WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008500040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A008500040001-6
` e, Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
29 January 1971
No. 0355/71
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(Information as of noon EST, 28 January 1971)
Pages
FAR EAST
Laos: The Tempo Quickens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Vietnam: A Matter of Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cambodia: The War at Phnom Penh's Door . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Thailand: Army Restiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
EUROPE
Poland: Gierek Gains Time with Worker-to-Worker Approach . . . . . 5
Yugoslavia Devalues Its Currency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Soviets Look to Future in Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
French Arms Sales Rose Sharply in 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Arabs and Israelis Prepare for End of Cease-fire . . . . . . . . . . 10
Middle East: The Deadline Draws Near . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Palestinian Intellectuals Stirring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA (CONTINUED)
International Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 13
Uganda: General Amin Takes Over . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 14
Senegal: Antiregime Activity on the Increase . . . . . . . . . .
. 15
Guatemala: Stirrings in the Opposition Camp . . . . . . . . . .
. 16
Cuba: Ideological Backtracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 17
Costa Rica: Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 18
Ecuador's "Tuna War" Shifts to the Diplomatic Front . . . . . .
. 19
Colombia-Venezuela: Relations Worsening . . . . . . . . . . .
. 21
Uruguay: New Efforts to Fight Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . .
. 22
Chile: Agrarian Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 22
NOTES: Austria; ICJ - South Africa;
rab
States; Lebanon; Kuwait; Guinea; Haiti
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FAR EAST
Laos: The Tempo Quickens
Military action has picked up in southern
Laos. The long-expected Communist attack on
Muong Phalane in the central panhandle has dis-
persed the battalion of government defenders sta-
tioned there. The battalion withdrew under heavy
rocket attack, and other government units in the
area are apprehensive that they will be hit soon.
Although the loss of Muong Phalane is not criti-
cal, the setback moves the Communist area of
dominance another notch to the west. Govern-
ment forces, however, are planning a drive to
recapture the town.
Farther east in the panhandle, government
irregulars operating against the new bypass road
south of Muong Nong report increasin contact
with enemy forces
Four government bat-
tali lions are now aligned along the road from about
seven to 12 miles south of Muong Nong.
In the Bolovens Plateau region, an enemy
force on 24 January routed government irregulars
from a small base at Site 23 on the southern rim
of the plateau. Other action in the area has con-
sisted largely of probing attacks and small unit
clashes.
Military activity in the north has been lim-
ited, although a number of skirmishes have been
reported with Communist forces west of Ban Na
and near Sam Thong.
On the political front, Communist special
envoy Souk Vongsak has departed for consulta-
tions in Samneua, saying he hoped to return soon.
He carried with him Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma's latest proposal to get the Lao peace
talks under way-a bid for changing the site of the
talks from Khang Khay in Communist-held terri-
tory in the Plaine to the royal capital at Luang
Prabang. Souvanna probably made the suggestion
to avoid giving the impression that he was stalling.
He may also want to buy time to formulate a
response to the Communists' recently scaled-
down proposal for a "de-escalation" of bombing
activity in Xieng Khouang Province-an overture
that seemed to raise the possibility of negotiating
a de facto cease-fire in that area.
Vietnam: A Matter of Priorities
The Tet cease-fire period passed quietly.
Sizable Communist main-force units in the north-
ern sector and along the Cambodian frontier in
Military Region 3 are stirring a bit, but they are
unlikely to attempt much action before the
spring, if then. Most enemy forces in the South
will continue to harass the government's pacifica-
tion effort and try to divert ARVN from large
operations in Cambodia.
Guarding the Trails
The low level of fighting stems in part from
the enemy's concentration on moving supplies to
the front lines in Laos, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam during the current dry season. This task
is now one of Hanoi's top priorities and it is
moving even more forces into positions where
they can help secure the supply lines through
southern North Vietnam and Laos against allied
air and ground interdiction operations.
Far from the main overland supply routes
through southern Laos, the Communists report-
edly are moving small amounts of supplies by sea
into southern South Vietnam and nearby Cam-
bodian territory. The last deliveries from Kom-
pong Som (Sihanoukville) to South Vietnam's
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Mekong Delta were made in January 1970; since
the allied cross-border operations last spring,
there have been many indications that ammuni-
tion is short in this area, and the Communists
may be trying to ease the problem by bringing in
some supplies by small craft.
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Cambodia: The War at Phnom Penh's Door
The atmosphere in Phnom Penh remained
tense following the dramatic Communist attacks
on its airfield and a flurry of terrorist acts inside
the city. The government has moved quickly to
increase the capital's defenses and to conduct
military clearing operations in its environs.
There were still no signs during the week
that the Communists were in a position to move
on Phnom Penh in force.
A somber Lon Nol has ordered a number of
Cambodian Army (FANK) battalions back to
Phnom Penh from outlying provinces, and the
forces garrisoned in the city reportedly will soon
total some 25,000 men. Despite the arrival of
these reinforcements, it seems unlikely that the
inexperienced Cambodians will be able to guar-
antee the safety of such vulnerable installations as
petroleum storage depots.
The Communists can make things even
tougher for Phnom Penh if they are determined
to shake the resolve of the Cambodian leadership.
For the moment, however, there is no evidence
that the pressure on the capital has unnerved the
leaders. Although the attacks have served to make
the city's population more apprehensive about
the war, there has been no discernible weakening
of the public resolve to stand up to the enemy.
Pich Nil Pass Operation
South Vietnamese forces completed their
withdrawal from the Route 4 operation, returning
the responsibility for the reopened highway's
security to some 30 FANK battalions deployed
between Kompong Speu city and the seaport at
Kompong Som. Communist troops were still in
positions enabling them to renew their attacks
against Route 4, however.
Stronger Ties with Saigon
Phnom Penh's increasingly important rela-
tions with Saigon apparently were improved as a
result of recent discussions between Lon Nol and
President Thieu in the South Vietnamese capital.
Military matters figured prominently in the talks,
with the South Vietnamese indicating willingness
to aid in training FANK troops in Cambodia, in
addition to continuing the training of FANK
troops in South Vietnam. On the delicate subject
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of the misbehavior of ARVN soldiers in Cam-
bodia, the two governments evidently agreed to
set up ad hoc joint investigation teams to handle
specific incidents allegedly involving ARVN
forces. As for Saigon's controversial request that
Cambodia foot the costs of ARVN operations in
Cambodia, Lon Nol told the press that the subject
was not discussed and will be taken up later.
and border customs were formally signed.
however, no attempt was made to resolve
several of the more difficult problems between
the two countries. The establishment of a mu-
tually acceptable exchange rate and the disposi-
tion of frozen Cambodian assets in the Bank of
Indochina apparently will be discussed during fu-
ture bilateral meetings at the working
During Lon Nol's visit, five agreements gov-
erning such matters as navigation on the Mekong
Thailand: ArmyRestiveness
Bangkok is facing another round of back-
stage political bickering and maneuvering as var-
ious factions attempt to gain advantage before
changes in the top leadership occur.
~ Nepotism and corrup-
tion in government have also come in for a large
share of criticism.
Krit is a figure of growing
LiM_ in Thai politics-he was recently made
deputy minister of defense-and he has been men-
tioned as a possible dark-horse choice over Gen-
eral Praphat as successor to Prime Minister
Thanom. Although he has been identified as a
close supporter of Praphat, Krit's recent endorse-
level.
ment of foreign policy changes recommended by
Foreign Minister Thanat suggests he may be stak-
ing out a position independent of Praphat, one
designed to encourage greater efforts on his be-
half by his supporters.
There is no evidence that any significant
organized opposition to the government has in
fact developed among the Thai military, but a
sense of restiveness apparently is percolating to
the upper ranks of the government.
With Thanom's days as prime minister
clearly numbered, the backstage maneuvering to
succeed him and to reshape the way Thailand is
governed can be expected to intensify in coming
months. General Praphat, long the most powerful
figure in the Thai leadership, is still almost certain
to succeed Thanom, and present indications are
that the transition will be orderly.
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EUROPE
Poland: Gierek Gains Time with Worker-to- Worker Approach
The regime is taking further steps to con-
ciliate the workers but at the same time to
demonstrate its control of the situation. This has
been characteristic of the evolving new style of
rule, where renunciation of force appears to be
coupled with a decision to allow the public airing
of grievances and to correct past inequities. New
preparations are under way for a landmark central
committee plenum, which may come as early as
next week.
The personal intervention of the leadership
in Szczecin and Gdansk, which had been plagued
by strikes and slowdowns for several weeks, has
quieted labor unrest on the coast. The security
apparatus continues to maintain a low profile
throughout the country, as it has since 22 Decem-
ber. Party leader Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz
were accompanied on their visits by Defense Min-
ister Jaruzelski and newly named Interior Minister
Szlachcic, both of whom also spoke to the work-
ers. This suggests that the leaders' marathon and
frank discussions went beyond bread-and-butter
issues to deal with bitterness over the ruthless
measures employed against the rioters in De-
cember.
The ouster of the former interior minister
also indicates that the first scapegoats for the
deaths and other casualties on the coast last
month have been sacrificed, even though the
switch does not go as far as the politburo changes
that some of the workers have been demanding.
Changes at the top are expected at the forth-
coming plenum; if only for psychological reasons,
however, they may not involve the persons
singled out by the workers.
The new willingness of the workers to wait
and see is in part a result of measures such as
Premier Jaroszewicz's letter to enterprise man-
agers ordering them to reassume their responsi-
bility for labor discipline but also charging them
with heeding and remedying the workers' just
grievances. The subsequent government decision
to put off for a year the controversial wage
incentive system, which had contributed to the
start of riots last month, also may help to mollify
the workers.
The government also announced this week
its intention to grant the Roman Catholic Church
legal title to former German church lands, now
formally under regime control. Together with si-
multaneous assurances by Gierek to the peasantry
that private ownership of land would continue,
these steps indicate the regime's need and desire
to enlist the support of wide strata of the popula-
tion. Indeed, one theme of the wide-ranging dis-
cussion in the public media has been the need to
overcome popular disbelief in the efficacy of in-
fluencing regime policy making through public
debate. Such official encouragement suggests con-
fidence that the dialogue with the people will not
get out of control but will remain within the
bounds of the system.
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Yugoslavia Devalues Its Currency
The government's move to devalue the dinar
by 20 percent was made in the hope that it would
reduce burgeoning imports and make Yugoslav
exports and tourism more attractive. This devalu-
ation, to 15 dinars per US dollar, is the second
one in five years. In July 1965 the dinar was
devalued by two thirds as part of that year's
stabilization and reform program.
In 1970 Yugoslavia ran a $1.2-billion trade
deficit, of which $1.1 billion was with the hard
currency area. Hard currency imports rose by 45
percent, swamping a 13-percent gain in exports as
well as continued increases in tourism and remit-
tances from Yugoslav workers abroad. The gov-
ernment attributes much of the huge increase in
imports to the rapid rise in Yugoslav prices rela-
tive to Western prices in the last year or so. To
prevent further price increases, the government
will maintain, at least through April, the rigid
controls on prices and consumer credit imposed
in October 1970. Moreover, in an effort to re-
strain consumer expenditures, devaluation has
been accompanied by increased interest payments
on existing savings deposits.
Speculation on devaluation, which has been
rumored since at least the fall of 1970, has con-
tributed significantly to the trade deficit. Devalu-
ation was not included in the initial stabilization
package adopted in October 1970. This fact
caused the resignation of Vice Premier Nikola
Soviets Look to Future in Yugoslavia
Moscow, evidently looking ahead to a Yugo-
slavia without Tito, is trying hard to develop its
influence there. The Soviets have moved both
within and-on occasion-beyond the limits of
diplomatic propriety in pursuit of this objective.
According to a Yugoslav diplomat, the So-
viets recently responded to Belgrade's proposal
Miljanic and brought to light an internal govern-
ment debate on the question. Public statements
by Premier Ribicic and Tito himself that devalua-
tion would come eventually undoubtedly en-
couraged a Yugoslav buying spree in the West.
Foreign importers apparently adopted a wait-
and-see attitude, judging from a slackening of
Yugoslav exports late in 1970.
In the short run, devaluation, together with
the other stabilization measures, may help to re-
strain imports of nonessential consumer goods
and cause some shift in purchases of essential
products to domestic suppliers. It also may lead
to some increase in exports of agricultural prod-
ucts and industrial materials already salable in the
West. The more favorable exchange rate could
induce larger remittances from workers abroad,
and it could benefit tourism. Tourists, however,
now may be spending less per day in terms of
dollars, and the capacity of Yugoslav tourist ac-
commodations may be a limiting factor in the
summer of 1971.
Based on the short-lived effects of the 1965
experience, the current devaluation at best can
only provide a breathing space. It is not a basic
solution to the long-term problems of increasing
Yugoslav competitiveness in Western markets or
of increasing the ability of domestic producers to
compete freely at home against imports from the
that a channel at the level of deputy foreign
minister be created for a regular exchange of
views on foreign policy by suggesting instead that
links be established at the ministerial level. The
Yugoslavs apparently have not yet replied, prob-
ably because this arrangement would lead to a
degree of political commitment that Belgrade has
resisted in the past.
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Meanwhile, Soviet officials have actively
continued their efforts to develop contacts in
Yugoslavia. The latest move was made by mem-
bers of a Soviet party delegation who arrived in
Belgrade on 20 January and who the Yugoslavs
claim were uninvited. In addition to visitors from
the USSR, Belgrade has been acutely sensitive to
attempts of Soviet diplomats to develop quietly
direct contacts with officials at the republic and
at even lower levels.
instance. The Soviets are quite aware of the cen-
tral role Tito has played in bridging over national
animosities and rivalries that have threatened the
unity of the Yugoslav state. They presumably
believe that his inevitable departure from the
scene and current steps toward decentralization
will offer them opportunities for re-establishing
their influence.
Belgrade's fears are often overdrawn, but
there are good reasons for its concern in this
French Arms Sales RoseSharply in 1970
A large increase in foreign sales of military
equipment carried France well over the $1-billion
level in 1970. The director of international affairs
for France's arms sales office recently announced
preliminary figures indicating sales of about $1.3
billion to foreign countries. By comparison, arms
sales in 1969 amounted to approximately $513
million and in 1968 reached a previous record of
$830 million, According to the announcement,
arms exports in 1970 accounted for almost 25
percent of all French equipment sold to foreign
customers. These figures reflect the value of con-
tracts actually concluded during 1970, but deliv-
ery may not be completed for several years.
with the 1969 figure of only $8 million. The sale
of 20 guided-missile patrol boats to Germany and
about a half dozen more to Malaysia presumably
accounts for this sharp increase. These boats will
be equipped with French Exocet antishipping
missiles, the cost of which is probably reflected in
the "aeronautical'' sales figures.
The remaining French arms sales include
about $100 million in ground forces equipment
and some $50 million in electronic equipment.
The sale of aeronautical equipment, in-
cluding aircraft and missiles of all types, ac-
counted for $940 million-nearly three fourths of
the total. About 15 percent of this amount, how-
ever, was equipment such as helicopters and avia-
tion electronics that could also be used for non-
military purposes. The $940-million figure prob-
ably includes some $100 million in Mirage sales to
Spain, $80 million for the 317 helicopters sold to
foreign clients (a 17-percent increase over 1969),
and may also reflect, at least in part, the sale of
110 Mirages to Libya. ou`nd`forces
ectrooics-
The sale of naval equipment came to about-.----
$220 million-17 percent of the total-compared 550877 1-71 CIA
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These figures probably include basic army equip-
ment such as rifles, ammunition, and grenades, as
well as tanks and radars.
The increase in arms sales results more from
concerted French sales efforts than from the
development of new equipment. The French have
expanded sales in Europe, Latin America, and
North Africa and are trying to penetrate former
British markets in the Far East and Africa. Fur-
thermore, new French military equipment is
being designed with the export market in mind as
well as for domestic needs. The French have also
succeeded in presenting themselves as a major
nonbloc arms supplier, which enables smaller
countries to avoid military entanglements with
either the US or the USSR.
Paris has taken other steps to facilitate arms
exports. Credit for these exports-underwritten
by the French Government-is readily available at
relatively low interest rates (6 to 8 percent) with
extended repayment provisions. In addition to
this aid, the government by law can finance
research and development and construction costs
for those arms programs with export potential.
The government also has emphasized increased
industrial effic+ency and profitability through the
reorganization and merging of several state-owned
industries during 1970.
Defense Minister Debre recently ordered the
reorganization of France's largest state-owned air-
craft engine company to enable it to expand and
participate more in joint international engine
projects. Several new tactical missile systems, two
new fighter aircraft, and at least one new heli-
copter-all with good export potential-are
scheduled to enter series production during 1971.
These new products, combined with older but
still popular military equipment, make 1971 a
promising year for French arms sales. / 25X1
AUSTRIA: Chancellor Kreisky's army reform
plan, keyed to a reduction of compulsory service
to six months, has become possibly the most
divisive national issue of the last decade. The two
opposition parties, which have a majority in par-
liament, the military establishment, and most of
the press are opposed to Kreisky's bill. The Swiss
Government and possibly others have unofficially
registered their concern that the plan might de-
stroy the Austrian Army's credibility. Aroused by
the vehemence of the opposition, Kreisky in-
flamed public opinion last month with some un-
flattering comments about the army's record. The
bill's fate rests with the three-party Federal De-
fense Committee, where Kreisky's intransigence
has blocked compromise efforts extending from
last October through the committee's latest meet-
ing on 14 January.
ICJ - SOUTH AFRICA: The International Court
of Justice (ICJ) will soon begin hearings on the
UN Security Council's request for an advisory
opinion on problems stemming from Pretoria's
retention of control over South-West Africa in
defiance of UN resolutions. South Africa, which
has generally avoided taking cognizance of inter-
national community concern over this issue, has
surprised many observers by opting to fight the
case before the ICJ. It asked unsuccessfully for
the disqualification of three of the fifteen judges
and has filed a 700-page brief challenging ICJ
jurisdiction. The case has attracted considerable
attention because it represents both an attempt to
revitalize the ICJ-along lines proposed by the
US-and, in the Africans' view, a test of Western
sincerity in dealing with Pretoria's intransi-
gence
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Arabs and Israelis Prepare for End of Cease-fire
During the six-month cease-fire period end-
ing on 5 February, both Israel and Egypt have
improved their military capabilities significantly
and the number and sophistication of arms avail-
able to them have increased substantially. There is
no evidence, however, that either side is redeploy-
ing or mobilizing forces to initiate a resumption
of hostilities. The present military situation ap-
pears to have developed into a strategic standoff
with neither Israel nor Egypt having the military
capability to impose its will decisively on the
other. Should an all-out shooting war start again,
the Israelis will probably defeat the Arabs, but
another round is almost certain to be more costly,
violent, and destructive.
Each side has become wary of the other's
intentions. Reconnaissance flights are being in-
creased in the Canal area and each side has oc-
casionally overflown the other's positions. Israeli
reconnaissance flights also have been stepped up
over Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.
Taking advantage of the cease-fire, the
Egyptians-with Soviet assistance-doubled the
number of operational SAM units within 50 kilo-
meters of the Canal. About half of the 60 to 70
operational SAMs in this zone are SA-3s. The
total number of firing positions in the 50-kilo-
meter zone is now about 150 and all of these
positions are revetted and bunkered.
The Israelis have also taken advantage of the
cease-fire and have completely rebuilt and
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strengthened their fortifications along the Suez
Canal. The so-called Bar Lev Line is now said to
be able to withstand any E tian artiller
bombardment.
On the ground, both sides have introduced
new weapons. The Egyptians have recently ac-
quired FROG-7 surface-to-surface rockets from
the USSR. This 31-foot weapon has a range of
some 35 to 40 nautical miles. The Israelis are
receiving improved, longer range artillery from
the US. Both armies also have more bridging
equipment and frequently conduct amphibious
exercises.
The most significant military change in the
last year, however, is the increased Soviet military
commitment to the Egyptian armed forces. The
presence of some 10,000 Soviet advisers and com-
bat troops has forced the Israelis to moderate
their tactics against Egypt and will continue to be
an inhibiting factor in Tel Aviv's planning. I-
ARAB STATES: The quadripartite summit meet-
ing of Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Syria ended in
Cairo on 22 January with a remarkably bland
communique. The announcement contained only
the usual rhetoric on the evils of Israeli ex-
pansionist policy as supported by the US. Men-
tion was made of strengthening the eastern mili-
tary front facing Israel, but the follow-up to this
will probably be no more successful than past
efforts.
The full-scale Arab summit meeting called
for earlier by Libyan strong man Qadhafi was not
mentioned. Subsequent reporting on this gather-
ing, which was initially to have been held in
Kuwait this week, indicates that the reluctance of
some leaders may delay or postpone it in-
definitely. Algeria has expressed its readiness to
attend such a meeting and reportedly has also
indicated its willingness to play host. Qadhafi,
however, has since said that unless all the Arab
leaders attend there is no point in holding a
LEBANON: President Franjiyyah's experiment
in running Lebanon with an extraparliamentary
cabinet of technocrats may soon be coming to an
end. In a country where possession of political
office is an important prerequisite for obtaining
wealth and a following, the Lebanese leader has
been subjected to increasing pressure from po-
litical groups for ministerial portfolios. Fran-
jiyyah has indicated he will make an effort to
appoint a new cabinet that will be "semipar-
liamentary" in its makeup.
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Middle East: The Deadline Draws Near
Israel and Egypt continue to exchange pro-
posals through Ambassador Jarring as the 5 Feb-
ruary expiration date of the cease-fire approaches.
Following a cabinet meeting on 23 January,
Israel announced that it would continue to par-
ticipate in the exchanges despite its displeasure
over the publication of the Egyptian response to
the original Israeli proposals. An official com-
munique noted that Prime Minister Meir and For-
eign Minister Eban would draft Israel's reply to
the Egyptian note. Details of the Israeli response,
which was delivered to Jarring on 27 January,
were not made public. The foreign minister was
quoted, however, as saying that the latest
Egyptian document failed to respond to principal
points in Israel's original peace proposals sub-
mitted to Jarring in early January.
The Egyptians have continued to complain
that Jarring has made little progress in his talks
with the parties. Cairo's main objection has been
that Israel keeps avoiding any commitment on
withdrawal or on the refugee question. The
Egyptians have deferred, at least for the time
being, a decision to call for a Security Council
meeting, but their impatience over the lack of
progress could lead them to change their minds
again.
Meanwhile, efforts to obtain an extension of
the cease-fire beyond 5 February continue. Press
sources in Israel state that the government ex-
pects Jarring or UN Secretary General Thant to
issue a public call for both sides to continue
negotiations and to extend the cease-fire. The
Israeli hope that Egypt will
utilize Jarring's appeal to justify an extension of
the cease-fire. The Israelis, who regard negotiating
under a deadline as unpalatable, favor as long an
extension as possible. The Egyptians, on the other
hand, apparently prefer the deadline concept;
even if it has not wrung concessions from the
Israelis, it has given the Arabs a number of op-
portunities to depict themselves as aggrieved par-
ties in UN forums.
Whether or not a formal extension of the
cease-fire is achieved, Arab concern over Israel's
intentions toward the occupied territories is likely
to be expressed more and more publicly and in
increasingly harsher terms. At the moment, the
prospect of the Arabs and the Israelis sitting
down to conduct meaningful negotiations with
the object of achieving a settlement seems as
Palestinian Intellectuals Stirring
Independent Palestinians are becoming in-
creasingly vocal in their criticism of fedayeen
leaders. In a conference held in Lebanon during
the first week of January, Yasir Arafat and other
Fatah leaders met with Palestinian intellectuals to
review the state of the resistance movement. The
commandos were quickly criticized for doing
nothing to achieve the unification of the various
guerrilla organizations and for jeopardizing the
movement's position in Jordan by permitting it to
degenerate to a point where its members
amounted to armed mobs. The wide discrepancy
between fedayeen battle claims and their actual
accomplishments against Israel was also pointed
out by the intellectuals.
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intellectuals are convinced that a solution of the
Palestine problem can never be achieved by the
fedayeen and they hope to play an influential role
if Palestinians participate in any future peace
negotiations.
This nascent group does not offer a chal-
lenge to the fedayeen position of primacy among
the Palestinians, nor-at the present-does it in-
tend to. If the position of the fedayeen continues
to decline, however, and if the ferment in and
among the many guerrilla organizations con-
tinues, the intellectuals could find themselves
with an increasingly important role in the
Palestinian community.
International Oil
The key issue between the oil companies and
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) of the applicability of any arrange-
ments agreed to in current talks still was un-
resolved as substantive negotiations began in
Tehran on 28 January. The oil companies con-
tinue to insist on an OPEC-wide settlement to be
guaranteed for five years, while OPEC has not
changed its position of wanting negotiations on a
regional basis, i.e., Persian Gulf, Mediterranean,
etc. The oil companies have attempted to circum-
vent the issue by initiating "parallel" talks in
Libya, which they view as part of an over-all
settlement with OPEC. Libyan officials, although
agreeing to meet with the oil company representa-
tives, have made it clear that Libya considers any
negotiations separate from those in Tehran.
Iranian officials, who have played the major
role of representing OPEC in discussions thus far,
hope that sufficient progress will emerge from the
Tehran talks to influence other moderate mem-
bers of OPEC to forestall efforts by the more
radical oil producing countries to take over at the
general meeting of OPEC scheduled for 3 Feb-
ruary.
The major oil consuming governments are
following the situation closely and most of them
openly support the oil industry proposals at this
time. A divergence between consumer and com-
pany positions will tend to emerge, however, if a
settlement leads to significant price increases in
the consuming countries. The members of the
European Community (EC) met on 27 January to
review how a common energy policy might pro-
tect their interests in situations such as the
present one. Italian officials, in particular, feel
that Italy's consumer interests and potential sup-
ply problems can probably be best protected in
the long run through closer coordination with its
EC partners.
The demands of OPEC could hike oil reve-
nues to the producer countries by at least $2
billion this year, a 25-percent increase over 1970.
This comes on top of a $700-million expansion in
oil income derived from tax increases last year.
For those countries with relatively small popula-
tions such as Libya, Kuwait, and the Persian Gulf
sheikdoms, the added income would be more
than they probably would spend and the bulk in
all likelihood would be held as foreign exchange
reserves. The other recipients would be able to
expand imports from the developed countries.
Costs to the major consuming countries-
Japan purchases virtually all of its oil from OPEC
members, Western Europe about 90 percent, and
the US some 17 percent-could be absorbed with-
out economic disruption. Increased oil prices
resulting from oil-producing countries' demands,
in the range now being discussed, would raise by
only about one percent the over-all value of
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imports in consuming countries. Furthermore,
part of the increased import cost would be offset
when the oil-producing countries either spend the
new revenues or deposit them in their foreign-
exchange reserves maintained in oil-consuming
Uganda : General A min Takes Over
General Idi Amin, Uganda's ranking military
officer, has succeeded in ousting the government
of President Milton Obote. After some initial
fighting on 25 January, relative calm has returned
to the capital city of Kampala and there are no
signs of resistance elsewhere in the country. From
sanctuary in Tanzania, Obote has been making
brave statements about returning, but a counter-
coup in his behalf seems increasingly unlikely.
Thus far, Amin appears to be feeling his way
cautiously, and has revealed his intentions only in
broad terms. He has promised that political par-
ties-including Obote's Uganda Peoples Con-
gress-will be allowed to function, that open na-
tional elections will be held and a civilian admin-
istration installed, and that corruption and mis-
management will be eliminated from the govern-
ment. He has also tried to reassure neighboring
Tanzania and Kenya, but both governments-and
especially Tanzanian President Nyerere-are likely
to view Amin with suspicion for some time to
come.
Although Amin had been intimately in-
volved with Obote when the latter seized power
in 1966, their relationship had often been
strained, and Amin blamed Obote, a Lango, for
recent moves to curtail his authority. Since last
September, Amin had been nursing grievances
because of Obote's reshuffle of the top army
leadership, which isolated Amin from direct com-
mand of troops.
The degree of popular support for Amin,
who has been attempting to enhance his own
personal image for some time, remains unclear.
There has been a substantial show of public
enthusiasm for the coup, but this seems to be
more a sign of approval for Obote's ouster than of
Amin's popularity. In fact, most of those cele-
brating are southerners from Uganda's largest
tribe-the Baganda-whose political influence had
been all but eliminated by Obote. Several
statements by Amin, who is from a small north-
ern tribe, suggest he is trying to enlist Baganda
support.
Prospects for Amin's regime are not par-
ticularly bright. Obote's skill as a politician had
been a key factor in keeping Uganda's serious
internal problems under control, and Amin will
be severely tested in his effort to maintain na-
tional unity. Much depends on the army itself, a
notoriously ill-disciplined force dominated by
northerners but shot through with personal and
tribal factionalism.
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Senegal: Antiregime Activity on the Increase
President Senghor's oft-troubled moderate
regime again faces growing domestic unrest,
marked by some violence. This latest of many
political tests comes at a time when Senegal is
also caught up in a serious economic crisis.
The recent upsurge of antiregime activity has
been highlighted by several fire bombings in
Dakar. One incident in mid-January caused ex-
tensive damage to two government buildings and
to the French cultural center. In addition, tracts
critical of the regime and of pervasive French
influence have been circulating in Dakar, and new
disturbances were reported last month in a tradi-
tionally restive southern province.
Dakar's reaction has been swift and harsh.
Shortly after the fire bombings, the government
announced the arrest of several alleged militants,
including the head of the radical Senegalese
Teachers' Union, to which the authorities at-
tribute much of the recent tension. The arrests
touched off a partially successful 24-hour sym-
pathy strike on 20 January by antiregime stu-
dents and teachers in several Senegalese cities,
including Dakar, but an immediate show of force
by the authorities has discouraged further action
for the time being. The government has formally
charged four fire bombing suspects
The heightened tensions evidently caused
the abrupt cancellation of an African cultural
festival that was to have opened on 25 January.
Senegalese authorities are especially anxious at
this time about keeping the lid on because of a
scheduled visit to Dakar next week of French
President Pompidou.
Meanwhile, Senegal's basically weak econ-
omy has been dealt a severe blow by a drastic
drop in the peanut harvest. Drought and the re-
sistance of growers to low, government-set prices
have combined to reduce the 1970-71 crop to a
mere 300,000 tons, about one third the average
since 1965. Normally, peanuts provide up to 80
percent of Senegal's export earnings. In an appar-
ent effort to alleviate the situation, President
Senghor has called an emergency meeting of the
West African Groundnut Council for March to
study short- and long-term prospects for peanut
cultivation. Another complicating factor is an
acute food shortage, particularly in Dakar, where
shops reportedly are almost out of rice. The gov-
ernment already has applied to an international
relief agency for 40,000 tons of foodstuffs, but
this would provide only temporary relief at best,
and the situation seems certain to lead to further
unrest.
KUWAIT: The third quadrennial election for the
50-member National Assembly was held on 23
January in an atmosphere of calm, with appar-
ently no meddling by the government. Results of
the balloting indicate that 13 opposition candi-
dates have been elected. Five moderate reformers
and eight candidates supported by the Marxist
Arab Nationalist Movement, including the leader
of the organization, were chosen in what were
described as very close contests. Over 180 candi-
dates had been nominated for the National As-
sembly, which will hold its first session on 9
February.
The ruling al-Sabah family's willingness to
permit relatively free elections this time is in
contrast with the blatant election fraud that the
regime perpetrated in 1967. Although the govern-25X1
ment will have greater opposition within the as-
sembly, its prestige among Kuwaitis has been en-
hanced by its conduct of the election.
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GUINEA: Four Guineans, all former high-ranking
government officials, were hanged on 25 January
for their part in the armed attacks on Guinea last
November. The executions, which followed sen-
tencing by only one day, drew sharp criticism from
abroad. Another 54 condemned prisoners await
execution, and 33 others have been condemned to
death in absentia. Sixty-eight persons now under
detention-including nine Europeans and six
Lebanese-received life sentences.
operated from Dakar has seriously strained relations
between the two countries. Dakar responded to a
sharp verbal attack by Toure on 22 January by
recalling its ambassador in Conakry and by expel-
ling the Guinean ambassador. Senegalese President
Senghor also accused Guinea of espionage activit
in Senegal.
Neighboring Senegal's reported refusal to ac-
cede to President Toure's request for the extradi-
tion of condemned Guineans who have long
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Guatemala: Stirrings in the Opposition Camp
All of the leftist groups in Guatemala, both
legal and illegal, have felt the weight of the govern-
ment's vigorous counterinsurgency effort launched
in November. The assassinations of prominent left-
ists in recent weeks probably have motivated the
unification attempts. The Communists may seek to
exploit their connection with the legitimate opposi-
tion by linking the common front to the implica-
tion by some government officials that "a state of
civil war" exists.
Fear of the government and distrust between
the would-be anti-Arana allies, however, are likely
to preclude early realization of an effective opposi-
tion. Nevertheless, should the violence be sustained
at the prevailing level for much longer, opposition
to the administration-which had promised pacifica-
tion-would become general.
Although it has made few political points in
the past few weeks, the government appears to have
scored perhaps its greatest successes to date against
the subversives.
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Cuba: Ideological Backtracking
Evidence that the Castro regime has shifted
from a strict interpretation of moral incentives is
.now conclusive. This modification of a policy he
has promoted since 1967 suggests that Castro real-
izes he has tried to advance too far too soon and
that the average Cuban has not yet achieved a
degree of political sophistication whereby only
moral incentives constitute a satisfactory motiva-
tional force. The reintroduction of material induce-
ments-only one of several measures adopted after
the disappointment of the 1970 sugar harvest--was
probably urged on Castro both by foreign and do-
mestic advisers. Cuban workers, however, will prob-
ably be unimpressed; domestic production of goods
to be used for incentives falls far short of the
quantity needed to influence output significantly,
and there is no present sign that imports will be
increased in sufficient quantity to fill the gap.
Although Che Guevara was the leading ex-
ponent of the superiority of moral over material
incentives in the early days of the revolutionary
government, the regime vacillated on the question
for years. As late as the 1967 sugar harvest, for
example, the Armed Forces Ministry offered its
personnel involved in agricultural work a series of
rewards ranging from homes and automobiles to
items of clothing and domestic appliances based on
individual productivity. By mid-1967, however, the
decision had been made to rely wholly on moral
pressures as a means of motivating the worker to
produce more. Cars and refrigerators were replaced
by pins and emblems awarded to pace-setting teams
or individuals, and pennants and banners graced the
flagpoles of factories and mills that fulfilled or
surpassed production goals. Statements by a host of
government leaders, including Castro himself, rein-
forced regularly the correctness of moral incentives;
material inducements for sparking production in-
creases were denounced as a corrupt and undesira-
ble remnant of the capitalist era. Even tips for
services were "voluntarily" relinquished under
strong government pressure.
The first hint that the policy on incentives was
being relaxed appeared in mid-1970 during the pe-
riod of economic reassessment in the wake of the
failure to achieve the harvest goal. On 26 July
Castro hinted that scarce consumer goods might be
distributed through the factories or work centers to
those who had met their production quotas and had
good attendance records. Labor Minister Jorge
Risquet paid mild lip service to moral incentives in
a television interview on 30 July, but he reiterated
Castro's remarks about such things as houses and
vacations for outstanding workers.
Cuban Communist Party (PCC) central com-
mittee member Fabio Grobart made the policy shift
official in an interview while attending the tenth
congress of the Hungarian Communist Party in
early December. He said, "We have approached the
problem of economic and moral incentives from a
new point of view" in the light of "recent experi-
ences." In referring to Cuba's household appliance
manufacturing plant, Grobart said, "We are now
planning to provide incentives for utilization of its
capacity, at Castro's suggestion, by granting priority
for the purchase of a refrigerator to those workers
who produce the most. In our circumstances, we
can call this material incentive."
The Domestic Trade Ministry formally pre-
sented the new plan to the public on 2 January,
announcing that refrigerators, television sets, radios,
bicycles, watches, and other appliances would
henceforth be distributed through work centers by
trade union committees on the basis of need. In
order to qualify, the needy workers must not have a
record of absenteeism and must have fulfilled work
norms both quantitively and qualitatively.
Castro probably believes he has little to lose in
softening his position on incentives. If the change
results in an increase in productivity, his economic
problems are relieved somewhat. If, however, no
measurable improvement is experienced, he has a
weapon with which to belabor his critics who for
years scoffed at his insistence on moral- induce-
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Costa Rica: Unrest
The general state of unrest permeating the
Costa Rican political scene may have settled in
for the duration of the Figueres government.
Figueres' moves to the left since his inauguration
last May for a four-year term have led to a con-
tinuing cycle of heavy criticism from the opposi-
tion and to defensive overreaction on the admin-
istration's part. Most recently, a spate of rumors
of arms landings, impending coups, and other
antigovernment actions has developed.
President Figueres' establishment of rela-
tions with various Communist countries and his
lack of honesty regarding a Russian presence in
San Jose have alarmed both Costa Ricans and
neighboring governments, who foresee a signifi-
cant upswing in Communist subversive operations
in the region. Both the President and his foreign
minister repeatedly have made misleading state-
ments regarding the method of implementing a
diplomatic exchange with the Russians, usually
suggesting that he was not considering the ex-
change of ambassadors.
\ The very influ-
ential daily La Nacion has been in the forefront
of spokesmen who oppose a Russian mission, and
a leading opposition figure recently delivered a
televised denunciation of Figures' foreign policy.
On the domestic scene, Figueres' open sup-
port for Communist labor organizers-who over
the past several months have gained control of the
workers in one of the country's most important
industries-has also alarmed conservative and
moderate circles. Figueres, moreover, appears to
have some devious dealings with the local Com-
munist Party, which technically is illegal but
which is operating with increasing openness. The
party seems to be having some success in moving
its people into key government agencies, possibly
with Figueres' connivance. In San Jose there is
talk that the President is "turning the country
over to the Communists."
Figueres and his supporters themselves may
be concerned that they have moved too far too
fast. Several members of the government party
have attacked the conservative minister of secu-
rity for disloyalty to the president and have in-
sinuated that the minister is involved in a right-
wing coup plot. The succession of unfounded
coup rumors followed by inconsistent "explana-
tions" by government spokesmen suggests that at
least some in Figueres' entourage wish to keep
alive the issue of a right-wing threat.
Figueres' motivations in pressing an unpop-
ular political view and in unnecessarily provoking
the opposition remain unclear. His tactics, how-
ever, have cost him some support in his own camp
and have built up a climate of suspicion and
unrest in the country. Unless he works to undo
the growing skepticism over his policies, Figueres
is likely to ins ire serious plotting a ainst his
government.
HAITI: Presidet Duvalier has scheduled a refer-
endum on 31 January to approve the designation
of his son Jean-Claude Duvalier as the next Presi-
dent-for-Life of Haiti. His decision to appoint his
son has not been challenged in Haiti and is not
expected to be during the President's lifetime.
Duvalier's death, however, will free potential pres-
idential aspirants to pursue their ambitions. If
Jean-Claude succeeds as planned, or if the contest
for power is brief and confined to a few rivals
within the establishment, chaos and violence and
an attendant power vacuum are not anticipated.
Duvalier's succession arrangement increases some-
what the probability of antigovernment adven-
tures, but a successful coup or exile invasion
during his lifetime seems unlikely.
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Ecuador's "Tuna War" Shifts to the Diplomatic Front
President Velasco has decided to extract
maximum political mileage from the seizures of
US tuna vessels by formally presenting his case to
the OAS. He has successfully depicted Ecuador as
the aggrieved but still defiant victim of "US eco-
nomic coercion" and the "tuna war" has received
predictable domestic and international support.
Since 11 January Ecuador has apprehended
17 US fishing boats and collected fines totaling
approximately $750,000.
Ecuador and several other Latin nations have
seized US vessels in the past, but such a large
number is unprecedented. In an attempt to settle
the problem the US has been involved in quadri-
partite discussions with Peru, Ecuador, and Chile
since 1969, but the talks have made limited head-
way. A Latin conclave on maritime rights earlier
this month strongly reaffirmed claims to a
200-mile limit on territorial seas.
There is no proof that Velasco specifically
ordered the initial seizures, but he must have
given at least tacit approval. The continued sei-
zure of boats after the US announced a one-year
suspension of arms sales on 18 January made it
obvious that Velasco had decided he could turn
the issue to his political advantage.
Three of the president's five terms have been
interrupted by military coups, and he has curried
the armed forces' favor since his assumption of
dictatorial powers last June; this opportunity to
flex military muscles may help consolidate his
support. In addition, public sentiment toward the
Velasco government has ranged from latent hos-
tility to relative indifference; the nationalistic
fishing-rights issue thus is tailormade for arousing
support. All public media and numerous civil and
political groups have supported Velasco's posi-
tion. Anti-US student demonstrations have been
very mild, however, apparently in large part be-
cause schools are not in session.
Ecuador has received international support
for its defiant stand from its Latin neighbors, and
from Cuba and China as well. At this point, the
Ecuadorean Government probably feels that
sympathies are running strongly in its favor. Sev-
eral fishing boats have now voluntarily taken out
licenses in accord with Ecuadorean law and others
reportedly have left the coastal area, but Velasco
is apparently not willing to allow the issue to
subside. Three boats were seized as recently as 27
January and the administration apparently in-
tends to fine every boat within its claimed waters.
The OAS meeting on terrorism presently
under way in Washington has afforded the Ve-
lasco administration a convenient forum for pub-
licizing its view. Ecuador's request to convoke a
special meeting of foreign ministers to consider its
charge that the US is guilty of "economic coer-
cion" because of its suspension of military sales
was approved by a vote of 22-0. Most Latin
American countries probably recognize that the
conference will accomplish little, but they have
little choice except to back Ecuador on such a
The Tuna Ship Apollo, the largest in the world,
seized by Ecuador on 17 January.
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Colombia-Venezuela Boundary
Venezuelan claim
GUAJIRA
PENINSULA
Uribia
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NETHERLANDS
'.ARUeA ANTILLES
ombian claim
CURACAO
Willemstad?
_te
p 100
statute miles
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Colombia-Venezuela: Relations Worsening
Relations between Colombia and Venezuela
are continuing to deteriorate. Last week Vene-
zuela made public its claim to the Gulf of
Venezuela, carried out a mass expulsion of illegal
Colombian residents, alerted its military forces,
and reinforced military units in the border area.
Venezuela's claim to the Gulf of Venezuela
would leave to Colombia only the water directly
off the latter's coast, reserving virtually all the
.gulf-believed to be rich in oil deposits-to Vene-
zuela. The claim is not new, but by taking it out
of the realm of secret diplomacy into the public
arena Venezuela has added a new element to the
dispute that can only increase the strain between
the two neighbors.
Further friction has also been caused by
reports of the forcible expulsion of 73 undocu-
mented Colombians from Maracaibo. Venezuelan
officials assert that Colombians illegally there are
crowding hospitals, creating slums, and engaging
in criminal activities. According to Venezuelan
statistics 35,000 Colombians have been expelled
recently.
The expulsions have been accompanied by
many abuses, which have served to raise the po-
litical temperature in Colombia. Aside from
human and nationalistic concern for their com-
patriots, Colombian officials are aware that any
large-scale influx of their nationals from Vene-
zuela would have far-reaching economic and
social consequences because unemployment al-
ready is dangerously high and fiscal resources
strained.
preted widely on both sides as an arms race. 25X1
Reacting to reports that Colombia had sent
an infantry battalion to the border, Venezuela has
ordered reinforcements to the western part of the
country and positioned troops along the border.
Colombia has been quietly improving its military
position on the peninsula since last August but
this is the first time that the Venezuelans, who
already have a preponderant military advantage in
the area, have reacted with a buildup of their
own. The Venezuelan response was prompted in
part by an exaggerated estimate of Colombian
strength, by reports of Colombian overflights of
the area, and by a general increase in tension.
Long-standing mistrust is being fed by sensa-
tionalist press campaigns now being waged by
both countries, and efforts by these two states to
modernize their armed forces are being inter-
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Uruguay: New Efforts to Fight Terrorists
The administration's recent efforts to press
the fight against terrorism are being somewhat
undercut by its own political bungling. In an
attempt to combat subversion more effectively,
President Pacheco decided last week to revamp
his Interior Ministry, which controls the police,
and fired the police chief. At the same time,
Pacheco took a step toward reforming the ineffi-
ciently run prison system-which has allegedly
allowed terrorists to direct operations from
jail-by transferring responsibility for its opera-
tion from the lax Ministry of Culture to Interior.
President Pacheco's new choice for Interior
Minister lasted for only 24 hours and was re-
placed with a lackluster political crony. The Presi-
dent transferred the subsecretary of Interior, who
had been reconfirmed in his post only a day
earlier, and appointed a new police chief who
reportedly has no previous public security experi-
ence.
Pacheco's haste in turning to second rate
individuals after his first choices declined posi-
Chile: Agrarian Unrest
Illegal take-overs of farms are spreading from
southern Cautin Province and are causing increas-
ing problems for the Popular Unity coalition. The
extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MI R), which is closely associated with President
Allende although not a member of the coalition,
is boasting of its role as instigator of the recent
seizures. Although the Communist Party opposes
the tactic, some local Communist officials are
becoming involved because of pressure from the
MIR. The minister of interior was recently forced
to dismiss the Communist governor of Lontue
Department for fomenting take-overs in his area.
The Radical Party, which draws much of its
traditional support from rural areas, finds itself in
tions has left key posts in the hands of untried,
and probably inefficient, bureaucrats. As a result,
meaningful reform may depend largely on the
President's personal initiative and direction.
In spite of the confusing political shuffle,
police raids were increased this week under the
limited state of siege now in effect. Although the
raids have not yet uncovered a clue to the where-
abouts of the three hostages held by the Tupa-
maros, the increased police activities may have
prompted Tupamaro Communique Number 15
warning that the prisoners' lives will be in danger
if police approach the area where they are
confined. The Tupamaros reiterated their earlier
withdrawal of a truce proposal, re-emphasizing
that the initiative for any further negotiations
rests with the government. In further noting that
their hostages "guarantee the physical integrity"
of Tupamaro prisoners held by the government,
the terrorists again have indicated that they plan
to hold onto their kidna victims indef-
initely.
an extremely difficult position as part of the
government coalition. Radical deputies have
called upon the party leadership to take a clear
stand on the immunity from expropriation of
farms smaller than the present legal limit of about
200 acres-a limit that the government has hinted
might be scrapped. Even members of the left wing
of the party are expressing discontent with the
invasions. It seems unlikely that the MIR, which
now is being given key positions in the agrarian
reform corporation, will cease its agitation, as the
land seizures give it an excellent opportunity to
ex and its influence in the countrysid 25X1
SECRET
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