WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009500030001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1972
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A009500030001-6
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
DHS review(s) completed.
Secret
Secret
7 April 1972
No. 0364/72
Copy Nn
47
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday
morning by the office of Current Intelligence, reports
and analyzes significant developments of the week
through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes
material coordinated with or prepared by the Office
of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Re
search, and the Directorate of Science and Technol-
ogy. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment
and therefore published separately as Special Reports
are listed in the contents pages.
The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified infor-
mation affecting the national security of the United
States? within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmis-
sion or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an
unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CONTENTS (7Apri11972)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
1 Vietnam: The Long-Awaited Offensive
3 Ostpolitik: New Ratification Moves
4 South Asia: Talk About Peace Talks
6 Indochina
8 China: More Personnel Problems
9 New Zealand: New Economic Policy
25X6
Soviets Set Cooperative Theme
Moscow and Peking: Talking Again
Fock Goes to Moscow
Smallpox: Yugoslavia and Elsewhere
Czechoslovakia: Exchange on Drugs
Italy: New Voting, Old Problems
Crops Threatened in East Europe
16 Lebanon: New Fedayeen Front
16 Turkey: Pressures From the Military
17 The Yemens: Aden Finesses Sana
18 Morocco: Searching for a Government
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
19 Uruguay: A Beef About Beef
20 Dominican Republic: Agrarian Reform
20 Argentina: Riots in the Provinces
21 UNCTAD Meets
22 OAS General Assembly to Meet 25X1
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VIETNAM: THE LONG-AWAITED OFFENSIVE
Recent Communist briefings and planning
documents keyed to the current offensive in the
South indicate that Hanoi is shelving, at least
temporarily, its three-year-old policy of empha-
sizing guerrilla style "peoples war." The new look
in Communist strategy stresses extensive use of
conventional main forces to seize and hold large
chunks of territory. Cadres in Military Region 3
were told in briefings in late March that "main
force punches" would be employed initially to
overextend the allies throughout South Vietnam.
Later phases would include widespread use of
political agitation, terrorism, and local force at-
tacks to shake up government control in the
countryside. The "city struggle," according to
these briefings, would come only after the Com-
munists' grip on the rural areas had been
strengthened.
Enemy documents captured recently in the
western highlands paint an even more specific
picture of a phased build-up of main-force pres-
sure to be followed by a growth in political agita-
tion and terrorism. There is a clear suggestion that
the enemy intends to use main forces to establish
full control of Kontum and Pleiku provinces by
the end of the year.
Communist planning on the eve of the cur-
rent offensive thus seems to foreshadow a pro-
longed military push in which main-force units
will initially do most of the fighting. The docu-
ments from the western highlands assert that this
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Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
North Vietnamese Regulars
Attack on Three Fronts
7 Apr 72
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area will be the primary battlefield of the cam-
paign, but the Communists give every indication
that they will pursue the same strategy with equal
vigor in northern South Vietnam. Communist
siege tactics against selected urban targets are not
ruled out, but there is nothing in the documents
to suggest that the Communists accept their own
current propaganda claims about the imminence
of a popular uprising in the cities in support of
military action in the countryside.
While Hanoi may return to guerrilla tactics
and the political struggle, it does seem to have
decided that now is the time to bring North
Vietnamese main forces to bear and to engage the
South Vietnamese Army in a conventional war
with territorial control as an important objective.
If the thrust of the current offensive does
turn a corner in terms of military tactics and
strategy, Communist longer term objectives
would seem to be much the same as those they
have been pursuing for years. Hanoi clearly would
like to induce a change in Washington's policy on
Vietnam, either by persuading the present admin-
istration that continued support for Saigon is
futile or by improving the prospects of presiden-
tial candidates opposed to the war. The Com-
munists also certainly want to undermine the
self-confidence of Saigon's army and erode the
faith of the South Vietnamese populace in their
government's ability to protect them. Any sig-
nificant progress along these lines would do much
to discredit Vietnamization, disrupt pacification
in South Vietnam, and undermine the stability of
the Saigon government.
Even if the Communists cannot hold ter-
ritory and population, they probably believe they
can make their recovery very costly for the South
Vietnamese. The Communists doubtless believe
that, as long as they do control new territory,
their leverage in dealing with Saigon and Washing-
ton, whether in Paris or elsewhere, will increase
Page 2
dramatically. The outcome of the current fighting
will determine in large measure what action Hanoi
takes in the political and diplomatic arenas.
The Situation on the Ground
The attacks that began late last week in the
northern provinces are the strongest in South
Vietnam since the large offensives of 1968. The
initial thrusts have carried Hanoi's regular forces
through South Vietnamese defenses along the
Demilitarized Zone and to the outskirts of the
northern cities of Quang Tri and Hue. Fighting in
the central highlands is on the upswing and the
North Vietnamese have opened a third front
along the Cambodian border northwest of Saigon.
The most dramatic onslaught was just below
the DMZ where the North Vietnamese staged a
rare conventional infantry attack strongly sup-
ported by heavy artillery barrages and tanks.
Communist forces quickly battered South Viet-
nam's green 3rd Division and drove it from more
than a dozen strongpoints. By week's end the
North Vietnamese drive had stalled momentarily
outside the capital of Quang Tri Province, but
sizable units were skirting the city to the west and
building up the threat to Hue, a more important
objective. Tens of thousands of refugees have fled
south from the Quang Tri battlefield and there
are rising fears of an attack on Hue, which was
badly ravaged in the 1968 Tet Offensive.
The South Vietnamese are rushing reinforce-
ments to Quang Tri from the Saigon area, and
they evidently intend to make a major effort to
contain the North Vietnamese advances. The 1st
Division, considered Saigon's best, is in Thua
Thien Province defending the western approaches
to Hue. The bad weather, which curtailed allied
air support during the opening days of the
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offensive, finally broke toward the end of the
week. Allied planes are encountering extremely
heavy anti-aircraft fire, however.
In the central highlands, action is still con-
fined largely to ground probes. The Communists
OSTPOLITIK: NEW RATIFICATION MOVES
The Eastern treaties, which come up for
their first vote in the Bundestag on 4 May, will be
the focus of a rare conference between govern-
ment and opposition leaders next week. Partici-
pating for the government will be Chancellor
Brandt and Foreign Minister Scheel; the opposi-
tion will be represented by shadow-chancellor
Barzel, Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee
Chairman Schroeder, and Christian Social Bundes-
tag whip Stuecklen.
Brandt suggested the meeting in order to
pass on what he termed sensitive information on
temporarily overran one South Vietnamese artil-
lery base in Kontum Province, but Saigon's troops
regained control of the position with the help of
air strikes. North Vietnamese forces are capable
of much heavier assaults in the highlands, and
they could come at 111time
the Soviet and Polish treaties, including allied
attitudes toward ratification. Barzel accepted and,
not to be outdone, announced that he, too, had
sensitive information for the chancellor.
Allied attitudes are an increasingly impor-
tant element in the debate on the treaties. French
leaders told Barzel, when he visited Paris in late
March, that they favor ratification. London, like
Washington, takes no official stand, but 20
English parliamentarians from all three parties
shocked their Christian Democratic hosts by
unanimously calling for ratification at a recent
Entering East Germany
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conference. The visit to Washington last week by
Egon Bahr, Brandt's chief foreign policy adviser,
will no doubt also be discussed at the unusual
conference.
Brandt will seek to impress Barzel with the
concessions that the Soviets and East Germans
have offered or hinted at in recent weeks in an
effort to ease ratification. One is the Soviet
decision to agree to a Berlin clause, permitting
conclusion of a long-pending economic agreement
and the operation of a bilateral economic com-
mission, even though the Four Power agreement,
which allows such clauses, is not yet in effect.
Under the clause, Moscow will allow Bonn to
represent West Berlin in negotiating the economic
agreement and on the commission. A West Ger-
man delegation arrived in Moscow on 3 April to
wrap up the economic agreement, although
formal signature is likely to await the ratification
of the Eastern treaties.
The conference will take place following a
successful opening of the Berlin Wall for Easter
week. By foot and automobile, as many as
700,000 West Berliners and West Germans
streamed into East Berlin and East Germany,
many for the first time since 1952. Despite in-
evitable traffic jams, Pankow made every effort to
expedite the flow, even opening special travel and
shopping facilities. Visiting privileges will be
repeated at Whitsuntide in late May.
The East Germans have touted the "good
will" thus shown as an important contribution to
European detente and as evidence of the need for
Bonn to ratify the Eastern treaties. The implica-
tion is clear that the new relaxed regimen will not
continue if the treaties fail. Pankow's action also
accelerates its campaign to shed its image as a
Page 4
hapless victim of Ostpolitik and to assume a lead-
ing role in European affairs.
SOUTH ASIA: TALK ABOUT PEACE TALKS
A flurry of diplomatic activity, press reports,
and statements by government officials have com-
bined to indicate that India and Pakistan are
moving toward peace talks. Central to much of
the speculation was Indian Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh's announcement last week that he
would visit Moscow on 3 April before returning
home from a visit to Afghanistan. The Indians
denied that Singh would contact Pakistani repre-
sentatives while in Kabul
The Soviets are acting as a go-between for
ew Delhi and Islamabad, and the Indians want
to exchange views with them on pending develop-
ments and outstanding issues. 25X1
The Soviets will be pressing the Indians to be
more forthcoming with the Pakistanis, although
Moscow is unlikely to push hard enough to en-
danger its own position in New Delhi. Moscow
would prefer the Indians not force President
Bhutto into concessions that would endanger his
domestic political support and encourage his
replacement by a military government which, in
turn, might seek to regain national honor by
reopening hostilities with India.
Bhutto, with some 94,000 Pakistanis held as
war prisoners by what India insists is a joint
Indian-Bangladesh command, is under considera-
ble domestic pressure. He is at a considerable
disadvantage in dealing with the Indians. New
Delhi has insisted that before formal talks begin,
Pakistan must deal with Bangladesh as a sovereign
nation, give an indication that it will end its
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policy of confrontation with India, and accept
the cease-fire line in Kashmir as an international
boundary. Bhutto could probably talk his coun-
trymen into accepting the loss of former East
Pakistan, even the recognition of Bangladesh, as
part of a prisoner exchange. But he probably
could sell only a gradual de-escalation of the
25-year-old Kashmir dispute. This could only
come as the end result of peace negotiations, not
as something agreed to before the talks begin.
Upon his return from Moscow on 6 April,
Foreign Minister Singh announced that India
desires a summit meeting with Pakistan after a
preparatory meeting of special emissaries. Singh
indicated that the timing of the meeting will
depend upon the response from Islamabad. Just
prior to his return, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi
had asserted that India and Pakistan were in di-
rect contact. Moreover, in a particularly concilia-
tory speech before the Indian Parliament on 4
April, she appeared to smooth the way for
Bhutto's acceptance of preliminary talks by
stating that she did not propose to negotiate in a
"spirit of arrogance."
Because New Delhi appears to be adopting a
more forthcoming attitude, Bhutto may shortly
decide to accept Mrs. Gandhi's assurances. In the
meantime, he is trying to improve his bargaining
position, particularly on the important prisoner-
of-war issue. Bhutto has insisted in public and
private statements this week that alleged war
criminals now held by the Indians can only be
tried in Pakistan after their repatriation. Still in a
recent Newsweek interview, he stated that he is
not opposed to war crimes trials in Dacca for
those "who went beserk" during the fighting in
East Pakistan. Bhutto may be trying to confuse
the issue. He probably reasons that under the
worst alternative once Dacca gets possession of
the alleged war criminals, its interest in the re-
maining Pakistani prisoners will lessen, giving him
-)n opening to separate the prisoner issue from the
Kashmir dispute and other bilateral India-Pakistan
,roblems.
The agreement reached between Bhutto and
the National Awami Party on 6 March is showing
signs of breaking apart. Under the agreement, the
National Assembly was to convene on 14 April to
discuss the constitution and to extend martial law
until August; Bhutto was to allow Wali Khan's
National Awami Party to take over administration
of the two frontier provinces where it is the
leading party. Bhutto has chosen National Awami
Party leaders to replace his own governors there,
but has held off installing them. This has nettled
Wali Khan. In recent days, he demanded the
assembly convene immediately to discuss foreign
affairs, said his party would not vote to extend
martial law, implied that acts of the present gov-
ernors of the two provinces might not be valid,
and even accused Bhutto of leading the country
to civil war.
Bhutto has enough votes from his own party
to dictate national assembly actions, but the
opposition could muster enough strength to
embarrass the President. Continued opposition by
the National Awami Party, moreover, could lead
to civil disorder-especially on the frontier-and
renewed opposition efforts to exploit labor and
other problems throughout Pakistan.
...Aid in Bangladesh
Significant criticism of Mujib's government
is also starting to surface. Inadequate food distri-
bution, widespread unemployment, and struggles
among competing labor groups have resulted in a
number of violent clashes in various parts of the
country. Some opposition leaders have begun to
complain that the government is failing to main-
tain law and order and that there is too much
corruption and favoritism among members of the
ruling Awami League. Despite his mounting prob-
lems, Mujib remains widely revered, and no real
challenge to him has yet developed.
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The decision to launch the Communist of-
fensive in South Vietnam may have rekindled
serious party dissension in North Vietnam. On the
eve of the military push, Tran Quoc Hoan, the
man who heads up Hanoi's secret police, directed
a stinging diatribe against "counterrevolut-
ionaries" both at home and abroad. Writing in the
March issue of the authoritative party journal, he
argued quite explicitly in favor of using "revolu-
tionary violence" more liberally to "repress" and
"exterminate" all those who oppose the party
line. This could be read as an official rationale for
a step-up in military activity and a wider use of
terrorism in the South, but its more likely pur-
pose seems to be to refute and intimidate those in
the North who may favor a less costly military
commitment or even a compromise approach to a
solution of the war.
Hoan in fact leaves little to the imagination,
pointing an accusing finger at those in the party
guilty of "timidity and lack of firmness," and
other dovish sentiments in the face of the US
threat. "Generally speaking," he writes, "any per-
son or organization that hates the revolution,
sabotages socialist reform...or opposes the strug-
gle for peace and national unification must be
considered counterrevolutionaries." And he goes
on to quote party First Secretary Le Duan to the
effect that any effort to coddle such types while
the country is struggling against US imperialism
would be "a dangerous rightist deviation and a
crime against the revolution."
Hoan is quite candid about how he would go
about fulfilling Le Duan's mandate. In addition to
"reindoctrination" as a cure for waywardness,
Hoan emphasizes the need for "penal measures,"
and he notes pointedly that "when the use of
violence is deemed necessary" to cleanse the
home front "it must be used resolutely." As if to
drive home his point, Hoan cites agrarian reform
as one area of the economy which has benefited
Page 6
from previous party efforts to stamp out "coun-
terrevolutionaries." The allusion can only be to
the agrarian reform program of the mid-1950s
when the regime liquidated thousands of peasants
who did not "agree" with the prevailing line. The
article also refers approvingly to the Soviet sup-
pression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 and of
the Czechoslovak uprising in 1968 as good ex-
amples of how best to handle counterrevolu-
tionary elements.
There is no clear indication in Hoan's dia-
tribe that a full scale party purge is already under
way, but it seems unlikely that Hanoi's top secu-
rity official would call for such extreme measures
in the party's most prestigious journal if the re-
gime were not actively considering them. Other
recent propaganda suggests that the regime in fact
became more sensitive to opposition and dis-
sidence as final preparations were made for the
military thrust in the South. An authoritative
article in December, which spelled out Hanoi's
new preoccupation with main-force warfare,
spoke ominously of the problem of "subjective"
attitudes in some quarters. More recently, the
Hanoi press warned that the expulsion of some
cadres might be necessary to ensure a proper
party response to the regime's policies. The last
time that North Vietnam is known to have carried
out an extensive party purge was in the mid-
1960s, when the regime moved decisively to rid
itself of middle-echelon and senior cadres who
opposed the decision to increase the level of
North Vietnamese military involvement in the
South.
A number of Communist main forces have
moved to the South Vietnamese border region,
making it less likely that they intend to launch
major ground campaigns soon against important
Cambodian targets. As long as the current of-
fensive in South Vietnam lasts, the Communists
probably will confine their operations in
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Cambodia to harassing attacks against scattered
government positions in the countryside. They
are also likely to maintain some pressure in and
around Phnom Penh in the form of continuing
sabotage and terrorism.
Enemy propaganda has been giving increas-
ing attention to Khmer Communist military activ-
ities in the vicinity of Phnom Penh. The picture
drawn is that the Khmer Communists are now in
charge of enemy military as well as political
actions in the capital region
there are now
some 5,000 Khmer Communist troops operating
within a 25-mile radius of Phnom Penh. Despite
their number, they probably still play a secondary
role to the Vietnamese Communist sapper and
artillery elements that have been primarily re-
sponsible for the enemy harassment of Phnom
Penh during the past few weeks.
On the political side, Lon Nol has continued
to push plans for an ostensible return to constitu-
tional rule. A new constitution conforming to
Lon Nol's requirements for a strong presidency
was delivered to the cabinet early in the week,
and some sort of limited referendum on that
long-awaited document is expected to be held
before the end of the month.
Lon Nol's uncharacteristically fast action on
the constitution and his conciliatory handling of
other student demands evidently helped to dis-
sipate much of the three-week-old student unrest
in Phnom Penh-even though some student
leaders appear to be properly skeptical about Lon
Nol's attachment to a truly republican form of
government. Increasing signs of factionalism
within student ranks also contributed to the stu-
dents' decision to halt their antigovernment pro-
tests.
Page 7
Almost four weeks have passed since the
Communists renewed their drive against Long
Tieng, and the outcome is still in doubt. Several
positions atop Skyline Ridge changed hands dur-
ing the week, but neither side has been able to
gain a decisive advantage.
Time is beginning to run out for the North
Vietnamese. Under normal circumstances they
could anticipate having between four to six weeks
of good weather remaining, but there are signs
that the rainy season may begin somewhat earlier
this year. The North Vietnamese have already
extended their offensive longer than they have in
the past, and all signs point to another concerted
push against Long Tieng in the coming week or
so.
I f the North Vietnamese are readying
another push before bad weather settles in, they
could find the prospects somewhat better now
that much of the US tactical air support for north
Laos has been allocated to priority targets in
South Vietnam.
President Thieu has granted Defense Minister
Vy's request to be placed on leave to facilitate the
investigation of charges of mismanagement of a
military savings fund. The scandal over the fund
has become a political liability for the govern-
ment, and it seems doubtful that Vy will return.
Several of his aides already have been relieved,
but Vy's departure will lend greater credibility to
the government's seriousness in backing the anti-
corruption campaign of Vice President Huong,
who is overseeing the investigation. Prime
Minister Khiem has been appointed acting defense
minister.
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CHINA: MORE PERSONNEL PROBLEMS
The death of Hsieh Fu-chih on 26 March
opens an obvious and gaping hole in the hier-
archy. Hsieh was a high-ranking politburo mem-
ber, vice premier of the State Council, minister of
public security, member of the party's Military
Affairs Committee, first political commissar of
the Peking Military Region and of the Peking
Garrison, party boss of Peking city, and chairman
of the Peking city revolutionary committee. He
had been out of the public eye for two years.
The announcement last week of his death
attributed it to stomach cancer contracted two
years ago. During those two years, however, the
regime never acknowledged Hsieh's illness, and no
replacement was ever named to any of the sensi-
tive positions he held. The regime's curious reti-
cence about Hsieh, persistent rumors that he was
wounded in an assassination attempt, and indica-
tions in early 1970 that he was involved in the
bitter wrangling over an investigation of ranking
ultra-leftists on the politburo all suggest that his
illness was as political as it was physical. In any
case, political jockeying between ultra-leftists and
conservatives probably explains the regime's
reluctance to name replacements for Hsieh in any
of his security or military posts.
Wu Te, veteran conservative on the central
committee, has been the de facto head of the
Peking city party apparatus. He was formally
designated on 2 April as acting head of the Peking
municipal government, making him a likely can-
didate for the first party post as well. But
whether Wu Te will inherit Hsieh's politburo
status and his concurrent military titles is far
from certain. His sensitive public security port-
folio is even more of a problem. The ministry
itself was heavily attacked by ultra-leftists during
the Cultural Revolution, and the naming of a new
chief is intertwined with the larger question of
the political rehabilitation of public security
forces themselves. This appointment may be
complicated by controversy over whether Hsieh's
Page 8
replacement should be civilian or military, and
whether he should be elevated to the politburo.
Personnel problems like these are unlikely to
be resolved until there is some easing of the
conflict between contending forces, both civilian
and military. That such a resolution is not at hand
is suggested by the curious turn taken in the
25X1 Hsieh Fu-chih
local authorities in some
areas are studying a secret document attributed to
Lin in which he denounces Mao, favors nego-
tiations with both the US and USSR, and emerges
as a proponent of pragmatic economic policies.
The circulation of the Lin document has caused
further confusion at lower levels, and the party
theoretical journal implied in March that the
decision to publicize the document has been criti-
cized. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DIS-
SEM)
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SOVIETS SET COOPERATIVE THEME
The speed with which the Soviets negotiated a
-ew cultural exchange agreement with the US, to-
gether with their cooperative and businesslike atti-
tude in other matters, underlines the Kremlin's
interest in promoting cordial bilateral relations prior
to the summit meeting in May.
the stalemated Sino-Soviet border talks after a four-
month absence. The announcement of his return
coincided with Brezhnev's major speech on 20
March in which he restated Moscow's willingness to
improve relations but stressed that it was up to the
Chinese to respond to earlier Soviet proposals.
The US and USSR completed work this week
on a new two-year cultural exchange agreement. The
Soviets, prompted by instructions to reach early
agreement, were particularly forthcoming. Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin had told a US official on 21
March that "instructions are already given; we want
a quick agreement."
Other contacts have been harmonious. Recent
discussions in Moscow on bilateral cooperation in
the fields of medicine and environmental health
were productive. At these talks the same concilia-
tory atmosphere prevailed as in the negotiations on
incidents at sea last October. Secretary of Agricul-
ture Butz goes to Moscow next week. He will open
talks on the sale of US grain and feedstuffs; he will
probably be extended the same hospitality accorded
former secretary of commerce Stans last November.
The exchange negotiations and a host of other
bilateral discussions provide clear evidence that the
Soviets want sweetness and light in their relations
with the US prior to the summit. Moscow probably
calculates that a cooperative attitude now on issues
of secondary importance will improve the chances
of achieving its objectives at the summit talks on
more important issues such as trade, the Middle
East, European matters, and perhaps SALT. To a
limited extent, the Soviets may be wooing the US in
an attempt to offset Chinese propaganda gains grow-
ing out of the President's visit to Peking and to
affirm that the US and USSR stand in a league
apart. Finally, the Soviets hope to derive concrete
economic, technical, and other benefits from agree-
Ilichev's return may have been in part related
to President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow.
The Soviets probably wanted to feel out Peking's
position following the Nixon visit. They also would
like to put the best face possible on their dealings
with the Chinese to improve the Soviet bargaining
position in May when the President comes to Mos-
cow. The Soviets doubtless also had an eye on world
opinion, particularly that of foreign Communists
such as the North Vietnamese and Italians who have
long urged that the two Communist giants resolve
their differences.
Moscow, however, probably does not antici-
pate a positive Chinese response to these overtures.
The Chinese have rejected similar Soviet offers in
the past, and even failed to make the gesture of
acknowledging Ilichev's reappearance in Peking. Fur-
thermore, Peking announced the day after llichev
returned that the annual talks with the USSR on
navigation in the border rivers had failed. Peking
may have intended that announcement to be a low-
key but negative reply to Brezhnev's initiative.
Soviet frustration with the stalemate in Peking
appears to be intensifying.
Moscow has sent its chief negotiator, Deputy
Foreign Minister Ilichev, back to Peking to resume
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Differences over long-range economic issues
dominated Hungarian Premier Jeno Fock's two
days of talks in Moscow with Soviet Premier
Kosygin last week. The discussions will be con-
tinued later this year, when several longer range
economic agreements will be extended.
Back in Budapest, Fock issued an unusually
candid statement on his "exchange of opinions"
with Kosygin over longer term Soviet raw mate-
rial deliveries and Hungarian industrial develop-
ment. Fock said that the two sides had been
unable to reach final agreement on Hungarian
industralization proposals over which "we had to
rack our brains." He added the Soviets were
unable to give a definite answer on long-range raw
material deliveries to Hungary. Nevertheless, Fock
described the talks as "easier than I had imag-
ined." They could not have been very satisfactory
to either party.
The central issue evidently was Moscow's
refusal to commit itself to specifics on long-term
raw material deliveries (especially fuel, oil, and
gas) to any of her resource-poor Eastern Euro-
pean allies. On the other hand, Budapest has been
reluctant to commit its resources for processing
Soviet raw materials in the USSR, hoping instead
to pay for such imports with machinery.
Although little was said publicly about
Hungary's current economic performance, the
Fock-Kosygin talks were part of Soviet moni-
toring of Budapest's economic reforms. Moscow's
hard bargaining on long-term agreements, though
unrelated to its skepticism about Budapest's new
economic mechanism, doubtless affected the
atmosphere of the talks.
Fock's almost unprecedented frankness on
Soviet-Hungarian differences is a marked contrast
to Budapest's normal reticence on its dealings
with Moscow. His tacit suggestion that Budapest
is successfully negotiating its economic differ-
ences with Moscow carries undertones of reassur-
ance that the Hungarian Government is not caving
in. On the other hand, knowledgeable Hungarians
will conclude that the Soviet terms for long-range
agreements have not changed. Given Hungarian
dependence on Soviet raw materials, this suggests
that negotiations will be long and diffi-
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SMALLPOX
Epidemic in Yugoslavia
Although a great deal of foreign medical
assistance has arrived, the smallpox epidemic may
not be brought under control until May. It has
already begun to upset the economy in Kosovo,
where the disease has taken its greatest toll.
Ten new fatalities were reported during the
past week, bringing to 25 the total number of
deaths. The disease has spread to Montenegro, but
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, where
organized vaccination programs are under way,
have thus far not been infected.
Besides the 3.25 million doses of vaccine
supplied by the US, the Yugoslavs have received
another three million doses from the Soviet
Union, and unspecified quantities from Romania,
Switzerland, and the UK. Communist China has
promised 3.5 million doses and Albania
another quarter of a million.
At least one instance of criticism of the
Yugoslav health service for not isolating and con-
taining the epidemic to Kosovo has appeared in
the Croatian press. Moreover, Belgrade's worst
fear-that the epidemic would have serious con-
sequence on the nation's tourist industry-may be
coming true. Resorts along the Dalmatian coast
report a number of cancellations. Exports from
Kosovo to neighboring Macedonia are being re-
turned, and produce raised in the region is not
selling, even on local markets, reflecting a fear of
contamination.
Outbreaks Elsewhere
In addition to Yugoslavia, outbreaks of
smallpox have been confirmed in Bangladesh,
Page 13
Albania, India, Iraq, Syria, and West Germany.
There are a number of suspect cases under sur-
veillance in Hungary. Saudi Arabia still has not
commented on Yugoslav charges that their epi-
demic was traced from Mecca.
The contagion is most widespread in Bangla-
desh, where at least 417 have succumbed, and
there may be more than 12,000 ill in the districts
of Jessore, Khulna, Faridpur and Barisal. Local
health officials blame refugees returning from
Indian camps for the spread of the disease.
The World Health Organization reports 15
cases in border villages along the Syrian-Iraqi
frontier. There were known cases in Iraq six
weeks ago. The Syrian Government has under-
taken an immunization program, as have the
Jordanians. This effort may impede spread of the
disease locally but a greater danger exists of its
reaching Turkey from Syria.
In Europe, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Romania, Austria, West Germany, Greece, and
Bulgaria are quarantining foreigners without valid
smallpox certificates.
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Czechoslovakia, while maintaining that it does
not have a hard drug problem, has agreed to ex-
change information with the US on drug seizures
and suspected traffickers transiting Czech territory.
This about-face contrasts sharply with the
reception given former US Customs commissioner
Ambrose last summer when he sought to enlist
Czechoslovak cooperation in curtailing illegal traf-
ficking. No one in Prague bothered to tell Ambrose
that customs officials from the socialist countries
were meeting in Slovakia to discuss narcotics at the
time.
Prague's more cooperative attitude is not en-
tirely unexpected. Although the authorities main-
tain that their concern is with the possible use of
Czechoslovakia as a route for smuggling drugs to
western and northern Europe from the Middle East,
recent articles in Czech and Slovak newspapers
indicate a less altruistic motive.
The press laments the growing use of drugs, not
only by the manicky (Czechoslovakia's hippies), but
by school-age children. Hallucinogens and barbitu-
rates evidently are involved; the most commonly
used agent is an anti-asthmatic drug containing
ephedrine produced only in Czechoslovakia. Hard
drugs still are relatively rare, but recent reports
indicate that they are becoming increasingly avail-
able.
ITALY: NEW VOTING, OLD PROBLEMS
The election platforms of Italy's major parties
and the campaign speeches of their leaders reflect
the disagreements that brought the last center-left
government to an impasse. If these differences per-
sist, the formation of a new government f '!owing
the national elections on 7-8 May will be a conten-
tious affair regardless of the outcome at the polls.
All four parties of the center-left favor major
reforms, but there is little consensus among them on
what the reforms should be or how they are to be
paid for. The Republican Party, for example, wants
to see greater fiscal responsibility before any new
reform programs are launched. This same issue
caused the Republicans to withdraw from the gov-
ernment in January.
Meanwhile, the Social Democrats claim it was
the leftward drift of the Socialists that disrupted
center-left unity and blocked reforms. Undeterred,
the Socialists are calling for still more reforms aimed
to win the support of "all the left in parliament,
Communists included." It is precisely this latter
point that the Christian Democrats, the fourth and
largest member of the former center-left coalition,
have repeatedly rejected. Christian Democrat Party
secretary, Arnaldo Forlani, said it again last week.
He flatly excluded any role in the government for
the Communists or neo-fascists. Forlani publicly
invited the Socialists to make a hard, critical re-
examination of such "futuristic theories."
While abusing each other, the Communists and
the neo-fascists are posing as respectable, responsible
parties capable of bringing order to the stalled ma-
chinery of government. This theme appeals to many
Italians who are disillusioned with the failures of the
center-left. The neo-fascists are capitalizing on this
disenchantment and are conducting their campaign
with vigor and with an air of self-assurance. They
hope their confidence will convince the voters that
they have the solution to the country's problems.
They are trying to build on the electorate's mod-
erate shift to the right over the past year.
The Communists are worried about this shift
and concerned that they will be hurt at the polls by
the dissident far-left Manifesto Party, which is
running on a separate ballot for the first time.
Losses in these quarters may be offset, however, by
voters who abandon the Proletarian Socialists. This
party, a third and far left brand of Italian socialism,
is having trouble establishing an ideological identity.
The elections are not likely to provide a neat
solution to the paralysis of government caused by
the fractionalization and proliferation of parties.
What the elections will determine is whether the
Christian Democrats, the key to any future gov-
ernment, look left or right to begin the bargaining
for a new coalition.
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CROPS THREATENED IN EAST EUROPE
Most of Eastern Europe is in the grip of a
drought that has diminished prospects for the
1972 harvest and could jeopardize the goal, given
high priority in most East European countries, of
boosting livestock production. The drought
comes on top of above-average damage to winter
barley and rapeseed plantings from winterkill.
Because there has been little rain since Sep-
tember, soil moisture reserves as of mid-March
were considerably below those of a year ago and
no better than 70 percent of normal, except in
Czechoslovakia and Romania. By the end of
March, Yugoslav agriculture experts described soil
moisture conditions in that country as below the
"withering point." Even in Czechoslovakia and
Romania, moisture reserves were slightly below
normal, although Czechoslovak officials claimed
that the warm, dry weather has so far been bene-
ficial to spring planting operations.
Unless the drought is broken by mid-April,
yields of winter grain, now at a critical stage of
development, and of newly planted spring crops,
will be sharply reduced. Yugoslav agronomists
have expressed concern over a possibile winter
wheat crop failure, claiming that yields may be
down as much as 30 percent in the Vojvodina, the
nation's major wheat-growing area. Bulgarian
officials have warned collective farms that new
irrigation projects must be operative ahead of
schedule in order to minimize drought damage.
Because some East European farmers traditionally
delay spring planting until there is sufficient
moisture, the area seeded to early spring crops
may be reduced.
The lack of moisture for good growth of
spring pastures and hay crops will put additional
pressure on already short supplies of fodder from
the 1971 harvest in East Germany, Hungary, and
Poland. This could reduce output of dairy prod-
ucts and beef this spring. Both Hungary and East
Germany have indicated that larger imports of
gutter will be needed. Farmers also may start to
,laughter livestock prematurely because of the
poor outlook and possibly higher prices for feed
crops. This would negate gains made in 1971
livestock numbers and productivity.
Unless crop prospects improve substantially
during the coming weeks, Eastern Europe will be
forced to import larger than planned amounts of
feed grain and high-protein fodder in 1972-for
the third successive year-to support their live-
stock programs. Import requirements for milling
wheat may be the highest in several years. Larger
imports would worsen balance-of-payments dif-
ficulties with the West. The US, a major exporter
of these commodities, is likely to be able to
increase its exports to these markets.
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LEBANON: NEW FEDAYEEN FRONT
A confrontation between the government
and the fedayeen may be building up, and there
are doubts that the government will be able to
cope with an all-out fedayeen effort. Fedayeen
officials reportedly regard a clash as inevitable,
and some believe it could develop as early as May
following this month's parliamentary elections.
The fedayeen are known to be stocking arms,
ammunition, and supplies throughout the
country, particularly in refugee camps. They have
paid extra attention to the urban areas, where any
such confrontation ultimately would be decided.
Beirut itself could be paralyzed by relatively small
groups of dedicated, well-organized commandos.
The US Embassy in Beirut believes the
Lebanese security apparatus, which consists of
Beirut city and riot police, detectives, and the
national gendarmerie, would be unable to control
the fedayeen. The army would, therefore, have to
be called in almost immediately. The army could
handle the fedayeen in set battles in the country-
side, but its resources would be severely strained
in urban conflict. The army has no experience in
urban fighting and would probably bring its heavy
firepower to bear. This, in a high-rise battlefield
of glass and plaster, would sorely test Lebanon's
urban population and political leaders.
The fedayeen movement in Lebanon has
always drawn its greatest support from the
Muslim half of the population; the fedayeen's
most outspoken opponents are Christians. Pro-
tracted army action would exacerbate the dif-
ferences between the two groups and, in time, the
army, which has the same divisions as the civilian
population, would itself be threatened by confes-
sional strife. This alone could prevent the army
from pressing a campaign against the fedayeen to
a decisive conclusion.
Lebanon is vulnerable to pressure from the
Arab states. Libya already has commandos
stationed with the fedayeen in Lebanon. The
other states would be unlikely to use armed inter-
vention to protect the fedayeen, but they do have
other weapons. There would be loud outcries
from Cairo and Baghdad condemning the "repres-
sion" of the fedayeen. Syria could close the
border, and agents in Beirut could stir up the
Muslims against the government.
Most of the fedayeen leaders, after their
experience in Jordan, are not eager for another
all-out fight. They have been careful so far not to
provoke the army or goad the government into
action, and the fact that they have not raised the
threat of urban warfare indicates they are not on
the point of using it. Their fatalistic statements
and contingency preparations cannot be ignored,
however, and the Lebanese Government is acutely
aware of the dangers that increased desperation
among the fedayeen, es ecially the extremist ele-
ments, presents.
TURKEY: PRESSURE FROM THE MILITARY
The military leaders have moved once again
to focus public attention on their demands for
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broad political, economic, and social reforms.
They have renewed their threat to take direct
charge of the government. They still appear re-
luctant to take over, but pressures for such action
may be mounting from within the military
establishment.
President Sunay, speaking for the military-
dominated National Security Council, has called
for suspension of partisan politics and asked for a
constitutional amendment to enable the govern-
ment to rule temporarily by decree. He has also
asked for new, as yet undefined, measures to
strengthen the government's hand in countering
political extremism and terrorism. Sunay's pro-
posals came against a background of factional
struggles within at least one of the major political
parties and another warning by Prime Minister
Erim that he might resign.
Sunay's call for increased executive
authority has drawn a mixed reaction. Even the
Justice Party, which has generally supported the
military-sponsored Erim government, is reluctant
to agree to the demands and may seek a national
referendum on the subject. It is doubtful that the
military leaders would impose the measures
Sunay requested if they believe such action would
provoke strong popular opposition.
As the political trouble deepens, added
measures are being taken to protect foreign repre-
sentatives in Turkey against possible terrorist
action. The terrorists lost several key leaders dur-
ing the clash with security forces last week that
climaxed the kidnaping and murder of three for-
eign technicians in north-central Turkey. The
guerrillas still have a considerable potential for
hit-and-run attacks. Although considerable
quantities of arms and explosives have been seized
in recent months, the terrorists almost certainly
have sufficient sources of supply to support
selected terrorist activity.
The radical government in Yemen (Aden)
presented a proposal on 3 April to reduce strains
with Yemen (Sana). Tension between the two has
been at a high level since a border incident in late
February. Describing the situation as an artificial
crisis resulting from the acts of "enemies and
imperialists"-read Saudi Arabia and the
US-Aden proposed urgent talks and a willingness
to discuss any proposals set forth by Sana. In
addition, Aden called for reopening the border
and the removal of all troops and tribal con-
centrations from the frontier region. Aden also
asked Sana to prohibit mercenaries from crossing
into Adeni territory.
By holding out the olive branch, Aden has
tried to put the onus for what it describes as a
potential civil war on Yemen (Sana). This pro-
posal may have been encouraged by the Soviet
Union, which has been trying to temper Arab
disputes
L__FA-Ire-ady badly split over the level of
support it should provide the tribes, the Sana
government will be hard pressed to come up with
a response to the plan satisfactory to its dis-
cordant factions or to the war hawks in Saudi
Arabia.
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Mohamed Karim-Lamrani has been tapped
to form another transitional government. The
main task of this one, when the prime minister
and the King complete their selection of min-
isters, will be to oversee local, regional, profes-
sional, and national elections. The delay in desig-
nating a prime minister-nearly five weeks after
the last Karim-Lamrani government was re-
lieved-reflects the dilemma of both the King and
the opposition National Front coalition, which he
has been consulting since last fall.
The opposition press, in reporting the ap-
pointment of a prime minister, stated that no
agreement concerning front participation was
reached and that the front would not take part.
Reportedly, the front had demanded all cabinet
positions except the ministries of defense and
posts, telephone and telegraph. These portfolios
are held by Morocco's only major generals, the
controversial Mohamed Oufkir and the able Driss
ben Omar Alami.
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MOROCCO
SEARCHING FOR A GOVERNMENT
The front is reported also to have insisted
that the new government pursue radical reforms
in the economy and in education as well as in
other domestic and foreign policies. The King
allegedly refused to give the front the lion's share
of ministries because he wanted to include
representatives from other parties and move-
ments. He also would not endorse initiation of a
reform program before parliamentary elections
are held, probably this fall.
In light of the front's announcement that it
will not participate in the new government,
Karim-Lamrani may end up with another
government of technicians. Because of substantive
differences within the front, however, it cannot
be ruled out that one or more of the opposition
politicians may participate as individ-
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URUGUAY: A BEEF ABOUT BEEF
President Bordaberry's moves to curb illegal
exports and domestic consumption of beef prob-
ably will antagonize both rural and urban
inhabitants. His failure to provide price incentives
for legal beef exports is likely to reduce his
chances of producing any major economic
improvement.
Late last month, Bordaberry publicly
threatened severe penalties for cattle smugglers
and revealed that he has asked for Brazilian help
in eliminating the illegal trade. Since official
prices paid producers will not be raised to match
those in Brazil, ranchers are not likely to turn to
legal Uruguayan outlets. During the last eight
months, legal beef exports have earned only
about $15 million, while cattle smuggling has
amounted to an estimated $50 million, much of
which is held outside the country.
Bordaberry also announced a plan to curtail
domestic consumption further. Effective im-
mediately, the slaughtering of steers for the
domestic market will be prohibited, and, from
mid-July through mid-November, no slaughter of
cattle of any kind for local sale will be allowed.
These restrictions will probably be more effective
in Montevideo than in the rural areas, where
cattle frequently are killed on farms rather than
in slaughter houses. Moreover, the restrictions will
probably also result in expansion of the urban
black market, already the major source of beef
for Montevideo consumers because of the pricing
policies of the previous administration. Neverthe-
less, Uruguayans, who until recently led the world
in per capita beef consumption, can be expected
to oppose the new policy since they have
protested against more moderate bans on
slaughtering.
Increasing beef exports is a key requirement
for Uruguayan economic recovery, and Borda-
berry has personally committed himself to this
difficult task. His public commitment to the new
policies, however, could make it more difficult
for him to try some different approach in the
months ahead should the new program fail to
bring the desired improvements in export earn-
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: AGRARIAN REFORM
President Balaguer's agrarian reform pro-
posals and speculation on his motives have domi-
nated the political scene for the past four weeks.
His reform package has made rapid progress
through the legislature. Bills have been passed
placing unused lands and certain rice lands under
the administration of the Dominican Agrarian
Institute. Only the bill to regulate the size of land
holdings has not yet been acted on.
The most vigorous objection has come from
the rice growers. Juan Bosch of the Dominican
Revolutionary Party and the Marxist-Leninist
Dominican Popular Movement see the President's
proposals as mere tricks to expand and con-
solidate government control to the ultimate detri-
ment of the poor. On the other hand, the Domini-
can Communist Party and the Revolutionary
Social Christian Party support what they regard as
the program's potential for social reform. Al-
though responses for and against have been
reported from the military, the President seems to
have fairly solid support from this important
group. The press and the church are wary, reluc-
tant to commit themselves until the President's
intentions become clearer.
So far, the reform program has not gen-
erated serious unrest.
The National o ice
chief has warned that neither land seizures nor
eviction of tenants by landowners would be
tolerated. More government-sponsored mass
rallies are planned, despite the risk that extremists
may try to exploit them or that the rhetoric
employed by some government spokesmen may
rouse unrealistic expectations among the
peasants.
President Balaguer is determined to establish
his reformist credentials. The development of
specific proposals will probably be a long-range
undertaking, heavily influenced by considerations
Page 20
of political advantage. The government bureauc-
racy's incompetence may prove the most intracta-
ble obstacle to needed reform.
ARGENTINA: RIOTS IN THE PROVINCES
The Lanusse government is worried over the
possible spread of the labor demonstrations and
violence that have paralyzed the provincial city of
Mendoza. The national labor confederation has
issued a strong denunciation of the government,
and hard-line unions are pressing for a protest
strike. As a warning against further labor agita-
tion, the government has temporarily frozen the
confederation's bank accounts.
The normally placid city of Mendoza was
first struck by violence on 4 April. When the
smoke cleared, at least one person had been killed
and several more wounded, the streets were lit-
tered with burned automobiles and buses, and the
army was in control of the city. The riot was
touched off by police trying to disperse a crowd
of some 15,000 gathered to protest an increase in
utility rates. Police reportedly lost control of the
situation, and order was not restored until rein-
forcements were rushed in. Similar trouble was
experienced in the neighboring city of San Juan.
The governor of Mendoza Province has been
replaced by an army commander, and an early
curfew was imposed on 5 April. The curfew was
broken, however, when demonstrators marched
toward the center of the city Wednesday night
following the funeral of a protester killed the day
before. Police also reported encountering sniper
fire following the funeral.
The events in Mendoza and San Juan, to-
gether with the fear that the trouble could spread,
will undoubtedly bring heavy pressure on Presi-
dent Lanusse to take stronger action to spur the
sagging economy and curb soaring inflation,
which has hit the provinces particularly hard.
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Large-scale labor demonstrations and rioting con-
tributed to the downfall of Lanusse's two prede-
cessors, and that lesson is not likely to be lost on
the current administration. The national labor
confederation has so far been unable to agree on
tactics to oppose Lanusse's economic policies, but
a confrontation between government and labor
cannot be stalled much longer unless the Presi-
dent is willing to make some major concessions
on the wage issue.
The third meeting of the UN Conference on
Trade and Development, scheduled to begin next
week in Chile, will continue the dialogue between
rich and poor nations. Instead of a direct focus on
development assistance and trade-related prob-
lems, representatives from 135 nations will give
priority this time to international monetary
problems. Although the conference probably will
achieve few results, it again will serve to drama-
tize the problems of the poor nations.
As at the other two conferences, representa-
tives will be divided roughly into three major
camps-the developed nations of the West, the
Communist nations, and the developing coun-
tries-reflecting their own political and economic
interests. In addition, there are differences among
the countries within each grouping, particularly
among the developing countries. The Communist
countries, split between developed and developing
countries, will unite on most major issues, but the
developed Communist nations will occasionally
find themselves on the defensive along with the
West. China, attending its first meeting, probably
will align itself with the developing countries.
The developing countries will press for in-
creased participation in international monetary
decisions, a satisfactory exchange-rate structure,
and a mechanism to create greater liquidity. They
also want a one-time issue of special drawing
rights by the International Monetary Fund, to
adjust for the depreciation of the reserves of
developing countries resulting from the increased
price of gold. In addition, the developing coun-
tries will ask the conference to recommend that
the International Monetary Fund link the alloca-
tion of special drawing rights to development aid.
While Communist nations will support most of
these requests, the USSR will not accede to the
demand for the one-time issue of special drawing
rights.
Trade and aid issues that were of primary
concern at the other meetings will be on the
agenda at Santiago. Although the previous con-
ference made some progress toward increasing
development aid on more concessionary terms,
the time frame of such aid and its composition
remains to be settled. The identification of the
least developed countries and special measures to
help them will come up for debate. The devel-
oping countries will renew their pressure on the
West for new commodity agreements to reduce
price fluctuations, for funds to diversify single-
crop economies, and for a liberalization of non-
tariff barriers that restrict trade.
The sheer size of the meeting, the unwieldy
nature of its agenda, the West's resistance to
demands it considers unreasonable, the disarray
within major interest groups all militate against a
successful resolution of major issues. The de-
veloping countries will use the conference to
pressure the West to accede to their demands. The
US will be a special target because of dissat-
isfaction over recent cuts in US aid and US failure
to implement a generalized system of tariff
preferences.
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On 11 April, most Latin American countries
will send their foreign ministers to Washington for
the opening of the annual meeting of the General
Assembly of the Organization of American States.
Some of the delegates may also be traveling to
Chile for the third ministerial-level meeting of the
UN Conference on Trade and Development which
opens on 13 April, so that any fireworks at the
General Assembly are likely to come early.
The issue that had attracted the most atten-
tion was the possibility that Peru would formally
request that the sanctions against Cuba be re-
examined. Convinced that there are not sufficient
votes to place the issue on the agenda, Peruvian
Foreign Minister de la Flor now says that he will
mention it only in his opening speech. Neverthe-
less, Peru may decide to take unilateral action in
establishing formal trade and diplomatic relations
with Cuba, following the OAS meeting.
There are several other points of tension in
Latin America that-while not on the agenda-
could be raised at the General Assembly. Among
these are Guatemala's dispute with Great Britain
over British Honduras, Panama's dissatisfaction
with the canal negotiations, and Ecuador's dis-
pleasure over the US ban on foreign military sales
to that country as a result of its seizure of US
fishing boats. In addition, Chile is likely to bring
up the Jack Anderson - ITT matter.
None of the regular agenda items should be
troublesome for the US, although the Uru-
guayan-sponsored item, "strengthening the prin-
ciples of non-intervention and the self-deter-
mination of peoples," could open a Pandora's
box. The item arose out of Uruguayan concern
over Castro's call for renewed violence in Uruguay
following that country's general elections last
November, but it conceivably could be turned
around by countries claiming that the sanctions
against Cuba constituted "intervention." Other
items that could arouse interest are the elections
to fill four vacancies on the Inter-American
Juridical Committee and the Colombian initiative
on arms limitation. The latter stands little chance
of achieving an useful end.
SECRET
7 Apr 72
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Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09500030001-6
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Secret
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Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09500030001-6