying government posi-
tions and occasional counterattacks against South
Vietnamese clearing efforts. re-
flect a Communist intention to ocus on the polit-
ical side of the struggle for the time being; they
will, at the same time, continue to rebuild and
refurbish their military forces. +
/Another opposition group has followed up
Big Minh's recent call for a "third force" role by
issuing a similar statement. A 29-member Lower
House bloc, consisting largely of An Quang Bud-
dhists and associates of Minh, claims that a major-
ity of the people has not followed either side in
the war and should play a key role in restoring
peace and rebuilding the nation. The statement
also contains one of the strongest public attacks
on Thieu's political policies in recent months.)
Laos: Marking Time Again
)Thanks to unusually energetic efforts two
weeks ago, government and Lao Communist
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
negotiators managed to conclude a peace agree-
ment before the Paris Conference on Vietnam
convened. The two sides now face another impor-
tant deadline-forming a new provisional govern-
ment by 23 March-but the joint commissions
charged with implementing the agreement thus
far have turned in a lethargic performance:}
t he commissions have met four times. Dis-
cussions at the sessions of the political commis-
sion have been marked more by cordiality than
by substance. The military commission, which is
supposed to work out the mechanics of the with-
drawal of foreign troops and the exchange of
prisoners, is bogged down over minor procedural
matters. As was the case in negotiations for the
peace agreement, the commissions are likely to
limp along until chief Communist negotiator
Phoumi Vongvichit returns from strategy
meetings in Sam Neua and Hanoi armed with the
necessary authority to make binding decisions)
7 \While the talks in Vientiane tick along, the
level of military incidents declines. Communist
and government units near Paksong on the
Bolovens Plateau traded the occasional shot
during the week, and in the north Vang Pao's
irregulars skirmished with North Vietnamese ele-
ments near the Plaine des Jarres. Elsewhere in the
country, field commanders reported little action.
As the fighting waned, the number of Lao T-28
bombing missions was reduced.)
Cambodia: Inflation and Unrest
International interest in Cambodia may be
focused on the military situation, but the urban
Khmer is far more concerned about the economic
problems engendered by the war. Rising prices are
having an immediate effect in Phnom Penh, where
inadequate incomes make it difficult for the
residents to cope with the high cost of food and
other necessities. Two organized groups in the
capital, teachers and students, are expressing open
dissatisfaction with higher prices on rice, gasoline,
and electricity.
1,The teachers' meeting with several cabinet
ministers was conducted in an unpromising at-
mosphere. Besides pressing their demands for
higher wages, the teachers complained about the
excessive salaries paid members of the national
assembly and the presidential staff. At least one
minister indicated his support for the teachers'
complaints, but the rest of his colleagues de-
nounced them. At the conclusion of the meeting,
government spokesman Brigadier General Lon
Non told the teachers that their problems would
be aired at the next cabinet meeting. He acknowl-
edged that official corruption was indeed wide-
spread, but did not indicate that anything would
be done to curb it.:J
S ) !Phnom Penh's university students, striking in
sympathy for their instructors, received no more
satisfaction from a meeting with government rep-
resentatives. At last report, student leaders were
planning a student congress for next week, pre-
sumably to put more pressure on the government.]
;4a IThe government probably will not back
down on the inflation issue since higher, more
realistic prices are an essential part of its eco-
nomic reform program. It may, however, grant
teachers a wage increase similar to that approved
last month for factory workers. If the regime does
stand fast, it is possible that the present frustra-
tion in Phnom Penh could eventually lead to
public disturbances in the capital on the order of
last September's rice riots. In any case, the situa-
tion does point to a paucity of popular support
for the Lon Nol administration./
+The Khmer insurgents stayed on the attack
on several fronts this week. Most of their military
effort was directed against widely separated gov-
ernment positions along the major road between25X1
Phnom Penh and the South Vietnam border.
Cambodian clearing operations along several sec-
tions of the highway made little headway.
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
CHINA: PEKING'S SIREN SONG
In the wake of the latest Sino-US commu-
nique, Peking has stepped up its campaign stress-
ing reunification of Taiwan with the mainland,"
Through such devices as extended broadcasts to
Taiwan, Peking gave wide publicity to a commem-
orative meeting on 28 February, the anniversary
of an uprising of native Taiwanese against the
Nationalists shortly after World War II. Peking
propaganda had ignored the event since 1965; the
last comparable celebration was in 1957.
Speeches at this meeting, including one by former
Nationalist general Fu Tso-i, who defected to the
Communists during the civil war, have been
widely publicized.;
The speeches, which were generally concilia-
tory in tone, stressed Peking's determination to
"liberate" Taiwan but made no reference to the
use of force. While the speakers called for "unity
prolonged process covering perhaps several
decades, and that present foreign investment on
the island would not be disturbed at least at first.
FAt the same time, Peking has actively at-
'temlSted to influence a broad range of political,
social, and economic groups on Taiwan to start
thinking in terms of unification. Mainland leaders
have encouraged Taiwanese living abroad and
others with ties to the island to visit China, where
officials have stressed the themes of recon-
ciliation, flexibility, and "leniency" for political
"mistakes." Pride in China's international and
domestic achievements is played up while con-
ditions on Taiwan are criticized. This may not be
the wisest course, since the criticism is often
unrealistic./
of action" by people on the mainland and on ;Peking obviously judged the time ripe to put
Taiwan, the main appeal for reunification was rthis 'campaign in higher gear. Despite Taipei's
clearly addressed to leaders of the Nationalist 2 tight controls on news from the mainland, the
government. General Fu called specifically for Communists may have succeeded in worrying the
direct negotiations, adding that informal contacts J Nationalist leadership; recently two university
might be a first step if the Nationalists are not 1)e. professors and several students were arrested for
ready for formal negotiations. The 'speakers "united front activities." j
c
I ; d h
t
t T
a m
ce
a
aipei could not count indefinitely
on US support and that neither Peking nor Wash-
ington would permit a "third party"-obviously
the USSR-to guarantee the island's separate
existence.
)Conscious of their relative diplomatic isola-
tion and suspicious of long-range US policy
toward their government, the Nationalists have
reacted cautiously to Peking overtures. Taipei has
deprecated the overtures, but has avoided a cat-
Since last autumn, Peking has engaged in a egorical no. Rather, a regime spokesman refused
largely private two-pronged effort to move the to comment on Peking's appeals, saying that he
Taiwan issue in the direction it desires. In talksi -; did not want to dignify them by a reply(In any
with Asian and European officials, Chou En-lai ' event, there is obviously more to come. The Com-
and other Chinese leaders have emphasized that munists have thus far not spelled out, either pri-
Peking does not contemplate the use of force to vately or publicly, their terms for reunifica-
regain the island, that reunification may be a tion. 25X1
SECRET
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Mar 73
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
The Philippines:
CROSSING SWORDS WITH ISLAM
SECRET
1The Muslim problem in the southern Philip- Although worried about Libyan involve-
pines has bedeviled governments in Manila since- rnent, Marcos is more concerned about Malaysia.
the Spanish first stepped ashore in the sixteenth The chief minister of the Malaysian state of
century. President Marcos, like his predecessors, , Sabah, Tun Mustapha, has long been involved
has vacillated between accommodation and armed with Philippine Muslim dissidents with the
force, but he is threatening to escalate ',thisr, knowledge, but not active support, of Kuala Lum-
hitherto isolated security problem into pi-in-ter- 1purffManila has already officially lodged a com-
national issue. ---'> plaint with Kuala Lumpur, and if present military
operations founder, Marcos will probably turn the
heat on Malaysia.(
~ f ,> )A major military effort recentlyi Iaunthed
against Muslim strongholds appears likblV to de-
generate into an inconclusive but pro~ractiad of-51' Malaysian Prime Minister Razak, noncom
fair. Charging that "foreign interests"~, are aiding , mittal in public, is trying to use the Muslim issue
the Muslims, Marcos has asked for emergen to extract territorial concessions from Manila. In
deliveries of US military equipment1or, his forces. ? return for restraining Mustapha, Razak has asked
The President may be proceeding oh, the assu p-j.$ Marcos to give up Manila's historical claim to
tion that if he can highlight the security threat',in; Sabah. Marcos was instrumental in elevating the
the south, he can persuade the US`1c raise they -Philippine claim to a matter of national honor in
level of its military assistance program. Hie p 1968, and he would find it difficult to retreat on
ably also wants more US military., supplies a the issue now 1
tangible evidence that Washington support b-itn
renewed government military pressure in nary 'ow diplbmatic=offensive, Kuala Lumpur will
the south could give some credence to chargesby , probably remain aloof while closely monitoring
President Qadhafi of Libya, who interests himself,," the develQping'sAu,)tion. The antagonism between
in Muslims anywhere, that Manila islengaged in a--'-Kuala Lumpur, and Manila over the Muslim issue,
vain to orchestrate an internat(onal protest on
Philippine actions against the Muslims, but thus
far he has had little response.
Area predominantly Muslim
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Basilan'
rally threaten the develop-25X1
ing role of, the. Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the) prospects for regional unity in
general.
BASILAN
ISLAND
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
THE GERMANIES: SLOWDOWN ON DETENTE .
)East German leaders are for the pr(sen1,`de~-'_) desired direction, Tito is turning his attention to
clining to proceed on further agreements with foreign relations. He seems interested in reviving,
West Germany. Pankow's chief negotiator, if possible, the nonaligned movement and in
Michael Kohl, was uncooperative and "chilly" settling problems with his immediate neighbors,
during a session with West Germany's Egon Bahr some of which grew out of his domestic concernsl
on 28 February. It was their first meeting since
the basic treaty was signed last December, and :.) )In an interview published late last month,
Kohl rejected almost all of Bahr's initiatives, in- ;, Tito reacted to Western press speculation and
cluding discussions of a commercial air agreement : some internal grumbling about "leaning toward
and the mechanics of setting up diplomatic mis- Moscow." He asserted that nonalignment was
sions in Bonn and East Berlin. The two will meet Belgrade's only foreign policy. He weakened this
again later in the month. somewhat by alleging that Soviet party leader
Pankow has achieved one of its main goals,
international recognition, and will probably await
ratification of the basic treaty this spring before
moving on to follow-up agreements with Bonn on
such matters as posts and telecommunications,
and judicial relations. The East Germans may also
be unsure how far Bonn will go on other issues,
such as the accreditation of journalists. Pankow
has accredited some West German journalists to
East Germany, established a joint border commis-
sion, and opened new border entry points.
The unproductive Bahr-Kohl talks have
deepened apprehensions in West Germany that
Pankow will not implement all the cooperative
ventures provided for in the basic treaty. Indeed,
some West Germans are worried that the East
Germans would like to discredit Chancellor
Brandt's Social Democratic Party by sabotaging
the treaty. Pankow's principal concern is the
appeal of Brandt and the West German brand of
social democracy to the East German people.
While East Germany is likely to maintain a con-
servative attitude toward further inter-German
cooperation for the time being, there is little
evidence that it intends to renege on the agree-
ments already concluded.
}Apparently satisfied that his get-tough line
in domestic matters is moving the country in the
Page 11
Brezhnev "fully agrees" and that neither Egypt
nor India had given up its nonaligned status by
signing friendship treaties with the Soviet Union.?
Believing that a policy of active cooperation
with the Third World is essential if Yugoslavia is
to avoid involvement in great power disputes,
Tito has taken several steps to breathe life into
the nonaligned movement and to ensure a key
role for himself at the meeting of the heads of
state of the nonaligned nations now scheduled for
September in Algeria.`
'_. 4As a first step, Tito is trying to revive rela-
tions with his old nonaligned partner, Egypt. Tito
received Egypt's Anwar Sadat in January and
another Egyptian official in February. He has also
sought Egyptian good will by calling for a Middle
East settlement in letters to Western heads of
state-including President Nixon. Stane Dolanc,
number two man in the Yugoslav party, will lead
a "powerful" delegation to Cairo later this
month, and Prime Minister Bijedic is making a
month-long trip which will include India, another
of the old nonaligned states.]
)Tito has also shown concern about his
neighbors. In late February, Dolaric spent five
r days in Bulgaria in a vain attempt to resolve the
long-standing and sensitive problem of
Macedonia. High level government contacts with
Vienna and Rome appear to be taking some of
the turn-of-the-year chill off Belgrade's relations
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
with its closest Western neighbors. With this in
mind, Foreign Minister Minic will meet with
Italian Foreign Minister Medici at Dubrovnik in
mid-March. The visit of Czechoslovak Foreign
Minister Chnoupek to Belgrade this week marks a
thaw in political relations with Prague, cool since
the Soviet invasion and the downfall of Dubcek in
1968.
-- 'Prime Minister Heath is most unlikely to pit
himself against the labor unions by calling a snap
general election. Despite his party's poor showing
in three by-elections last week, he remains de-
termined to stand on his anti-inflation policy in
the face of growing union militancy. The new
budget, given a cool reception by labor leaders,
aims at rapid economic growth and raises the
possibility of exacerbating the already strong in-
flationary pressures.'
- The leaders of the Trades Union Congress
failed to maintain control of the special meeting
held on 5 March to discuss ways of opposing the
government's anti-inflation policies. In particular,
the leaders had wanted to avert any call for a
general strike against the government's pay
policy. Despite their efforts, the delegates over-
whelmingly approved a resolution calling for a
nationwide day of protest action and for help to
unions engaged in disputes arising from govern-
ment policy. No date has been set for the general
strike, but it will be the first such national action
by labor since the general strike of 1926.
In addition, further wildcat strikes by both
moderate and militant unions are likely in the
coming weeks. So far, Prime Minister Heath has
been adamant about maintaining his wage guide-
lines and has given the unions no sign of flexi-
bility. Thus, any resumption of government-labor
talks in the near term appears unlikely.`
The usually moderate gas workers' union has
been' on strike for some three weeks, forcing
thousands of industrial plants to close and many
households to restrict their gas consumption. The
union announced that it intends to cut off house-
hold supplies early next week unless the British
Gas Corporation stops supplying gas to industrial
facilities. Such an action would create real hard-
ship for individual consumers. Strikes by hospital
workers have spread to more than 750 hospitals,
forcing patients to go home. The railroad engi-
neers have staged several one-day strikes that have
caused massive traffic jams. In another potentially
disruptive confrontation, the miners' union and
the National Coal Board are at an impasse over
fringe benefits.
' jAlthough the new budget took into account
the needs of the poor and aged and tried to offer
something to everybody, labor's response has
been negative. The moderate general secretary of
the Trades Union Congress, Vic Feather, said,
"There was next to nothing to reduce the resent-
ment aroused by the government's prices and
incomes policy." Militant labor leader Jack Jones
called it a "bad budget." Several measures, how-
ever, will appeal to the average citizen. The value-
added tax scheduled to go into effect next month
will not be placed on food or certain children's
items, the elderly are to be given some tax relief,
and a land hoarding charge should help to ease
the housing shortage-'
The budget aims at sustaining a five percent
rate of economic growth over the long term.
Growth is not to be halted either to reduce infla-
tion or to cope with a current account deficit in
the balance of payments. The government, does,
of course, want to control inflation and is calling
for greater responsibility and effort all around.
Public expenditures are expected to increase
about 13 percent, but the government is trying to
avoid adding to the inflationary spiral by pro-25X1
posing that a higher proportion of savings be
channeled to the government through savings
SECRET
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
USSR: MEDITERRANEAN EXERCISE /. / - (
During the past ten days, the Soviets have
addeid nine major naval combatants to the Medi-
terranean Squadron and have completed the
initial phase of what probably will be a large-scale
exercise.
The Soviets began to augment their Mediter-
ranean force on 28 February and on 1 March sent
the new Kara-class cruiser down from the Black
Sea. The next day the Soviets sent two more ships
from the Black Sea Fleet into the Mediterranean.
One of these was the Moskva, a helicopter carrier
that had not been out of the Black Sea for nearly
three years. On 6 March the Zhdanov, a Sverdlov-
class cruiser modified to serve as a command ship,
entered the Mediterranean bringing the number of
major combatants there to 14. A cruiser and
destroyer returning home from Cuba also entered
through Gibraltar on 7 March and may take part
in the exercise.
The Soviet ships gathered at the Kithira
anchorage near Crete. On 4 March they moved
some 50 miles south of the island and began an
anti-submarine warfare exercise. On 6 March the
ships ceased operations and six of them, including
the Moskva and the Kara cruiser, entered the Gulf
of Sollum anchorage near the Egyptian coast.
When the naval activity resumes, other fleets
could become involved, possibly as part of the
impending Soviet multi-force exercise. During the
last large-scale Soviet naval exercise-called
"Okean"-in 1970, activity in the Mediterranean
began some two weeks ahead of the other
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Mar 73
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
SUDAN: SEQUEL TO BLACK FRIDAY
V
The execution by Black September, Fatah's
~erro~ist arm, of three diplomats last week is still
causing reverberations throughout the Arab
world. The execution involved the first Fatah
murder of hostages in cold blood-the Israelis at
Munich were killed during an exchange of fire
between police and the terrorists.)
`1ln choosing the Saudi Arabian Embassy in
Khartoum as the site, Black September trampled
on Arab interests which have heretofore been
sacrosanct. The Saudis are undoubtedly taking a
hard look at their aid to Fatah. The Libyans,
however, can be expected to keep Fatah finan-
cially afloat.,,
Numayri, deeply embarrassed and bitter,
reacted this week by pledging just application of
Sudanese law to the terrorists. Numayri pointed
out that the murders were a criminal act which
had "nothing to do with revolution or courage."
The penalty for murder in Sudan is death. He
pinned responsibility for the incident on Fatah'
Sudan's ties with Libya will reach the
breaking point if Numayri's suspicions of Libya's
complicity are confirmed. Two Sudanese em-
ployees of the L,byan Embassy are among six
people arrested in connection with the Black
September operation)
Black September, meanwhile, gives every
indication of not being deterred from staging fur-
ther terrorist operations. The curtailment of
fedayeen operations against Israel by Lebanon
and Syria leaves the fedayeen with international
terrorism as a primary means of drawing attention
to Palestinian grievances. Because the Khartoum
operation failed to bring about the freeing of a
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Mar 73
prominent Black September member and 15
other fedayeen now under sentence of death in 25X1
Jordan, the terrorists will probably now try to
seize more hostages for the guerrillas held in
Jordan as well as those in Khartoum.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
INDIA: THE SAME OLD PROBLEMS
s'; [Religious divisions, ethnic, class and genera-
tional conflicts, regional jealousies, political an-
tagonisms and the grinding problems of scratching
a living out of an underdeveloped land are per-
)Mrs. Gandhi suffered a setback recently in
the `backward and perennially unstable state of
;Orissa. As part of an overall plan to substitute
"
"
progressives
loyal to her for more conservative
regional or communal leaders, Mrs. Gandhi organ-
ized the collapse of Orissa's opposition-led coali-
tion government in June 1972 and then brought
pressure to bear on the Orissa Congress Party to
accept her friend, Mrs. Nandini Satpathy, as chief
ministert
petual undercurrents of Indian life, but they
seldom have flowed as close to the surface as they
do today. With the unifying experience of war
with Pakistan now only a memory, these time-
honored problems impinge directly on Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi's time and attention,
detracting from her ability to govern the nation.]
A highly visible example of this is her in-
ability to turn aside the persistent demand by the
residents of the Andhra region of the state of
Andhra Pradesh for separation from the less
developed Telengana section. Deep-rooted caste
as well as economic pressures are at work, and
both areas want separate statehood. Any show of
accommodation from New Delhi could stimulate
similar demands in other states. New Delhi has
yet to propose a solution for this problem, which
recently erupted into rioting that abated only
after Mrs. Gandhi promised the separatists a fair
hearing.!
/Irs. Satpathy proved unable to work with
powerful vested interest groups within the party,
and her attempts at land reform, as well as other
efforts to implement Mrs. Gandhi's promise to
"abolish poverty," alienated these and other im-
~~,,portant non-Congress groups. Defections from the
Congress Party resulted, forcing Mrs. Satpathy's
resignation on 1 March. Although the opposition
claimed and probably had the strength to form a
new government, New Delhi took over direct ad-
ministration of the state two days later.-]
In recent months the overburdened prime
minister has had to deal with student riots on
university campuses, a prolonged teacher strike in
the state of Haryana, and violence in Assam over
opposition to a proposal that Assamese become
the sole language used for higher public instruc-
tion there.]
II these problems have arisen while Mrs.
Gandhi is trying to cope with the most serious
drought since the mid-60s. The drought has led to
sharp rises in the price of food and consumer
items. The prime minister's opponents have seized
on the effects of the drought as an ideal issue on
which to attack her in the 12-week parliamentary
session which opened on 19 February.
(None of these problems endangers Mrs. Gan-
dhi's hold on the reins of power, but the "Indira
Wave" which elected governments beholden to
her in practically every state in March 1972 is
losing force. Criticism of the prime minister, once
rare, is on the increase, and although she is likely
to win most of her battles, over the short run at
least, the time when she could do this easily is at
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Mar 73
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
the drought began, to about 3 million tons. Much
of what is left may be unfit for human consump-
tion. Rations in most parts of India are being held
at no more than half of the normal level. Never-
theless, there have been no reports of widespread
starvation, largely because of the arrival of the
first 200,000 tons of imported grain, greater gov-
ernment efforts to redistribute domestic supplies,
and the beginning of the spring harvest in
southern India.
t
:Despite severe food s ortages and a pre-
dicted decline in production of 9 or 10 million
tons in the crop year that ends in June the gov-
ernment has limited its purchases of foreign grain
since December to about 1.65 million tons. So
far, New Delhi has avoided large-scale imports by
drawing down buffer stocks and reducing the
government-subsidized grain ration. The govern-
ment has said that it will reassess the need for
further imports after determining the size of the
spring harvest, which is just beginning.
New Delhi is no longer releasing data on its
buffer stocks, but it appears that they have been
reduced from 9.6 million tons in mid-1972, when
Shortages of drinking water and animal
fodder, however, continue to cause people and
livestock to leave drought areas. These move-
ments are expected to increase in the next few
months, although government officials are confi-
dent they can cope with the situation if the
monsoon begins on schedule in June.7
Page 16
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A010100050001-6
SECRET
New DeThi's decision to limit food imports
for The present is a calculated risk based on a
combination of high hopes for the spring harvest,
steep world prices for grain and shipping, a re-
luctance to ask for foodgrain imports on conces-
sionary terms, and an unwillingness to draw
heavily on its foreign exchange reserves. New
Delhi has, however, continued to make small
purchases of cheap grains, including 150,000 tons
of grain sorghum obtained from Argentina. India
probably paid about $70 per ton for it compared
with the current world wheat price of more than
$100 per ton.
Soviet undertakings would have to be financed
from existing Soviet credits?