WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009000010001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
State Dept. review
completed
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
30 July 1971
No. 03$1/71
Copy No
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SECRET
CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EDT, 29 July 1971 J
Page
Indochina
Vietnam: Filling Out the Election Ticket
Laos: The GovernmAnt Moves in the South
Cambodia: Concern for the Future
1
. 2
. 3
Communist China: Ferreting Out the Extremists . 5
Soviets Uneasy About Sino-US Moves
. 7
RSFSR Premiership Changes Hands
8
UK-Malta: Negotiations on the Knife's Edge
10
Romania: Ceausescu Feints and Jabs
11
Tito Gains Ground in Fight Against Croat Nationalist;.
13
Rome and Vienna Wind Down Their Dispute Over Soiath Tyrol
14
Sudan: Numayri's Problems Still Around
15
Pakistan: Guerrilla Activity on the Rise
16
Liberia: A Time of Testing _ _ _
17
Egypt: Sadat Searches for Peace Despite Frustrations
18
Yemen (Aden): Plus rya Change...
18
Black Power Comes to South Africa
19
Argentina-Chile: The Salta Talks
20
Cuba: Castro Accentuates the Positive
21
A Counterbalance to Moderate Trend in Peru
22
Costa Rican President Isolated Politically ..
23
Haiti: Under New Management ..
23
Uruguay's Leftist Challengers Off to a Fast Start
24
NOTES: Berlin Pass Talks; Arms Control; UN; tjSSR-Sudan; UN -Peace-Keeping;
Ethiopia; UN -South Asia; Venezuela-Colombia
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SE~I~Efi
Indochina
Vietnam: Filling Cut the Election Ticket
FAR EAST
poor shawing, but it is obvious that much of his
potential suppor# has been scared off by local of-
ficials, who are actively backing President Thieu.
President Thieu's selection of Senator and
former prime minister Tran Van Huang as his run-
ning mate will provide a regional and religious bal-
ance to his ticket. Huong was a rather ineffective
prime minister wha did not enjoy an easy relation-
ship with the National Assembly, but as a civilian
and a southern Buddhist he will balance Thieu's
Catholic and central Vietnam background. In addi-
tion, Huong is widely admired for his personal
integrity, has a large following in Saigon, and may
offset Thieu's unpopularity there.
Prime Minister Khiem--Thieu's alternate vice-
presidential choice being
passed over. However, Thieu probably considers
Khiem's administrative abilities more useful in the
prime minister's job. If Huong should drop out,
Khiem still would be available to fill out the ticket.
Huong is 67 and his health is not good.
Big Minh's selection of Dr. Ho Van Minh for
his vice-presidential candidate follows a period of
behind-the-scenes backing and filling by the general
and his potential running mates.
Time and events are continuing to run against
Vice President Ky's chances of qualifying for the
fall election. Reports on the status of Ky's endorse-
ments conflict, but at last count he apparently had
no more than 20 certified endorsements of the 100
he needs, although his staff is claiming over 100
signed or promised supporters. Laek of money for
campaigning and bribes and the lackadaisical efforts
of his campaign staff have also contributed to Ky's
Page 1
Province chiefs throughout the country have
been openly soliciting endorsements for the Presi-
dent and have frequently employed subtle pressures
#a induce councilors to sign for Thieu, sign blank
endorsements, or simply refrain from endorsing Ky.
wen in the. absence
of direct pressure, most councilmen are aware of
the dangers of arousing the displeasure of a power-
ful province chief or mayor.
Thieu's organization seems determined to ex-
clude Ky from the election, not only to assure the
former's victory, but to give him a majority man-
da#e this time-he won in 1967 with only 34.9
percent of the vote. Thieu and -his advisers seem
unconcerned about the possible unfavorable impact
on Thieu'S image abroad and they have discounted
Big Minh's threats to pull out of the race. if Ky is
blocked. In view of Thieu's determination to be a
majority winner, he seems unlikely to relent in his
efforts to black Ky's candidacy.
Small-scale Communist attacks increased dur-
ing the past week as the enemy continued its effort
to nibble away at the government's pacification
program. Most of the targets were militia outposts
and smalP population centers. One raid on a Mekong
Delta hamlet accounted for some 30 civilian casual-
ties. Enemy sappers also penetrated swell-defended
air base near Saigan and destroyed four helicopters.
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~r~~t~r, t
Although the expected- upsurge in larger
scale enemy action this month has been delayed
by heavy rains and flooding, signs persist that the
enemy still hopes to stage another round of at-
tacks soon. The evidence suggests that the action
will be mostly concentrated in the northern
provinces.
Worry in Hanoi
Hanoi continues to register unprecedented
concern that Peking-Washington diplomacy has
upstaged its own seven point initiative. Bitter
indirect criticism of the Chinese is still appearing
in the press, and Le Duc Tho, the top negotiator
in Paris, has been called home for consultatians.
The Vietnamese may also be seeking some Soviet
assistance- in refocusing world attention on the
seven points.
Moscow has already provided propaganda
support by echoing North Vietnamese strictures
against any Washington-Peking attempt to settle
the Vietnam war "behind Hanoi's back," and the
Soviets will probably do more. Afforded an op-
portunity to score points against the Chinese,
Moscow will probably do its best to accom-
modate itself to any plan the Vietnamese come
up with to recapture the negotiations initiative.
Laos: The Government Moves in the South
Four irregular battalions, numbering 1,300
men, were airlifted to an area north of the town
of Saravane on 2$ July in a major new govern-
ment offensive in south Laos. The troops sub-
sequently occupied the town without opposition.
This provincial capital has been in enemy hands
since last year, and its capture should give a
psychological boost to the government in Vien-
tiane. The irregulars, however, do not intend to
Page 2
hold the town for long, but will try to move
aga i n~:t Communist installations and supply
caches to the west.
Tl~e move into Saravane is the beginning of a
wider Effort in the Bolovens Plateau. On 29 July
government units began an operation to recapture
Paksong in the central portion of the plateau. As
a diversionary measure, government units had
been moved into areas on the eastern edge. of the
plateau. These units ran into stiff Communist
resistance.
The Communists have between six and eight
North `/ietnamese battalions in the Bolovens with
armor ,end artillery support. They hold most of
the key high-ground positions on the plateau and
have hid some time to pre-position ammunition
caches.
In north Laos, irregular units have once
again moved into the foothills north of the Plaine
des Jar~~es, reoccupying positions that had been
lost to a Communist counterattack on 21 July.
An irregular force also seized Phou San, a high
point about five miles northeast of the govern-
ment position at Phou Keng. The force moving
south from Bouam Long, however, continues to
encounter difficulties. Several clashes have slowed
the irregulars' advance.
North Vietnamese resistance in the Plaine
has increased. On 26 July enemy gunners directed
over 100 rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle
rounds ;~t the government base on Phou Theung.
Other enemy units initiated clashes on the north-
ern and eastern edge of the Plaine.
The Government on Peace Talks
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma attempted
to keep up at least the appearance of a dialogue
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Jul 71
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5~.t~1~C.~, i
~anyT;.n!
~ovoas Lang
~ Govarnment?hefd Iocetlon
f Communist-held Iatatton
on Lao peace talks by replying to the extremely
hard-line Pathet Lao statement of 11 July. His
la#est message to Communist leader Souphanou-
vong called for immediate and serious negotia-
tions to end the war. 5ouvanna again ignored the
Communist proposal for acountry-wide cease-fire
and instead proposed a bombing haft limited to
the area of the eventual talks site,. presumably the
Plaine des Jarres and Vientiane alternately.
Souvanna's message did make one sug-
gestion, moving a step closer to specifics about
the modalities of talks. He proposed that security
for the talk sites be provided by a mixed force of
Lao Army and Pathet Lao forces under the super-
vision of the International Control Commission.
The Communists are unlikely to respond
positively to Sauvanna's latest message. Most of
it, including the proposal for a partial cease fire,
has already been rejected. The Communists took
the occasion of the ninth anniversary of: the
Geneva Accords to repeat their position on nego-
tiations. They asserted that they will continue to
seek a negotiated solution to the war even while
they "smash" US acts of escalation.
r
The government has moved to calm fears
that an improvement in Sino-U5 relations ;may
create difficulties for Cambodia. to a radiobroad-
cast to the nation on Zti July, Lon Idol reaffirmed
Phnom Penh`s "satisfaction" with Presildent
(sfixan's forthcoming visit to Peking. The prime
minister also stated that the National Assembly
shared his view that the Geneva Accords of X954
call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from
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Cambodia, and that Sino-US rapprochement
should lead to a new international respect for the
accords.
It seems likely that Lon Nol's speech was
aimed at least in part at reassuring politically
important elements of the armed forces-es-
pecially the elite Khmer Krom (KK) units-that
the government will continue to resist Communist
aggression. The prime minister's remarks came at
a timE~ when the morale of KK troops was show-
ing some signs of flagging. The KK soldiers have
regularly borne a disproportionate share of the
Camb~~dian Army's combat res onsibilities and
have taken heavy losses.
~ThUs
far thE; decline in morale apparently is slight, and
does rot appear to have affected the discipline or
fighting qualities of KK units.
The Lon Nol government suffered the first
political casualty of its new administration when
the N~~tional Assembly voted to censure Minister
of Commerce Khung Thay Ly, apparently as
much to protest the government's failure to curb
inflation as to fault Ly for his inept performance
in office. The speed with which the government
accept~:d Ly's resignation served to confirm re-
ports that it was prepared to see him go without a
fight, in the hope that his removal would increase
assembly support for the regime's proposed eco-
nomic stabilization program. 25X1
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`.~'~C:~C~'i~
Communist Chinas Ferreting Ghat the ~'xtrer~iists
The behind-the-scenes investigation of a noto-
rious Peking-based Red Guard organization that has
been exacerbating tensions within China's ruling
politburo over the pas# year may be entering a more
public phase. Western diplomats in Peking have
recently been informed of the censure of a former
Foreign Ministry official associated with activities
of tl~e "May I6 Corps," which had attacked Pre-
mier Chou En-lei and other moderately oriented
officials during the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile,
amass rally to repudiate
the May 16 Corps wFll-be-held in Canton earEy next
month. Similar political rallies are likely in other
areas and could result in some fresh purges of local
cadres, many of whom may be only tenuously
connected, if at all, with the original May 16 organi-
zation. I n any case, it appears tha# a major decision
has been taken in recen# weeks to repudiate openly
the more extreme manifestations of the Cultural
Revolution and that the political fortunes of ultra-
leftist leaders both at the national and local levels
are continuing their downward spiral.
Efforts to ferret out and arrest alleged follow-
ers of the May 16 Corps were initiated in Peking
and nearby Tientsin in fate 1969. Although the full
ramifications of the investigation are still no# clear,
it apparently served as the catalyst in an intense
power struggle between moderate and ultraleftist
forces on the politburo and touched off the dra-
matic alterations within the top leadership over the
past year. The May 16 case has never been openly
discussed in the Chinese press and local officials
were apparently kept in the dark about the a#fair
until late 197!) when they were evidently ordered
to begin holding anti -May 36 criticism sessions at
various administrative levels.
were pro a y esEgned to prepare local cadres for
future revelations stemming from the intricate ma-
neuvering in Peking.
I n recent months, the campaign m the prov-
inces appears to have broadened to include investi-
gations into the backgrounds of suspected May I6
elements, the majority of which probably include
local cadres. The campaign in Canton has been run
by the military and has reportedly been confined to
factories,
the staffs in government offices, schools,
hospice s, and communes have been prime targets.
Because the original May 16 Corps appeared to have
relatively few adherents outside of Peking, it is
likely that the party leadership has authorized the
campaign as a device for further undercutting the
positions of extremist elements that may Mill be
challenging the dominance of conservatively ori-
ented military officers and veteran party .cadres in
many localities in the emergent post -Cultural
Revolution par#y apparatus.
The degree to which Peking is willing, to ex-
pose publicly the extent of disunity at the highest
levels of national leadership, however, remains a
moot point. fn May,. apro-Communist Australian
journalist claimed that he had been told in;Peking
that the names of the "plo#ters" behind the ?riginal
May 16 group would be revealed as roan as the
investigation was completed
IAt this
stage, therefore, it appears that Peking will pri-
marily use the public rallies against the May 16
Corps both for domestic and international con-
sumption and as a forum for repudiating political
extremism, past and present.. Even if the forthcom-
ing rallies shed little additional light on the cpmplex
internal leadership picture, the very fact that the
May I6 affair is being moved into the public; realm
seems another indication of the growing strength of
the moderate elements in the central leadership and
of the strong shift to the right in China's internal
politics.
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WEEKLY' SUMMAR'! 3t} Jul 71
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EUi~t~PE
Soviets Uneasy About Sinn-US 't~~oves
In a carefully worded article in Pravda on 25
July that ended a nine-day official silence, the
Soviets expressed some of their worst fears re-
garding the Sino-American rapprochement but
offered to wait for future events to "reveal the
true intentions" of Peking and Washington. The
Soviet message was clearly twofold: on the one
hand, it was a serious warning that Sino-US con-
tacts cannot be used to pressure the USSR; on the
other hand, it was a reaffirmation of Moscow's
willingness to continue efforts to improve rela-
tions with bath China and the US. For at least the
time being, then, the Soviets are not of a mind to
permit recent events to get in the way of border
talks with Peking or the strategic arms talks with
Washington.
Although the article employed the Soviet
practice of using statements from the foreign
press to vent Moscow`s ire, it did not attempt to
conceal the view that the rapprochement is
designed in no small measure tobring pressure on
the USSR, and could even lead to a ?'political
combination" against the Soviets. The article ac-
cused both Peking and Washington of cloaking
their intentions behind a "dense propaganda
screen," and it warned that their actions will be
watched closely in Moscow. Any attempt to use
the .contacts tv ".pressure" the USSR, Pravda
warns, could only be the result of a "loss of touch
with reality."
The article, however, states that the 24th
Party Congress defined Soviet policy toward Pe-
king and Washington, and that the current course
of events "confirms the correctness" of this
policy. In this way,. the Soviets have endorsed
bilateral negotiations with both states an;d the
article itself concludes with an endorsement of
active cooperation with Peking and the US.
Meanwhile, the private remarks of Soviet
officials appear to parallel the Pravda message of
warning and wariness regarding Sino-American
developments. Several Soviet diplomats have
expressed the opinion that China and the U$ have
reached some understanding on Vietnam; The
Soviets are already seeking a sympathetic. audi-
ence in Hanoi and other Communist stags for
their view that Peking's actions have threatened
North Vietnamese opportunities for success
against the US. The Soviets are probably fearful
of being cut out of future efforts to -arrange a
political settlement in Southeast Asia.
Moscow, aware that Washington's moves
have considerably enhanced Communist China's
chances for early entry into the UN, had reit-
erated its endorsement of Peking's admission. Sev-
eral days after the Presidential announcement on
15 Juiy,the Soviets publicly released a note fo UN
Secretary General Thant calling for Peking's entry
and Taipei's ouster from the UN. Although the
Soviets are probably counting on Taipei to' be an
obstacle to Peking's entry-as well as to any
genuine improvement in Chinese relations with
the US-Moscow must prepare for the day when
it is competing with Peking for influence among
Third World states at the General Assem-
bly.
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RSFSR Premiership Changes Hands
The replacement of Gennady Voronov by
party secretary Mikhail Solomentsev as premier of
the Russian Federation this past week sets the
stage for future changes in the Politburo and
Secretariat from which Brezhnev and his allies
probably have the mast to gain.
Election of 57-year-old Solomentsev by the
new RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 28 July places
the Soviet Union's dominant republic under the
premiership of an independent with no obvious
ties to top Soviet leaders. In the early 1960s, in
fact, Solomentsev rose to the position of second
secretary of Kazakhstan during an eclipse in the
career of Kazakh leader and Brezhnev protege D.
A. Kunayev, now a member of the Politburo. An
industrial specialist with some experience in agri-
culture, Solomentsev was appointed party secre-
tary and chief of the Central Committee's heavy
industry department in 1966. His rare speeches
do not reveal a parochial outlook, however, as
they have touched on the themes of consumer
production, decentralization of some economic
responsibilities, and ideology.
Voronov, 60, is also a loner, but one who
has recently been obviously out of favor with
Brezhnev and his allies. Voronov's appointment as
chairman of the People's Control Committee on
22 July was a serious demotion.
Despite some apparent support last fall from
anoth~~r independent, senior secretary Suslov,
Voronov suffered a series of reversals this past
year. In February his chief deputy for six years
was r~aplaced by an official with career ties to
Brezhnev. Brezhnev's ranking of the Politburo at
the party congress this spring showed a steep
decline for Voronov in the five years since the
1966 congress. Voronov's rivalry with Brezhnev's
unofficial deputy, Kirilenko, goes back to the
early 1960s. Voronov's persistent advocacy of
more agricultural reform at a lower cost con-
tradic~led the wishes of First Deputy Premier
Polyansky and the agricultural program an-
nounced by Brezhnev last summer.
Changes in the Politburo seemed to be fore-
shado~roed by its expansion at the party congress
in April. Solomentsev's replacement of Voronov
as RSI=SR premier has relevance for the composi-
tion of both the Politburo and the Secretariat. By
precedent, Voronov's new position does not en-
title him to continued membership on the Polit-
buro. Solomentsev, on the other hand, is now in
line to gain Politburo status, although he will have
to relinquish his Secretariat post, leaving a
vacancy in that body.
Gennady Voronov
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St/f~~t~:"1'
CaRAND HARBQR
Cont/nued use by
M#ntoff's Proposals for New
Malta/Ult Re#ationship
HAIL FAR
Relinquishment by RAF
~~~,~ y ~r>i~K~v svMM>~,RV 3a ~~~ ~i
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~L,l~1C1.1
U K-M a I to : Negotiations on the Knife's Edge
The British high commissioner in Valleta has
described the UK-Malta negotiations on a new
defense arrangement as being "on the knife's
edge." He is not optimistic about the outcarne of
the talks, which have been in progress for more
than a month, because Prime Minister Mintoff has
displayed little flexibility in his tactics. Mintoff
has told the British that if they do not soon meet
his financial demands, British forces will have to
be withdrawn and he will turn elsewhere for aid.
Valleta has advanced two proposals for a
new agreement. The first embraces a "wholly
exclusive defense arrangement" that would per-
mit the British to retain a veto power over third
country military use of Maltese facilities in ex-
change for an annual payment of $72 million.
The other proposal is fora "less exclusive arrange-
ment" costing $48 million annually, under which
Malta would have the power to grant the use of
its harbors and airfields to any nations except
those in the Warsaw Pact. The use of the island by
British forces would be strictly defined under
either of these two proposals. The Royal Navy
would be limited to Grand Harbor, and the Royal
Air Force would have to give up its base at Hall
Far and retain facilities only at Luqa, Malta's
principal airfield.
Mintoff has told the British that, although
NATO must leave the island, the Allies could
contribute toward the UK payment to Malta.
Valleta, however, would not count bilateral de-
velopment aid from NATO members as part of
the "rent" it is seeking from the British.
The UK has asked the Allies for their posi-
tion on the principle of a NATO contribution to
Malta and how much each would be willing to
offer. Although NATO Secretary General Brosio
is dubious about the chances for a special finan-
cial contribution, he has agreed to hold a meeting
to discuss the request. London will seek a firm
response by 5 August so that it can resume
negotiations with Valleta. The British representa-
tive to NATO has implied that London would like
to offer Mintoff an annual payment of $24
m i I I i on, of which the UK would pick up
some~uvhat less than half. The level of annual UK
aid up to now has averaged out to about $12
million.
~/lintoff's negotiating tactics are aimed at
producing an agreement before the Maltese par-
liament convenes in late August. An accord with
London that is seen as a significant improvement
will hE~lp mute opposition criticism of the Maltese
Labor government and consolidate Mintoff's hold
over the moderate wing of his own party, thus
allowing him to exercise his one seat parlia-
mentary majority with confidence.) -
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Romania; Ceausescu Fedrzis and Jabs
The 25th annual session of the Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA' opened in
Bucharest on 27 July against a backdrop of recent
assertive speeches by Romanian leader Ceausescu.
Insofar as these speeches stressed national sover-
eignty and the right of each party to determine its
own policies, Ceausescu basically restated old
principles, but he also used them to surface same
new ideas, particularly with respect to economic
integration. His apparent intent was both to reas-
sure the Romanian people and to signal his allies
that Bucharest proposed to stand firm during the
CEMA session which called, i~~ter~rlra, for "devel-
oping socialist economic integration."
Ceausescu used his strangest language with
respect to CEMA and Moscow in a speech at
Constants on 23 July. In it, he asserted that
CEMA is "an important _body," _but added that
"interdependence in production must in no way
infringe on national sovereignty" nor influence
the right of each nation "to decide independently
its development program according to its own
wishes." He later drove home his point by "de-
nouncing old enslaving economic and military
agreements and treaties" and by adding that the
"times of oppression and diktat have gone for-
ever."
The Constants speech else contained other
carefully tailored phrases implicitly striking out at
mounting Soviet pressure and .criticism of the
Romanian regime. Thus Ceausescu stressed that
"an absolute end must be put to the imperialist
policy of force, diktat, and interferente in the
affairs of other states or of any kind of pressure
against other states." More specifically, he as-
serted that "small and medium-sized states should
oppose the imperialist policy of force and diktat
and should assert and defend their right to a tree
life!"
Ceausescu is walking a very thin wire fpr an
Eastern European Communist leader. Earlier this
month he posed some maverick ideas with respect
to economic integration-a subject about which
Bucharest has long been chary. Noting that "in-
tegration is being discussed, both the socialist
#ype and that of the Common Market," he stated
that "we must distinctly analyze and discuss the
#hese5 and practices connected with capitalist in-
tegration as well as the problem of socialist taop-
erative relations and the forms of integration
within the framework of CEMA."
Neither the more positive tone of his re-
marks on "the practices of the Common Maf?ket"
nor his linkage of CEMA and Common Market
principles will reduce Moscow's irritation :with
Bucharest. At the same time, however, the Ro-
manian leadership considers itself sufficiently pru-
dent politically to sense the "danger quota,t' as a
high-level Romanian official recently put it that
Moscow will tolerate. In practical terms, there-
fore, Bucharest can be expected to resisit any
sharp increase in integration within CEMA, but it
can accept minor progress that is coupled- with
precise language protecting Romania's national
sovereignty.
How extensively Bucharest cooperates at
this CEMA session will help to determine whether
Moscow tests anew Romania's loyalty to all
Soviet-sponsored and bloc-wide institutions, in-
cluding the Warsaw Pact. In this regard, !more
Soviet pressure may be forthcoming to gain @ither
Romanian participation in next month's .com-
bined Pact exercise in Bulgaria or transit rights for
participating Soviet troops via Romanian surface
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S~GKE'1'
BERLIN PASS TALKS: West Berlin Senat nego-
tiator Mueller and East German state secretary
Kohrt again failed to make any progress on 26
July in their meeting aimed at trying to hammer
out a holiday pass agreement for West Berliners.
The East Germans, who have little interest in an
agreement for humanitarian purposes alone, con-
tinued to insist on discussing the question of the
Bonn government's presence in West Berlin, a
topic reserved for the Four Power negotiations on
the divided city. The lack of enthusiasm on both
sides at this meeting, the first since May, was
reflected in the fact that the next session is not
scheduled until 30 August, "unless ro ress is
notecl in the Four Power talks." 25X1
ARMS CONTROL: The Soviets have responded
in a forthcoming manner to US suggestions for
revisions in their draft convention curbing biologi-
cal weapons (BW). Only a few minor points re-
main at issue between the two countries, and
agreement should be reached soon on a single text
to be presented to the other participants in the
25-nation Geneva disarmament conference. The
UN: At week's end the UN faced the strong
possibility of unprecedented strike action by its
staff personnel-clerical, security, and main-
tenance workers-beginning in October. Secretary
General Thant has offered a retroactive eight-per-
cent pay hike, but the staff union is demanding a
15-percent boost. Thant believes the UN member
states could accept an eight-percent increase, but
USSR-SUDAN: Soviet-Sudanese relations are al
most certain to deteriorate sharply in the next
few weeks. As of 1200 EDT, Thursday, Moscow
had not yet commented authoritatively on the
execution of Sudanese Communist Party leader
Mahjoub. Based on its reaction to the execution
earlier this week of the leading Sudanese Commu-
nist trade union official, however, Moscow is
likely to protest vigorously.
Press reports from Khartoum indicate -that
Sudanese President Numayri, in a speech on 29
July, absolved the Soviets of any role in the
nonaligned delegates still would prefer a conven-
tion :hat would also include limits on chemical
weapons (CW), but they are not inclined to pre-
vent ~icceptance of a text confined to BW. Thus it 25X1
seems likely that the conferees will present a BW
convention to the UN General Assembly this
fall.
the Big Four major donors-the US, UK, France,
and the USSR-have told him they have serious
problE~ms with his 1972 budget, which failed to
project even the eight-percent rise. Any strike
action would pose serious security problems at
the headquarters complex and hinder the upcom-
ing GE~neral Assembl session.
recent coup attempt and reiterated his desire for
good relations with the USSR. At the same time,
however, Numayri also announced that at least
some ~~f the estimated 470 Soviet economic and
military advisers would be leaving the Sudan "be-
cause '`heir mission was completed." None of the
military or economic projects undertaken by the
Soviet~~ in the Sudan would appear to be far
enougPr along to warrant the departure of the
experts, but in the present circumstances both
sides may see some advantage in cutting back on
the Soviet presence. It is unlikely, however, that
either side will want to terminate the aid program
Page 12
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Tito Gains Gr?tand in Fight Against goat Nationalists
Events over the past two weeks indicate that
Tito has made impressive gains toward re-estab-
lishing control over Croatian nationalists. The
Croat party-including leaders sympathetic to the
nationalists-has dropped its resistance to Tito's
demands for action and for the first #ime is trying
to isolate and neutralize radical separatists.
Since the party meeting in late April, Ti#o
has pushed for such measures but, constrained by
consideration for his upcoming political reforms,
was unable to bring his full administrative power
to bear. Now that his reforms have been passed
into law and his dramatization of the Soviet
threat has tightened Yugoslav unity, Tito's warn-
ings are having more effect in Zagreb,
Moderate Croat party leaders fell into line in
early July, but until last week the nationalistic
members still refused to accept the inherent dan-
gers of their course. A turn in Tito's favor, how-
ever, came on 25 July when C+/Iika Tripalo, the
Croatian party leadership's rmos# active booster of
Croat independence, made _an abrupt tactical
about-face. Tr:ipalo, aware of the party's expul-
sion of two prominent proteges two days earlier,
delivered a speech emphasizing that nationalism
had become a threat to the federation, that con-
centration of power in the federation had bene-
fited ail Yugoslavs, and that separatism was inimi-
cal to both Yugoslav .and Croatian interests. He
further recommended "self-denial, discipline and
practical action" as guidelines for the future.
Tripalo's back-pedaling will confuse the na-
tionalists, and more fissures in their unity ire to
be expected. There are indications that the goat
party chief, Mrs. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, the goat
party's most vocal supporter of Tito's fine, i5 now
ready to capitalize on this opportunity. The goat
student federation, which has been virtually un-
checked in its separatist course since party loyal-
ists were driven out of its leadership early this
year, will be a primary target of her efforts. A
rival group, the Croat youth federation, his al-
ready begun to dissociate itself from recent ex-
ce55e5 by the student federation. Other tiilrgets
will probably be militant Croatian culturiill so-
cieties, like Matica Hrvatska, and nationalist, jour-
nals that have incited quarrels with other minori-
ties.
Tightening discipline will not be an easy task
for the Croat party, however. The manner in
which it handles the more adamant nationalists
will be subject to criticism both from Belgrade for
being too soft and from its own ranks for serving
as an anti-Croatian tool. Mrs. Dabcevic-Kuc~r will
have to strike a balance that will redeem her ;party
in Tito's eyes and preserve, as much as possible,
party unity and influence over the repub-
UN - PEACE-KEEPING: A working paper the peace-keeping mission, with little latitude fpr the
Soviet delegation at the UN has given the t;5 on Secretary General. Other UN members are becom-
guidelines for UN peace-keeping missions reveals ing restive over the lack of progress in completing
no movement by the USSFt on key substantive the guidelines and may soon offer their; awn
paints, but the Soviets want to revive bilateral proposals.
talks on the subject. They continue to insist that
the Security Council have full control over a
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Rome and Vienna Wind Down Their Dispute aver South Tyrol
Steady progress toward settling the long-
disputed status of the South Tyrol area, called the
Alto Adige in Italian, has resulted in considerable
improvement in Austro-Italian relations.
Discontent has simmered-and sometimes
boiled-in the South Tyrol, where most of the
people speak German, since Austria was forced to
cede the area to Italy after World War I. In 1946,
Italy promised to give autonomy to the South
Tyrol, which it had designated Bolzano Province.
In fact, Rome merged the province with pre-
dominantly Italian Trento Province to form an
Italian-dominated "autonomous region" called
Trentino -Alto Adige.
The affected German-speaking population
numbers only some 200,000 but their demands
have always evoked sympathy in Austria, partic-
ularly in the North Tyrol, and have been an
unavoidable political issue for all postwar Aus-
trian governments. Rome's interest in finding a
solution to the dispute has been heightened by
repeated terrorist activities of anti-Italian groups
having imprecise ties to Salzburg, Munich, or
Vienna. In December 1969, Rome and Vienna
agreed on a program of steps to peace in the
South Tyrol. It provided that progressively over a
period of four years, Bolzano Province would be
given more legislative and administrative auton-
omy and the German and Italian languages will
have equal status in the public media and the
educational system.
Th is month, Austrian Foreign Minister
Kirchschlaeger and Italian Foreign Minister Moro
signed a treaty providing for jurisdiction by the
International Court of Justice at The Hague in
case of further dispute over the government or
the borders of the province.
Steady Progress Continues
- on South Tyrol Dispute
' AUSTRIA
!Innsbruck
'(Alto-Actige)
BOLZANO PROVINCE
~T~~t~Tiao-
a~'TO-a?ioe
Venice.-.-
~:.
The progress made by the two governments
in laying the South Tyrol issue to rest has been
marked by the relaxation of tensions in the
area-~~articularly evident in the cessation of ter-
rorist attacks-and in the emergence of better
feeling between Rome and Vienna. Italy has
moved away from its long-standing role as the
most outspoken opponent of Austria's bid for
association with the Common Market and now
supports Vienna's request for early negotiations
for a free trade area between Austria and an
en larged European Community. 25X1
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MIQDLE EAST - AFRICA
Sudan: Nuntavri's Problems Sti1l.~round
Although he has been restored to .power
fallowing the collapse of the three-day Commu-
nist take-aver in Khartoum, Revolutionary Com-
mand Council Chairman Numayri will not find his
position much better than it was before the coup.
In southern Sudan, the 16-year-o~d rebellion
led by the Anya-Nya continues. Although the
dissidents do not present a serious challenge to
the government, their unrelenting guerrilla war-
fare has forced Numayri to station a sizable por-
tion of the army in the major .cities of the area.
Military leaders are not pleased about having their
forces tied down in garrison duty, however, and
are frustrated by their inability to take effective
action against an opponent that appears and dis-
appears quickly into the jungle. They are likely to
-bring pressure on Numayri until he tinds some
accommodation with the rebels.
Economic problems also remain to be coped
with. Two years of incredible mismanagement
and erratic changes of policy have brought devel-
opment to a standstill. Increased revenues haae
been offset by growing expenditures, and the
country's cotton crop, a prime source of income,
is heavily mortgaged to Moscow to pay for arms.
Although the removal of Communists from the
government may provide a more favorable climate
for aid from Libya and the West, it is likely to be
some time before any ecanamic turnabout is pos-
sible.
ETHIOPIA: Emperor Haile Selassie intends to
visit Communist China this fall, probably in Eate
October. The trip follows the establishment of
diplomatic relations in December 1930. Addis
Ababa apparently hopes Peking will offer eco-
nomic assistance, and a high-level committee is
already at work on a list of aid projects to be
discussed with the Chinese. An Ethiopian trade
Moreover, with an Indonesian-style vendetta
against the Communists moving into high:; gear,
Numayri wil9 now be more beholden than ever to
the army, the only source of authority and power
left in the country. The military establishrAent-
and especially its senior officers-has Cang been
conservative in political ideology and is likely to
urge Numayri to remove whatever leftists amain
in the government. The chairman will also be
under great pressure to emulate more close [y the
"progressive revolutionary" regimes in Libya and
Egypt.
Paradoxically, however, when Numayri moves
in this direction-and he has already announced
his intention to take Sudan into the Federation of
Arab Republics next January-it will cost him
grass-routs support, for the Sudanese have: been
divided on the issue of association with ~gypt
ever since independence. Numayri will have to
work hard indeed to sell to the people the ad-
vantages of a closer political relationship'. with
Cairo, the cornerstone of the federation.
Numayri may have been given a second
chance, but his tenure depends to a large degree
on how well he handles his problems, and espe-
cially on his ability to keep the military placated.
If he stumbles, as he had been doing in the
months before the coup, Numayri could find him-
self removed from power again, this time by a
conservative junta.
and aid delegation is going in September to .work
out details of an economic agreement that; then
can be signed by the Emperor the following
month.
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Pakistan: Guerrilla~4ctivityon the Rise
Sabotage, assassinations, and ambushes in
East Pakistan are increasing. Bengali insurgents
have been able to disrupt the transportation sys-
tem in the eastern part of the province and com-
munications elsewhere are far from normal. A
Pakistani general admits that, on an average, 'two
bridges a day are being blown up.
Sabotage of the electric power system also
continues, and the cutoff of natural gas in Dacca
may have resulted from guerrilla operations.
The guerrillas are not yet strong enough to
challenge the army directly, and it appears un-
likely that they will be able to do so in the near
future. But with many government troops di-
verted to the border-where clashes with the
Indians continue-the army may be spread too
thin to deal effectively with the sabotage cam-
paign.
Guerrilla activity and government inactivity
have both contributed to the lack of progress in
solving the food distribution problem. The US
consul~~te general believes that it may prove im-
possible to distribute the 1.4 million tons of grain
that will be needed before the end of the year,
and predicts that starvation in parts of the prov-
ince is likely to begin by November.
Ire India, pressure to recognize "Bangla
Desh" is mounting, although the flow of refugees
has slackened, at least temporarily. Prime Minister
Gandhi's political opponents are allegedly unani-
mous ~n support of recognition, and the major
opposi~:ion parties are planning a series of public
demonstrations on the issue. Mrs. Gandhi has
strengthened her public statements in support of
the "freedom fighters," but still maintains that
India will base its decision to recognize "Bangla
Desh" exclusively on direct national interest and
on whE~ther such a move would support the cause
of the Bengal is. I n discussions with members of
parliament on 25 July, however, she gave the
Bengali nationalists some encouragement by as-
serting that no preconditions or criteria-such as
control of specific amounts of territory in East
Bengal-have been established for recogni-
UN -SOUTH ASIA: The UN secretariat this
week completed its decisions on staffing the refu-
gee areas in West and East Bengal, and the full
complement of personnel should be on the scene
shortly. With food and other relief supplies now
flowing into the subcontinent on a more adequate
basis, the international community is again focus-
ing on political problems there rather than on the
humanitarian concerns. India has reacted
sharply-in both diplomatic channels and the
mass media-to Secretary General Thant's pro-
posal ti~at UN observers be stationed on each side
of the Indo-Pakistani border. New Delhi main-
tains that such a proposition would be tanta-
mount to suggesting that the civil war in East
Pakistan was an international conflict. The pres-
ence of such observers could also hinder Indian
cross-border operations in support of the Bengali
freedom fighters. ~
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Liberia: A Time of Testing
The death last week of President William
Tubman ushers in a time of testing both for the
system of government he developed during 27
years of rule and for William Tolbert, his succes-
sor. Former vice president Tolbert must now
make that system-which depended heavily on
Tubman's personality and intimate knowledge of
the personal affairs of members of the ruling
elite-responsive to his own direction.
Tubman's death has created among most
Liberians a sense of loss and shock, as well as
fears that with him wilt go the prosperity and
political stability associated with his Eong rule.
Reforms initiated by Tubman helped lay the basis
for modernization of the mineral-rich economy,
and for more equitable sharing of the country's
wealth and political power by disparate social and
tribal groups. In his first public speech after be-
coming president, Talbert pledged to continue
these highly popular policies.
Many observers doubt that Talbert possesses
the skills necessary to duplicate Tubman's adroit
manipulation of Liberia's various in#erest groups.
One danger is that he will alienate powerful seg-
ments of the ruling group by ignoring their advice
or adopting too heav -handed an .a roach in
lining up supporters.
Tolbert has enemies within the power struc-
ture, but they do not appear to be organized into
a single faction. They have #hus far moved cau-
tiously because at this time the President still
looks like a winner. This could change if Tolbert
Page 17
badly mishandles the reins of power over the next
several months, however.
Unable to prevent Tolbert's accession to the
presidency, his rivals have fastened on the legal
question of how long he may govern without
facing elections, which many believe he could not
win. The four-year term to which Tolbert and
Tubman were elected in May 1971 does not offi-
cially begin until next January. Some opponents
maintain that the new President's mandate does
not extend through the new term and that presi-
dential elections must be held next year. ~~ 25X1
Tolbert is clearly prepared to fight back,
probably through behind-the-scenes deals; with
key members of the ruling oligarchy. The_ main
plum in his bargaining is the now vacant office of
vice president, for which an "immediate" special
election is required- ?ne rumor circulating in
Monrovia is that Tolbert has agreed to back
William Tubman Jr., the late president's 36-year-
old son, for the post, and to stand for election
himself at the same time,
Tolbert allegedly reasons
that aTolbert -Tubman
Jr. ticket would be un-
beatable, and that he
would profit. from en-
h anted legitimacy and
the longer eight-year ten-
ure allowed first-term
presidents. Whatever the
final solution, the ma-
neuvering by Liberia's
power brokers has only
just begun.
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Egypt : Sadat Searches for Peace Despite Frustrations
President Sadat broke no new ground during
his speech commemorating the anniversary of the
revolution of 23 July 1952, but he did vent his sense
of frustration over the state of Middle Eastern af-
fairs,
He began his address with a lengthy review of
the domestic situation, dwelling on the need to
create a strong, modern state, and calling for "open
dialogue and democracy" within Egypt's newly re-
structured political organization, the Arab Socialist
Union (ASU). Sadat expressed his sadness at the
present disarray in the Arab world, especially on the
moribund "Eastern Front." Particularly bitter criti-
cism was directed at King Husayn of Jordan and his
recent actions against the fedayeen. Sadat accused
Husayn of "prevaricating," charging that he must
bear the responsibility for the "crimes which have
taken place in Jordan."
The Egyptian President's unhappiness was also
evident in his remarks. concerning the prolonged
impasse with Israel. He restated his earlier vow that
1971 would be a decisive year, then went somewhat
further by pledging that he would. "not allow it to
pass without this battle being decided." Sadat modi-
fied this statement. a few days later, however, when
he told the ASU National Congress, "I am not
saying -that our road to victory must be completed
this year." Sadat closed no doors to a political
solution during his remarks; he reiterated his sup-
porf for UN peace efforts and stated that he would
"never stop looking for any road leading to peace if
there is a chance for peace."
Yemen (Aden) : Flus ~a Change...
The squabbling between "moderate" and leftist
factions in Aden will probably be quelled by the
return last week of the influential secretary general
of the National Front (NF), the country's sole
25X6 party. In the absence of Abd al-Fattah Ismail,
competition between the
lesser political leaders had brought the government
to a virtual standstill.
Salim Rubai Ali, the head of state, took advan-
tage of Ismail's absence to extend his personal influ-
ence and win support for his Maoist policies. Ali
inspired various "spontaneous happenings," includ-
ing the seizure of land by landless laborers, of fish-
ing boats by crews, and of unoccupied homes by the
homeless. Revolutionary groups also started appear-
ing in schools, factories, and government offices. In
a short time, it appeared, Ali was attempting to
create a Yemeni version of the Chinese cultural
revolution.
Ali's bid for power was opposed by Muham-
mad Ali Haytham, the prime minister, who heads a
group of so-called moderates. This group, whose
extremism has a dash of pragmatism, remained
mostly on the defensive, however, reacting to Ali's
excesses rather than taking the initiative. The
Haythain group's one attempt to take the play away
from A,li fizzled when it was found that he had
already gained the backing of the most influential
members of the NF.
Haytham's position was weakened further
when h~~ lost the support he had depended on from
the army and the Interior Ministry's security forces.
The army sided with Ali as the strongest seeming
political leader on the scene-ironically, a practice
that Haytham himself had established under earlier
circumstances. The prime minister's presumed sup-
port from the security forces proved to have been
only a temporary tactical maneuver by the tribal
group that controlled the ministry; the tribesmen
were, iri fact, trying to bring down both Ali and
Haytharn.
Isnnail apparently also hoped that his two rivals
would destroy each other during his absence, and so
he delayed his return until their in-
fighting finally threatened to undermine the
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stability of both the government and the NF. Ismail
was particularly concerned by the outbreak of
clashes between landless peasants and property own-
ers. Although this never developed into large-scale
fighting, it created serious bitterness between local
factions; even personnel of the armed forces became
personally involved and refused to fake action to
preserve order.
Black Power Comes to ~o~ath ~,frica
A developing black power movement, primarily
among university students, is causing concern in the
government. The authorities are uncertain how to
deal with the movement, however, because it es-
pouses "'separateness," which is in keeping with the
official policy toward the country`s blacks,
The core of the movement lies in the all-black
South African Student Organization ~SASO), which
was formed in 1959 when black students brake
from the multiracial National Union of South Afri-
can Students. The main purpose of the organization,
according to a SASO spokesman, is to instill in black
people an awareness of their own power, to restore
their self-respect, and to teach them that they have
to look out for themselves. SASO leaders have
closely followed the activities of black Americans in
recent years and readily admit to borrowing liberally
from their views and terminology.
SASO claims 3,000 active members, a rapid
growth from the original 30 who attended organiza-
tional meetings in late 1968. At a conference in July
1970, the leadership decided that priority should be
given to building "black consciousness" and a feel-
ing of solidarity among African, Asian, and Colored
students. They initiated a campaign to end the activ-
ities of all multiracial organizations on nonwhite
campuses and get the students to affiliate with
SASO. Within a year, they have had substantial suc-
cess: of the ten schools targeted. seven have form-
ally affiliated with SASO and one has op#ed far a
type of associate membership.
Although not as successful o#f the campus, the
movement is not solely a student phenomenon. In
Soweto, a large African township near Johannes-
Now that he is back, Ismail will probably sup-
port Haytham, so that together they c8n put a
temporary end to Ali's radical policies. Once the
mini-Mao is restrained, however, Ismail'3 alliance 25X1
with Haytham is likely to dissolve, giving the ex-
tremists an opportunity to stir up trouble
again.
burg, a "Black is Beautiful" campaign has been or-
ganized by David Thebehali, a militant yowng mem-
ber of the local Urban Bantu Council. He yvants Af-
ricans to support black-owned shops, to establish
separate black churches, and to give children tribal
rather than English names. Thebehali a.1so urges
blacks to move to their proposed rural homelands,
which he wants them to develop themselves using
money and expertise gained in the cities; if assist-
ance is necessary, he believes it should be sought
from black Americans rather than from the white
South African Government.
Blacks have been hesitant to show fnuch en-
thusiasm for the movement, despite its still nonpo-
litical nature, because of the government's: pervasive
presence:. The blacks suspect-probably carrectly-
that SASO is heauily infiltrated with informers, and
that security officials are watching its activities care-
fully. The government is caught in something of a
bind., however, because a developing "black con-
sciousness" is a natural by-product of the official
policy to establish and eventually grant independ-
ence to the African homelands.
A complicating factor-and one the govern-
ment is also watching with concern-is the rise in
popularity of the charismatic chief of Zululand,
Gatsha $uthelezi. Some black student mjlitants al- -
ready look to Buthelezi for leadership on a national
level, and the government may worry that he will be _
able to take advantage of these rnovementS to create
a united black fron#. The quandary that Pretoria
must therefore reconcile is how to continue with its25X1
plans for black "independence," which . it wants,
without fostering a further growth of black power,
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WESTERN HEMISI~HERE
Argentina-Chile: The Salta Talks
The meeting of Argentine President Lanusse
and Chilean President Allende in the Argentine
city of Salta on 23-24 July was generally har-
monious and friendly and has been well received
in both nations. The talks were held to mark the
signing of an agreement on arbitration procedures
aimed at resolving the long-standing boundary
dispute in the Beagle Channel and provided an
opportunity for General Lanusse and the Marxist
Allende to size each other up.
The mutual suspicions that have tradi-
tionally characterized relations between the two
countries were intensified by the election of a
Marxist government in Chile last year. Leftist
Chilean politicians were concerned that Argen-
tina, perhaps in concert with the military govern-
ment of Brazil, might seek to intervene in Chilean
politics or actively attempt to isolate the Allende
regime. The Lanusse government, on the other
hand, has been concerned with the possibility
both of a Communist take-over in neighboring
Chile and of leftist subversion being directed into
Argentina from across the long and undefended
border. The presidents reassured one another in
Salta last week, although hints of the tensions
were not entirely absent from the ceremonies and
private talks. Allende reportedly told Lanusse
that rie would not do away with democratic proc-
esses and that if the people rejected his socialist
progr~~m he would not impose it by force. For his
part, Lanusse joined Allende in an official joint
declaration that, among other things, paid
homa~~e to the principles of nonintervention and
"political pluralism" in international affairs.
[)omestically, both presidents appear to have
benefited from the Salta meeting. President
Lanusse's image was probably enhanced with the
Argentine political left, and this should aid, how-
ever slightly, his current effort to smooth over
some of the deep divisions in Argentine politics.
The rneeting also gave a timely boost to the
prestige of the Allende administration, which is
beginning to be embarrassed by shortages, eco-
nomic disorganization, and recent political re-
verses. The talks with Lanusse are being treated in
the Cf?iilean press as the harbinger of a "new era"
in Argentine-Chilean relations, and this major step
toward neutralization of an ideological adversary
is genE;rall re arded as a di lomatic trium h for
Allende. ~
VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA: Friction has eased
considerably following Colombian participation
in the recent celebration of 150 years of Vene-
zuelan independence. The presidents of both na-
tions worked at lowering the tensions raised in
late May, when a Venezuelan plane violated
Colombian airspace and attacked two US heli-
copters on a surveying mission. Despite the belli-
gerent mood, fed in Bogota and Caracas by the
sensationalist press, the Pastrana and Caldera gov-
ernments agreed to proceed with scheduled meet-
ings in Rome, where delegates will seek to settle
the jurisdictional dispute over the potentially oil-
rich Gulf of Venezuela. The emphasis on the two
countries' common heritage has continued this
week, with Venezuelan labor groups meeting with
their counterparts in Colombia, "to establish a
harmonious climate." A Venezuelan labor confed-
eration in turn has invited Colombians to meet in
Caracas this weekend to discuss means to resolve
outstanding differences peacefully. With many bi-
lateral issues still unsettled, however, and- with
continuing military readiness along both sides of
the frontier, the danger of another hostile inci-
dent is always present.
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Cuba: Gastro Accentuates thc~ Positive
Fidel Castro struck a cautiously optimistic
note regarding both foreign and domestic matters
in his speech an 26 July. He clearly sees the trend
of events in Latin America as developing in
Cuba's favor, and he tailored his comments to
take advantage of this movement. In discussing
problems of the national economy, he was careful
to counterbalance the negative with the positive
aspects of production, and he neglected com-
pletely to refer to the failure to achieve this year's
sugar harvest goal. His generally positive approach
suggests that he is aware of the demoralizing
impact his long recitations of economic problems
have had on the public in the past and that he is
taking pains to avoid any loss of confi~denee such
as that which followed his speech at this time last
year.
With Chilean Foreign Minister Almeyda and
a delegation of students and workers from Bolivia
looking on, Castro lauded the "revolutionary"
governments of Chile and Peru and expressed
optimism that in Uruguay, too, a "popular gov-
ernment" could be in power following elections
Page 21
fate this year. He attempted to take advantage of
recent statements by some Bolivian officals re-
garding diplomatic relations with Cuba, saying
that the request of Bolivian workers and students
for relations "'will not find a negative response"
on the part of the Cuban Government. He indi-
cated, however, that he expected that those in-
uolved in the execution of Che Guevara in' Octo-
ber 1967, some of whom still occupy important
positions in Bolivia, would be dealt with in due
time in the meantime, he said, every positive
attitude of the Bolivian Government would have
Cuba's support.
In domestic affairs, Castro avoided a repeti-
tion of the bleak economic picture he painted last
year. Although he acknowledged that production
difficulties were continuing in some sectors, he
attempted to give a more positive view by pre-
senting comparative statistics showing a general
increase in industrial output during the first. half
of 1371 over the same period last year. such a
comparison is not very meaningful, however, be-
cause production in the first half of 1970 was low
because of ttte unusually large diversion of labor
into the sugar harvest. In quoting statistics, Castro
failed to mention the size of the 1971, sugar
harvest., which was more than a million tons be-
low the original goal of seven million toes and
two and one-half million tons below production
ref 1970. Although his emphasis was on piositive
economic developments, he gave no indication
that he expected Cuba's problems to diminish
significantly in the near future.
Regarding Cuba's relations with the US, Cas-
tro said he "will not seek a conciliation of any
kind with the Yankee imperialists." He d!id not
flatly reject all moves toward an improven3ent in
relations, but he stated emphatically that conces-
sions on his part would be tots{ly un~ccept-
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A Counterbalance to Moderate Trend in Peru
Recent developments in Peru demonstrate
an effort by the Velasco government to take a
more pragmatic approach in dealing with the
growing economic problems and at the same time
to retain a revolutionary image. Moderates and
conservatives seem to be taking an increasingly
dominant role in the government's day-to-day
operation through their control of most of the
ministries, but at the same time the government
has set up a new "social mobilization" organiza-
tion that has a definite radical leftist orientation.
Evidence of a trend toward moderation has
slowly been building over the past several months.
The first indication was cabinet changes in April
and May, the most significant of which was the
appointment of the moderate Admiral Jimenez to
the important post of minister of industry. In-
creasing criticism from the army both of Presi-
dent Velasco's leftist drift and of his handling of
Peru's economic problems was probably largely
responsible for the apparent change of direction.
The recent signing of an oil exploration and ex-
ploitation contract with the Occidental Oil Com-
pany, the tougher stand toward the Communist
labor confederation, and President Velasco's quiet
reaction to cuts in Peru's US sugar quota, are
some of the -more outstanding examples of the
apparent move toward moderation.
The establishment last month of the Na-
tional System for Support for Social Mobilization
(SNAMS) now appears, at least in part, to be an
effort to salvage the military government's fading
revolutionary image. President Velasco appointed
one of his most trusted supporters, General Rod-
riguez Figueroa, to head the new cabinet-level
organization. The stated objectives of the new
organization are the training and orientation of
the people, the development of social institutions,
and thE; establishment of a direct line of commu-
nication between the government and the people.
General Rodriguez, himself one of the mare dy-
namic and radical members of the government,
reportedly will be assisted by Carlos Delgado, an
adviser to Velasco who is generally believed to
have been responsible for the President's more
radical and demagogic speeches.
Rodriguez and Delgado have appointed sev-
eral leftist and pro-Communist officials to -aid
them iri getting the social mobilization or aniza-
tion off the ground.
Pr~asident Velasco and General Rodriguez
have dE~nied that the social mobilization effort is
aimed .at creating a government political party,
but considerable speculation remains that it will
serve tF~at purpose. There is evidence that some
elemeni:s within the armed forces are becoming
more intent on turning the government back to
civilian~~, but this cannot be done until some
mechanism has been devised for transferring
power to civilians who will continue the revo-
lution the military has begun. Until that time the
social mobilization organization, led primarily by
radicals., will probably be charged with bolstering
the sag~~ing revolutionary image of the Velasco
government.
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Costa Ftican President Isolated Politically
A chorus of opposition to the establshmen#
of a Soviet presence has developed, as have signs
of more general opposition to President Figueres'
personalist government.
With the Soviet ambassador expected to ar-
rive at any time, pressure is mounting for Figueres
to withdraw his approval of a Soviet mission in
San Jose. Although right-wing groups have been
sniping at Figueres ever since he began commer-
cial and diplomatic dealings with the USSR, fear
that Costa Rica's traditional democratic institu-
tions will be undermined by sophisticated subver-
sive activity has spread to a wide spectrum of the
society. The official publication of the Catholic
Church has expressed concern aver the political
disruption that might follow the Soviets' arrival
and has joined the conservative Free Costa Rica
Movement in its call for a plebiscite on the issue.
The opposition now has extended to the
paint that Figueres is isolated in his desire to
remove Costa Rica from the small company of
nations in Latin America without diplomatic ties
to Moscow. His two vice presidents have pub-
lished a letter attempting to remove themselves
from responsibility for the Figueres' policies, with
which they disagree,. and his National Liberation
Party (PLN) leaders have strop I criticized
Figueres' performance.
Even the coffee growers association, 25X1
whose members stood to gain financially from
anticipated Soviet coffee purchases, this week
voted against the government position on diplo-
matic relations with the USSR. The coffee grow-
ers evidently read the broad anti-Soviet sentiment
as an overwhelming impediment to a sale fo the
Soviets, because the barter-rather than cash-de-
sired by Moscow requires legislative approval.
Figueres' policies frequently have been at
odds with general PLN positions, and the Presi-
dent regularly pursues his own course without
consulting party or cabinet officials. His treat-
ment of the PLN as a "family club" has left deep
resentments and divisions in the organization.
PLN Leaders have decided to put their internal
crisis on ice until next month, when they will
meet to hammer out suggestions for a cabinet
overhaul and a working arrangement with the
President.
rarity dissipated.
These political difficulties, combined; with
the poor prospects that the Central American
Common Market can be revived and the deteriora-
tion in Costa Rica's monetary and balance-of-pay-
ments situa#ians, have made for a tense period. A
final vote is due in the assembly this week on the
highly controversial constitutional amendment
that would permit the Communist Party to func-
tion legally. If the amendment is defeated as ex-
pected, some of the political heat may be tempa-
Haiti : Under New Mana~gernent
President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier con-
tinues to display an acute and practical intelli-
gence in his conduct of foreign and domestic
policy. From the government's inauguration on
22 April to the dedication of the Peligre hydro-
electric project on 22 July, the administration has
honored its debt to Papa Doc while departing
markedly in style from that associated with the
dead dictator's regime.
The welcome extended to the world press at
the beginning of the new government continues in
force. Definite but dignified overtures to foreign
investors and requests for foreign aid have been
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made. The conditional
amnesty for exiles ap-
pears to be both an open
invitation to expatriates
to return and a firm
warning to those dedi-
cated to Duvalier's over-
throw to keep their dis-
tance.
Young Duvalier is
seeking to profit from
the more positive aspects
of "the Duvalier revolu-
tion" engineered by
Francois Duvalier while at the same time dis-
sociating the new government from the uglier
aspects of his father's regime. Prime examples of
the new look are the apparent downgrading of the
National Security Volunteers (VSN), an instru-
ment of intimidation and local control used by
the IatE: dictator, and Justice Minister Andre
Rousseau's speech at the Estates General, in early
July, in which he criticized excesses of the past.
Th~~ dangers inherent in an essentially col-
legial government nominally headed by a young
and inexperienced chief executive are obvious,
but the decisiveness and cohesion displayed thus
far suggest that the participants are not yet in-
clined to pursue their individual ambitions. The
governrrient's durability may be increased by the
lack of .any realistic alternative, by the unexpect-
edly permissive atmosphere, and by the govern-
ment's ,avowed interest in social and economic
development.
Uruguay's Leftist Challengers Off to a Fast Start
The new leftist coalition, the Frente Amplio,
has dominated the political spotlight through the
early months of the campaign leading to the gen-
eral elections in November. The left's free-spend-
ing campaign is designed to portray the coalition
as a serious electoral threat and, although it has
not yet been confronted with full-scale counteref-
forts by the major parties, it continues to main-
tain considerable momentum.
With the Colorado and Blanco parties still
occupied with internal squabbles, the Frente's
high-profile campaign has received the lion's share
of publicity. By early July, Frente presidential
candidate Seregni had visited all 19 departments
in the country. This campaigning, along with his
wide-ranging activities in the capital, is designed
to portray Seregni as a credible national candi-
date. Thee Frente strategy is straightforward: por-
tray itself as a popular, realistic alternative to the
traditional party structures that, through their
century-long political domination, have brought
terrorisrn, corruption, and economic decline. The
Blanco and Colorado counterstrategy is to por-
tray the Frente as an upstart, Communist-led at-
tempt t~~ undermine Uruguay's democratic politi-
cal structure. The Blancos and Colorados have yet
to oppose the Frente campaign in force, however.
For example, what is probably the strongest fac-
tion of the Colorado Party, List 15, will not
choose its presidential candidate until after its
internal elections in mid-September.
Meanwhile, the Frente campaign is in high
gear and suffering from no lack of funds, It seems
probablE;, given the destitution of other Frente
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members, that the Communist Party of Uruguay
(PCU) is supplying most of the finances for the
Frente effort, which includes a large dose of radio
and TV publicity.. The "democratic forces"
within the front-the Christian Democrats and the
Colorado and 131anco dissidents-maintain #hat
they will control the coalition. However, It is the
PCU, and to a lesser extent a political group
associated with the terrorist National Liberation
Movement, that, is concentrating on basic organ-
izational activities.
Seregni also has demonstrated considerable
skill in identifying the Frente with opposition
causes. Frente legislators are strongly supporting
the current congressional effort #o impeach Presi-
dent Pacheco for overstepping his authority, an
attempt that has cleared the Chamber of Deputies
but seems likely to fai6 in the Senate next week..
After a student death during a confused alterca-
tion involving police last Saturday, a Frente
declaration held the government responsible, and
the coalition unsuccessfully attempted to inter-
pellate the minister of interior over the incident.
Public opinion polls in May showed the
Frente running even or slightly ahead of the tradi-
tional parties in Montevideo. Such a performance
Imo'
'This dog (leftist Fronte Arnplw coalition) is nine years old . ,_ .
- lsn'l he called Fll)EL? (nine-year-old Communist political group)
--0f course ...it's the same dog, but with a different collar.
has buoyed Frente supporters' hopes and: they
now predict they will capture the mayoralty in
the capital and contend they have a real chance of
winning the national elections. Such claims have
yet to be tested by a concerted apposition cam-
paign or by expected anti-Frente administration
efforts, however, and even at this early date they
appear exaggera#ed.
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