WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008200030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 18, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
43
18 September 1970
No. 0388/70
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(Information as of noon 17 September 1970)
P
ag
e
The Third Nonaligned Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
1
FAR EAST
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
2
Cambodia: Government Offensive in Trouble . . . . . . . . . . .
.
4
France: Premier Challenged in Bordeaux Election . . . . . . . . . 8
East European Countries Face Bleak Harvest Prospect . . . . . . . 9
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Jordan-Fedayeen: Situation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Israel-Egypt: Cease-fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA (continued)
Libya: Revolutionary Regime in Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
South Africa: Coloureds' Resentment Grows . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Sierra Leone: Prime Minister Challenged . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Chile: Allende Strengthens His Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . li5
Brazil: Government Tries to Muzzle Prelate . . . . . . .. . . . . 1 ~3
Guyana Moves Into the Third World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Honduras: Lopez Power Play Expected . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Bahamas: Prime Minister Facing Political Difficulties
NOTES: Philippines; NATO; USSR - East Germany - UN; Bul aria-
Romania; Netherlands; International Aviation; Congo (Kinshasa);
Central America; Uruguay; Bolivia
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The Third Nonaligned Summit
The third nonaligned summit, which closed on
10 September, was a qualified success. In contrast to
the factionalized Cairo summit six years ago, a gen-
erally cooperative attitude prevailed, but the search
for a consensus led to adoption of resolutions com-
posed of standard third world platitudes, including
heavy emphasis on anti-Western themes. Controver-
sial proposals were dropped from the final 15 resolu-
tions, suggesting that many of the conferees had ties
with other powers that they did not wish to jeopard-
ize.
Southern African problems predominated.
Such a bias was perhaps preordained by the com-
position of the conference, in which 34 of the 54
full members represented African governments, by
the location of the conference in Zambia which bor-
ders four white-ruled territories, and by the fact that
southern African problems were such that all the
delegations could agree on them. The most strongly
worded resolution adopted was on colonialism, call-
ing for diplomatic and economic sanctions against
South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia, as well as for
financial and material contributions to the com-
mittee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
responsible for channeling aid to insurgent organiza-
tions seeking to overthrow the white minority gov-
ernments. The resolution parallels the first OAU
resolution on colonialism which has been on the
books since 1963, and it should have just as little
political effect on the white-ruled states of Africa.
Furthermore, the statement also empowered Zam-
bian President Kaunda to visit Western countries in
the name of the conference to lobby against trade,
the sale of arms, or investment links with white
Africa.
Kaunda was elected chairman of the summit on
the opening day and occupied a central role
throughout the conference. The laurels for best per-
formances, however, go to Prime Minister Gandhi of
India, who asserted that the nonaligned states would
never "yield to the threat of any"; and to Guyanese
Prime Minister Burnham, whose extemporaneous
and eloquent speaking style (as well as his radical
views) made him a big hit. Madame Binh, foreign
minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment of South Vietnam, was well received-more for
her cause than her eloquence. None of these per-
formers, however, offered the nonaligned a new
sense of direction or any concrete proposals for
action.
Yugoslav President Tito and his large entourage
were much evident in their behind-the-scenes pro-
motion of closer economic ties among the non-
aligned. A leading Yugoslav trade and financial
figure, Toma Granfil, was elected chairman of the
important economic committee.
Reactions to the summit in Moscow and Peking
were varied. The Soviets were cool. They applauded
the "anti-imperialist" aims of Lusaka, but cautioned
the conferees not to be sidetracked into discussing
allegedly peripheral problems. Moscow's mild warn-
ing probably reflected the Kremlin's disagreement
with one draft resolution's criticism of the occupa-
tion of Czechoslovakia and Soviet awareness of the
nonaligned movement's coolness toward both super-
powers. Peking, on the other hand, was warmer.
Clearly not wanting to miss a chance to undercut
Soviet and US influence in the third world, Peking
congratulated the summit on its success, empha-
sizing selectively those themes that supported
China's own positions. The Chinese reprinted the
conference declaration without comment, however,
suggesting that Peking could not endorse the meet-
ing's resolutions.
Despite the lack of friction and the relative
ease with which the delegates found common
ground, the participants failed to meet the challenge
of preparing nonalignment for the coming decade. A
draft resolution calling for the creation of perma-
nent machinery for the nonaligned movement was
dropped, and in its place the summit empowered
President Kaunda to maintain contact among the
nonaligned states and to "ensure" that the resolu-
tions are carried out.
The appropriate resolutions adopted at the
summit on strengthening the United Nations, de-
colonization, and disarmament will probably be
presented at the current UN General Assembly ses-
sion. None of the nonaligned members, however,
will provoke a floor fight if the resolutions meet
stiff opposition.
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FAR EAST
Vietnam: Comparative Views on the War
Communist Proposals Offer Little New
The set of proposals tabled by Madame Binh
at yesterday's session of the Paris talks appears to
be a dressed-up version of the Communist Ten
Points announced 16 months ago. In effect, the
proposals called for a US commitment to with-
draw all American and third country forces by
mid-1971 and US acquiescence in bargaining over
the political future of South Vietnam between
the Communists and a Saigon government
stripped of its present leadership. In return,,
Madame Binh held out prospects for a prisoner
release and a kind of cease-fire that would ensure
the safe departure of US and allied troops from
Vietnam.
The Communist initiative seems aimed at
shaking the Saigon government and fanning peace
sentiments in the United States and South Viet-
nam. Its central demands are just as tough as
earlier Communist proposals, though sweetened
somewhat to make them more appealing. The
suggestion that a prisoner repatriation is possible
if the US will bend on Communist political de-
mands appears to be a new element. Hanoi pre-
sumably hopes this move will stir up new trouble
for both Washington and Saigon.
Both the Vietnamese Communists and some
government supporters seem to agree that al-
though the Communists are not likely to make
easy progress soon, long-term prospects for the
Communists are good. During the past year, many
captured enemy documents and prisoners have
revealed that the Communists are pessimistic
about their ability fundamentally to change the
balance of forces in the South very soon. Over the
longer term, however, both statements from low-
level Communist sympathizers and directives
from the highest levels stress that there are basic
reasons for eventual Communist success. These
reasons range from a blunt insistence on the
justice of the Communists' cause to intricate ex-
planations of how "people's warfare" can defeat
any modern army to broad assertions that social-
ism is the wave of the future in the world.
Many leaders on the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment's side are optimistic about the near term
but are often pessimistic concerning the long
haul. These views are not found throughout the
ranks of the government and army? of course.
There are officers and officials who insist that the
Western-oriented government can survive indef-
initely. More often than not, however, non-Com-
munists point to recent local successes for the
government and near-term prospects for further
improvement, but speak with little confidence of
war prospects after most US forces have with-
drawn.
For instance, General Lam, the South Viet-
namese commander in the northern provinces,
recently asserted that he was confident that allied
forces would be able to withstand any attacks the
North Vietnamese could organize within the next
few months, even if the enemy committed many
new reinforcements from North Vietnam. Lam
suspects that the North Vietnamese may wait,
however, and not attack in strength until after
nearly all American combat forces have pulled
out of the northern military region. In this event,
he said, the South Vietnamese might have to
abandon the forward defensive system of fire-sup-
port bases that the allies have maintained for
years in the mountains of the north in order to
protect the coastal plains. By adopting a defensive
posture in the piedmont and coastal areas, Lam
believes that he could fend off North Vietnamese
pressure, but it is clear that in these circumstances
the Communists would be in a better position to
attack the populated coast.
The recently appointed commander of the
South Vietnamese 1st Infantry Division, the main
government combat force in the north, also be-
lieves that the North Vietnamese will wait for US
disengagement before going on the offensive
again. According to yet another report, the mayor
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of Hue recently said he doubted that ARVN
could alone defeat the Communists over the long
haul.
South Vietnamese doubts and Communist
hopes concerning long-term war prospects help
explain why enemy forces are able to stay in the
field even under extremely adverse circumstances.
It seems likely that Communist morale feeds and
sustains itself to a considerable extent on evi-
dence of non-Communist irresolution and pes-
simism. In addition, the view prevalent in some
government and army circles-that a military vic-
tory over the Communists is not possible without
US combat assistance-must encourage the Com-
munists' hopes for their own eventual military
success, or at least a share of political power in
the South.
Senate Action Expected on Economic Reform Bill
A modified version of the so-called program
law allowing President Thieu to carry out certain
economic reform measures may get through the
Senate within the next two weeks and the Lower
House shortly thereafter. Most of the bill's origi-
nal provisions were eliminated by the Senate fi-
nance committee, but the truncated version re-
portedly gives the President the authority to es-
tablish a second, higher foreign exchange rate for
certain transactions.
At a minimum, the bill will provide for an
exchange rate substantially above the present of-
ficial rate of 118 piasters to the dollar to apply to
purchases of piasters by American personnel in
Vietnam, a measure that may draw some dollars
away from the black market but will have little
impact on South Vietnam's economic problems.
The higher rate also may apply to certain classes
of imported luxury goods, which would tend to
discourage purchases of such goods and reduce
importers' profits.
The bill falls far short of what is needed to
stem inflation. Nevertheless, there are some addi-
tional measures President Thieu can take on his
own authority, and the passage of the program
law could put him in better position to move
ahead with them. The National Bank of Vietnam
already has put in effect new interest rates that
should encourage savings and will make credit
more costly. The higher cost of credit should help
to discourage speculation by importers, which has
added to current inflationary pressures.
Some of the planned measures will be un-
popular because they will result in higher prices.
Increased prices of imported items to importers
may be passed on to consumers and could induce
increases in prices of other goods, such as oc-
curred after the imposition of higher import taxes
last October. A proposed wage increase for gov-
ernment employees, however, should help
dampen much of the political uproar. The govern-
ment apparently hopes that after initial price in-
creases its program will help keep inflation within
manageable limits for a while.
Students Running Out of Steam
Pressure on the government from some other
quarters, however, seems to be easing. The threat
of increased student agitation appears to have
dissipated despite the continued detention of sev-
eral militant leaders. Tougher government meas-
ures against demonstrators, student preoccupa-
tion with examinations, and a lack of broad stu-
dent support for any specific grievances have
hampered efforts by activists to sustain the noisy
protest movement. Some militant leaders hope
that the enactment of economic reform legisla-
tion might cause a public outcry and help them to
rekindle antigovernment agitation.
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Cambodia: Government Offensive in Trouble
Fhe government's largest offensive operation
of the war has run into serious difficulty. The
Cambodian Army task force attempting to push
overland to Kompong Thom city along Route 6
was stopped and driven back this week by well-
entrenched Communist troops of the Viet Cong
275th Regiment at Tang Kauk village, 35 miles
south of Kompong Thorn. Government troops
suffered heavy casualties in the fighting there, and
efforts to reinforce them were thwarted after the
enemy reportedly captured a village and de-
stroyed several bridges to the rear of the task
force.
Phnom Penh's early optimism over the op-
eration's prospects for success seemed to be
fading fast, as some Cambodian military officials
began voicing concern that the Communists may
surround the government column and inflict even
heavier losses. Lon Nol, who personally conceived
the operation, probably would be reluctant to call
it off because he has portrayed the drive to
Kompong Thom as a significant step forward in
the fighting in Cambodia.
Meanwhile, the government's amphibious re-
lief convoy left Kompong Chhnang on 17
September on its second supply run to Kompong
Thom. Elsewhere, the Communists continued to
harass government positions in widely scattered
locations. In the northwest, the Communists
maintained their pressure on Siem Reap city and
also attacked and occupied two government out-
posts in Battambang Province in their first such
forays there.
m pon g;'F;om
jto'74
Kempong Chhnang',. //)I Tog
ernment column ttalldrl/. K~iu kk ?
PHNOM PENH
readers ip in nom Penh continues to work
smoothly together, and the potential for internal
political struggle apparently is still slight. Lon Nol
retains strong support from the army and stu-
dents, as well as the backing of most National
Assembly deputies. Despite some grumbling
bout tardy military pay procedures, Cambodian
Army recruits still appear loyal to the govern-
ment; and are optimistic about prospects for
eventual victory.
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PHILIPPINES: The capture of Commander
Sumulong, a ranking Huk chieftain, on 16 Sep-
tember has provided the Marcos government with
.3 propaganda plum but will not appreciably re-
duce Huk influence and terrorism in central
I.._uzon. The administration has already publicized
the appearance before President Marcos of the
captured Huk to buttress its claim that the secu-
rity situation has been significantly eased. It is
unlikely, however, that Sumulong's some 100 fol-
lowers will lay down their arms. The more ideo-
logically motivated insurgency of a rival 300-man
Huk group under Commander Dante in any case
represents a greater security problem than did
Sumulong's essentially racketeering activi-
ties. (CONFIDF.NTIAI: NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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EUROPE
NATO: The Eurogroup permanent representa-
tives last week drafted a statement advocating a
two-year burden-sharing arrangement clearly
linked to the retention of US combat capability
in Europe "at substantially the current levels."
The statement does not specify the amount of
assistance, but takes the position that the Euro-
pean members of NATO should make an offer by
early December to influence US policy decisions.
The Eurogroup defense ministers are likely to
endorse the draft statement-without a specific
aid offer-at their meeting on 1 October. The UK
has apparently persuaded the group to take a
general position for the present, going on to ex-
plore with the US and among themselves a range
of possible arrangements.
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France: Premier Challenged in Bordeaux Election
Over the last year Jean-Jacques Servan-
Schreiber, founder-director of L'Express, one of
France's largest and most influential weeklies, has
progressively intensified his drive to become a
national political figure. After becoming the
leader of the Radical Socialist Party in October
1969, he won a National Assembly seat in an
impressive victory over Gaullist and Communist
opposition last June. Now, in a whirlwind cam-
paign against Premier Jacques Chaban-Delmas for
the National Assembly seat in Bordeaux,
Schreiber has again gained nationwide attention
and turned what would otherwise have been a
routine by-election into an important political
event.
Servan-Schreiber entered the Bordeaux elec-
tion race in competition with several other candi-
dates at the last minute only after efforts to
choose a single candidate of the left failed. Al-
though he has little chance of defeating the
premier, who has served the area well both as
mayor and deputy, Chaban-Delmas may be forced
into a run-off election. Servan-Schreiber, in any
case, has breathed new life into opposition
politics in France, has succeeded in provoking the
Gaullist party into a defense of its position, and
has raised basic questions of constitutional law
and the election system-
Servan-Schreiber will have established himself as
the de facto leader of the non-Communist left
and the most prominent anti-Gaullist politician in
France.
Ironically, if either Servan-Schreiber
Chaban-Delmas wins, neither will occupy Bor-
deaux's National Assembly seat. The vacancy re-
sulted from the death last summer of Chaban-
Delmas' substitute in parliament. Assuming he
wins the election, the premier plans to continue
as head of the government, leaving a new substi-
tute deputy to accept the mandate. If he loses, he
has announced that he will resign both as premier
and mayor. Servan-Schreiber likewise does not
plan to accept the Bordeaux seat because he a l -
r e a d y i s a deputy from Nancy. I f he were to win,
a new Bordeaux by-election would follow
October.
Although Servan?Schreiber's recent activity
on the French scene is gaining him political prom-
inence which may eventually lead to a bid for the
presidency, he is unlikely to pose any serious
challenge to the Gaullist government for some
time. The premier's "New Society" continues to
maintain a high degree of social and economic
stability, and the Gaullists enjoy a massive major-
It he gains a respectable margin in Sunday's
vote by coming in second behind Chaban-Delmas,
USSR - EAST GERMANY - UN: The Soviets
appear ready to make a major effort to seat East
Germany in the UN at the current General As-
sembly session. Their ambassador to Pankow is
included in the delegation to the meeting, suggest-
ing that Moscow plans to bring up this subject.
Numerous other signs of such a campaign include
the increasing public emphasis by the Soviets and
Fast Germans on Pankow's demand for member-
ity in the National Assembly.
ship.
Moscow probably
believes that admission to the UN would precipi-
tate general international recognition of Pankow,
and ultimately force Bonn to follow suit, but the
West Germans are sure that there are enough
votes to block such a move at this session. ~ 25X1
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East European Countries Face Bleak Harvest Prospect
Eastern Europe's 1970 grain harvest will be
the smallest in several years. Total grain produc-
tion is estimated at 66.4 million tons, an 11 per-
cent drop from the record level of 1969 and the
first decline in output since 1964.
A series of weather-related difficulties-in-
cluding drought, snows, cold, and floods-have
plagued the region and caused a reduction in the
total area to be harvested as well as smaller per-
hectare yields for most grain crops. Increased use
of high-yielding grain varieties and more chemical
fertilizers failed to offset the adverse effects of
the unfavorable weather.
Grain production prospects are below last
year's for every East European country except
Bulgaria, where output may exceed that of 1969
but will fall far short of planned goals. Estimated
declines range from about one percent in East
Germany, where the 1969 harvest was only
mediocre, to 16 percent in Poland. In Romania
and Yugoslavia, estimated output not only will
drop substantially, but will fall below the
1964-68 average annual output by 10 and 15
percent respectively.
Bread grain production, which accounts for
about half of total grain produced in the region,
was more adversely affected than that of coarse
grain, and may drop by 15 percent or more from
last year's above-average harvest. Coarse grains
(barley, oats, and corn), largely used to feed live-
stock, are currently projected at 93 percent of
last year's record level.
Eastern Europe's demand for imported grain
during July 1970 - June 1971 may be as high as
7.5 million tons, or nearly one million tons more
than last year. The increase largely reflects the
need of Yugoslavia-self-sufficient in wheat last
year-to import upward of 700,000 tons of
wheat, as well as lesser amounts required by
Hungary and Romania. The northern countries
are likely to maintain imports at last year's high
levels. Bulgaria is the only country that probably
will reduce imports of grain, unless an unexpected
reduction in the corn crop occurs.
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There is no indication whether the USSR,
with a probable record wheat harvest, will in-
crease its exports to Eastern Europe. Neverthe-
less, corn and other feed grains still will have to
be purchased in the West by the grain-deficit
northern countries, although possibly in smaller
quantities than last year. Yugoslavia and Romania
are expected to meet wheat import requirements
largely through Western purchases. Hard currency
earning corn exports by these two countries will
be sharply curtailed.
BULGARIA-ROMANIA: Bulgarian Premier
Zhivkov and Romanian President Ceausescu in
their meeting last week agreed that a Romanian
delegation would visit Sofia in November to sign
the long-delayed renewal of the treaty of friend-
ship, which expired in January 1968. They also
agreed to continue design work on a joint Danube
River hydroelectric power project, long sought by
the Bulgarians. Their meeting, the first in three
years, illustrated Sofia's desire for closer eco-
NETHERLANDS: The De Jong coalition's
chances of coasting placidly through the last
seven months of its four-year mandate have re-
ceived a severe jolt in recent weeks. The nation's
traditionally tranquil society was shocked when
the annual effort to clear out hippies from
Amsterdam's Dam Square led to the worst clashes
between youth and police since 1966. This epi-
sode, and the battlefield aspects of the seizure of
the Indonesian Embassy by Amboinese dissidents,
The extent to which Eastern Europe has to
maintain or increase grain imports from the West,
combined with the likely stagnation or reduction
of agricultural exports, will intensify current
balance of payments problems in the 12-month
period ending next June for most countries. On
the basis of the 1970 harvest, Bulgaria currently
appears to be the only country in a position to
expand the total value of agricultural exports in
nomic ties with Romania. Bucharest had a double
motive-first, an interest in creating the appear-
ance of improving relations with its Warsaw Pact
partners to balance its independent foreign policy
moves in other areas, and second, taking another
step in its renewed initiative for Balkan detente.
These motives are also exemplified by the
Romanian defense minister's first state visit to
East Germany early in September, and by Ceau-
sescu's plans to meet with Yugoslavia's President
have made law and order a prominent political
issue. The series of wildcat strikes in Rotterdam,
the first there in 24 years, have revealed an unsus-
pectedly wide degree of labor discontent and
endangered the government's efforts to limit
inflation. In grappling with their problems, the
coalition parties could easily fall out, resulting in
the downfall of the overnment. F_
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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA
Jordan-Fedayeen: Situation Report
Over 50 airline passengers and crewmen,
most of them US citizens, remained in the hands
of Palestinian commandos as King Husayn moved
on 16 September to bring the fedayeen organiza-
tions to heel.
The all-military cabinet installed on Wednes-
day gave the Palestinian commando organizations
until the end of the day to observe the terms of
the latest government-fedayeen agreement signed
the day before. The fedayeen reacted by putting
all of their combat organizations under the com-
mand of Yasir Arafat, the leader of the Palestine
Liberation Organization. Fedayeen broadcasts
from neighboring capitals denounced the new
government as "fascist," and all commando
groups in Jordan were put on combat alert.
Arafat himself deplored the change in government
and appealed to neighboring governments to
intervene to prevent further bloodshed; some
broadcasts attributed the initial use of the
"fascist" appellation to Arafat. Both the army
and the fedayeen held their fire in Amman, al-
though fighting continued around Irbid and in
other parts of the country.
At dawn on Thursday, Jordanian Army units
encamped outside the city since last June moved
into the capital, firing on fedayeen strongpoints
and the Wahdat refugee camp with tanks and
artillery. Official broadcasts accused the fedayeen
of precipitating the action by firing on govern-
ment installations in the city. The fedayeen,
denying that they had fired first, responded with
mortar and rocket fire against government troops
and buildings. The shooting spread to the center
of the city, and the fighting became general.
Despite fedayeen appeals for assistance,
neither Iraqi nor Syrian regular forces had made
any move toward Jordan as of Thursday noon,
although there were indications that fedayeen
contingents in both countries would be sent into
northern Jordan. Unless they were drawn into the
fray by indiscriminate Jordanian Army action, it
seemed unlikely that Iraq's Salah-al-Din units in
Jordan would join in on the side of the fedayeen.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine continues to hold 54 passengers and
crewmen from the airliners it hijacked and de-
stroyed at Dawson's Landing. The International
Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), having suc-
cessfully negotiated the release and repatriation
of most of the kidnaped passengers, suspended its
formal negotiations with the PFLP despite nearly
frantic pressure from representatives of the Ger-
man, British, Swiss, and US governments.
Throughout the week diplomats from the four
nations met with ICRC officials in Bern and
Amman in an effort to present a united front
against PFLP terms for the release of the rest of
the hostages. Israel's refusal to be a direct party
to the negotiations-on the grounds that this
amounted to submitting to blackmail-left the
other governments under strong pressure to make
separate deals with the PFLP for the release of
their nationals.
The PFLP is holding fast to its demand-
apparently backed now by the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization-that hijackers imprisoned in
Europe and a dozen-odd prisoners of the Israelis
must be released before it will even designate the
Palestinians the Israelis must free in return for the
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hostages. The new confrontation with the Jor-
danian Government may also prompt the feda-
yeen to use the hostages to prevent Jordanian
Army assaults on some fedayeen positions. The
PFL,P was temporarily suspended from member-
ship in the fedayeen Central Committee for its
unauthorized and unheralded destruction of the
hijacked aircraft, but was soon restored to
membership.
Despite the general condemnation of its
action even in the Arab world, the PFLP's spec-
tacular success in dramatizing the Palestinian
cause has again forced the larger and more moder-
ate commando groups into a more radical
posture. The PFLP's avowed purpose was to
Israel-Egypt: Ceasefire
The problems in Jordan somewhat over-
shadowed events surrounding the US peace ini-
tiative and the cease-fire between Egypt and Is,
rael.
Israel on 14 September lodged its 14th com-
plaint with the UN concerning Egyptian viola-
tions of the cease-fire. The latest charge included
allegations that SA-3 missile batteries had been
moved to within 19 miles of the Suez Canal, well
within the 32-mile cease-fire/standstill zone. Ac-
cording to Israeli press reports, the cabinet on 1 --
September discussed the possibility of arranging
for a new cease-fire agreement that would estab.
lish a demilitarized zone on both sides of the
canal; one Israeli editorialist suggested that such
an arrangement could both save face for the
Egyptians and meet Israel's objections to the mis-
sile buildup. It is extremely unlikely that Cairo or
Moscow would agree to such a plan, however, and
even Israeli Deputy Premier Allon said on 15
September that his government had not and pro-
bably would not accept any proposal regarding a
new cease-fire agreement in the near future.
During Prime Minister Meir's visit to the US,
which begins this week, the Israelis will probably
demonstrate its opposition to Arab acquiescence
in the US peace plan., with the release of im-
prisoned commandos only a secondary aim. PFLP
officials have also made clear their desire that
King Husayn be overthrown for his "betrayal" of
the Palestinian cause. It will be all but impossible
now for Arafat to cooperate publicly with the
King, despite their previous efforts to avoid a
violent showdown. The PFLP action had already
drawn Yasir Arafat and the fedayeen "mod-
erates" into a more radical posture; the army's
general assault on the Palestine commando move-
ment has virtually eliminated the middle ground
previously occupied by Arafat and the bulk of the
fedayeen organizations.
emphasize their concern over the Egyptian viola-
tions and attempt to prod Washington into taking
some action that will redress the alleged imbal-
ance in the canal area. Eban probably will pursue
a similar course of action during his stay in New
York at the UN General Assembly beginning this
week. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon on 15
September stated that Israel will continue to boy-
cott the Jarring talks so long as the cease-fire/-
standstill zone is not restored to its condition
before the cease-fire went into effect on 7 Au-
gust.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad, meanwhile,
has announced that his country views the US
peace initiative as virtually dead. In a press con-
ference on 15 September, Riad declared that cur-
rent US action in support of Israel, including the
recent publicity about new military and economic
aid, have ended the US initiative. It is necessary
to reactivate the four-power discussions on the
Middle East, Riad added, and to work through
this channel for implementing the 1967 UN Secu-
rity Council resolution on the Middle East. Egypt,
Riad said, is willing to facilitate the role of UN
mediator Jarring in this effort and will continue
to respect the cease-fire so long as Jarring is
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active-"We will cooperate with him under the
auspices of the Security Council resolution, not
under the auspices of the US initiative." Riad has
reportedly postponed indefinitely his scheduled
arrival at the UN.
The Soviets continue to reject as unfounded
all US-Israeli charges of Egyptian cease-fire viola-
tions. Moscow has repeatedly set forth Cairo's
case that new missile installations have not been
introduced into the canal zone and that those
missile movements that have taken place are both
Libya: Revolutionary Regime in Control
After a year in power the Libyan revolu-
tionary regime, which toppled the monarchy on 1
September 1969, has accomplished much in the
eyes of the Libyan people. It has ejected the
British and Americans from their military bases
and has ended dependence upon them for arms
by making arrangements with the Soviet Union
and France. It has established close relations with
Nasir's Egypt and with the new radical military
regime in the Sudan. It has also adopted a policy
of strong backing for the fedayeen and their goal
of replacing Israel with a nonsectarian, multicul-
tural state.
legitimate and required for security purposes. At
the same time, Moscow has accused Israel of using
the "alleged violations" as a pretext to sabotage
the peace talks. The Soviets have also attacked
reported new US arms commitments to Israel as
"dangerous steps" that only further encourage
the "Tel Aviv extremists to wreck a political
settlement."
There have been virtually no shooting inci-
dents along the Suez Canal since the cease-fire
was established. 25X1
Qaddafi, who views the US as Israel's main-
stay, has been advocating increased action against
US interests, especially oil, in the Arab world to
force the US to modify its relationship with Is-
rael. In Libya itself, all domestic petroleum
marketing facilities have been nationalized, and
some US firms have been ordered to cut back
their production at least temoraril.
Other Western interests have suffered from
the regime's xenophobia. The government has
Although there are reported differences confiscated the property of all Italian residents,
within the ruling Revolutionary Command Coun- the largest Western community in Libya, and
cil, Colonel Qaddafi still appears to be its leader nationalized the principal Italian bank. At the
and spokesman. His eagerness for close ties with same time, the regime is wary of Soviet attempts
Egypt has caused apprehension among many Lib- to su lant Western influence.
yans, but Nasir is much admired in Libya, espe-
cially in Tripolitania. Qaddafi has become so de-
pendent on Nasir that Egyptian troops are sta-
tioned near Tripoli and Benghazi as a deterrent
against a countercoup, especially by anti-Egyptian
and hundreds of Egyptian technicians are advisers
within the Libyan Government.
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South Africa: Coloureds'Resentment Grows
South Africa's Coloured community is be-
coming increasingly bitter and more alienated
from the whites.
Although the two million Coloureds (mulat-
toes of mixed white, black, and in some cases,
Asian parentage) have always had to accept a
large degree of de facto racial separation and
discrimination, it had been assumed that they
would align themselves with the whites in the
event of a crisis with South Africa's large black
population. That assumption now is being ques-
tioned, both by moderate Afrikaner politicians
and by the English press. Coloured children, for
example, are showing open hatred for whites, a
phenomenon virtually nonexistent in the past.
Moreover, Coloured spectators have been cheering
visiting foreign athletic teams and booing the all-
white South African teams-a practice picked up
from the blacks.
The increasing concern in Afrikaner circles
over this trend stems in part from new population
projections. These indicate that in 30 years there
will be 40 million blacks in South Africa, but
only six million Coloureds and six million whites.
These statistics give impetus to the idea that
whites must modify their policies to keep Col-
oureds on their side against a black threat.
The Coloureds were disenfranchised in 1948,
but until 1967 four white representatives in par-
liament were specifically designated to look after
their affairs. The Coloureds held a special referen-
dum in the fall of 1969 to elect a Coloured
Persons Representative Council, designed by the
Afrikaner government to be the first step toward
establishing a "Coloured nation." Territorial
apartheid is impossible, however, because the Col-
oureds have no separate homeland.
Now two plans-essentially soaps-i:o bring
the Coloureds back into the government on a
small scale are being privately discussed by Afri-
kaners. One would permit the now powerless Col-
oured Council to elect two Coloureds to the
South African Senate, a weak upper house in the
British tradition. A second plan would link the
council and parliament, but would stop short of
direct representation for the Coloureds. Neither
proposal could get off the ground unless Prime
Minister Vorster puts his personal prestige and
power behind it, and he seems more concerned
with other policy matters. The plans are probably
too little and too late, but they at least represent
a greater awareness among the Afrikaners of the
potential dangers to their security if they con-
tinue to isolate and embitter the Coloured com-
munity.
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: The Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) meets
today in Montreal in a special session to review
the US request for consideration of an air services
boycott of nations harboring aircraft hijackers.
Similar proposals received no support at a meet-
ing of Western nations last December and only a
lukewarm response at the ICAO Assembly
meeting in June. The recent wave of hijackings
appears to have altered the diplomatic climate,
however, with some nations now viewing such
sanctions as an attractive means to forestall the
increasing possibility of a world-wide strike by
the International Federation of Airline Pilots'
Associations.
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Sierra Leone: Prime Minister Challenged
Important defections from the cabinet and
the ruling All People's Congress (APC) have se-
riously weakened Prime Minister Stevens' power
base and touched off a major political struggle.
Party factionalism broke into the open last
weekend with the resignation of two prominent
cabinet ministers who represent a party faction
long critical of Stevens' leadership. At a sub-
sequent well-attended rally in the capital held in
defiance of a government ban, the ex-ministers
charged Stevens with corruption and using vio-
lence to intimidate opponents. Potentially more
damaging to Stevens' political position was the
resignation from the APC of John Karefa-Smart, a
widely popular figure often mentioned as Stevens'
strongest challenger.
To discourage further defections and stifle
overt criticism, Stevens declared a state of emer-
gency on 14 September. He could use it as a
pretext for suppressing opponents, a stratagem he
has employed in the past. The declaration, a first
step in Stevens' counterattack, must be affirmed
by a two-thirds vote in Parliament or it lapses.
CONGO (KINSHASA): Counterinsurgency oper-
ations in the rugged terrain near Lake Tanganyika
in the eastern Congo have intensified, although
recent rumors of a sharp increase in rebel activity
in this area seem unfounded. A combination of
small raids on government outposts and uncon-
firmed reports of increased Communist Chinese
support for the rebels through Tanzania probably
triggered the reinforcement of army units search-
ing for remnants of the 1964 Simba revolt.
The raids may be part of a reported effort
by various rebel factions to combine forces and
Controversy is likely to center around the
corruption charges and Stevens' efforts to in-
troduce a new constitution under which Sierra
Leone would become a republic ruled by a strong
executive president. His opponents both within
and outside his party, see these efforts as moves
toward one-man rule. The defections will make
completion of the necessary constitutional steps
more difficult.
The defections will also force Stevens to
reassess his intention to call new elections soon.
Traditionally, the main political opposition to his
northern-based APC came from a southern-based
party that ruled until 1967. Now, however, Stev-
ens faces a significant opposition in the north; all
the defectors are from that area.
With tensions building, the prospect for vio-
lence, never far below the surface in Sierra Leone
politics, is increasing. If Stevens tries to use the
emergency declaration to imprison his critics, ten-
sions will rise sharply. Furthermore, attempts at
strong-arm tactics could backfire by alienating
security force commanders, who are opposed to
becoming involved in political moves to quash
Stevens' opponents. 25X1
disrupt the presidential and legislative elections
scheduled to be held late this year. It is unlikely
that either China or Tanzania would suddenly
give significant support to die-hard Congolese
rebels. Still, continuing small raids as the elections
approach could be embarrassing to President
Mobutu's government and could provoke in-
discriminate punitive operations against local
inhabitants who have hitherto withheld support
from the rebels.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile: Allende Strengthens His Position
fhe prospects that his opponents will avert
the inauguration of Salvador Allende as President
on 4 November are dimming. His quick assump-
l:ion of the role of president-elect and the in-
timidating tactics of his partisans have helped to
:educe the alternatives of the opposition largely
to flight or accommodation and to ensr.re the
~tapid development of a Marxist state.
Ica frequent public appearances and inter-
.'Jews with Chilean and international newsmen,
AH ende has alternated reassurances with dire ac
as,tions in an attempt to buttress his claim that
tre i?, already the president-elect. The Communists
yid some of Allende's nth(,,- hackers, meanwhile,
rnidly extending their ,sower in kev areas and
e +.ntirnidatinn actual of potential opponents
'en to the point of threaf.eninrt murder They
exerted their influence in man- TV and
io stations, telecnmrnunicationc facilities,
"-cv spapers, and universities. The Communists are
Aso consolidating their strong position through
her control of most of tf;r-, 8,000 local Popular
malty cornmi ttees organized to back Allende
lnrirart the presidential campaign,
Neither military nor pAitical opposition to
ende has coalesced, and the exodus of many
Chileans holding important positions that affect
the economic life of the country has reduced the
options and effectiveness of would-be opponents.
Although initial signs of financial panic have
eased, economic fears and uncertainties have al-
ready caused widespread repercussions.
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC)-- the
largest party with the biggest representation in
Congress--is trying to close ranks so that it can
reassert whatever influence it has. It seems un-
likely at this point, however, that PDC legislators
will avail themselves of the constitutional op-
portrmity to join runner-up Jorge Alessandri's
backers and reiect Allende's slim plurality In-
P')('- leaders are seeking guarantees from
Allende that they claim would ensure the survival
of Chilean institutions and democracy. Allende,
However, would have no difficulty circumventing
these guarantees
President Eduardo Frei has pcbli(-ly kept
aloof from the whole situation, but he probably
had a hand in his party's drawback from the hasty
and ingratiating approach to Allende made by its
defeated candidate Radomiro 1-ornic. The ?loog
rivalry between Tomic and Frei reflects some. Of
the many divisions that have limited the PDC's
effectiveness and have led to its decline in size
during its six years in power.
Leaders of both the PDC and the armed
fnrc -, fear that any reversal of Allf=nde'c nnprr;; ,-
ac Cory of 4 September would sei off extensi.,e
::.ad possibly uncontrollable violence. Evidence is
increasing that the military is unlikely to chal-
lenge or even encourage opposition to Allende.
Ranking officers in all services reportedly will
confine themselves to "protecting the constitu-
tional process." They too are seeking assurances
from Allende that he will respect the independ-
ence of the armed forces--assurances that he may
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Brazil: Government Tries To Muzzle Prelate
Many government and military officials are
becoming increasingly irritated with Archbishop
Helder Camara because of his accusations that the
Brazilian Government tortures prisoners and
otherwise violates human rights. Officials believe
that his statements, which are made mostly dur-
ing his frequent travels abroad and receive wide
coverage in the foreign press, have contributed
heavily to the Medici administration's very un-
favorable image in Europe and the US. This belief
reportedly is shared by a considerable segment of
the Brazilian hierarchy, which has attempted to
avoid exacerbating the tense relations between
the Church and the government and military.
As background for
a campaign recently
launched to discredit
Dora Helder, a detailed
study of his life was pre-
pared by the National
Intelligence Service. An
officially sponsored tele-
vision program on 24
August accused the pre-
late of using falsified
photographs to docu-
ment his charges of po-
lice brutality, and an
article entitled "The
Angel of Terror" in the
15 September edition of the widely circulated
magazine 0 Cruzeiro, attacks the archbishop for
supporting Brazilian fascists in previous years and
for associating with the extreme left at present.
The article also was inspired by the government.
President Medici is also considering asking
Education Minister Passarinho to debate publicly
with the churchman on the issues of torture and
human rights, but Passarinho, a politically astute
cabinet official, has tried to dissuade Medici from
putting him in this uncomfortable position.
The archbishop is aware that he has few
opportunities to publicize his views in Brazil, and
is convinced that the government's efforts to
muzzle him really serve to increase his stature.
He therefore plans to continue to utilize his
foreign travels to speak out and thus improve
his standing as an advocate of social justice; he
reportedly is now very anxious to visit Peru. In
August, Dom Helder was awarded the first
annual Martin Luther King Award in Atlanta,
and he recently said that the only thing better
than winning a Nobel Prize would be an attempt
by the Brazilian Government to use pressure to
prevent his receiving it.
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Guyana Moves Into the Third World
Prime Minister Burnham used last week's
Nonaligned Nations conference in Lusaka to ac-
centuate his strongly nationalistic policies and
link himself with the third world.
In a significant policy switch, Burnham
called for the admission of Communist China to
the United Nations, stating that "the UN should
become truly universal in character." In the past,
Guyana has either voted with the US or abstained
on resolutions calling for China's admission. Burn-
ham also urged nonaligned members to give
"tangible support to African liberation move-
ments" and to pledge annual payments to their
cause. He announced a Guyanese contribution of
US$25,000. On Vietnam, Burnham said that for-
eign troops should be withdrawn. This is the first
public stand taken by any Guyanese leader on the
war. Even before the conference Burnham served
notice that he was embarking on a new foreign
policy by announcing on 5 September that
Guyana and the USSR had agreed to establish
diplomatic relations.
In addition to his foreign policy pronounce-
ments, Burnham again attacked foreign aid as
insufficient and always in the interest of the
donor, claiming that any benefits received were
purely incidental and unintended. He announced
that upon his return home he would seek means
to control his nation's minerals. Before the con-
ference Burnham had put the large Canadian and
US-owned bauxite companies on notice that he
will seek at least 51-percent government participa-
tion in that industry.
Burnham's statements reflect his drive to
demonstrate his "independence" from both major
blocs-particularly from the US-and also suggest
that he will become more active in third world
activities. The 14-member Guyanese delegation,
one of the largest at the conference, is a good
measure of the importance Burnham placed on it.
He was the only chief of state from the Western
Hemisphere to attend, and he probably believes
that his position as spokesman for the Caribbean
has been enhanced by his statements in
Lusaka. 25X1
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Honduras: Lopez Power Play Expected
President Lopez, determined to remain ii
power beyond June 1971, appears to be wavering
on how to circumvent the constitutional prohibi-
tion against a second term. His most likely
method is to have the military pull a coup that
25X1 would overturn the constitution and defer the
,March 1971 elections.
Oswaido Lopez Arellano
Honduran President
assembly in return for the establishment of a
government of national unity, which would, in
the future, alternate the presidency between the
government and opposition parties. Efforts to
drum up enthusiasm for continuismo have been
ineffective, however.
The Liberal Party, joined by students, labor
leaders, and leftists of various persuasions, have
declared their opposition to any extraconstitu-
tional action. Although inertia and incompetence
have prevented these opposition elements from
working out a coherent political strategy, Liberal
Party leaders apparently believe that official an-
nouncement of their presidential candidate will
arouse such public interest in elections that Lopez
will not intervene.
Although preferring to avoid a heavy-handed
approach and aware that an attempt to extend his
term would increase political tensions and per-
haps lead to some terrorist incidents, Lopez is
unlikely to forgo his political ambitions at this
stage. The military, which supports the President,
appears capable of maintaining control and Lopez
could probably undercut some leftist opposition
by adopting a more radical, nationalist pol-
icy.
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Lopez has been pa--
ticularly concerned with
preserving a semblance
of legality, and his sup-
porters h ave I o n g
labored to convince the
opposition Liberal Party
In agree to a constituent
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Bahamas: Prime Minister Facing Political Difficulties
An economic slump combined with dissatis-
faction within the ruling party could lead to a
challenge to Prime Minister Pindling's leadership.
The recent trend toward more nationalistic
economic policies and tighter government con-
trols over foreign investment reportedly has
undermined investor confidence, which in turn
has led to a significant loss in anticipated govern-
ment revenues. The degree to which the shift in
government policy is responsible for the eco-
nomic slump is unclear, but the administration
has responded to the loss of revenues by mod-
erating its public line. For example, the govern-
ment recently placed full-page ads in major US
and European dailies in order to tout the admin-
istration's economic accomplishments as well as
to reassure foreign investors. Nevertheless, the
appointment this week of a government commis-
sion to re-examine the Hawksbill agreement,
which grants investors some local autonomy, will
continue to make businessmen cautious about
further investments.
Pindling's political foes are trying to capi-
talize on these economic problems. The opposi-
tion United Bahamian Party has publicly chas-
tised the government for its turnabout policies,
claiming they are placing the nation in "economic
jeopardy." More meaningful than such sniping
from the opposition camp, which only controls
about one fifth of the seats in the Assembly, are
signs of dissatisfaction within Pindling's own
party. His parliamentary bloc, upset by the eco-
nomic problems, is said to be exerting pressure
for cabinet changes. Some of the prime minister's
rivals in the cabinet are said to be resisting any
changes, possibly with a view toward creating a
government crisis in order to force Pindling from
power. If Pindling attempts a wholesale shake-up,
it might permit his ministerial foes to join with
those parliamentary members dissatisfied with
current policies; together they would create a
formidable challenge to his leadership.
Pindling has not consistently exercised firm
leadership in his three and one-half years in
power, but he has proven to be a relatively adroit
politician. This latest behind-the-scenes ma-
neuvering is the third time in the last year that
disgruntled party members reportedly have
coalesced behind Minister of Education Wallace-
Whitfield, Pindling's prospective successor. The
prime minister's opponents, however, have re-
peatedly backed off from any showdown.
Pindling remains personally popular, and his25X1
themes of economic nationalism and the
"Bahamas for Bahamians," have probably en-
erated some public sympathy for him.
CENTRAL AMERICA: The economics ministers
of the five Central American Common Market
countries reached agreement last week on a plan
which, when implemented, will allow the Market
to function normally. Bowing to Honduran de-
mands, the ministers agreed to the establishment
of a development fund that would be used to
correct persistent intraregional trade deficits. A
coordinated agricultural policy is also to be de-
veloped, and new protocols on the establishment
of regional industries are to be negotiated.
Working level meetings will begin in October to
iron out the details, which will be reviewed by the
ministers in November. F_ I 25X1
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URUGUAY: Urban terrorism is on the increase
despite the intensive efforts of security forces to
suppress the guerrillas. Since the kidnaping of
three foreigners in late July and early August, the
extreme leftist Tupamaros have lost a number of
top leaders because of increased police and army
activity in Montevideo. Despite these reversals,
the Tupamaros have sharply increased their ter-
rorist attacks. Since 10 September, these attacks
have been broadened to include targets clearly
identified as US-owned. Messages from im-
prisoned Tupamaros-who now total between 180
BOLIVIA: Clashes between the army and guer-
rillas of the pro-Cuban Army of National Libera-
tion (ELN) are occurring with greater frequency.
In fighting on 12 and 13 September there were at
least eight guerrilla casualties; the armed forces
suffered four. Despite the military's poor state of
preparedness, operations north of La Paz in the
past seven weeks have resulted in the death or
capture of nearly half of the guerrillas that par-
ticipated in the raid on a mining encampment on
19 July. The increasing number of clashes sug-
gests that the army's net is slowly being drawn
around the ELN group.
and 200-recently intercepted by the police have
confirmed suspicions that the guerrillas are in
some instances being directed by imprisoned lead-
ers.
President Pacheco is expected to announce
the cancellation of his official trip to Europe,
scheduled for October, because the fate of the
American and Brazilian held hostage by the
Tupamaros for more than six weeks remains in
The government's fight against rural insur-
gents is now being joined by a crackdown on
suspected subversives in the urban centers. This
move was initiated on 16 September with the
arrest and exile of several leftist priests, including
Father Jose Prats, who in July mediated the re-
lease of the two hostages held by the ELN in
return for the release of 10 imprisoned ELN
members. The arrests have already caused violent
demonstrations, and more trouble is ex-
pected.
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Secret
Secret
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Sweden Enters the Unicameral Era
Secret
N? 43
18 September 1970
No. 0388/70A
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CONFIDENTIAL
After 16 years of controversy and compromise, the Swedes are about to
abandon more than a century of bicameral legislative rule and enter the brave new
world of unicameralism. As if to make the transition more exciting, some of the
political parties have changed leaders since the last election in 1968, while others are
bubbling with internal discontent following abortive attempts to dump their chair-
men.- of managing the reform has fallen to the Social Democrats, in
power for 38 years but under the leadership of Prime Minister Olof Palme for a little
less than one year. Political polls forecast little change in the existing balance of
power, but with the rules of the game almost entirely rewritten, no political observer
is willing to leave-any bets unhedged.
On 20 September more than 5.6 million
Swedes will be able to take part in an historic
election to choose the 350 members of the
nation's first unicameral parliament. At the same
time they will pass judgment on nearly a year of
Social Democratic government under the leader-
ship of the controversial Olof Palme. The voters
will thereby signify whether they are willing to
grant his party the opportunity to celebrate 40
continuous years in office in 1972. Political
observers are inclined to believe that Palme and
his party will be returned to power, but they are
cautious in their forecasts because of their igno-
rance of how the new electoral system will work.
Under the old system the 233-seat Second
Chamber (lower house) was elected every four
years, most recently in 1968, with each party
gaining representation on a strict proportional
basis within each of the nation's 28 electoral
districts. The 151-seat First Chamber (upper
house) was chosen by provincial and local coun-
cils, one eighth of its membership coming up for
election each year. During most of the postwar
period, the balance of power between the Social
*Literally, the Moderate Coalition Party
**Literally, the People's Party
***Literally, the Left Party-Communists
Special Report
Democrats on the one hand and the three
bourgeois parties-the Conservatives,* the Center,
and the Liberals**-on the other has been fairly
even. Only in 1968 did the Social Democrats gain
a clear majority in the lower house, but this was
wholly attributable to the national sense of shock
at the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia less than
a month earlier and a desire to avoid experiments
in a critical time. Under the skilled leadership of
Tage Erlander, the Social Democrats did not need
a majority of the lower house to rule, because the
prolonged squabbling among the bourgeois parties
prevented the formation of a cohesive non-
socialist coalition. At times the Social Democrats
were able to lure the Center Party into coalition
with them; at other times they were able to
operate with the silent support of the Com-
munists*** under the thoroughly revisionist lead-
ership of Carl-Henrik Hermansson. In addition,
Social Democratic control of a disproportionate
number of provincial and local councils meant
that the party was usually overrepresented in the
upper house, and in the postwar years it enjoyed
an uninterrupted majority over all the other
parties. Because of the bicameral system's rule
that both chambers act jointly in "economic
questions," the Social Democrats could usually
- 1 - 18 September 1970
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Sweden
Parliamentary Seats
by Electoral Districts, 1910
GdTENORG-BOHUS~ < KARABORQ 6STERGlSTLAND
W^ OVINCEI :.:ID j/ rc
17 1-
1DNK( PING
MALMO-LUND-
LANDSKRONA-
HAISINGBORG
18
HALLA#iD~?"`~ V I
KRONOBERG/
6 a
KR ISTIANSOTAO(, BLEKING`E`
-.-t
'1 6
'Y1ALHUS
~1D
GOTLAND
2
Special Report -2-
18 September 1970
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act as a majority government regardless of the
fact that they might have only a plurality in the
lower house.
Under the new system, the 350-seat parlia-
ment will be elected every three years, and the
voting age will be lowered from 20 to 19. Parties
will gain representation on a proportional basis
within all of the nation's 28 electoral districts if
they win at least 4 percent of the total national
vote. Those parties that receive less than 4 per-
cent of the national vote but more than 12 per-
cent in one electoral district, however, may
receive their proportionate number of seats in
that district. Of the 350 seats, 310 will be dis-
tributed among the 28 election districts and 40
will be considered as having the whole nation as
their constituency. Unlike members of the lower
house in the old system, members of parliament
from specific election districts will no longer have
to be resident in their districts. Furthermore, the
number of representatives per district will be de-
cided according to the number of persons eligible
to vote in each district instead of the district's
total population, as was the case in the old sys-
tem. If the 1968 lower house elections had been
held according to the new system, the Social
Democrats would have received 184 seats and the
bourgeois parties 166, (Conservatives 51, Center
61, Liberals 55), a closer balance than was
achieved under the old system. The Communists,
with only three percent of the total national vote
and less than 12 percent in any single district,
would have been shut out altogether.
Complicating the picture further in com-
paring the old and new electoral systems is the
fact that henceforth, parliamentary, provincial,
and local elections will be held simultaneously.
Previously provincial and local elections were held
midway through the parliamentary term, and as
Sweden had no parliamentary by-elections, these
served as a fairly reliable index of the state of
voter opinion. Even so, certain distortions crept
in, as voters tended to make up their minds on
the basis of the appeal of local personalities and
Composition of Lower House
1968-1910
Center
Party
Liberal
Party
Social
Democratic
Party
Conservative
Party
32
Special Report
Communist
Party
3
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compelling everyday issues unrelated to ideo-
logical considerations. For these reasons skillful
splinter parties could from time to time eke out
isolated marginal victories. In national elections
the voters tended to adhere to their traditional
ideological loyalties, regardless of the personali-
ties or issues involved. The ultimate effect that
simultaneous, across-the-board elections will have
on the outcome of the national elections cannot
be foreseen.
The Swedish election commission may have
been somewhat relieved to learn that at least one
part of its added responsibilities in administering
the new system could be postponed. The original
intention of the law was to introduce machine
voting to replace paper ballots in 1970. Late in
1969, however, the Facit company, an interna-
tionally known Swedish business machines con-
cern, announced that it could not possibly come
up in time with a device comprehensive enough to
handle the large number of options available to
the voter and also simple enough for him to
operate. Therefore, the commission prepared
hundreds of thousands of yellow ballots for
parliamentary contests, blue ballots for provincial
slates, and white ballots for local contests. Yet
when delivery was made to local polling places in
early August, the ballots of the different parties
were mixed together in some localities, while
correctly labeled and packaged ballots were sent
to the wrong districts. One Stockholm newspaper
commented half-ironically that "this election
could well become really exciting."
Developments within the Political Parties, 1968-1970
Many of the principal players, as well as the
rules of the game, have been changed since the
last election. Outstanding in this respect was the
departure in October 1969 of the widely re-
spected Tage Erlander from the positions of
Social Democratic party chairman and prime
minister, after nearly a quarter of a century in
both jobs. His successor in thesepositions was Olof
Palme, then only 42 years old, but with 15 years'
experience as Erlander's right-hand man and as a
Special Report -4
skillful political controversialist with a sharp
instinct for the jugular.
Coming from the upper bourgeoisie and with
family connections to the lesser nobility, Palme is
cordially disliked by his social peers as a traitor to
his class and by his fellow members of parliament
for his cavalier disregard of the clubby atmos-
phere that surrounds legislative proceedings. At
the same time he is feared because of his demon-
strated ability to destroy the political reputations
of his opponents. Even within his party there is a
certain uneasiness. Despite his unanimous election
as party chairman, there was some concern
expressed sotto voce that while Palme had dis-
played a consistent tendency to espouse fashion-
able causes with remarkable ease and alacrity, no
one really could say where he actually stood.
After he became prime minister, the national
press editoralized that never before in Swedish
history had a man whose principles were so little
known entered such high office.
Until 1964 Palme preferred to play a be-
hind-the-scenes role in policy matters. As a result
of radio and television debates in the parlia-
mentary election campaign that year, however, he
came to be regarded as a key party spokesman.
The following year the expansion of the Ameri-
can military effort in Vietnam provided Palme
with a perfect issue to attract the support of the
young radicals, both in the party and on its
fringes. In July 1965 he assailed IJS policies in
Southeast Asia, condemning "the use of military
means against the demands for social justice." In
1966 he called on the United States to end the
bombing in Vietnam and recognize the National
Liberation Front. In 1968 he took part in a mass
march protesting the war, accompanied by Ameri-
can deserters and North Vietnamese diplomats,
and at this point Washington called its ambassa-
dor home for extended "consultations."
Despite the official American reaction, the
leadership in the party and government backed
Palme's actions, as there was no question of his
success in winning support among heretofore
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uncommitted segments of the electorate. Besides,
the party had grown concerned that its own left
wing would succumb in the 1968 elections to the
very attractive revisionist siren song of the Com-
munists under Hermansson. Ironically, the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia put an end to any
appeal Hermansson and his party may have had,
and the disaffected trooped back into the Social
Democratic ranks in record numbers.
Following the Social Democratic victory in
the 1968 elections and Palme's election to high
party and national office a year later, the Swedish
leadership decided that the time had come to
cultivate an image of reason and responsibility.
Palme monopolized the radio and television
broadcast schedules explaining himself and his
ideas, demonstrating that he was indeed not the
devil incarnate. In the spring of 1970 he traveled
to Bonn, London, and Paris to introduce himself
and explain how a neutral Sweden would fit into
an enlarged European Community. Following
these trips, which received considerable favorable
publicity in Sweden, Palme attempted to repair
his relations with the United States. Encouraged
by the arrival of a new American ambassador to
fill the Stockholm post that had been vacant for
15 months, Palme arranged a private trip to the
US, ostensibly to receive an honorary degree at
his American alma mater, Kenyon College, but
actually to make unofficial contact with Ameri-
can political leaders. Despite a long conversation
with Secretary of State Rogers, Palme was re-
ceived coolly in Washington. After some criticism
at home that he was neither making any break-
throughs nor adhering to his self-professed atti-
tude of independent criticism of the transgres-
sions of great powers, Palme became a little more
forthright in describing the Swedish official atti-
tude, thereby satisfying his domestic critics to
some extent. The trip to the United States was
followed almost immediately by a journey to
Moscow, where Palme attempted to persuade the
Soviets of the importance of Swedish entry into
an enlarged European Community. Although the
Soviets were willing to lavish kind words on
Swedish neutrality, they remained unmoved in
their opposition to "closed blocs."
Special Report
Within a few months after the departure of
Tage Erlander from the leadership of the Social
Democratic Party, the Liberal Party replaced its
leader, Sven Weden, in office for only three years,
with Gunnar Helen, a prominent party figure who
had been on the sidelines since the mid-1960s
because of illness. Helen took over a deeply di-
vided party whose leadership was anxious to draw
closer to the other bourgeois parties while its
youth organization sought to radicalize the party.
After doing quite well in the 1966 provincial and
local elections, the liberals suffered a sharp set-
back in 1968 because of this division. The party
believed that Helen, with his skill as a political
debater and conciliator, could improve its for-
tunes.
Helen went about his repair work cautiously,
and by the end of 1969 he could point to rising
confidence among the membership in his abilities
as a leader and to renewed efforts to patch up
differences with the other bourgeois parties,
notably with the Center Party led by Gunnar
Hedlund. As a concession to the youth wing of
the party, he encouraged internal debate, raised
several junior members to higher positions of
responsibility, and perhaps most important of all,
announced the party's intention to stop receiving
contributions from business and industrial circles.
In contrast to the relatively secure financial
position of the Liberals, the Conservatives under-
went a severe financial crisis in the fall of 1969,
and there was considerable sentiment to dump
party leader Yngve Holmberg, in office only since
1965. Many of the party's more conservative
circles in the south and west had resented the
change of the Swedish name of their organization
from "the Right Party" to the characterless
"Moderate Coalition Party," and the news that
Holmberg had nearly bankrupted the party in the
1968 elections was a little too much for them to
bear. Using the tactic that the best defense is a
strong offense, Holmberg succeeded in getting
re-elected as party chairman, but even so, nearly a
year after the last congress, roughly one third of
the Conservative members still persist in their
belief that he is not doing a good job.
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Under the leadership of Gunnar Hed und,
now in his third decade as party chairman, the
Center Party has pursued a serene course. After
its experience in coalition with the Social Demo-
crats from 1951 to 1957, the Center decided that
its political future lay in de-emphasizing its identi-
fication with agrarian interests and in promoting
cooperation with the other bourgeois parties in
order to develop a viable alternative to socialist
rule. Taking a leaf from the Norwegian experience
in 1965 and the Danish experience in 1968, the
Center Party initiated joint discussions with the
other bourgeois parties on parliamentary tactics,
policy coordination, and election techniques. Par-
ticularly close ties were formed with the Liberals,
the two parties being commonly lumped together
,is the "Middle Parties," and there has been some
speculation that the eventual aim is a merger of
the two. During Sven Weden's chairmanship of
the Liberal Party, cooperative efforts were toned
down somewhat, but the Social Democrats' suc-
cess in exploiting bourgeois differences in the
1968 elections pointed up to the Center the need
for a resumption of closer cooperation.
Hedlund, even while pursuing this course,
has not forgotten to leave other doors open. His
relations with Erlander were particularly friendly,
and while his regard for Palme is somewhat more
qualified, he has not forgotten the advantages
derived from coalition with the Socialists. He
therefore has not been as sharp as his bourgeois
colleagues in criticizing the government's policies
and programs. The Center Party is swift to ad-
vance compromises on given issues in parliament,
and since the departure of Erlarder and Bertil
Ohlin, a prominant Liberal politician, Hedlund
has assumed the mantle of the leading active e'der
statesman of the nation.
The situation in the Communist Party has
been stormier. Party chairman Carl-Henrik Her-
mansson came into office in 1964 as the leader of
the modernizing, reformist segment of the party.
His revisionist policies, to the great dissatisfaction
of both old-line party stalwarts centered in the far
north, and Maoist activists in Goteborg and
Special Report - 6 -
Stockholm, had succeeded in attracting votes in
the 1964 and 1966 electoral contests. Hermans-
son advocated democratization of the economy
and completion of the welfare state, using the
peaceful means suitable for Swedish conditions
and independent of direction from Moscow. All
this success came to naught in 1968, however,
when the voters deserted the party in droves after
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, despite
Hermansson's explicit condemnation of the act
and his call for a break in Swedish relations with
Moscow. The party conservatives in the north
took the opportunity to express their support for
international Communist solidarity and con-
demned Hermansson's policies as bankrupt. By
late 1969, the northerners could muster enough
strength at the party congress to return some of
their men to leadership positions and modify
some party policies, but not enough to topple
Hermansson.
Once the congress was over, the Communists
found themselves under attack from a new
quarter. The Maoist fringe decided to form a
completely separate political party, the Com-
munist League of Marxist-Leninists (KFML), to
struggle for an armed revolution and against the
revisionist policies of the "bankrupt Hermansson
clique." At a time when the Communist Party is
attempting to pull itself together to attract
enough votes to cross the 4-percent threshold, the
KFML has succeeded in drawing away up to 10
percent of the party's potential supporters.
The Campaign
Following their congresses in late 1969 and
early 1970, the parties began to reduce their
lengthy programs to election manifestoes and
catchy slogans. The Social Democrats seized on
"Increased Equality" and "The Strong Society,,"
the Center advocated "Equality" and "Decentrali-
zation," the Liberals called for "Grass-Roots
Democracy" and "A More Humane Society," and
the Conservatives announced for "Cooperation-
Justice-Responsibility." The Communists were
more specific, calling for lower prices and taxes,
19 September 1970
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Apropos the ideological differences between the
democratic parties
(S-Social Democrats FP-Liberals
C-Center M-Conservatives)
changes in collective bargaining procedures, and
international solidarity with oppressed peoples.
Closer inspection of the positions of the non-
Communist parties revealed that there was little
to distinguish one from the other. The various
party leaders were not eager to clarify their posi-
tions in an election campaign before the adjourn-
ment of the old parliament in June. Furthermore,
in order to preserve the sacrosanct, month-long
July holiday, the political parties agreed to re-
strict the election campaign to a mere 30 days,
beginning in mid-August.
Such an agreement did not rule out exten-
sive press interviews and articles detailing the dif-
ferent party positions. The Social Democrats were
particularly concerned at the lack of response to
their platform. Their proposal to place govern-
ment representatives on the boards of directors of
major banks and industrial firms had been ac-
cepted calmly by the bourgeois parties, reassured
by a generation of close cooperation between big
business and Social Democracy. Their advocacy
of a tax reform granting greater relief to low-
income persons also had been received positively
Special Report
by the bourgeois parties. In fact the bourgeois
parties were ready to accept nearly every reform
suggested by the Social Democrats, because in
their opinion the big issue was not the need for
innovations but the need to put Sweden's eco-
nomic house in order.
The Swedish economy has been showing all
the traditional signs of overheating since late
1969. There is a serious labor shortage. Factories
are producing at or above normal capacity and are
unable to fill orders. Wages are rising at a rapid
rate, and the concomitant rise of consumer de-
mand is reflected in the rapid increase in imports,
worsening Sweden's traditional negative balance
of trade and leading the country into a serious
balance of payments situation. By the summer of
1969, the consumer price index was rising at an
annual rate of 8 percent; food products led the
way with a 10 percent increase, and there were
constant rumors that the Swedish krona (5.18
Swedish kronor equal one US dollar) would be
devalued to give a boost to Swedish exports,
make imports more expensive, and cool off the
economy.
The government has been reluctant to take
any stern measures to control the boom by in-
creasing Sweden's already high taxes, fearing that
the public reaction to such an unpopular step
would find expression in the 1970 elections. In-
stead, a harsh program of credit restrictions was
instituted, leading to a substantial downturn in
construction activity including housing, and the
rate of industrial capital expansion. Soon there-
after rents in the already-tight housing market
began skyrocketing. The bourgeois parties have
demanded that effective steps be taken to bring
the economy under control, at the same time
attacking the government's recent and proposed
steps for nationalizing additional sectors of the
economy as undermining foreign confidence in
Sweden. They have also deplored the spread of
the official economic bureaucracy as an obstacle
to the development of the market economy and
free competition.
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The Social Democrats retorted that the
people had never had it so good-wages were at all
time highs, unemployment was virtually non-
existent, social welfare benefits were greatly ex-
panded, and so on. To protect these gains the
trade unions insistently reminded their members
of their duty to vote socialist. The party even
resorted to raising the specter of economic col-
lapse if the bourgeois parties were to come to
power. Palme consistently harped on the theme
that although the three parties were free in their
criticism of the Social Democrats, they failed to
publish an alternative program that would come
into effect in the event of their victory. The
Center and Liberal parties replied that their joint
program worked out in May was sufficient basis
for a nonsocialist government, and if the Con-
servatives were unwilling to subscribe to it, the
two parties could form a minority government,
confident of receiving Conservative acquiescence
in parliament. In addition, there was adequate
precedent in Norway and Denmark for not pub-
lishing an all-bourgeois program before the elec-
tion outcome.
This debate, replete with minor points
scored on each side, was not sufficient to stimu-
late public attention. It was at this point that the
Social Democrats' political experience came to
the rescue. First, they obtained the galley proofs
of a book by Gosta Bohman, a leading Conserva-
tive, that heatedly attacked Palme for his use of
foreign policy questions, particularly Vietnam,
for internal political purposes. Palme ripped sev-
eral extensive passages out of context to demon-
strate that this was really a veiled Conservative
attack on Swedish neutrality. Alarmed, Gunnar
Hedlund of the Center Party called for further
clarifications from Bohman and defended the of-
ficial concept of Swedish neutrality. Liberal
leader Gunnar Helen was swift to announce that
no Conservative would serve as prime minister or
foreign minister in any bourgeois coalition, thus
opening the same Pandora's box that contributed
to the bourgeois defeat in 1968. Palme, delighted
at this crack in the unified bourgeois facade,
swiftly exploited the underlying lack of confi-
Special Report
Olof Palme: "and thank you for Gosta Bohman's book
and Gunnar Helen's statement on the posts of prime
minister and foreign minister."
Bence between the middle parties and the right.
Even the Conservatives momentarily shed the fig
leaf covering their divisions. Party leader Yngve
Holmberg first announced that the book con-
tained only Bohman's personal opinions, but after
hurried consultations, corrected himself several
days later to say that the party 'back:ed the sub-
stance of Bohman's argument. The Social Demo-
crats, having already written off the Conservatives
as a feeble political opponent, did not choose to
exploit their embarrassment.
Shortly thereafter, the Social Democrats
turned the argument about rising prices to their
advantage. They had been very concerned about
the popularity of the opposition's main issue and
were aware that the same issue had beaten the
ostensibly leading British Labor Party several
months earlier. When the national price and wages
commission submitted an emergency report that
the economy was about to endure a siege of
sharply increased prices, Finance Minister and
Social Democratic Party elder Gunnar Strang, as
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u, - 9s~ t
t \' l e~,`
D'ngens Nyheter, 29 August 70
Finance Minister Strang and Prime Minister Palme
(priserna-prices prisstopp-price freeze skatterna- taxes)
well as other leading socialist economists, decided
to reverse themselves and persuaded the govern-
ment to impose an immediate price freeze on
certain basic food products.
The opposition questioned whether this de-
parture from 14 years' reliance on the forces of
free competition was legal. According to the 1957
Exceptional Powers Law, under whose terms the
price freeze was enforced, such steps could be
taken only in case of war, danger of war, or
"other causes leading to serious increases in the
general price level." If the government were to
establish that it had used its powers legally, then
the economic situation was far worse than the
government had led the people to believe earlier.
Otherwise the government seemed to be resorting
to its exceptional powers just to perpetuate itself
in office. Unfortunately for the opposition, the
popular reaction was not to criticize the Social
Democrats for the means they used to cope with
their own mismanagement, but to express grati-
tude for relief in a time of galloping inflation. The
Social Democrats, meanwhile, advertised them-
selves as resolute and experienced in times of
Special Report
crisis, while Strang, who was responsible for the
crisis more than any other individual, received
bouquets of roses wherever he went.
If the old electoral system were still in ef-
fect, one could predict with reasonable certainty
that the Social Democrats would be returned to
power, though probably with a minority of seats,
to rule with the silent support of the Commu-
nists. Under the new system, however, there are
many imponderables. Such minor parties as the
Progressive Party, the Christian Democratic Party,
and the Communist League of Marxist-Leninists
have no chance to pass either the 4-percent or
12-percent thresholds, and it seems likely that the
Communist Party will also be excluded. Yet all
the splinter groups could between them pull
down as much as 6 percent of the total vote,
making it possible for the bourgeois parties to
capture control of parliament with only 47 per-
cent, a not impossible achievement in the light of
the most recent polls.
Parliamentary
Elections
9/68-`
Opinion
Poll '
9/69
'Opinion
Poll
8170
Social Democratic Party
50.1
54.0
49.3
Center Party
16.1
18.0
17.7
Liberal Party
15.0'
13.5
16.2
Conservative Party
13.9
11,5
11.0
Communist Party
3.0
2.0
2.4
Christian Democratic Party
1.5
2.6
Other
0.4
0.8
An additional problem facing the Social
Democrats is the bourgeois insistence that a
socialist victory is in the bag. Obviously the three
parties hope to be so persuasive that bourgeois
voters will come out in force to support them,
while overconfident Social Democratic voters will
stay at home. Furthermore, the impact of the
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large number of first-time voters on the outcome
is an unknown, as they tend not to have any
party identification and do not turn out at the
polls in such large percentages as the older voters.
The addition of local and provincial contests to
the national elections has also stimulated the
growth of ad hoc political coalitions and greater
stress on individuals than on ideology. Com-
pounding all these uncertainties is the fact that
the complicated system for deciding which man
won which seat may delay the announcement of
the final outcome for some 10 days after the polls
have closed.
There is no doubt that the transition to a
directly elected unicameral parliament will make
Swedish politics more exciting and more dramatic
in the 1970s than ever before. Aside from the
elections themselves, the shorter, three-year term
of office means that governments will be con-
stantly campaigning for public support, while the
more even balance between the socialist and bour-
geois parties will probably encourage efforts to
bring down the government by votes of confi-
dence and other parliamentary devices.
For all the uncertainties about the outcome
and the shape of future Swedish politics, it would
seem that Olof Palme has the best chance to
continue in power, though as the head of a mi-
nority government. This does not rule out a re-
vived coalition between the Social Democrats and
Center, but there is serious question whether
Gunnar Hedlund could agree to accept Palme's
leadership. If the bourgeois parties were to be the
victors, a three-party coalition led by Hedlund
would probably take shape, though recalcitrants
within the middle parties might force a center-
liberal minority government, dependent on Con-
servative sympathy.
Whoever wins, there will be little freedom of
movement for striking new policy initiatives. All
four parties are unanimous on the central foreign
and security policy questions. Despite their dif-
ferences in the election campaign on economic
issues, the four parties are in fundamental agree-
ment in this area, too. Thus, for example, there is
little likelihood of change in the nine-to-one ratio
of private to state and cooperative enterprise. The
four parties also agree on the broad lines of labor
market and social welfare policies. Only in
nuances and minor details would one be able to
distinguish a post-1970 Social Democratic govern-
ment from a future bourgeois coalition.
As for personalities, not much is known
about the likely cabinet makeup in a post-1970
bourgeois government. On the other hand, a
post-1970 Social Democratic government would
probably approximate its immediate predecessor.
Palme is a subscriber to Erlander's policy of gra-
dual renewal of the cabinet, rather than complete
shakeups. There has already been a hint that
Commerce Minister Gunnar Lange will retire later
in 1970, and Finance Minister Gunnar Strang and
"Disarmament" Minister Alva Myrdal may retire
within a few years after the election. There are
also one or two other cabinet members whose
future is uncertain, but they do not occupy major
posts.
The end result of the reforms is to inject
new life into the Swedish parliamentary system,
anesthetized by years of one-party dominance. If
a party shift occurs, there will also be an auto-
matic rejuvenation of the losing party and an
increased sensitivity to political considerations
within the government bureaucracy. Should the
reforms prove successful in Sweden, the tradi-
tional pacesetter in the Nordic area, there is even
the possibility that similar changes will be in-
troduced into neighboring Denmark, Norway,
Finland, and even more remote Iceland. ~__~ 25X1
Special Report - 10 -
18 September 1970
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