WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008700060001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 7, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
7 May 1971
No. 0369/71
State Dept. review completed
Copy N4 0053
l--7 "EYCC
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SECRET
CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EDT, 6 May 1971)
Page
Indochina: Politicians Hold Forth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Vietnam: Thieu Thinks Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Laos: Talking About Talking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Communist China: Face Saving or Face Lifting? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Philippines: Protesters on the Move . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Soviet-US Relations: Trade, Politics, and Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Civilian R&D Still Troubles Soviets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
East Germany: Passing the Torch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Polish Church-State Discussions Intensify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Yugoslav Regime Confronts Internal Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Soviets Put Pressure on Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 l
Egypt: Falling Out at the Top . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Yemen (Sana): A New Government Faces Old Problems . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Pakistan: Fighting Subsides, Economic Problems Increase . . . . . . . . . 15
Peking Courts Turkey and Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Turkey: Military Grip Tightens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks Still Flounder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
May Day in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Cuba: Castro Reasserts His Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Central American Common Market: Another Try to Save It . . . . . . . . . . 21
Guyana: End of Bauxite Strike? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Colombia Has a "New" Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
NOTES: Romania; Maritime Issues; Netherlands; USSR-Guinea;
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FAR EAST
Indochina: Politicians Hold Forth
The political wrangling that was stirred up
by Lon Nol's sudden resignation over two weeks
ago finally ended when the ailing Cambodian
leader fashioned a compromise solution for or-
ganizing a new government. Ironically, his blue-
print called for him to remain as prime minister,
with Sirik Matak still responsible for actually
running the regime as his "delegate." Matak lost
little time in assembling a new cabinet, which
won quick approval from the National Assembly.
Before Lon Nol re-entered the picture, Chief
of State Cheng Heng made several futile attempts
to find someone who would agree to try to as-
semble a new cabinet. His first candidate was
Matak, who quickly declined on the grounds that
he was unwilling to respond to pressures for
sweeping changes in government personnel and
policies. Heng's next nominee was his own lack-
luster personal counselor, Chuop Hell, who evi-
dently was never a serious choice and who bowed
out of the running in short order. National As-
sembly President In Tam was next on Heng's list,
but his candidacy soon collapsed when he was
unable to get the backing of Lon Nol and Matak.
The compromise proposal fashioned by Lon Nol
succeeded in calling a halt to this passing parade
before it reached Son Ngoc Thanh
Matak's political position seems to have
improved considerably as a result of the prime
ministerial imbroglio. With a reaffirmation of sup-
port from Lon Nol, he probably can continue to
rely on the cooperation of the military establish-
ment. Moreover, his chief political antagonist,
Lon Non, apparently has been whipped into line
by his brother, the prime minister. It is likely that
Lon Non's strong public declaration early in the
week supporting Matak was part of the price
Matak demanded in exchange for his agreement
to put together and direct the new government.
Matak's cabinet has the earmarks of a politi-
cal compromise. The most important positions in
the new administration have been allocated to
members of the outgoing government and the
Phnom Penh establishment. Matak, for example,
will act as his own defense minister. Foreign Af-
fairs Minister Koun Wick retains that position,
while National Assembly President In Tam is first
vice premier and minister of interior. Matak's
choice for second deputy prime minister in charge
of economic affairs is Sok Chhong, the former
director of the National Commercial Bank. Hang
Thun Hak, the popular minister of community
development, has retained that portfolio and also
is third deputy prime minister. At the ministerial
working level, however, Matak has filled the re-
maining ten cabinet slots with junior bureaucrats,
most of whom seem to be relatively well qualified
for their respective responsibilities.
The new administration should be able to
get off to a relatively stable start. Now that they
have helped contribute to the eclipse of some of
the old guard, reform-minded elements in the
capital are likely to be content to sit back for the
time bein and see how the new government
perform
s.
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The Military Situation
The Cambodians also registered some rare
military progress during the week. Over a month
after they set out to reopen Route 4, government
forces-spearheaded by Khmer Krom troops-
finally succeeded in making contact with the two
Cambodian Army battalions that had been
stranded at the Pich Nil pass. Only limited Com-
munist resistance was encountered by the govern-
ment troops as they moved into the pass area. No
Cambodian truck convoys have yet tried to use
Route 4, however, probably because there are still
sizable numbers of Communist troops near Pich
Nil.
Vietnam: Thieu Thinks Election
President Thieu's early re-election activities
are centered on frequent image-building trips to
the hustings. He is currently spending a day or
two in the countryside each week, and plans three
such trips a week as the election nears. In the
manner of Western campaigns, he confers with
local officials and mingles with the populace. He
also makes a standard, hard-line, anti-Communist
speech to evoke national pride, and enumerates
the government's programs that reflect favorably
on his stewardship in Saigon.
Thieu also apparently is trying to ensure the
support of some usually progovernment political
parties. Recently he reportedly urged labor leader
Buu to organize his new Farmer-Workers Party
(FWP) more quickly, and indicated that he would
support FWP candidates in this summer's Lower
House elections. Earlier, Thieu suggested to lead-
ers of the Revolutionary Dai Viet Party that he
would back some of their candidates in the Lower
House elections. Thieu's basic attitude toward
party politics probably has not changed-he holds
most politicians and parties in low esteem-and he
still seems determined to rely primarily on other
groups such as the government bureaucracy. He
apparently realizes, however, that parties do have
some influence in the country and that their
support could decide a close election. With Vice
President Ky's candidacy becoming more likely,
Thieu may feel that there is now a greater chance
for a tight race.
Thieu may also be concerned about support
from the South Vietnamese Army-support he
considers vital to his re-election.
Little Fighting For Now
A period of accelerated Communist activity,
evidently set for early May, still has not gotten
off the ground. Enemy forces along the coast in
the northern provinces shelved or even called off
many attacks that had been long in preparation
with two notable exceptions: South Vietnamese
territorial forces beat back a strong assault by
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Communist regulars below Da Nang; and the
Communists' stepped up rocket bombardment of
Da Nang city and the adjacent air base.
Laos: Talking about Talking
In the first important political move in many
months, the Communists this week proposed re-
viving discussions with the government to arrange
peace talks.
The reaction on the gov-
ernment side. was positive and with cabinet
approval a cable was sent to Souphanouvong wel-
coming Souk's visit. No further word has been
heard from the Communists, although speculation
has already begun in Vientiane that Souk will be
arriving there early this month.
The talks about peace talks last year were
largely concerned with procedural questions, and
both sides tried to gain the advantage before
entering into substantive matters. The Com-
munists proved fairly flexible, backing away from
sweeping demands for a total bombing halt as a
prelude to talks and accepting a face-saving
formula on the question of whether Souvanna's
negotiator would represent him as "prince" or as
"prime minister. The preliminary talks broke
down, however, when Souvanna rescinded his
earlier agreement that the negotiations would be
conducted in the Communist-held town of Khang
Khay on the Plaine des Jarres. The whole subject
was suspended while Operation Lam Son 719 was
being executed.
How seriously the Communists and the
Laotian Government intend to push for talks this
year and how flexible they are prepared to be in
order to move the negotiating situation along will
become clearer after Souk's arrival. The objectives
of the NLHS presumably are still to lay the
groundwork for a future settlement that will
enable it to resume some participation in the Lao
Government and, more immediately, to obtain a
bombing halt or some other diminution of the
war that is to its advantage.
Muong Phalane Falls Again
Three battalions of government irregulars
were driven from the Muong Phalane area on 2-3
May by a North Vietnamese force estimated at
five battalions. The irregulars, who had recap-
tured the town about six weeks ago after the
Communists seized it in late January, withdrew
westward to Dong Hene and have been moved
back to their base camp for rest and refitting. One
company of irregulars is still missing, however,
and is believed to have suffered heavy casualties.
Communist propaganda has claimed that
Dong Hene will be attacked after the fall of
Muong Phalane. If the Communists follow past
practice, however, they will be content with hold-
ing Muong Phalane during the rainy season, thus
keeping government forces well to the west of the
important Communist infiltration corridor
through Muong Phine.
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Communist China: Face Saving or Face Lifting?
The large May Day turnout in Peking last
week shed little light on the intensified infighting
that has wracked China's ruling elite over the past
year. Instead, the regime's handling of three
prominent absentees and its refusal to list the
remaining politburo members who appeared
alongside Mao Tse-tung and heir-designate Lin
Piao in any sort of authoritative pecking order
indicate that Peking is still unable to solve its
difficult leadership equation.
The most notable absentees were politburo
standing committee members Chen Po-ta and
Kang Sheng. Chen, Mao's personal secretary, and
Kang, the regime's top security specialist, played
leading roles in Mao's sweeping purges of the old
Communist Party apparatus. According to per-
sistent rumors circulating in Peking's diplomatic
circles, Chen and Kang were severely criticized at
a major party gathering last fall, and both have
been out of sight for some time.
Peking attempted to rationalize the absences
with the lame excuse that some leaders were
unable to be present due to "work or sickness."
The Chinese have never before resorted to this
device to explain the absence of important lead-
ers. At this stage it seems premature to conclude
that both men, long close allies of Mao, have been
finally divested of all responsibility within the
leadership, but their continued absence from pub-
lic view strongly suggests that they have suffered
a major setback.
The fluidity of the current leadership situa-
tion in Peking was also affirmed by the absence
from the ceremonies of politburo member Hsieh
Fu-chih, who came under fire last year, pre-
sumably from leftist elements in the regime. Al-
though Hsieh was appointed head of the Peking
municipal party committee on 19 March, he did
not deliver the customary address at the munici-
pal congress and may not even have been present
at the meeting. Hsieh's continued lingering in the
shadows thus suggests that there is still some
pulling and hauling going on within the leadership
over his political status.
Signs of continuing strains throughout the
leadership hierarchy were also evident in the
sober regime commentary on domestic develop-
ments in the authoritative editorial marking May
Day. The editorial's stocktaking of internal prog-
ress was surprisingly limited, particularly in view
of the rapid quickening since last December in the
formation of party committees at the provincial
level and below-the first order of domestic busi-
ness for the past two years. Instead of indulging
in self-congratulation, however, the editorial
stressed the necessity for senior cadre to improve
their understanding of Mao's "revolutionary
line," to combat resurgent revisionist influences,
and to commit fewer mistakes. Such strictures
have become the overriding theme in domestic
propaganda in recent months, and their reitera-
tion not only attests to the often broad gap
between Peking's demands and the performance
of local authorities but also reinforces the im-
pression that fundamental differences over policy
implementation are continuing to feed personal
antagonisms at the top of the regime.
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Philippines: Protesters on the Move
The fatalities during May Day demonstra-
tions in Manila have set the stage for a new period
of domestic turmoil. The Philippine student
movement, which has been relatively quiet since
February, fielded some 2,500 leftist students and
workers in a protest over the policies of the
Marcos administration. Despite advance warning
that the group was inclined toward violence, only
forces untrained in antiriot techniques were as-
signed to the scene at the Congress building.
Firing into the crowd, the security forces killed
four and wounded over 30, allegedly after the
protesters hurled homemade bombs. An indigna-
tion rally set for 7 May promises to be massive,
although the clear readiness of the government to
take firm repressive measures could persuade radi-
cal organizers to ease off on provocative acts.
Student disaffection is based on conviction
that President Marcos is using the presidential
office for self-enrichment to the neglect of the
country's pressing social and economic problems.
Despite his repeated denials, suspicion is growing
in the Philippines that Marcos intends to evade
the two-term constitutional limit, which obliges
him to step aside after his current term expires in
1973. This view is strengthened by the obvious
efforts of President and Mrs. Marcos to control
delegates to a constitutional convention that
opens next month.
Student radicals have looked on the exercise
in constitutional reform as an administration ploy
to divert public attention from government short-
comings and as a tool for Marcos to further his
own political ends. Student activism, currently
limited by the absence of many students from
Manila for the annual school holidays, could
reach serious proportions after the new school
year begins in July. Students no doubt will dem-
onstrate then against expected increases in school
fees, which were raised last year. If by mid-sum-
mer Marcos also has tried to push the constitu-
tional convention into lifting the stricture against
his continuance in office, the student temper
could be considerably inflamed.
A Marcos decision to impose martial law in
the face of persistent street action would have the
immediate result of hardening battle lines and
would have a widely adverse effect on public
opinion. The government might be hard pressed
to maintain security, although it certainly has
enough well-trained forces to prevent a complete
breakdown of law and order. In the longer run, a
dramatic manifestation of popular disillusionment
with the leadership could have a strong bearing on
Marcos' final decision regarding a residential
term after 1973.
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EUROPE
Soviet-US Relations: Trade, Politics, and Violence
A high-level Soviet economic delegation led
by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Komarov
arrived in the US on 5 May for a two-week visit.
The 14-man delegation is composed largely of
representatives of the motor vehicle and ma-
chine-building industries.
The primary purpose of the visit is probably
to obtain advanced technology and equipment
from US corporations for a heavy truck manu-
facturing complex to be built in the USSR. The
Soviets have already conducted preliminary nego-
tiations with some of these firms through inter-
mediaries. The delegation will also try to encour-
age US businessmen to lobby for relaxation of
licensing controls on the export of sophisticated
manufacturing equipment to the USSR.
Anomalies in the arrangements for the visit,
however, suggest that political as well as eco-
nomic considerations may be involved. Most
members of the present delegation were sched-
uled to come to the US several weeks ago, but
their trip was postponed. No more was heard on
an official level until 22 April, shortly after the
sudden "thaw" in US-Chinese relations, when
Soviet officials hastily began arranging visas for
the delegation-only two weeks before it was to
depart. Moreover, the composition of the delega-
tion was upgraded by the addition of several
high-ranking officials. Moscow's haste in upgrad-
ing the delegation, its timing, and other peculiari-
ties suggest a link to Soviet concerns over the
turn in American-Chinese relations and a desire to
offset recent events.
Moscow apparently attaches considerable
political and economic importance to the visit. It
has been arranged despite recent warn;ngs from
both Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador
Dobrynin that curtailment of Soviet delegations
to the US is being given "serious consideration"
because of continued harassment and violence
directed against Soviet officials here.
Some curtailment of cultural exchanges has
already occurred. The Soviets have refused to
approve a previously arranged trip for a US per-
forming group, contending that because "condi-
tions" in the US had forced cancellation of the
1971 Bolshoi Ballet tour, the USSR should not be
obligated to receive US groups. In addition, the
Soviets have balked at permitting a US techno-
logical exhibit, stating that harassment in the US
may force cancellation of a similar USSR exhibit.
I he Soviets obviously believe that they have
been restrained in their reaction to attacks on
Soviet personnel, fire-bombings of their auto-
mobiles, bombings of Soviet offices, and other
such harassment. What seems to irritate them
especially is the fact that many of those re-
sponsible have thus far escaped punishment. The
Soviets are prone to regard the inability of the US
Government to interfere effectively in these local
judicial matters as calculated "connivance" by
Washington in the harassment. The fact that most
of the harassment is carried out by Jewish
militants only makes matters worse in Soviet
eyes.
Should the attacks and harassment continue,
further deterioration in the atmospherics of
Soviet-US relations is likely-including additional
curtailment of cultural exchanges and retaliation
in Moscow against US officials and citizens. But,
as the visit of the economic delegation suggests,25X1
Moscow will not abandon those exchanges and
other contacts it considers to be in its own in-
terest.
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Civilian R&D Still Troubles Soviets
At the 24th party congress Brezhnev con-
tinued to show concern over the persistent prob-
lems of assimilating new technology into civilian
production, stating that "the weakest links (in
technical progress) are those which connect the
achievements of science with their practical reali-
zation and utilization in mass production."
Eleven decrees were issued on this subject during
1965-70, but these have failed to effect any dra-
matic improvements in applied civilian research
and development (R&D).
Faced with declining factor productivity
(labor and capital) in industrial production since
the late 1950s, the Soviets have been aware that
more rapid introduction of modern technology is
needed to reverse this trend. Despite claims by
Brezhnev that a "planned socialist economy
opens the widest scope to the all-sided progress of
science and technology," efforts have been ham-
pered by the ineffective organization of the scien-
tific and technical sector as well as by the criteria
used to judge the performance of research and
design institutes and industrial enterprises.
Over-all civilian R&D goals are centrally
planned, and there is insufficient coordination
between the scientific researcher, the designer,
and the final user at the enterprise level. The
researcher and designer receive little feedback re-
garding the success or failure of their inventions
and the user has little control over the design of
equipment received. In addition, technological ad-
vancements are usually planned on an enterprise-
by-enterprise basis with little thought to broader
applications.
Some aspects of the incentive system further
hinder coordinated R&D efforts. Researchers' and
designers' rewards do not depend on the use-
fulness of their inventions. Enterprise incentives
focus on short-run goals for output, profits, and
sales fulfillment, thus discouraging disruptions of
the productive process and extensive outlays of
funds for new equipment.
The 11 decrees that have been issued reflect
the regime's deep concern over the problem but
also show that the Soviets have not developed a
consistent approach for reaching a solution. Some
provisions extend the role of centralized control,
while others grant more autonomy to directors of
scientific organizations. One promising provision
encourages linking research, design, and testing,
and bases rewards on the effectiveness of a new
development. With the exception of industry-
wide reform in the electrotechnical industry,
however, the effects of the decrees appear to be
negligible.
In many cases, imported technology
provides only a short-run solution, bypassing
applied R&D channels and meeting the same
resistance at the enterprise level as new Soviet
technology. Future efforts at speeding the
implementation of new technology will largely
depend on the integration of research institutes,
design organizations, and enterprises. Removing
enterprise resistance to new technology will
probably require restructuring incentives to
reward innovation, and adjusting prices to
compensate for the initial high costs of new
methods of production.
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vi vi J.
East Germany: Passing the Torch
"The years are demanding their due and do not allow
me any longer to carry out such demanding activity
as that of Central Committee First Secretary. "
With these words Walter Ulbricht prefaced his
resignation on 3 May from the top party post in
favor of his protege, Erich Honecker.
There are numerous reasons why the change
came about at this time. Besides his age and its
accompanying infirmities, Ulbricht's penchant for
overambitious economic plans had become a domes-
tic irritant. Moreover, the Soviets were annoyed by
his obstructionist attitude regarding East-West nego-
tiations. Given these circumstances, the 78-year-old
leader apparently felt that it was expedient to imple-
ment his carefully nurtured plan for an orderly
transfer of authority, an unprecedented event in
ruling Communist circles. Ulbricht is now chairman
of the party, a new, honorary post, as well as chair-
man of the Council of State. While neither of these
posts as such confers meaningful political power,
Ulbricht may continue to wield influence on key
questions.
Honecker became a politburo member in 1958,
and diligently worked at advancing his own career.
No matter was too small or too great for his atten-
tion. His activities ranged from dealing with citizens
seeking permission to visit relatives in the West to
the substantial task of supervising secret prepara-
tions for the erection of the Berlin Wall in the
summer of 1961. In addition, he has been the
party's cadre chief and has had responsibility for all
security matters. Honecker is skilled at political ma-
neuver, and has a strong personal following in the
party.
At a central committee meeting last December,
Honecker joined with a consensus of politburo
members who favored economic policies placing
high priority on a balanced economy and an im-
proved standard of living for East German workers.
This contrasted with Ulbricht's position, which em
phasized developing a few select industries such as
computers and chemicals. Honecker so skillfully
handled this turning point in relations with Ulbricht
that there were no visible signs of disruption within
the party.
The USSR was the first of East Germany's
allies to congratula'e Honecker warmly. Less effu-
sive congratulations from other Eastern European
capitals followed. Initial domestic reaction appar-
ently favors the changeover.
Honecker's previously expressed views on for-
eign policy, however, give little indication that Pan-
kow will alter its hard-line position on relations with
the West. In his maiden speech as party first secre-
tary on 3 May, Honecker reiterated East Germany's
demand that Bonn ratify the treaties with the USSR
and Poland prior to a settlement on Berlin. Never-
theless, Honecker does not have Ulbricht's prestige
in Moscow, and should the Soviets decide to move
in the stalemated Berlin negotiations, the key to
European detente, Honecker would have little
choice but to go along. 25X1
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Polish Church-State Discussions Intensify
A three-way dialogue-between the Polish northern territories. Three days later Bishop
t the Polish a iscopate and the Vati- Dabrowski, the episcopate secretary, was assigned
p
governmen ,
can-is under way regarding the complicated to ne otiate the transfer with state representa-
status of church property in the former German tives.
Principal cities visited"
by Cardinal Konig
in Rome last week. The details of the three-day
session were not divulged, but the two sides did
agree to have future talks.
The Vatican has resisted pressures from
both the Polish Government and episcopate for
a resolution of the question. Even though it
favors the normalization of Polish church-state
relations, it does not want to offend German
Catholics. Some members of the Curia, how-
ever, appear to be less concerned about Ger-
man sensibilities on this issue. Cardinal Koenig
of Vienna, for example, made his position clear
during a tour of the disputed Polish territories
last week when he referred in speeches to "this
land of yours-your western territories."
Many other points of friction between the
episcopate and the regime will have to be me-
diated before a complete normalization of rela-
tions can occur. These include disputes in the
fields of religious education, the religious press,
taxes, and church construction. There has been
some limited progress in these areas recently
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territories. This issue has been the main obstacle
to the normalization of church-state relations for
25 years. Both the government and the episcopate
want the Vatican to recognize the Polish church's
jurisdiction over dioceses in these areas, but the
Vatican prefers to delay any decision until after
the Polish - West German nonaggression treaty is
ratified. All sides realize that Vatican action in
this matter would amount to de facto recognition
of Poland's postwar borders.
The new Polish leadership announced in Jan-
uary that documents were being prepared that
would legally transfer to the episcopate property
rented by the Polish Church in the western and
The property transfer cannot be completed,
however, until the Vatican is persuaded to allow
the Polish church to establish permanent dioceses
in the former German territories. These dioceses
now have a temporary status and are subordinate
to the Roman Curia rather than to the Polish
episcopate. Several members of the Polish ecclesi-
astical hierarchy have been to Rome this year to
plead their case, and Bishop Dabrowski was re-
ceived by Pope Paul only this week. Moreover, an
official Polish Government delegation-the first
since World War II-met with Vatican officials
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and a willingness on both sides to communi- port and to gain tacit Vatican certification that
cate. the former German territories are indeed Polish.
This latter goal has taken on added importance in
view of the uncertainties surrounding the ratifica-
The Polish leadership has been accommodat- tion of the Bonn-Warsaw treaty. 25X1
ing because it wants to increase its popular sup-
Yugoslav Regime Confronts Internal Problems
Deeply angered by growing regional chauvin-
ism, criticism of party reforms, and noncompli-
ance with economic stabilization measures, Presi-
dent Tito has been forced into using his consider-
able prestige to demand forceful corrective meas-
ures. This obviously personal tactic, although po-
tentially effective, is a temporary setback to
Tito's efforts to institutionalize the choice of his
eventual successor as well as to his plans for a new
decentralized federal system. Tito has already re-
ceived the party leadership's general endorsement
for the program and regional party support seems
to be falling into place, but there are signs of
resistance from other quarters that could pose a
test of wills.
Last week the party presidium was sum-
moned to Tito's Brioni retreat for three days of
private discussions on internal problems. The de-
liberations ended in apparent unity on the gravity
of the problem but seem to have failed to pro-
duce a comprehensive scheme for corrective ac-
tion. Some vague steps were announced, which
included plans for convening, at an unspecified
date, a party conference on ideological unity and
organizational strength. There was also a call for
correction of "shortcomings" in the internal se-
curity apparatus, and an announcement of a firm
policy for checking the "destructive criticism"
emanating from the national press. Moreover, the
presidium ordered heightened vigilance against
foreign attempts to undermine national unity.
The day after the presidium announced its
position, Tito took his case to the people. Speak-
ing at a May Day celebration in Labin, he blasted
critics of his reform program, demanding stern
measures against irresponsible media, student dis-
sidents, and those managers who ignore centrally
imposed economic stabilization measures. In the
latter case, Tito threatened a sweeping purge that
"will probably take a few months." This an-
nounced plan for extensive personnel changes
could be counterproductive, lead to further de-
lays and confusion, and in the end weaken the
President's ability to carry through his political
and economic programs.
Tito also said there would be party cadre
changes and a "regrouping" of the federal gov-
ernment. He indicated that he wants to transform
the party into a unifying force around which the
federation can be safely decentralized.
Regional party support for Tito's position
seems assured. The Croatian party, which has
been the focus of criticism, has called for a cen-
tral committee plenum on 11 May, presumably to
discuss the full implications of the presidium's
position, and to take appropriate action. In gen-
eral, federal government organs and some republic
governments have agreed with Tito's calls for
stern measures.
Student leaders, on the other hand, are
showing no inclination to knuckle under to pres-
sures against their opposition to constitutional
reforms and their independent political activi-
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Soviets Put Pressure on Berlin
Soviet efforts to bring pressure on Bonn to
change its position on the Berlin negotiations
have recently received considerable attention in
the West German (FRG) press.
The press has cited as examples of these
pressure tactics the Soviet refusal on 5 March to
conclude a trade agreement covering West Berlin,
and the suspension of Soviet-FRG talks on an air
traffic agreement involving the use of Berlin air-
ports on 24 March.
More recently, the Soviets have rejected the
FRG contention that Abraham Kopelowicz, a
West Berliner arrested in Moscow on 8 March, is
ROMANIA: The Romanian Communist Party
will celebrate its 50th anniversary on 8 May.
General Secretary Ceausescu undoubtedly will
reassert Romania's independent policy line, as he
did last month at the Soviet party congress, in a
further effort to discredit Western press reports
that Bucharest is returning to Moscow's fold. At
the same time, Ceausescu probably will rebut
charges from other Communist parties, led by the
MARITIME ISSUES: Recent developments in-
dicate growing problems for the US-and the
USSR as well-over the issue of the "innocent
passage" of nuclear vessels through territorial
waters, including international straits. Spain,
which raised the subject at a UN meeting in
March, maintains such activity violates the 1958
Geneva Convention. Its position this week has
been endorsed by Ethiopia. Brazil, which claims a
entitled to consular protection from the West
German Embassy. Concurrently, the Soviets re-
fused to certify the documents of a West Berliner
who wanted to marry a Soviet citizen, on the
grounds that the Berliner's documents stated that
he had German nationality. The Soviet Embassy
contended that the individual in fact possessed
"West Berlin" nationality. These Soviet actions
are assertions of Moscow's position that West
Berlin citizens have a unique status. They are
probably aimed at making more attractive to West
Germany the Soviet draft treaty of 26 March,
which offers to permit the FRG to provide con-
sular services for West Berliners abroad.F_-]
CPSU, that Romania's frequent refusal to co-
operate with them in broader economic schemes
represents a narrow nationalism. The Romanians
will claim that their efforts to maintain good
relations with Communists of all persuasions in
fact makes them true internationalists. The cele-
brations may shed some light on what seems to be
an increasing trend toward a Ceausescu per-
sonality cult.
zone of 200 miles for its territorial waters, has
issued regulations that assert a right to inspect
nuclear-powered ships entering the zone. No at-
tempt has yet been made, however, to enforce
these new rules. Brazil wields a great deal of
influence in Latin American and African maritime
discussions, and its example could induce similar
moves b other states.
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NETHERLANDS: The governing four-party coa-
lition, which fell two seats short of a parlia-
mentary majority in last week's national election,
has apparently begun efforts to add another party
to its ranks. Soon after the returns were in, a
right-wing socialist party with eight seats an-
nounced its willingness to negotiate with the coa-
lition-the three confessional parties and the lib-
erals. Should these negotiations fail, it is possible
that, with passive cooperation from almost any of
the 14 parties that won parliamentary representa-
USSR-GUINEA: The five-month Soviet naval
presence off Guinea has ended, at least for the
time being. A small Soviet force went there to
buttress President Sekou Toure after the Portu-
guese-led attack on Guinea last November. The two
Soviet destroyers and an oiler that had main-
tion, a viable minority government of the confes-
sionals and the liberals might still be formed.
Thus, a call for new elections by leaders of the
Labor Party, now the largest in parliament and
nominal leader of the opposition, is premature.
The lower house will attempt on May 11 to
suggest a government formateur to the Queen,
but cabinet formation is typically a lengthy proc-
ess in Dutch politics and the resent case should
be no exception.
tained the patrol since early April entered the
Mediterranean this week. Other Soviet warships
probably will continue to make infrequent cruises
in west African waters and to exert political in-
fluence in the area by making friendly port
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Egypt: Falling Out at the Top
Vice President Ali Sabri raised his opposition
to President Sadat's policies from sniping to an
open challenge last week and got himself fired for
his pains.
Strains appear to have been building up for
some time between the President and Sabri, who
had received only a nominal office in the post-
Nasir administration. At a meeting of the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU) central committee on 25
April, Sabri intemperately questioned Sadat's
justification and authority for agreeing to Egypt's
entry into the Federation of Arab Republics with-
out prior consultation with the ASU. Sadat had
handled the arrangements for the federation
pretty much on his own for larger political rea-
sons, apparently confident that he would receive
pro forma approval from Egypt's political institu-
tions, including the ASU. He was therefore vul-
nerable to Sabri's outspoken criticism of the com-
promises worked out with the Syrian and Libyan
leaders and, failing to rally support from other
ASU officials, he had to submit to some of the
changes demanded of him. The open challenge to
his authority required a response, however, and
within a week Sabri was out.
In dealing with the Sabri-ASU challenge,
Sadat and others within the hierarchy must have
recognized that a more basic issue between the
two was Egypt's current effort to explore the
possibility of a peace settlement with Israel,
against which an ASU-based campaign has been
operating for the past several months. A purge of
Sabri's followers in the ASU is likely to follow in
the near future. It is reasonably certain, however,
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that political repercussions will be largely con-
fined to this organization, where Sabri's sup-
porters are concentrated.
Sadat's position has probably been strength-
ened by removal of this vice-presidential gadfly-
assuming that the dismissal holds, which at the
moment seems likely. Both Sadat's supporters
and detractors cannot but have been impressed by
the decisiveness with which he cut down an in-
creasingly embarrassing critic. Sabri's ouster
leaves the other vice president, Husayn Shafii, as
Sadat's undisputed constitutional successor.
Assessed as a lightweight by many political
observers when he assumed office last October,
Sadat now seems to be exercising leadership with
an increasingly firm hand. When he moved against
Sabri, Sadat was no doubt confident of the sup-
port of both the army and Minister of Interior
Goma, who controls the security apparatus and is
one of the three or four key figures in the regime.
Sabri's prominent identification with the
Soviet Union is an embarrassment for Moscow,
particularly in view of the coincidence of Sabri's
dismissal with Secretary Rogers' visit to Cairo this
week.
The Soviets
Lpro ably recognize the cha lenge orTered to Sadat
by Sabri and by the ASU politicians as being out
of bounds, although this will not greatly mitigate
their discomfiture. Moscow is already nervous
about ongoing US-Egyptian contacts. The dis-
missal of Sabri, and presumably his principal fol-
lowers in the ASU, will probably sharpen Soviet
apprehensions about the direction of current
Egyptian policy and prompt Moscow to seek fur-
ther reassurances from Cairo. Over the longer
term, Sabri's ouster is unlikely to do much dam-
age to Soviet-Egyptian relations. Soviet fortunes
in Egypt do not rise and fall with one man. The
commitments that Moscow has made to Cairo
ensure it a continuing position of substantial in-
fluence.
Sadat's May Day Speech
The lengthy and elaborate praise of the So-
viet Union in Sadat's May Day speech may have
been yet another attempt to assure Moscow that
there were no anti-Soviet implications in Sabri's
dismissal. Sadat's forthright defense of the federa-
tion and of Cairo's efforts to explore the possibil-
ity of a political settlement with Israel may be
interpreted as a public response to Sabri and
other critics of Sadat's policies in the ASU.
Portions of the address relating to the sus-
pended hostilities seem to have been intended to
set the tone and the terms for Egypt's position
during the talks with Secretary Rogers. With re-
gard to reopening the Suez Canal, Sadat reiterated
points made in his initiative of 4 February, insist-
ing on Egypt's right to deploy its armed forces on
the eastern bank and on a definite limit on the
cease-fire period during which Jarring would set a
timetable for complete Israeli withdrawal. As to
the conditions for an over-all settlement, Sadat
categorically rejected the demilitarization of the
Sinai and any form of an Israeli presence at
Sharm ash-Shaykh.
Although the speech contained no hint of
change in past Egyptian positions, it was notable
for the low level of histrionics and sabre-rattling.
Although the option of resuming hostilities was
kept open, Sadat did not dwell on the con-
sequences if peace discussions should fail. As
Cairo prepared to welcome the US Secretary of
State, Al Ahram editorially stated the general
Egyptian expectation that, following his visi125X1
"America can bear the responsibility, before the
world and before history, about what will happen
in the region."/
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ISRAEL: Israel's hard line against withdrawal
was reiterated by minister without portfolio Israel
Galili in an interview published on 30 April. Re-
ferring to Secretary Rogers' trip to the Middle
East, Galili said "If, in fact, there are still those...
who comfort themselves with the hope that Is-
rael's position can be worn down, or softened by
compensation or temptation, we will make it
clear to him that he cannot rely on these hopes."
Egyptian President Sadat's May Day speech
received extensive treatment in the Israeli press.
Commenting on Sadat's demand that Egyptian
troops must cross the Suez Canal upon Israeli
withdrawal, the press said that this would put an
end to hopes for a Suez agreement in the near
future. Some papers, however, saw the Egyptian
President's demand as a negotiating ploy and
noted that a number of Sadat's stern statements
left the door open for detailed clarification.
Secretary Rogers' talks in Israel were expected to
be "strenuous, but friendly." The influential
Haaretz reported that Israel will stand on its po-
sition that Egypt must guarantee not to resume
hostilities and not to cross the canal 25X1
Yemen (Sana) : A New Government Faces Old Problems
Yemen's first elections, carried out earlier
this year, produced a relatively moderate govern-
ment staffed by veteran politicians. The deep-
seated domestic problems of this small Arabian
republic, however, will yield to no quick solution,
and foreign policy is hampered by the awkward
position that Yemen occupies in the civil war
smouldering in Southern Yemen.
The parliamentary elections, largely an exer-
cise in public relations, had little bearing on the
formation of the new government, other than
providing a sounding-board of basically conserva-
tive opinion in the "legislative" body. The cabi-
net, made up primarily of incumbents of previous
republican governments, is a balance achieved in
behind-the-scenes maneuvering by established
power factions. The prime minister, Ahmad
Numan, at 71 is one of the oldest republican
leaders as well as one of the first to rebel against
the former royalist regime. Government policy,
therefore, is expected to be conservative.
The government will be challenged by prob-
lems in five major areas: Numan's need for a good
relationship with General al-Amri, a member of
the three-man executive Republican Council and
head of the army; the general economic situation,
still aggravated by the war and the aftermath of a
long drought; the attitude taken by the leftists
who feel betrayed by the slow pace of the revolu-
tion; the success (or lack of it) of the institutional
machinery created by the new constitution; and
finally, developments in the unpredictable state
of Southern Yemen, now called the Peoples
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).
Yemen has become awkwardly embroiled in
Saudi Arabia's attempt to subvert the PDRY by
subsidizing dissidents who operate from both
Yemen and the southern fringes of Saudi Arabia.
Both Yemens have made efforts toward union,
each on its own terms, but the timing has always
been such that the political systems were irrecon-
cilable. Yemen's current involvement in the Saudi
Arabian effort derives from its dependence on
Saudi aid and goodwill, but its association is
causing it much embarrassment with the more
radical and powerful Arab states as well as posing
the dangerous possibility of future military
clashes with its southern neighbor.
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Pakistan: Fighting Subsides, Economic Problems Increase
West Pakistani troops have taken almost all
important towns in East Pakistan, although some
areas are still under Bengali control and some
fighting continues. Direct government control,
however, is still limited to major population
centers and a few other strategic points. There are
now more than 50,000 government troops in the
province, but they could easily be tied down by
garrisoning and protecting what the army now
holds. Most of the 62,000 villages are still subject
only to indirect control through economic and
military reprisals.
Incidents of sabotage and ambush by the
largely unorganized Bengali forces are likely to
continue. With little leadership and no prov-
ince-wide coordination, however, the Bengalis
probably will be unable to wage a full-scale guer-
rilla war for some time.
and on the development of a plan to transfer
resources on a massive scale to East Pakistan. The
bank official noted that, in general, the Pakistani
Government had not been aware until recently of
the seriousness of its over-all financial situation-
domestic finances are also in very bad shape-and
that hopes for economic recovery were still based
on unrealistic assumptions about making up for
lost exports and taxes.
Islamabad, in one way or another, has
managed to outrage all important aid donors
other than Communist China. In a clarifying
statement on its recent decision to apply a six-
month moratorium on debt repayments, the gov-
ernment has indicated that the moratorium will
apply to Communist creditor nations as well as to
official Western creditors.
In the meantime, the government faces
growing economic problems in both parts of the
country and potential political problems in West
Pakistan. Z. A. Bhutto, whose party won a ma-
jority of the West Pakistani races in elections last
December, has publicly warned the military gov-
ernment against any "inordinate and unneces-
sary" delay in transferring power to the elected
representatives.
A World Bank official has said that Pakistan
needs sharply stepped-up aid from the West to
avoid economic collapse. Islamabad has been in-
formed, however, that any support from Western
donors would depend on a return to normal in
East Pakistan, on exchange and fiscal reforms,
Economic activity is picking up in East Paki-
stan, but the situation remains grim. Prices of all
major commodities increased substantially in
Dacca in the last week-rice by 13 percent and
kerosene by 81 percent. Lines of communications
remain disrupted, with only 54 percent of the rail
network in service. On the positive side, exports
of jute, Pakistan's main foreign-exchange earner,
have slowly begun to get under way, and 15 of 51
jute mills in the major urban areas are attempting
to begin one-shift operations.
Relations between New Delhi and Islamabad
continue to be characterized by charges of border
violations and diplomatic maneuvering for third-
country support. As of 6 May, the fate of Indian
diplomats in Dacca and Pakistani diplomats in
Calcutta had not been settled, according to the
Pakistanis because of "India's intransigence and
inability to fulfill the assurances given Pakistan."
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Peking Courts Turkey and Iran
Communist China's campaign to expand its
diplomatic contacts world-wide and to win votes
for admission to the UN is gaining ground in
Turkey and Iran.
Direct Sino-Turkish talks on establishing dip-
lomatic relations started in Paris around 22 April.
The Turkish foreign minister has pre icte tat
the talks will take a long time, but the Chinese
undoubtedly are eager to gain recognition before
the next session of the UN, and may continue to
demonstrate the flexibility concerning recogni-
tion formulas that they exhibited recently in
establishing relations with Kuwait and Cameroon.
Iran's interest in establishing diplomatic ties
with Peking became obvious with the recent visit
to China of the Shah's twin sister, Princess
Ashraf, and the Shah's remarks to Japanese and
Egyptian newsmen indicating that Iran was study-
ing the question of recognition. Princess Ashraf
has left little doubt that she will recommend
diplomatic relations. Teheran has followed up her
visit with one by the Shah's half sister, Princess
Fatimah, who arrived in China on 29 April. Dur-
ing a banquet in her honor in Peking the next
day, Premier Chou En-lai remarked that friendly
Chinese-Iranian relations had "begun to be re-
established."
Both Turkey and Iran regard` Communist
China as a possible balancing factor in their
relations with the Soviet Union and they are
unlikely to be overly concerned about the possi-
ble effects of recognition on issues at the United
Nations. The Turks also reportedly believe that
recognizing Peking would gain them the potential
support of Peking and its friends for Turkey's
position on Cyprus, which would be eventually
translated into support at the UN on the issue.
Despite statements by Iranian and Turkish
spokesmen that their governments wish to
preserve their relations with Chiang K'ai-shek's
regime on Taiwan, both Teheran and Ankara
probably are counting on Chiang's breaking off
relations with governments recognizing Com-
munist China to save them from the potential
diplomatic embarrassment of publicly forcing the
Nationalists to leave.
Recognition by Turkey and Iran will in-
crease pressure on other Middle Eastern govern-
ments to follow suit. Lebanese leaders apparently
would prefer to put off an early decision, but
Beirut's foreign minister recently revealed that
recognition of Communist China by Kuwait had
already increased internal pressure for Lebanon to
make a similar move. Pressure on Libya, which is
attempting to build an image as a "liberated"
Arab state, may also increase.
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Turkey: Military Grip Tightens
In the two weeks since the new government
invoked limited martial law, the military has sig-
nificantly tightened its grip over major trouble
centers, particularly Ankara and Istanbul. The
restrictions have been applied primarily to
extremists, however, and inconvenience to the
public has been kept to a minimum. As the do-
mestic security situation has improved there has
been a perceptible growth of public confidence
and optimism.
in their crackdown on both the left and
right, the martial law authorities have banned
several newspapers and have arrested over 200
persons, including at least 25 military students
,ind junior officers. In Ankara alone more than 20
student organizations have been banned. All labor
strikes and lockouts are forbidden. At the same
time, many schools and universities are being
reopened and, for the first time in several years,
students are able to take their spring examina-
tions in a peaceful atmosphere.
Military leaders are also inspecting Kurdish
areas where unrest has been reported. Raids in
Kurdish villages in eastern Turkey are said to have
uncovered substantial quantities of arms, am-
munition, and explosives, but the threat of a
Kurdish separatist movement appears to be exag-
gerated. In parliament, a new and tougher martial
'aw bill being processed will substantially increase
the powers of search, seizure, arrest, and trial.
Despite martial law, sporadic violence con-
tinues. Six explosions occurred in Ankara in a
single night. On 3 May a bomb thrown from a
moving train in Istanbul injured four and en-
dangered the lives of over 1,300 visiting business-
men, most of them foreign nationals.
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Sr,u1Ch 1
It has become increasingly clear that martial
law will be extended beyond the initial 30-day
period, probably for several more months. The
declared objective is a total "cleansing" of ex-
tremist elements from Turkish society
Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks Still Flounder
Intercommunal talks, stalemated for several
months, recently hit a new low, brought about
this time by Greek Cypriot statements favoring
"enosis" (union with Greece) and the deliberate
Turkish omission of the word "provisional" in
referring to the Turkish Cypriot Provisional
Administration. Nevertheless, neither the Greek
nor Turkish Cypriots appear willing to bear the
onus for ending the talks that were reopened on
28 April. Moreover, Ankara and Athens, not
wanting to risk another clash over Cyprus, have
encouraged both sides to continue meeting.
Turkish Cypriot negotiator Rauf Denktash,
after consultations with Ankara, on 28 April re-
stated the Turkish Cypriot position on the whole
range of constitutional issues that have occupied
the talks for almost three years. The most striking
aspect of the Denktash proposal is the insistence
on local autonomy provisions that, if imple-
mented, would essentially give the Turkish
Cypriot minority a more separate and equal
partnership than that granted under the 1960
constitution.
Although Denktash did not press for any
preconditions for further negotiations, his Greek
Cypriot counterpart, Glafkos Clerides, believes
Denktash's proposal is unyielding in substance
and doubts that continued discussions will be
useful. Clerides maintains that the Denktash
proposal highlights the basic difference in the
fundamental approach to the problem by the two
sides: a unified government on the island as op-
posed to two communal administrations. He
added that a meeting in Athens will be necessary
before the Makarios government can decide on its
reaction to the Denktash proposal. Such a Greek -
Greek Cypriot discussion probably cannot be held
before 17 May when the next intercommunal
meeting is scheduled.
The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, are
more self-confident because of reinforced backing
from the new Erim government in Ankara. Erim
has indicated that Turkey is frustrated over the
lack of progress in the intercommunal talks. He
said he wanted direct talks with Greece on the
problem, but admitted that, in the absence of
adequate preparations, such discussions are not
possible at this time. Nevertheless, Erim agrees
that until a satisfactory compromise solution to
the Cypriot stalemate can be found, the com-
munal talks must continue in order to maintain a
climate of good relations between Athens and
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
May Day in Latin America
May Day events in Latin America were on a
larger scale, more demonstrative, and more nu-
merous than in many years. Leaders of at least
eight countries addressed large crowds. Parades
and demonstrations with nationalistic themes oc-
curred in about a dozen countries, but there was
little violence.
President Allende shared the rostrum in San-
tiago with Chilean Cardinal Silva, the Cuban and
Soviet ambassadors, and other dignitaries, but
Fidel Castro stayed at home and addressed a rally
in Havana. Allende's speech was moderate and
cautious. With only minor exceptions he es-
chewed "anti-imperialist" rhetoric and em-
phasized his administration's desires for a "hu-
mane revolution."
In Bolivia, President Torres did not speak,
but he marched in a massive parade in La Paz
with more than 15,000 workers and students.
There was no violence, however, probably be-
cause Torres had anticipated leftist demands by
canceling the concession of a US-owned mining
company the day before.
Guyana's Prime Minister Burnham marched
with workers in the capital, and in response to
criticism from the crowd, he delivered an angry
speech. In a mining center in the interior, workers
successfully defied the government's efforts to
ban what became the largest May Day parade on
record there.
General Torrijos of Panama delivered a
lengthy address to a sizable crowd in a provincial
town, and parades and demonstrations with gov-
ernment backing occurred in major cities. In his
most quoted remark, Torrijos said that he and the
Panamanian Government would enter into nego-
tiations about the Panama Canal "on our feet or
dead, but never on our knees."
President Figueres of Costa Rica delivered
his state of the union speech in San Jose follow-
ing the largest May Day parade in recent years.
President Lanusse was the first military ruler of
Argentina since Juan Peron to address a May Day
crowd. He spoke at the inauguration of a new na-
tional university and discussed some of his pro-
grams that are designed to return Argentina to
constitutional rule. Brazilian President Medici an-
nounced an increase in the minimum wage, which
he said was consistent with his goal of improving
the lot of the workers. Venezuelan President Cal-
taken on labor matters.
dera discussed measures that his government has
Cuba: Castro Reasserts His Leadership-
Fidel Castro is showing signs of resuming the
vigorous style of leadership that he abandoned in
mid-1970. His recent spate of speeches-five in
two weeks-suggests that he is rapidly regaining
the confidence that was shaken by last year's eco-
nomic setbacks. His launching of a strident cam-
paign against intellectuals, too, is reminiscent of
his aggressive reaction to past challenges. In addi-
tion, the newly announced housing construction
plan contains the same overoptimism charac-
teristic of his previous economic schemes.
Cuban intellectuals, in particular, are in for
trouble. Reacting to events related directly to the
recent arrest of poet Heberto Padilla in Havana,
Castro delivered a vehement denunciation of in-
tellectuals and "cultural colonialism" in a major
speech on 30 April at the closing session of the
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national congress on education and culture. He
gave a severe tongue-lashing to European and
Latin American writers and artists who leaped to
Padilla's defense and also criticized the wasting of
precious resources on "useless, decadent books"
written by a "privileged minority" in Cuba. Al-
though Castro characterized dissident intellectuals
at home as only "two or three stray sheep" who
want to "continue to sow poison, insidiousness,
and intrigue in the revolution," it is clear that
intellectual ferment is much more widespread.
Castro's pronouncements are a forewarning that
the "small group that has monopolized the title
of 'intellectual' " will find the publication of its
works impossible unless it adheres to the political
guidelines demanded by the regime.
. The congress' final resolution reflected much
of Castro's antipathy toward writers and artists
and also indicated the regime's concern with the
impact on Cuban youth of such foreign cultural
influences as "extravagant fashions, religion, and
moral and sexual deformations...." Although it
stated that "neither religion nor homosexualism is
an important obstacle to the development of
Cuban youth," the resolution proposed a plan "to
prevent religious sects from proselytizing and
making new converts" and specified the "socially
pathological nature of homosexuality...."
Castro's new moves against intellectuals
could affect directly Haydee Santmaria, the gov-
ernment official responsible for inviting foreigners
to participate in Cuban literary competitions;
these have been a special target of Castro's wrath.
She is a member of the central committee of the
Communist Party and has been a faithful follower
of Fidel since the early years of the revolution.
Castro's May Day speech was directed more
toward economic themes. Although he now seems
to have adopted a long-term view regarding the
achievement of significant material benefits, he
apparently has retained his penchant for overesti-
mating the productive capacity of the people. I n
his May Day speech, for example, he revealed
plans for a schedule of house construction that
calls for 100,000 homes a year by 1975. Castro
may be using this as a device to buy time in the
face of a steadily worsening housing shortage, but
he could wind up in much the same position in
which the unfulfilled commitment to produce ten
million tons of sugar in 1970 placed him. Such a
monumental building program is doomed to fail-
ure if, as Castro maintains, it must be carried out
by underemployed workers and without a major
diversion of resources of the construction indus-
try.
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Central American Common Market: Another Try to Save It
Diplomats from El Salvador and Honduras
are preparing for what may be the final attempt
this year to normalize their relations and repair
the damage done to the Central American Com-
mon Market by their war in July 1969. Having
agreed at last month's OAS General Assembly to
discuss all outstanding issues, both sides are draw-
ing up position papers for presentation at a bi-
lateral meeting scheduled for 20 May.
Previous attempts to resolve bilateral prob-
lems have floundered because neither side was
willing to address the subject of greatest impor-
tance to the other. Thus, El Salvador has placed
primary emphasis on ending Honduran blockage
of the Pan American Highway to Salvadoran traf-
fic, while Honduras has insisted on discussion of
the border dispute as a precondition to negotia-
tion of any other issue.
Common Market talks have thus far proven
equally fruitless. Honduras, believing it has bene-
fited least from Common Market membership,
has demanded that the other member states give
special assistance to its industrial development.
Moreover, concerned about its deficit position in
G uyana: End of Bauxite Strike?
The 13-day wildcat strike by workers of the
Demerara Bauxite Company (DEMBA) ended on
3 May, relieving the Burnham government, at
least temporarily, of the most pressing of several
related problems confronting it. If Burnham dis-
appoints the workers' expectations, the strike
could resume, costing the government public con-
fidence and provoking more problems that the
political opposition could exploit.
During the strike, the workers
Common Market trade and the resultant balance-
of-payments problems, Honduras has refused to
participate in the market until corrective steps are
taken to end these imbalances. El Salvador, how-
ever, has blocked such concessions and is unlikely
to change its position until it can achieve some of
its political objectives. In order to end the im-
passe, the current negotiating effort will attempt
to arrange a package deal incorporating trade-offs
on bilateral and Common Market issues.
Although there have recently been some bor-
der incidents, and hard-line elements in both
countries will continue to oppose any com-
promise, there exists at present a particularly fav-
orable negotiating climate. President-elect Cruz of
Honduras has taken an active interest in the prob-
lem and would like to begin his administration
having resolved his country's major foreign policy
problems. The Salvadorans realize the urgency of
reaching an accommodation before July, when
preparations for the 1972 elections will reduce
government flexibility. Moreover, the neutral
three-Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala-
will exert whatever influence the can to romote
an agreement.
were increasingly exasperated by the govern-
ment's failure to satisfy their wage and pension
demands and dispel apprehensions about their
status when the Canadian-owned company is na-
tionalized. Their belligerent response to the arrest
of some strike leaders and threats of police action
to maintain law and order during the strike bodes
ill for the future if the walkout resumes.
Cheddi Jagan, Communist leader of the Peo-
ple's Progressive Party (PPP), and the black mili-
tant African Society for Cultural Relations with
an Independent Africa (ASCRIA) tried to take
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advantage of the strike. Neither was notably suc-
cessful but there were side effects that may prove
troublesome to Burnham in the future. One was
ASCRIA's departure from its usual go-it-alone
policy, soliciting the cooperation of other mili-
tant groups, including the youth arm of the pre-
dominantly East Indian PPP, on issues ostensibly
unrelated to labor unrest. Although these joint
efforts were unimpressive, a precedent has been
set. Another development was Jagan's meetings
with the bauxite strikers and with civil service
organizations that chose this time to push their
long-neglected wage demands. The US Embassy
believes, however, that consultation and public
cooperation by ASCRIA and the civil servants
with Jagan was only a tactic to put pressure on
the government and that Jagan's political pros-
pects probably have not been appreciably en-
hanced.
The government appears to have played its
hand rather clumsily during the strike. Burnham
first affected a lack of concern about the stop-
page and blamed DEMBA and its parent com-
pany, the Aluminum Company of Canada, for
fomenting it. Then, probably because ASCRIA's
influence is generally believed to be strong among
the bauxite workers, he sent Eusi Kwayana,
ASCRIA's Presiding Elder, to talk to the strikers.
Kwayana failed to persuade them, probably be-
cause the issues are primarily a labor matter and
the strikers did not want the dispute politicized.
The Burnham government may find itself
subjected to a heavy though probably not fatal
combination of pressures if the strike is resumed.
The opposition is presumably constrained by the
overriding importance of the successful national-
ization of DEMBA, but Burnham's unimpressive
recent performance cannot have been lost on the
public generally or on the opposition particu-
larly.
Colombia Has a "New" Party
Former dictator Rojas Pinilla announced on
19 April that his National Popular Alliance
(ANAPO) has become a political party. The deci-
sion to formalize ANAPO's status was based on
the belief that the new voting generation and the
lower class urbanites are no longer attached to the
traditionally oriented Liberal and Conservative
parties and that ANAPO, as a party, would thus
attract them.
The 1970 general elections, in which
ANAPO took part as a faction of the Conservative
party, showed that the traditional strength of the
Liberals and Conservatives had greatly eroded and
that ANAPO appeared to have inherited much of
their former support, particularly among low-in-
come groups. This development springs from
causes within the political groupings themselves
and society as a whole. The bonds connecting the
two major parties with their mass following have
deteriorated because of factors such as immigra-
tion from the countryside, growth of cities, the
breakdown of traditional institutions, and a grow-
ing concern over socioeconomic issues. The ap-
peal to low-income Colombians is based, in con-
siderable measure, on ANAPO's demagogic op-
position to the "establishment" and to the Na-
tional Front that has governed the country since
1958. This system is scheduled to end in 1974.
The vote that ANAPO received in 1970, however,
may have been a transitory phenomenon. Some
former adherents of the traditional parties voted
for Rojas Pinilla more because they were dissatis-
fied with their own parties' candidates than be-
cause they were attracted to Rojas.
The "new" party will formally proclaim it-
self on 13 June and will also issue its platform at
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that time.
ANAPO is portraying itself as the party
of the exploited, but it will have to overcome
many internal difficulties before it becomes a
strong and viable political organization. The
unification of its disparate elements into a
party structure will be difficult and these ef-
forts are already coming under fire from party
stalwarts. The platform itself and the final se-
lection of a standard bearer for 1974 will also
present difficulties, and there is a considerable
lack of secondary leadership.
General Rojas, at 71, is the central figure in
ANAPO and he is the party's one unifying ele-
ment. His death or illness would greatly hamper
resolution of these difficult issues. When Rojas
dies-his many illnesses appear to be under con-
trol for the moment-it would fall to his daugh-
ter, Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, to maintain
the solidarity of the movement. This will be a
difficult task at best and next to impossible if she
persists with her presidential ambitions. In such a
situation the movement could fragment, thereby
seriously damaging its chances for the future.
Much will depend on the Liberal and Conservative
parties. Both are currently undergoing schisms,
but if these are resolved and one or both of them
adopt positions more responsive to the genuine
popular pressures for social and economic re-
forms, then ANAPO would be undercut and
would probably lose much of its apparent
strength.
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