WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008500060001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 12, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/10/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500060001-4
' Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
ARMY review(s)
State Dept. review
completed. completed
Secret
12 February 1971
No. 0357/ 71
Copy N?_ 48
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CONTENTS
(information as of noon EST, 11 February 1971)
Page
FAR EAST
Indochina: Hitting Where It Hurts . . .
Laos: Up Tight in the North . . . . . . . 2
Cambodia: More Misfortune for Phnom Penh . . . . . . . 4
Communist China: Harassing the Hierarchy . . . . ? . 5
South Vietnam: Communist Fortunes Decline in the Mekong Delta . . . 6
Philippines: Students Refuse to Quit . . . . . . . 8
Thailand: Insurgent Gains in the North . . . . . . 9
HANOI'S OTHER STRUGGLE: Building Up the Home Front
Moscow "Goes Public" on SALT Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Polish Leaders Assess Past Errors and Future Hopes . . . . . . . . 12
USSR-Austria: Little Change in Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Italy: Social Reform Program Moves Slowly Ahead . . . . . . . . 14
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EUROPE (CONTINUED)
Maritime issues to the Fore
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Cairo's Offer Leaves Tel Aviv cold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chad: Insurgency Dims Peace Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Libya: A Change in Direction? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
South African Police Harass Clergy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
. 22
Chilean Politicians Open Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 22
Argentine President's Position Deteriorates . . . . . . . . .
Ecuador: Domestic Problems Surface in Wake of Tun.L War . . . . . 23
USSR-Syria; USSR-Mauritius; Nigeria;
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FAR EAST
Indochina: Hitting Where It Hurts
After a ten-day allied buildup south of the
Demilitarized Zone, South Vietnamese forces
early this week launched the first major ground
attacks of the war against the Ho Chi Minh trail
complex in the Laos panhandle. The operation is
meant to disrupt North Vietnam's current dry-
season supply effort, which now is in full swing.
Its success will depend primarily on how much it
inhibits the movement of enemy supplies to the
battlefields farther south. Other considerations
will be the number of Communist casualties
inflicted and the volume and type of supplies
captured. A successful operation could curtail
Communist military capabilities significantly in
Cambodia and South Vietnam through most of
1971.
Hanoi has anticipated strong allied ground
attacks against its infiltration corridor for
months, and has moved several thousand troops
into the area to meet the threat. Communist
concern probably began to climb sharply toward
the end of January when Hanoi detected the first
stages of allied deployments for the current
operation.
Communist forces initially fell back before
the South Vietnamese thrust, but they are likely
to make a stand and perhaps try to counterattack
before long. During the first few days of the
operation, enemy units in exposed forward po-
sitions harassed ARVN columns but withdrew
when pressed. Communist artillery units shelled
advancing South Vietnamese troops as well as
fixed allied supply points and fire support posi-
tions when they could. Farther west, in the Laos
panhandle, enemy forces were digging in around
key facilities, supply lines, and dominant terrain
features, and are under orders to hold their posi-
tions as long as possible.
Mu Gi
Pais
Bolovenv
Plot...
25 50
Miles
Despite growing allied pressure, the Com-
munists are bent on moving substantial amounts
of supplies through the Tchepone area for as long
as they can. Since late January, unusually large
numbers of trucks have been noted moving south.
In northern South Vietnam, meanwhile, the
Communists apparently plan to continue shelling
and probing allied positions stretched along
Route 9 that are supporting the ARVN drive into
Laos. Elements of an artillery and an infantry
regiment have borne the brunt of the effort so
far, but reinforcements may be moving in from
north of the DMZ. There is no evidence that the
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large number of North Vietnamese combat units
located within easy reach of the DMZ area will
mass and attempt a major strike against the allies
Laos: Up Tight in the North
The government's position around both the
Long Tieng base complex and Luang Prabang is
deteriorating, and political nervousness is in-
creasing proportionately.
On 7 February Communist units overran a
number of government outposts guarding the
eastern approaches to Long Tieng. The positions
that fell included a mobile group headquarters
about nine miles northeast of Long Tieng; the
group commander was killed in the fighting. Ir-
regular forces defending Khang Kho, also east of
the Long Tieng complex, were forced to abandon
their positions on 8 February and retreat south
following a coordinated North Vietnamese attack.
The full extent of the casualties is not yet known.
Heavy Communist shelling attacks have con-
tinued at Ban Na, hampering aerial resupply and
medical evacuation efforts. Other government
positions in the Ban Na/Sam Thong/Tha Tham
Bleung area have also been subjected to probes
and shelling attacks, and two outposts near Tha
Tham Bleung have been abandoned.
Meanwhile, the government is taking steps to
strengthen its forces west of the Plaine. Two
irregular battalions have been airlifted into posi-
tions north and northeast of Long Tieng. About
200 reinforcements are being airlifted into the
Pha Khao area, where a Communist ground attack
was beaten back on 10 February. I n addition,
government forces from the various outposts lost
to the Communists are moving back toward the
Long Tieng area.
along Route 9 any time soon.
The precise timing of any Communist drive
southwest of the Plaine is not yet clear, but the
continuing expansion of forces in the area in-
dicates that the Communists plan to follow up
their recent attacks. Ban Na seems to be the
probable starting point for any Communist push
on the complex. It commands the northern ap-
proaches to Long Tieng and contains several key
artillery positions.
Farther north, in the Luang Prabang area,
government irregulars have again been driven
from positions along a ridge about ten miles
northeast of the capital. Three NVA companies
launched coordinated attacks on these sites on 9
February. The Communists have previously used
these positions to shell nearby government out-
posts.
The government has moved to strengthen its
forces around Luang Prabang and has airlifted
two irregular companies into the area. An opera-
tion to retake positions about 30 miles northeast
of Luang Prabang was disrupted almost im-
mediately, however, when an NVA force scat-
tered the lead government elements as soon as
they had cleared their helicopters.
The deteriorating situations at Luang Pra-
bang and Long Tieng are causing growing concern
among top Laotian government leaders. On 9
February the National Security Council adopted a
resolution recommending that Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma declare a state of emergency
and order a general mobilization in all areas
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Paso 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Feb 71
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except the Vientiane military region.
Communist-controlled
territory
Q Contested territory
Long Tleng ??` ,. 'hang
Pha Khao
Increased nervousness on the part of some
civilians is noticeable as well. The sound of
government artillery can be heard in Luang
Prabang, and has given rise to numerous rumors
about Communist intentions and an imminent
threat to the town. The established Pathet Lao
policy of professing allegiance to the King would
seem to rule out such a threat, as it has in years
past, but the Communists indeed have much to
gain by continuing to underline Luang Prabang's
vulnerable military position.
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Cambodia: More Misfortune for Phnom Penh
The country suffered a new setback from a
totally unexpected quarter when Prime Minister
Lon Nol was stricken by a stroke on 8 February.
The Cambodian leader's illness should not lead to
any immediate political instability or detract
from Phnom Penh's determination to resist Com-
munist aggression, however.
It may be several weeks before a precise
prognosis can be obtained on Lon Nol's prospects
for a full or partial recovery. According to one
press report, Lon Nol's younger brother and close
confidant, Lon Non, has claimed that Nol's con-
valescence would last a month. Lon Non also
indicated that Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak
will assume the prime ministership in an acting
capacity.
Matak is an experienced administrator and
served as acting prime minister for over three
months during the early prewar days of the gov-
ernment. Since last March he has been responsible
for managing the regime's domestic business, with
Lon Nol concentrating almost exclusively on mili-
tary matters. Matak may be in for some tough
political going, however. He has been criticized
recently by students, intellectuals, and other of
the government's key supporters for his failure to
stem inflation and cut down on bureaucratic cor-
ruption. Matak may also be handicapped to some
extent by the fact that he cannot hope to enjoy
the degree of support from the military establish-
ment that Lon Nol has been able to accrue over
the years.
As long as Matak retains Lon Nol's backing,
however, he should be able to preserve the politi-
cal unity that has been one of the government's
most important wartime assets. Moreover, as he
so ably demonstrated when he led the move to
oust Sihanouk, Matak is a skilled political in-
fighter who possesses the strong will necessary to
keep independent-minded Cambodian officials in
line.
Matak may well choose to return much of
the responsibility for the daily conduct of the war
over to Lon Nol's two key military subordinates,
Generals Srey Saman and Sat Sutsakan. It clearly
will not be physically possible for Matak to give
the exhausting personal attention to military af-
fairs that Lon Nol has. While this may result in
some temporary dislocation and confusion, it
may also help breed greater efficiency in the long
run as Cambodian Army officers are forced to
assume their normal responsibilities.
Carrying the War to the Communists
The South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) dry
season offensive in eastern Cambodia moved into
its second week, with elements of Vietnamese
Communist main force units putting up a deter-
mined defense of their bases and supply lines in
Kompong Cham and Kratie provinces. The Com-
munists reportedly suffered substantial losses in
their initial attempts to blunt the offensive, how-
ever.
The heaviest fighting was reported around
the Chup rubber plantation, just east of Kompong
Cham city. There, ARVN forces, backed by air
and artillery support, successfully repelled a series
of enemy ground and mortar attacks. One of the
few enemy prisoners captured near Chup stated
he was from the 272nd Regiment of the Commu-
nist 9th Division.
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The Communists also attacked ARVN forces
closer to the border in Kompong Cham. An en-
emy mortar attack, on an ARVN regimental com-
mand post near the town of Krek, at the junction
of Routes 7 and 78, caused no casualties but
destroyed a sizable quantity of fuel and ammuni-
tion.
In southern Kratie Province, the Commu-
nists staged several ground and mortar assaults on
ARVN units near the town of Snuol. The ARVN
troops reportedly inflicted more casualties on the
enemy than they themselves received in those
25X1 Communist China: Harassing the Hierarchy
Peking's campaign against the alleged politi-
cal shortcomings of China's local authorities is
steadily gathering momentum. In recent weeks
the propaganda rhetoric has become progressively
more strident, and the movement has taken on
the appearance of a major, multifaceted critique
of both the post - Cultural Revolution party and
government apparatus and the civilian and mili-
tary cadres who staff it. The current intensity of
the campaign suggests, moreover, that it may be
an outgrowth of divisive though muted struggles
over power and policy in Peking.
In part, thecampaign may be viewed as a
sustained effort to restore lines of authority
broken during the Cultural Revolution. Despite
marked progress in reinstituting the local party
apparatus, the regime still has no easy task in
making its will prevail on a conglomerate of new
and "rehabilitated" cadres, especially since they
include many who have lost their enthusiasm for
leadership and others who now feel freer to ques-
tion Peking's programs. Some press articles over
the past few days have been unusually candid in
admitting that many senior officials are reluctant
to accept instructions from higher levels on the
grounds that the directives do not apply to condi-
tions in their bailiwicks. In addition, several pro-
vincial editorials last week indicated that some
local authorities are questioning Peking's guide-
lines on this year's grain production and its pro-
gram of developing small-scale, self-supporting in-
dustrial enterprises in rural areas. The regime's
mounting frustration is illustrated by the recent
revival of the old Cultural Revolution slogan that
Mao's instructions must be followed "whether or
not they are understood."
Beyond the pulling and hauling between Pe-
king and various provincial authorities, there
seems to be a growing concern in Peking that the
rebuilt local party and government organs are
evolving into a conservative elite similar in spirit
to the apparatus Mao set out to purge and re-
vitalize during the Cultural Revolution. Thus,
charges have been repeatedly made that local
leaders are failing to adhere to Mao's line, are
becoming arrogant and complacent, are un-
responsive to popular will, and are in danger of
"falling off the locomotive of revolution." In
practice, the local promoters of the revolution are
expected to respond to such charges by engaging
in more self-criticism as well as by accepting fre-
quent critiques of their performance from the
"revolutionary masses"-a process that tends to
raise political temperatures and enormously com-
plicates day-to-day administration.
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It is also apparent that much of the current
invective is being directed at professional army
men who have assumed dominant leadership posi-
tions in most localities. In recent weeks provincial
radiobroadcasts have loosed a torrent of commen-
tary detailing how military officiials have over-
stepped their authority by acting in a high-handed
and arbitrary manner. Publication of a new Mao
directive ordering military administrators not to
fear criticism and to conduct "rectification"
every one or two months suggests that political
pressures on the army are increasing.
The furor over the quality of local leadership
may also be a reflection of maneuvering and
muted policy disagreements within the politburo.
The curious juxtaposition in national propaganda
South Vietnam:
of heavy criticism of the army's administrative
performance with periodic testimony as to the
importance of its political mission affirms that
the military's increased role in civil affairs is still a
contentious issue. It also seems possible that
many of the diatribes on leadership deficiencies
are being penned by militant ideologues who be-
lieve their position in regime councils is being
undercut as the reconstruction process moves for-
ward. Indeed, one factor in the recent fall of the
former head of the Cultural Revolution Group,
Chen Po-ta, may have been his opposition to
increased military influence. Chen's setback, the
earlier demise of Public Security Minister Hsieh
Fu-chih, and recent rumors that another ranking
politburo member-Kang Sheng--may now be in
serious trouble are also part of the uncertaint
surrounding the nation's leadership. 25X1
Communist Fortunes Decline in the Mekong Delta
During the past several years, Communist
forces in the Mekong Delta have been growing
progressively weaker. Although American combat
forces were withdrawn a year-and-a-half ago, a
series of positive events have improved the lot of
the South Vietnamese Government there consid-
erably. These include the assignment to the area
of several first-class regional commanders, new
tactics, increased emphasis on the role of the
territorial security forces, expansion of the village
militia and, more recently, the Cambodian cross-
border operations that stimulated a more aggres-
sive fighting spirit in the South Vietnamese Army.
Consequently, the Communists have found it in-
creasingly difficult to maintain either large con-
centrations of forces or the effectiveness of their
political cadre in the heavily populated portions
of the delta. With the additional restrictions im-
posed on their military forces by the disruptions
to their Cambodian supply lines, the Communists
are capable of only small-scale shellings, limited
ground attacks against remote outposts, and oc-
casional harassments similar to the cyclical pat-
tern of activity evident throughout most of 1970.
Major General Ngo Quang Truong, who took
over MR-4 last August, recently voiced his satis-
faction with the performance of the South Viet-
namese forces in the delta, specifically citing the
progress of the 21st Division in penetrating the
large enemy redoubt in the inhospitable U Minh
Forest. The construction of four artillery bases in
the interior of the forest is proceeding on sched-
ule and he claims that half of the enemy's
3,000-man force there has been wiped out.
Truong, one of South Vietnam's most widely
respected military men, claims "the delta will be
under effective South Vietnamese governmental
control in 1971."
South Vietnam's 9th Division has established
artillery positions on every mountain peak in the
Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc Province, and
it is now in the difficult process of destroying
enemy strong points located in numerous moun-
tain caves. Although the Communists will still be
able to slip some personnel and supplies across
the Cambodian border from time to time, the
area is gradually being denied them as a major
base area.
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Even the South Vietnamese 7th Division,
once considered one of Saigon's least effective
army units, has been driving deep into Commu-
nist Base Area 470 in northwestern Dinh Tuong
Province and has constructed fire support bases
there. According to Truong, three battalions of
the North Vietnamese 88th Regiment that in-
filtrated into the area early last year, before the
allied cross-border operations into Cambodia, will
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be forced either to break up and disperse or to
"face annihilation." As a result of the South
Vietnamese occupation of this long-time enemy
sanctuary, many civilians are now voluntarily
moving back into nearby regions previously under
enemy control.
In addition to the army gains, Truong be-
lieves the territorial security forces in the delta
have improved and are being utilized with greater
efficiency. The recently concluded "Dong Khoi"
campaign, in which Regional and Popular forces
conducted simultaneous cordon and search opera-
tions, was highly successful. Because of this,
Truong said similar, short-term, but highly con-
centrated operations are being planned for the
future.
To further improve the operation of the
regular army troops in MR-4, Truong is realigning
their operational areas. The Marine brigade pres-
ently near Neak Luong in Cambodia is being
pulled back and will be replaced by two regiments
of the 9th Division, leaving a third regiment in the
Seven Mountains region of Chau Doc Province.
The operational area of the 7th Division is being
expanded to pick up some of the slack left by
these moves. The 21st Division will continue to
be responsible for the southern six provinces of
M R-4.
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Philippines: Students Refuse to Quit
Students in Manila, who have been confront-
ing the government since mid-January, seem de-
termined to keep up the fight. They have armed
themselves with incendiary devices and some
other weapons, including two machine guns, in
order to maintain control of the university
grounds. Their announced objectives include the
withdrawal of all criminal charges against "activ-
ists," permanent control of the university radio
station and printing facilities, and the denial to
security forces of entry into the university
premises.
The longer term goal, however, probably is
to develop political issues that will embarrass the
Marcos administration. Indeed, the students' pres-
ent activities seem designed to provoke the secu-
rity forces into the use of violent tactics. The
movement is basically antiestablishment and is led
by a radical student organization, although some
moderates have joined it during the past two
weeks.
The students took up the torch in January
when the drivers of Manila's "jeepneys"-con-
verted jeeps used extensively for public trans-
portation-went on strike to protest a raise in
petroleum prices. Marcos responded by rolling
back gas prices and declaring that only the cost of
some higher grade petroleum products would be
increased. The jeepney drivers, for the moment at
least, seem mollified and have generally lost inter-
est in the strike.
Student tactics hav included setting up bar-
ricades around the University of the Philippines
and protesting marches. The president of the uni-
versity is under virtual house arrest; he reportedly
is allowed to survey the campus only under a
student escort.
The government's restrained methods of
dealing with the problem have apparently only
increased student resentment. Marcos may be
waiting for student violence to bring an aroused
and inconvenienced public around to supporting
his administration, at which time he could bring
troops onto the campus. The authorities issued an
ultimatum to the students on 8 February stating
that, if the barricades were not down by the
ninth, police forces would be moved in. So far
this threat has not been carried out.
Anti-Americanism has not yet become a key
issue in the present troubles. The radical students
may soon, however, turn to this ever-popular is-
sue to keep up the fight, and Marcos' dilemma of
whether or not to send in the troops and create a
few more "martyrs" will remain.
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Thailand: Insurgent Gains in the North
Communist insurgents in the north are making
some headway in recruiting lowland ethnic Thai
villagers. Since the insurgent movement began there
over three years ago, its appeal has been directed
almost exclusively at remote hill-tribe peoples who
have long been excluded from the mainstream of
Thai society. Thai government leaders have con-
sistently maintained that lowland ethnic Thais were
impervious to insurgent proselyting and that any
efforts to integrate them into armed units with the
tribal people would prove futile because of the tradi-
tional animosities between the two groups.
US Embassy reports indicate, however, that
insurgent groups ranging in size from 50 to 130
members conducted propaganda and recruiting ses-
sions in ethnic Thai as well as hill-tribe villages in
three districts of Chiang Rai Province on at least a
dozen occasions between October and December
1970. In one instance, armed insurgents sealed off a
complex of ten lowland Thai villages in Chiang
Muan district, near the Laos border, where they
remained overnight in order to conduct propaganda
meetings. The insurgent band reportedly included a
number of youthful Thais native to the Chiang
Muan area who were recognized by their fellow
villagers. Local authorities not only failed to chal-
lenge the insurgents, but made no official report of
the role played by the ethnic Thai recruits because
they feared that Thai officials further on up the line
would hold them accountable.
The deputy governor of Chiang Rai, who is
clearly alarmed over the deteriorating security situa-
tion in his province, recently told an embassy offi-
cial that the absence of an effective Thai Govern-
ment presence together with widespread corruption
among police and local officials were prime reasons
why the insurgents were enjoying some success in
attracting ethnic Thai to their movement.
Bangkok's confidence in its estimate of the
insurgency in the north has also been shaken by the
extent of Communist strength, organization, and
support as revealed by the operations of Chinese
irregulars in that sector. Over the past two months
some 750 former Chinese Nationalists-remnants of
forces driven from China two decades ago-have
conducted operations under Bangkok's auspices
against several insurgent base areas along the Thai-
Lao border in northern Chiang Rai Province. In
addition to capturing two bases, sizable quantities of
military equipment, field supplies, and documents,
the irregulars have fared surprisingly well against the
considerable resistance put up by the Communists.
The Thai 3rd Army, which is directing the
irregular operations, has provided logistical, air, and
artillery support to the Chinese, but in only one
instance have its ground forces been committed to
the fray. Bangkok apparently still prefers to have
the irregulars, who are now manning defensive posi-
tions in captured enemy camps pending the arrival
of reinforcements, continue to carry the brunt of
the effort against the insurgents.
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EUROPE
Moscow "Goes Public" on SALT Problems
Moscow last week broke its public silence on
contentious issues under negotiation at SALT as
Pravda and Izvestia attacked Washington's stand
on American forward-based systems (FBS) and an
initial, ABM-only agreement. The two articles
represent Moscow's first step in maneuvering for
position at the renewal of SALT in Vienna on 15
March and suggest there is little prospect for give
in the Soviet negotiating position.
The Soviets took up the cudgels on 3 Febru-
ary in a Pravda article written by V. Shustov, a
disarmament expert in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Shustov charged US "militarists" with
ordering the American press to stress that the
strategic arms talks should not be concerned with
"nuclear facilities advanced to the frontiers of the
USSR and other socialist countries." He went on
to declare that this position "deliberately disre-
gards" the fact that a mutually acceptable agree-
ment must yield no unilateral military advantage
to either side. The article also claimed that the
strengthening of US military forces over the past
year is incompatible with efforts to reach an
agreement.
Three days later, Izvestia attacked Washing-
ton's attitude toward an ABM-only agreement.
Citing Western reporting on Ambassador Smith's
remarks before a Congressional committee, this
article alleged that Smith devoted great pains to
an attempt to prove "why the US should not
conclude a separate initial measure" limiting
ABMs. It charged Smith, the head of the US
SALT delegation, with trying to prejudice the
views of legislators and scientists in the US who
have reacted favorably to the suggestion for an
ABM-only agreement.
The views in the two articles were preceded
by remarks of Soviet Defense Minister Grechko in
Finland on 29 January. In a luncheon address on
the last day of an official visit, Grechko said that
there had been no substantial results at SALT
because the US "wants to take advantage" of the
talks. Reading from prepared notes, he said that
SALT was not being carried out on an equal basis,
and that the USSR could "not accept this."
These three events seem in part to indicate a
new determination in Moscow to make its case in
public for propaganda effect. In a private con-
versation last month, Pravda commentator Yury
Zhukov said that his government was irritated by
US press leaks on SALT, and would be respond-
ing in its own way.
The articles-which probably are only the
opening shots in a campaign leading up to the
Vienna round-are intended in particular to
demonstrate Moscow's resolve on the FBS issue
and thus influence the US to consider a separate
limitation on ABMs. The Soviets as yet have been
careful to discuss publicly only those issues
causing negotiating problems and on which they
have taken a particularly strong position. The
Soviets may hope that by calling public attention
to fundamental differences in the negotiations
and by pitching their statements to Washington
directly, they will increase pressure for some fur-
ther movement in the US position.
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Polish Leaders Assess Past Errors and Future Hopes
Party leader Gierek was able to strengthen
his position at a central committee plenum on 6-7
February that assessed the faults of the old lead-
ership and charted a course for the immediate
future. Although Gierek only promised that the
party will consider a myriad of measures to re-
juvenate national life, he seems to have convinced
most of the people that a new start is being made.
Gierek minced no words in divorcing his
regime from the former leadership. He accused it
of misinterpreting the December upheaval, an ex-
pression of legitimate grievances, as a counter-
revolution. He blamed the clique surrounding ex-
party leader Gomulka and his already ousted
politburo colleagues, former economic czar
Jaszczuk and ideologist Kliszko, both of whom
were stripped of their central committee member-
ship. Gomulka, who is still hospitalized, was let
down more gently; his membership was only
suspended. Moreover, Gierek acknowledged Go-
mulka's past achievements, and said that the
former party leader would not be further punished.
As expected, former trade union chief Loga-
Sowinski, a Gomulka holdover, was ousted from
the politburo, as was Stanislaw Kociolek, whose
dismissal had been demanded by the workers
along the Baltic coast. No replacements on the
policy-making body have been made, but the bal-
ance between Gierek's followers and others has
not been perceptibly altered as a result of the
ousters.
Gierek announced his intention to advance
the date of the next party congress, originally
scheduled for next year. This indicates that he is
confident of gaining further control over the
party machinery during preparation for the con-
clave. Meanwhile, accelerated changes in the
middle and lower level party bureaucracy and all
levels of the government can be expected; some
of the ministerial changes may be made at a
parliamentary session beginning on 13 February.
Replacements for the dismissed associates of
Gomulka on the central committee are workers,
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except for the deputy defense minister in charge
of the army's political administration. His ap-
pointment may indicate Gierek's desire to im-
prove control over internal security troops, whose
brutal measures against the strikers in December
resulted in riots and more recently led the work-
ers to call for the dismissal of the long-time secu-
rity chief, Moczar. Although Moczar is useful to
Gierek on the politburo, his other liabilities sug-
gest that his importance as a challenger to
Gierek's power has long been overrated by both
his supporters and detractors.
Gierek's sketch of the future seemed con-
fined to the few months that will precede the
party congress. He advocated strengthening the
features that have characterized his rule so far,
including greater participation by all segments of
the population in the party and government, a
continuing direct dialogue with the workers, a
rejuvenation of trade unions, and a more genuine
legislative role for parliament, with power to over-
see the government.
The new party leader went out of his way,
however, to assure both his domestic and foreign
audiences-especially in Moscow-that the leading
role of the party will not be challenged, and that
the party as a whole was not being indicted for
the shortcomings of the former leadership. He
said "bourgeois democracy" had no relevance in
Poland, and pointedly added that "Poland can
develop only in an inseparable alliance with the
USSR and its socialist neighbors, and the party is,
and will remain, the leading force of the Polish
nation. Any neglect of these basic truths would
Talks with Soviet President Podgorny re-
vealed no change in Moscow's opposition to
Vienna's quest for some kind of arrangement with
the European Communities. Podgorny reiterated
Moscow's fear that such an association might lead
to a decline in Austria's trade with Eastern
Europe and, more importantly, to West German
economic ascendancy in Austria. Neutral Austria
would like Soviet acquiescence before reaching
any agreement with the Communities, although
Vienna's leaders defend their sole right to in-
terpret their neutrality.
Kirschlaeger may have achieved a break-
through on the question of defensive missiles,
however. Although Gromyko stood by the past
Soviet position that all missiles are banned under
the State Treaty of 1955, Prime Minister Kosygin
later said that the issue could be reviewed by
experts because Austria was so obviously inter-
ested. Kosygin indicated, however, that Moscow's
price would be Austrian agreement to buy the
missile system from the USSR.
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USSR-Austria: Little Change in Attitudes
Austrian Foreign Minister Kirschlaeger's visit
to Moscow from 25 to 29 January, his first since
Chancellor Kreisky's socialist government was
installed last spring, served to keep relations be-
tween the two countries in adequate repair. He
was not able, however, to work much of a change
in Soviet attitudes.
Despite the final communique's claim that
the talks were friendly, an Austrian official de-
scribed them as "cool to chilly." The mood was
foreordained by Kreisky's blunt comments to the
Council of Europe on 25 January on the subject
of a Conference on European Security (CES).
Austria favors and would like to host a CES, but
believes it should discuss real issues. In talks with
Kirschlaeger, Soviet Foreign Minister Grornyko
belabored Kreisky's suggestion that Berlin and the
Middle East could be on a CES agenda. The
former, he said, might doom the conference from
the start, while the latter was the prerogative of
the Big Four powers.
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Italy: Social Reform Program Moves Slowly Ahead
Prime Minister Colombo's government is
making progress on its social reform program
despite its preoccupation with recent outbreaks
of violence. Organized labor appears to be giving
the government effective support.
On 6 February, after a 17-hour talk between
representatives of the government and the three
major labor confederations, substantial agreement
was announced on the housing and health care
reform measures for which organized labor has
been pressing. Draft legislation on housing is
scheduled for presentation to the cabinet by 20
February with reforms in health care to follow by
15 March. Future government-labor discussions
are to concern three other long-sought reforms on
the development of southern Italy, agriculture,
and transport.
Steady progress on the social reform pro-
gram demanded by labor appears to be a prereq-
uisite for industrial peace and strong economic
growth. Continued strike activity last year to-
gether with a sharp rise in absenteeism limited the
rise in industrial production to 6.5 percent, sig-
nificantly below the predicted rate of 10.5 per-
cent.
Italy's neo-fascists have been seeking to
profit from reaction against the widespread and
frequent strikes of the past 18 months with scat-
tered but increasingly violent attacks against left-
ists and public: authorities. Bombings, one death,
and a number of injuries last week at the hands of
neo-fascists in southern Italy prompted sharp
demands from center-left and Communist parties
for a government crackdown.
The Com,nunists, in a further effort to en-
hance their image as a democratic political party,
called for "law and order." The national labor
confederations, which are variously affiliated with
the Communists and the four center-left parties
of the Colombo coalition, called a two-hour gen-
eral strike on an anti-fascist theme but generally
seem to be supporting government efforts to con-
ta.in violence from either right or left extremists.
The easing of pressure should be welcome to
Prime Minister Colombo as he prepares for his
visit to Washington on 18 February. He report-
edly objects to the image of extreme political
instability in Italy which he believes has been
disseminated in the American press.
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Maritime Issues to the Fore
The signing of the treaty banning weapons
of mass destruction from the seabeds was accom-
plished on 11 February at ceremonies in the US,
UK, and USSR. It will come into effect when
these three and only 19 other governments have
ratified. This should occur fairly rapidly, even
though there may be a number of holdouts.
France and Communist China traditionally de-
cline to adhere to international arms control
agreements of this sort. A few Latin American
nations that think the treaty impinges on their
claims to 200-mile territorial waters may also fail
to ratify; only two of the nine making such claims
signed the treaty this week.
The General Assembly's seabeds committee
convenes in New York next week for the first
time since its recent expansion from 42 to 86
members. The meeting is in preparation for the
1973 Law of the Sea conference. Its chairman,
Ceylon's UN delegate Amerasinghe, hopes the
committee will agree to establish two working
groups: one to handle the question of interna-
tional machinery to control peaceful exploitation
of the ocean floor, the other to consider most of
the other maritime issues, e.g., territorial waters
claims and rights of passage through international
straits. A few other issues would be left for action
by the committee itself.
A key decision on voting procedures that
might set a precedent for the rules governing the
1973 conference itself may also be made at the
upcoming meeting. The US favors the institution
of no more than a two-thirds majority rule,
whereas several other states, especially the West
Coast Latin American states-concerned that an
international seabeds regime might have jurisdic-
tion over valuable natural resources close to their
shores-want a "consensus" arrangement that
would permit them to filibuster to protect their
interests.
The New York sessions follow intensive re-
gional consultations on maritime issues since the
Assembly voted last December to organize a new
Law of the Sea conference. The superpowers have
consulted in particular with other leading mari-
time nations-the Soviets with Canada and the US
with the Japanese-and they will have a bilateral
meeting in Washington early next week before the
seabeds committee convenes. Moscow opposed
the Assembly resolution calling for the 1973 con-
ference-apparently fearing it might grant too
much authority to an international regulatory
mechanism. In view of this, it is especially impor-
tant that these preparatory talks go well. The
1971 and 1972 General Assemblies have the right
to opt to cancel the 1973 conference or alter its
agenda.
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USSR-SYRIA: Syrian Prime Minister Asad's re-
cent Soviet visit appears to have allayed mutual
suspicion somewhat, although the views of the
two governments on political tactics in the Middle
East clearly remain out of harmony.
The final communique stressed examples of
growing Soviet-Syrian economic cooperation, es-
pecially the Euphrates Dam project. Differences
between Moscow and Damascus on the issue of a
political settlement were not resolved, however.
The Soviets almost certainly pressed for a public
Syrian endorsement of a political settlement;
their failure to obtain it is undoubtedly a prin-
cipal reason that the talks were characterized as,
"frank" in the final communi u6.
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Cairo's Offer Leaves Tel Aviv Cold
President Sadat's proposal to reopen the
Suez Canal in return for a partial Israeli with-
drawal has not evoked a positive response from
Israel.
Sadat made his offer on 4 February when he
announced Egypt's agreement to maintain the
cease-fire for another 30 days. Terming it a "new
Egyptian initiative," Sadat called for the partial
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the east bank of
the Suez Canal as the first stage of a timetable to
be prepared later to implement the other pro-
visions of the 1967 Security Council resolution
on the Middle East. If this were done, he added,
Egypt would then be prepared to begin im-
mediate steps to clear the canal and reopen it "for
international navigation."
The Egyptian president's proposal appears to
be yet another effort to convince world opinion
that Cairo genuinely desires to explore new
avenues for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. It may also have been directed at those
Western European countries most interested in
seeing the canal reopened in order to motivate
them to increase the pressures on Israel to adopt a
more forthcoming position on the question of
withdrawal.
Egypt's public offer appeared to catch Israel
somewhat by surprise, and an official reaction
was several days in coming. On 9 February, how-
ever, in a speech to the Knesset, Prime Minister
Golda Meir characterized the proposal as designed
to give Cairo a strategic advantage without in-
cluding any real commitment to peace. Although
Mrs. Meir stated that Israel would favorably con-
sider proposals aimed at the mutual reduction of
military forces along the canal, she did not in-
dicate that Israel was prepared to depart from its
long-held position of no withdrawal without a
signed peace treaty. The Prime Minister did say,
however, that Israel was prepared to discuss a
separate arrangement, outside of the peace talks,
for reopening the canal to all shipping provided
that ships flying the Israeli flag were included.
Although there are likely to be further ex-
changes on this topic, the initial Egyptian re-
action was to term Mrs. Meir's statement "an
outright rejection of the Egyptian peace gesture."
An Egyptian spokesman also clarified Sadat's
reference to international navigation in the Suez
Canal by explaining that Israeli ships would be
able to use the waterway only after the problem
of the Palestinian refugees was solved in con-
junction with implementation of the entire Secu-
rity Council resolution.
The USSR's satisfaction with the current
Middle East situation came through clearly in a
recent conversation between a medium-ranking
Foreign Ministry official and a US Embassy
officer in Moscow. The Soviet official praised
Sadat's proposal to reopen the canal as a "positive
initiative," but made it clear that Moscow does
not expect the canal to be reopened except in the
context of a general settlement. The Soviet
official also had warm words for the somewhat
less obstructive Syrian attitude toward political
developments in the Middle East, opining that if
the Jarring mission achieved real progress, there
was a good chance the new government would say
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Chad: Insurgency Dims Peace Prospects
Despite initially encouraging signs, the cam-
paign waged by President Tombalbaye to resolve
peacefully Chad's persistent Muslim rebellion has
borne little fruit. The scheduled further reduction
of the French counterinsurgency role is fast
approaching, and armed dissidence is on the rise
again in all sectors.
Last August, Tombalbaye belatedly ac-
knowledged the existence of the insurgency and
promised to correct the administrative abuses and
lack of social services that contributed to it. Com-
bined with the offer of a general amnesty, an
all-out effort was launched at home and abroad to
get peace talks moving.
Although the insurgents in eastern Chad
showed no discernible interest in coming to
terms, many rebel leaders in the central region
respected a self-imposed cease-fire for six months
while pursuing negotiations with the government.
Last month a settlement was announced with 12
Moubi chieftains, but it may not be accepted by
the entire tribe, who in 1965 were the first to
revolt. Moreover, the remaining rebel bands in the
truce zone have resumed operations.
The aggressive and well-armed Toubou
tribesmen in the north also remain recalcitrant.
Peace overtures by the government last December
via a special mission to Libya did not persuade
the Toubou sultan-in-exile there to enter into
discussions nor did they lead Tripoli to withdraw
its support for the dissidents. There is increasing
evidence that Libya began extending modest
financial and material aid to the Toubous last
year in reaction to Chad's close ties with Israel.
The last of the French combat troops, who
were sent to Chad in early 1969, are scheduled to
be withdrawn within the next few months, leav-
ing behind only an expanded military advisory
group and the administrative reform mission.
Chad's French-led forces, however, backed by the
permanent French intervention unit at Fort-
Lamy, are considered by the French commander
ready to assume the defense burden outside the
north. A final sweep by the French troops is
under way in the north to force the Toubous to
seek peace or to neutralize them temporarily.
Although the level of fighting is far below
that of two years ago, no quick end is in sight.
The prospects for extending peace to other areas
might be enhanced if the government can some-
how find the resources to fulfill visibly its prom-
ises to the Moubi, but a planned crackdown on
lagging tax payments in the more secure prefec-
tures could intensify the rebellion still fur-
ther.
Areas of Muslim Dissidence
Northern (Touboul
Central-Eastern (National Liberation
Front of Chad FROLINA and Chad
Liberation Front FL T
550954 2-71 CIA
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Libya: A Change in Direction?
Premier Qadhafi made two speeches recently
that seem to point Libyan policies away from the
"Qadhafi plan" for Arab military unity against
Israel and toward a primary emphasis on the
alleviation of domestic ills. This new policy line-
if it is more real than illusory-will probably have
little chance of success so long as the center stage
of Arab politics is occupied by the emotional
issue of Palestinian liberation.
The most striking aspect of the first speech
at Zawiyah on 24 January was that it was aimed
almost exclusively at the Libyan public and did
not deal with grand designs for Arab strategy as
Qadhafi has been prone to do. He called for a
constitution, a peoples' council, and a president
elected by popular referendum. Although Qadhafi
said that he would not nominate himself for the
presidency, two days later, before adulatory
crowds, the premier decided that he would not
rule himself out after all.
The speech in Benghazi on 2 February ex-
pressed Qadhafi's disillusionment with his efforts
to inspire Arab unity. He ruefully acknowledged
the possibility of separate peace settlements with
Israel by Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. Moderate
in tone, this speech once more centered around
the promise that the Libyan people would have a
chance to question government policy.
Qadhafi has obviously been under a great
deal of pressure lately. In addition to the usual
USSR-MAURITIUS: The Soviets will start using
Port Louis this April to service its fishing fleet in
the Indian Ocean under the terms of a pact signed
in July 1970. Mauritius is insisting that the Sovi-
ets submit a manifest of incoming fishing crews at
least ten days in advance and one for outgoing
crews 14 days before the exchange. The USSR
had requested that its crews be exempt from
normal customs and immigration procedures.
Soviet tankers will be permitted to refuel on the
same ad hoc basis as ships of any other country.
business of government, the quadripartite union
envisioned with Egypt, Syria, and Sudan, the
question of the Arab-Israeli cease-fire, and the
international oil crisis have all occupied much of
his time and energies.
There seems little doubt that Qadhafi and
the regime are increasingly disturbed about the
unsettled domestic scene. They may be groping
their way toward some type of popular insti-
tution for the safe release of public indignation-
perhaps along the lines of Egypt's docile assem-
bly, the Arab Socialist Union.
Arab-Israeli fighting broke out once more, Libya
"would join" the fray. Despite national discon-
tent and xenophobia, the premier would not find
it hard either to rekindle his own enthusiasm or
to whip up popular support for his pan-Arab
policies. A peaceful progression toward closeness
with the Maghreb and a steady plodding toward
long-term solutions to domestic underdevelop-
ment may be the stuff of true Libyan statesman- 25X1
ship, but the appeal of pan-Arab nationalism will
continue to be capable of deflecting Libyan pol-
icy from more sober and long-term goals.
Soviet spokesmen have indicated that 8,000
tons of fuel per month will be the maximum
required during the height of the fishing season,
and the number of tankers calling at Port Louis
will depend on the number of fishing and whaling
ships in the area. On the average, about a dozen
Soviet fishing vessels operate in the Indian Ocean
at any one time and close to 60 whaling ships are
present during the whaling season' in the Ant-
arctic. Currently, Soviet tankers from ports in the
USSR carry fuel for both types of ships in the
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South African Police Harass Clergy
Many South African church leaders believe
that the recent arrest of the Anglican dean of
Johannesburg, a well-known critic of apartheid, is
part of a calculated attack on clergymen who are
critical of government policies.
The dean, who has been charged with pos-
sessing and distributing subversive literature, is
the most prominent, but not the only, anti-
apartheid clergyman who has been subjected to
recent police actions. Since the World Council of
Churches gave $200,000 in "humanitarian" aid to
the southern African liberation movements last
September, several other clerics have had their
passports withdrawn and three visiting churchmen
have been deported for openly criticizing the gov-
ernment's racial policies. Although the head of
the security police publicly denied last week that
the police were engaged in a "vendetta" against
the churches, another official has admitted that
the Vorster government is deeply concerned
about the "liberal" views of Catholics and Angli-
cans and is determined "to pick off" their most
vocal leaders.
NIGERIA: During the past two weeks the gov-
ernment has had to deal with extensive labor and
student unrest. I n defiance of a government ban
on strikes, workers in the private sector-who are
faced with a rapidly rising cost of living--have
been striking for wage increases to match those
recently granted by the government to public
employees. Most of the strikes have been of the
wildcat variety. The government appears power-
less to enforce its antistrike decree and may have
to make employers in the private sector-some of
The dean's arrest has stirred apprehension in
church circles, but it has not yet intimidated
liberal church bodies. Protest from the pulpit
against the arbitrary and far-reaching police
powers of the state has been loud and strong. The
government, however, has characteristically
turned a deaf ear. In a press interview, the minis-
ter of police noted casually that he had been
unaware of the dean's arrest and detention until
the following morning, and that this was "the
normal way in which these things are done."
This admission reflects the autonomy with
which the security police are allowed to operate
against government opponents. In detaining the
dean, a British citizen, however, the Vorster gov-
ernment may have blundered. Although his arrest
is unlikely to deter the Heath government from
selling arms to South Africa, the Laborites and
British press in their effort to stop the arms sale
may use it to embarrass Heath. 25X1
whom have already granted wage increases-give
in to the workers' demands.
ruary.
Student unrest began early in the month in
western Nigeria when a peaceful demonstration
against poor food at the University of Ibadan
deteriorated into a full-scale riot in which the
police killed two students. Sympathy demonstra-
tions followed at other schools. For the present,
student agitation has subsided, and the University
of Ibadan, which was closed because of the riot-
ing, is scheduled to reopen on 12 Feb-
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chilean Politicians Open Up
Politicians are becoming increasingly active
as 4 April, the date of the nationwide municipal
elections and a special senatorial election to fill
the seat vacated by President Allende, ap-
proaches. On 4 February Allende held a press
conference marking his first 90 days in office. His
comments were generally moderate, although he
sharply criticized the president of the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) for statements about the
investigation of the murder last October of the
army commander in chief. In addition, Allende
was careful to draw a distinction between his
government for "the benefit of all Chileans" and
the Socialist Party. He mentioned particularly the
party's new secretary general, extremist Carlos
Altamirano. In an apparent attempt to reassure
those who were concerned because of Allende's
support for Altamirano's election, the President
said, "Transformations and changes are going to
take place within bourgeois democracy, and if
Altamirano believes we should go faster, I will tell
him why we're not going to go faster."
The PDC candidate for the senate election
has attacked the government for its alleged pres-
sure on voters. He condemned Allende's an-
nounced trip to the senate electoral district as
unseemly electoral intervention. There is a pos-
sibility that the PDC and the conservative Na-
tional Party will arrange a face-saving compromise
by which the Nationals will withdraw their candi-
date, thus eventually leaving a race between the
PDC man and the Socialist sponsored by the
government coalition. The PDC candidate believes
that his only chance for victory-slim in any
event-lies in a two-way contest. A deal of any
sort with the right is opposed, however, by strong
forces within the PDC as well as by those conserv-
atives who still see the Christian Democrats as the
cause of all the problems now facing Chile.
Allende is attempting to allay any fears of a
confrontation with the US over the copper na-
tionalization issue-a clash Altamirano and Com-
munist Party Secretary General Luis Corvalan
would like to see happen-by deftly placing the
blame for any such development on the US.
Speaking to copper workers he said that the cop-
per nationalization could not be considered ag-
gression against the US. In an interview with a
French reporter the President said that if the US
opposed "our right to nationalize copper, they
will bear the responsibility."
Argentine President's Position Deteriorates
President Levingston's position with most
significant Argentine power groups appears to
have deteriorated somewhat in the past week,
largely as a result of the President's own actions.
Levingston's already weak position was hurt fur-
ther as a result of three events: a strongly worded
presidential attack on foreign investment and
large Argentine businesses, the announcement of
a 5.5-percent increase in the cost of living for
January, and the firing of the popular Social
Welfare Minister Francisco Manrique.
Levingston apparently received a relatively
free hand from the commanders of the three
armed services when he met with them on 31
January, but his adoption of nationalism to
achieve popular support and his dismissal of
Manrique-who has close ties to army commander
General Lanusse-can only serve to widen the
breach between the President and the military
junta. Levingston has acted in apparent defiance
of Argentina's maker and breaker of presidents,
General Lanusse, and at the same time has shown
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a marked lack of progress in dealing with the
country's pressing economic and labor problems.
The President's adoption of a nationalistic
line may well have touched a responsive chord
with the public in general, but this is probably
more than balanced by the negative reaction to
the dismissal of Manrique and the implications for
the working man of the January inflation rate.
Labor is now involved in wage negotiations with
the government and reportedly will demand in-
creases far in excess of the unofficial guidelines
established by the Levingston government.
Business, too, has lost almost all confidence
in the government and has already begun to with-
hold new investment. This is particularly true of
foreign investors who are not convinced by the
President's statements that he is opposed only to
those foreign businesses-meat packers and petro-
leum companies-that have sought to frustrate his
programs and have generally worked against the
Argentine national interest.
The President, thus, has failed so far to at-
tract wide popular support and is rapidly losing
the good will of important elements of such
groups as the military and business.
Ecuador: Domestic Problems Surface in Wake of Tuna War
President Velasco received strong interna- personal regret to the US mission. The President's
tional backing for his anti-US stand during the failure to consult with military leaders has helped
"tuna war," but he has not succeeded in drum- to raise rumors of a possible military move against
ming up significantly increased popular support at the administration.
home. Plans for a national plebiscite later this
year to ratify a new constitution, which is also
designed to demonstrate approval of the presi-
dent's dictatorial take-over last June, are again
drawing opposition fire.
Domestic political groups have had little
choice except to support Velasco on such nation-
alistic issues as the fisheries dispute, but they have
responded in lukewarm fashion. In addition, the
recent decision to expel the US Military Group, a
probable face-saving device designed to gloss over
Ecuador's inability to persuade OAS members to
pass an anti-US resolution, has prompted a de-
cidedly mixed reaction. Editorial comment has
generally supported the government move, but
several papers have taken a cautious line. Military
leaders were taken by complete surprise by the
decision, and a number of officers expressed their
With the furor raised by the tuna boat sei-
zures now subsiding, Velasco's foes are again
focusing on the plebiscite issue. Velasco has pro-
posed a new constitution similar to the 1946
document which he helped draft. The "new" con-
stitution will grant greater authority to the execu-
tive, curtail congressional activities, and place
greater restrictions on personal freedoms. Velas-
co's opponents have complained that there is no
way to oppose the plebiscite or propose new
alternatives. In the past two weeks, both the
Liberal Party and the Conservative Party-the
major opposition groups-have publicly criticized
the President's plan; leaders of both parties have
been jailed. The President's demonstrated intoler-
ance for dissent has held active political opposi-
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HAITI: The press on 10 February reported that
2,391,916 votes were cast in the referendum on
31 January that ratified the choice of Jean-Claude
Duvalier as the successor to his father. The Cen-
tral Election Committee announcement did not
state that all the votes were affirmative. It noted
that one "no" vote and two blank ballots were
cast, something of a feat since available informa-
tion indicates that only preprinted affirmative
ballots were available at the polling booths.
In early February rumors circulated that
Duvalier would soon turn power over to Jean-
Claude and would go abroad for medical treat-
ment.
On 10 February,
however, Luc ner am ronne, one of Duvalier's
closest confidants, told the US ambassador that
Duvalier will remain in office as long as his health
permits, possibly "for another ten years." On 5
February, National Security Volunteers (VSN) in
the Artibonite region appeared to be mobilizing.
Duvalier has brought VSN contingents to Port-
au-Prince on other occasions when an important
event was to take place.
The conflicting rumors defy reconciliation
or evaluation. In the past, Duvalier has used his
poor health to further his plans, pretending to be
sicker than he was to confuse the opposition and
bewilder observers as to his intentions and capa-
bilities. At any rate, his state of health does not
appear thus far to have interfered with the execu-
tion of his plan to arrange the succession. F__
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Hanoi's Other Struggle: Building Up The Home Front
Secret
N2 43
12 February 1971
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SECKL'l' Now
Hanoi is seeking to gain greater support from the home front-the
"great rear"-for the battle in the South. Its efforts to improve the perform-
ance of the North Vietnamese people and economy, already hampered by
problems of inefficiency at home and complicated by the death of Ho Chi
Minh in September 1969, were challenged anew by events in Cambodia in
1970. These developments forced Hanoi's leaders to divert more of their
country's manpower, as well as more of their own energy, away from
domestic problems and back to the war, but this has not meant that the
North Vietnamese are neglecting the home front. Their approach has been
strikingly pragmatic and uncoercive; efficiency, improvement in managerial
techniques, and even material incentives are being emphasized, even though
party control remains a basic feature of North Vietnamese society.
Hanoi has taken this pragmatic course primarily because of the require-
ments of the war and the overriding need to get as much as possible out of
the North Vietnamese populace over the long haul. Indeed, most of what
Hanoi has been doing on the home front seems to be aimed at putting the
regime in a position to support the war effort throughout Indochina for the
foreseeable future.
Although Hanoi is still able to provide essential support for the war, its
current policies have not conspicuously improved the North's performance.
Nevertheless, the regime probably will continue to rock along much as it is
doing now, mainly because shifting from the carrot to the stick would
undermine popular willingness to undertake the long-term effort Hanoi now
foresees.
Last year, like the two before it, was a hard
one for North Vietnam. In 1968 and 1969, Hanoi
had suffered severe military setbacks in South
Vietnam and had shifted to a lower cost, longer
range war strategy. It had made this shift partly
to devote more attention to rebuilding the North
and improving its performance as the "great rear
area" for the battlefield to the south-a perform-
Special Report - 1 -
ante hampered by continuing problems of morale
and inefficiency. In September 1969, in the midst
of this effort, Ho Chi Minh had died, and his
survivors had been confronted with the added
task of maintaining the regime's cohesion in the
absence of his towering personality. No sooner
had they settled the immediate questions raised
by Ho's passing and begun to dig into their do-
mestic problems, than the spread of the war to
Cambodia provided a new test of their resilience
and flexibility.
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Events in Cambodia compelled the North
Vietnamese to turn more of their attention and
energy to the immediate problems of the war, and
to ante up more manpower than they had
planned. It did not force complete reorientation
of their priorities, however. The evidence so far is
quite convincing that even in the broadened war
Hanoi is still applying the economy-of-force stric-
tures that it began using in South Vietnam after
the offensives of 1968 and early 1969. Concom-
itantly, it is continuing to do its best-still with
decidedly mixed results-to tidy up the situation
at home. To achieve as much as it can in the
North without interfering with its direct war con-
tributions, the Communist leadership has spent
the last year cajoling, prodding, and urging its
people-but not often coercing them-to greater
and more conscientious effort. Its task has been (Communist) Party structure after Ho's death,
more than usually difficult because the populace and indeed Ho's position as chairman remains
seems to have gone a bit slack psychologically in unfilled. There is now hardly any doubt, however,
the years since the bombing stopped.
Hanoi's two long-standing goals-achieving
the "liberation" of South Vietnam and "building
socialism" in the North-remain very closely
interrelated in Communist eyes. The North Viet-
namese take seriously their role as custodians of
the "great rear area," and clearly there is a con-
sensus to keep the North as strong and viable as
possible as the best means for Hanoi to support
and attain its goal of ultimate victory in the war.
Thus the continuing emphasis on programs and
activities at home in no way indicates that Hanoi
is wavering in its support of the war in the South.
The North Vietnamese regime was sobered by the
events of 1970 and now foresees an even longer
struggle than before; it may be concerned over a
drop in the dedication and effectiveness of the
people; but the leadership's determination in the
face of these challenges seems as strong as ever.
Because the North Vietnamese are intensely
secretive with friend and foe alike, little is known
about the workings of the inner circle in Hanoi.
There were no formal changes in the Lao Dong
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that Le Duan, the party's first secretary, is the
leading figure in the collective that has governed
the country since Ho's death. Le Duan lacks Ho's
mystique, and he does not receive nor seem to
seek the hero-worship that he and his colleagues
accorded Ho; but his pre-eminence is visible in
many ways. It was he who wrote by far the most
authoritative document to come out of North
Vietnam since Ho died, a massive article on the
whole range of Vietnamese Communist policy
that was published last February and dissemi-
nated widely in North Vietnam. Moreover, the
regime's domestic policies bear more of a resem-
blance to Le Duan's pragmatic, flexible approach
than to the more dogmatically Marxist views that
are often attributed to National Assembly chief
Truong Chinh, who is presently the second-
ranking man in the party hierarchy.
At the top of the Politburo pecking order
with Le Duan and Truong Chinh are Premier
Pham Van Dong and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen
Giap. It is believed that in the past policy disputes
have divided these leaders-particularly Le Duan
and Truong Chinh-but the salient characteristic
of the Hanoi leadership during the last year has
been its unblemished appearance of unity. The
Communists have an interest in projecting such an
image, of course, but it is something they have
not always been able to achieve in the party.
Historically, Hanoi has given the "democratic"
aspects of "democratic centralism" full play and
from time to time debate has spilled over into
published Vietnamese Communist writings.
Throughout 1970, however, the overt literature
was almost entirely devoid of controversy.
A more concrete sign that there is no un-
manageable friction in the Hanoi collective was
the smoothness of the transition after Ho's death.
In fact, the so-called "new" leadership is simply
the "old" leadership minus Ho. For a few months
there was a period of uncertainty in which Le
Duan was not heard from and Truong Chinh was
particularly prominent. Once Le Duan reap-
peared, however, his authority was unquestioned.
Not only did he face no open challenge, but there
Special Report
has been no sign of a party shake-up that might
have been expected if a serious behind-the-scenes
struggle had taken place.
None of the evidence permits a confident
appraisal of the depth or the durability of this
apparent harmony. Hanoi's leaders must share a
degree of real consensus developed during more
than a generation of working together, but a good
deal of animosity-animosity that could not be
fully ventilated because of the need to present a
united front to Hanoi's enemies-may also have
been stored up over the years. As far as current
policy is concerned the question is somewhat
academic; dissension has been contained in the
past when it was running stronger than it seems to
be running now, and any disputes at present are
almost certainly manageable. But over the longer
term the leadership problem will bear watching,
particularly if current trends in the war continue.
The make-up of the ruling group has remained
essentially the same for decades. Since 1960,
when Truong Chinh was formally replaced by Le
Duan as first secretary, there have not even been
any changes in the ranking. Hanoi's rulers are
only exceptionally durable, not immortal, and
any backlog of dissension may start to surface
when succession questions begin to loom larger.
Strengthening the North: The Problem
of Motivation
Inefficiency at home has been a perennial
problem to North Vietnam. Although this short-
coming has not seemed to impinge seriously on
the prosecution of the war itself-probably be-
cause the sheer magnitude of a war effort tends to
offset most organizational shortcomings-its
existence continues to hamper efforts to improve
performance on the home front. To complicate
the regime's problems, since the end of the bomb-
ing the people at all levels seem to have decided
that they could rest on their oars a bit. Worker
productivity, which declined during the bombing,
has not improved significantly since then. Prof-
iteering and other forms of corruption within the
administration have persisted, peasants have
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"1 was born in the days when the co-op reaped
its first five tons of autumn rice per hectare."
neglected their duties in the agricultural coopera-
tives to work their private plots of ground, and
the black market has continued to flourish. To
the regime's intense displeasure, Hanoi even has a
few home-grown hippies.
By early 1970 the leadership had spent two
years trying with no particular success to over-
come these maladies. Along with the standard
propaganda exhortations, and motivation cam-
paign, it introduced some basic changes in
domestic priorities. Development of heavy in-
dustries, for instance, which had received priority
before the bombing, was downgraded in favor of
agriculture and light industry, and the regime
started trying to make more consumer goods
available. Nothing seemed to do much to stimu-
late popular devotion to the cause, however. Then
the safehaven and supply channel that Cambodia
represented disappeared. It soon became apparent
that Hanoi would have to start sending more men
off to war than it had planned and that this drain
would continue longer than it had hoped. More-
over, the prospect of an expanded and even
longer war must have aggravated the morale
problem at home just at the moment when solv-
ing that problem took on new urgency.
Essentially Hanoi's answer to its dilemma
was to intensify the programs it had already in-
troduced. As Le Duan had prescribed in his article
of February 1970, North Vietnam's effectiveness
was to be improved through the widespread use
of technology, through improved administrative
techniques, through decentralization, and even
through the use of incentives. Farmers, for in-
stance, have been guaranteed that for five years or
more the state will take only a certain percentage
of their crops, leaving them free to sell any
surplus to the government or on the open market.
Central direction of the society and economy was
mellowed with pragmatism, and the heavy em-
phasis was on efficiency, not on Marxist ortho-
doxy.
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A good example of the regime's technique is
a campaign still in progress to increase agricultural
production. Articles promoting the campaign
have been full of administrative mea culpas: the
officials who supervise operations on the coopera-
tives have been self-seeking, party cadre have set
poor examples, the system for distributing con-
sumer goods to the peasants is inadequate to
provide incentives for higher production. Almost
totally lacking are condemnations either of the
peasants themselves or of the highly unsocialist
free market into which many agricultural goods
are channeled. In fact, although the government
has called for the eventual elimination of the free
market, it apparently finds the market necessary,
not just to provide incentives for increased agri-
cultural production but as a supplement to offi-
cial channels of distribution.
In dealing with the broader problem of gen-
eral slackness in the populace, Hanoi has followed
a similar line based on friendly persuasion. A
press campaign urging respect for law and order-
covering everything from petty pilfering and dis-
respect for one's elders to major crimes and large-
scale malfeasance-was carried out intermittently
through much of 1970. On the whole, its empha-
sis too was hortatory rather than punitive.
And when legislation finally was written to back
up the exhortations, it was aimed at cleaning up
the system rather than at coercing the individual.
Two decrees, one to protect "socialist property"
and the other to protect "private property," were
issued in late October. The first of these was
aimed at those in and out of government who
divert property belonging to the state (i.e., most
of the goods, real estate, and money in the coun-
try) to their own benefit. The targets of the
second were mainly officials who use their posi-
tions to fleece their fellow citizens. Wrongdoing
under either decree carries stiff penalties, embez-
zlement can be a capital offense, for instance.
The government clearly regards the socialist
property decree as the more important of the
Special Report
two. It has already made highly publicized ex-
amples of several errant officials who were caught
with their hands in the till. The decree on private
property seems by comparison a sop to public
opinion. Nevertheless, the two edicts taken to-
gether-but particularly the open decision by the
regime to defend the sanctity of private prop-
erty-further attest to the unorthodox methods
by which Hanoi is trying to solve the problems it
sees.
The regime's current domestic policies have
struck more than one orthodox observer from
elsewhere in the Communist world as revisionist,
excusable (if at all) only because a nation at war
has special needs. One East German visitor, for
instance, was appalled that so much of the output
of the agricultural cooperatives found its way to
the free market. Some members of the regime
almost certainly share these views. Although no-
body in Hanoi seems to be arguing very hard at
the moment for ideological purity, the long-term
implications of the conflict between orthodoxy
and revisionism still exist and could be important
for the leadership and the party.
North Vietnam's domestic policies have been
pragmatic since Hanoi intensified the war effort
in the 1960s. The bombing that began in earnest
in 1965 administered a particularly heavy blow to
orthodox precepts of centralization and orderly
planning; since then the ambitious five-year plan
has been replaced by a series of one-year plans.
Even after the bombing stopped, however, a prac-
tical outlook on domestic policies persisted. The
present decentralized, uncoercive approach to the
problem of revitalizing the North continues the
trend.
The more orthodox members of Hanoi's
leadership almost certainly are unhappy with the
way things are going. Whether they eventually
make a serious attempt to reverse the direction of
events will depend largely on the extent of their
support in the lower echelons of the party; this
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will depend in turn on the extent to which the
party has absorbed the pragmatic habit of
thought it has been exposed to for so many years.
There is a chance, in other words, that by giving
pragmatism in their domestic policies priority
over ideology, Hanoi's present leaders may be
laying the groundwork for long-lasting and sub-
stantial changes in North Vietnam's basic philos-
ophy.
"Everything for the Front Line"
But for now, Hanoi's outlook is shaped
mainly by the requirements of the war, and its
policies are summed up in the slogan "everything
for the front line." The idea that North Vietnam
must be kept strong, stable, and in a position to
provide the manpower to support the war is
deeply entrenched in these policies, and what
Hanoi is doing to improve the situation on the
home front is aimed mainly at supporting the
longer war the Communists now believe lies
ahead.
In late 1968 and in 1969, when Hanoi
thought it might obtain US concessions that
could lead to a political settlement, there were
some signs that the North Vietnamese were begin-
ning to think about traditional postwar problems
of reconstruction and development. There were
strong suggestions that some of those looking
down this road were pressing for an early return
to economic orthodoxy, for further collectiviza-
tion of agriculture, and for a harsher type of
domestic discipline. Such indications have long
since disappeared, along with any signs that the
Vietnamese Communists anticipate an early end
to the war.
The priority needs of the war are seen
clearly in the accelerated military mobilization
campaign that got under way not long after
Sihanouk was overthrown. It is impossible to
ascertain with any precision the number of North
Vietnamese mobilized. It seems reasonably cer-
tain that more men entered the army last year
than in 1969, but not as many as in 1968, when
Special Report - 6 -
WELCOME SPRING '71
by To Huu
Goethe: Man should act
Lenin: Man should know how to dream
'71 comes, serious, like a soldier
Setting out upon receiving orders, combat-ready,
His face beaming calmly,
Fresh and strong in his green, light uniform,
The Central Committee met, on a chilly day
A home-returned swallow from the opposite window looked this way;
The high command sat-grizzled hair, silky heads;
With Uncle still there, serene, looking down, mildly.
The plan was worked out,
The front shall step up attacks,
The rear shall give all-out support.
The Fatherland, entering spring, calls the paddy fields
Alive with the new five-ton strains
Which stand upright like young lads eager to achieve exploits,
How lovely they are, those plots of barren land,
Those waste hills gnawed by erosion!
At the party's words, they suddenly find themselves rich again.
The sap of youth rises, faces shine,
This land remains green even in winter.
T1te Yanks destroy, we build anew.
We fill up bomb-craters to install blast furnaces,
Our factorie< lean against the walls of deep, solid caves.
We lean on our own hearts, full of pride.
Our great life sees with the party's eyes,
Which, beyond each step now, show us vistas of longer dreams.
This spring Uncle no longer writes poems,
With the Central Committee's call burning hot in its heart,
Our nation as one man is marching, to the firing line.
We shall strike, strike thunder blows
To shatter the hawks' wings, and bash in their heads.
The Fatherland is rallying.
Fearless of a long-drawn fight, we shall grow up fast
To clear the Ho Chi Minh roads so it will illumine all posterity.
Surely Uncle will be glad
As each time we won a success,
He would laud us: "That's good."
Be worthy, O year '71!
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major offensives were under way in South Viet-
nam. Moreover, the call up of men into the regu-
lar army has been accompanied by a drive to
expand and to improve the country's regional and
militia troops-the forces that serve as a home
guard. These steps seem to have returned North
Vietnam rather closely to the conditions of the
bombing years, when much of the population was
organized along military lines to produce, to
guard and maintain supply lines to the south, and
to provide replacements for Communist forces in
South Vietnam.
To drive home the point that "everything
for the front line" is the current theme in Hanoi,
the Communists convened a central committee
meeting, probably in late January, to deliberate
on the demands imposed by the broadened con-
flict. For the past several years these sessions were
not publicized, but this one issued a closing com-
munique and was also discussed in an editorial in
the party daily. As is usual with such documents,
the communique does not say much about the
war, but its treatment of domestic issues leaves no
doubt that Hanoi anticipates a long war and is
going to call on the populace for greater sacri-
Special Report
fices. The editorial makes the same point more
explicitly.
The communique pays lip service to the
longer term, orthodox socialist goals of develop-
ing heavy industry, further collectivizing agricul-
ture, and generally building a more orthodox
Marxist state. But it indicates that real pursuit of
these objectives will be put off, as they have been
in the past, because they are not compatible with
an all-out effort to carry on the war.
Hanoi may be following its present course at
home in part because some of its top leaders are
inclined toward pragmatism and opposed to over-
reliance on rigid ideology. But the requirements
of the war are the main factors in its choice. The
regime does not want to rock its domestic boat
by trying to carry out programs that might
require considerable coercion of the population
just at a time when it is asking for more sacrifices.
Ideological purity simply is a luxury North
Vietnam cannot afford; the most important task
is to create among the people and in the economy
the proper mood and conditions that are nec-
essary to carry on the war.
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