WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
`"OSecret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
NAVY review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Secret
10 November 1972
No. 0395/72
COPY N2 46
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
he WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
requiring more comprehensive treatment and there-
and the Directorate of Science and Technology,
uently includes material coordinated with or prepared
Office of Economic Research. the Office of Strategic
f Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
eveiopments of the week through noon on Thursday.
published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
>..oni:eritA
the national secui ity of the United States, within
;in^ of Title 18- sections 793 and 794, of the US
receipt by an un_iut_horized person is prohibited by
CONTENTS (10 November 1972)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
1 Negotiations: The Red Line
2 USSR: Quiet Anniversary
3 Korea: Moving Ahead
4 East Germany: Fruits of Detente
4 Indochina
7 China: A Certain Caution
Bland General Assembly
Netherlands: Togetherness Again
Finland: The Kekkonen Connection
13 Uganda: Next the British
14 The Arabs: Gathering in Kuwait
14 Lebanon: Leashing the Fedayeen
15 Cyprus: The Intercommunal Talks
15 Morocco: Another False Start
16 Oman: State of a Rebellion
1.8 Iraq: Oil and the Economy
19 India: Economic Dip Ahead
19 Turkey: Melen Soldiers On
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
20 Mexico: Foreign Investment
21 The Stage Is Set for Peron
22 Chile: Settling Down
24 Bahamas May Seek Help
SPECIAL
?EPORTS (Published separately)
B Soviet Naval Operations
West Africa
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
NOW
law~
SECRET
N OTIATIONS _ M Rte LINE
I JHanoi, Moscow, and Peking are taking dif-
ferent tacks in registering dissatisfaction with the
state of the Vietnam negotiations, but none of
the three is saying anything to torpedo the talks.'
(Of the three, Moscow lets its eagerness for a
settlement show most clearly. When Hanoi ies
talking about a deadline for signing
that, the Premier
Kosygin expressed the Soviet hope
would continue)Speaking for the leadership on 6
November, Politburo member Mazurov noted the
possibility of further negoti tion and called for
signing "as soon as possible."!
I 'These comments reflect Moscow's assess-
mentL that at long last negotiations between
Washington and Hanoi have reached a delicate
and critical stage and that nothing should be done
to jeopardize prospects for agreement. Over the
past several months, the Soviets have come more
and more to regard the conflict in Vietnam
higher
annoying obstacle in the way of Moscow's priority effort to cultivate relations with Washing-
ton. The North Vietnamese, of course, have been
painfully aware of this, and the Soviets will be
careful to avoid so alienating them as to leave the
field open to the Chinese. Moscow probably
hopes, however, that its lukewarm support will
help persuade Hanoi to be more flexible in ad-
dressing the issues still blocking agreement with
the US. .1
strongest appeared in People's Daily on 3 Novem-
ber. It charged that Washington was stalling in
order to renegotiate the "basic content" of an
agreement the US had already accepted. The com-
mentary was harsher in tone and focused more
sharply on Washington's culpability and motives
than anything the Chinese have said about Viet-
nam since President Nixon's Peking trip. The four
statements together amount to the strongest
backing the Chinese have given Hanoi in months
on important negotiations issues.,)'
[Peking obviously hoped to improve its atstand-
ing with Hanoi vis-a-vis Nto Moscow.
be signaling Beyond
ing genuine
Chinese also appeared imperiled.
concern that an early settlement was imp
The 3 November article said flatly, "If the US
plan is successful, there will hardly be any
prospect of restoring peace in Vietnam." Peking
was careful, however, not to rule out further US -
North Vietnamese negotiations.']
1 ) .. Peking has cooled its rhetoric on settlement
in recent days. Although no authoritative com-
mentary has been issued since late last week, the
Chinese have tried to keep faith with Hanoi by
publishing an unusually large volume of foreign
press reports disparaging Washington and Saigon.
Tfhe Chinese have been markedly stiffer
en
Moscow. Last week, Peking issued four p o g es
sively tougher statements backing the
North Vietnamese statement of 6 October tand he
attacking Washington's response.
/ The Vietnamese Communists themselves
have kept up a drumfire of propaganda castigating
the US for delaying the conclusion of the agree-
ment. They have, however, studiously avoided
saying what the consequences would be if the US
was not immediately forthcoming, and Xuan
Thuy, in fact, made it clear in an interview last
1d be nmpnable to a
weekend that Hanoi wou
further, round of negotiations.
SECRET
Paae 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
general Secretary Brezhnev returned to pub-
lic life this week, showing the effects of a four-
week illness. On 6 November, Brezhnev led all
Moscow-based members of the Politburo at the
usual celebration on the eve of the anniversary of
the Bolshevik revolution. He reviewed the mili-
tary parade in Red Square the next day with
other members of the leadership and spoke at the
official reception that followed. US Embassy of-
ficials noted that Brezhnev experienced some dif-
ficulty in moving, looked much thinner and paler
than before, but otherwise appeared to be in a
jovial mood.\
,The anniversary address by Politburo mem-
ber and First Deputy Premier Mazurov dwelt
largely on domestic affairs, particularly economic
troublespots. Mazurov offered repeated assur-
ances that, despite the harvest failures, the au-
thorities are meeting the country's food require-
ments and adhering to the consumer program
"without deviation."
fOn agriculture, Mazurov followed the line
taken recently by the minister of agriculture.
Mazurov called the drought the worst in a cen-
tury, but predicted a harvest reaching the average
yearly level attained during the previous five-year
plan. He mentioned a letter to General Secretary
Brezhnev from a farmer in Saratov who in effect
thanked the authorities for the fact that the
famine of 1921 was not being repeated. Mazurov )
inter-industrial structures," but made clear that
such measures remain in the experimental stage.
For now, Mazurov indicated the authorities
would rely on exhortations for discipline and on
the application of social and economic sanctions
as well as incentives for workers and managers.
yhe foreign affairs section of Mazurov's
speech was more moderately worded than the
corresponding speeches of the previous two years.
He stressed the progress made in finding practical,
negotiated solutions to difficult problems with
the West. He said, for instance, that the summit
meeting with President Nixon last May showed
that "even the most complex" problems could be
resolved with a "realistic approach," and he noted
the radical improvement in Soviet - West German
relations.'
) ?. }On other subjects, Mazurov reaffirmed So-
viet support for North Vietnam, but he left open
the prospect of further negotiations between the
US and North Vietnam by saying that the peace
agreement should be signed "as soon as possible."
Sino-Soviet relations stood out in Mazurov's
speech as the principal area where little if any-
thing had been accomplished.]
,(2 [Reflecting the moderate tone of the festivi-
ties, the military parade in Red Square on 7
November featured no new weapons but did in-
clude placards lauding SALT and disarmament.
Defense Minister Marshal Grechko endorsed Mos-
cow's foreign policy in general, and the search for
detente with the West in particular. Although
Grechko did not echo Mazurov's praise for the
May summit, he did say that "a certain relaxa-
tion" of the international situation has been
achieved. He added that favorable conditions have
been created for a Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Moreover, although he
echoed Mazurov in noting that hostile "imperial-
ist" forces still exist in the world, he expressed
satisfaction with the Soviet defense effort. Ac-
cording to Grechko, the Soviet authorities "are
taking the necessary measures for the further
strengthening of the country's defensive capa-
emphasized belt-tightening in the industrial
sphere, demanding an end to the waste of power
and natural resources and to the dissipation of
capital in excessive construction. Premier Kosygin
had raised similar points in a hard-hitting speech
on 30 September
1973 plan. I
concerning the draft of the
Mazurov spoke of the need for innovation in
economic management, but did not promise any
real movement in this field. He warned that insuf-
ficient attention to good management threatens
to slow economic and scientific-technical prog-
ress. He referred to an "integrated systems ap-
proach" to problems and to "new industrial and
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
1(~ LNorth-South contacts seem likely to broaden /' (Seoul and Pyongyang have accorded the new
in scope following the agreement last week on the agreement unprecedented publicity. The South
composition and functions of the coordinating
committee on unification[-The accord was
fashioned in three days of remarkably cordial ~C)
negotiations in Pyongyang between South Korean
CIA Director Yi Hu-rak and senior North Korean
officials-including Premier Kim II-sung. The
ten-man committee will be headed by Yi and
Kim's brother. It will discuss a broad range of
political, social, and economic matters in
meetings that will be held every two or three
months, alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang-
Various subcommittees will prepare detailed
studies, and a joint secretariat will be established
in Panmunjom. J
?L; L,The two sides agreed to end propaganda
attacks on each other, and at a press conference
in Seoul, Yi acknowledged that a whole range of
cooperative endeavors with the North had been
discussed. He cited as examples a proposal by
Kim II-sung to permit South Korean fishing boats
in northern waters and a suggestion by President
Pak Chong-hui that the two sides jointly develop
tourism. Joint sport and cultural endeavors were
also mentioned.
Koreans have given extensive photographic cover-
age to Kim 11-sung in all newspapers, suggesting
that the government may be preparing the popu-
lace for even closer dealings with the North. Both
countries have tied their announced constitu-
tional reforms in part to the need to remove
impediments to future inter-governmental cooper-
ation.
I l eoul is reported to be seriously studying a
process which would involve cooperation on se-
lected domestic and international matters beyond
that envisaged for the coordinating committee,
but would almost certainly not lead to any major
change in either side's existing political and social
systems. I
r Cooperation on such a scale would have to
be preceded by considerable direct negotiation,
substantial progress in the Red Cross talks and
perhaps a summit meeting between Pak and Kim.
Seoul has already taken steps to prepare for such
developments. Last month's martial law decree
and the new, more authoritarian constitution give
President Pak a free hand to security at
home.
Lee Hu-pak, Southern co-chairman of coordinating committee, greeted by Kim fl-sung (r).
SECRET
SECRET
Page 3
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
SECRET
iWith improved relations between the two
Germanies just around the corner, the Western
allies have begun exchanging views on normalizing
their own relations with the German Democratic
Republic.
LThe British last week proposed to Washing-
ton that the Berlin missions of the three Western
allies begin to coordinate their views on how to
proceed toward recognition. The French have in-
dicated an eagerness to recognize East Germany.
One senior Foreign Ministry official said privately
that while Paris favors consultations with London
and Washington, many of his colleagues want
France to be out in front of any general Western
movement toward East Germany. He stated that
France is in a "different political situation," both
because of the influential East German lobby in
France and because Paris already has de facto
commercial and cultural relations with Pankow.
His remarks were given weight by the visit to
France last month of top-level East German party
leaders. Other French officials have indicated,
however, that Paris will await ratification of the
inter-German treaty- T
Some of the smaller allies, such as Denmark,
also want to be among the first to recognize East
Germany. They feel pressed by West European
neutrals who intend to do so at the first politic
opportunity- On 7 November, Copenhagen sent a
i )Both sides have reduced the scale of their
representative to Stockholm to begin negotiations
for "coordinated Nordic action" on recognition
of East Germany.,'
The Western countries have awaited com-
pletion of inter-German negotiations on a basic
treaty and the subsequent lifting of West German
objections before approaching Pankow directly.
Most agree that recognition should proceed at a
deliberate pace, taking into account such issues as
Four-Power responsibilities over Germany and the
legal status of East Berlin.)
(Developments in the domestic political scene
in West Germany could disrupt a coordinated
Western approach to Pankow. Should the West
German election on 19 November fail to return
Brandt to office, or should Bonn fail to ratify the
f general political treaty, the Western countries
would probably come under pressure from Bonn
to delay recognition. Indeed, the Brandt coalition
has already asked the Allies to delay their support
for East German membership in international or-
ganizations pending ratification of the treaty and
West German preparations for UN membership.
The French, like the Scandinavians, may not de-
lay long. Regardless of the outcome of the West
German election, the tendency toward recogni-
tion has already gained a momentum that will be
difficult to stop.
areas. Heavy typhoon rains contributed to a de-
crease in military action along the coast.
ground operations, reflecting anticipation and 21 f Reports of declining enemy morale are crop-
uncertainty over an impending cease-fire agree- ping up with increasing frequency. Many captured
ment. During the week, the Communists did carry enemy soldiers appear disillusioned and confused,
out shelling attacks directed at provincial capitals complaining of food and supply shortages and
in Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Thuan, and Dinh Tuong hardships caused by allied air and artillery power.
as well as against lesser targets. The Communists `. The slippage in the expected cease-fire deadline
also kept up their road-blocking efforts in many has also had a profound effect. The Communist
SECRET
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET "e
hierarchy is trying to counter this problem by
portraying the agreement worked out with the US
as a "fundamental victory" for the Communists.
A recently captured COSVN document claimed
that a cease-fire should be understood as a "tran-
sitional period" that will lead to "greater vic-
tories." 3
.. / [;Uncertainty about a cease-fire date has
prompted some military commands in the north-
ern provinces to withdraw troops from the battle-
field and send them to rear areas for political
indoctrination. The recent trend away from large
numbers of heavy artillery attacks to less expen-
sive mortar attacks may also reflect indecision on
the part of some local commanders. These com-
manders had received orders to stage large-scale
attacks immediately preceding and just following
the announcement of a cease-fire, but the appar-
ently unexpected delays in the cease-fire time-
table may have forced them to alter their tactics
and to conserve ammunition for a later date]
J )The South Vietnamese are also letting up.
Although some commanders are claiming great
victories in keeping the enemy away from Sai-
gon's doorstep, much of the territory that has
fallen to the Communists since last spring is
2. still to be taken back. A South Vietnamese
Marine operation launched last week against
enemy defenses west of Quang Tri City was
beaten back, and units in other areas have had
difficulty in keeping the major roads open.)
Thieu and the Peace Agreement
[South Vietnamese are still out in the streets
in support for President Thieu's position on a
peace settlement. Some 20,000 Catholics took to
Saigon's streets last weekend, and even the An
Quang Buddhists participated in some of the pro-
government demonstrations in the northern prov-
inces. Most of the country's political and religious
groups have publicly expressed support for
Thieu's stand, but some An Quang Buddhist lead-
ers are criticizing the regime.i
he government is showing public signs of
flexibility on the issue of North Vietnamese troop
withdrawal. An unidentified "important official"
has been quoted in the pro-government press as
stating that Saigon may not insist that Hanoi
admit in a peace agreement that it has troops in
the South. Saigon may instead accept verbal as-
surances that the North Vietnamese will with-
draw. The official maintained that the govern-
ment is standing firm on other aspects of a peace
agreement, especially the rejection of "any tri-
partite organization."_"?
LAOS: HOLDING PATTERN
32 The peace talks in Vientiane, begun a month
ago, have yet to register real progress. Both sides
are marking time awaiting Prime Minister
Souvanna's return from abroad and developments
in the negotiations on Vietnam. In the interim,
negotiators of the two sides continue to use their
weekly negotiating sessions to discuss minor pro-
cedural matters and to exchange polemical state-
ments- The Lao Communists have concentrated
much of their fire against Souvanna's claims that
his government is still the provisional government
of national union set up by the 1962 accords.
Souvanna's spokesmen have used the bulk of their
talking time to denounce the North Vietnamese
presence in Laos. ?
(? /Government troops in the central panhandle
on 2 November moved back into Keng Kok, a
village about 30 miles southeast of Savannakhet.
The two North Vietnamese battalions, which
staged a surprise attack on Keng Kok late last
month, pulled back to the eastltlhe Communists'
relatively quick withdrawal suggests that their oc-
cupation of Keng Kok may have been intended
primarily to divert government troops from offen-
sive operations along Route 9 rather than to grab
additional territory before a possible cease-fire.)
31 LIn northern Laos, the Communists con-
tinued to dominate the military situation. After
several days of preparation, elements of two
North Vietnamese regiments on 2 and 3 Novem-
ber carried out ground and artillery attacks
against irregular troops that had been trying to
regroup along a ridge about four miles south of
the Plaine des Jarres. The attacks forced the gov-
ernment troops to abandon nearly all their posi-
tions; most of them have moved back to Pha
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
SECRET
Dong, a base about ten miles south of the Plaine.
Vang Pao is attempting to bring in additional
troops to hold his few remaining positions, but
these troops are encountering strong enemy pres-
sure and probably cannot hold out for very long'
i. LAs the dry season begins, the Lon Not gov-
ernment's over-all military position is deteri-
orating. With the interdiction of Route 4, the
government has now lost control over sections of
all but one of the key highways leading out of
Phnom Penh. The Mekong River is now the
capital's primary supply line. 1
In their first significant military action
against Route 4 since April 1971, Communist
forces cut the road late last week some ten miles
southwest of the town of Kompong Speu. Initial
attempts by government units to reopen the road
have been repulsed by Khmer Communist ele-
ments occupying high ground overlooking the
interdicted section. On past performance, the
Cambodian Army will have considerable dif-
ficulty reopening Route 4 and restoring the gov-
ernment's overland access to the seaport at
Kompong Som.?
The Khmer Communists are keeping up their
harassment of a number of government positions
on Route 2 between Phnom Penh and the south-
ern town of Takeo. The Communists now control
several small segments of the road north of
Takeo, as well as almost all of the highway be-
tween Takeo and the South Vietnam border. By
midweek, the Khmer Communists had succeeded
in isolating the government garrison at Angtas-
som-a few miles west of Takeo. Phnom Penh has
been slow to assist its demoralized troops in this
area. Air strikes, however, reportedly have helped
deter the Communists from staging any sizable
ground attacks against the town of Takeo itself.?
L ;_In the northwest, government forces led by
elite Khmer Krom units finally managed to dis-
lodge Communist troops from a short segment of
Route 5 between Kompong Chhnang City and the
town of Oudong. The highway had been closed
since mid-August, and it must undergo some
repairs before it can be reopened to regular com-
mercial traffic. 1
[Besides keeping the Cambodian Army off-
balance and predominantly on the defensive, the
Communists' steady pressure against the coun-
try's highways has strained Phnom Penh's econ-
omy. The interdiction of Routes 2 and 5, which
are the main roads for moving rice and other basic
foodstuffs to the capital, contributed to the
nearly 20-percent rise in the city's general price
index in September. This jump primarily reflected
the critical shortage of rice in Phnom Penh and,
although the government has imposed a price
ceiling on rice, food prices for October were still
climbing.
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
SECRET Nowle
3i,
CHINA: A CERTAIN CAUTION
t .(Continuing political uncertainty in Peking is
having a noticeable effect on life in China's prov-
inces. Since the fall of Lin Piao in September
1971, a number of leading national and provincial
figures, of both radical and moderate persuasion,
have disappeared from the scene] lAt the same
time Peking has been following consistently
moderate domestic and foreign policies. Under
these confusing circumstances and with the
memory of past abrupt changes in course vivid in
their minds, officials at all levels are showing a
marked tendency to sit tight and wait for the dust
some factories has been exacerbated by the with-
drawal of the soldiers sent in to keep order during
the Cultural Revolution] The failure of rehabili-
tated managers to maintain discipline may explain
why soldiers have had to remain in many factories
and mines.)
il~ (j There is ample evidence that Peking's prob-
lems with timid officials are not limited to the
industrial sector. The People's Daily recently
criticized commune leaders for not implementing
agricultural policies firmly, charging, probably
correctly, that they were afraid of making mis-
takes. Others were accused of carrying out incor-
rect policies. As on many earlier occasions, the
newspaper focused on the work-point system for
rewarding rural labor, a particularly sensitive issue
in the countryside. Although the current party
line favors a relatively liberal work-point policy,
the system has frequently been a target of radical
criticism. ]
3( !Education and crime have also been in-
fluenced by cautious officials. Nearly all the
schools that were closed during the Cultural Rev-
olution have been reopened and most educators
reinstated, but many teachers reportedly are
afraid of their students. Crime has been at a high
level even though the public security apparatus
has been reorganized to deal more effectively
with the problem, suggesting that public security
officials are also less than decisive.)
4,0 [These instances of disenchantment and
;t t; to Peking
s i [This political miasma has apparently spilled
over into industrial enterprises where factory
mana ers are reluctant to assert their authority.
~LRecent commen-
taries in domes is me is ave attacked such
"anarchism" and have called for more "revolu-
tionary discipline." The commentaries often
singled out new workers for criticism, suggesting
that some of the trouble has been caused by
youths who were leftist Red Guards during the
Cultural Revolution. If so, some recently rehabili-
tated factory managers have demonstrated little
inclination to crack down on their former tor-
mentors, perhaps because they fear the tables
may again be turned][The problem of control in
social disorder are no doubt irri a ing
but they present no serious threat to the regime.
Indeed, one of the more striking developments
been the level of 25X1
h
as
over the past few years
economic progress attained in the face of political
conflict. In any event, the caution being exercised
by officials at the lower levels is likely to con-
tinue until the leaders at the center resolve their
fiinriamental policy and personnel problems. =
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
Iftow SECRET
4 Prime Minister Heath has imposed a 90-day
freeze on wages and prices. His action followed
I several frustrating months of trying to talk in-
dustry and union leaders into accepting a volun-
tary anti-inflationary pact. Whether the freeze
+'A will work depends largely on the willingness of
the militant left-wing unions to cooperate. J
+S' f he effort to slow Britain's rampant infla-
tion comes at a critical juncture, with EC entry
less than two months away. Retail prices are
rising at nearly eight percent annually and manual
workers' wages at more than 15 percent. These
increases, as well as the lack of progress in the
talks on voluntary restraints, contributed to ster-
ling's recent weakness. The pound fell to an all-
time low of $2.32 in late October. More ominous
for the long haul, new investment has been
frightened off, hampering modernization of
British industry.]
4'! [The freeze went into effect on 6 November,
although the 90-day period will not begin until
the bill receives royal assent. Government sources
expect the bill, already through its second reading
in Commons, to become law at the end of the
month. The bill contains a provision for ex-
tending the freeze an extra 60 days, so that it
could last as long as six months. Despite the
failure so far, Heath still hopes to work out a
voluntary anti-inflation agreement. Any pact,
statutory or voluntary, must have at least the
passive acceptance of labor and management to
succeed.
1~. Anticipation of the freeze seriously dimin-
ishec its initial impact. An estimated 1.2 million
workers got under the wire to win pay increases,
and automobile manufacturers raised prices by
five percent or more last week. Stores recently
have been hiking prices, by as much as 20 per-
cent. ,1
4/,_ The public welcomed the freeze, hoping it
7would curtail the rise in consumer prices and the
decline in the value of savings. The government
4 ' has set up hot lines to receive complaints about
violations and has asked for public support in
making the regulations stick. Business leaders,
who had been cooperating with the government
on voluntary price restrictions, regard controls as
a step toward putting the economy in order be-
fore EC entry in January. A slower rate of infla-
tion would aid Britain's export potential and per-
mit domestic producers to compete on more even
terms with other European firms. A representa-
tive of the powerful Confederation of British
Industry, however, commented last week that
wage and price controls should provide for
orderly increases.J
4.`) Cooperation from the unions looks doubt-
ful. Along with the Labor Party, they are ex-
pected to mount stiff opposition on the grounds
that the program curtails their right to strike for
higher wages and improved working conditions.
The unions dislike the provision giving the govern-
ment power to take unions and companies to
court if they flout the freeze. Trades Union Con-
gress leaders have indicated they will not resume
talks on a voluntary pact until the 90-day freeze
ends. Whether the talks resume will depend
largely on the ability of the more moderate union
leaders to convince left-wing militants that talks
are a sensible path.
SECRET
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
Compared with past sessions, the 26th Gen-
eral Assembly so far has been quite temperate.
Except for Chinese jabs at the Soviets, the major
powers have been treating each other gingerly. In
this polite atmosphere, the assembly has been
unable to come to grips with urgent problems.'
.,67 The assembly has not, for example, been
able to come out strongly against terrorism. The
US has pressed hard for convening an interna-
tional conference in 1973 to conclude a treaty on
the protection of diplomats-a move that might
hasten agreement. The assembly's legal com-
mittee, however, has voted to defer consideration
of a treaty draft until next fall, with a view to
adopting it by the end of 1973. Another US
initiative calls for a conference to conclude a
general treaty against terrorism, but many UN
members want this matter put off to next year..
The Soviet Union has been trying to help the
US modify its anti-terrorism proposal to attract
maximum support. The Soviets also have tried to
make their own initiatives widely acceptable.
They were willing, for example, to modify their
proposal for a world disarmament conference to
make it more palatable to the US, although it is
still doubtful that the two countries will be able
to get together on this issue. I
5~) The Chinese continue to attack Soviet
initiatives. They called Moscow's non-use-of-force
proposal a "sheer hoax" and pose impossible con-
ditions for Chinese participation in a world dis-
armament conference. Peking's representatives,
however, are becoming known less for their
polemics than for their grasp of UN issues and
skillful diplomacy. They know the superpowers
no longer call all the shots at the UN. The US
anti-terrorism resolution, for example, cannot be
approved without African and Asian votes, and
without similar support the US will have a hard
time winning assembly endorsement of a reduc-
tion in its contribution to the UN budget..
60 [During the last month of the assembly,
several issues will be resolved to one degree or
another. The delegates will likely pass a terrorism
resolution, though it may not be one totally
agreeable to the US, The Soviet proposals for a
world disarmament conference and the non-use of
force may also be approved. There may be a
resolution calling for a comprehensive nuclear test
ban. The US may even get its assessment reduced.
Little will be done to advance perennial issues
such as the Middle East problem toward solution,
The assembly is almost certain, however, to ap-
prove the recommendations of this year's Stock-
holm environmental conference and to prepare
the way for a law of the sea conference, probably
in early 1974.
(per [The overriding question in their national
election on 29 November is whether the kind of
conservative coalition that has governed the
Netherlands for most of the past 14 years can be
reconstituted. Twenty parties are competing for
voter attention. Although the center-right coali-
tion partners enjoy distinct advantages, the latest
polls indicate that they will fall short of a col-
(,,jlective majority. The three confessional parties
seem likely to suffer the greatest losses as the
voters turn to secular and leftist parties. An op-
position progressive bloc led by the Labor Party
may receive as much as 40 percent of the vote.3
66- LNevertheless, the Biesheuvel government-
composed of the confessional parties plus the
Liberals-can derive some encouragement from
(;,recent developments. Two weeks ago it demon-
strated its solidarity by defeating an opposition
attempt to cut the 1973 defense budget. More
importantly, the Democratic Socialists, a small
party that bolted the coalition last July, now hint
that they might rejoin their former colleagues.
The Liberals are openly advocating a restoration
of the five-party coalition that was formed after
the 1971 national elections.
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
[This new spirt of cooperation arises from a
feeling on the part of many that there is no viable
alternative to another center-right arrangement.
Earlier this month, the Labor Party tried to lure
the Catholic People's Party from its coalition
partners by proposing pre-electoral talks, but the
attempt failed.)
)Negotiations among the center right parties
will not be easy, however, and there is little
assurance that a coalition of these parties will be a
stable one. The Democratic Socialists, conserva-
tive on economic matters, are reiterating their
demand for vigorous anti-inflationary measures as
payment for their support. Last month, prices
were 7.4 percent higher than a year ago.]
(Prime Minister Biesheuvel, sensitive to pro-
labor sentiment within the Catholic People's
Party and his own Anti-Revolutionary Party, has
been unwilling to institute wage or price controls.
He prefers the easier policy of "voluntary re-
straint" on the part of labor and business. The
conclusion last week of a voluntary accord on
wage and price guidelines for 1973 is a plus for
the government, but Biesheuvel's failure to stem
inflationary pressures may still strengthen the
hand of the Democratic Socialists.
az
z0
z
w J
Q
0O
FINLAND: THE KEKKONEN CONNECTION
(/"6 , L,7 1 68 )
!Helsinki's draft treaty with the EC is now
enmeshed with Finnish domestic politics, and
several of Finland's eight major parties are with-
holding support for the agreement. The touchy
question of exceptional legislation to extend Pres-
ident Kekkonen's term of office has become
entangled with treaty approval.
Recently, a Swedish newspaper--claiming
that its report was based on the verbatim record
of Kekkonen's talks with Soviet leaders last
August-said that Brezhnev had warned of the
negative consequences for Finland if Helsinki
ratified a treaty with the EC. According to the
story, only Kekkonen's personal pledge to main-
tain close bilateral ties with the Soviets mollified
Moscow.
The story may exaggerate the strength of
Soviet reservations, but it does add substance to
other reports linking EC treaty approval and
special legislation to extend the President's term.
Center Party chairman Virolainen hinted of such
linkage following negotiations with the Social
Democrats earlier this month. Both parties will
hold executive committee meetings next week to
discuss a package deal involving cooperation on
PARTY
POSITIONS
ON CURRENT ISSUES
O
osed t
Support
pp
o
Presidential
Opposed to
Number of Seats
Party -
~ Linkage
1 Extension
j EC Treaty
in-Parliament
X*
55
Center Party
3
35
Swedish Peoples Party
Liberal Party
~--
Conservatives
X**
Rural Party
X
18
Christian Peoples Party
X
4
Communists
37
*Presuming the party executive approves the linkage at its mid-November meeting
**The Conservatives prefer a referendum on the presidential extension question
SECRET
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECKE I
the EC issue, on domestic economic questions,
and on special legislation to extend the Presi-
dent's term.
Right now, only the Center Party approves
linking the EC treaty and presidential extension.
The Social Democrats may have difficulty swal-
lowing the tradeoff. The other two coalition
partners-the Liberal Party and the Swedish
Peoples Party-oppose the automatic extension of
Kekkonen's term. The Centrists and the Social
Democrats might try to persuade the large Con-
servative Party, which favors the EC treaty, to
support the linkage by offering concessions on
the pension reform and other fiscal matters. Fur-
thermore, the "revelation" that Moscow acqui-
esced in Finland's EC arrangement only after
Kekkonen's personal pledge of continued cooper-
ation with the Soviets may convince the other
parties of the necessity of linking the EC treaty,
which most Finns support, to the extension of
Kekkonen's presidency, which is le
popular.
UGANDA: NEXT THE BRITISH
T A i mana ed to net out 00 TThe President also has ordered that all Asians
ns
g
1 All but a ew sca
Uganda by President Amin's deadline of 8 No- must assemble on 9 November at selected loca-
vember. About 35,000 who are citizens of the tions where government officials will count them
UK, India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh departed for and determine if they are Ugandan citizens, state-
those countries. Several thousand stateless Asians less, or exempted from the expulsion order.
left for the US, Canada and other countries.] According to the government, the Asians will
,bout 1,200 stateless Asians remained after the then have to select a rural area to which they will
deadline, however, along with a few thousand be relocated.
Asians holding Ugandan papers and Asians
exempted from the expulsion order because they
possess certain skills..
3 [Amin evidently will turn on the British next.
Last weekend, the Ugandan President, who now
labels the expulsion of the Israelis and Asians as
'~`;~ 1Amin, who once indicated that stateless "part of an economic war" designed to put the
Asians would be placed in detention camps, re- economy in Ugandan hands, announced that his
cently gave assurances that the remaining Asians next step will be "aimed against the British.'I[The
will "be dealt with humanely.'J The UN and other President has kept up a steady stream of charges
Ii relief agencies have set up departure centers for ' against the British Government and its citizens
stateless Asians and probably will attempt to living in Uganda. Recently, he accused British
unced that the
d
anno
move them to Europe and elsewhere by the endue businessmen of spying an
r ill "bu out" British owned farms in
w y
f
l
ti
o
ng
a
of the week) jRumors have been circu
i
s
weeks, however, that the army will take drab
action against those who remain. Roadblocks
have been re-established, the army has been
placed on full alert, and house-to-house searches
are likely.
(j min has directed that Asians who are
Ugandan citizens must leave the cities and live in
rural areas where they will be permitted to engage
in little more than subsistence farming. This in
regime
western Uganda. British residences in the area
have since been searched by security forces.]
~Gf JAmin has tempered these remarks with high
praise for British leaders and by saying he
effect will hasten the departure of citizen Asians. I
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
SECRET
THE ARABS: GATHERING IN KUWAIT
;The usual wrangling is expected when Arab
defense and foreign ministers convene in Kuwait
on 15 November. Kuwaiti officials preparing for
the meeting readily admit that there is little hope
of meaningful military or economic cooperation
among Arabs unless their differences are resolved.
For this reason, Kuwait has recently been
involved in a number of mediation efforts. These
have been directed at problems between Lebanon
and the fedayeen, Egypt and Jordan, Jordan and
the fedayeen, Egypt and Sudan, and between the
two Yemens. Kuwait was chosen as the location
for the meeting because it is considered neutral
ground where virtually all Arab representatives
can come. I
;Most Arab states, with the apparent excep-
tion of Jordan, are planning to attend. The
Jordanians have been chary of attending Arab
conclaves since the assassination of Prime Minister
Wasfi Tal by a Black September team when he
went to Cairo to attend a similar meeting.
Jordan's problems with Egypt and the other
Arabs may well be one of the topics on the
agenda in Kuwait. The assembled Arabs will also
discuss a coordinated Arab plan for dealing with
the Israelis. Such a plan will not be easy to
LEBANON: LEASHING THE FEDAYEEN
)The Lebanese Army is keeping a close rein
on the fedayeen through roadblocks, checkpoints,
ambushes, and patrols. The US defense attache in
Beirut reported that no fedayeen have reinfil-
trated into the areas that were cleared after the
government issued its ultimatum on 17 Septem-
ber. The guerrillas have also been kept away from
populated areas in the south and away from the
border.
Y' Nevertheless, the Lebanese Army does not
want to take stronger measures that might pro-
voke an all-out confrontation with the fedayeen.
Such a development would strain the army's
resources and exact a heavy toll in Lebanese lives
and property, especially in cities where the
-7'fedayeen are strong.][So far, the Lebanese popula-
tion, including the generally pro-fedayeen Sunni
Muslims, have acquiesced in the government's
policies. Army morale is high, and it is con-
ceivable that the government may eventually try
to impose further restrictions, such as control
over the refugee camps.
, ;'Despite the army's success so far, the
Lebanese, and guerrilla leader Yasir Arafat
himself, are concerned about keeping extremists
among the fedayeen in check. Continuing minor
skirmishes between army units and undisciplined
bands of guerrillas reflect the restiveness of the
Iocal fedayeen and the ineffectiveness of
fedayeen leadership.)fThe smaller, more extremist
groups in the Palestine Liberation Organization
repudiated immediately the September agreement
that the leadership signed with the government.
Within Arafat's own Fatah group, the largest of
the fedayeen organizations, extremists have con-
demned Arafat for "capitulating" to the Leba-
nese; last month there were two bloody fights
between pro- and anti-Arafat elements. J
z ~,1he power struggle within Fatah is stim-
ulating further fragmentation of the organization.
Fatah's terrorist arm, Black September, may be
ready to split from its parent organization. Black
September's militant leaders apparently believe
they are losing out in the power struggle. J
The Lebanese suspect that Syria is en-
couraging the infighting among the guerrillas in an
effort to replace Arafat with someone more
susceptible to Syrian control and less amenable to
compromise with the Lebanese.l [Memories of
Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1958 and 1969
are still fresh in Beirut, and the Lebanese realize
that a fedayeen movement directed by Damascus
would be more difficult to contain. The Syrians
reminded Beirut of their ability to cause trouble
last summer when they instigated raids by one
guerrilla group into Israel in violation of the
"freeze" then in effect.
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRE I 'No,
CYPRUS: THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS
~7 ! [A bit of progress has improved the climate
for the intercommunal talks, now in their fifth
month. At the urging of the UN participant, the
: h entatives have
k
d T
I lid'
is rep.
ur
mainland Greek an
presented a proposal for reshaping the legislature
to fulfill both national and communal functions.
The proposed legislature would consist of 60
Greek Cypriot and 15 Turkish Cypriot deputies, a
ratio more closely reflecting the relative size of
the two groups than the 35-15 split specified in
the 1960 constitution. In addition to national
legislative functions, the two groups of deputies
would meet separately to exercise the local gov-
ernment powers given by the 1960 constitution
to the two communities.']
(/ Even if the two sides adopted the new legis-
lature, the road ahead would be rough. The nego-
tiators would still have to face up to the question
of which matters should be considered local and
which national. This question has stalemated the
talks in the past and could easily do so
again.
MOROCCO: ANOTHER FALSE START
j ,Last week, King Hassan appointed his
brother-in-law, Ahmed Osman, to form a coali-
tion government, but principal political leaders
refused to negotiate with the prime minister -
designate) (Osman is the director of the royal
';'+cabinet, and most politicians view his appoint-
ment as clear evidence that Hassan does not
intend to give up any of his power.]
!~`J [The proposal has some attractive features for
both communities, and Turkish Cypriot nego-
tiator, Rauf Denktash, and his Greek Cypriot
counterpart, Glafcos Clerides, have registered
;d guarded approvaJI The two men are proceeding
their communities' will-
th
ey assess
cautiously as
ingness to compromise and calculate what effect
flfhe principal opposition groups-the con-
servative Istiglal and the two factions of the left-
wing National Union of Popular Forces-had
expected one of their ranks to be named prime
minister. These opposition groups are all de-
manding a diminution of the King's power and
major economic and political reforms as prereq-
uisites for cooperation. The Istiqlal has added to
the list the release of all political prisoners, the
elimination of all foreign bases, and theTnationali-
zation of basic sectors of the economy. 1
ji31 'tDenktash, for example, reacted favorably to
the proposal because it would force the Greek
side to revive the defunct communal authority,
thus supporting the Turkish contention that com-
munal affairs should be left to the communities.?
i It Once the proposal was made public, he said he
had some serious reservationsf(Having announced
his intention to run for vice president next Febru-
ary, Denktash clearly wants to avoid alienating
those Turkish Cypriots holding out for complete
local autonomy. At the same time, he knows
Ankara, which supports a compromise solution,
i- will have a major influence on the contest.
~t Fr' [Clerides, meanwhile, also received the pro-
posal favorably at first, because of its more
equitable distribution of parliamentary seats The
Greek Cypriot Council of Ministers, however, has
since cautioned Clerides to withhold endorsement
until Denktash clarifies his position. In any case,
the Greek Cypriot decision rests with President
Makarios, who has yet to take a stand.]
I t(p [Hassan apparently feels that the opposition
price is too high. The parties' rejection of Osman
is undoubtedly an embarrassment to the King and
may well intensify his antagonism toward all
politicians. He may direct that a government be25X1
Complete stalemate)
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
OMAN: STATE OF A REBELLION
-'t [The guerrilla struggle in Oman's Dhofar
Province, which began as a normal separatist
movement, is in its ninth year and has become a
leftist-controlled war of liberation} The ruler of
Oman, Sultan Qabus, is optimistic about the out-
come, but he knows the fight will not be brought
to a quick end.
j`The fighting goes on hundreds of miles from
the country's population centers and does not
directly touch most Omanis. Nevertheless, Sultan
Q
b
a
us worries that vital domestic development
projects may have to be postponed because of the
growing costs of the war. More than half of the
sultanate's annual revenue of about $140 mil-
lion-almost exclusively derived from oil-is being
spent to combat the insurgents.]
p The 1,000 rebels operate in small bands,
ehploy hit-and-run tactics and make good use of
the difficult terrain. When pressed by the Sultan's
forces, they pull back to sanctuaries in neigh-
boring Yemen (Aden). The Aden regime appears
to be the only one in the Arab world that pro-
vides arms and money to the rebel Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf.
The group may also get a little aid from Chinaj
,~ ILast month, the Sultan's British-led forces
resumed their offensive against the rebels fol-
lowing the annual summer monsoon, which for
the most part grounds the Omani Air Force.
Much of the success of the Sultan's forces is
attributable to the air force, especially its helicop-
ters and Skyvan transports, which supply units in
isolated mountain posts.T
K In the coming months, Qabus' forces will
step up Operation Simba, an effort to interdict
the principal rebel supply line from Yemen
`~ (Aden). The operation is mounted from Station
Mainbrace, a mountain-ridge army base and
landing strip near the Aden border. More than
1,500 mortar and artillery rounds-up to 80 on
some days-have been fired at the base since last
April. 1
An Omani Skyvan transport off the Dhofar coast.
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
Z f ti
Abu Ohahi
YEMEN
(Aden)
Ai Mukaile
553796 11-72 CIA
Arabian
is bustling with development. Roads around
Salalah are still swept for mines, however, and
barbed wire rings the town.]
jFrom headquarters in the city of Aden, the
Popular Front reports a stream of military clashes
with Omani forces-often exaggerating its success.
1The biggest engagement of the year was back in
-July when a rebel force of about 200 attacked
and almost captured Mirbat, a coastal town about
40 miles east of Salalah. Nearly 50 of the
attackers were killed. Helicopter-borne reinforce-
ments and jet sorties were necessary to turn the
tide in favor of the Sultan. J
c-r [Oman is receiving military assistance from
the UK and several other countries. About 150
British officers lead the Sultan's army and operate
his air force. In addition, Jordan has provided a
limited number of officers, Iran is believed to
have supplied several helicopters and crews, and
about 100 Pakistanis hold middle-level and
technical positions in the army"'
r yfi. [Oman has tried to obtain financial aid from
Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, but has run into
snags. Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi is willing to
a.,, provide funds for civilian development projects,
but prefers not to have his aid used to buy mili-
tary equipment. Zayid fears an adverse reaction
?&' Although Sultan Qabus has declined to set a?4-from Arab radicals if he becomes closely as-
timetable for crushing the rebellion, there are sociated with the military effort. Omani officials
signs that the Omani efforts are succeeding. 0~~have been critical of Saudi sluggishness in
high and the Dhofari provincial capital of Salalah
responding to Omani requests.
) Salalah
\\- tMirbat
Mainbrace
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
IRAQ: OIL AND THE ECONOMY
" IThe nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum
Company's northern oil fields in June has not
seriously affected the country's foreign payments
position. Iraq's balance of payments probably will
show a surplus this year, largely as a result of the
sales of nationalized oil and austerity measures
imposed after nationalization. The domestic
economy, however, has been hard hit by the
austerity measures, which have been unnecessarily
severe. Discontent with the regime, in particular
with strong-man Saddam Tikriti, is becoming
more vocal within military and civilian circles,
including the Baath party. I
Although oil production was sharply cur-
tailed immediately following nationalization, it
has been coming back and now is about 1.4
million barrels per day, compared with the 1.7
million barrels per day produced in 1971. The
current rate of production equals that just before
nationalization.1
1Iraq receives hard currency for almost all of
its oil exports. Basrah Petroleum Company and a
partly state-owned French company are buying
about 1 million barrels per day. The USSR and
East European countries are taking somewhat less
than 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day as
payment for military and economic aid in lieu of
hard currency. Most of the remaining oil is ex-
ported under barter arrangements, some of which
specify partial payment in hard currency. Since
September, Iraq's oil revenues have been roughly
equal to average monthly receipts in 1971.1
jro- jStill, Iraq lost some $130 million in oil
revenues from curtailed output from June
through August. Thus far, Iraq has received an
estimated $50 to $90 million from other Arab
nations to help make up the loss. To conserve
foreign exchange, the government cut imports
sharply, including those for development projects.
Further savings of foreign exchange have occurred
because of the favorable agricultural crop this
year, which has permitted Iraq to export rather
than import grain.)
C The austerity measures and the worsening
domestic economic situation have not helped the
image of the Baathist regime. The Baath justified
nationalization by saying it would raise living
standards. The claim looks hollow today. The
"sacrifice taxes" imposed on all civilian and mili-
tary employees, allegedly enrich Baath leaders
and are a source of extreme irritation. Cuts in
imports have resulted in shortages of consumer
and capital goods. Most importantly, the develop-
ment program, which was just beginning to show
some real progress, has been sharply reduced.j
)The Beirut press has reported the existence
of an alliance among a splinter from the Baath,
disparate anti-Baath groups, and Kurdish leader
Barzani, whose common goal is the eliminationof
the present regime. Neither this nor any other
anti-government combination now seems in a
position to unseat the present leaders without
outside assistance-say from Syria or Iran. The
Baath leaders may be somewhat at odds with each
other, but they will probably be able to hang
together enough to maintain control by means of
strict security measures and terrorist
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY . 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
`-. SECRET
National income this year is likely to decline Imports of raw materials and spare parts for
J =:-
for the first time in six years. The modest gain of industry and fertilizer for agriculture could al-
about four percent a year in recent years resulted leviate some of India's problems. New Delhi, how-
primarily from good weather and good crops, but ` ever, is reluctant to increase such imports for fear
?.: the drought this year will reduce farm output of depleting foreign exchange reserves and pre-
markedly. Prices of food grains and other basic1 cipitating foreign exchange difficulties. Despite a
's! consumer items are rising, while per capita in- high level of foreign exchange reserves-now at
come, hovering around $100 per year, is declin- $1.1 billion, or the equivalent of about six
ing, months' imports-India's foreign exchange com-
mitments are heavy, and reserves have dropped by
lThe Green Revolution and five successive $85 million so far this year. Exports are not doing
years of favorable weather, which brought India well, and foreign debt payments and defense-
steady increases in farm production, account for related foreign expenditures are rising. Net for-
the economic growth since 1967. Because of eign aid slumped to $500 million last year, com-
erratic rainfall this year, the food-grain crop is pared with an average annual $900 million
likely to decline to 95 million tons, about 11 throughout the 1960s.
million tons less than the last crop year. The fall
crop now being harvested is down sharply from
last fall. Inadequate soil moisture and fertilizer
supplies and some farmer resistance to expansion
of irrigation now threaten the spring crop) TURKEY: MELEN SOLDIERS ON
.:: 1Barring a sharp reversal in the prospects for [Prime Minister Melen appears to be weather-
the spring grain crop, New Delhi will need food- ing the squall that blew up when the Republican
grain imports next year well above the 450,000 Peoples Party withdrew support from his govern-
tons already planned. New Delhi's current grain/},5-mentJ Although the military leadership chose to
stocks of 5.5 to 6 million tons are probably avoid a government upheaval at this time, Melen's
adequate to meet the requirements of the public fundamental problem remains: how to enact the
distribution system for the next six months. New reform legislation the military wants.]
Delhi is reluctant to deplete its stocks, however,
and probably will seek grain from abroad. It has
not requested a resumption of US PL-480 ship-
ments, which, until halted late last year, provided
the bulk of the country's food-grain imports.]
jlndustrial production, in a slump for two
years, shows little sign of recovery. Public and
private investment are in the doldrums. Govern-
ment harassment, indecisive industrial policies,
and threats of stepped-up controls, especially over
large private industries that have capital to invest,
continue. There are a host of other problems:
shortages of raw materials, spare parts, and im-
ported capital goods; transport bottlenecks;
electric power shortfalls; strikes and labor unrest;
and managerial weaknesses. Many industries are/
operating well below capacity.t jl
IThe catalyst for the Republican Peoples
Party action was the recent passage of a new
five-year development plan, which the party de-
nounced as capitalist-oriented. In addition to dis-
agreement over social and economic matters,
personal relations between Melen and Republican
Peoples Party leader Ecevit had been souring for
months.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
Although the military leaders have played
down the Republican Peoples Party withdrawal,
they still intend to press for the
re orm program. Melen has had very little success
in moving the program through the legislature. If
the program continues to languish, the military
may replace him with another "above-parties"
prime minister or even assume direct control.j
4s for the Republican Peoples Party, it
seems to have been weakened considerably, at
least in the short run. Perhaps 25 percent of the
party's members of parliament will resign from
the party before the dust settles. Turkey's elder
statesman and former party leader, Ismet Inonu,
has already resigned and may seek to succeed
President Sunay when his term expires in March.
Ten Republican Peoples Party parliamentary dele-
gates resigned earlier this year over the party's
drift to the left and formed the Republican Party.
At least some of the new defectors may join that
group]
)Despite the defections, party purists ap-
parently believe that their organization will be in
a stronger electoral position because it can cam-
paign as a genuine opposition:, _The more
moderate Ecevit has promised to cooperate with
the government on reform legislation-probably
recognizing that without reforms the elections
may not be held at all.
MEXICO: FOREIGN INVESTMENT
'_ (Businessmen and foreign investors are puz- from import duties and restrictive investment
zled over the government's ambivalent attitude regulations as inducements to establish plants
toward foreign investment. On the one hand, they , producing for export,] [Government officials
are reassured by top government officials, includ-1-{-_clearly have swallowed their nationalism in this
ing President Echeverria, that foreign investment instance, chiefly because the program responds to
is welcome when it "accelerates development, im- the administration's economic goals-it creates
proves technology, produces exports, and con- jobs and expands export earnings.
tributes to the achievement of national goals."
Most investors can live with provisos like these'; [Meanwhile, there are signs that the govern-
;At the same time, however, they hear top govern- ment is dissatisfied with several other aspects of
ment officials, including the President, say that foreign investment. The latest foray against
foreign investment must adhere to lofty and hazy private business was the establishment of a gov-
principles such as "service to mankind,,, social ernment enterprise to control the tobacco in-
functions," and "true collective needs.'JThey no dustry. Private tobacco firms, mostly US- and
doubt also are concerned that the government British-owned, will slowly be incorporated into
take-overs of several private firms in the tele- the enterprise, which in time will engage in all
phone, banking, mining, tourist, and tobacco in- activities connected with the production, process-
dustries, although not calamitous for business, ing, and marketing of tobaccol',The government
will lead to more government control., stepped in, one official said, to see that the best
interests of the peasants and workers were pro-
An indication that the government hopes to tected. ]
encourage certain types of foreign investment was
the recent opening up of the "border industry" t--,,. In another area of foreign investment, the
program to most of the country. This program government may be about to take control of
offers foreign companies, mainly US, exemptions contracts to transfer technology. Officials have
SECRET
25X1
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1.0 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
m,me SECRET lwi~
25X1
often complained that Mexico is, among other breaches of the peace by either pro- or anti-
things, paying too high a price for the use of Peronists.]
foreign technologyj~ law has been submitted to
the legislature that would give the government J'-5- This guarantee of Peron's personal safety
almost complete control over such matters as the nearly completes the arrangements for the trip.
transfer of technical services and the leasing of Travel arrangements have been made by Peronist
and payment for patent and trademark rights leaders in Argentina who have chartered an
- Ali+alia airliner for Peron and his entourage. Con-
- -
't The economic nationalism is partly for do-
mestic political consumption, partly to spur Mexi-
can firms to greater efforts, and partly to caution
foreign concerns. Some of the actions the govern-
ment proposes to take might inhibit foreign capi-
tal and technology, but it is more likely that its
proposals will be negotiable. The government
does not seek to undermine the operations of the
domestic private sector and will back off from
measures that seriously jeopardize Mexico's at-
tractiveness for foreign capital. In many areas, the
government is trying to stimulate private enter-
prise. t
'So far, no major Mexican businessman has
taken public issue with the government and none
is likely to do so. Should the government decide
that the country's priority needs require closer
control of the economy, more restrictions on
foreign capital, and more take-overs of private
a real test of wills hetween the govern-
t:- +h
en
ment and the private sector may begin.
THE STAGE IS SET FOR PERON
LPresident Lanusse has added his voice to
those who expect former president Juan Peron to
return to his native Argentina within a short time.
Only hours after Hector Campora, Peron's per-
sonal representative in Argentina, announced on 7
November that the 77-year-old Peron would re-
turn on the 17th, Lanusse told the nation that the
armed forces would guarantee the former presi-
dent's personal safety and warned against any
nlcting swIie, UUL 111 -
impending visit had sown considerable confusion
among both admirers and enemies as to whether
the aging ex-dictator was actually coming.
Campora's announcement, after he had flown to
Madrid to confer with Peron, seemed to reassure
everyone that this time the promise to return
would be kept.,}
i r c- Peron has said before that he would return.
Once he even got as far as Brazil before being
turned back. This announcement could be no
more than another attempt to throw the opposi-
tion off balance and to pressure President Lanusse
into agreeing to Peron's political demands. It
seems more likely, however, that this time Peron
has gone too far and must return or face a serious
loss of prestige. He has been unable to maneuver
the government into barring the trip, and the
negative reaction of his followers to press stories
that the trip was off probably warned him that
his position as the leader of the largest political
movement in Argentina would be seriously
eroded if he failed to appear this time. j
3 lThe speculation in Buenos Aires has been
that when n Peron returns, it will be for only a few
days and for the purpose of personally endorsing
an electoral accord with the military. The short
lead time for the trip and the tenor of Lanusse's
speech indicate that the Peronists and the govern-
ment may be very close to an agreement on the
conduct of the national elections next March and
on the government that will take power in May. It
is uncertain whether the accord will include an
agreement on who will replace Peron on the
Peronist ticket. It is doubtful that there has been
enough time since serious negotiations began for
the military and the Peronists to work out all
aspects of an accord, but the trip could be post-25X1
poned until some time in December or the details
may be worked out after an agreement in princi-
pie is reached.
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
Allende had offered three weeks earlier. This time
the offer was accepted, in part because of the
exhaustion of the strikers' finances but also be-
cause Prats was a guarantor. The terms are more
political than economic, and although Prats may
have commitments from Allende to back him up,
neither man may be able to control the more
reckless members of the government who are bent
on reprisals.
ln fact, despite the easing of political ten-
sions i
sions and the restoration of economic activity,
the entrance of the military into the cabinet is
not a source of satisfaction for many Chileans.
There are military officers who believe that Prats'
decision to bolster the Allende government re-
flects his own ambitions more than the interests
of the military, and they will judge his conduct
accordingly. 1
Lflb, The naming of the army commander, Gen-
eral Prats, as interior minister was the key to
halting the long protest shutdown. His agreement
to join the cabinet, along with an air force general
and an admiral who accepted lesser portfolios,
lent military prestige to President Allende's gov-
ernment and provided an implicit guarantee to
the opposition that the legislative elections next
March will be fairly conducted. The retention of
strong civilian ministers and the choice of several
new ones indicate, however, that Allende plans
only tactical moderation of the political and eco-
nomic policies that led to the shutdown. J
1} brats' first order of business as interior min-
ister was to meet with the protest leaders. He
offered terms that differed little from those
Prats and Allende
Tensions Easing
SECRET
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
(Many of Allende's own political advisers
yielded only reluctantly to the President's long-
standing desire to get the military more deeply
involved. They rightly suspect that this move
strengthens his position more than that of the
Popular Unity coalition. The Communists are
fundamentally suspicious of the military, and
most Socialists believe the military ministers will
be a stumbling block in the rapid imposition of
the coalition program. Some striking groups are
not convinced that their interests will be pro-
tected; others find the conditions of the govern-
ment's terms less than reassuring.;
?4 J"Allende, having reasserted his authority, may
now go ahead with the trip he had planned to
Mexico, Cuba, and UN headquarters later this
month. Some reports include Moscow on the
itinerary.
Although the shutdown is over, the damage
to the economy will continue to be felt for
several months. The shutdown contributed to
serious supply and distribution problems; to in-
creasing shortages of farm supplies, such as ferti-
lizers seeds and pesticides; and to a further delay
Tear Gas Disperses Strikers, October 1972
JIn the near term, available transport facilities
largely will be used to meet immediate needs for
grain, fuel, and other necessities, consequently,
shortages of less critical items are likely to persist.
)the transportation system, which was strained
'before the shutdown began, will be hard pressed
Ito eliminate the accumulation of goods that have
piled up. One of the striking truckers' major
grievances was the shortage of tires, batteries, and
other spare parts. Repair time for both the truck
fleet and the nation's railroad stock has been
increasing. Moreover, port congestion became
more severe during the strike as few goods were
removed from the wharves or port warehouses
after they were unloaded,
in plantings. Harvest prospects, poor before the ) 5-5- [After four weeks, during which only limited
strike, have worsened appreciably because the in- consumer supplies were available, housewives'
terruption occurred at the height of the planting larders are severely depleted and restocking will
season. Food stocks are at their lowest level in increase the demand for goods in short supply.
C11 many years, and imports of high-cost foods such Since stores reopened, supplies of many essential
as beef and butter have been cut because of p.t.,consumer items have simply disappeared from the
foreign-exchange shortages. 7 shelves. J
[Initially, the shutdown had little effect on
industry because industrial workers did not par-
ticipate. As the strike continued, however, many
firms began to run out of the raw materials and
c components normally delivered by striking
truckers. Grain shortages at mills in Santiago
threatened serious bread shortages, while other
[ (1 industries also were pinched. When retail outlets
closed, inventories of finished goods began to pile
up. Production in many plants will have to be
held down until raw materials can be obtained
and inventories of finished goods depleted..)
J ? During the disruptions, President Allende
pushed ahead with the nationalization of several
large private firms, and many of these will not be
returned. With this exception, all trucks and
businesses requisitioned are to be returned to
,their owners now that the strike has ended. The
' 'government, however, almost certainly intends to
retain a much larger role in the marketing and
distribution process than it had before the disrup-
tion.
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nov 72
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
UNITED
STATES
Mian t
(PS. Air Force Eastern Missile
Test Range Facility ELEUTHERA
14assau* NEW U.S. Navy Facility
PROVIDENCE
CAT
ISLAND
BAHAMA ISLANDS
(U.K.) GREAT
EXUMA
`U.S. Coast Guard
LORAN Station
) tThe Nassau government, facing a projected budget deficit of at least $15 million by
the end of the year, may turn to the four US defense-related installations in the Bahamas
for revenue. Existing"-agreements with Great Britain, which now runs the Bahamas'
foreign relations, give the US full freedom in its use of these facilities. The base rights will
have to be renegotiated since the islands become independent next July.]
)i By then, the general exodus of white businessmen following Prime Minister Pind
ling's overwhelming election victory last September will probably make the island's
monetary problems even more acute. Businessmen whose capital holdings are valued at
about $2 million plan to sell or close their shops. Others have already left the islands with
large amounts of US dollars, resulting in the virtual disappearance of large-denomination
;',bills. This caused the government to enact some hasty foreign exchange control measures;
but nothing has been done to reassure jittery businessmen.7
( 1The worsening of the Bahamas' financial problems so close to independence may
impel Pindling to seek help from the US or Britain. Should foreign governments turn him
down, he may be tempted to place pressure on the US about the bases or he might seek
financial help from private sources, possibly including some from criminal elements.
SECRET
Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Nnv 77
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
Secret
Secret
-- ,~~ Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3 NMI
 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
"~ Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Soviet Naval Operations Off West Africa
Secret
Np 43
10 November 1972
No. 0395/72B
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS OFF WEST AFRICA
14 IMoscow has been quietly developing its naval operations in the waters off West Africa
during the past four years. As a consequence, the Soviets have achieved short-range political
and economic gains in West Africa as well as a potential beachhead for future military
operations.]
1~- On occasion, these Soviet naval operations have assumed an aspect of old fashioned
"gunboat diplomacy." For example, in 1968, the Soviets used these limited operations to
coerce the Ghanaian regime following Accra's seizure of two Soviet fishing trawlers. More
recently, Moscow has used its navy to support the Guinean Government since the Portu-
guese-sponsored raid on Conakry in November 1970.1
Special Report
10 November 1972
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
Area of Soviet West African Naval Operations
YI.) The Soviet naval force off West Africa since late 1970 usually has consisted of two surface
ships and a support ship. Measured in ship days, these operations make up less than five percent
of the total Soviet naval activity on the high seas and are only about a third of the level of
Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean. They are noteworthy primarily because they represent an
example of the limited use of naval power to further Soviet interests.)
41VVest Africa is but one area where the Soviet Navy is being used for political effect. Soviet
warships have also been used to further Moscow's political objectives in the Mediterranean, the
Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. The spread of these operations reflects the general expansion
of the Soviet Navy's world-wide mission.]
Ghana: Pressuring a Small African State
j4 In October 1968, Ghana seized two
Soviet fishing trawlers that had violated its
territorial waters. The Accra government
suspected the trawlers were rendering clan-
destine support to subversives seeking to
restore the ousted Nkrumah.T
[In early February 1969, two Soviet
missile destroyers, a diesel submarine, and an
oiler left the Mediterranean and headed south
along the African coast. The Soviets ap-
parently wanted to make certain that the
Ghanaians were well aware of the warships
and had them stop en route for a short port
visit in nearby Guinea..]
13 )The port visit in Guinea was unusual in
that Moscow announced not only the arrival
of the ships and their anticipated length of
stay, but also confirmed their departure. The
Soviet warships then moved to a station off
the coast of Ghana-not close enough to be
Special Report -2-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
seen from the beach but where they could be
spotted by Ghanaian patrols. 3
13 tThe presence of the Soviet warships appar-
ently contributed to Accra's decision to release
the trawlers and their crews, although a stern
diplomatic note from Secretary Brezhnev, Soviet
economic pressures, and the failure of Ghanaian
officials to find any proof of espionage activity
doubtless also contributed to Accra's decision to
let the Soviets go. Nevertheless, Moscow had used
its navy in a limited show of force to increase its
political leverage against a small African state.]
Guinea: Propping Up the Toure Regime
i4- lMoscow's initial involvement in Guinea was
back in 1958 when Soviet aid proved instrumen-
tal in keeping the Sekou Toure regime afloat. At
the time, the French abruptly granted Guinea
independence and withdrew their support. Since
then, Soviet-Guinean relations have remained gen-
erally cordial, but with some strains. Although
President Toure emphasizes his country's mem-
bership in the socialist camp, he is fundamentally
an African nationalist who reacts strongly to any
development he believes compromises Guinea's
sovereignty or his dignity. Toure has expelled
Soviet ambassadors on two occasions because he
suspected them of links with enemies of his
regime. J
[Moscow also has been involved economically
in Guinea, including cooperative ventures with
Conakry in fishing and bauxite mining. Soviet
military and economic assistance to Guinea from
1958 through 1971 amounted to $215 million
dollars. In 1971, Moscow exported $12.4-million
worth of goods to Guinea while importing about
$3.3 million-primarily bauxite and agricultural
products.
WEST AFRICA: Scope of Soviet Naval Operations*
217
Underway
In port
96 93
N 0 J F M A M J J
1970 1971
553793 11-72 CIA
Special Report
SECRET
144
131 131
67 70
M A M J
1972
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET A
WEST AFRICAN OPERATIONS
NAVAL UNITS BY TYPE*
1972 (through October)
1 destroyer
1 destroyer
1 missile cruiser
1 missile destroyer
7 missile destroyers
5 missile destroyers
1 tanker
1 attack submarine
2 destroyers
3 total
2 landing ships
2 attack submarines
1 repair ship
5 landing ships
2 replenishment ships
2 replenishment ships
5 tankers
8 tankers
19 total
1 submarine tender
26 total
*Including naval-associated merchant ships,
14., [The Soviet naval involvement came as a
direct result of the amphibious assault in Novem-
ber 1970 on Conakry by a combined force of
Portuguese military elements and Guinean exiles
opposed to Toure. President Toure-fearing sub-
sequent Portuguese attacks-asked several nations,
including the USSR, for assistance in the defense
of his government.]
r ', [in the early period Soviet naval ships off
eonakry usually consisted of two destroyers and
an oiler. Two surface-to-air missile (SAM) ships
were in the small force that visited Conakry in
March 1971. Since then, a total of ten other
SAM-equipped ships have called at Conakry.
Special Report
i4- [These Soviet missile ships probably were not
the primary deterrent to further Portuguese
attacks, and it is not likely that they would have
engaged hostile aircraft. Toure, however, may
have believed that they would.I
J j- [n August 1971, an Alligator-class landing
ship joined the Soviet naval contingent in Cona-
kry. It had a light load of amphibious vehicles and
a small complement of troops. When fully loaded,
a ship of this type can carry a battalion of some
500 troops plus their amphibious equipment,
which includes PT-76 tanks. Alligator landing
ships have been used for political effect in the
Middle East and in the Indian Ocean, where they
have engaged in naval exercises and staged mili-
tary demonstrations for friendly states. By mid-
1972, the Alligator had become the mainstay of
the Soviet contingent in Guinea. Thus far, the
Soviets have not used the ship for a naval demon-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
ti./ Jtuht I
In September and October 1972, one of
these landing ships, anchored in Conakry's
harbor, moved close into shore opposite the presi-
dential palace during night-time hours in an
apparent show of increased protection of Toure.
The move took place during Guinean independ-
ence celebrations when Toure was claiming that
another invasion was imminent.
Scope of Soviet Operations Off West Africa
/ )The largest Soviet force to make the scene
off West Africa included a Kresta-class guided-
missile cruiser, a Kotlin-class guided-missile
destroyer, an Alligator-class landing ship, an F-
class diesel submarine, and an oiler. This force
visited Conakry last January before heading for
the Caribbean]
L-[During 1971, the average length of stay per
ship was 59 days, while total ship days exceeded
1,000. Between August and December 1971, the
Soviet ships spent more than a third of their time
in port. Thus far in 1972, the level of operations
is 60 percent higher than in 1971, and the Soviet
ships visiting Conakry have spent virtually all of
their time in Conakry port or at anchor off
nearby Tamara Island..]
/L 1Moscow appears to be keeping only as many
ships in Conakry as deemed necessary to assure
President Toure of Soviet protection. Since July
1972, there has been a decrease in Soviet naval
activity in the waters off Guinea. The landing ship
returned to Soviet waters in mid-October, and a
lone submarine tender has been maintaining the
Soviet presence in West African waters. President
Toure, however, is again showing the jitters with
the approaching second anniversary of the Portu-
guese invasion, and a Soviet destroyer and tanker
that are headed toward Conakry could arrive in
port by 10 November.)
Alligator Class Landing Ship
Special Report
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRE 1
the Soviet naval foothold in Conakry has
provided a convenient base from which to make
good-will visits to other West African ports. Since
early 1971, for instance, Soviet warships and
auxiliaries have visited Freetown in Sierra Leone
and Dakar in Senegal, as well as ports in Morocco.
Moscow also has a fishing fleet working off
Guinea. In addition, several Soviet space support
and oceanographic survey ships frequently op-
erate in these waters. "i
Potential Soviet Military Gains
)Although the Soviet Navy is off West Africa
more for the political than the military gain, there
are some military benefits,]
2The West African ports that the Soviets fre-
quent are convenient stops for warships to and
from European ports and the Indian Ocean.
During 1971, for instance, three of the naval units
--stopping in West Africa were on their way to the
Indian Ocean. Conakry, however, has not become
a regular way station for the Soviet Navy.]
)4, [Nevertheless, Conakry could provide a well-
located shore facility for Soviet submarines. The
waters off West Africa could be used for logistic
support of submarines in wartime or during
periods of prolonged tension when Moscow might
not wish to force its way through the Norwegian
Sea where NATO's anti-submarine warfare forces
are concentrated.]
)In 1967, a Soviet submarine tender, a
Guise-missile support ship, and a nuclear-powered
cruise-missile submarine spent three months in
these tropical waters evaluating logistic support
methods for submarine operations on the high
seas. Several other submarines and surface ships
operated with this group for shorter periods. In
early 1972, Moscow also sent its newest naval
replenishment ship, the Boris Chilikin, to West
ZAfrican ports for an apparent evaluation of its
fleet support capabilities
GUINEA
Presidential palace
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
_ bLUKL I
Fleet Auxiliaries
and Naval Associated
Merchant Ships
Surface Warships
and Attack Submarines
Statistical Comparisons
Soviet West African Naval Operations 1971*
A- Iln a general war with NATO, the Soviets
would almost certainly try to get a large part of
their submarines to sea. A submarine tender op-
erating from a port such as Conakry could pro-
vide support services such as replenishment,
change of crews, and minor repairs. In addition, a
Lama-class cruise-missile support ship located
there would permit Moscow to resupply its
cruise-missile submarines and surface ships, most
of which carry no on-board reserves..
-... [The Canary and Cape Verde basins are areas
of frequent operations of Soviet oceanographic
research ships. Unique hydrometeorological and
oceanographic conditions make this area a signifi-
cant zone for research into basic ocean sciences.
Much of the oceanographic and hydrographic
activity conducted there thus far does not appear
to be directly related to anticipated military op-
erations. Soviet hydroacoustic research ships have
if worked the waters east of the mid-Atlantic ridge
for the past ten years. The ridge forms an effec-
tive sound barrier between submarine detection
systems in the western Atlantic and submarine
transit lanes and operating areas to the east. In
Special Report
NOTE: In order to obtain comparibility
deployments of Ballistic Missile Submarines,
Cruise Missile Submarines, Intelligence
Collectors, Research Ships, and Space
Support Ships have been excluded from
the computations.
addition, space-support ships stationed in the
Canary and Cape Verde areas monitor the re-
entry phase of Soviet manned-space operations as
well as the injection from earth orbit of Soviet
space probes. 1
14 )Use of a port facility in West Africa for
resupply could extend the duration of present
distant patrols by Soviet submarines in the
western Atlantic. This could increase on-station
availability of the submarines by as much as 30 to
60 percent. j
4- [Soviet submarines fitted with the new
3,100-nautical-mile missile would be within
potential launch range of the US coast soon after
leaving Conakry, but the problems involved in
basing ballistic missile submarines overseas prob-
ably weigh against such a use. Attack submarines
using cruise missiles and torpedoes operating from
a base in Guinea, would be only a few days from
vital Western shipping lanes from Europe to
South America, South Africa, and the Indian
Ocean. The jumbo tankers carrying oil from the
Middle East to Europe and North America would
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
SECRET
be vulnerable to Soviet submarines operating in facilities, there are significant political reasons
these waters. By the end of this decade, about 25 why the Soviets would be reluctant to make the
percent of the US total crude oil supply and over heavy economic and military commitment neces-
half of its imports will traverse these seaways. sary to establish a permanent base in Guinea.
About 75 percent of Western Europe's oil %4Moscow, moreover, realizes that Toure is unlikely
imports, or two thirds of its t tal supply, will also to grant such facilities. The Soviets have been
be delivered via this sea routej often enough in becoming deeply involved
in the support of one-man regimes. In this con-
text, they appreciate that their present entree
into Guinea is largely due to Toure's distrust of
his own security forces' ability to protect him and
Rumors have that an overbearing Soviet presence might unleash
abounded since 9 that a Soviet submarine nationalistic forces that could erode whatever
base would be built on Tamara Island but Mos- gains the Soviets have made.
cow has not pressed the issue. Despite the mili-
tary advantages that might be gained by such
Special Report
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3
`r'
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09900020001-3