WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 5, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed
5 February 1971
No. 0356/ 71
Copy N2 43
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/05/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
SECRET
Page
FAR EAST
Vietnam: Going All Out for a Long War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Laos: The Communists Up the Ante . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Cambodia: Bringing in the Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Thailand: Riled Over Rice and Rubber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Peking Hardening Enforcement of Birth Control . . . . . . . . . . . 6
OKINAWAN REVERSION: A Difficult Transition
(Published separately as Special Report No. 0356/71A)
EUROPE
Polish Party Prepares Pivotal Plenum . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
8
Pompidou's Trip Reaffirms French Interest in Black Africa .
. . . .
9
European Communities: The Institutional Issue . . . . . .
. . . .
10'
UN Succession Derby Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
11
Italy: Financing Reform Stirs Political Controversy . . . .
. . . .
12
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Egypt: Sadat Sweetens the Pot . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
14
Jordan: The Army's Grip Tightens . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
15
SECRET
Page WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
SECRET rl~
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA (CONTINUED)
Uganda: General Amin Retains Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
India-Nepal: Continued Impasse on Trade and Transit . . . . . . . 17
Zambia: Kaunda Curbs Domestic Discontent . . . . . . . . . 18
Morocco: Student Strikes Continue . . . . . . . . . 18
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Argentine Political Crisis Subsides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Chilean Socialists Choose Hard Line Leadership . . . . . . . . . . 21
Bolivia: Disorganization Increases Within the Left . . . . . . . . . 22
OAS Session Ends on a Discordant Note . . . . . . . . . . 23
Cuba: Dissatisfied Youth Give Castro a Headache . . . . . . . . . 24
NOTES: North Vietnam - USSR; East Germany - West Germany; UK-UN-
China; ILO-US; Egypt; Pakistan; International Oil; Guatemala; Haiti; Cuba
SECRET
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
w ~r,l~1C ~ 1 j
FAR EAST
Vietnam: GoingAll Out for a Long War
A Communist Party central committee meet-
ing ended in Hanoi early this week with a rare
burst of publicity. Meetings of this sort normally
set forth fresh guidelines covering future Viet-
namese Communist policies; this one probably
was convened to deliberate on the demands im-
posed by the broadened conflict in Indochina. A
closing communique-the first such document
since 1964-was issued on 1 February. Its main
thrust is that more is going to be required of the
North Vietnamese populace in the coming
months to meet the needs of the present struggle.
The last known gathering of this kind in
which the whole range of issues facing Hanoi was
aired took place in the spring of 1969. At that
time the party established a new policy of fight-
ing the war on a lower key, so as to preserve its
forces for the long haul. The guidelines for this
policy did not begin to appear in the South until
after the southern Communist command issued
COSVN Resolution Nine in the summer of 1969.
The new central committee meeting probably has
set Hanoi's basic course for the next year or so.
Tactical advice-based as in the past on a secret
resolution covering Communist prospects in the
war-will probably soon be disseminated to party
authorities down the line.
In the open communique, the war itself is
given short shrift. Its treatment of domestic issues
in North Vietnam, however, leaves no doubt that
the Communists see a long war ahead and that
they expect to call on the North Vietnamese for
greater sacrifices than were anticipated just two
years ago. In a way that has been commonplace
for the past year or so, the party once again calls
for better performance on the home front, espe-
cially since Sihanouk's ouster last spring. The
communique makes it clear that the regime in-
tends to persist in pragmatic, relatively non-
coercive domestic policies in which expediency
Page 1
and practicality are the watchwords. Lip service is
paid to the longer term goals of developing heavy
industry, further collectivizing agriculture, and
generally building a more orthodox Marxist state.
But the communique indicates that real pursuit of
these objectives will continue to be put off, as it
was during the bombing years, because they are
not compatible with an all-out effort to carry on
the war.
New Enemy Attacks
In South Vietnam, the Communists began a
new round of offensive action shortly after the
quiet Tet holiday period. The new phase opened
with a spate of shellings and a few ground attacks
centered largely in the northern half of the coun-
try. The airfields at Da Nang, Phu Cat, Nha Trang,
and Cam Ranh were struck by large-caliber
rockets, but casualties and damage were generally
light. During the first two days of increased ac-
tion, more than 135 civilian and military casual-
ties were reported. Some of the heaviest occurred
when the enemy attacked and overran at least
four outposts manned by South Vietnamese ter-
ritorial security forces-a favorite target in the
Communist drive against the government's pacifi-
cation programs. By midweek, the level of action
generally had tapered off.
As expected, enemy-initiated action has
been light in the southern parts of the country
and in the provinces surrounding Saigon. Commu-
nist forces are generally weaker in these areas, and
government security measures have been effective
in minimizing enemy military activities. Many
enemy units are still preparing for action, how-
ever, and they are expected to keep up a higher
level of activity during the next few weeks
Precampaign Maneuvering Continues
The main contenders for next fall's presiden-
tial election are continuing to seek out support
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
SECRET
for their campaigns. Thieu is using his position as
head of the government to good advantage and
has made it clear that he is relying on the entire
government apparatus for his re-election.
The province chiefs are in a better position
to marshal political support, and Thieu is shifting
them around to ensure that loyal followers fill the
crucial posts. A dozen provincial chiefs have al-
ready been shifted to new assignments or re-
moved altogether, primarily to ensure that those
of doubtful loyalty are where they can do the
least harm to Thieu's re-election efforts.
Laos: The Communists Up The Ante
Fighting has flared again in northern Laos.
Communist forces have overrun a small govern-
ment force defending Muong Soui northwest of
the Plaine des Jarres on Route 7. Muong Soui had
been virtually deserted by its civilian inhabitants
for several months and was only lightly garrisoned
by neutralist troops following its recapture by
government irregulars under General Vang Pao
last October. Its fall is probably of more psycho-
logical than strategic importance at this time.
Lacking a ready-made political organization,
Big Minh is still maneuvering for the organized
support of the Buddhists-without which he has
little chance of making a credible challen e.F_
If the Buddhists should de-
cide to withhold their active support, it is un-
likely that Minh will be able to develop an effec-
tive campaign organization that could enerate
broad-based support.
Of greater significance, the royal capital at
Luang Prabang for the first time may be in some
danger as a result of Communist attacks in that
area on 2 February. Several government positions
10 to 15 miles northeast of the capital were taken
and one raid occurred at a village only five miles
from the town.
As the official residence of the King, to
whom even the Pathet Lao have always professed
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
- SECRET -MOPW
LAOS
6 NA
BURMA
Com ub15f ettack w _' y
c+ ` Gverr t' by enemy
Luir*Pra ang
4~ne
i Muori `Soy ,,-de bang Kkiny
,Ban Na~ ay
$ m Thong
_I
Tieng munist
THAILAND Fo g
probe"y 1 IC4~. ---I
NORTH
VIETNAM
Muonta.ti
uPhane
DEMARCATION
LINE
Muo g Nong'
VIETNAM
Goyerrr nt ''
`'~ rrte 99
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
)Tan Rau
'IT r5ai
~1$olovens
~~Plgteav
F occ pted tb
y
t
veh tin
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
SECRET
allegiance, Luang Prabang has long been presumed
to be immune from attack. The King recently
said, however, that this year he believes the North
Vietnamese intend to occupy the capital with
Pathet Lao troops in order to bring about the
political capitulation of the Souvanna Phouma
government. Two weeks ago Souvanna proposed
to the Communists that Luang Prabang be named
as the site for the oft-delayed Lao peace talks
instead of Khang Khay in Communist-held ter-
ritory on the Plaine des Jarres. The Communist
attacks on 2 February could be read in Vientiane
as politically motivated and taken as a vigorous
rebuff of Souvanna's proposal.
Other ground action has been relatively lim-
ited. Communist probes and shelling attacks
south and west of the Plaine have continued, with
most of the contacts reported in the general area
around Ban Na and Sam Thong.
In the panhandle, government troops have
been stalled in their effort to retake Muong
Phalane, overrun by Communist forces last week.
Four battalions of government irregulars are con-
tinuing operations designed to interdict Route 99
south of Muong Nong. They have reported only
limited contact with the enemy-an attack on
their command post that was repelled, and an
ambush of a company of North Vietnamese try-
ing to prevent a mining operation on the road.
A company of irregulars has reoccupied Site
42 on the southeastern rim of the Bolovens Pla-
teau. The Communists are making probing attacks
around Ban Houei Sai on the northern side of the
lateau. I
Cambodia: Bringing in the Oil
Few significant military actions were re-
ported during the week, as the Communists con-
tinued to focus on carrying out harassing attacks
against the government's main lines of communi-
cation. Enemy activity in and near Phnom Penh
subsided somewhat, giving government forces a
chance to try to strengthen the capital's porous
defenses.
In their most telling foray, Communist
troops staged a successful ambush of a truck
convoy attempting to move petroleum supplies
on Route 4 from the refinery at Kompong Som
to Phnom Penh. Ten vehicles were destroyed, and
most of the convoy quickly returned to Kompong
Som. A subsequent convoy of 41 trucks escorted
by two government battalions reportedly reached
Phnom Penh without incident, however.
The pinch on Phnom Penh's fuel stocks was
also eased by the delivery of fresh supplies from
South Vietnam. Diesel fuel for the city's key
power and industrial facilities was airlifted from
Saigon to Phnom Penh, and a riverine convoy also
made it up the Mekong from South Vietnam
despite several harassing attacks en route. It de-
livered some 4,000 metric tons of assorted pe-
troleum products to the capital.
In the meantime, government troops were
making little contact with Communist elements in
the course of their clearing operations around the
city.
The government also took a number of
administrative steps to improve the capital's
SECRET
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
UL' vl\.L:J 1
N"We
defenses, including a reorganization of command
responsibilities, the establishment of new opera-
tional security boundaries, and an augmentation
of informant nets and other intelligence collec-
tion mechanisms. Lon Nol also ordered the con-
struction of a well-fortified dike around the city's
main defensive perimeter. Still, these measures are
not likely to deter or prevent future Communist
harassing attacks and acts of sabotage and terror-
ism.
Although no successful new acts of Commu-
nist terrorism occurred in Phnom Penh this week,
the city's relative tranquility was shattered when
an altercation between South Vietnamese sailors
and Cambodian military police in the port area
erupted into a brief miniwar in which one civilian
was killed and a number of others were wounded.
An official investigation of the incident was or-
dered immediately. Two other clashes between
government and South Vietnamese Army
(ARVN) elements in the Phnom Penh area were
also reported, including one at the South Viet-
namese base at Neak Luong that resulted in one
ARVN soldier dead and several wounded on both
sides.
The incidents have put additional strains on
the always fragile relations between the two coun-
tries. Their timing was particularly unfortunate
since they followed closely on the heels of recent
cordial and productive talks in Saigon between
Lon Nol and President Thieu.
Thailand: Riled Over Rice and Rubber
Bangkok's relations with Washington are go- furor over the proposed sale of PL-480 rice to
ing through another period of stress and strain. Indonesia and South Korea. They argue that
Over the past few weeks, Thai government lead- Washington is dumping rice surpluses in Thai-
ers, legislators, and journalists have been in a land's traditional Asian markets and thus further
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
undermining Bangkok's already hard-pressed eco-
nomic situation.
Foreign Minister Thanat, predictably, has
been in the forefront of those government leaders
who have chastised Washington on the rice issue.
In a recent diplomatic note, the Foreign Ministry
charged the US with responding to Thailand's
"whole-hearted cooperation" in Indochina with
"damaging and unfriendly treatment." Thanat
also accused the US of seeking political gain from
the sales at Bangkok's expense. Thanat and
others, including Prime Minister Thanom, made a
strong presentation concerning this issue to De-
fense Secretary Laird during his recent visit to
Bangkok.
Rice, Thailand's chief foreign exchange
earner, has been a source of considerable friction
between Bangkok and Washington in the past.
About a year ago, for example, Thai leaders were
highly incensed over what they viewed as
American chicanery behind Saigon's decision to
drop well-advanced negotiations for Thai rice and
substitute US PL-480 rice instead.
Washington's plans to resume sales from its
natural rubber stockpile have also touched off a
highly negative Thai reaction. Rubber is Bang-
kok's second most important foreign exchange
earner, and selling from US stockpiles will almost
certainly add more fuel to the fire. The Thai in
the past have relied upon Malaysia to take the
lead in dealing with the US when the natural
rubber market is threatened, but this time they
have taken their case directly to the US ambas-
sador. They have also begun to give the rubber
issue widespread play in the press.
Peking Hardening Enforcement of Birth Control
:::~tthheerehhas been a noticeable in-
crease in government pressure since late 1970 to
promote birth control. The preparatory stage for
birth control, which has lasted almost a decade,
chiefly because of unresolved ambivalence in the
attitude of the leadership, seems to be concluding
and an era of enforcement beginning.
During the past two years, according to the
Chinese press, some 300,000 medical personnel
have been reassigned from the cities to rural areas
and about 400,000 villagers have been trained and
organized into so-called "barefoot doctor" mobile
teams serving even the most remote areas. These
two groups administer a birth control program
under relatively primitive conditions and provide
general medical services. Contraceptive devices
and pills are being manufactured domestically.
Word-of-mouth propaganda has conditioned the
population to expect and to acquiesce in govern-
ment pressure for smaller families.
The regime, apparently uneasy over ideo-
logical implications, has not promoted the birth
control program in public media. The last men-
tion was in late 1969, when Shanghai and a few
other localities were said to have adopted birth
control and eradication of schistosomiasis as
priority public health goals.
since late 1970, at least some localities have been
redefining the ideal family as including two
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
,..r SECRET
instead of the previously tolerated three children.
new-born second
children will be threatened with exclusion from
household registers-presumably cutting them off
from official rations-unless their mothers agree
to sterilization. Hospitals in several cities have
also instituted undefined "new birth control pro-
grams." Most significantly, rural cadres have
begun making proselytizing visits to individual
peasant families and generating neighborhood
pressures to help gain compliance.
In spite of these indications of a hardening
attitude toward enforcement, the birth control
program is not expected to curb population
appreciably over the short run. The pressure of
population on food supply has eased. Concessions
toward the peasants and material inputs for
agriculture have created a reasonable prospect
that food production will be able to keep pace
with population growth. Secondly, the history of
previous campaigns in China suggests that the
pressure for birth control will not be sustained.
Also, the effectiveness of the barefoot doctor
program
lowerin
is likely to be greater in the area of
mortality rates than in lowering birth
rates.
25X1
NORTH VIETNAM-USSR: Although the volume
of seaborne deliveries to North Vietnam last year
(1.9 million tons) was virtually the same as in
1969, the USSR's share of that total rose from
about half in 1969 to two thirds in 1970. De-
liveries from Communist China and Eastern
Europe continued to slump, while the free
world's small share, which had increased sharply
in 1969, declined.
I he USSR replaced China as the chief sup-
plier of foodstuffs, North Vietnam's largest im-
port category, and regained first place from Japan
as the source of fertilizer. Petroleum imports de-
creased slightly last year, with the USSR sup-
plying 98 percent of the total.
The Soviets received very little last year in
return for its larger deliveries. Well over half of
Hanoi's 574,000 tons of seaborne exports went to 25X1
the free world as an earner of much needed
foreign exchange, while the USSR received less
than one percent of the total tonnage.
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
EUROPE
Polish Party Prepares Pivotal Plenum
The leadership has begun earnest prepara-
tions for the much postponed central committee
plenum widely expected before the middle of the
month. The press has zeroed in on the faults of
the old regime and has mounted a campaign to
inform the public about the political, social, and
economic reforms that were briefly outlined by
party leader Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz dur-
ing their visits to the coast last month.
These themes, together with further per-
sonnel changes at the top, will constitute the
agenda of the upcoming party meeting. Repeated
delays in scheduling the plenum indicate the dif-
ficulty the new regime faces in reaching agree-
ment on how to explain the past and deal with
the future.
At the plenum Gierek will seek to elaborate
on the "roughly worked-out vision" of the future
he presented to workers in Gdansk. The changes
he envisaged focused on the genuine application
of the concept of individual and collective respon-
sibility of officials at all levels of the party and
government, as well as an unimpeded flow of
information both ways between the authorities
and the people. He called for increased repre-
sentation of workers in the party, local govern-
ment, the mass organizations, and trade union
organs. Gierek does not intend to revive the con-
troversial "workers councils" of the immediate
post-1956 period, but he promised that workers
would assume their long-neglected right to co-
participation in management through established
bodies.
More fundamentally, Gierek contemplated
measures to divorce the party from the daily and
detailed running of the country, without divesting
it of control functions. He seems to intend to
delegate much routine authority for imple-
menting policy to local governments, the mass
organizations, and the trade unions, which would
then be expected to be responsive and "responsi-
ble" to public opinion. Such proposals could also
be intended to cushion the party leadership from
periodic crises of public confidence such as oc-
curred in December.
In the economic area, the new leadership
will have to show willingness to respond to work-
ers demands by the more efficent use of the
meager resources available. At the same time it
will have to deal in a new way with the same
problems that faced Gomulka, including, the need
to modernize industry, improve management,
production, and planning, and streamline if not
decentralize the cumbersome economic system.
These tasks will be complicated by Gierek's com-
mitment to redraft and reorient the 1971-75 eco-
nomic plan, which must include a new investment
mix that would simultaneously stimulate eco-
nomic development and raise the standard of
living, especially in the critical area of housing.
To achieve all of this, Gierek may be more
willing than Gomulka to make basic changes in
the economic system and to accept some of the
inevitable political consequences. The outline he
sketched in Gdansk, for example, appears to be
modeled on reforms that have already been intro-
duced in Hungary and sanctioned by Moscow.
For their part, the Soviets may be ready to coun-
tenance such changes in Poland as an alternative
to the stagnation and inefficiency that brought on
SECRET
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
SECRET .
Pompidou's Trip Reaffirms French Interest in Black Africa
The French President's visit to five Franco-
phone African countries from 3 to 13 February
publicly reaffirms the continuation of French in-
terest in the area that existed during the De
Gaulle era. Pompidou's travels will take him to
the sub-Saharan countries of West Africa with the
greatest economic and political importance to
France: Mauritania, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Came-
roon, and Gabon. The journey is expected to be
the first of a series of four during which the
French leader will visit all of the former French
colonies in Black Africa except Guinea, which has
not had diplomatic relations with France since
1965.
During the course of his present trip Pompi-
dou will explore general bilateral and multilateral
interests with the five African heads of state, but
his talks are expected to concentrate on French
financial and technical assistance. Economic aid is
one of the principal means by which France main-
tains its presence and influence in Francophone
Africa. Following a decline in aid to Africa over
the past several years, Paris made known last
spring that it hoped to maintain and perhaps even
increase its assistance. In January, Pompidou an-
nounced in a press interview that the 1971 budget
will show an approximate 15 percent increase
over 1970 in aid allocated for Franco-African
cooperation.
I n addition to this significant increase,
Pompidou revealed a new dimension to French
economic assistance-a program of investment
guarantees to encourage private development in
Francophone Africa and Madagascar. Any French
enterprise, whether organized as an individual
proprietorship, partnership, or corporation, may
apply for a guarantee on any new direct invest-
ment operation. Previously existing investments,
or future extensions of such operations, are not
eligible for guarantees under this program, how-
ever.
All of the countries on Pompidou's current
itinerary are expected to give red carpet treat-
ment to the leader on whom they depend for vital
financial and technical assistance. In some places,
however, local elements with grievances might try
to embarrass their governments by creating inci-
dents. The most probable locale for any such
disturbance is Senegal, where in recent weeks
there has been an increase in restiveness among
dissident students and the antigovernment faction
of the labor movement. These elements may pos-
sibly attempt to seize the occasion of Pompidou's
presence to gain sympathetic international atten-
tion. In Libreville, capital of Gabon, a massive
government clean-up campaign in preparation for
the trip has resulted in the demolition of 200 to
500 homes, damaging the friendly atmosphere
that surrounds the visit. Tight security measures
taken by French and African gendarmes, how-
ever, will most likely be sufficient to keep any
potentially dangerous situation under con-
President Pompidou Visits Africa
February 3-13
SECRET
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
SECRET AM%
European Communities: The Institutional Issue
The meeting in Paris early last week between
Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou served
to focus renewed attention on the institutional
problems of the European Communities (EC).
Prior to the meeting and, in part at least, in
anticipation of it, Pompidou used a press confer-
ence to set forth his views on the Communities'
future political development. The French presi-
dent spoke of a future European "Confedera-
tion," which would nevertheless have its own
"government whose decisions were binding on all
states belonging to it." Pompidou suggested that
"in a final phase" the member states might ap-
point ministers with "strictly European func-
tions" as representatives to the Council. These
would "no longer be part of their national govern-
ments."
If Pompidou's concept of a confederation
seemed to move him away from the hard-line
Gaullist position, it was also evident that he is no
convert to instant supra nationalism. Although he
acknowledged a role for "committees"-pre-
sumably a reference to the EC Commission-he
denied that such bodies could take decisions and
enforce them. Moreover, he asserted that the
Council-where decisions would be made-can
only decide on the basis of unanimity-as does, he
recalled, a coalition government that does not
want to risk a breakup. Moreover, he foresaw no
increased powers for the European Parliament
until a "genuine executive power" comes into
being.
The immediate relevance of these concepts
was clearly apparent in Pompidou's subsequent
discussions with Brandt of the Community's pro-
jected economic and monetary union. The Ger-
mans, who are wary lest the present habit of
unanimous voting in the Council make it impos-
sible to develop effective economic policies paral-
lel to monetary integration, want the possibility
of the later introduction of "new institutions" to
be specified as part of the union's first stage.
Although agreeing that monetary and economic
policy measures would have to proceed together
and that the Community would have to have the
necessary powers to run the union effectively,
Pompidou indicated that "pragmatism" would
rule out any attempts to define now the eventual
institutional structures.
Suggestions were made in Paris by both sides
to fuzz over these differences and reports from
Brussels indicate the representatives of the Six
have gone quite far toward a compromise that
might be agreed on at the Council session on 8
February or later. The institutional problem
nevertheless remains, since some of the EC mem-
bers continue to see effective decision-making
machinery necessary before they agree to the
degree of interdependence required by economic
union. On his return from a meeting with
Pompidou last weekend, Italian Prime Minister
Colombo, for example, said that the process of
unification would be difficult without at some
time providing for Community powers and the
appropriate institutions to wield them.
Although compromise is apparently neces-
sary now for continued movement, deferment of
the institutional question may carry its own risks.
The French, rightly or wrongly, expect a go-slow
attitude from the British, and such an attitude
may in fact be encouraged if the French view is
seen to have the upper hand among the Six.
Moreover, the unexpected interest that has de-
veloped in the Six's current experiment in co-
ordinating foreign policies-focused at present on
the Middle East-suggests that the "constitu-
tional" argument of the mid-1970s may find itself
dealing with the kind of institutions required for
a Community whose jurisdictional horizons are
broadening considerably_ beyond the economic
sphere.
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
SECRET
UN Succession Derby Begins
Secretary General Thant's statement re-
cently that he has "no intention whatsoever of
serving beyond the present term" has initiated the
Byzantine maneuvering to determine who will
occupy the office when his term expires on 31
December. The current favorite is the only an-
nounced candidate, Finnish UN delegate Max
Jakobson, but Thant himself may emerge from
the scramble with still another term.
The UN Charter provides that the secretary
general shall be appointed by the General As-
sembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council. Although the Charter does not stipulate
a set term, five years has become customary.
Thant has served longer (10 years) than either of
his predecessors, Trygve Lie of Norway and Dag
Hammarskjold of Sweden, and all three obtained
the position as a result of bargaining and agree-
ment between the superpowers.
Although Thant's disavowal of interest in
retaining the job is somewhat more categorical
and comes much earlier in the year than his
similar remarks in 1966, his statements then did
not prevent him from accepting a draft for his
present term. It is believed that Thant, only 62
years old and in relatively good health, would be
amenable at least to a shorter term if an authentic
draft movement should develop. He reportedly is
not in good graces with the present regime in
Burma, and the only alternative position he ap-
parently has in mind is the chancellorship of the
UN University, a project that remains in limbo
pending further study.
The less developed countries have indicated
strong interest in corning up with their own candi-
date, but the likelihood that he could win with-
out the support of the superpowers is very slim.
All of the plausible Latin American candidates,
including former Chilean President Eduardo Frei,
are believed to be unacceptable to the Communist
states. Among the Africans, only Robert
Gardiner, head of the UN Economic Commission
for Africa, has any real stature in the interna-
tional community. The principal Asian possibility
is C. V. Narasimhan of India. Although stra-
tegically placed as Thant's chief aide, his grating
egotism makes him unacceptable in many quar-
ters.
Jakobson's main rival among the Europeans
is former Austrian Foreign Minister Kurt Wald-
heim. Jakobson has already received some in-
formal, low-key Soviet backing and official
Scandinavian endorsement, although the latter
was conditioned on Thant's confirming his inten-
tion to retire. Two drawbacks attributed to
Jakobson's candidacy-his Jewish ancestry and
problems stemming from his book on Finnish
neutrality-appear surmountable.
Despite the recent contretemps over the har-
assment encountered by the Soviet delegation in
the New York area, the Soviets have continued to
keep in close touch with the US on UN organiza-
tional matters-peacekeeping, fiscal issues, and
procedural reforms in both the Council and the25X1
Assembly. Presumably they will want to arrive at
agreement with the US on who should be secre-
tary general after this ear.
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
SECRET
Italy: Financing Reform Stirs Political Controversy
Controversy over financing of social reforms
now dominates the Italian political scene. The
"white paper" on public finances released Janu-
ary 27 provides a new andexhaustive compilation
of tax and spending data that should be helpful in
reaching concrete proposals that had been de-
layed by the government's preoccupation with its
anti-inflationary bill and uncertainty as to the
actual state of public finances. Failure to resolve
details of the program and its financing could lead
to extensive and disruptive strikes in the spring.
Support for the social reform program has
come from nearly all political sectors, including
the Communist Party. Considerable controversy
has arisen, however, over the financing and timing
of the reforms. The Communists, who in general
are trying to work within the Italian system, feel
that housing and health reforms, along with im-
provement in public transportation, should take
precedence over other expenditures and should be
implemented immediately. They maintain, more-
over, that such programs should not add to cur-
rent government expenditures, but rather replace
unspecified "wasteful" programs. Some Commu-
nists have even stated a willingness to accept
slower economic growth as a cost of immediately
implementing reforms. They would not accept
any curtailment of union powers, however.
In contrast, various members of government
parties espouse a conservative schedule that
would not detract from economic growth and
price stability. They seek labor stability and
resumption of earlier productivity and output
trends as preconditions to reforms; some also
favor an "incomes policy" to combat claims for
wage increases.
In general, the government recognizes the
need for a quick start on the reform program. But
Prime Minister Colombo emphasizes that labor
peace is necessary to bring about economic
growth, without which the reforms would bog
down and economic disequilibrium would result.
Even without large expenditures for new social
programs, the Treasury experiences chronic
deficits largely attributable to support of social
security institutions, local governments, and the
autonomous state agencies.
Labor Minister Donat Cattin dissents. He
ruffled government circles several weeks ago by
claiming that pressures from labor were not the
major cause of the relatively slow economic
growth last year. He charged the disappointing
performance in 1970 to political uncertainties as
well as to the credit squeeze and the government's
economic bill. The Communist Party generally
supports this view. It feels that allotting major
responsibility to labor is a convenient way for the
government to abort its social reform program if
strikes continue this year.
SECRET
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
Iftow, SECRET
EAST GERMANY-WEST GERMANY: East
German government and party chief Walter UI-
bricht and deputy party leader Erich Honecker
delivered the key reports to last week's 15th
party plenum. Both concentrated on economic
subjects and treated foreign policy only in very
general terms. Undoubtedly motivated by Po-
land's recent troubles, they called for the under-
standing and cooperation of the workers in over-
coming the economic problems that plagued the
country in 1970, and after the plenum, some
UK-UN-CHINA: The British, seeking to improve
their relations with mainland China, have told the
US formally that they may drop further support
of the Important Question (IQ) tactic for han-
dling the Chinese representation issue at the UN.
The IQ procedure has provided a margin of safety
for Taiwan and its supporters by requiring a two-
ILO-US: The festering dispute over the orienta-
tion of the International Labor Organization
(ILO) apparently was not resolved at a recent
high-level US-ILO talk in Geneva. ILO Director
General Jenks Was especially distressed that the
US, which objected last year to the appointment
of a Soviet national to a top administrative post,
offered no assurances that its financial contribu-
tion to the ILO would be resumed during 1971.
price cuts were announced. Although they did
not specifically mention the East - West German
negotiations or Berlin, the leaders did not stray
from the current Pankow line of firmly rejecting
any form of special relationship with West Ger-
many. Honecker called for a rebuff of Bonn's
Social Democrats in their "attempts at spiritual
subversion" and Ulbricht characterized West
German Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik as "more
or less concealed strategy aimed at the erosion of
thirds vote to seat Peking. The British added that
they would favor neither new procedural delaying
tactics nor any "two Chinas" proposal. The UK
demarche reflects the widespread belief that the
IQ device cannot be used much longer as a means
to frustrate the admission of mainland
China.
He predicted an "explosive situation" for the US
when the ILO governing body convenes on 15
February. Jenks added that "elements" within
the ILO may now seek to refer the issue to the
International Court of Justice for an opinion on
whether a government can retain membership in
an international organization while declinin to
a basic assessments.
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
SECRET
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
EGYPT: Cairo has decided to observe the cease-
fire for one more month. President Sadat an-
nounced on 4 February his country's willingness
to continue the period of military quiet for one
additional month ending on 7 March. Some spec-
ulation linked Egypt's agreement to the cease-fire
to certain reciprocal moves to be made by Israel,
but it was not clear what, if any, conditions Cairo
would in fact demand. The Egyptians presumably
view an extension not only as providing evidence
of their sincerity in seeking a peaceful solution,
but also see its expiration arriving soon enough to
maintain pressures for substantive movement in
the diplomatic arena. Cairo's decision was
publicized as having been made in response to UN
Secretary General Thant's appeal earlier this week
to "exercise military restraint" during the present
"very difficult and crucial" stage of negotia-
Egypt: Sadat Sweetens the Pot
President Sadat is attempting to broaden his
popular support through limited domestic liberal-
izations and greater attention to social ills.
Egypt's public media have been giving exten-
sive coverage to the government's discussions of
the shortcomings of Cairo's transportation system
and other public services and to its promises to
remedy these ills. There has also been much talk
about reforming the country's antiquated educa-
tion system. These steps follow up a move made
last fall to court favor with Egypt's consumers-
traditional Ramadan price reductions on popular
items such as tea, sugar, and kerosene at that time
were made more generous than usual.
Steps designed to improve the domestic po-
litical climate have also been instituted. The
arbitrary practice of property sequestration,
practiced sporadically under Nasir, has been pub-
licly renounced by the Sadat regime. A judicial
committee is to "liquidate" this process and
future sequestrations are to be carried out only
through proper judicial channels.
Arbitrary restrictions on travel and employ-
ment, which had been placed on some individual
Egyptians for political reasons, are being eased
somewhat in an apparent move to help alleviate
the repressive atmosphere prevalent under Nasir.
The sister of one prominent Egyptian who re-
cently regained his travel rights expressed a senti-
ment probably shared by others when she told
the chief of the US Interests Section in Cairo that
"the death of Nasir wasn't all bad." F
These moves appear to be striking a respon-
sive chord among the people and have dissipated
some of the initial apathy and hostility that met
Sadat's elevation to the presidency. If nothing
more, there is probably a general appreciation for
the increased official concern being voiced about
Egypt's more glaring domestic problems. The
country's ills are manifold, however, and the gov-
ernment, with only limited resources, will be hard
pressed to solve the more complex issues in a
manner satisfactory to all. A rapprochement with
the Muslim Brotherhood will be a particularly
formidable task in view of that organization's
demand for complete political freedom.
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
_"0111 SECRE't --wow
Jordan: The Army's Grip Tightens
The Jordanian Government is slowly tighten-
ing its control over the fedayeen, taking advan-
tage of the success it gained in the January fight-
ing. The commandos are constantly dogged by
the threat of further unequal combat, but feel
constrained to remain passive and defensive in
order to husband their reduced capabilities.
The army has apparently been pressing its
advantage inexorably; it is moving forward gradu-
ally to exploit any undefended strongpoint with-
out attempting to provoke trouble where it can
be avoided. Even this method of rolling up
fedayeen-held territory in northern Jordan has
occasioned clashes, but these have been small and
widely dispersed, attracting little outside at-
tention.
The Higher Arab Follow-up Committee
charged with maintaining the cease-fire appears to
be virtually ignoring these small skirmishes and
has found little to do of late. The deputy chair-
man
announced that as a result the number of
o servers would be reduced from 23 to 10.
The strong position of the government is
illustrated by the issuance of regulations stipulat-
ing the death penalty for illegal possession of
automatic weapons and for the discharge of fire-
arms in a public place. Although automatic
weapons in themselves are not illegal, the new
measure leaves the public security force as the
final arbiter on illegal possession. In this way the
bedouin and the peasantry may retain weapons,
and loyal troops may fire off feux de joie into the
air-as they did on the occasion of the King's
return-without suffering more than a mild
reprimand.
When Premier Wasfi Tal declared last week
that the fedayeen could no longer fight Israel
from within Jordanian territory, the commandos'
outcries were muted. Yasir Arafat, interviewed in
Cairo, responded only that "our situation has
become more difficult, but we have not been
beaten."
When backed into a corner, the commandos
can probably still give a good account of them-
selves. The fedayeen continue to claim that the
army is "out to aet them" despite the cease-fire
agreement.
this may yet happen, but Jordanian interests
are equally well-served by bottling the feclayeen
u in their northern hideout
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
SECRET
Uganda: General Amin Retains Control
Life is slowly returning to normal in Uganda
while General Idi Amin, who seized power on 25
January, moves cautiously to establish his own
government. There was only scattered violence
this week, caused principally by members of the
Baganda tribe-Uganda's largest-as they con-
tinued to exact revenge from those fellow tribes-
men who had cooperated with deposed president
Obote. The army also continued to round up
individual opponents.
The general consolidated his power by sus-
pending most sections of the constitution, dis-
solving parliament, and declaring himself head of
state. On 2 February he appointed a cabinet
mainly of civil servants, but also containing some
politicians who have important tribal backing.
Amin also dismissed all local elected officers in an
apparent attempt to root out Obote supporters
from positions of influence in the hinterlands.
Amin has been concerned with increasing his
popular support and with getting international
recognition. In quick succession he released all
political prisoners who had been detained without
charges, detailed his accusations of corruption
against the Obote regime, and offered to provide
a state funeral for the traditional King of the
Baganda who had been deposed by Obote in 1966
and died abroad last year. In his quest for interna-
tional support, the general has sent representa-
tives to meet with the leaders of Kenya and
Ethiopia and has held meetings with foreign dip-
lomats in Kampala. Amin promised the US charge
quick solutions to all bilateral problems adding
that he would eliminate all Communist influence
from the armed forces and seek military equip-
ment from the US.
Meanwhile, Obote continues without much
real success to seek help from other African lead-
ers. Although his offensive has managed to delay
recognition of Amin, no country has offered to
provide military support.
Although an early restoration of the Obote
regime seems unlikely, Amin has many serious
problems to solve. He will find it particularly
difficult to cope with Uganda's long-standing
tribal jealousies, to stem a general decline of law
and order, and to deal with severe economic
difficulties such as a drop in the prices of agri-
cultural exports, a rising cost of living, and lack of
revenue to finance government expenditure.
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
v OL,l.rJXLII *no
India-Nepal: Continued Impasse on Trade and Transit
Last October, the ten-year-old Indo-Nepalese
trade and transit treaty expired and most observ-
ers expected that a new treaty would soon replace
it. Numerous efforts to reach an accord failed,
however, and a final extension of the treaty ran
out on 31 December. Since then, charges and
countercharges have dropped bilateral relations to
their lowest point in many years. Furthermore,
New Delhi's current preoccupation with national
elections, slated for early March, makes it un-
likely that the treaty impasse will be broken be-
fore then.
Neither side has been willing to concede to
the other's demands on several key issues. India
wants a closer scrutiny over Nepalese imports and
exports, since New Delhi has long been irked by
smuggling across the largely uncontrolled border.
The Indians also want to crack down on Nepal's
practice of undercutting the Indian market with
Nepalese manufactures made from material
bought cheaply from third countries. Nepal is
willing to implement some additional controls,
but refuses to accede to a demand for complete
statistical data, viewing this as an infringement of
its sovereignty. Additionally, the Nepalese are
pressing for a land route across India to East
Pakistan, which they maintain was provided for in
the 1960 treaty. Although the route was not
established because of the Indo-Pakistani hostili-
ties in 1965, Kathmandu insists India is bound by
international custom and agreements to permit
this transit right. Nepal argues, moreover, that
because it is tiny, underdeveloped, and land-
locked, it requires preferential treatment in order
to develop its economy.
Faced with New Delhi's unyielding stance,
Nepal has sought ways of lessening its economic
dependence on India. The Nepalese have not
made any deals yet, however, and probably are
agonizing over the possible consequences of any
attempt to alter the economic status quo along
the Himalayan rim.
Despite this public airing of differences,
trade and transit still continue much as they did
prior to 31 December, although New Delhi is
restricting certain imports and exports. Nepal
would prefer a bilateral written understanding at
least to formalize the current situation, however,
but it hesitates to make the request for fear of
losing face if New Delhi declines. The entangle-
ment of political and economic factors has pro-
longed the stalemate, but the advantage offered
to both countries by a restoration of amicable
relations is a strona factor in favor of an eventual
settlement.
PAKISTAN: West Pakistani politician Z. A.
Bhutto is disappointed by the lack of progress in
his talks with East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rah-
man late last month, but he still plans to try to
resolve their differences. The two leaders met in
an attempt to reach agreement on Pakistan's con-
stitution that will be drafted by a National As-
sembly in which Mujib's followers have an abso-
lute majority.
The major issue in their talks was Mujib's
six-point program for nearly total provincial
autonomy; Bhutto accepted only two points. The
two leaders were farthest apart on Mujib's some-
what vague plans for -Financing the central
government that would leave all taxing power
with the provinces. Nevertheless, Mujib did indi-
cate possible flexibility on some points, and
Bhutto hopes that Mujib's desire to end military
rule and his interest in becoming prime minister
of a united Pakistan will make agreement on a
constitution possible.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
SECRET
Zambia: Kaunda Curbs Domestic Discontent
President Kenneth Kaunda once again has
taken the steam out of domestic discontent. He
will, however, have to continue to keep control
over competing factions in his ruling United Na-
tional Independence Party (UNIP) if Zambia is to
remain politically stable.
Government policies had come under unex-
pectedly widespread criticism from UNIP officials
in mid-January while Kaunda was attending the
Commonwealth Conference. The discontent in
part was induced by the President's increasing
tendency to act arbitrarily, and several party fac-
tions complained that Kaunda had reshuffled the
cabinet and had made important policy decisions
without consulting them.
Kaunda's position as president was never in
jeopardy, but he nonetheless moved quickly on
his return from Singapore to control the dissi-
dence. He asserted that he would concentrate on
the policies that had been criticized, a statement
that apparently reassured most Zambian leaders
that they would be consulted more in the future.
As a result, they soon closed ranks behind him.
This strengthened Kaunda's hand in dealing
with another problem that had once again
cropped up in the party-tribal dissidence. Mem-
bers of an assertive Bemba faction had resurrected
charges of party and government discrimination
against their tribe and their spokesman, former
vice president Simon Kapwepwe. Perhaps in rec-
ognition of Kaunda's strength, however,
Kapwepwe has dissociated himself publicly from
inflammatory statements made by other Bembas
and has called for all tribes to unite against "im-
perialist intrigues against Africa." With
Kapwepwe in line, Kaunda then suspended the
most important Bemba dissident from the cabinet
pending a judicial inquiry into the charges of
tribal bias.
Although Kaunda has successfully contained
the latest unrest, he must tread carefully in the
future. He has centralized government powers
considerably in the last year and a half, and he
will have to avoid the temptation to rule auto-
cratically. Such a change would only again raise
the hackles of party subordinates and could cost
him important political support. Moreover,
Kaunda must still contend with the perennial
problem of dealing with the Kapwepwe faction
without losing the popular support of the Bemba
tribe, which remains a major source of govern-
ment strength.
Morocco: Student Strikes Continue
Despite the stern security measures and pun-
itive action taken against strike leaders, the gov-
ernment has been unable to suppress student
strikes.
The present phase of perennial activism
among students began in the secondary schools of
Rabat and Casablanca on 11 December and
prompted the early closing of schools for the
year-end vacation. The major issue was the de-
mand that authorities rescind a requirement that
technical school students take an additional year
of schooling before they get their diplomas and
qualify for advanced education. The students also
protested the very limited opportunities for uni-
versity training.
When classes resumed on 4 January, the boy-
cott continued and spread to most major cities,
despite the threat that any student who had not
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
or-k-AlU", 1 ~,
returned to class by 7 January would be expelled.
Most secondary schools remained open this week,
but classes were sparsely attended. Security forces
are in evidence near most schools
Meanwhile, a solidarity strike at Mohammed
V University in Rabat continues, rendering the
university largely inoperative.
decisive handling of the situation.
simism and uneasiness over the government's in-
As the strike drags on, there is growing pes-
INTERNATIONAL OIL: After three weeks of
talks with oil companies ended without agree-
ment, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), at a ministerial meeting in
Tehran on 3-4 February, decided that the six
Persian Gulf members would take legislative ac-
tion on 15 February to achieve increased oil rev-
enues. All OPEC members, with the exception of
Indonesia, have agreed to withhold oil from any
company that does not comply with these meas-
ures. Although the Shah of Iran left the door
open for further negotiations up to 15 February,
the oil companies probably will opt for a "legis-
lated" settlement, hoping that this would ease the
problem of passing on any increased costs to the
consumers.
At the meeting, OPEC stipulated that Libya
and Algeria could introduce legislation at their
convenience, but offered to support them only on
the basis of the minimum terms established by
the Persian Gulf countries plus a "reasonable"
transport differential. Even so, Libya may use
denial of oil as part of its technique for securing
demands that go considerably be and those of
the original OPEC resolution.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Argentine Political Crisis Subsides
The differences between President Leving-
ston and army commander General Lanusse and
the two other service chiefs appear to have been
at least temporarily resolved. The chiefs of the
three services who make up the military junta
that named Levingston president objected as
much to Levingston's failure to coordinate his
actions with them as to any specific policy, and
Levingston apparently has agreed to work more
closely with the junta in the future.
The President had announced in Decem-
ber-apparently without consulting the junta-
that he planned for the nation to return to
elected civilian government no sooner than 1975.
This was followed in early January by govern-
ment-decreed price raises on basic commodities,
utilities, and transportation. These increases, com-
ing all at one time, provoked a public outcry.
At the same time, labor problems were com-
ing to the fore. A US-owned meat-packing com-
pany closed down, throwing some 13,000 out of
work. A strike in Cordoba over the firing of some
workers threatened to get out of hand, and labor
served notice that it would press for wage in-
creases far above the 20 to 40 percent the govern-
ment thought would come out of its newly de-
clared policy of free bargaining.
Levingston, who has never had a power base
of his own, then apparently decided to seize on
nationalism as an issue to garner some popular
support and to help divert public attention from
the problems created in part by his government's
policies. Wide publicity was given to the remarks
of the well-known nationalist politician, Oscar
Alende, after he had a three-hour meeting with
the President. Alende charged that "foreign
monopolies" were seeking to control Argentina
and were attempting to divide the military and
bring about the overthrow of the Levingston
government.
Alende's charges, coming as they did from
the presidential offices and apparently linking
Lanusse and his colleagues to these "foreign
monopolies," made a clash of some sort between
Levin stop and the junta inevitable.
The heralded "clash" came on 31 January in
a long, but not too unpleasant, meeting between
the President and the three service chiefs. No
significant reversals of government policy are yet
noticeable, but Levingston did disclaim some of
Alende's more extreme charges and apparently
agreed to coordinate future government moves
with the junta. The President apparently received,
however, general agreement on his developmen-
talist economic policies and approval of his more
nationalistic line, albeit in a somewhat milder
form.
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
SECRET
Thus, the expected clarification of the fu- and the growing inflation will continue to
ture direction of the Argentine Government never smoulder, and further challenges to the govern-
came and there is still no clear plan for dealing ment will undoubtedly come from labor leaders
with the country's increasingly serious political who believe that the military-directed overnment
and economic problems. Public dissatisfaction has been serious) weakened.
with the government's handling of the economy
Chilean Socialists Choose Hard Line Leadership
The extreme leftist faction of President
Allende's Socialist Party (PS), which is headed by
Senator Carlos Altamirano, gained complete con-
trol of the party leadership this week. With Al-
lende's backing, a new central committee com-
posed entirely of hard liners was elected by the
party congress; Altamirano was chosen secretary
general. Three cabinet members, including the
top-ranking ministers of interior and foreign af-
fairs, are also aligned with the Altamirano group.
The nationalistic, Marxist PS has frequently split
over such power grabs, but the disgruntled
backers of defeated Secretary General Aniceto
Rodriguez are unlikely to quit the party now
because they would lose access to government
jobs and really have nowhere else to go. Rod-
riguez' political clout has declined steadily since
he retreated from party activity in pique over not
receiving a cabinet post.
Allende, who is not closely identified with
either faction, probably supported Altamirano
because it was realistic politically. He recognizes
that the hard liners have growing strength and
appeal and wants to keep them responsive to his
influence-particularly since Altamirano had
threatened to bolt the party if he lost. Moreover,
the opposition parties believe that Allende wants
to strengthen the Socialists within his government
so that they can act as a counterbalance to the
forceful pro-Moscow Communist Party (PCCh).
Although the PS and the PCCh have cooperated
effectively on political matters for a long time,
their relationship has been marked by bitter rival-
ries. The electoral victory of the Popular Unity
coalition, which they dominate, and the control
of the government they now enjoy, has not erased
this rivalry.
The PCCh made no secret of its preference
for Rodriguez and his "courthouse regulars."
Communist leaders distrust the hard line Social-
ists and their proteges in the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR), who espouse armed
revolution as the only sure way to ensure the
radical changes they consider essential in Chile.
Perhaps impressed by the extremists' sweeping
take-over of the PS leadership, however, PCCh
Secretary General Luis Corvalan publicly assumed
a militant attitude at the congress. He reiterated
his recent warnings that the socializing process
under way in Chile is not yet irreversible, and that
the Marxists must see that it becomes so.F_
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
SECRET
Bolivia: Disorganization Increases Within the Left
The left is becoming increasingly disorgan-
ized in its attempts to put pressure on President
Torres' government. This disorganization, which
is becoming more public, has resulted from in-
ternal disagreement over whether to influence the
government from within or to become an outside
pressure group. The lack of unity is permitting
Torres to accede to some leftist demands while
paying lip service to others, and, in general, to
maintain his government more or less independ-
ent of the more extremist positions.
The most publicized confusion surrounds
the attempts of former cabinet minister Quiroga
to form a new leftist political party. For several
weeks the press carried items announcing the im-
minent birth of the Bolivian Socialist Party (PSB).
It reportedly was being organized by leftist ex-
tremist Quiroga and would include politicians,
labor leaders, journalists and other vocal leftist
spokesmen.
On 27 January Quiroga announced that his
party would be called the National Leftist Revo-
lutionary Union and that it would have nothing
to do with the PSB. He did not specify whether
his group would be pro or antigovernment. Other
leftist leaders immediately dissociated from the
PSB, but they did not announce whether they
were joining Quiroga's group, nor did they specify
their position toward the government. The major
element of the PSB that has not yet defected is a
labor group called FARO, which is willing to
work with the government.
The leftists are also having problems trying
to establish an appointed popular assembly,
which they expect will have some of the powers
of a national legislature. Although Torres has gen-
erally approved the idea of such a body, he has
not been specific in describing its membership or
powers. An informal leftist political command, in
attempting to establish these criteria, is consider-
ing a body of over 200 members that would
include representatives of labor, students, the
middle class, peasants, and leftist and Communist
political parties. The political command says that
the popular assembly would comment on and
make decisions on national and international
problems, look out for popular and national inter-
ests, and control the measures that the govern-
ment dictates.
In addition, several of the groups that have
been publicly identified as probable components
of the popular assembly are at odds over the role
it should la
SECRET
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
OAS Session Ends on a Discordant Note
The third special session of the General As-
sembly of the Organization of American States
approved a limited convention on terrorism by a
slim majority this week, but the walkout of six
delegations seriously marred the proceedings. The
public quarrels over the terrorism issue and Ecua-
dor's harangue over its fisheries dispute with the
US further damaged OAS prestige in the hem-
isphere.
The 23-member organization approved the
new treaty by a vote of 13 to 1 (Chile); there
were two abstentions (Peru and Bolivia). It
obliges signatories to cooperate in the punishment
and extradition of terrorists, treating their actions
as common crimes rather than political acts, but
is applicable only in cases involving foreign of-
ficials. Opposition to the treaty was led by Brazil,
which argued strongly for a document that would
deal with all aspects of terrorism and not confine
itself to kidnapings of the "diplomatic elite."
When Brazil's views failed to carry, its delegation
withdrew from the meeting. Joining in the un-
precedented mass boycott were Ecuador, Argen-
tina, Paraguay, Guatemala, and Haiti. Ecuador
withdrew largely out of pique at the US over the
"tuna war" issue rather than because of any sub-
stantive problems with the terrorism draft.
Ecuador's call for a Meeting of Foreign Min-
isters during the session to consider its charges of
economic coercion against the US accomplished
little except to impede efforts to reach a consen-
sus on the terrorism issue. Quito's affirmative
vote for the resolution that called upon both
states not to aggravate the situation should end
formal OAS consideration of that matter. The
foreign ministers' meeting remains officially in
recess, however, and the fisheries dispute could be
reopened at any time.
The public quarrels that surfaced at the
meeting will heighten Latin disenchantment with
the OAS as an effective tool for joint political
action in the hemisphere. Last week an influential
Brazilian newspaper, which sometimes floats arti-
cles inspired by the government, commented that
the OAS has "practically ceased to exist" and
that Brazil should "officially consecrate its col-
lapse." With such divisive issues as whether the
sanctions against Cuba should be reconsidered
still to be taken up the OAS is likely to undergo
GUATEMALA: The government's anti-in-
surgency campaign has apparently put the terror-
ists on the defensive.
The government imposed a state of siege on
13 November in the wake of growing leftist vio-
lence and mounting political pressure on the
Arana government to adopt a tough law-and-order
stance. Since then, the initiative has shifted to the
government side and there has been a general
improvement in the security situation although a
low level of violence has persisted. Leftist politi-
cians, however, are nervous about what they con-
sider to be government-inspired violence and
counterterror, and in the long run there is the
potential fora polarization of the society. F
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
SECRET
Cuba: Dissatisfied Youth Give Castro a Headache
The Cuban Government is again trying to
tackle the recurring problem of how to control
the country's rambunctious youth. The young
people, who have gained the most from the revo-
lution, are openly questioning the government's
ability to satisfy the basic needs of the people and
are even challenging Castro's policies. This has
caused Castro to reshape, from the ground up, the
mass organizations designed to translate youth
activities into support for the administration. The
students and other young people, however, are
not likely to respond favorably to the govern-
ment's measures despite Castro's sugar-coated
"democratization" of the organizations. The re-
gime has now become the "establishment," and it
will take more than a few institutional changes to
recapture the imagination of the young people
and guarantee their loyal support.
The signs of youthful discontent are numer-
ous. It has long been Castro's practice, for ex-
ample, to visit with students for spontaneous dis-
cussions on ideological, economic, or administra-
tive problems facing the country. In the past year
or so, however, these meetings have been marked
by increasing dissatisfaction and animosity. On
one occasion late last October, Castro clashed
verbally with dissident students at the University
of Oriente in Santiago de Cuba. The students
complained bitterly of overwork, of the lack of
food and clothing, that funds were being wasted
on Castro's "pet" economic schemes, and that
certain regime officials enjoyed special privileges.
A month later, both Fidel and Raul Castro
publicly criticized the estimated 300,000 to
400,000 children between 6 and 16 who have
dropped out of school and who are consumers
but not producers. Fidel hinted that trade schools
run on strict discipline might be set up for drop-
outs to ensure that they would contribute to
productivity. Last week, with the current sugar
harvest already behind schedule, the Cuban Com-
munist Party (PCC) released a statement describ-
ing as "laughable" the productivity of the high
school and university students cutting cane in
Oriente Province. Statistics showed that on a
daily basis some students were cutting less than
half the amount of cane expected of nonpro-
fessional canecutters. At the same time, the
armed forces magazine carried an article by the
president of the Young Communists League
(UJC-the PCC's youth arm) denouncing young
men who wear long hair. Similar press attacks
have been made in the past on "hippies," boys in
tight pants, and other forms of youthful noncon-
formity.
The government has adopted a multifaceted
approach to the youth problem. The University
Students Federation (FEU) has been split off
from the UJC, thereby satisfying one of the
demands made by the students in Oriente in
October. Branches of the new FEU are now being
established at the four university centers. The
organization at the national level, to be called the
Cuban FEU, will be formed in April. The Pio-
neers, the UJC's organization for children under
12, is also being reconstituted as an independent
entity, and a new body, the Federation of Sec-
ondary School Students, is being set up for high
school students. The UJC, which found itself un-
equal to the task of controlling the various youth
groups, is also in the process of reorganization.
For those young people who reject the stu-
dent life, the government has founded the Cen-
tennial Youth Column and the Youth Column of
the Sea. The former, formed in 1968 to fill the
agricultural labor shortage in Camaguey Province,
is operated along military lines under the auspices
of the UJC. The latter, organized in 1970 to
handle more stubborn cases, trains young men to
man Cuba's rapidly expanding fishing
fleet.
SECRET
Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Feb 71
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
SECRET
HAITI: Rumors are circulating in Port-au-Prince
that President Duvalier may soon install his son
Jean-Claude as president and then retire or go
abroad for medical treatment. Although it would
be unusual for Duvalier to leave the country for
report that he will go to turope-pu55iuiy
Spain- or treatment or an operation in early Feb-
ruary. On 1 February Jean-Claude reviewed a
parade cif the presidential guard. Duvalier
appear,
These developments reportedly are to take
place shortly after the results of last Sunday's
referendum to confirm Jean-Claude's designation
as the next president are made public on 7 Feb-
ruary. The results of the referendum are a fore-
gone conclusion. Government officials encour-
aged multiple voting, ballots were distributed to
eight-year-old "voters," and vote tallies in some
areas were ready for certification two days before
the referendum took place. If Jean-Claude takes
office under these circumstances and does not
CUBA: The monthly number of refugees seeking
asylum inside the Guantanamo Naval Base has
declined to the lowest point since September
1966. In January only 10 "fence-jumpers" en-
tered the base compared with a monthly average
of 24 last year and 70 in 1969. A total of 394
Cubans entered the base in 1970; 885 sought
asylum the year before and 1,000 during 1968.
The completion by the Castro regime of
three six-foot barbed wire fences and a mine field
The "Royal Family"
immediately demonstrate unsuspected abilities
and does not have adequate support from the
establishment his tenure is nok~ to be
long.
opposite the base perimeter fence was responsible
in part for the decline in the number of fence-
jumpers. Even though the risks are greater than
ever, would-be refugees can be expected to con-
tinue to seek asylum within the base. Some will
walk overland and cross through the new security
barrier; others will swim into the base from the
north, which has been the primate route durin
the past few months.
SECRET
Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Okinawan Reversion: A Difficult Transition
Secret
N! 43
5 February 1971
No. 0356/71A
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/05/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
SECRET
The violent and unexpected rioting at Koza last December spotlighted the difficult
and perhaps stormy period that the US has entered in Okinawa. The ruckus also served
to dispel any euphoria lingering from the November 1969 agreement between Prime
Minister Sato and President Nixon for the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. Emerging from
the burned-out hulks of American vehicles was a bitter realization that during the
transition period leading up to and after reversion in 1972 persistent basic problems will
tax the patience and resources of both the US and Japanese governments--as well as the
Okinawans.
The prospect of reversion has prompted feelings of anxiety and insecurity on
Okinawa, revealing uncertainty among the people over what impact it will have on their
economic situation and political status. At the same time Okinawans are growing
increasingly sensitive to the hazards and inconveniences posed by the US military
presence on the island, in part because of the realization that the political authority of
the US on Okinawa will soon diminish and its military presence will continue only at the
sufferance of their own (the Japanese) government. These factors have combined to
produce a mood of frustration and impatience that will result in continuing friction and
sometimes explosive outbursts.
Lashing Out at the US Military Presence
The violent and unprecedented anti-
American riots at Koza on 20 December, unlike
any previous major anti-US incident on Okinawa,
apparently were completely spontaneous. The dis-
orders, sparked by a minor traffic accident in
which an Okinawan was slightly injured by an
American, were the culmination of resentment
built on a string of similar incidents in recent
months.
Most important of these earlier incidents was
the so-called "Itoman case," in which a US serv-
iceman was acquitted on charges of killing an
Okinawan woman in a hit-and-run accident. The
acquittal verdict was rendered at a US military
court-martial only nine days before the Koza riot.
It brought an immediate outcry from almost all
Okinawan leaders, left and right. The highest offi-
cial of the pro-US Liberal Democratic Party on
Okinawa, Deputy Chief Executive Chinen, accom-
panied by the Ryukyuan Government's (GRI) top
Special Report - 1 -
SECRET
5 February 1971
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
legal expert, immediately visited the US civil
administration to express "shock" at the acquit-
tal. Chinen, with unusual emotion, expressed a
view shared by most Okinawans-that the out-
come of the case "cast serious doubt on US
justice."
Following the Koza riots, Japanese Prime
Minister Sato promptly called on the Okinawans
to avoid any actions that might interfere with the
process of reversion, which he said was "only a
step away." The press then lambasted Sato for
lacking understanding of Okinawan emotions, but
Foreign Minister Aichi, in a statement more re-
sponsive to popular sentiments, urged the US to
reflect on the incidents that led up to this "un-
leashing of emotions."
Local sensibilities were less stirred up over
the injuries done to Okinawans by Americans in
these incidents than they were over the absence
of punishment to the American offenders. Oki-
nawans, in effect, were objecting strongly to the
implication that these crimes were committed
against "second class" human beings. This ele-
ment of racism, the belief by Okinawans that
they are being denied their basic human rights,
has become an explosive element in reaction to
what might be termed relatively minor and innoc-
uous incidents.
Such incidents have prompted sharp de-
mands, particularly from Okinawan leaders, that
criminal jurisdiction in cases involving offenses
committed by US servicemen against Okinawans
be transferred to GRI courts. The US has coun-
tered that as a practical solution this would be
impossible because it could involve congressional
action, which would take longer to arrange than
reversion itself. As a partial compromise, the US
has agreed to permit Japanese or Okinawan law-
yers and judges to sit as "official observers" at
military trials involving Okinawans.
Following on the heels of the Koza riot, new
disturbances broke out on 10 January protesting
the planned movement of mustard gas through
Special Report
SECRET
several Okinawan villages to a waiting ship, which
was to take the gas to Johnston Island in the
central Pacific for storage. Ironically, Okinawans
had long been demanding that the gas be moved
off their island, and continual delays by the US
military-because of difficulties in finding politi-
cally acceptable alternate storage sites-had
aroused continuing anti-US criticism. The Okina-
wan left, chagrined over its failure to exploit fully
the spontaneous anti-US violence in Koza in De-
cember, seized on the concern over "inadequate"
safety precautions involved in the planned ship-
ment in an effort to create a major incident. It
was partially successful, creating disturbances
which briefly delayed the shipment of the gas.
The shipment, the first of a series that will end in
the complete removal of chemical weapons from
Okinawa before reversion next year, finally took
place on 13 January, but only after Okinawan
Chief Executive Yara agreed to leftist demands
that he make maximum efforts to persuade the
US to ship the rest of the gas via an alternate
route bypassing populated areas. This proposal
would require building a new road, a project that
could take several months.
The controversy over storage of nerve gas on
Okinawa contains racial overtones that fan local
resentment over "US justice." Although many
villagers are genuinely apprehensive over the
nearby presence of highly toxic gas-especially
since leaking nerve gas overcame a number of US
servicemen in a well-publicized incident in July
1969-they seem more irritated by US willingness
to do on Okinawa what is considered unsafe in
the US. The cancellation of plans to store the gas
in one of a number of Western states because of
popular American uproar intensified Okinawan
demands that their fears be treated with equal
consideration.
Lurking behind the Okinawans' emotional
and occasionally contradictory responses to these
problems is a deep-rooted sense of anxiety and
insecurity over their future. Their fears are both
SECRET
5 February 1971
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
...r SJ UKL"l
Aza
art of Naha U,.S. ministration
Special Report
SECRET
OKINAWA
U.S. Military Installations
Air Force Marine Corps Army
0 5 10 15 Miles
5 10 15 Kilometers
PHILIPPINE
51;A
CHINA ~1i1'ti'`( ay
se
L - -
0" "Okinawa
Ftl
(Under U.S. Admin.)
N[WAN
I'I1I LIPp1 ?A Is
PHILIPPINES
5 February 1971
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
political and economic; they reflect a growing
ambivalence toward the long-cherished goal of
reversion to Japanese rule. Most Okinawans prob-
ably still prefer reversion, but they now realize
that it will not solve most of their problems and
will even create new ones.
These mixed feelings are graphically clear in
the contradictory attitude of most Okinawans
toward US military bases. Most think that the US
could and should cut back on its massive hold-
ings. Nearly 150 installations occupy over 70,000
acres of land, including a substantial amount in
the valuable and heavily populated flatlands of
southern Okinawa. Employed on these bases,
however, are a very large number of Okinawans
who vigorously oppose base consolidation when it
directly affects their jobs, even though many of
them have been in the forefront of earlier anti-
base demonstrations. Indeed, any substantial cut-
back in the US presence will adversely affect the
economic well-being of virtually all Okinawans.
Many Okinawan businessmen have actively cam-
paigned in favor of maintaining the US base pres-
ence as closely as possible to present levels. Some
have even hired professional thugs to beat up
leftists who have been demonstrating against the
US military during the last year or two, in an
effort to discourage their "business-disrupting"
activities. Bitter clashes between these groups
have occurred during numerous "general strikes"
called by Zengunro, the base workers union, to
protest layoffs. The over-all impact of the actions
taken by rightist-inclined businessmen has been
limited, however.
Most Okinawans, regardless of their political
bent, are quite concerned that Japan will not fill
the gap left by a gradual reduction in the US
military presence following reversion. The US mil-
itary presence accounts for about half of Oki-
nawa's national income, and Japanese efforts thus
far to plan for post-reversion economic develop-
ment have not generated much optimism on Oki-
nawa. The GRI in the last year has intensified
efforts to attract foreign investment, but Japan
has been hesitant, requesting that all applications
Special Report
SECRET
for investment be submitted to Tokyo before any
action by the GRI. Japanese industry has shown
no great enthusiasm for going into Okinawa, and
the GRI has had to resort to various unconven-
tional techniques to stimulate interest. In one
case, for example, the GRI announced it had
decided to consider an application by the Alumi-
num Company of America (Alcoa) to invest in
Okinawa, apparently only to shock the otherwise
uninterested Japanese aluminum companies into
considering investment in Okinawa. The Japanese
companies, of course, do not wish to see an
American company get a foothold in what is
about to become a prefecture of Japan. The Japa-
nese Government takes a similar attitude, particu-
larly toward those companies that entered after
the announcement of reversion plans.
Reductions in the number of local employ-
ees on US bases has also contributed to the eco-
nomic insecurity felt by the Okinawans. These
cutbacks have prompted regular strikes by
Zengunro, and US military authorities fear that
further layoffs planned for the next few years,
particularly those in the immediate future, could
set off serious trouble. The past strikes drew only
erratic popular support, but in view of rising
tensions, US officials now think that future shut-
downs could be more disruptive.
The Zengunro leadership has decided to call
a series of strikes beginning in mid-February, the
first of which will last for 48 hours. The leaders
rebuked radical leftist demands that there be a
"total shutdown" of the bases, preventing US 25X1
military personnel from entering. A compromise
was reached, however, which provided that all
Okinawan base workers be "shut out."
Okinawans are also concerned about their
political status following reversion. The island will
then be just another prefecture of Japan
5 February 1971
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
Part of the problem centers on the Okina-
wan chief executive, Yara Chobyo, who repre-
sents the "reformist" (i.e., leftist) coalition. The
Okinawan affiliate of
Prime Minister Sato's
ruling conservative
party controls a major-
ity in the legislature,
but had to settle for
the relatively unimpor-
tant post of deputy
chief executive. Yara is
continually caught be-
tween the unsympa-
thetic pressures ema-
nating on the one hand
from Tokyo and US
civil and military au- Squeezed from both sides.
thorities, and on the
other from the more radical leftist elements of
the coalition that put him in office. In the furor
over removal of chemical weapons, for example,
Yara was condemned by the Japanese Govern-
ment for not standing up to the leftists, who in
turn berated him for yielding to American pres-
sures to sanction the removal plans. Yara, of
course, is aware that Tokyo is not likely to do
much to strengthen his position. His occasional
trips to Tokyo to plead one cause or another
normally elicit only minimal cooperation from
the government.
Okinawa has just acquired another voice in
Tokyo-seven nonvoting Diet representatives-but
their impact, at least until reversion, will be very
slight. Four of the seven are affiliated with oppo-
sition parties. The Japanese press, moreover,
Special Report
SECRET
interpreted the election as a slap at Tokyo's Oki-
nawan reversion policy, especially the continued
large US military presence there. The winners, in
fact, seem to have been elected because of their
personal appeal rather than their ideological ori-
entation. Because they have no voting privileges
until after reversion, the Okinawan representa-
tives must content themselves with exercising
their powers of verbal persuasion.
The ambivalent attitude of Okinawa-
toward reversion is heightened by lingering suspi-
cions and animosities from their World War II
experiences with the Japanese military. Many
islanders are no more eager to have Japanese
soldiers stationed on the island than to have US
soldiers there. They fear that many US military
facilities will not be removed as US troops with-
draw, but instead will be turned over to the
Japanese military.
Within six months after reversion Tokyo
plans to have a 3,200-man garrison on the island
(compared with about 45,500 US troops). Re-
sponding to leftist charges that this was a new
version of "Japanese imperialist oppression,"
Japanese defense chief Nakasone emphasized the
military's natural role in defending Japanese terri-
tory and pledged every effort to avoid "inconven-
iences" to the public. Nevertheless, according to a
former police chief of the GRI, Japanese troops
are likely to meet with greater hostility than
American soldiers because in the case of the lat-
ter, who are "aliens," Okinawan custom dictates a
more restrained attitude.
Negotiating Difficulties
In view of the growing frictions between
Okinawans and US military authorities and for
domestic political purposes, the Japanese would
like to speed up the reversion process. Tokyo
wanted to complete the negotiations before the
Upper House elections in June, but very recently
hinted strongly that it would now like to wrap up
the negotiations before nationwide local elections
in April.
5 February 1971
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
SECRET
To meet this timetable, however, the Japa-
nese will have to get down to some serious bar-
gaining. A number of thorny issues remain to be
resolved. These include economic and financial
arrangements for reversion, guarantees for US
business interests, and the status of the Voice of
America facilities. The last two issues are proving
particularly difficult. The Japanese, who normally
maintain highly restrictive policies on foreign in-
vestment, are dismayed at the prospect of Oki-
nawa's becoming a Japanese prefecture with
many major American corporations already well
established there. A special headache is those
businesses that rushed into Okinawa once rever-
sion was scheduled hoping that this would pro-
vide an eventual avenue into the Japanese market.
In many ways the period leading up to and
following Okinawa's return to Japanese control
will bring increased rather than reduced problems
for US authorities. Okinawans are going to be
more and more unwilling to accept US authority,
which they know will be assumed by Japan next
year. The failure of the US to meet Okinawan
demands for such things as the immediate re-
moval of all chemical weapons or the transfer of
criminal jurisdiction to GRI courts will exacer-
bate tensions further. What formerly would have
been minor unnoticed incidents could henceforth
spark disorders similar to those in Koza in Decem-
ber. Symptomatic of this tendency is the recent
reaction of Okinawans to minor traffic accidents
involving American drivers. Hostile and menacing
crowds frequently surround the car and driver,
temporarily preventing US or GRI police from
reaching the scene. Indeed, the reliability of the
GRI police, many of whom are sympathetic to
Special Report
local grievances, will become more of a problem.
I n the past, US authorities have endeavored to use
the police as a "buffer" in order to avoid the
inherent dangers of direct contact between angry
local inhabitants and US military police. The US
authorities are seeking a reversal of a recent order
to lay off nearly all Ryukyuan security guards
around US military facilities-a move that would
require US Marines to take over that defense
responsibility and increase the possibility of a
direct confrontation with any Okinawan demon-
strators. The US authorities in fact prefer an
expansion of this guard force, since it could react
much faster than the GRI police and would be
under US command and control.
The recent incidents will probably force the
GRI to take a tougher stand on a variety of
reversion and base-related issues than would
otherwise have been the case. Chief Executive
Yara will be in a particularly difficult position,
caught as he is between conflicting pressure from
US authorities and radical members of the re-
formist coalition. The Japanese Government will
have to pay more homage to Okinawan grievances
in negotiating the terms of reversion, particularly
regarding the size and location of US military
facilities. Japanese negotiators, for example, prob-
ably will intensify their efforts to relocate facili-
ties away from the heavily populated Naha area.
Opposition parties in Japan, which need appealing
issues, undoubtedly will seek to exploit any inci-
dent on Okinawa to embarrass the Sato govern-
ment, thus possibly forcing Tokyo to take more
extreme positions vis-a-vis the US.
In short, the problems inherent in this transi-
tion period will not necessarily be solved by rever-
sion. The large US base presence inevitably will
cause frictions, even though such difficulties as
the dispute over criminal jurisdiction will be clari-
fied when Japan assumes administrative authority
and normal Status-of-Forces arrangements take
effect. The US probably will be under greater
pressure to consolidate its base presence after
reversion, and mainland political parties will iden-
tify more closely with Okinawan grievances.
-6- 5 February 1971
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
Dislocation of the local economy caused by the natural distaste for alien rule, the basic political
altered US presence will be an increasing problem. and economic problems created by the shift in
Thus, although reversion will remove or amelio-
rate certain sources of trouble, particularly the
Special Report
SECRET
5 February 1971
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
Secret
-me
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/05/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5
Next 15 Page(s) In Do
cument Denied
Approved For Release 2008/05/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08500050001-5