WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010100030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 23, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
23 February 1973
No. 0358/73
Copy
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;s?>u?d every Friday ro ning by CONTENTS (23 February 1973)
nd analyzes signif-
wn,,ith or prepared
ii '.S
En
EAST
R
~d there-
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
1 Indochina
6 The Sino-Soviet Quarrel
7 China: The Sum of its Parts
8 Japan: Automobiles & Oil
10 Ireland: Time for a Change?
11 International Monetary Developments
11 Malta: Mintoff Melts
12 East Europeans Buy in the West
13 Arab States - Israel:
Intractable Rivals
14 Libya: Arms From the UK
14 Jordan: Fedayeen Lose Another
15 Cyprus: Makarios' Plans
15 Greece: Student Unrest
16 East Africa: Distress Signals
17 Cuba: Hijacking Pacts
18 Argentina: A Nervous Period
19 Chile: Countdown to Elections
20 Dominican Republic: Guerrillas
21 Ecuador: A Soldier's Year
22 Nicaragua: Political Aftershock
SPECIAL
REPORTS
A Japan: The Communist Party
Comes of Age
B Iran's Military: Dominating the Gulf
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Paris Again
the International Conference on Vietnam,
the gathering at the foreign minister level that is
the final stand in the network of supervisory
bodies provided for in the Paris accords, meets in
Paris on 26 February. Most participants want a
short, largely pro-forma session. The past few
weeks have seen a spate of diplomatic activity
designed to develop a basis of agreement among
the 13 participants before the formal sessions
begin. Disputes could still disrupt the proceed-
ings, but it now appears that the conference will
ratify the accords in fairly short order and estab-
lish some mechanism to which the supervisory
teams can report.
Participating will be the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council, the four
countries furnishing personnel to the Interna-
tional Commission for Control and Supervision,
the three indigenous Vietnamese parties, and UN
Secretary General Waldheim. They could run into
difficulties over the question of the continuing
supervisory mechanism. It is clear that the Viet-
namese Communists want responsibility for the
maintenance of the accords to rest essentially
with the four former belligerents, with outside
interference kept to a minimum. They have been
particularly firm in opposing any participation by
international bodies-a stand that explains their
unwillingness to see Waldheim named chairman of
the conference.;
Members of the ICCS meet with North Vietnamese delegates to the Joint Military Commission.
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I Moscow and Peking have echoed some of the
Vietnamese Communist demands, but their basic
aims at the conference differ from those of their
Vietnamese clients. The Soviets are looking for
some sort of implicit guarantee of their post-war
right to be involved in Indochina, but both Peking
and Moscow want to defuse Vietnam as an impor-
tant issue in big-power politics. Both, moreover,
want arrangements that will make major viola-
tions of the accords by any party very difficult.
Neither will want to give the impression in public
of opposing the Vietnamese Communists; both
will probably work behind the scenes to prevent
hangups over trivial details. They seem to want a
conference communique that expresses strong but
general support for the accords, backed perhaps
by private understandings to supplement arrange-
ments for continuing supervision. This mutuality
of interests does not, however, mean that the
Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia, or anywhere
else, is a thing of the pasty
i !Aside from the big powers and the Vietnam-
ese parties themselves, most of the participants
seem likely to play a secondary role, although
some-the French and the Canadians-might per-
form useful service as go-betweens. The one re-
maining question is Saigon's attitude toward the
conference. The Thieu government has been reti-
cent in public on the subject, but it has clearly
implied that it wants more stringent guarantees
against Communist encroachment than it seems
likely to get. If President Thieu is dissatisfied with
the results of the conference, he might refuse to
associate himself formally with it. So far, how-
ever, the note of deep concern present in Saigon's
official and semi-official press last fall has been
absent from current output, suggesting that
Thieu, like the other participants, will be willing
to live with the results.
Saigon Politics
President Thieu is moving to shore up his
position with South Vietnam's non-Communist
political forces. His aim is to create at least the
appearance of unity on the eve of the interna-
tional conference in Paris and possible political
talks with the Viet Cong. Following up his recent
meetings in Saigon with major political and reli-
gious leaders, the President announced last week-
end the formation of a broad-based "popular
front" to advise the government. The front may
play a role in the selection of Saigon's contingent
to the National Council for National Reconcilia-
tion and Concord called for in the cease-fire
agreement
;Several opposition figures are participating
in the new front, but there is considerable doubt
that the body will broaden Thieu's support very
much. One moderate opposition leader says his
group is involved reluctantly; he is skeptical about
the President's motives, believing that the front is
intended only as "a show" to enhance Saigon's
position at the Paris conference. Other politicians
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Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Plelku,,, _
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undoubtedly recall disappointments during past
short-lived government fronts and are unlikely to
give their wholehearted support this time unless
Thieu allows them some meaningful role in
making national policy. One party leader who is
not participating is threatening to create a rival
front, but his chances of getting a significant
group together are slim.
Four An Quang Buddhist senators attended
the organizational meeting of the new front. They
subsequently said that they were present as "in-
dividuals" and that the An Quang movement did
not wish to commit itself. The four senators indi-
cated that they will withdraw from the front if it
embarks on a course they consider unwise.
The Buddhists are also considering a role in
the National Council. An Quang leaders have indi-
cated that, having made clear their preference for
the Thieu government over the Viet Cong, they
might join the council as part of a "neutralist"
group to be chosen by Saigon. One prominent An
Quang monk recently issued a statement asserting
that "people who have done nothing for the
country for a long time" should be excluded from
the council, suggesting that the Buddhists are
afraid that members of the exile community
might usurp what An Quang considers to be its
rightful role.
Some Buddhist and other opposition sena-
tors, meanwhile, are trying to convene a special
Senate session to amend the controversial presi-
dential decree on political parties. Although the
senators have little chance of passing any amend-
ments, they could trigger a stormy debate that
would embarrass the Thieu government. Some
senators remain bitter toward Thieu over the de-
cree's stiff membership requirements for parties
and do not credit recent indications that Thieu
himself is considering liberalizing the decree.
A Waning War
fhe intensity of military action has declined
further in most of the country, although some
Page 3
sharp fighting is still going on in the northern
provinces. Most of the activity is concentrated in
southern Quang Ngai Province around the coastal
village of Sa Huynh, which was retaken by the
government last weekend after nearly three weeks
of Communist occupation. The North Vietnamese
are dug in just south of the village, blocking
coastal Route 1, and are offering stiff resistance.!
The government has reopened Route 14 be-
tween Pleiku and Kontum cities, but the Commu-
nists continue to shell and harass South Vietnam-
ese military convoys trying to use the road. Presi-
dent Thieu ordered this trouble spot cleared
quickly and threatened to fire senior government
officials in Kontum Province if they failed. Gov-
ernment officials throughout the country seem to
believe that the situation in the countryside has
stablized as much as can be expected, and no
major new land-grabbing efforts by either side are
foreseen for the present. '
There are signs that the Communists are
beginning to take steps to carry out other provi-
sions of the Paris Agreement. The Viet Cong, for
example, have finally selected three border entry
sites through which the authorized replacement
of arms and equipment are supposed to be chan-
neled to Communist units in the South.'
Both Communist and government authori-
ties have appealed publicly to their troops to
observe the cease-fire. Both sides have, in fact,
issued orders to their respective units to limit
military activity for the most part to defensive
maneuvering. Sporadic shellings and ground at-
tacks by both sides probably will continue, how-
ever, particularly in an effort to gain further ad-
vantages in local positions before the interna-
tional truce teams are fully in the field."
LAOS: SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
. !Amid the popping of champagne corks and
expressions of general relief, government and
Communist plenipotentiaries on 20 February
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Feb 73
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signed a long-awaited Lao peace agreement in
Vientiane. The result of over four months of
tedious negotiations, the military aspects of the
pact provide for an immediate bombing halt, an
in-place cease-fire, the withdrawal of "foreign"
troops, and an exchange of prisoners within 90
days. On the political side, the agreement calls for
an even division of cabinet portfolios in a new
provisional government, but leaves the exact dis-
tribution-of the portfolios open to further nego-
tiations.]Although the document does not specify
who will head the new government, both sides
apparently wish to retain Souvanna Phouma as
prime minister.)
The comprehensive nature of the agreement
almost certainly came as a surprise to Souvanna's
own cabinet, and an unpleasant one to rightist
members. Two days earlier, Lao Communist
leader Souphanouvong had himself proposed a
relatively simple interim cease-fire arrangement
that would have allowed Souvanna more time to
overcome rightist objections.; The rightists were
particularly opposed to an even split of cabinet
positions with the Communists. By initialing a
comprehensive settlement, Souvanna presented
them with a fait accompli.;
With no option but to accept the agreement,
the rightists will now probably concentrate their
attention on the distribution of cabinet port-
folios. They will undoubtedly urge Souvanna to
retain the key ministries of defense, foreign af-
fairs, and finance for members of the present
government-an arrangement the Communists are
The Mekong River in Laos
Peace in sight
Page 4
Government-held location
? Communist-held location
L
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Occupied by
Communists
tsolovens ?
Plateau Attopeu,
unlikely to accept and one that the realistic Sou-
vanna is unlikely to push for.I
Getting in the Last Licks
1 IPathet Lao supreme headquarters on 21 Feb-
ruary ordered all Lao Communist units to strictly
observe the terms of the cease-fire agreement.
Minutes after the deadline at noon on 22 Feb-
ruary, however, North Vietnamese units attacked
government positions around Paksong and forced
the irregulars to abandon the town)
On the eve of the cease-fire, elements of an
eight-battalion irregular force had skirmished with
North Vietnamese units just west of Muong Pha-
lane in the central panhandle, but neither side
appeared ready to mount any large-scale attacks.
1 on north Laos, Communist mortar and artil
lery fire early in the week kept irregular units
from moving up to the edge of the Plaine des
Jarres, while North Vietnamese infantry troops
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Feb 73
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engaged elements of a 700-man irregular force on
a ridge overlooking Route 4 near Xieng Khouang-
ville.
;With the signing of a cease-fire in Vientiane,
Cambodia is the last avowed battlefield in Indo-
china, and from all indications, the Communist-
led Khmer insurgents are prepared to sustain their
struggle against Phnom Penh indefinitely. Their
ability to keep up the pressure was demonstrated
anew this week as they maintained their hold on
sections of several major highways. In the Phnom
Penh area, the insurgents checked government
efforts to clear a stretch of Route 1 between the
capital and the Mekong. On the river's east bank,
other insurgent forces were still in control over
much of Route 15 between Neak Luong and Prey
Veng. Although Phnom Penh sent reinforcements
to both fronts, government efforts to regain the
initiative along the two roads foundered on inept
leadership and faulty tactical coordination.
South of Phnom Penh, insurgent pressure
against portions of Route 2 kept that highway
closed to the South Vietnamese border. Gov-
ernment clearing operations along the roadway
north and south of the town of Takeo registered
no real progress. To the west, insurgent attacks at
mid-week on several government positions on
Cambodia Army Patrol
The war continues
Page 5
Kompong
Som
SOUTH V!E'TTJYAM
0 MILES 231,
Route 3 closed a portion of that highway just
north of Tram Khnar.I
1
On the Economic Front
1) i frhe Lon Nol government finally enacted
J" 1) some of the price reforms recently recommended
by the International Monetary Fund. Increases in
prices for gasoline and other POL products have
been put into effect, and higher electricity rates
and rice prices will soon follow. Mindful of a
possible adverse public reaction to the increased
costs of these sensitive items, Lon No] on 20
February called on his countrymen to confine
any complaints to orderly protests sent through
regular bureaucratic channels. Some Cambodians
failed to heed the President's appeal, however,25X1
and reacted to local price hikes in Battambang
and Kompong Cham cities by looting the shops of
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Feb 73
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Changing Names on the Frontier
'Soviet sensitivity to Chinese claims to huge
initiatives. Predictably, the official blamed the
continuing impasse on the Chinese.i
chunks of Siberia recently came through in an "' :~, j'Although officials of neither side hold out
unusual way. In a decree of 26 December 1972, much hope for early progress, both seem intent
the Russian Republic's Supreme Soviet gave Rus- on keeping the negotiations goincl.j
sianized names to nine towns situated on territory
claimed by China, thereby removing at least that
sign that the Chinese had once inhabited the area.
Some of the towns are near the border with China
where fighting broke out during 1969. The decree
did not cover all of the geographic names of
apparent Chinese origin, in the area, and further
changes may come later,
,Names of towns in the USSR are frequently
changed, usually for political reasons, but this is
the first time that names of Chinese origin have
been altered.
11 The chief Soviet negotiator at the border
talks in Peking, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev,
and Ambassador Tolstikov returned to China on
12 January after four weeks in Moscow, but there
has been no hint of forward movement in bilat-
eral relations. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official
recently told a US Embassy officer that Ilichev
attended a plenary session of border negotiators
shortly after his return, but presented no new
The past several weeks have been marked by
intense competition between the USSR and China
for influence in such key areas as Japan and
Western Europe. In overtures to Japan, for ex-
ample, the Chinese have tried to thwart plans for
joint Soviet-Japanese projects to exploit Siberian
resources. Peking has coupled blunt language on
the Soviet threat with a more flexible economic
policy aimed at presenting China as an attractive
long-term trading partner. Elsewhere, as the talks
on mutual force reductions were getting under
way in Vienna, the Chinese did their best to
convince the West Europeans that Moscow cannot
be trusted. New Sino-Soviet frictions are likely to
emerge in the wake of the Paris agreement on
Vietnam, as both Moscow and Peking move to
prevent the other from gaining a dominant
position in Indochina.
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;Political patterns in China's provinces have
been a valuable guide to assessing the direction of
the political wind in Peking. During radical phases
of the Cultural Revolution, leftists prospered in
the countryside, only to lose out to order-minded
military men in the moderate backlash that fol-
lowed. Now, the once-overwhelming military
presence in top provincial party and government
posts is being slowly eroded by civilian officials,
although this does not connote a return to rad-
icalism.i
';The pace of high-level provincial appoint-
ments has picked up noticeably. Since the last
provincial party committee was reformed in
August 1971, 28 persons have been named
deputy secretary or higher. Fifteen of these have
been announced in the last three months. The
majority are old cadres, and many were ousted by
the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.
Most of these new leaders have been added to the
existing party committees, but in some cases they
may be replacements for missing military men. At
least 25 soldier-politicians are out of sight.l
The new appointees include experienced
civilians and military men as well as some officials
who are virtually unknown. The last named were
not part of the pre - Cultural Revolution party or
government establishment and may form a dis-
tinct force opposed to both the veteran cadres
and military men. While this breakdown is per-
haps oversimplified, each of these groupings al-
most certainly has ties to leaders in Peking, and
competition at the Peking end appears to be a
primary reason for political conflict in the prov-
inces.
This is not to say that the bitter memories of
the Cultural Revolution, when political and other
warfare was conducted generally along left-right
lines, have been forgotten. Likewise, ties to ex -
defense minister Lin Piao are a continuing factor
in the political equation. Today, however,
struggle for political power appears to have
evolved beyond a split on left-right lines or be-
tween pro- and anti-Lin factions. While most mili-
tary men and civilian regulars were allied against
Page 7
the left during the Cultural Revolution, they now
appear to be contending with one another for
power, and to some extent these two groups are
being challenged by the newcomers.]
The addition of rehabilitated civilian cadres
to the party committees will make little dif-
ference in terms of policy. Both groups have
supported the pragmatic policies espoused by
Premier Chou En-lai during and since the Cultural
Revolution, ',,The newcomers are, however, an
'Leftist opposition to reinstating party veterans
has also probably been a factor in the slow pace
of provincial leadership change. Moderate
elements in Peking, meanwhile, have the delicate
task of ensuring the support of the military while
replacing selected soldiers with civilians. The
recent resurrection of several high-ranking mili-
tary officers ousted during the Cultural
Revolution may be an attempt by moderates to
sooth military nerves.'
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While the action in the provincial arena has
become visible, developments in Peking remain
obscure. The picture is a murky one. Although
the central leadership can agree on moderate
social and economic policies, political appoint-
ments remain subject to serious difference and
hard bargaining. If all major leaders in Peking,
including Mao and Chou, saw eye-to-eye on what
shape the provincial leadership ought to take,
there is little doubt that events would have moved
much more swiftly than they have up to now.
The same difficulty undoubtedly accounts for the
failure to fill long-vacant central party and mili-
tary posts. Whether the movement on provincial
appointments presages an end to the political
paralysis in Peking is an open question. F_
Japan, with the fastest growing motor-
vehicle industry among industrialized countries,
now ranks as the world's second largest producer.
By 1972, Japan was producing 6.3 million units,
more than one sixth of world production. As it
has grown, the Japanese automotive industry has
shifted from one basically geared to producing
light commercial vehicles for the domestic market
to one producing passenger cars for world wide
sale.
The Japanese since the mid-1960s have in-
vested about $1 billion annually in new plant and
equipment. These heavy capital outlays have
made Japan's automotive industry among the
most efficient in the world. Labor productivity
has far outpaced most Western European pro-
ducers.
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independent rear su per Sian, too
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realty f at to driue it to betiere it.
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itts h'pr=are tuft a be nkwn'g. .
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car price You?ae motto dive one
to believe it. Drive a Daton ,.
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bird the kin, of tIevnr n sophisttcatron
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ow nun ell' o the theme of out slogan Get Toter 1-ids on a / ,rota-- h u if to rer
let go.' The Corona owner has a strong degree of brand loyalty. He knows he's
fraught a lxrawiful piece of mach inert. See