WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009000050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A009000050001-9
. Secret
State Dept. review
completed
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
27 August 1971
No. 0385/71
Copy
N2 45
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0L' V1\L' 1
CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 26 August 1971)
Page
International Economic Developments . . . . . . . .
. ... . . . . . . . .
. 1
Improved Oil Supply Provides a Short Breather . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. 2
Indochina
Vietnam: Reluctant Candidates in the South . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. 3
Cambodia: FANK Takes the Initiative . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. 5
Laos: Still Stalled in the South . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. 5
tnS" o - North Korean Relations: Back-scratching Diplomacy
. . . . . . . . . .
. 8
Burmese Claim Advances Against Insurgents . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. 9
Political Bombing Upsets Philippine Scene . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
10
Berlin: Potential Accord Will Raise Hopes of Detente . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
11
Yugoslavia Reacts to Warsaw Pact Pressure . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
12
Romania: Ceausescu Charges Ahead . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
13
Middle East Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
17
Arab Federation: Another Step Toward Nominal Union
. . . . . . . . . . .
19
South Africans Sharpen Debate Over Coloreds . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
20
Bolivia: A New President; A New Direction . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
21
Mexican Student Riots Claim Another Political Victim .
. . . . . . . . .
23
El Salvador Prepares for Election Campaign . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
24
Chile: Rivalry Increases Within the Government . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
25
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International Economic Developments
European money exchanges and the Japa-
nese stock exchange continued to reflect a lack of
decisive foreign governmental response to the new
US economic policy- Chaotic conditions did not
materialize this week, however, as only marginal
transactions were carried on in money markets
while officials continued to grapple with possible
moves.
Most of the European foreign exchange
markets that had been shut down last week to
allow the governments to contemplate the new
US economic measures reopened on Monday,
with each country implementing its own arrange-
ments. The Germans and Dutch have continued
their currency floats. The French adopted a dual
rate system, adhering to a fixed parity for com-
mercial transactions while permitting the rate for
financial transactions to float. Belgium also is
employing a dual rate, but its commercial franc is
floating in concert with the Dutch guilder. Italy
with the UK maintained fixed parities, albeit with
wider bands.
Although Tokyo stuck to its support of the
yen-dollar rate and absorbed about $2.7 billion
dollars since President Nixon's announcement on
15 August, continued apprehension caused Japa-
nese businessmen to unload stocks of export-
oriented industries until mid-week. At that time
the Tokyo stock exchange recovered sharply, fol-
lowing reports that overseas investors were seek-
ing bargains. This encouraged some Japanese
investors to take advantage of depressed stock
prices. Stringent Japanese controls on capital
transactions and mild reactions on reopened
European exchange markets calmed the situation
on Tokyo's foreign exchange market. Japanese
commercial banks have been forced to buy back
some of the dollars they sold last week in order to
maintain dollar balances called for by "unofficial
guidelines" of the Bank of Japan. Avoidance of
new violent activity in the exchange market will
make it easier for Tokyo to stick to its decision
not to revalue the yen except as part of a multi-
lateral realignment of parities.
European foreign exchange activity has been
cautious, with the US dollar showing some weak-
ness. At first, the dollar actually strengthened
against some currencies as outstanding dollar
obligations were covered by traders. By mid-
week, however, the value of the dollar depre-
ciated on the average of two to three percent
from the rate of two weeks ago as jittery dealers
reacted to Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) Schweitzer's suggestion
that the price of monetary gold be increased and
noted an IMF study advocating multinational
realignment of currencies. His recommendations
entail large upward revaluations of the Japanese
yen and certain European currencies against the
dollar. European officials dismissed the IMF staff
proposals as untenable.
Canadian Finance Minister Benson, chairing
the Group of Ten major industrial countries (US,
UK, Sweden, Canada, Japan and EC member
countries), continues to urge that the Deputies
Committee meet on 4-5 September to draft a list
of suggested changes in international currency
parities for discussion by the Group of Ten
finance ministers in London on 15 September.
The results of these meetings are to serve as the
basis for a formal proposal at the annual IMF
meeting on 27 September in Washington.
After failure to reach a common exchange
rate policy at a 16-hour Council session last week,
the EC countries scheduled another session for 13
September, two days before the Group of Ten
convenes. The Benelux countries, who hope that
successful operation of their scheme for managing
exchange rates might serve as an example for the
community, advocated an even earlier meeting.
This proposal, however, was quickly rejected by
the French on Wednesday because, in their view,
the earlier meeting would not allow sufficient
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t7l',VitJ 1
time for necessary preparations. Paris, in fact, is
skeptical that its basic differences with the Ger-
mans can be bridged even by 13 September.
Because it is generally felt that political decisions
are needed to break the deadlock-essentially one
between France and West Germany-the EC for-
eign ministers will join the finance ministers at
the next session.
Despite more cautious statements from some
members of the community, notably West Ger-
many, EC Commissioner Dahrendorf took a very
tough line on the US ten-percent import sur-
charge at this week's GATT meeting in Geneva.
The community presumably will aim to have the
GATT working group's report on the surcharge-
expected prior to the September IMF meeting in
Washington-be as negative as possible in order to
provide a rationale for the threat, at least, of
trade retaliation should the surcharge not be
Improved Oil Supply Provides a Short Breather
The availability of oil from the Middle East
and a complete turnaround in the shortage of
tankers that plagued the market just a few
months ago assure Western Europe of favorable
oil supply conditions as the heavy winter con-
sumption period approaches.
Unlike last year, when short-haul oil from
Mediterranean sources was in tight supply and
selling at a premium, oil producers currently are
using only part of their production capacity. The
Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline), which carries
Saudi Arabian crude oil to the Mediterranean, has
been operating at less than half capacity since
June. The Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline
system to the Mediterranean is also operating at
substantially below capacity, and Libyan oil pro-
duction has declined below the limit allowed by
the government. This slack in the system at the
present time stems from precautionary stock-
piling in Western Europe following threatened
production shutdowns last spring as well as from
lower consumption during the summer.
Short-run tanker rates in the past year have
dropped from over $3 to less than $1 per barrel
of oil moved from the Persian Gulf to Western
Europe. This change and high pipeline transit fees
have shifted some demand for nearby Mediter-
ranean oil to that from the Persian Gulf. Produc-
ers there have responded by raising output in the
first six months of this year by 20 percent.
The current excess of oil supplies is not
likely, however, to alter the long-range plans of
Middle East oil producers in the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to seek
"participation" in the operations of Western oil
companies. OPEC will meet soon in a special
session to discuss a plan calling for a 20-percent
equity in the production processes of oil com-
panies, but some time will be required to explore
the potential role of member governments. Wide
differences in operating conditions and varying
complications in existing agreements between
governments and oil companies will require ex-
tensive study before a plan acceptable to all
OPEC members can be developed for negotiations
with the oil companies. Implementation of any
measures decided upon would take place over
several years, according to OPEC officials. F
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Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Indochina
FAR EAST
The withdrawals of Big Minh and Vice Presi-
dent Ky from the presidential race have left Presi-
dent Thieu unopposed in the 3 October contest
and have contributed to a very unsettled political
atmosphere in Saigon. In a rapid series of develop-
ments beginning late last week, Minh announced
he was pulling out of the contest, the Supreme
Court reversed an earlier decision and put Ky's
name back on the ballot, but Ky publicly stated
that he would not go along with the decision and
re-enter the campaign for the presidency.
Minh's resolve to run had been wavering for
some time; his announcement of withdrawal on
the grounds that Thieu was rigging the election
was consistent with Minh's earlier expressed fears
that he would be denied a fair chance to win. Ky,
on the other hand, remained interested in running
and delayed a final decision for two days follow-
ing the Supreme Court's action while he con-
sulted with various political and religious groups.
He apparently received little encouragement, and
probably concluded that the odds were stacked
too heavily against him to allow a respectable
showing. The vice president probably will try to
remain politically active in hopes of staking out a
position as the leader of the opposition.T
The withdrawals have discredited the elec-
tion in the eyes of Vietnamese observers. Opposi-
tion groups such as the An Quang Buddhists have
begun to call for a boycott of the election. Ex-
tremist groups, including some students, veterans,
Page 3
and left-wing agitators may attempt to exploit the
situation by instigating disruptive antigovernment
protests. Criticism of the government's election
policy had already been increasing prior to the
announcements of Minh and Ky. Some usually
progovernment elements, particularly in the Na-
tional Assembly, have joined opposition groups in
protesting abuses of authority by government of-
ficials in connection with the presidential election
and next Sunday's Lower House contests.
Despite the criticism of his policies, Thieu is
standing firm and intends to go ahead with the
presidential election on schedule
Thieu is aware of the increased possibility
of demonstrations and is taking additional secu-
rity precautions. In addition, he is meeting, with
government and military leaders, seeking an in-
formal vote of confidence on his election policy.
Many opposition groups, including the po-
litically potent An Quang Buddhists, are actively
engaged in campaigning for the Lower House elec-
tions, and large-scale disruptive protests are un-
likely before these are held on 29 August. Most
groups will probably wait to assess the results of
these contests before deciding on any new course
of action. Progovernment candidates are expected
to win a majority of the 159 Lower House seats
at stake, but if many appear to do well because of
unfair official interference on their behalf, some
opposition groups might consider adopting more
militant tactics.
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Communist Military Action
The Communists began their latest surge in
military activity about as expected during the
week with damaging attacks against the US base
at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang City. At Cam
Ranh, allied personnel casualties were relatively
light, but enemy sappers succeeded in setting off
explosions that destroyed a huge ammunition
dump and damaged many buildings. Communist
mortar and rocket fire in the Da Nang area caused
fires which destroyed more than 100 houses. The
Communists also are maintaining pressure along
the DMZ and, at scattered points elsewhere in the
country, have stepped up light shellings and
sapper probes to harass allied bases. So far the
Communists probably believe they are succeeding
in impressing upon a considerable number of the
South Vietnamese-on the eve of the Lower
House elections--that they are still a force to be
reckoned with.
Jitters in Hanoi
Hanoi's concern that Peking might try to
play a mediating role in the Vietnam war has not
abated. In the past few weeks expressions of
concern have taken on new dimensions. Although
Hanoi has not attacked the Chinese by name, the
target of the invective is clear. Brief, but unmis-
takable denunciations of the Peking-Washington
detente are appearing regularly in all major North
Vietnamese publications. Not only has Hanoi
warned against any replay of the big power
politics of the 1954 Geneva Conference, but it
now is accusing the Chinese of heretical revolu-
tionary concepts, including failure to understand
either the appropriate tactics or proper targets of
revolution.
One of the strongest barbs came this week in
a party daily article accusing President Nixon of
trying to "spray the toxic gas of chauvinism into
opportunist heads in a bid to play the socialist
countries against one another." In the latest issue
of Hanoi's theoretical journal, Hoc Tap, the lead
editorial denied Vietnamese allegiance to any for-
eign revolutionary model and claimed that the
Lao Dong party would not "act in complete con-
formity with any existing formula." Hanoi's army
daily in early August accused the Chinese of not
being able to distinguish friend from foe.
Part of Hanoi's anguish may stem from con-
cern that the Sino-US developments will have an
unsettling effect on Vietnamese party cadre.
Some of the issues for which the Chinese are
being taken to task are believed to have long been
a matter of dispute within the Lao Dong party.
The effort to squelch the idea that the US-Peking
detente provides a new way to end the Vietnam
war may be intended to discourage Vietnamese
cadres from leaning in that direction. The authori-
tative Hoc Tap editorial, for example, was broad-
cast throughout North and South Vietnam almost
as soon as it hit the streets in Hanoi.
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During the rainy season, Phnom Penh is con-
tinuing to exploit the lull in significant Commu-
nist military activity by conducting short-term
offensives designed to expand areas under govern-
ment control and give some Cambodian Army
(FANK) units badly needed field experience. The
most ambitious government campaign now under
way involves the use of 12 FANK battalions to
clear a six-mile portion of Route 6, north of the
village of Tang Kouk, in Kompong Thom Prov-
ince. If that objective is achieved without too
much difficulty, the government plans to commit
more troops to the operation in order to advance
as far north along the highway as possible. A
FANK drive of major proportions was attempted
by the Cambodians along Route 6 in this same
area last fall, but Communist resistance bogged it
down at Tang Kouk.
The Cambodians reached their initial objec-
tive, the village of Rumlong, on 24 August. They
ran into some stiff Communist resistance en
route, and suffered 19 killed and 41 wounded in a
series of skirmishes with enemy elements. The
FANK advance was also slowed by poor road
conditions. The Communists have destroyed
many bridges and culverts on Route 6, and have
also dug many trenches across the road.
More modest FANK clearing operations in
the southeast and also in the Phnom Penh area
were concluded during the week, after encounter-
ing only token enemy opposition. A nine-bat-
talion operation in the Prey Veng - Svay Rieng
provincial border area south of Route 1 generated
Page 5
some Khmer Communist ralliers and helped im-
prove the morale of the local population.: The
latter result was particularly timely, because
many villagers were still smarting from the abu-
sive behavior of South Vietnamese troops who,
until recently, had been operating in the same
general sector..
The government has reorganized its forces
attempting to take Paksong on the Bolgvens
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Plateau, but has been unable to dislodge the
North Vietnamese from the town. A new three-
pronged assault was launched on 21 August when
two battalions were airlifted to positions south-
east of Paksong. At the same time, three other
irregular battalions were ordered to push toward
the town from the northwest, while three Lao
Army battalions again began to move east along
Route 23.
The government has used Lao T-28s and
artillery to pound the North Vietnamese forces
holding Paksong-probably from the three bat-
talions of the NVA 9th Regiment-but they have
so far shown no disposition to fall back. The
North Vietnamese are fighting from well prepared
positions along Route 23, and they have made
effective use of flanking attacks and heavy weap-
they may also be using
As yet, the Communists have not under-
taken seriously to contest government sweep op-
erations that are being conducted by four irregu-
lar battalions in the Saravane area. Several skir-
mishes have occurred near Saravane, however, and
the Communists used rockets against the town
airstrip on 24 August. No damage was reported.
Military activity has remained relatively light
in other sections of the country. Vang Pao's
irregulars on the Plaine des Jarres have been
skirmishing daily with Communist units, but
little territory has been gained or lost. The
operation to retake Muong Soui, the former
neutralist headquarters, continues to move
slowly because of Communist harassing attacks
and poor weather conditions. F
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CHINA-JAPAN: Japanese attention to the China
issue will be increased as a result of a visit to
Tokyo by Peking official Wang Kuo-ch'uan. A
long-time specialist on Japan, Wang attended
funeral services on 26 August for Kenzo Mat-
sumura, a persistent advocate of closer Sino-Japa-
nese relations.
Wang reportedly will remain in Japan for
about a week. Prime Minister Sato, the major
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) contenders for
the prime ministership, and other top government
officials, as well as opposition politicians have
expressed a desire to meet with Wang. F-
Peking's decision to send an official of
Wang's stature to Tokyo suggests that the Chinese
hope to capitalize on the prevailingly favorable
Page I
"China mood" in Japan and possibly strengthen
it. Wang almost certainly is prepared to meet with
important Japanese officials, possibly including
members of Sato's cabinet, but it is not clear how
he will handle the request for discussions with
Sato himself. The visit will increase pressure on
the Sato government from elements in the LDP,
opposition parties, and the media to take new
initiatives toward improving Tokyo's relations
with Peking. It also could affect current discus-
sions in Japan on approaching the question of
Chinese representation in the UN.
An announcement on 25 August that
agreement had been reached to double the size
of the Japan-China trade offices in 'Tokyo and
Peking was probably also intended by China to
tantalize the Japanese over the prospects of
increased trade with the mainland, once Tokyo
adopts a more "progressive" attitude toward
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Sino - North Korean Relations: Back-scratchingDiplomacy
The growing closeness in Sino - North Korean
relations has been underlined in recent weeks with
exchanges of high-level delegations and accom-
panying policy statements supporting the latest
developments in the foreign affairs of both coun-
tries. Although this warming trend has been in train
for some time, it appears that in light of China's
evolving new position with the US both Peking and
Pyongyang have found added advantages for put-
ting on an eloquent display of Sino - North Korean
solidarity.
The Chinese seem to have had little difficulty
allaying possible North Korean misgivings about the
impending US presidential visit to Peking. When the
announcement was made on 16 July, a Chinese vice
premier, Li Hsien-nien, was in Pyongyang at the
head of a delegation observing the tenth anniversary
of the signing of the Sino - North Korean treaty of
friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. The
responsibility for informing North Korean leaders
about President Nixon's visit and for explaining the
rationale behind Peking's invitation almost certainly
fell on Li's shoulders. Several days later Prince
Sihanouk arrived in Pyongyang from Peking and,
presumably, further allayed any fears on Pyong-
yang's part. In a speech at a rally honoring
Sihanouk on 6 August, Premier Kim II-sung for the
first time publicly endorsed Peking's decision.
Peking promptly gave wide publicity in its official
propaganda media to Kim's speech. Kim remains
the only foreign Communist leader to have en-
dorsed publicly the Chinese move toward the
United States.
Peking clearly welcomed Pyongyang's support,
which came at a time when certain other of China's
allies, most notably Hanoi, have been voicing mis-
givings about Sino-US developments. The Chinese
have apparently been unable to still completely
Hanoi's apprehensions that North Vietnamese inter-
ests will be sacrificed as a result of the Nixon visit.
Peking had probably hoped to reassure Hanoi some-
what by flaunting the endorsements from Kim II-
sung and Sihanouk and by playing up Peking's
continued close relations with them. Peking, more-
over, may have intended to exploit Pyongyang's
Page 8
support as a means to help counter some of the
criticism coming out of Moscow.
In a more narrow bilateral sense, the Chinese
also perceive in closer Sino - North Korean relations
the added expedient of helping to keep down ten-
sions on the Korean peninsula in the sensitive pe-
riod prior to and during the presidential visit. This
consideration-in addition to the need to find justi-
fication for its own approach to negotiations with
the US and to win over North Korean support-has
been at least partly responsible for a number of
unusual steps that the Chinese have taken recently.
These include the appointment of a Chinese repre-
sentative to the Military Armistice Commission
(MAC) for the first time in five years, Peking's
precipitate endorsement of the North Korean
eight-point unification plan and the seven demands
put forward by the Communist side at a recent
MAC meeting, and Peking's support for negotia-
tions between Pyongyang and Seoul on the ques-
tion of divided families. Peking has also added eco-
nomic inducements-the signing of an economic
cooperation agreement on 15 August and the likeli-
hood of a military aid pact to be worked out
between Chinese military leaders and a visiting
high-level military delegation from Pyongyang.
The North Koreans, meanwhile, have in mind
advantages of their own in reaffirming a close rela-
tionship with Peking. Kim II-sung probably calcu-
lates that by close support of Peking he can reap
significant benefits for his own regime, particularly
in the area of international recognition and accept-
ance. This approach might well pay immediate divi-
dends :n the forthcoming debate on Korea at the
UN. Moreover, Pyongyang probably considers that,
for the moment, working closely parallel to Peking
offers a good opportunity of hastening a US with-
drawal from Korea. Indeed, both Peking and Pyong-
yang are attempting to channel current pressures
for US military withdrawals from Indochina and
Taiwan to the Korean area as well. In addition,
Pyongyang may feel that the Chinese will be more
useful in helping to forestall a concomitant rise in
Japanese influence in South Korea as the US with-
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Burmese Claim Advances Against Insurgents
The operational area of former prime minis-
ter U Nu's rebels apparently has been reduced by
Burmese military action. The insurgents have
been pushed back to the Thai border from
advance positions inside Burma, according to the
deputy commander of the Burmese military re-
gion opposite the rebels' bases in Thailand. He
admitted the Burmese Government was con-
cerned over the insurgents' presence near
Moulmein and Tavoy earlier this year but claimed
that the main infiltration points around Myawadi
now have been sealed.
Insurgent bands continue to drift across
other sections of the border, however. Inas nuch
as the Burmese admittedly find it difficult to
keep track of all of the infiltrators, there is a
possibility of continued isolated incidents some
miles inside Burma by Nu's forces or by ethnic
insurgents long in rebellion against the Rangoon
government. According to Rangoon press ac-
counts, one such incident occurred recently in
which government forces suffered five fatalities in
a two-hour engagement,
Despite the likelihood of occasional inci-
dents of this sort, U Nu's potential for trouble-
making appears to have been lessened as a result
of increasing troubles with his reluctant dallies
among the Burmese minorities. The Karens, who
constitute the main ethnic group along the
Burmese-Thai border, halfheartedly cast their lot
with Nu to secure weapons and funds from him.
Now that some arms have been delivered, the
Karens, traditionally antipathetic toward the
Burmans, are apparently less disposed to be help-
ful.
1 INu
also must cope with frustration among his fellow
exiles over the limited accomplishments of the
o-year-old resistance movement.
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Political Bombing Upsets Philippine Scene
President Marcos' actions in the wake of last
weekend's grenade attack on a campaign rally of
the opposition Liberal Party have provoked
charges that he is only interested in turning the
incident to his benefit. There is popular suspicion
that Marcos' Nacionalista Party was involved in
the bombing, in view of the Nacionalistas' record
of violence in the 1969 presidential elections. It
appears that the net effect of the affair will be to
erode further Marcos' public standing.
The President has suspended the writ of
habeas corpus, contending that the action was
necessary to permit the apprehension of the radi-
cal leftists he claims were responsible for the
bombing that caused nine deaths and the hospital-
ization of all eight Liberal senatorial candidates.
No evidence has developed to confirm the radi-
cals' guilt. The violent effort to wipe out the
Liberal Party leadership, however, does not fit the
traditional pattern of Philippine political violence,
which has been marked by attacks on individual
adversaries more than by wholesale slaughter.
The Liberal Party, which was nearly eclipsed
by Marcos' Nacionalistas in the 1969 elections,
believes that public sympathy developing for it in
the wake of the bombing will improve its pros-
pects in the November senatorial and municipal
elections. The Liberals view Marcos' threat of
martial law as a possible step toward tampering
with the election timetable and thus denying
them the political mileage they hope to get from
the tragedy. Their fears that Marcos may use the
habeas corpus measure against selected Liberal
candidates have been heightened by Marcos' con-
centration on building a case of complicity in the
bombing against Benigno Aquino, the only Lib-
eral senator not at the fated rally. Marcos sees
Aquino as a potentially serious rival. If Marcos
took advantage of the present situation to move
against Aquino-who has admitted contacts with
Philippine leftists-the action would bring cries of
political repression.
The government's restraint to date in round-
ing up suspects in the bombing incident has some-
what eased tensions in Manila. Continuing acts of
terrorism have, however, prompted Marcos to re-
iterate his threat of martial law. The radical left
would like to nudge Marcos into overreacting by
taking this unpopular step, and will likely main-
tain its disruptive action.
EUROPE
AUSTRIA-SWITZERLAND: The Austrian press
has revealed that Swiss President Rudolf Gnaegi
recently proposed the establishment of an arms
pool by Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden and
cooperation in defense matters, including the de-
velopment of an antitank system. Access to Swed-
ish military technology obviously has great appeal
to Switzerland, which already has some limited
cooperation with Austria. Gnaegi's proposal, how-
ever, essentially reflects Bern's concern over the
Page 10
decline in Austria's military credibility since
Chancellor Kreisky's Army Reform legislation re-
duced the term of military service from nine to
six months. Although irritated by Swiss criticism
of his defense policies, Kreisky is interested in
Gnaegi's proposal, if for no other reason than to
allay domestic critics of his reform measures on
the eve of the national elections scheduled for 11
October.
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Berlin: Potential Accord Will Raise Hopes of Detente
The Berlin agreement referred to the Four
Powers by their ambassadors on 23 August will be
well received in Eastern and Western Europe-
with the notable exception of East Germany.
Although some time will be required to complete
the steps necessary before the agreement can be
signed, the impetus toward detente in Europe is
apt to increase as these stages are passed.
Assuming the Four Powers approve the
draft, East and West Germany must then nego-
tiate an agreement on such details as documenta-
tion and administration of traffic between West
Germany and West Berlin, handling problem
cases, and increasing communications between
the Soviet and Western sectors of Berlin. Al-
though Pankow would probably prefer to ob-
struct the consummation of the accord, which
voids East Germany's claim to full control over its
territory, it has been left little room for maneuver
and will be under Soviet pressure to come to
terms. Indeed, Pankow has suggested moving up
the meeting dates of the East - West German and
East German - West Berlin negotiators who have
been sparring for some months to no purpose.
Bonn is predictably enthusiastic about the
terms of the accord, which are better than it had
anticipated and which it expects to present to the
West German public as a prize justifying Chan-
cellor Brandt's Ostpolitik. The opposition Chris-
tian Democrats' initial reaction has been subdued.
The Social Democratic - Free Democratic coali-
tion also anticipates that it will be able to present
for ratification well before the 1973 elections the
treaties with Moscow and Warsaw that were
hostage to a Berlin agreement.
ference on European Security. Soviet spokesmen
are already putting additional stress on a security
conference that, along with such detente
measures as mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions, is designed to reduce the American pres-
ence and role in Europe. Most European states,
anxious to gain a greater voice in European affairs
and to avoid increased defense expenditures, will
feel under pressure to speed preparation of nego-
tiating positions.
Bonn will see these efforts as complementing
the broader purposes of Ostpolitik-to promote a
European reconciliation by overcoming Soviet
and East European fears of German intentions. In
this way, Brandt hopes to make German reunifi-
cation ultimately possible. Topics still on this
agenda are a treaty of reconciliation with Czecho-
slovakia, normalization of relations with Hungary
and Bulgaria, and a broad settlement of differ-
ences with East Germany.
Most East European states welcome this
trend as enhancing their national security by re-
moving a potential German challenge to postwar
boundaries. They also hope to gain greater access
to Western technology and financing, which they
hope to use to ease domestic pressures. East
Germany, on the other hand, feels threatened and
may attempt to frustrate an East - West German
accommodation by setting such preconditions as
full diplomatic recognition and UN membership.
Pankow's campaign to limit East - West German
contacts and to eliminate the more obvious, evi-
dences of a common German identity, already
under way, will nevertheless tend to isolate it
from its allies.
Approval of the accord will also satisfy
NATO's condition for moving toward a Con-
Although present Soviet policy entails some
risk for East European stability over the long
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term, the Soviets no doubt believe this can be
contained and see themselves as gainers from re-
cent events. The Berlin agreement, in addition to
its effect on detente prospects, is probably viewed
as a milestone in gaining Western acceptance of
Moscow's primacy in Eastern Europe and of East
Germany's legitimacy as a sovereign state. More-
over, Moscow probably correctly expects Bonn,
with its confidence increased and its need for
support reduced, to become more independent in
dealings with its allies. The Soviets probably an-
ticipate new opportunities for playing off one
Western state against another and for delaying
consolidation of the European Communi-
Yugoslavia Reacts to Warsaw Pact Pressure
The Yugoslavs are becoming increasingly
sensitive to Soviet-inspired pressures in the
Balkans. Some Warsaw Pact countries have
treated Yugoslavia roughly in their press since
their leaders met in the Crimea early this month.
Belgrade is nervous and uncertain about the moti-
vation behind Brezhnev's visit now scheduled for
22-24 September. Tito may be overreacting to
make it clear that he does not intend to concede
anything in his talks with Brezhnev.
Although there have been some minor
polemical skirmishes with Moscow's allies, the
Yugoslav media have directed most of their com-
plaints to Moscow. In one broadcast beamed to
the USSR, for example, the Yugoslav party con-
demned Soviet attempts to control and direct the
foreign policy of its allies. The thrust of this
attack indicates Belgrade's willingness to embar-
rass publicly those East European regimes doing
Moscow's bidding and thereby fuel latent anti-
Soviet sentiment in the area.
This tactic is a particularly dangerous threat
to Budapest which, prior to the Crimean party
summit, had friendly relations with Belgrade.
Moreover, the 15th anniversary of the Hungarian
revolt is only two months away and party leader
Kadar would like to avoid any further potential
for anti-Soviet manifestations during this sensitive
period. Belgrade senses Budapest's vulnerability
and has so far used this advantage sparingly in
direct replies broadcast to Hungary.
There are also indications that Tito is paying
special attention to the areas in Yugoslavia that
border on Hungary and Bulgaria. Last week, for
example, Belgrade made an issue of a fairly in-
nocuous display of Hungarian nationalism at a
soccer game in the Vojvodina, probably as a firm
warning to the smaller minorities in Yugoslavia to
refrain from nationalistic demonstrations. In
Macedonia, Yugoslav officials speaking at the na-
tional revolution anniversary vigorously warned,
again without visible cause, against Bulgaria's "re-
newed" irridentist claims to Macedonia.
These preventive measures also play a role in
Tito's preparations for Brezhnev's visit. Tito has
made it clear that he is in firm control of areas
where the Soviets might consider arousing nation-
alist tensions. In addition, he has reportedly
levied tough preconditions for the visit, including
a requirement that the Soviets renew their com-
mitment to the declarations of 1955 and 1956
which guaranteed Yugoslav sovereignty and the
right of all Communist parties to pursue "dif-
ferent roads to socialism." Tito also is currently
demanding that Moscow end its support of hostile
Yugoslav emigres. The Yugoslavs say that the
Soviet, claim their only purpose in the Brezhnev
visit is to improve relations. Tito obviously is not
accepting these assurances at face value or re-
laxing his guard. Brezhnev appears to be in for
tough bargaining sessions in Belgrade.
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Romania: Ceausescu Charges Ahead
Romanian leader Ceausescu used the days
leading up to Bucharest's 27th "liberation" an-
niversary on 23 August to emphasize Romania's
adherence to an independent course in the Com-
munist world. Although faced with psychological
pressure from Moscow and his other Warsaw Pact
allies, Ceausescu confidently carried his campaign
for national sovereignty and solidarity to all sec-
tors of Romanian society last week. After re-
ceiving popular acclaim during an extensive tour
of the provinces, he obtained unanimous party
and government endorsement of his policies at a
highly unusual joint session of all leading party
and government bodies on 19 August.
Before this session, Ceausescu had met with
Soviet Ambassador Drozdenko at the latter's
request. The meeting probably did not go
smoothly inasmuch as the talk was described as
"comradely," a term that in the Communist
vernacular implies disagreement. The ringing
endorsement of Ceausescu's policies by the lead-
ing party and government bodies thus takes on
the character of a defiant reaction to Drozdenko's
apparent menacing attitude.
Ceausescu further advanced his nationalism
campaign in a speech on 20 August to a grad-
uating class at the Romanian military academy
where he emphasized that "the Communist move-
ment does not need any center in any part of the
world," a reference mainly aimed at Moscow. In
the same speech he also remarked, in an obvious
reference to China, that "we do not forget for
one moment that the socialist system is composed
of 14 countries in Europe, Asia, and America."
Belgrade's replay of Ceausescu's remarks the same
day probably increased Moscow's suspicion about
Yugoslav-Romanian collusion, and reinforced the
Kremlin's general apprehension over the course of
events in the Balkans.
Amid such atmospherics, a high-level Chi-
nese military delegation flew from Tirana on 22
August to begin a five-day visit in Bucharest,
where it was accorded red carpet treatment at the
"liberation" celebrations. Furthermore, on 23
August in Peking, the acting Chinese foreignmin-
ister strongly supported Romania's independent
stance by saying that "those (read Moscow) ;who
pursue a policy of hegemony are again creating
tension in the Balkans." The Kremlin's displeas-
ure with the coziness in Romanian-Chinese `rela-
tions was apparent in the low-level Soviet turnout
at Romanian celebrations in Moscow, as well as in
two recent press articles which asserted that
China "was trying to oppose one country agiinst
another and to shake the socialist community."
It appears that the rivalry between the USSR
and China for influence in Romania, indeed in the
Balkans, will continue.
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Geneva Conferees Ponder Nuclear Test Ban and China's Views
Encouraged by the favorable prospects for
the US-USSR draft convention curbing biological
weapons (BW) many delegates at the 25-nation
Geneva disarmament talks now are giving greater
attention to the possibility of other arms
accords-particularly a comprehensive ban on
nuclear testing (CTB). The conferees find it diffi-
cult to discuss these matters, however, without
speculating on the impact Communist China will
have on future disarmament negotiations should
it enter the UN this fall.
Last week the Japanese delegate described a
CTB as the "most important" subject on the
agenda, a reference to the prevailing view at
Geneva that a CTB would be a far more mean-
ingful measure than the BW agreement. Tokyo
and Ottawa are pressing particularly hard for
action on this topic because they are worried
about the environmental implications of a US
high-yield underground test in the Aleutians this
fall. Many other delegations are anxious to see a
CTB become a reality because they believe it
would inhibit further research to improve stra-
tegic weapons and thus reinforce any agreements
made at the superpowers' strategic arms limita-
tion talks.
Moscow is sensitive to these ruminations and
may be preparing a new initiative to respond to
the growing concern over the need for a CTB.
Such a move also would have the advantage of
carrying the "disarmament offensive" that
Brezhnev launched last March a step further. The
Soviets do not appear inclined to concede to the
US insistence that on-site inspection is necessary
to verify compliance with a CTB. Nor is there any
sign that the Soviets have reversed their opposi-
tion to partial measures, such as a ban on tests
beyond a threshold defined by the Richter
seismological scale. However, Soviet delegate
Roshchin has implied that Moscow might be
interested in subscribing to a CTB verified by an
international "nuclear detection club" using
seismic data exchanges.
Roshchin also told US officials recently that
he hopes Peking participates in the talks should
China enter the UN this fall. He said this should
be accomplished through a modest enlargement
of the Geneva conference that would not jeopar-
dize the serious negotiating atmosphere the So-
viets find so desirable. Roshchin may have been
talking for effect in order to disguise Soviet un-
easiness over the possibility of China's entry into
organizations such as the Geneva Conference. The
Japanese have commented privately in much the
same fashion- They, like the Soviets, want to
avoid a disarmament conference open to all
states, a concept the Chinese have consistently
favored.
There are some indications that Peking
would eventually be willing to participate in the
Geneva talks. In a recent speech, the Pakistani
delegate implied that Peking might join the con-
ference once its UN membership is secured.
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VL JJ_ 1_ 1
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Middle East Developments
In mid-August, in part to improve their im-
mediate security but also perhaps to better their
long-range control, the Israelis began to reduce
the size of the volatile Arab refugee camps in the
Gaza Strip by resettling the residents and cutting
broad military atrol roads directly through the
camps. this has
drawn minimal refugee or fedayeen opposition,
despite the summary evictions and the demolition
of hundreds of houses. The Israelis vigorously
deny, however, that they are forcing the Arabs
out of the strip.
Through 18 August, according to UNRWA
officials, about 2,300 families-some 12-14,000
persons-had been relocated. Most have found
their own housing in Gaza town or elsewhere in
the strip, but some 200 families have been moved
into homes provided by the Israelis. About
350-400 families have elected to go to Al Arish in
the Sinai, some 30 miles south of Gaza, while
some 150 families have gone to the West Bank,
according to an UNRWA estimate.
there is
talk of using vacant housing near Jericho for the
refugees. On the other hand, however,F_
in Phase Two-the Israelis intended to con-
struct four new resettlement areas in the Strip.
UNRWA officials have voiced suspicions that
Israel intended to engage in large-scale resettle-
ment outside the Strip in preparation for an even-
tual Israeli annexation of the area. Defense Min-
ister Dayan's recent speech about "more
permanent arrangements" in the occupied terri-
tories has increased these suspicions.
among them that the Arab states have abandoned
their cause, as well as from the presence of more
than the usual numbers of Israeli military person-
nel. International Red Cross personnel an the
scene attribute the calm to an atmosphere of
shock intentionally created by the Israelis
through such means as midnight visitations, short
notice to the refugees, and the quick demolition
of their houses. Egypt has protested the Israeli 25X1
action to UN Secretary General Thant and ',seems
certain to insert the subject into any Middle East
debate at the upcoming General Assembly ses-
sion.
The Jordanians are apparently still talking
about taking the issue of Israeli activity in Jerusa-
lem to the Security Council, presumably before
the General Assembly convenes late in Septem-
ber. Although the Jordanians are probably hoping
to limit the discussion to the single issue of Jeru-
salem, such a move by Amman would almost
inevitably open the door to an airing of the entire
Middle East question by other Arab state, who
are not disposed to cooperate closely with Jordan
following its recent clash with the fedayeen.; 25X1
Even if the Jordanians reconsider their deci-
sion, a heated debate in the UN General Assembly
on the whole Middle East problem is looming
over the horizon. An Egyptian "diplomat is of-
fensive" to gain support is already under way,
although Cairo media indicate that tactical deci-
sions relating to the assembly were still ' being
worked out this week.
UNRWA officials believe that the lack of
opposition from the residents arises from a feeling
The Israeli Foreign Ministry is also working
intensively in preparation for the assembly
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session. It is apparently concerned that the Arabs
this year will seek passage of a milder resolution,
which the US might find palatable. Such a text
could call on the Israelis to make a more positive
response to the proposals of UN mediator Gunnar
Jarring and could censure Israel for its actions in
Jerusalem. To bolster its case, Tel Aviv is blasting
the terms of the Damascus communique setting
up the Federation of Arab Republics, and is also
emphasizing recent Egyptian remarks on the im-
minence of resumed warfare.
President Sadat continues to work hard to
bring about an agreement between the Jordanian
Government and the fedayeen. Following the
FAR meeting in Damascus, he flew to Jidda to
inform King Faysal-also involved in the media-
tion effort-of the outcome of discussions on the
issue.
If no one can speak for
the fedayeen, and if-King Husayn stands pat on
the terms he presented to the Egyptian-Saudi
negotiating team, any settlement-even one that is
largely a face-saving gesture for all parties-re-
mains oat of reach.
The cabinet of new Premier Hasan al-Amri
was announced on 24 August. An unexpected
development was the naming of a southern Yem-
eni, Abdullah al-Asnaj, as minister of foreign af-
fairs. AI-Asnaj was active in southern Yemeni
trade union and political affairs until his exile in
1967. He is one of the more prominent leaders of
the National Unity Front (NUF), a band of exiles
who have been mounting a campaign based in
Yemen against the radical regime in Aden. The
appointment of al-Asnaj will cause a further de-
terioration in the already hostile relations be-
tween the two Yemens.
EQUATORIAL GUINEA: A massive roundup of
President Macias' tribal foes and some foreigners
that began early last week is continuing. The most
important spokesmen for the tribal minority have
been arrested, as well as some of the President's
own tribesmen, a handful of Nigerians and one
Spaniard. A purported "loan" by a Spaniard to
the vice president-one of the arrested minority
leaders-apparently triggered Macias' actions. The
absence of any public charges indicates that the
government is still preparing its case, but circum-
stantial evidence suggests that Macias is reacting
to a real plot rather than simply consolidating his
position further.
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Arab Federation: Another Step Toward Nominal Union
The constitution of the Federation of Arab
Republics (FAR) was approved on 20 August in
Damascus by the leaders of Egypt, Syria, and
Libya. It strengthens earlier indications that the
member states will surrender few sovereign
powers to the union.
The text is based on the Benghazi Declara-
tion promulgated at the FAR summit last April
and gives more appearance than substance to any
supposed supranational authority for the federa-
tion. Each member of the presidential council,
composed of the three heads of state, will have a
veto on any decision made by the council for a
period of two years after the constitution comes
into force. This provision formalizes an arrange-
ment already in use for summit-level consultation
on foreign and defense policy. The requirement
for unanimous decision in the council also pre-
serves the authority of each head of state over his
country's domestic affairs.
There is no reason to expect that the pro-
jected Federal National Assembly will have any
more political weight than the present Egyptian
and Syrian legislatures, which operate as creatures
of the respective regimes. The establishment of a
federal capital in Cairo and the adoption of a
common flag, anthem, and emblem are merely an
attempt to contrive the trappings of union.
Each state will retain indefinitely its separate for-
eign service and its own membership in the UN.
The jurisdiction of the other federal ministries is
not specifically defined and such limited responsi-
bilities as may be assigned will be decided by the
presidential council.
In the military sphere, each chief of state
retains control of his armed forces, in effect
making the proposed federal command a paper
organization. The right of military intervention to
protect a threatened member regime, explicitly
provided in Article 64, would seem to have practi-
cal application only with regard to Libya. Syria
and Libya do not have the military muscle to
intervene in Egypt and logistic problems virtually
preclude any effective Egyptian action beyond air
support for a threatened Syrian regime.
The appointment of a follow-up committee
to "supervise the implementation of the, con-
stitution" suggests that the federation's institu-
tional machinery will be set up at a deliberate
pace. After the constitution is submitted to a
referendum in the three countries on 1` Sep-
tember, one of the first steps that will presumably
be taken is the selection of the first chairman of
the presidential council.
Meanwhile, despite the rhetoric in thg con-
ference declaration of "no conciliation, no nego-
tiation with the Zionist enemy," the Egyptians
have yet to announce that they have abandoned
efforts to work out an interim settlement. Similar
language was incorporated in the FAR's Berghazi
Declaration last spring, apparently at Qadhafi's
insistence, but did little to obstruct Sadat's sub-
sequent diplomatic maneuvering. Israeli Foreign
Minister Eban, however, was quick to claim that
the intransigence of the Damascus Declaration
proved that the Arabs were responsible for the
absence of visible progress in the talks.
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MALAWI - SOUTH AFRICA: President Banda's
state visit to South Africa from 16-20 August was
judged an outstanding success by both sides and
almost immediately prompted reports in the
South African press of a forthcoming summit
meeting between black and white African leaders.
The visit-the first by a black African head of
state-was designed to project an image of inter-
racial harmony, and thereby show that black Afri-
can states can communicate with South Africa. It
is doubtful, however, that most black African
may also attend.
states, with their long-standing animosity to
South Africa's apartheid policy, will be con-
vinced. Although there has been no official con-
firmation of a summit, such a meeting would be a
logical follow-up to Banda's visit. According to
the press, the meeting is being planned for next
February in Blantyre, Malawi, and will include
Malawi and South Africa along with Rhodesia,
the Malagasy Republic, Botswana, Swaziland,
Lesotho, and perhaps the Ivory Coast. Leaders
from South Africa's black African homelands
South Africans Sharpen Debate Over Coloreds
A recent statement by nearly 30 Afrikaner 100 prominent Afrikaners from the Cape area,
university professors advocating full citizenship where the bulk of the Colored population lives.
rights for Coloreds (persons of mixed parentage) Moreover, an unprecedented number of letters
has brought to a head the long-simmering ques- poured into newspaper offices, almost all "aston-
tion of the future of South Africa's Colored ishingly sympathetic" to integration.
population and threatens a further split in the
once-monolithic ruling National Party.
South Africa's two million Coloreds have
always been a problem for the practitioners of
apartheid. In pursuit of their policy of separate
development, the Afrikaners have established a
vast system of African homelands where every
black could eventually be resettled, regardless of
where he was born and raised. The Coloreds,
however, have no traditional tribal home and
therefore do not fit into this scheme. The Na-
tional Party has ignored the problem for years,
although last December party leaders spoke
vaguely of a policy of "parallel development,"
which seemed to be a compromise between total
integration with the white community and ter-
ritorial separation.
The university professors' statement was
quickly rejected by the government, but was
endorsed less than a week later by a group of over
Page 20
A week ago, the National Party repeated its
commitment to parallel development, an indica-
tion of the seriousness with which the party lead-
ers view the current debate. They undoubtedly
intend to apply both pressure and persuasion to
bring party rank and file back into line. Although
Prime Minister Vorster appears to be leaning to-
ward greater integration, he probably believes he
is unable to move too rapidly without losing
support from the party's conservatives.
The Coloreds' increasing discontent with
second-class citizenship was brought home force-
fully last spring when they rioted during a local
bus strike. Until that time, most South African
whites regarded them as docile and easy-going,
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and only a few observers had decried the deterio-
ration in white-Colored relations that had taken
place in the past few years.
Most whites and a substantial number of
Coloreds believe that accommodation between
the two groups is still possible, provided the
whites take steps soon to grant full equality to
the Coloreds. The government has shown some
signs of moving in this direction; in June, for
example, it reversed a decision taken several
months earlier and announced its intention to pay
Coloreds and whites equal wages for equal work
in public service and urged private industry also
to raise the Coloreds' salaries. Whether the gov-
ernment can act quickly enough to prevent irrepa-
rable damage to prospects for future cooperation
is questionable, however.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Bolivia: A New President; a Ne w Direction
The new military-civilian coalition gov-
ernment led by Colonel Hugo Banzer is strongly
anti-Communist, and the new President has
vowed to reverse the leftist policies of the Torres
regime. Banzer was swept to power on 22 August
by a revolt that began three days earlier in the
eastern province of Santa Cruz and ended in
bloody fighting between the rebel forces and the
military and leftist civilian backers of Juan Jose
Torres in La Paz.
The move against Torres had been many
months in planning but was finally sparked by a
pre-emptive move by the government on 19
August that resulted in the arrest of Colonel
Banzer and several other plotters in Santa Cruz.
Rebels quickly seized control of Santa Cruz and
began picking up the support of army divisions
throughout the country. By midday on 21 August
President Torres' support had dwindled to the
army regiment charged with his protection and
several thousand leftist students and workers,
armed but completely unorganized. The serious
fighting lasted only a few hours, resulting in more
than 100 dead and 500 wounded, but sporadic
clashes between army troops and armed students
continued through midweek.
Page 21
The military was supported in its move
against Torres by the Bolivian Socialist FaIlange
(FSB) and the Nationalist Revolutionary Move-
ment (MNR). These parties, the two largest and
best organized in Bolivia, now have equal repre-
sentation in the Banzer government. This lends
the new government an appearance of popular
support and strength, but the traditional and
intense rivalry between the moderately rightist
FSB and moderately leftist MNR will create seri-
ous problems for the new president. In addition,
MNR leader and former president Paz Esteossoro
is back in La Paz after seven years of exile and
will probably soon be at odds with the govern-
ment as he seeks the political limelight that was
his from 1952 to 1964.
President Banzer has served notice that he
will take a hard line against leftist dissidents; This
attitude was dramatically demonstrated by an
armed assault on the university in La Paz where
leftist students were continuing to resist the new
government. He has also announced that a
priority task for his government will be to crush
the pro-Cuban guerrilla group that has sworn to
continue its opposition. The campaign against
pro-Cuban guerrillas and student dissidents could
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serve as a pretext to eliminate all leftist opposi-
tion to the Banzer government.
Other policy statements by the new presi-
dent indicate that he plans to steer a basically
moderate course. He has noted that some of the
more irresponsible actions of the two previous
governments will be reversed, but the clock
cannot be turned back and such things as the
expropriation of the US-owned Bolivian Gulf Oil
Company cannot be undone. In domestic politics,
Banzer has said he will strive for national unity,
eliminating the terms left and right from the
vocabulary and "speaking only of nationalism."
He has avoided setting a date for elections, saying
"the country's problems must come first."
Argentina, which apparently provided some
support for Banzer's move against Torres, was the
first Latin American nation to recognize the new
regime
Banzer said in a press
conference that he will continue relations with
the Soviet Union and the East European coun-
tries, but is not interested in restoring relations
with Cuba. Relations with the US are expected to
improve, and the Bolivians have already indicated ante.
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step to pull Bolivia from
merged. "
seeking substantial economic assist-
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Aug 71
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Mexican Student Riots Claim Another Political Victim
Attorney General Julio Sanchez Vargas re-
signed last week, the latest political victim of the
events of 10 June
Sanchez' departure probably
reflects President Echeverria's desire to establish
credibility as the students' champion beset by
disloyal or ineffective subordinates. The change
may offer the bonus of saving Echeverria from
having to account fully for the June affair when
he delivers his state of the union address at the
opening of Congress on 1 September.
Several top-level politicians had resigned last
June, ostensibly to free the attorney general's
hand in investigating the causes of the violent
clash, which saw students harshly repressed by a
Pedro Ojeda Paullada
group of toughs called
"halcones" who are gen-
erally acknowledged
Sanchez
Vargas` preliminary re-
port last month was a
blatant whitewash, and
pressure from opposition
critics and from the public media has been
mounting. Sanchez, a man of high personal in-
tegrity and political insensitivity, may himself
have demanded permission to issue a full and
honest report and thus precipitated his own
downfall.
The naming of 37-year-old Pedro Ojeda
Paullada to replace Sanchez has been praised by
the government's critics. Ojeda, unlike Sanchez, is
not burdened by association with past student
troubles and his inexperience for the attorney
generalship will grant him a period of grace before
public pressure rebuilds.
Sanchez' removal will help endear Echeverria
to the political left. The former attorney general
is known as a hard liner who believes in taking
stern measures against leftists, students, and
others who disrupt order and seek a change in the
political system. He is believed to have been
unsympathetic to Echeverria's policy of releasing
most of the student leaders jailed for the 1968
disturbances, and Echeverria is probably pleased
to have rid himself of the conservative Sanchez.
The President has energetically sought to portray
his administration as more open and democratic
than past regimes. In particular, he has worked at
opening lines of communication to students and
the left in general. His policies -have not' been
popular with the old guard, which views them as
offering dangerous possibilities for the destruc-
tion of the Mexican system of government.
Echeverria's alienation of this powerful and
moneyed element is likely to give him some tough
political crises in the future.
Rumors that other politicians on the cabinet
level will fall in Sanchez' wake may be the normal
consequence of a dramatic political happening.
Echeverria may, however, be displeased with the
performance of some of his lieutenants, whpm he
appointed on the basis of their loyalty, youth,
and enthusiasm- The inexperience of various
officials has caused the government some chagrin,
and Echeverria is most likely weighing the merits
of their removal against the reflection their
ousters would cast on his own judgment. 25X1
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NrI.r1cLI
HAITI: The first evident clash between members
of the new administration has demonstrated that
the majority is still disposed to cooperate in order
to preserve the collegial government. Disagree-
between Minister o Interior
Luckner Cambronne and the President's sister and
private secretary, Marie Denise Dominique, led to
a showdown of sorts earlier this month. The
principal members of the government, most im-
portantly the President's mother, sided with
Cambronne. The incident ended, for the time
being, on 12 August when the Dominiques and a
sizable entourage returned to France where Mad-
ame Dominique's husband is Haiti's ambassador.
The incident itself probably did little if any im-
mediate harm to the government. F_
El Salvador Prepares for Election Campaign
With the presidential election now only six
months away, the governing National Conciliation
Party (PCN) has chosen its candidate, and opposi-
tion parties are taking hesitant steps toward coa-
lescing behind a single opponent.
As required by the constitution, the PCN
candidate, Col. Arturo Armando Molina, was re-
lieved of active military duty last week. Several
vice presidential hopefuls have been mentioned,
but it is generally assumed that Colonel Molina
will be allowed to select his own running mate
during the party convention next month. Because
the PCN is the largest single party, is the best
organized, and has the advantages derived from
being the governing party, its candidate is con-
sidered a sure winner.
Opposition parties, however, believe that if
they can throw their combined strength behind
one person, they have a chance of capturing the
presidency, as well as the substantial portion of
congress they have gained in the last four elec-
tions. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC), two
smaller leftist parties, and one conservative party
have begun talks. Given the lack of enthusiasm
among the conservatives, however, any coalition
that results will most likely include only the PDC
and its leftist allies and be dominated by the PDC,
by far the largest of the three. Regardless of the
success or failure of the coalition, opposition
parties will be concentrating on the legislative
elections in March because, under the Salvadoran
system of proportional representation, they have
every expectation of again electing a sizable por-
tion of the legislative deputies.
Anticipating the stresses of the approaching
election campaign, the government is making an
effort to reduce the chance of embarrassing dis-
orders by trying to settle a seven-week-old
teachers' strike. The government's offer, including
pay increases, was rejected by the teachers' union
earlier this week, and the minister of education
replied on nationwide TV that the government's
offer was final. A teachers' demonstration on 25
August resulted in significant disorders. Security
forces did not intervene, but officials have warned
union leaders and some Communists involved
against further violence. As a result, another
demonstration planned for 27 August may have
few participants. The teachers appear to be losing
support because of their intransigence, while the
government, already strongly backed by the mili-
tary, is gaining public support for a fully opera-
tive school system.
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I)1{u1Cr- I
Chile: Rivalry Increases Within the Government
The Socialist Party's (PS) increasing deter-
mination to extend influence in the labor field is
heightening internal rivalry in the Allende govern-
ment. The Socialists reportedly consider Commu-
nist Party (PCCh) organizational efforts among
workers a failure, despite the advantages of ad-
ministration patronage and support from Mos-
cow. PS leaders criticize PCCh policies such as
profit-sharing :or workers as conservative and
compromising and call militantly for mobilization
of the workers to greater consciousness of the
needs of the revolution.
partner of the two Marxist parties in their long
domination of the labor organization, and lit has
many plans to use the confederation to
strengthen Communist political power.
Meanwhile, the opposition Christian Demo-
crats have been using their own influence in; some
copper and peasant unions to encourage wage
demands, strikes, and other tactics to exacerbate
Allende's growing economic woes. Particularly
galling to the Communists is the Christian Demo-
cratic hold on many peasants, who are resisting
government attempts to transform agrarian re-
form settlements into units resembling state
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