WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008200020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 11, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
NAVY review 45
completed. 11 September 1970
State Dept. review No. 0387/70
completed
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(Information as noon EDT, 10 September 1970)
Page
The UN: 25th General Assembly to Open . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
UN: Soviets Oppose "Two Chinas" Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
FAR EAST
Vietnam: Military Flare-up Subsides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Thai Insurgency: A Mixed Bag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Cambodia: Phnom Penh Launches an offensive . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Communist China: New Watchdog for the Military . . . . . . . . . 8
EUROPE
Competition for Eastern Trade Within EC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Soviet Improvement Plans for Comsat Network . . . . . . . . . . 10
Hungary: Liberal Domestic Policy Outlines for the 70s . . . . . . . 11
BELGIUM SEEKS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Middle East: Fedayeen Hijackings Cap Week of Drama . . . . . . 14
Libya: Oil Agreement; Soviet Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA (continued)
Israel-Egypt: The Cease-Fire Falters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
India: Political Problems and Maharajahs . . . . . . . . . . . 17
OAU: Seventh Annual Meeting Concludes in Addis Ababa . . . . 18
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Salvador Allende Moves Toward the Chilean Presidency . . . . . 19
Colombia: Government Reacts to Guerrilla Ambush . . . . . . . 21
Bolivia-Gulf Settlement Near . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Guyana: Danger of Setback in 1970 Sugar Crop . . . . . . . . 23
NOTES: Communist China; Romania-Bulgaria; NATO-Greece; USSF,;
Nonaligned Summit;F_____]Uruguay; USSR-Caribbean; Guyana-USSR
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The UN: 25th General Assembly To Open
The silver anniversary UN General Assembly
meeting opening on 15 September will be a major
diplomatic event, highlighted by the presence of
at least 80 heads of government at a special com-
memorative session in mid-October. In addition
to considering such perennial issues as the Middle
East conflict, Chinese representation, and colo-
nialism and racism, the delegates will probably
concentrate on recent developments in arms con-
trol areas and on various proposals intended to
revitalize the UN's institutional machinery.
Assembly debate on the Arab-Israeli im-
broglio is likely to be acerbic, especially if the
90-day cease-fire breaks down or ends before ne-
gotiations under the auspices of Gunnar Jarring,
Secretary General Thant's Middle East envoy, suc-
ceed. A potential casualty of the debate is the UN
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which des-
perately needs Assembly assistance in overcoming
its estimated $9-million deficit for 1969-70 wel-
fare services in the Middle East refugee camps.
Preliminary estimates of the voting pattern
on Chinese representation indicate that the tradi-
tional Albanian resolution to seat Peking and ex-
pel Taiwan will once again be considered an Im-
portant Question requiring a two-thirds vote and
subsequently will fail to obtain even a straight
majority. The usual surfeit of African-sponsored
proposals on Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories,
and South Africa apparently will be offered, and
sensitivities may be inflamed should the British
UN: Soviets Oppose "Two Chinas "Plan
The Soviets are pressing the Belgians not to
advance their "two Chinas" draft resolution at
the coming session of the General Assembly. The
Belgian proposal would give Taiwan's seat on the
Security Council to Peking while allowing the
Nationalists to remain in the Assembly. The So-
Government make a final decision to sell mari-
time defense equipment to Pretoria.
Recent changes in the US-USSR draft sea-
beds treaty designed to bolster its verification
provisions appear likely to win an Assembly en-
dorsement of the document. Caught in the vortex
of Assembly debate, however, may be the vexing
problem of chemical and biological warfare. Last
year the Assembly challenged, by an 82-3 vote,
the US contention that the Geneva Protocol of
1925 does not ban the use of tear gas and herbi-
cides in war. Concurrent with this year's As-
sembly session the US Senate will consider the
White House request for endorsement of the Pro-
tocol with the understanding that it does not ban
such usage. International critics of the US posi-
tion may attempt to prevent Senate endorsement
by applying pressure through the Assembly. Both
superpowers could also come under fire from the
less advanced countries as a result of the inde-
terminate nature of the first two rounds of SALT.
Colombia has succeeded in having review of
the UN Charter, a dormant subject for several
years, placed on this year's agenda, but major
power opposition probably will prevent any sub-
stantive accomplishments on this issue. More
likely to achieve some meaningful reforms is the
Canadian initiative on methods to upgrade the
efficiency of Assembly committees. The less ad-25X1
vanced countries may press hard to gain greater
powers and allocations for UN agencies dis ensin
economic assistance.
viets have told Brussels they would be "embar-
rassed" by Peking's presence on the Security
Council and have threatened to work against
Belgium's candidacy for a Council seat should it
persist with its proposal.
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Moscow's strong-arm tactics represent a
change from the soft sell it has been using for the
last few years to make known its opposition to
Peking's admission. Last year, for example, the
Soviets voted for the Albanian resolution, which
calls for Taiwan's ouster from the UN, but for the
first time did not speak in favor of Peking's ad-
mission.
The Belgian initiative has not garnered wide-
spread support and may not even be formally
introduced. Moscow appears concerned over its
possible appeal, however, and probably wants to
FAR EAST
Vietnam: Military Flare-up Subsides
The flurry of Communist military activity
which began in late August apparently now is
slacking off. There are indications, however, that
enemy units in South Vietnam's northern prov-
inces and in scattered locations elsewhere in the
country may be preparing to launch another
round before the end of the month.
Although the widespread shellings of out-
posts and some district towns started to taper oft
after the first 48 hours, they nevertheless con-
tinued at a higher than normal level through the
early part of this week. On several occasions be-
tween 4 and 8 September, such shellings were
followed by small but sharp guerrilla and sapper
raids; these inflicted substantial government and
civilian casualties at negligible or no known cost
to enemy troops. Particularly hard hit were a
district headquarters and nearby Ranger camp in
the north, a civilian self-defense training center
along the central coast, a Popular Forces training
center in the highlands and some Territorial Se-
curity Forces outposts in the lower delta.
There is some evidence that the recent up-
surge signaled the start of the Communists'
"autumn-winter campaign" and is to be followed
b a second phase in a few weeks.
The character and targets of the enemy's
actions in the recent phase suggest that the Com-
munists are still trying to find ways to reverse the
government's progress in pacification over the
past year without departing from their own pres-
ent economy of force tactics. The em
uerrilla and local force activit
~ prooaoiy
foreshadows more of the same low-keyed, stag-
gered types of actions in coming weeks, perhaps
with increased political as well as military harass-
ment of those elements that serve as the back-
bone of the government's pacification effort.
Increasing violence in the protest activities
of disabled veterans has forced the government to
abandon its restraint in dealing with them for a
more severe crackdown. The Thieu government
has been reluctant to take forceful measures
against the veterans because of sympathy for their
plight within the armed forces, but public sym-
pathy has been somewhat blunted by the extor-
tion and opportunism practiced by some of the
veterans. The increasing lawlessness of the more
militant agitators erupted in two armed clashes on
3 September, in which several veterans and police
were wounded, as well as three American MPs. 25X1
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The prime minister had ordered the police and
Capital District military commanders to take any
measures necessary to put down the disorders, a
policy publicly reaffirmed on TV by the director
general of National Police on 4 September. Simi-
lar orders now have been given to province chiefs
and mayors.
As part of the government crackdown, po-
lice and military units have torn down several
hundred illegally built shacks in various parts of
Saigon. The government, however, plans to try to
meet legitimate housing needs of the veterans by
the end of the year.
The government's harsher tactics appear to
have dampened the situation, at least for the
moment. New disorders may emerge, however,
from the demands of former members of paramil-
itary units, some of whom have recently gathered
in Saigon complaining of their exclusion from
veterans' benefits now extended to the regular
armed forces.
To add to the government's problems, stu-
dent unrest also continues to simmer. Most of the
students arrested during a demonstration on 30
August have since been released except for several
leaders, including controversial Saigon Student
Union chairman Huynh Tan Mam, who will be
brought to trial. Mam was previously convicted of
Communist activities by a military court last
March, but released when the Supreme Court
declared his trial unconstitutional; his rearrest
could provide a source of new agitation.
Meanwhile, a number of serious problems
plaguing the South Vietnamese police were aired
at a recent meeting in Saigon. The police have
been heavily burdened by new responsibilities be-
Page 3
ing thrust on them while they are still critically
short of personnel and hampered in attracting
new recruits. The National Police originally had
hoped to expand to 122,000 by the end of the
year, but they will have difficulty reaching even
105,000.
In addition, the lack of coordination be-
tween the police and other security forces has
continued to undercut the pacification program.
In the effort to combat the Viet Cong infrastruc-
ture, the army generally has ignored the police,
while the Special Police generally have ignored
the government committees tasked with over-all
coordination. Morale has suffered under low pay
and rising living costs, which in turn have stimu-
lated police corruption. The police have also
chafed under the restrictions that were placed on
their handling of demonstrations, but their
morale should get a boost from the new guide-
lines that permit them to take any necessary
measures.
North Vietnam's chief delegate to the Paris
talks, Xuan Thuy, was back at the table last week
for the first time in eight months; his deputy, Ha
Van Lau, and the top Viet Cong negotiator,
Madame Binh, may soon follow. It was clear from
Thuy's remarks in Paris, nonetheless, that the
Communist position is as hard as ever.
He told newsmen at a reception on 2 Sep-
tember that the Communists were standing pat
and awaiting allied initiatives to move the confer-
ence along. When asked about private talks, for
instance, Thuy said that the US must call for
them and then he would "consider the matter."
He turned aside a proposal made by a group of
US Senators for a standstill cease-fire in Vietnam,
saying that "fundamental issues" would have to
be settled before -the Communists would accept a
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 Sep 70
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stand down. Thuy claimed that this was spelled
out in the Viet Cong ten-point proposal, but in
fact the ten points are ambiguous about the
timing for a cease-fire. Thuy is not apt to make
such formulations lightly, particularly since rank-
ing Communist spokesmen rarely are so specitic
about cease-fire prospects. He may have adopted
a hard-line posture in public to underscore the
toughness of Hanoi's terms.
Thuy told a Western diplomat that Lau
would return to Paris, but he did not say when.
Lau left the talks last spring presumably as part of
COMMUNIST CHINA: The bland communique
issued at the close of the plenum of the party
central committee last week failed to propose any
new policy guidelines, strongly suggesting that
behind-the-scenes disagreements still pose a se-
rious obstacle to governmental reconstruction.
The plenum, which met from 23 August to 6
September, was addressed by both Mao Tse-tung
and heir-designate Lin Piao, but neither their re-
marks nor much of the plenum agenda were re-
vealed. One major topic of consideration appar-
ently was the convening of the Fourth National
People's Congress. Although affirming the re-
gime's desire to hold a congress, however, the
communique was pointedly vague on a timetable
even though pre-congress preparations have been
Hanoi's effort to protest the US failure to replace
Ambassador Lodge. He was quite active in diplo-
matic contacts outside the conference room, but
it is hard to read anything into his return at this
point. Madame Binh, meanwhile, stopped off in
Lusaka to lobby for full representation for the
Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) at
the Nonaligned Conference, but without notable
success. Like Sihanouk's government-in-exile, the
PRG was finessed into "observer" status. Her
next stop probably will be Paris, although Com-
munist spokesmen have not yet announced her
under way at the local level for some months. In
all likelihood, the plenum grappled with the var-
ious controversial issues requiring approval by the
rubber stamp congress, such as revising the state
constitution, selecting a new chief of state, and
formally restaffing the various central government
ministries and bureaus. But the communique was
notably silent on these points, and it left other
questions unanswered such as current political
standing of the 23 central committee members
who failed to attend the plenum. For example, it
remains unclear whether public security minister
and politburo member Hsieh Fu-chih--out of
sight since 19 March--was present and whether his
status was an issue at the session.
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The Thai Insurgency: A Mixed Bag
Bangkok has struck hard at the insurgency in
the north. In one of the most successful counter-
insurgency operations ever waged by government
forces, a 450-man Thai Army task force con-
ducted a series of raids in late August against the
principal insurgent stronghold area in northern
Nan Province along the Thai-Lao border. The
well-coordinated and executed operation, which
involved night movem n i ht helicopter sunnort_
took the insurgents
completely by surprise. Fourteen enemy cadre
were captured and several others killed without
significant loss to government forces.
The operation should help boost Thai mo-
rale in an area where the insurgents had enjoyed
consistent tactical success-which they had begun
to exploit politically-and where the government
has been at a loss to develop a coherent strategy.
The insurgency in the north continues to spread,
however. Small enemy units have recently been
spotted farther from the Lao border than hereto-
fore, and it will take a good deal more than one
success to rectify the situation.
I n the northeast, on the other hand, the
insurgent movement is continuing to rebound
from the setbacks it suffered during 1967-68. The
Communists there have maintained a level of
activity markedly higher this rainy season than
last. Most of this increased activity has been or-
ganizational rather than military, with the Com-
munists seeking to strengthen their support base
and extend their writ into new areas of the in-
terior. In contrast to their focus this spring on
Nakhon Phanom and Sakhon Nakhon provinces,
insurgent activity now affects portions of at least
eight northeastern provinces.
Bangkok's growing preoccupation with de-
velopments in Cambodia may be contributing to
rising insurgent fortunes in the northeast. In an
effort to counter the potential threat to its border
posed by recent Communist advances in northern
and western Cambodia, the government has reas-
signed seven of the 15 Thai Army companies
normally committed to counterinsurgency tasks
in the northeast to security missions along the
Cambodian frontier. This evidently has contrib-
uted to a winding down of government pressure
against the insurgents in the northeast.
The fundamental problem, however, is the
top Thai leaders' continued discounting of the
insurgent threat in the northeast. Based on the
experience of 1967-68-when the overextended
insurgents were forced to retrench in the face of
government pressure-and the continuing weak-
ness of insurgent leadership and appeal, the Thai
are convinced that they can keep the insurgency
in the northeast within manageable proportions.
For their part, the insurgents can profitably use
an extended period free from serious harassment,
which is likely if they choose to avoid the kind of
flamboyant actions that force the government to
Northern Thailand: Areas of Insurgency
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Cambodia: Phnom Penh Launches an Offensive
The government's most ambitious military
operation of the war attained initial success when
a government amphibious relief convoy reached
Kompong Thom this week. Advance elements of
a second Cambodian Army task force headed
north from Skoun on Route 6 in a parallel effort
to reinforce and resupply the embattled defenders
of Kompong Thom city. This task force is spear-
headed by six infantry (battalions recently re-
turned from retraining in South Vietnam. Five
other battalions are moving westward from
Kompong Cham to provide route security behind
the advance elements. The government's advance
has been slowed by destroyed bridges along
Route 6 and the numerous obstacles placed across
it by the enemy. The Communists have so far
offered only token resistance.
he major area of Communist military ac-
tivity shifted during the last week from east of
Phnom Penh to areas south of the capital. Gov-
ernment forces recaptured Srang, 25 miles south-
west of Phnom Penh, when the enemy withdrew
after holding the town for five days. The Cam-
bodian Army, however, continues to report
sizable enemy troop concentrations nearby and in
areas around the nearby towns of Tram Khnar
and Saang to the east, both of which came under
repeated enemy harassing attacks.
Elsewhere, the Communists launched light:
harassing attacks near several provincial capitals in
the south and southeast. I n the northwest, the
enemy increased its harassment of government
defensive positions at isolated Siem Reap city.
Cambodian troops clashed with Communist units
north and west of the city., and in one encounter
13 Cambodian soldiers were killed by Commu-
nists wearing uniforms similar to those of Cam-
bodian paratroop units.
Status of Communist Supply Routes
Recent aerial hoto ra h
provide no evidence of major
ogistic activity in enemy-controlled provinces in
northern and northeastern Cambodia. Several of
the major routes are impassable for trucks be-
cause of destroyed bridges and deteriorated roads,
with few signs of repair activity in evidence.
Route 19, the main road from northeastern Cam-
bodia into South Vietnam, is in good condition
but little traffic or other logistics activity was
observed in mid-
no significant enemy activity
was observed on the major rivers in the area
during late August.
Vacancy at Lusaka
The Nonaligned Conference formally opened
on 8 September, and as anticipated neither the
Lon Nol nor the Sihanouk delegation was seated.
more
e egations supporte i anou than Lon of at
the preparatory foreign ministers' conference on
6 and 7 September. The majority, however,
favored seating neither, and believed that Cam-
bodia should remain a member of the conference
without official representation in attendance.
This ministerial compromise was apparently ac-
cepted by the full conference.
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O.Gl.)JXJ I
Kompongo)
Thom %Second Government
Parsai?rru_phibious convoy column advancing
:caches KoFftppng Thom
Kam on %
Chhnang .$koun
Kompong Charn?`
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Communist China: New Watchdog for the Military
Peking's decision to fill the long-vacant post
of chief political commissar for the armed forces
marks the final step in normalizing China's mili-
tary high command in the wake of the Cultural
Revolution. At a reception in Peking last. week,
alternate politburo member Li Te-shenq was
identified as the director of the General Political
t)r;oartment, once the top watchdog of the army's
rea,ity to the Chinese Communist Party. During
lhr Cultural Revolution, the department had be-
?_orne a battleground for forces seeking to purge
hi;h military officers, and it has not functioned
n;rmally since .1967.
l._; le-sheng's appointment reinforces other
c: nt indications that the General Political De-
, tment is beginning to resume at least some of
it-, pre - Cultural Revolution duties, which in?
l,!Ied overseeing the armed forces' party come
;'.lees as well as political control over al
rulitary personnel. Representatives of the depart-
appeared at important regional military
.., derences last week.
Li Te-sheng
Watching the army
there are fresh signs of
di ;satisfaction in Peking
with the performance of
many of the military of-
fix.ers who dominate the
present administrative
machinery in China's
provinces. Such discon-
tent is implicit in the
current campaign to re-
study two past resolu-
tions authored respec-
tively by Mao Tse-tung
and Lin Piao which dealt
with army-civilian rela-
tions, military indiscipline, and deficiencies in
party work within the army. More openly, wide
publicity has been given to recent speeches by
local army men decrying indications in their ranks
of irresponsibility toward the party's cause and
weak political indoctrination.
These strictures reinforce the notion that an
intense debate over the military's role in day-to-
day politics is far from resolved. The issues are
complex, ranging from Peking's desire to ensure
centralized control over its most viable governing
instrument to concern over the fitness of some
officers for holding party posts vithin the army
and by extension, on nascent civilian party com-
mittees. Such unusual public criticism suggests
that the new director of the General Political
Department may come under considerable
pressure from forces within the top leadership
who are at odds over the extent of the army's
future responsibilities in provincial adminis-
tration.
Relatively little is known o Li Te-sheng's
personal political inclinations but he may be a
skilled opportunist who was deemed a suitable
compromise candidate for his sensitive new post.
Nevertheless, as both a military district com-
mander and head of the government of Anhwei
Province, Li's acceptability to China's powerful
provincial military figures was probably an im-
portant consideration in his appointment. His
background as a tactical commander rather than a
political officer and his record of opposing Cul-
tural Revolution excesses in his bailiwick also
suggest that his appointment does not signal an
~Increased radicalization of the General Political
Department.
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EUROPE
Competition for Eastern Trade Within EC
Concern over a possible commercial agree-
ment between Bonn and Moscow in the wake of
the recently signed nonaggression treaty may be
spurring increasing competition among the Euro-
pean Community countries for such bilateral
agreements. Belgian officials, for example, last
week cited the possibility of a West German -
USSR trade agreement, as well as recent Soviet
bilateral agreements with France and Italy, as
obliging the Benelux states to "protect their own
interests." Belgium will head a Benelux nego-
tiating team visit to Moscow in October.
The EC Council decided last year that bi-
lateral negotiations between Community mem-
bers and East European states could be author-
ized through 1972. The Belgians fear, however,
that, although the original delays in establishing a
common EC commercial policy resulted primarily
from a French desire for bilateral deals with East-
ern Europe, other countries will now develop
vested interests in the existing situation, thus
making a common policy even more difficult to
work out.
Most European officials and businessmen
probably do not have exaggerated hopes for the
immediate prospects of trade with Eastern Eu-
rope. One Belgian official doubted that a Bene-
lux-Soviet treaty-which, as envisaged, would
specify most-favored-nation treatment and raise
import quotas for some Soviet products-would
make much difference to Belgian trade with the
USSR. The competition among Western countries
stems in part, however, from their interest in
longer term prospects as consumer goods exports
to Eastern Europe increase. In the absence of a
comprehensive common commercial policy and as
trade grows between the EC and Eastern Europe,
Western competition increasingly takes the form
of "outbidding" on credit terms for exports.
Increasing headaches are also being caused
by the exceptional status granted trade between
the Federal Republic and East Germany. Since
such trade is considered "inner-German," East
German products-or third-country goods im-
ported through East Germany-can enter the en-
tire Common Market duty-free through West Ger-
many.
Bonn seems well aware of the need to avoid
engendering the fears of its EC partners that it
seeks a special position in trade with the East.
West German industrialists, for example, want to
enlarge to at least Community scale the German
part of a prospective truck-manufacturing agree-
ment between Daimler-Benz and the USSR. It
remains to be seen, however, whether Bonn will
attempt to use Moscow's apparent desire for in-
creased economic cooperation not only to further
German Ostpolitik but also to encourage Soviet
recognition of the EC as a whole as a valid inter-
locutor on trade matters. Bonn's partners will be
watching Economic Minister Schiller's trip to25X1
Moscow on 24 September for signs of West Ger-
man intentions toward a bilateral trade pact with
the Soviet Union
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Soviet Improvement Plans for Comsat Network
I he Soviets are engaged in a program to
develop new satellites and ground stations that
could substantially improve their communications
satellite (comsat) network within the next year or
two. For six years, their comsat program has been
dependent upon "first generation" technology,
which lagged significantly behind that of the
Western-based Intelsat consortium.
Fourteen Molniya-1 satellites have been suc-
cessfully orbited since April 1965. They have
been used mainly to relay one TV channel from
Moscow to all parts of the country, creating the
world's only domestic satellite TV distribution
system. The highly elliptical orbit of Molniya-1
provides excellent coverage of the northern lat-
itudes. It requires at least two satellites in orbit
simultaneously to provide continual coverage of
the Soviet Union, however, and has contributed
to the short operational lifetime of the satellites,
increasinq the costs of the Soviet program-
1-he USSR plans to launch two new types of
satellites-Molniya-2 and Statsionar-that will
operate with an expanded potential channel
capacity and will allow the simultaneous relay of
both TV and multichannel voice transmission.
Moreover, the Statsionar will have a geostationary
orbit, which parks it over the point of the globe.
1 his should increase its lifetime and thereby re-
duce long-run system costs.
Two types of Soviet ground stations pres-
ently operate with Molniya-1. The Orbita sta-
tions, of which there are 29 with eight more
under construction, are capable only of receiving
one channel of TV. The Molniya stations, in Mos-
cow and Vladivostok, can both transmit and re-
ceive, and are used for relaying telephone and
telegraph traffic as well as TV between the two
cities. The Soviets apparently plan to modify 18
of the present Orbita stations and build three new
stations for operation with Molniya-2 and
Statsionar. All Orbita stations probably will be
modified to operate in the internationally recom-
nended frequency range and selected Orbita sta-
OnS, will be equipped for both transmission and
reception of multichannel telephone and tele-
graph traffic.
Through mid-1970. total monetary outlays
for the Molniya-1 program are estimated to have
been about $700-750 million. The plans for
Molniya-2 and Statsionar, as well as continued
expansion of the ground segment and main-
tenance of the system during the next two years,
probably will require $300-350 million more.
Even so, the system has brought TV to remote
crrts of the country at a fraction of the cost that
would have been required by conventional cable
and/or microwave radio relay lines.
Intersputnik,
the Soviet-sponsored interna-
tional comsat organization, has remained es-
sentially a "paper tiger" since its announced
formation in 1967. Its membership has never in-
creased beyond the original eight signatories-all
Communist countries-and of late its existence is
only infrequently mentioned. It is possible that
soviet authorities are reluctant to undertake
major initiatives in this direction until their new
generation satellites have been successfully tried,
or they may be holding Intersputnik as a bar-
gaining point in future dealings with Intel-
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Hungary: Liberal Domestic Policy Outlines for the 70s
The Hungarian party's outline for the party
congress later this year calls for a "grand social
program" aimed at widening popular support by
granting cautious political reforms and extending
the liberal economic policies of the 60s.
The outline, published as the "guiding prin-
ciples of the tenth party congress," ushers in a
new political phase in Kadar's attempt to make
socialism workable in Hungary. The program of-
fers new opportunities for Hungarians to take
part in local political life and tangible financial
incentives to active supporters of the regime. At
the same time, the document insists on the in-
violability of party prerogatives in setting national
goals and interfering directly in any "politically
important matters."
The incentives offered are multifaceted but
probably too limited in scope to have any im-
mediate effect on the quality of political life. A
more liberal electoral system, greater independ-
ence of local government, and final institutionali-
zation, via constitutional reform, of the post-
Stalinist era are the more important general
changes. There are also specific concessions to the
nation's youth--more appointments to leading po-
sitions (including party membership at 18 years
of age)-and to those intellectuals willing to be-
come "active champions of socialism." While the
document warns sternly against "reactionary, na-
tionalist and idealist views," it clearly does not
contradict Kadar's past disavowal of "administra-
tive measures" as tools in cultural policy.
The party leadership also intends to give the
organization's image a face-lifting. Amendments
to the party statutes attack its most visible fail-
ures, such as local demogoguery, protected cor-
ruption, and general abuse of power, and orders
closer attention to public opinion, via a compre-
hensive system of polling. Internally, the new
statutes promise the rank and file more authority
to criticize bureaucratic abuses.
The new approach includes some potentially
disruptive issues, not the least of which will be
the intellectuals' reaction to the new "socialist
champion" criteria. The party has already denied
that Kadar's eight-year-old alliance policy, "he
who is not against us is with us," has been
changed. There has also been a sensitive reaction
to charges that Kadar is introducing "a Hungarian
way to Communism," so it is likely that Stalinists
at home, and possibly in more conservative Pact
regimes, are unhappy with the concessions to
"bourgeoise parliamentarianism."
It is highly unlikely that Kadar will leave
himself open to serious charges from any side. He
is too realistic to risk the current stability in
overly ambitious liberalization schemes or ad-
venturous ideological purification programs hav-
ing no chance of success. Behind the increased
rhetoric idealizing socialist morals, he will almost
certainly continue to use well-proven material in-
centives as the core of his program for gradually
uniting the party and the nation.
In the economic sphere, Hungary's fourth
five-year plan will be even more flexible than
previous plans. Under the economic reform
(NEM), which was introduced in 1968, enter-
prises are free for the most part from centrally
imposed targets, and stated goals are labeled
"indicators" as distinct from previous "direc-
tives." One indication of the change in planning is
the apparent provision for a larger than usual
reserve of unallocated output. Consumption and
investment are planned to grow at a slower rate
than output-giving the government a hedge
against excessive increases in demand.
The keynotes of the new plan are increased
quality of output and greater efficiency, as else-
where in Eastern Europe. Moreover, there will be
added stress on increasing the standard of living.
The projected 6-7 percent annual gain in indus-
trial output is to come more from modernization
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than from large new projects. Labor productivity
is expected to account for 75-80 percent of the
increase in national income. The people will wel-
come the fact that consumption is planned to
grow at the same rate as national income (5.4-5.7
percent); it had declined as a share of national
income during most of the previous plan period.
In addition, sharp increases are planned for invest-
raments in housing and in public services.
Continued prevention of inflation and un-
employment is needed for success in imple-
menting the NEM, and the regime will therefore
move slowly in freeing controls on prices and
imports. Progress is expected, however, in improv-
ing incentives by modifying the system of profit
taxation and wage regulation, and in removing
some subsidies to enterprises.
In foreign trade, key problems will continue
to be those of increasing exports to the West and
stabilizing Hungary's hard currency balance of
payments. Hungary, already the leader within
CEMA in promoting cooperation agreements and
licensing with Western firms, intends to break
new ground by attempting to attract limited
ROMANIA-BULGARIA: Romanian leader Ceau-
sescu's meetings on 11 and 12 September with
Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov will be the first in
years. Neither the location nor the exact purpose
of the exchange has been publicized, but the two
leaders probably will devote their main attention
to putting finishing touches on a new treaty of
friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance,
replacing the one that expired in 1968. Bucha-
rest's renewal of such treaties with its Warsaw
Pact allies apparently awaited signature of the
Soviet-Romanian treaty. Since that event in early
July the Poles and the Romanians have initialed a
revised treaty that probably will be formally
signed within the next month or so, and renewal
of a Hungarian-Romanian treaty also should fol-
NATO-GREECE: The impasse over the report
recommending Alliance support for the
strengthening of Greek forces was apparently
broken this week. Danish Prime Minister Bauns-
gaard told US Ambassador Dudley that his gov-
ernment will make only an oral statement when
the Defense Planning Committee reviews the
report next week. Presumably none of the NATO
members will pose objections to its adoption.
Persistent Scandinavian opposition to the Greek
regime had hamstrung the report for five months
and threatened to rovoke a serious dispute
within the Alliance.
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USSR: The Soviets are completing their I n fer of naval units across the
Northern Sea Route to the Pacific Fleet
Si -
1968, most of the surface combatants that have been transferred from thew stern
fleets to the Pacific-including a guided missile cruiser, two guided missile de-
stroyers, and two large landing ships-have gone via the Indian Ocean. Although this
southern route is considerably longer, it provides the opportunity for politically
profitable ort calls and several months of warm cat n
route.
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MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
Middle East: Fedayeen Hijackings Cap Week of Drama
Five aircraft hijacking attempts, four of
them successful, by the radical Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) headed by
George Habbash highlighted another week of
feverish activity in the Middle East.
Acting almost simultaneously on 6 Septem-
ber, PFLP terrorists captured Pan Am, TWA, and
Swissair flights over Europe. A fourth attempt
that day was thwarted by the crew of an Israeli El
Al plane; one of the hijackers was killed and his
female associate, who had participated in the suc-
cessful hijacking of a TWA plane to Damascus last
September, was arrested by British authorities
when the aircraft landed in London.
All three planes hijacked on the 6th were
originally diverted to Beirut. The Pan Am flight
George Habbash
PFLP Leader
then went on to Cairo, where the passengers
barely managed to get out before the terrorists
blew up the plane. The TWA and Swiss planes
were flown to Dawson's Landing, a remote air-
strip north of Amman, Jordan. Some 120 of the
passengers and crew-all non-Jewish women and
children-were evacuated to a hotel in Amman.
Some 180 others-males and Jewish women and
children-were still being held captive at the air-
strip as of noon 10 September.
The fifth hijacking came on 9 September
when a British BOAC airliner was grabbed after
leaving Bahrain. It too was flown temporarily to
Beirut and then went on to the so-called "Revolu-
tion Airport" where the other two aircraft were
held. Some passengers of this plane were still
being held at Dawson's Landing al: latest report;
22 "non-Westerners" were taken to Amman early
on 10 September.
As its price for freeing the captive aircraft
and passengers, the PFLP has demanded the re-
lease of commandos in prison in Switzerland,
West Germany, and Israel, and the woman being
held by British authorities. The fedayeen set an
original deadline of 2200 EDT 9 September, but
have since extended this for 72 hours while nego-
tiations continue. The US is attempting to work
through the International Committee of the Red
Cross with Swiss, German, Israeli, and British
officials to arrange for the release of the passen-
gers and aircraft.
Within the Palestinian terrorist movement,
the PFLPs extreme actions appear to have again
taken the ball away from Fatah, the more mod-
erate group led by Yasir Arafat. Although the
PFLP espouses the same objectives as Fatah-the
eradication of Israel and the restoration of Pal-
estine as an Arab state-it has generally taken a
more violent course and has carried out interna-
tional activities. Early in its existence, the group
had ties to Egypt, but after the 1967 war it
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branded President Nasir a reactionary. Since then,
Iraq has afforded both financial and logistical
support, although the PFLP has not become
Baghdad's puppet. The group can be expected to
carry out additional violent acts in the future,
including kidnapings, bombings and even assassi-
nations.
For Jordan's King Husayn, meanwhile, the
hijackings have brought little but further trouble.
Already knee-deep in problems created by the
fedayeen, Husayn this week saw Amman all but
come under the control of the Palestinian com-
mandos. Several attempts to ease the situation
through agreements between the security forces
and the fedayeen leaders were quickly overtaken
by the outbreak of new fighting. Early in the
Libya: Oil Agreement; Soviet Arms
Premier Qaddafi's speech in Benghazi on 4
September raised the ante on Libya's relationship
with the oil companies. He announced an agree-
ment with Occidental to raise the posted price by
30 cents per barrel to $2.53. In addition, the
posted price will rise by two cents per barrel
annually until it reaches $2.63. In return, Occi-
dental will be permitted to produce up to
700,000 barrels per day, about twice the current
rate and somewhat less than its peak production
last April. Occidental's agreement will have a sig-
nificant impact on the negotiations of the other
companies, although they have not yet indicated
just how much.
Qaddafi's other remarks generally tollowed
the line of his coup anniversary speech on 1
September. He boasted about the nationalization
of Italian property, and came down heavily on his
week Husayn tried to work through the cabinet,
but by Wednesday he had granted full authority
to his military chief of staff to end the crisis.
The possibility of bringing any real order to
the situation-particularly in Amman, where the
fedayeen hold the upper hand-is questionable.
The army is known to be impatient to deal with
the fedayeen, and there are indications that disci-
pline is breaking down as some units attempt to
take matters into their own hands. Husayn is
obviously reluctant to authorize the kind of
bloody fighting necessary to drive the fedayeen
out of Amman, but if skirmishing continues, he
may be forced to accede to the wishes of the
army-if only to kee some kind of control over
their actions 25X1
favorite theme: that complete Arab unity is the
main goal of the republic. In achieving this goal,
he noted, the Arabs' dependence on imports of
Soviet arms does not make anyone feel tranquil.
He emphasized this point by saying that Egypt
was training Libyans to use Soviet-made weapons
because, "We reject the presence of foreigners
inside our army."
Meanwhile, a substantial quantity of Soviet
military aid, limited thus far to ground forces
equipment, has arrived in Libya.
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Israel-Egypt: The Cease-Fire Falters
The Israeli cabinet announced on 6 Sep-
tember its decision to suspend participation in the
Jarring talks until after a rollback of the Egyptian
missiles that the Israelis allege were moved into
the standstill zone since the cease-fire began. The
action effectively stalled the US effort to restore
some movement to the process of achieving a
political settlement in the Middle East. State-
ments to the press by Prime Minister Meir, For-
eign Minister Eban, and Defense Minister Dayan
left open the possibility that Israel might seek to
"rectify" the Egyptian violations by unilateral
action, but the general impression was left that
Israel would wait to see if diplomatic action could
restore the bargaining advantages it held when the
cease-fire began.
The move appears to have been a compro-
mise reached mainly to propitiate Defense Minis-
ter Dayan. Dayan may well have been pressing for
even stronger measures, such as a formal state-
ment that Israel no longer considers itself bound
by the cease-fire. In any event, the defense minis-
ler has profited politically as a result of the deci-
sion; both Dayan's supporters and the local press
are portraying him to the public as the one man
who stood firm and saved Israel from being
forced into concessions dangerous to its security.
Egypt, meanwhile, continues to deny the
Israeli charges that it is expanding its missile
system in the area near the canal. Cairo's UN
representative in New York described the Israeli
allegations as a feeble pretext for boycotting the
peace contacts. Following an Egyptian cabinet
meeting on 7 September, Cairo radio reported
that the ministers heard "definite information
showing that the Israeli claims are lies spread by
Israel and supported by the United States." The
Israeli accusations were premeditated, the radio
continued, and were intended to pave the way for
more arms for Israel and to serve "as advance
justification for any action Israel may carry out."
This view will probably be trumpeted as proven
correct by news reports on Wednesday that the
US has agreed to sell Israel additional Phantom
fighter-bombers.
moment.
The Egyptians are not likely to agree to any
rollback of surface-to-air missiles under any con-
ditions, even if the peace initiative appears to be
in danger of foundering completely. Although
Cairo would like the US initiative to succeed in
arranging for a political solution to the Middle
East impasse, the Egyptians apparently consider a
stronger defensive posture along the Suez Canal as
a more immediate and overriding necessity at the
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India: Political Problems and Maharajahs
Government action to abolish the annual
payments made to former rulers of princely states
and remove the rajahs' traditional privileges has
become the latest point of contention between
Prime Minister Gandhi and her political op-
ponents. A constitutional amendment to elimi-
nate the payments and privileges passed the lower
house of the Indian pariiament last week, but
failed by one vote to win the two thirds approval
required in the upper house. Mrs. Gandhi, who
has staked her prestige on the issue, immediately
arranged for President Giri to withdraw official
recognition from all 320 rajahs. The government
asserts that this automatically ends any claims by
the princes to their traditional allowances and
privileges. For their part, the rajahs are preparing
a court challenge to the legality of the President's
action.
Because the Indian constitution gives the
President authority to recognize a prince, the
government argues that he also has the right to
withdraw that recognition. Constitutional power
to withdraw recognition is a carryover from the
British authority to remove unsuitable native
rulers; its use in individual instances has been
upheld by Indian courts. Giri chose to "derecog-
nize" each prince separately, but in effect he
"dethroned" the entire lot and his right to do so
remains open to question. Since Girl also acted in
defiance of parliament, the government is taking
special care to plug all the legal loopholes.
With the approach of national elections,
which must be called by February 1972, Mrs.
Gandhi has found it increasingly difficult to re-
tain the support of other parties for her minority
government. The issue of the princes' subsidies
has an emotional appeal for the country's numer-
ous poor, and Mrs. Gandhi had hoped to use it to
draw into her camp all politicans not wishing to
be tarred as "reactionaries." These tactics drew
some outside support, and also provoked a certain
amount of dissension within opposition parties,
some of whose members were loath to take a
stand against a popular issue simply to thwart the
prime minister. Conversely, however, Mrs. Gandhi
angered conservative supporters in her ruling Con-
gress Party.
It is important now that her party do well in
local elections to vindicate her stand and to retain
her political momentum. The first test will come
on 17 September, when the southwestern state of
Kerala goes to the polls. Local issues are likely to
prove more important there than national ideo-.
logical wrangles, but the election may still give
some indication of her success in developing an
issue with a vote-getting, all-India appeal.
Parliament is in recess now for about two
months, and Mrs. Gandhi has a breathing space in
which to woo new supporters and placate dis-
gruntled old ones. India's politicians are very
much aware that national elections may be called
early, however, and are anxious to spot the vic-
tory bandwagon. In this atmosphere, even a
minor political setback, such as a local election
defeat or an adverse court verdict, could have a
damaging effect on Mrs. Gandhi's future. 25X1
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OAU: Seventh Annual Meeting Concludes in Addis Ababa
The yearly meeting of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) ended ahead of schedule in
Addis Ababa last week. In contrast to past divi-
sive sessions, this year's gathering ran quickly and
efficiently as the heads of state approved virtually
without change the resolutions prepared for them
at the pre-summit foreign ministers' meetings.
A major event at this seventh annual session
was the highly publicized reconciliation of Nigeria
with the four African governments-Tanzania,
Zambia, Gabon, and Ivory Coast-that supported
Biafra during the civil war. Much of the pre-
liminary diplomatic spadework for the reconcilia-
tion was accomplished by the Kenyans, who also
played an unusually active role at Addis Ababa.
Nigeria intends to establish diplomatic rela-
tions soon with Zambia, and probably also with
Tanzania. Nigerian-Gabonese diplomatic ties will
probably not be established until the two govern-
ments can agree on arrangements for the repatria-
tion of Biafran children evacuated to Gabon
during the war. It will probably also be some time
before formal ties are restored with Ivory Coast,
where former secessionist leader Ojukwu is now
living.
On the issue of actual or intended arms sales
to South Africa, a major item on the agenda, the
heads of state specifically condemned the UK,
France, and West Germany. This resolution-also
the work of the Kenyans-was approved by the
OAU leaders despite intense lobbying by Paris
with help from some Francophone African
delegations.
The OAU plans to follow up its condemna-
tion by mounting a campaign to deter these coun-
tries from dealing with South Africa. It author-
ized Zambian President Kaunda to head a
delegation to approach the governments con-
cerned. Kaunda has appointed the foreign
ministers of Kenya, Mali, Algeria, and Cameroon
as members. The OAU also hopes to assist the
African liberation movements !in Angola and
Mozambique by applying pressure on those coun-
tries that sell arms to Portugal, including possibly
the US because of its NATO ties with Lisbon. The
delegation plans tentatively to travel to Bonn,
Paris, and London in mid-October, but this effort
appears unlikely to bear significant re-
NONALIGNED SUMMIT: Preliminary reports
indicate that the Lusaka meeting, which ended on
10 September, went much as expected, con-
centrating on those issues upon which all the
de legations could agree-anticolonial ism from
whatever source, criticism of big-power politics,
strengthening the UN, economic cooperation
among the nonaligned states and the complete
withdrawal of US troops from Indochina. The
foreign ministers met on 6 and 7 September and,
although apparently deciding to recommend seat-
ing neither Cambodian delegation, reached a com-
romise giving the Provisional Revolutionary
Page 18
peace initiative.
Government of South Vietnam observer status.
President Kaunda of Zambia set the tone for the
gathering, which included heads of state, on 8
September when he warned that the nonaligned
nations of the world can only find security
through collective action. Kaunda called for a
new effort to revitalize the UN and to give new
substance to all aspects of nonalignment-politi-
cal, economic, and technical cooperation. Diver-
sity of interests among the participants makes it
unlikely that practical steps in this direction can
be agreed upon. The summit probably took nc
action that might jeopardize the Middle Eas
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Salvador Allende Moves Toward the Chilean Presidency
Marxist Salvador Allende is already assuming
the role of Chilean president-elect, although he
won a plurality of only 36.3 percent in the elec-
tion on 4 September. His opponents, who view
his coming to power as a disaster, are wallowing
in indecision.
Allende is moving quickly and assertively to
consolidate his slim 1.4-percent lead over con-
servative former president Jorge Alessandri and
thus ensure his choice in the congressional runoff
between the two on 24 October. In a major -press
conference on 5 September Allende
reiterated his
intention to make far-reaching changes in Chilean
economic, political, and social systems. Simul-
taneously he emphasized the political variations
of his key advisers within the Communist-led
Popular Union coalition which nominated him.
Allende also visited President Frei to demand
immediate measures to control bank withdrawals
and flight of capital. Frei concurred and also
agreed to accept an economic liaison representa-
tive from Allende; he refused a similar political
arrangement.
Political opposition to congressional valida-
tion of Allende's claim to the presidency is not
yet either cohesive or effective. Alessandri's back-
ers were overcome by his unexpected defeat and
seem panicked, particularly over economic pros-
pects. Alessandri has not conceded. On 9 Septem-
ber he announced that if he were elected by the
Congress he would resign in order to bring about
new elections, in which he would not run. Mean-
while, his partisans must present proof of their
claim of electoral fraud to the National Electoral
Court by 14 September.
President Frei's deep aversion to the implica-
tions of an Allende government has long been
apparent. Nonetheless, he has been reluctant to
become the rallying point or even a participant in
schemes to head it off. Efforts by moderate lead-
ers of his Christian Democratic Party to block
Allende's approval by Congress have begun, but
will require discipline unusual in the PDC. Mean-
while, defeated candidate Radomiro Tomic and a
few leftist Christian Democrats virtually joined
Allende, raising only minimal bargaining points
for their cooperation. Some reportedly will join
his cabinet with the almost certainly unfounded
idea that they could prevent the disciplined Com-
munist Party from dominating Allende's adminis-
tration.
he pre-election assess-
ment by Communist leaders that key troop com-
manders in the Santiago area would not act
against a constitutionally chosen overnment ap-
Salvador Allende
Winner of slim plurality in Chilean election
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COLOMBIA: Areas of Guerrilla Activity
////, Armed Forces of Colombian
Revolution (FARC)
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)
3
99953 9-70 CIA
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Colombia: Government Reacts to Guerrilla Ambush
The military's quick response to a guerrilla
ambush that left seven soldiers dead and eight
wounded may discourage further guerrilla attacks,
at least for the time being. Communist forces
remain capable of causing high local tensions,
however. The insurgents have been generally
quiet, and the action on 1 September apparently
was the most serious in more than a year. The
guerrillas may have been testing the mettle of the
newly inaugurated Pastrana government.
policy since late 1968 has been to avoid pro-
voking the government for fear that any guerrilla
activity would reflect on the Soviet diplomatic
presence in the country. Some small clashes have
taken place with military forces from time to
time, however
The 135-man pro-Cuban National Liberation
Army (ELN), which gained prominence through
the death of its most prestigious recruit, priest
Camilo Torres in 1966, is believed to have been The guerrilla arm of the splinter Colombian
responsible for, the ambush. Military action on 4 Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist-the Popular
September resulted in the capture of several guer- Liberation Army (EPL -has also engaged in low-
rillas, including Salvador Afanador, who is re- level activity recent) .
ported to be one of the most important leaders of
the organization; 35 peasants were also detained.
The ELN, which consists of four groups, suffers
from internal splits and defections. Its urban sup-
port apparatus in Bogota is reported to be in
disarray. ELN policy in the past has been to avoid
action with large groups of soldiers while attack-
ing small patrols or outposts. It is too early to tell
whether the recent action represents a change in
tactics. The ELN appears to be dedicated to im-
proving its knowledge of the area where it
operates and making friends with the local
peasants. Relations with Cuba remain close.
The larger but less active insurgent force is
the 200-245 man Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), the Communist Party's action
arm. Operating in four main groups, the FARC's
While avoiding clashes with superior army or
police forces, the EPL has raided small towns,
ranches and police posts. The recent series of
attacks by EPL groups is believed to have come
about because of weakness-the need for pub-
licity and food.
Despite their small numbers, the various
guerrilla groups are able to cause considerable
trouble through kidnapings and robberies.
Security forces often have difficulty in reacting to
raids in the remote areas of guerrilla operations.
Following the latest incidents Minister of Gov-
ernment Vallejo stated that the four-month-old
state of siege would remain in effect as long as
guerrilla attacks continued.
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Bolivia-Gulf Settlement Near
In a press conference on 7 September Presi-
dent Ovando explained the principal provisions of
the settlement negotiated for Gulf Oil Company's
property that was expropriated last October. He
said that the remaining details would be worked
out in the next 15 days. Gulf's chief negotiator
told the US Embassy that he was pleased with the
arrangements and confident that the government
would follow through with the settlement.
The negotiated settlement calls for Gulf to
receive about $78.7 million in compensation for
its lost property, plus an additional $14-15 mil-
lion in repayment of debts owed the company.
The compensation is acceptable to Gulf, although
;t is some $20 million less than the approximately
$101 million calculated value of Gulf's invest-
ment in Bolivia. Gulf will receive a percentage of
proceeds from petroleum exports until the $78.7
million is paid, but the method of repaying the
debt has not yet been determined.
President Ovando indicated in his press con-
ference that the sticky problem of the Spanish
state oil company's role in the settlement had also
been settled. The Spanish company, under the
SECRET
name of CAMBA, was originally brought into the
negotiations as an intermediary for the company
and the government when dealing directly with
Gulf seemed politically impossible for the Ovando
government. CAMBA was to receive a 20-year
contract to operate the expropriated fields and
market Bolivian petroleum. When the settlement
seemed near, however, the Bolivian Government
sought to exclude CAMBA altogether. A com-
promise apparently now has been reached
wherein CAMBA will provide technical assistance
for three years and marketing assistance for five
years. It will receive $400,000 for the first three
years and a reduced rate later.
President Ovanclo and members of the nego-
tiating commission appear prepared to face up to
the political difficulty and public criticism the
settlement is expected to arouse. Extensive public
objection to the settlement, however, could cause
further delays in the final agreement. Gulf already
has consented to a decrease of $800,000 in the
total compensation so that the government could
avoid paying for a concession that was sure to
raise public question because of legal doubts
about the validity of the title.
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Guyana: Danger of Setback in 1970 Sugar Crop
Prime Minister Burnham faces political ob-
stacles in efforts to avoid a serious shortfall in the
important sugar harvest. Labor strife and pro-
longed bad weather threaten the 1970 sugar har-
vest, already behind schedule.
A struggle between the two leading sugar
workers unions-the Communist-led Guyana Agri-
cultural Workers Union (GAWU) and the Man-
power Citizens Association (MPCA)-over sugar
worker representation may cause additional de-
lays in the current harvest, which is approxi-
mately half over. Sugar last year accounted for
US $41.3 million in export earnings and is of vital
importance to the Guyanese economy.
GAWU "unofficial recognition." This would en-
able the Ministry of Labor to negotiate with
GAWU "workers' representatives," but Jagan ap-
parently is not willing to accept anything short of
full "recognition." The government may be will-
ing to accord full recognition if it is the only way
to avoid losing the 1970 crop.
The only officially recognized sugar workers
union, the MPCA, which represents about 58 per-
cent of the workers has reacted strongly to the
government's proposal. Although the MPCA has
lost considerable ground in the past year, it could
precipitate a fight for control and is strong
enough to cause a serious loss of production if it
calls a strike.
Cheddi Jagan, Communist leader of the
People's Progressive Party, which controls GAWU,
is taking advantage of the situation and his
union's increased strength and better discipline to
make a strong bid for government recognition.
Jagan, whose popularity has been in decline, ap-
parently believes that he has found an area in
which to regain some of his lost status.
The government, in an apparent effort to
save the harvest, has shown willingness to give
URUGUAY: The Tupamaros appear to be in the
process of modifying their ransom demands for
the American agronomist and the Brazilian diplo-
mat they have held for more than five weeks. The
Tupamaros reportedly have no intentions of gra-
tuitously releasing the hostages. From their initial
demand for the release of all imprisoned guer-
rillas, the Tupamaros may now be willing to settle
for a package containing all or some of the fol-
lowing conditions: the release of 50 Brazilian
prisoners, the publication of the Tupamaros mani-
Prime Minister Burnham is thus faced with
the risk of heavy economic losses if the sugar
industry is disrupted by widespread labor strug-
gles. In addition, there is the incipient threat that
the Communist-led GAWU may dominate the
sugar industry and be responsive to Jagan's con-
trol. Burnham may gamble, however, that he can
exercise effective influence over the GAWU lead-
ers and eventually wean control of the union
away from Jagan.
festo, and a million dollars. Although the Tupa-
maros have made no additional kidnap attempts
since the abduction of the American agronomist
on 7 August, they have carried out a number of 25X1
bombings, shootings, and robberies in Monte-
video. On 8 September the Tupamaros stole 180
pounds of plastic dynamite,
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USSR-CARIBBEAN: The seven Soviet ships cur-
rently making a visit to Cienfuegos, Cuba, mark
the third time in the past 16 months that the
Soviet Navy has operated in Caribbean waters.
The latest naval group, comprising two guided
missile ships, an amphibious landing ship, and
four support vessels, arrived at Cienfuegos on 9
GUYANA-USSR: Guyana and the Soviet Union
have announced an agreement "in principle" to
establish "non-resident" diplomatic relations. It is
expected that their ambassadors at the United
Nations will handle diplomatic affairs, but details
of the agreement are to be "worked out later."
The Soviets have been seeking full diplomatic ties
with Guyana since last spring, but the Guyanese
September. Antisubmarine operations during the
latter part of the ships' Atlantic transit indicate
that a nuclear submarine was with the task force. 25X1
Following the visit, the Soviet ships will probably
conduct further operations and possibly visit
other ports in the Caribbean area.
apparently were concerned that resident status
would present them with unnecessary "security
problems." Guyana's Prime Minister Burnham
had been pushing for early approval of the agree-
ment, believing that his third-world posture
would be enhanced during his presence at the
Nonaligned Nations Conference at Lusaka. \ 25X1
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Belgium Seeks Constitutional Revision
Secret
N? 45
11 September 1970
No. 0387/70A
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CONFIDENTIAL
An oft-quoted cabinet minister's
complaint around the turn of the cen-
tury-"The Belgians, they do not exist"-
reflects a political problem that has been
assuming ever greater importance over the
last generation. When the great powers
created Belgium in 1830, they threw to-
gether two populations with differing cul-
tural backgrounds, the Dutch-speaking
Flemings and the French-speaking Wal-
loons. With the awakening of Flemish cul-
tural consciousness, the now more nu-
merous Flemings have been demanding
equal status within the state, a demand
ultimately requiring that the old constitu-
tion be revised. In May and June of this
year, Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens came
closer than any other Belgian prime minis-
ter to achieving this elusive goal. He prob-
ably will continue the quest during the
coming legislative year, though he has not
revealed the tactics he intends to pursue
Tempers flare during Flemish
when parliament reconvenes next month. demonstration in Brussels in 1962.
Although the French- and Dutch-speaking
populations within the boundaries of modern Bel-
gium have coexisted since ancient times, it was
not until the end of the 19th Century that a
Flemish cultural consciousness began to develop
in earnest. In large part its emergence was a reac-
tion to the political, economic, and cultural domi-
nation of the French-speaking population, the
Special Report - 1 -
CONFIDENTIAL
Walloons, and the Frenchified Flemish upper
class, since the creation of the Belgian state.
The Flemish struggle for equality was a slow
process during the first half of this century. The
Linguistic Law of 1932 for the first time estab-
lished the use of Dutch in Flanders and French in
Wallonia as the official languages of government
administration. Compulsory education in the sec-
ond national language was also required for the
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Lhett FJeinish spec ing SLIMBURG
VLAANDERENri -, Ha-11
I. Nernur
Linguistic frontier
Province boundary
Rems,ining bilingual
a r-n
BELGIUM
M ? ri -1
~ A L L 0 N I
~? ti? '~ _~ S French-speaking
"S'.'C NAMUR
first time that year. Dutch was raised to equal
status in the judiciary and military as well in the
late 1930s. The possibility that population shifts
could alter the primary language in any locale was
finally eliminated in 1963, when a series of four
Linguistic Laws drew a definitive boundary across
Belgium.
Demographic and economic changes have
complicated the drive for parity between the two
major communities. Because of a greater birth
rate, Flemings have outnumbered French-
speaking Belgians since the turn of the century,
and now account for about five of every eight
citizens. In contrast to the gradual decline of the
Walloon iron and steel industries, the basis of
Belgium's economic strength in the 19th Century,
Flemish commerce and industry have been pros-
pering and now provide the bulk of the national
economic wealth. For these reasons, the Franco-
phones have increasingly come to regard the
Special Report
CONFIDENTIAL
GERMANY
German-\,
?speaking '?~
^ LUXEMBOURG '
lon
A
r
Luxembourg
Flemish bid for equality as a drive to dominate,
and a militant Francophone movement has
emerged demanding protection for Walloon inter-
ests.
Given the depth of the division between the
two major communities, it is perhaps surprising
that there has been relatively little civil strife.
There have been only a few riots associated with
the problem, and numerous mass demonstrations
did not lead to violence. But the potential for
civic disorder has always been present, and many
moderates believe this potential has increased in
the last decade with the emergence and growth of
militant political parties in both camps.
The struggle to accommodate the conflicting
cultural, economic, and political interests of the
two communities, once the postwar reconstruc-
tion was completed in the 1950s, became the
dominating political issue of the 1960s. This
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CONFIDENTIAL
accommodation could only be accomplished
through revision of the constitution, a process
requiring the approval of two thirds of the two
houses of parliament. This approval has so far
been impossible to obtain because of the division
of the electorate into three major parties and a
host of minor ones, most of which cut across
ethnic lines. A succession of governments through
the 1960s could not find the required majority in
parliament for any reform package.
Stability Through Reform
The first major reform effort in the 1960s
came shortly after passage of the 1963 Linguistic
Laws, themselves an important achievement.
Bickering in parliament finally led the leaders of
the three largest parties in early 1965 to discuss
the issues outside of parliament in a series of
"Round Table" meetings. Substantial agreement
was reached on many issues, but the meetings
foundered when the conservative, Brussels-based
Liberals, the smallest of the three parties, with-
drew because of disagreements over the future of
the Brussels region.
In 1966 a new government emerged, a coali-
tion of Social Christians (Catholics) and Liberals,
led by Social Christian leader Pierre Vanden
Boeynants, and a respite from linguistic quarrel-
ing followed in the form of a two-year truce
subscribed to by all major parties. This fragile
agreement broke down, however, in the face of
demonstrations by militant Flemish students at
the prestigious University of Louvain in January
1968. The government resigned the following
month when it was unable to agree on handling
student demands that a beginning be made on
The Belgian Parliament Before and After
the Elections of March, 1968
May 1965 - March 1968
GQVERN4f,64,
VNP-12 FDF-3
Others-2
PCB - Belgian Communist Party
PSB - Belgian Socialist Party
PSC - Social Christian Party
PLP - Liberal Party
Special Report
AL1710N
VNP - Flemish National Party-Volksunie
FDF - Francophone Democratic Front
FDF-RW - Coalition of Francophone Democratic
Front and Walloon Rally
- 3 - 11 September 1970
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CONFIDENTIAL
relocating the university's French-speaking de-
partments on a site in Wallonia.
The parliamentary election campaign in Feb-
ruary and March was dominated by the linguistic
issue. The small, militant nationalistic parties-the
Flemish Volksunie and its Francophone counter-
parts, the Walloon Rally and the Francophone
Democratic Front-trumpeted regional autonomy
within a new federal state structure; the three
major parties continued to uphold the principle
of seeking reform within the present unitary state
system. The major parties were obviously on the
defensive, however, and it quickly became appar-
ent as the campaign unfolded that their internal
unity was fragile.
To the surprise of few, the election on 28
March 1968 showed a remarkable growth in
strength of the militant national parties. The
Flemish and Walloon militants cornered 15.7 per-
cent of the popular vote, as compared with only
8.9 percent in the 1965 election. More impor-
tantly, these parties increased their seats in the
212-seat Chamber of Representatives from 15 to
32. These gains came at the expense of the major
parties; the Social Christians lost eight seats, the
Socialists five, and the Liberals one.
Although the elections left the major parties
in their traditional position of strength, their lead-
ers were gloomy. The Social Christians emerged
from the contest with their Flemish and Walloon
wings functioning as separate entities having only
a tenuous loyalty to their national headquarters.
Regional centrifugalism in the other two parties,
although less strong than in the Social Christian
Party, inhibited incisive leadership. At the same
time, the major party leaders saw the elections as
evidence of an increasing polarization of the elec-
torate which could benefit only the small militant
parties. This feeling led to the conclusion that, as
indecisive as the March elections had been, an
effort to win a clearer mandate from the people
in a new election would lead only to further gains
by the minor parties.
Special Report -4
The only chance at this point to achieve
constitutional reform lay in the formation of a
grand coalition of the three major parties, for any
combination of only two big parties would not
command the 142 seats in the Chamber-two-
thirds of the total--required for constitutional
amendments. Even a grand coalition was of
doubtful efficacy, for most observers were skepti-
cal that the leaders could enforce discipline, given
the ugly mood of recriminations prevailing in the
parties. In any event, the grand coalition was
never put to the test, for the Socialists decided
that they were too doctrinally opposed to the
Liberals to participate in any coalition with them.
The signs pointed, therefore, to the creation
of a weak caretaker government, which, while
formally charged with seeking constitutional re-
form, would in fact undertake no major initiatives
Gaston Eyskens
Belgian Prime Minister
11 September 1970
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toward this end. Still, the search for a viable
combination of forces proved quite protracted. It
was not until the end of June 1968-after the
longest interregnum in Belgian history-that Gas-
ton Eyskens, a moderate Social Christian, was
able to patch together a coalition with the Social-
ists. With 128 deputies, this coalition enjoyed a
majority, but lacked 14 seats of a two-thirds
majority.
By October, nevertheless, the Eyskens coali-
tion had drawn up a legislative program encom-
passing constitutional revision that was destined
to remain largely unchanged up to the present.
One major provision called for recognition in the
constitution that the country is composed of four
linguistic regions, the Dutch (Flanders), the
French (Wallonia), the bilingual Brussels area, and
the tiny German-language region in eastern Bel-
gium. The first two regions were also to be
granted "cultural autonomy," including such
fields as education, arts and letters, museums and
libraries, radio and television cultural activities for
youth, cultural relations between the communi-
ties, and, with certain restrictions, cultural rela-
tions with foreign countries.
The second major provision of the reform
package called for the creation of Dutch-speaking
and French-speaking linguistic groups in each
house of parliament. These groups were to have
the power to suspend parliamentary action on
any bill if three quarters of either group decided
the bill would be detrimental to the interests of
its community.
Along with constitutional reform, the
Eyskens government also drafted a program to
decentralize decision-making in economic devel-
opment. This program provided for the creation
of Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels sections in the
national Economic Planning Bureau, the creation
of an Economic Council for Brabant (which in-
cludes Brussels) alongside of the existing eco-
nomic councils for Flanders and Wallonia, and the
creation of regional development corporations.
Special Report
This economic decentralization program was
intended by the government as a concession to
the Walloons, who had long believed something of
this nature was required to combat their region's
economic decay. The government hoped that Wal-
loon members of parliament would support pas-
sage of the constitutional reforms, in which the
Flemings were greatly interested, in exchange for
Flemish support for economic decentralization.
Progress toward enactment of all these meas-
ures was glacial. They were subjected to the
scrutiny of special parliamentary committees for
months, while behind the scenes the power blocks
worked out new concessions and refinements. A
major stumbling block was the status of Brussels.
Historically and geographically a Flemish city,
Brussels in fact is heavily Francophone because of
its national role since 1830. Under the Linguistic
Laws of 1963, bilingual Brussels is defined as
comprising 19 urban central communes, while the
surrounding suburban communes remain legally
Flemish. As more and more Francophones moved
to the suburbs, they brought with them their
French language and culture, creating pressure to
expand the officially bilingual area of the capital
to include these communes. At the same time,
holding the line of the "French island" of Brus-
sels at 19 urban communes became a rallying cry
and a test for Flemings of all political stripes.
A second major problem involved the mech-
anics of passage. The economic decentralization
program could be passed in each house of parlia-
ment by a simple majority, which the coalition in
theory possessed, because such a program did not
require amending the constitution. But Flemish
deputies in both coalition parties refused to enact
the program until the way was clear for action on
the constitutional reform package.
The prospects of achieving a two-thirds ma-
jority on the constitutional reforms seemed as
remote as ever. The Liberals, left out of the
government at the Socialists' insistence and re-
fused even an unofficial role in drafting the
11 September 1970
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legislation, threatened to boycott parliamentary
consideration of the package, an action that
would have denied the coalition a quorum. The
militant Flemish and Francophone deputies, on
the other hand, were certain to vote against the
package because each group felt the other had
been granted too many concessions. Finally, coa-
lition deputies from Brussels, particularly the
Brussels Socialists, might break party discipline to
vote against the bills because Brussels' plight was
overlooked.
By Easter 1969, several constitutional re-
form measures were reported out of the special
committees, where a simple majority sufficed.
But, rather than force a showdown on the floor
of either chamber, the government procrastinated
until the approach of the summer recess, thereby
reducing the politicians' appetite for protracted
haggling or their willingness to force the govern-
ment out of office.
By mid-June, the government increased pres-
sure on the Senate to act on constitutional revi-
sion by demanding that it remain in session
through August if necessary. In the Chamber,
meanwhile, it decided to move ahead on eco-
nomic decentralization. On 19 June, the decen-
tralization bill was passed after Eyskens promised
publicly not to submit the bill to the Senate until
that body had made progress on constitutional
reform. No amount of pressure, however, could
force the Senate to take action, and it too ad-
journed in mid-July.
By the time parliament resumed in the fall,
it was clear to Eyskens that he had reached an
impasse: he could not convince the opposition
parties to give their blessing to proposals on con-
stitutional reform in which they had been refused
any hand in drafting. Although the Socialists had
earlier refused to permit the opposition Liberals
to participate in the drafting process, Eyskens was
able to cajole his coalition partners by early Sep-
tember into accepting a series of extraparlia-
mentary discussions among representatives of five
parties-the two coalition partners, the opposition
Liberals, and the two important militant parties.
These discussions, close in spirit to the Round
Table talks of 1964-65, would hopefully lead to a
compromise package of constitutional reforms to
which all parties would be committed.
The Committee of 28, popularly dubbed the
Eyskens Committee, began meeting in September.
It consisted of Eyskens, the two ministers for
community relations, and parliamentarians from
the five parties. On 30 October, to no one's
surprise, the three Volksunie representatives
walked out of the committee, arguing that their
party remained opposed to any constitutional
limitation on the rule of the Flemish majority. On
12 November, the remainder of the committee
had completed its final report. It was a statement
of agreement on principles, most of which had
been spelled out before, but it did not point
clearly toward detailed legislation. Most impor-
tantly, it failed to reflect any agreement on the
status of Brussels.
The problem of Brussels was then handed
over to a special commission, with largely the
same membership as the Committee of 28, amid a
rising tide of public debate. Some Belgians argued
that parliament should enact those compromises
already in sight; others believed that parliament
should enact a series of principles, leaving the
details to a later period when agreement might be
easier to reach. But the Volksunie and Liberals
reiterated their threats to deny a parliamentary
quorum on any legislation on the subject unless a
package covering all aspects-a "global" solu-
tion-were submitted. Several Francophone Social
Christian leaders demanded in mid-December that
Eyskens draft such a solution for presentation to
parliament as the price for their continued partici-
pation in the government. Although the special
commission considered several compromise sug-
gestions on the Brussels problem, it broke up
shortly before Christmas after 15 sessions without
reaching agreement.
The cabinet was diverted in January of this
year by other issues, chief of which was a wildcat
Special Report
11 September 1970
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CON FI.vt,N 1 11A L,
strike in the Limburg coal mines, but Eyskens
continued his patient efforts, first to obtain agree-
ment in the cabinet on a global solution, and then
to obtain a two-thirds quorum in parliament. He
was spurred on by his Francophone colleagues,
who refined their threats to leave the cabinet by
demanding cabinet agreement on a global solution
by 31 January and submission to parliament no
later than 15 February. He missed the January
deadline, but on 15 February announced to a
surprised nation that the cabinet had unani-
mously agreed on a community relations pro-
gram.
The program turned out to be a broad-brush
formula that parliament would have to flesh out.
The keystone was to be Francophone agreement
to only minor changes in the Brussels situation in
exchange for Flemish agreement to ample protec-
tion of minority (Francophone) interests in the
government, including parity in the distribution
of ministerial portfolios and the right of either
linguistic group in parliament to block legislation.
The package would not please the Brussels
Francophones, but the cabinet may have cal-
culated that the opposition Liberals would not
dare to oppose such important legislation, which
the majority of Belgians, supported. The Liberal
leaders had just announced abandonment of their
parliamentary boycott, a decision many assumed
was taken with an eye toward communal elec-
tions upcoming in the fall of 1970.
Parliament did not begin to act until May.
On the 15th, Eyskens announced that he was
submitting to the Senate the economic decentrali-
zation bill passed by the Chamber the previous
June. At the same time, he was submitting a new
bill defining the geographic scope of the new
regional economic councils, a task left undone the
year before because of disagreement on Brussels.
The new bill would ensure that the six suburban
communes around Brussels would remain under
Flemish jurisdiction.
On 28 May, the Senate passed three of four
critical constitutional amendments, one estab-
Special Report
lishing the linguistic groups in both houses of
parliament, one prescribing parity in ministerial
portfolios, and a minor bill on subministerial cabi-
net posts. The important fourth amendment
failed because of Liberal opposition. This amend-
ment would have specified the size of the major-
ity in either linguistic bloc in parliament that
would be required to block proposed legislation.
The Liberals wanted a two-thirds majority, which
would give them virtual veto power. When the
Liberal proposal was rejected in favor of a simple
majority, the Liberals voted against the entire bill
and threatened to resume their boycott of future
consideration of legislation on constitutional revi-
sion.
Eyskens' fortunes seemed to take a sudden
turn for the better when, on 9 June, the Senate
French-speaking Walloons taunt Flemish demonstrator
in Brussels.
approved the basic amendment creating the Flem-
ish, French, and German unilingual regions, and a
bilingual Brussels area limited to the 19 urban
communes. Not only did the government parties
exhibit a heretofore unknown unity-only five
Socialist senators from Brussels voted against the
amendment-but the solid front of the promised
Liberal opposition failed to materialize. All but
one Flemish Liberal senator voted for the govern-
ment amendment. If the government parties
- 7 - 11 September 1970
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Demonstrators follow the Flemish banner in 1962.
could continue to maintain discipline, and if
Flemish Liberals would support them, the re-
mainder of the amendments could pass the Senate
and the entire program could pass the Chamber.
The limiting of Brussels to the 19 urban
communes evoked a quick response from the cap-
ital's Francophone community. On 25 June, a
hastily constituted "Committee of Public
Safety," including leaders from several political
parties, conducted a protest demonstration in the
center of the city. Attended by about 12,000
people, the demonstration demanded "liberty"
for Brussels and denounced "the iron collar" im-
posed by the political settlement. There was no
violence.
Shipwreck within Sight of'Port
Lyskens was to be denied his success in
parliament. On 25 June, when the Senate was
passing the 13th and final amendment having
substantive importance for community relation,;,
the government fell two deputies short of a
quorum in the Chamber on an amendment con-
cerning the organization of the Brussels metro-
politan government. This lack of a quorum re-
sulted from a boycott of the proceedings by the
20 Volksunie deputies, who felt too many conces-
sions had been made to the Francophones, and by
45 Francophone deputies. These politicians in-
Special Report _8_
cluded the Communists, the Walloon militants,
the five Brussels Socialists, and several Franco-
phone Liberals. The fate of the economic decen-
tralization bill in the Senate, which had been
introduced in May and was then nearing a final
vote, was also endangered, for the Social Christian
senators threatened to vote it down in return for
the persisting Socialist defections on constitu-
tional amendments.
The decentralization bill finally passed the
Senate by a narrow margin on 2 July after the
Social Christian threat evaporated in a cloud of
bitter verbiage. The next day the bill went back
to the Chamber for final vote. The government
again failed to raise a quorum in the Chamber for
considering any of the constitutional amend-
ments, and these bills currently are in limbo as a
consequence. The government was able, however,
to muster enough votes to pass the decentraliza-
tion bill with a last-minute change. Ironically, this
change involved deleting the definition of the
geographical boundaries of Brussels. The defini-
tion will now be accomplished by a royal decree;
the king presumably will decide according to the
advice of the prime minister and what he believes
to be the majority opinion in the nation. This will
likely be to limit Brussels to the 19 urban com-
munes, as the Senate had defined it in May.
The Future for Revision
Criticized by friend and foe alike, compared
unfavorably with other Belgian politicians past
and present, and frustrated repeatedly in his legis-
lative efforts, Eyskens has had ample justification
and opportunity to resign. His failure to step
aside suggests that he has much more courage
than most people have given him credit for. Com-
ing as close to success as he did near the end of
the last parliamentary session has enhanced the
stature of his Fabian efforts to compromise the
irreconcilable. Chances are that Eyskens hopes to
last out his government's mandate until 1972, and
that he intends to press onward with constitu-
tional revision.
11 September 1970
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Eyskens has not revealed his tactics for the
future, and he apparently has more than one
option open. With parliament due to convene
shortly after the communal elections in October,
he may resume the battle over revision where it
left off in July, using as leverage a threat to
precipitate parliamentary elections by resigning.
Because the militant nationalist parties are ex-
pected to do well in the communal elections at
the expense of the large parties, most observers
believe that cumulative and reciprocal damage to
the large parties would be the greater the closer
communal and parliamentary elections are to
each other. The threat of early parliamentary
elections, therefore, might goad the leaders of the
larger parties into greater pliability.
Eyskens could also choose, however, to let
the dust settle for some months, meanwhile
patiently striving for new compromises behind
the scenes. He may well find himself forced into
marking time, for there is no guarantee that his
jury-rigged scaffolding of political support for the
revision and decentralization plans will not col-
lapse at any time. If his political framework holds
up, he may still opt to divert the nation's atten-
tion for a while to other pressing problems before
returning to revision. Chief among such problems
is the means of financing the country's dual sys-
tems of public and Catholic schools.
This issue was a major domestic political
problem from the time of Belgian independence
until 1958, when the three major parties arrived
at a 12-year pact under which both systems re-
ceive state financial support. The pact expires this
year, and will most likely simply be renewed. The
pact has not generated much public attention so
far, and Belgian reaction to the religious-based
civil strife in Northern Ireland suggests the Bel-
gian public today has little stomach for such
controversy. Yet pact renewal could conceivably
provoke a new crisis of sorts between strong
Catholics, mostly in the Social Christian Party,
and the anticlericalists in the Socialist and Liberal
parties.
Special Report
If and when Eyskens returns to the battle
over revision, one of the first decisions he will
have to make will be whether to push for a new
compromise over Brussels-the point of conten-
tion which wrecked his plans earlier this year-or
to try anew to enlist Liberal support for his old
plans. These two alternatives need not be mu-
tually exclusive, but either by itself might suffice
to give his program the necessary support in par-
liament.
The Brussels question at this point appears
insoluble, and whatever compromise is most
palatable in parliament is likely to be the one
adopted and pursued by the government. In the
past year there has been no dearth of Brussels
plans floated by individuals in and out of public
life, and the Belgians' proverbial preference for
compromise should continue to generate other
schemes.
The quest to line up Liberal support for
revision and decentralization depends largely on
the extent of the party's unity. If it emerges from
the communal elections with its current tenuous
degree of unity, coalition strategists may con-
clude that the government bills can hope to pick
up support in parliament from dissident Liberal
elements, even though this strategy did not give
the government victory last spring. In the unlikely
event the Liberal image is improved by the elec-
tions, and its unity strengthened, Social Christians
would have to face again the task of trying to
convince their Socialist partners to admit the Lib-
erals into a tripartite coalition or, at least, work
with the Liberals in another Round Table con-
ference.
Some Belgian political commentators, des-
pairing of any solution at this time, believe that
constitutional revision is a task for future genera-
tions. If it should prove elusive in the near future,
the government and parties will have to continue
making such ad hoc adjustments in the country's
political, economic, and social structure as they
have been doing over the past few years. The
9- 11 September 1970
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gradual trend toward federalism will therefore tions and services. Deplorable as 'this is to many
continue, regardless of what happens in parlia- thoughtful Belgians, they profess to see no other
rnent. The trend has already resulted in burden- way to accommodate the mutually antagonistic
some and wasteful duplication of public institu- Flemish and Francophone communities.
Special Report _10-
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