WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008200010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 4, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
44
4 September 1970
No. 0386/70
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(Information as of noon EDT, 4 September 1970)
Page
FAR EAST
Laos: Who's Going to Khang Khay? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cambodia: Phnom Penh Under Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Vietnam: A New Round of Communist Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Malaysia: Government Edges Back Toward Parliamentary Rule . . . . . . . 6
Communist China: People's Congress Complications . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Communist China: Substantial Increase in Foreign Aid . . . . . . . . . . . 8
EUROPE
USSR: Brezhnev Speaks in Central Asia on Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . 10
Yugoslavia: The Party Strengthens Its Hold on the Military . . . . . . . . 11
THE THIRD NONALIGNMENT SUMMIT:
THE SWAN SONG OF YUGOSLAV PREDOMINANCE
BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES:
THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Another Crisis Flares in Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Middle East: Cease-fire Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Expanding Iranian Navy to Assume Greater Role in Persian Gulf . . . . . . 14
Libyan Coup Anniversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Bolivia Counters Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Cuba: No Ready Solutions for Regime Ills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
USSR-Peru: Economic Cooperation on the increase . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Colombia: President Pastrana's Conciliatory Start . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
NOTES: USSR-Indonesia; Australia; Communist China; Arms Control; Iceland;
Arab States; Palestinians; Ecuador; Panama; Uruguay; El Salvador - Honduras; The
Caribbean
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FAR EAST
Laos: Who's Going to Khang Khay?
The dialogue between Vientiane and the Com-
munists may break down-at least temporarily-be-
cause of a dispute over representation at the talks
to be held at Khang Khay. On 1 September, hours
before Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's depar-
ture for an extended trip abroad, Pathet Lao leader
Souphanouvong made a last-minute play to get his
half brother to agree to the Communist scenario for
the second stage of the negotiations. Souphanou-
vong named a new representative to go to Khang
Khay and called on Souvanna to appoint his own
plenipotentiary.
The prime minister had already named an
18-man delegation to represent the "government
side" if the talks materialized in his absence. But
the Pathet Lao apparently are strongly opposed to
meeting with a large group that includes rightists,
and they are insistent that Souvanna appoint an
individual to represent himself, rather than the gov-
ernment.
able delay before the momentum is re-established,
but it seems likely that a way to continue will be
found.
On the military front, government troops have
still made no progress in their extended effort to
take Ban Na. But 15 miles to the north, on the
western approaches to the Plaine des Jarres, an
irregular force of 300 men reached the vicinity of
Muong Soui on 1 September without significant
opposition. Muong Soui is an important storage and
transshipment point on Route 7 that has been in
Communist hands since February 1970. Enemy
units in the area have already reacted sharply to the
government's foray, and the irregular force may
have to be evacuated.
Souvanna countered the latest Communist in-
itiative on 2 September with an offer to meet with
Souphanouvong himself later this month in Paris. It
seems most unlikely that the Pathet Lao chief will
accept this invitation, and there is no sign that
Souvanna will agree to send a personal representa-
tive to Khang Khay. By accepting the Communist
plan for talks between plenipotentiaries of the two
princes, Souvanna would be acceding to the Pathet
Lao contention that he can only speak for himself
and for his neutralist party, not for the government
of Laos. Moreover, the prime minister recognizes
that the rightists and other important political ele-
ments in Vientiane expect to have their interests
represented in any negotiations that may develop.
It is entirely possible, however, that the pres-
ent impasse between the two sides on how to pro-
ceed at Khang Khay will not be permanent. Both
the government and presumably the Communists
are interested in reaching some sort of accommoda-
tion by which the level of fighting might be de-
creased for the time being. With Souvanna traveling
abroad until late October, there may be a consider-
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Bouam
Long* 25X1
haTam progress
Bleung
0 Government-held location
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Cambodia: Phnom Penh Under Pressure
In the past few weeks the Communists have
continued to edge closer to Phnom Penh and have
made several attacks on government positions
guarding the approaches to the capital. In the
closest action to the city since the fighting began,
the enemy made an unsuccessful attack late last
week on a small government force at the village of
Moat Krasas, a scant five miles east of Phnom
Penh. Communist troops also occupied the town
of Srang, 25 miles southwest of the capital. Cur-
rent Cambodian Army estimates claim there are
approximately 5,600 enemy troops within a
20-mile radius of the city. These forces are op-
posed by 20,000 government soldiers.
The recent attacks, which have revived spec-
ulation that the Communists may be planning an
early assault on Phnom Penh, seem to be pri-
marily intended to shrink the city's defensive
perimeter, increase its sense of isolation, and de-
moralize the Lon Nol government and the general
population. Enemy harassing actions even closer
to the capital are likely, including rocket and
mortar attacks, possibly accompanied by hit-and-
run terrorist raids.
The Communist campaign to isolate Phnom
Penh and to keep Cambodian forces tied down
defending population centers while the enemy
filters freely through the countryside probably is
designed to facilitate efforts to re-establish border
base areas, to revamp and extend lines of com-
munication, and to organize and train ethnic
Cambodians in areas under enemy control.
1-here is increasing evidence that the Corr-
munists are making substantial progress in recruit-
ing in rural areas. There are signs also that the
government is at last becoming realistic in its
appraisal of this problem. Previously, government
leaders had only grudgingly admitted that Siha-
nouk retained some support among the populace,
arguing that his identification with the Vietnam-
ese (and Chinese) Communists had largely dissi-
however,
a large percentage of the Communist force in
Cambodia is made up of ethnic Cambodians.
Nevertheless, the government has yet to
make any serious and sustained efforts to counter
these Communist organizational activities, and
there have been many complaints from provincial
officials about this failure. The newly formed
Ministry of Community Development has out-
lined an ambitious long-range program to carry
the regime's message to the people, but it prob-
ably will be some time before even its initial goals
are achieved.
Phnom Penh recently has intensified its
effort to have its delegation seated at the Lusaka
conference of nonaligned states opening next
week. Various delegations have been sent to
several African, Middle Eastern, and Caribbean
countries to lobby for the Lon Nol government's
case. If the government fails to obtain official
acceptance at Lusaka, it hopes to ensure that a
majority of the countries represented will also
refuse to recognize Sihanouk, whose backers have
also been busily trying to line up support. Thus
far, neither claimant seems to have secured the 25X1
necessary backing to win a seat, and a large
number of prospective participants have indicated
they favor seating neither delegation.
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Phnom Penh Area
A
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K.,ah r _
. nec~3~wfF~
s.ey Raa.:
I "p.i ~.. vn a+Mu
Unsuccessful enen y attack
29 August'
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Communist concentration .,.
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Vietnam: A New Round of Communist Activity
Communist forces began a new flurry of
attacks in widely separated areas of South 'Viet-
nam on 30 August. The enemy had been planning
this upsurge for some time to coincide with sev-
eral important Communist anniversaries that.
occur during the period of 28 August - 4 Septem-
ber, including the first anniversary of Ho Chi
Minh's death.
On the first day of the Communist attacks,
the number of enemy mortar and rocket attacks
lose to over 60, the highest number recorded in
four months. Over 200 allied troops and civilians
were reportedly killed or wounded in these
attacks.
These actions did not have much impact?
however, on the conduct of the government's
Senate elections, which were held on 30 August.
Only about half a dozen polling places came
under fire, and the Communists apparently made
no concerted effort to disrupt the elections.
In contrast with previous flurries this year,
when the number of attacks usually dropped on
the second day, Communist shellings rose to over
/0 on 31 August. From 30 August to 2 Septem-
ber there were 100 mortar and rocket attacks
reported in Military Region (MR) 4, 52 in MR 2,
43 in MR 1, and only 22 in MR 3.
The Communists concentrated most of their
attacks on outposts of the government's terri-
torial security forces, which defend the villages
and transportation arteries in the countryside. In
conjunction with the shellings, however, Com-
munist terrorists and local forces increased their
harassment of civilians. Although some enemy
artillery and sapper unfits have participated ire the
current round of attacks, major Communist
ground forces have not been committed.
The South Vietnamese Senate that has
emerged from last Sunday's elections probably
will be no more tractable than its predecessor.
The three favored ten-man slates have won the 30
seats at stake in the 60-member Senate, according
to unofficial returns. The An Quang Buddhist-
hacked ticket headed by Vu Van Mau held a
slight lead over incumbent Senator Cao's progov-
ernment list, with the slate headed by an in-
dependent, Upper House Chairman Huyen, in
third place.
The victory of the Mau list will ensure the
continuation of strong opposition in the Senate,
although members of the list are among the more
moderate elements in the An Quang -faction. The
ticket appears to have run even better than an-
ticipated. Its strong showing should serve to ward
off allegations of government rigging, such as fol-
lowed the 1967 voting. The outcome may thus
strengthen moderates within the An Quang lead-
ership and encourage the Buddhists to be po-
litically more active within the system rather than
to promote antigovernment agitation in the
streets.
Prospects for the government's legislative
program in the new Senate may depend on how
the Huyen slate lines up. The ticket appears gen-
erally sympathetic toward the government, but it
contains independent-minded men who probably
will not vote consistently with either progov-
ernment or opposition blocs.
Neither the government nor most other
groups involved in the elections, except for the
Buddhists, appear to have made much of an effort
to get out a large vote. Because of this and prob-
ably in part because the election was the third
nationwide one this year, voter interest appeared
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Huynh Van Cao
Government stalwart
relatively low. Only about 65 per cent of the
country's registered voters went to the polls-a
figure somewhat lower than the turnout for
similar elections in the past.
I n another development that threatens prob-
lems for Thieu, the Supreme Court may set aside
the conviction of Lower House Deputy Tran
Ngoc Chau late this month. A Supreme Court
i
justice has told US Embassy officials that the
court will consider the imprisoned deputy's ap-
peal on 25 September. Because of the precedent
set by an earlier decision of the court, the justice
said that he expects a prompt decision voiding
Chau's conviction.
The controversial methods used by the gov-
ernment in securing the arrest and conviction of
Chau last winter on charges of pro-Communist
activities aroused a storm of criticism. President
Nguyen Van Huyen
News to independent line
Vu Van Mau
Buddhist political opposition goes respectable
25X1
Thieu staked his personal prestige on the Chau
case, and he would be extremely reluctant to free
the deputy.
Hanoi's 25th anniversary celebrations pro-
duced no surprises. The North Vietnamese leaders
promised to go the full course to final victory, the
Chinese congratulated them on their capacity for
revolution, and the Soviets wished them well in
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5r,tJKt I
the "building of socialism" and in promoting a
"correct" solution to the war.
I n the major speech of the day, Premier
Pham Van Dong put special emphasis on the Viet
Cong as alleged advocates of "peace" in South
USSR-INDONESIA: Moscow has aqreed to the
settlement of Indonesia's $800-million debt on
30-year terms similar to those accepted by West-
ern creditors. The rescheduling reduces Indo-
nesian debt payments to manageable proportions
and will permit Djakarta to move ahead with
planning for long-term economic development.
Vietnam, suggesting that the Communists see
some grounds for capitalizing on this issue in the
coming months. Recent antigovernment demon-
strations in South Vietnam, he claimed, were a 25X1
"'natural outcome" of the aspirations of the
"townspeople and the great policies of the
Liberation Front in search of peace."
Although neither country seems eager to renew
significant Soviet military and economic aid, a
Soviet mission will visit Indonesia to explore com-
pletion of economic projects discontinued several
years ago and to discuss possible new economic
Malaysia: Government Edges Back Toward Parliamentary Rule
Prime Minister Rahman's announced retire-
ment strongly suggests that the leadership sees
that a return to open political activity is now
manageable. Declaring that he will step down on
21 September, the Tunku announced last Monday
that Parliament will reconvene in February 1971.
Parliament has been suspended since rioting oc-
curred between the Malay and Chinese corn-
munities following elections in West Malaysia in
May 1969.
1he Tunku, however, also affirmed that the
National Operations Council (NOC), the Malay-
dominated organization that has been running the
country since May 1969, will continue to func-
tion "to deal with the dangers of Communist
activity." This undoubtedly is the leadership's
way of cautioning opposition political elements
that it intends to retain close control over na-
lional affairs. In any case, Kuala Lumpur now has
a six-month grace period in which to test reac-
tions to greater political freedom.
In dealing with the non-Malay community,
the government's position is sharply circum-
scribed by the unwillingness of the Malay ex-
tremists to accept any lessening in Malay domina-
tion of the government. In fact, further constitu-
tional legislation designed to increase the Malay
position is slated for introduction when Parlia-
ment reconvenes.
In the short run, the new Malaysian gov-
ernment should prove fairly stable and will main-
tain its predecessor's style of muddling through
and suppressing those who try to rock the boat.
Rahman predictably named his deputy prime
minister, Tun Razak, as his successor. Razak, long
accustomed to being number two, will probably
tend to rely on the wisdom and expertise of the
Tunku, who will not be averse to exercising his
influence from behind the scenes.
The new leadership, however, will be faced
with some long-term problems. The top echelon
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Tan Sri
Ghazali, the opportunistic permanen secretary of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is expected to
play a major role in the new government, and he
may take on the post of minister of foreign af-
fairs. Beyond these few, however, candidates for
the front-rank are not now obvious.
AUSTRALIA: Reforms in the opposition Labor
Party, about to be implemented, should enhance
its electoral chances in 1972 and in the senatorial
race this year. The party's Federal Executive is
preparing to dismiss the Communist and leftist-
dominated leadership in the state of Victoria and
reconstitute the state executive there. Action may
even include stripping several key Victorians of
party membership. Steps toward these moves
began in early August and have gained wide sup-
port among the party's rank and file, trade union
The new Malay leadership may also prove
less than prepared for communal violence. In the
process of gathering the reins of power more
securely into its own hands, Kuala Lumpur has
bypassed and eased out senior Chinese leaders in
the key police Special Branch. Lowering Chinese
morale in this heretofore efficient and heavily
Chinese-staffed branch will inevitably reduce the25X1
government's access to information within the
Chinese community, the group most susce tible
of Communist exploitation.
leaders, and parliamentarians who are fed up with
Victoria's autocratic, extreme leftist party leader-
ship. The Labor Party's inability to win a national
election in the last 21 years derives in great part
from voter reaction to Communist influence in
the party's branch in Victoria, where over 25
percent of the nation's population is con-
centrated. Genuine reform in that state should
both reduce present divisiveness in the Labor
Part and broaden its electoral base. 25X1
Communist China: People's Congress Complications
Peking is moving forward with its plans to
convene the Fourth National People's Congress
(NPC), the civil government counterpart to a
party congress, but at an uneven pace. Even
though the congress is largely a rubber-stamp
body, extensive preparations for it have been
made at the local levels, and these have reportedly
proved more romnlicated and time-consuming
than expected.
Regime officials have retused to
Regime propaganda has so far shed little
light on a possible agenda in contrast with
practice prior to past sessions of the NPC.
central
directives covering preparations were issued as
early as last June. At that time, Peking reportedly
called for a nationwide group study program to
discuss revising the state constitution that was
promulgated in 1954. More recently, extensive
name lists, made up primarily of people who
attended the Third NPC in 1964-65, have been
publicized in major cities. As of late August,
however, a final selection of delegates in these
areas was still to be made.
In line with previous screening practices, the
name lists probably were sent out by Peking to
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various local authorities well before June. The
elapse of time since, however, suggests that final
delegate selection may have become yet another
hone of contention in various areas between rival
actions eager to ensure adequate representation
[or their adherents at the congress.
I hese procedural problems could be rapidly
overcome once a format is found that is both
acceptable to Peking and workable at the local
levels. Furthermore, the revised constitution is a
COMMUNIST CHINA: Last month's announce-
ment that Chou En-lai had accepted in principle
in invitation to visit Southern Yemen has evoked
a high level of interest in a considerable number
of Asian, African, and European capitals and has
given rise to widespread rumors that he will in-
clude several other countries in his itinerary. It is
in fact highly unlikely that Chou will confine his
trip-his first to a non-Communist nation since
the onset of the Cultural Revolution-to Aden. A
'J-opover in Pakistan seems a virtual certainty, and
visits to Nepal, Tanzania, Zambia, Albania, and
Romania also seem good bets. Other possibilities
include Congo (Brazzaville) and Sudan, and the
drastically simplified version of the one promul-
gated in 1954. Such an abbreviated form suggests
that, as was the case of the ninth party congress
last year, Peking may go ahead with a pro-forma
NPC that would announce a new president and
constitution and probably a restructuring of min-
istries. Some of the more troublesome details of
various political and personnel changes en-
gendered by the Cultural Revolution, however,
ma be left for a later date. I
French have been unofficially claiming that a visit
to Paris is also in the works. Peking is eager to
restore and improve relations with a wide variety
of states in an effort to circumscribe the influence
of the "superpowers," but if Chou is actually
contemplating visits to all these countries he will
probably have to schedule several trips. No date
for the visit to Southern Yemen has been set, but
it is unlikely that the trip will take place in the
next month, as Chou is almost certainly preoc-
cupied with preparations for China's upcoming
National People's Congress. 25X1
Communist China: Substantial Increase in Foreign Aid
Seeking to improve relations and to augment
its more active foreign policy, Communist China
is increasing its economic and military aid to a
number of countries in Africa and the Middle
Cast. During the past three months, Communist
China has extended $400 million in economic aid
to Tanzania and Zambia, and Sudan and Southern
Yemen have each received about $40 million
from Peking. This amounts to nearly half of all
Communist Chinese economic aid previously
extended to less developed countries during the
past 15 years. The recent surge in aid commit-
ments and Chou En-lai's foreign tour reportedly
planned for this fall underscore Peking's emer-
gence from its self-imposed foreign isolation
during the Cultural Revolution.
Southern Yemen, the most recent Chinese
aid recipient, has earmarked a 20-year, interest-
free credit of $43.2 million for the construction
of roads and light indlustrial plants. Aden, which
has not yet used most of a Chinese credit of $12
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million extended in 1968, has expressed surprise
at Peking's largesse.
The largest Chinese aid project is the
1,060-mile Tan-Zam railroad on which con-
struction will commence in October. Peking has
extended a 30-year, $400-million credit for rail
construction, locomotives, and rolling stock.
Repayment will be either in commodities or in
any convertible currency. Peking also will furnish
Tanzania and Zambia with commodity credits
permitting them to purchase Chinese goods,
which they will then sell to cover local costs.
Although the agreement provides for a maximum
of 2,000 Chinese to work on the project in
Tanzania at any one time, shortages of local man-
power may require the use of additional Chinese
labor.
Peking extended its first economic assistance
to Sudan in late June. The $42-million loan,
repayable over 16 years, will be used to construct
a fertilizer plant and several light industrial
factories.
Peking's military assistance in Africa is con-
centrated in Tanzania, where both Western and
Soviet military programs have been closed out.
The Chinese are constructing a naval base at Dar
es Salaam and will assist in the construction of a
new air base beginning early next year. On com-
pletion of pilot and ground support training, jet
fighters will be delivered. More than 200 Chinese
military advisers are assigned to the Tanzaniar25X6
Army. Peking also has promised to provide Congo
(Brazzaville) with four patrol boats and training
EUROPF
ARMS CONTROL: The 25-nation Geneva dis-
armament conference concluded its 1970 meeting
this week amid expressions of strong support for
the latest revision of the US-USSR draft treaty
limiting military utilization of the seabeds. Sev-
eral nonaligned states represented at the arms
control talks particularly applauded changes set-
ting forth in greater detail the options available to
verify compliance with the treaty. Prospects now
appear very good that the upcoming UN General
Assembly will endorse the treaty, which would
then be opened for signature early next
year. 25X1
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USSR: Brezhnev Speaks in Central Asia on Foreign Policy
in his tour of Central Asian republics this
week, party chief Brezhnev combined meetings
with provincial leaders with a report to the nation
on the foreign policy matters that have occupied
foviet leaders this summer. The top leaders, in
fact, had just forgone their customary August
vacations in their haste to sign the treaty with
West Germany and to arrange formal Warsaw Pact
endorsement of the move. Speaking in Alma-Ata
un 28 August at the celebration of Kazakhstan's
both anniversary, Brezhnev delivered a careful
and probably Politburo-approved explanation of
the treaty and of the cease-fire in the Middle East.
rom Kazakhstan, he moved on to the neighbor-
ing republics of Turkmenia and Tadzhikistan,
where he apparently gave much the same address
in each capital.
Brezhnev praised the West German Govern-
;nent--"we unequivocally value" its "realistic
approach"--and the treaty-a "serious contribu-
tion" toward easing tension in Europe. He ex-
pressed Moscow's desire for speedy ratification,
with the counsel that only this would allow all of
the opportunities created by the treaty to be
realized. At the same time, he went into some
detail in justifying Soviet accession to the treaty.
He stressed that it recognized the inviolability of
existing borders in Europe and resulted from
Soviet efforts since World War II and from close
consultation with the countries of the Warsaw
Pact.
Moscow's willingness to negotiate with West
Germany sprang from decisions taken by the
Soviet leaders in the aftermath of Brandt's elec-
tion to the chancellorship in September 1969.
they clearly decided that it was then possible to
acquire Bonn's endorsement of the status quo in
Europe, and that such an agreement would offer
more security than the walls of hostility they had
maintained for the past quarter century.
In this Central Asian tour, Brezhnev was
clearly intent on associating himself personally
with the fruition of Soviet diploma-tic efforts that
the treaty represents. In his June election speech
Brezhnev had given pointed stress to the useful-
ness of Moscow's direct talks with Bonn. In his
recent speeches he continues to move away from
the more rigid tone of most of his past pro-
nouncements toward a more flexible stance on
questions of foreign policy. Premier Kosygin, of
course, has on occasion shown a proclivity for
quiet diplomacy, and politburo member Mikhail
Suslov, in particular, has argued for a rapproche-
ment with European social democrats.
The treaty, however, tends to go against
attitudes deeply ingrained in the Soviet masses
and officialdom, and weakens the prop that the
"German threat" has served for many Soviet insti-
tutions and controls.. On the other hand, the
senior leaders can claim a very tangible accom-
plishment that can serve them in building a record
and program to present to the party congress next
March.
Brezhnev's conciliatory comments on China
reflect Moscow's current tactic of restraint vis-a-
vis Peking. He acknowledged that the border talks
in Peking are "going slowly," but pledged a "con-
structive and patient approach" on Moscow's
part, and called on the Chinese to respond in
kind. Brezhnev, however, took pains to refute
"imperialist fabrications" that the Soviet - West
German treaty frees Moscow's hands for increas-
ing pressure on China, thereby drawing attention
to this consideration.
On the Middle East, Brezhnev emphasized
Moscow's "positive" view of recent diplomatic
developments, including the cease-fire, and criti-
cized those who have resisted this "small step
toward peace." He demanded total Israeli with-
drawal from all occupied territory but again
voiced Soviet support for the national rights of all
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Yugoslavia: The Party Strengthens Its Hold on the Military
The promotion of Vice Admiral Branko
Mamula to commander in chief of the Yugoslav
Navy-replacing retiring Admiral Mate Jercovic-
further strengthens the party's hold on key slots
within the military hierarchy. Mamula, a dedi-
cated Communist and political officer, has built
his career on diligent party activity. He is the
tenth military leader influential in the party to
have received such a prominent post.
Since the occupation of Czechoslovakia in
August 1968, the party and government have
been very much concerned about reducing the
isolation of the armed forces from the rest of the
population. Until then, Yugoslav leaders had en-
couraged the military to remain aloof from
politics and social programs, thereby inad-
vertently fostering the estrangement of some ele-
ments in the armed forces from society as a
whole. The regime now wants to ensure an
identity of views and purpose with the military,
especially on policy objectives and the country's
new system of decentralized defense.
Specifically, the reformers who now hold
sway in the party are concerned that once Tito is
gone, the conservative, more orthodox Commu-
nists might unite with like-minded elements in the
military to reverse the progress already made to-
ward decentralization and reform in Yugoslavia.
To guard against this, the party structure in the
military has been decentralized and reorganized
to resemble Republic party organizations. In ad-
dition, political discussions and debates within
the armed forces' party organs have been en-
couraged. If this program is to be successful,
however, the party needs younger, more po-
litically sophisticated officers in key positions-
men who are articulate, knowledgeable, and well
grounded in Yugoslavia's complex political life.
In January, progress was made toward this
goal by the appointment of Colonel General Milos
Sumonja, the former chief of staff, to the post of
deputy minister of defense, and of Colonel
General Viktor Bubanj to replace him as chief of
staff. Both men have been active in party affairs
and both are closely identified with and support
the regime's new defense strategy. Among other
appointees whose careers include a strong party
orientation are Inspector General Ante Banina
and Colonel General Vlado Scekic, who was
named commander of the Frontier Guards in
January 1969.
ICELAND: The governing coalition's late-August
decision not to dissolve itself, as one of its mem-
bers wished, marked the beginning of a period of
intense political activity, during which Iceland's
political parties will be jockeying for favored po-
sitions from which to contest the general elec-
tions in May 1971. Prime Minister Hafstein, who
assumed leadership of the Independence (con-
servative) Party upon the death of Prime Minister
Benediktson in July, has been able to consolidate
his control over the party, the leading member of
the coalition. The party has just held the first of
its primaries to prepare for the election, however,
and there are clearly other party leaders waiting
for a chance to challenge, should Hafstein
stumble. In any case, preoccupation with this
maneuvering is likely to produce a period of
indecisiveness in Iceland's domestic and foreign
policies. 25X1
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MIDDLE E=AST AFRICA
Another Crisis Flares in Jordan
Both the Jordanian Government and feda-
yeen moderates seem to be trying to avert an
all-out clash, although shooting-presumably
prompted by radical elements on both sides-
continues.
tainty over the intentions of the Iraqis.
Jordan's latest crisis grew out of a series of
clashes of varying intensity before, during, and
after the meetings of the Palestine National
Council on 27 and 28 August. Some of the feda-
yeen were quick to charge that the incidents were
deliberately caused by unspecified "elements"
within the Jordanian Government who were try-
ing to provoke an army crackdown on the ccm-
mandos. Both sides made genuine efforts to
defuse the situation, however; fedayeen leaders
and government officials met on 28 August and
agreed to try to avoid friction. Nevertheless, ten-
sion persisted and armed fedayeen continued to
patrol the streets.
f he crisis peaked when members of a radical
fedayeen group-the Popular Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine
fired a rocket at
ing
Husayn's motorcade on 1 September. The assassi-
nation attempt was followed by heavy and con-
tinuous shooting, including rocket and mortar
fire, in most parts of Amman. Radio Baghdad and
fedayeen spokesmen in Beirut charged that army
troops were systematically bombarding refugee
camps in Amman, but these reports may have
been exaggerated and they have been denied by
the Jordanian Government. By the evening of 1
September the worst of the shooting was over,
although isolated clashes, sniper fire, and in-
stances of banditry and disorder continued.
The major complicating factor in the govern-
ment's handling of the situation has been uncer-
Iraqis seem to have backed down; there has been
no sign of movement on the part of regular Iraqi
troops in Jordan. Despite their rhetoric, the Iraqis
are unlikely to commit their troops to the fight,
unless it becomes obvious that the fedayeen have
the upper hand.
Both sides seem to prefer talking to shoot-
ing, at least at the present stage. Amman radio
reported that the Jordanian cabinet has adopted
"effective" measures to restore order and
strengthen the "ties of fraternity" between the
array and the fedayeen-an indication that the
government is probably not contemplating a mili-
tary crackdown. For their part, the commandos
have called for an emergency meeting of the Arab
League to discuss the Jordanian situation; accord-
ing to Egyptian press reports, the 14-member
body will convene on 5 September.
The fedayeen-who have been seriously de-
moralized by the widespread popular backing for
the US peace initiative-probably do not feel
strong enough to risk: a showdown with the gov-
ernment at the present stage. Radicals in the
movement, however, may believe that they have
little to lose in attempting to push matters to a
head and are unlikely to submit: to discipline
unless they regard themselves as dangerously
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~Gl~itL' 1
isolated. The King, for his part, is probably less
willing to compromise than on previous occa-
sions, particularly because he can be sure of at
least moral support from President Nasir. As al-
ways in Jordan, extremists on either side could
easily engineer a situation that could rapidly get
Middle East: Cease-fire Violations
The Israeli cabinet failed to reconcile its
differences over Israel's position toward the peace
talks and its reaction to the Egyptian cease-fire
violations in meetings on 30 August and 1 Sep-
tember. The next meeting is scheduled for 6 Sep-
tember. Yosef Tekoah, Israel's representative to
the peace talks who has been in Israel to partici-
pate in the cabinet sessions, will probably delay
his return to New York at least until after Sun-
day's meeting.
Some members of the cabinet were reported
by the Israeli press to be opposed to making an
issue of the violations at this time and to be in
favor of continuing the talks. By the middle of
the week, however, the views of Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan, who had earlier been described as
insisting on the correction of the Egyptian viola-
tions before talks could continue and as pressing
for authority to take direct military action if
Most observers believe, however, that Prime Min-
ister Golda Meir will avoid a cabinet crisis even at
the price of agreeing to Dayan's views.
At any rate, the increased cabinet concern
over the violations has been responsible, at least
in part, for the hardening of Israel's position
toward the talks. Press reports from Tel Aviv have
indicated that Israel will insist that Egypt remove
from the cease-fire zone the missiles the Israelis
say were moved into the zone since the cease-fire
went into effect on 7 August. As yet, however, no
responsible Israeli official has tied Tekoah's re-
turn to a roll-back of the Egyptian missile installa-
tions.
Egyptian Stance
Media attention in Egypt this week has fo-
cused on Israeli charges that Cairo continues to
abrogate the cease-fire, and on the slow pace of
settlement efforts under the US peace initiative.
An article in Egypt's semiofficial newspaper
al-Ahram on 31 August charged that the Israeli
uproar over the movement of Egyptian missiles
closer to the Suez Canal was meant to conceal the
electronics arms deals Israel has been making with
the US. Another tack taken by the Egyptian
media, adopted as well by some officials, was that
the Israeli charges of violations by Egypt were
meant to divert attention from the peace-making
effort and perhaps to provide an excuse for not
seriously cooperating with UN mediator Gunnar
Jarring. Egypt also recently began to counter the
Israeli claims by accusing Israel itself of cease-fire
violations. 25X1
In New York, Egypt's chief UN delegate,
Muhammad Hasan Zayyat, again met with Jarring
on 31 August and afterward charged that Israel
was trying to avoid "the danger of facing peace."
' Zayyat continued,
Israel's "expansionist policy,v
could not be served by peace, which would place
a limitation on that policy. The Egyptians are
probably eager to see the peace contacts begin in
earnest, fearing among other things that critics of
Cairo's acceptance of the cease-fire will find fresh
ammunition in Israel's hesitancy to partici-
pate. 25X1
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Expanding Iranian Navy to Assume Greater Role in Persian Gulf
Iran recently took possession of a Brit-
ish-built destroyer, the largest combatant in the
Iranian Navy. Although the ship was built in
1946, it underwent a two-year refit and modern-
ization by a British firm after being purchased by
!ran in 1967.
Expansion of Iran's naval forces was begun
in 1966 when the Shah decided to increase pur-
chases of equipment from both the UK and the
US. The Shah views the partial and possibly com-
plete British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf as
it development that will afford Iran an oppor-
tunity to assume a pre-eminent role in Gulf secu-
rity, and he considers an expanded navy essential
to this new role. The Shah has been paving the
way for Iran's increased presence by easing rela-
tions with the Arab states of the Gulf through
such steps as giving up claims to Bahrain.
The Iranian Navy presently has five cor-
vettes, one frigate, 23 patrol boats, and 19 non-
combatant ships. In addition, the navy has re-
cently acquired eight new British-built amphi-
bious hovercraft, each capable of carrying 30
combat-equipped troops at a top speed of 60
knots.
In early 1971, Iran will begin receiving from
the UK four new 1,200?-ton frigates armed with
Sea Cat missiles. Three of the frigates already
have been launched. The Sea Cat is a short-range,
surface-to-air missile system primarily for use
against subsonic, low-flying aircraft. It also, how-
ever, has some capability against incoming super-
sonic targets.
Iran's naval headquarters are located in Teh-
ran. The main naval base, capable of handling
most repair and maintenance, and the headquar-
ters of the Persian Gulf Command are located at
Khorramshahr, about 40 miles up the Shatt al
Arab River. Because the river forms a common
boundary between Iran and Iraq and relations
between the two states have been tense for some
time, new headquarters are under construction at
Bandar 'Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz. The port
is completed, but many facilities and naval instal-
lations are not yet finished.
The Iranian Navy presently is capable of
conducting fairly effective coastal patrol opera-
tions in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
Continued improvement in its training and the
procurement of modern weapons should, by
1972, give the navy a capability for effective
defense against small surface combatants.
SAUDI
ARABIA
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'Isfahan
~Y
aj annU
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a~ ~r gif C m mand
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ARAB STATES: The mood among the moderate
Arabs might be typified by the current atmos-
phere in Lebanon. The optimism there that im-
mediately followed the announcement of a cease-
fire agreement now is giving way to pessimism.
Israeli allegations of Egyptian cease-fire violations
are seen as a pretext to avoid serious negotiations
for peace. Tel Aviv's acquisition of advanced mili-
tary hardware and sophisticated electronic equip-
PALESTINIANS: The emergency session of the
Palestine National Council held in Amman on
27-28 August produced few surprises. As ex-
pected, the council formally rejected the US
peace proposals. Its most concrete action was to
ask Egypt and Syria to allow the 3,000-man bri-
gades of the Palestine Liberation Army that are
presently under their command to transfer to
Jordan. Because this action would only add to the
fedayeen's ability to interfere in the current peace
developments, however, it is unlikely that the
council's request will be granted.
ment is viewed as more'serious than Egypt's viola-
tions because these will improve Israel's offensive
military capability. There is also concern that the
US, whose initiative in arranging the cease-fire is
regarded as its most "evenhanded" action since
the June 1967 war, may bow to Israeli pressure
and supply Tel Aviv with even greater amounts of
offensive military e ui ment.
Stating that the Palestinian movement is be-
set by plots to liquidate it, the council called for
the immediate unity of all fedayeen organiza-
tions. It further demanded that the powers of the
Palestine Liberation Organization central commit-
tee be strengthened to channel effectively the
activities of the fedayeen. The obvious absence of
George Habbash, the leader of the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine, however, under-
scored the fact that individual fedayeen organiza-
tions, which have ignored earlier calls for unity,
will continue to resist any effective limitations on
their freedom of action. 25X1
Libyan Coup Anniversary
The first anniversary of the Libyan coup on
1 September passed without Premier Qaddafi's
taking any action against the foreign oil com-
panies in Libya, although such action had long
been expected.
The volatility of Libyans generally and the
political immaturity of the members of the ruling
Revolutionary Command Council can lead to
swift and sometimes violent actions against for-
eigners. The atmosphere in Libya has become
tense over the status of the Arab-Israeli situation,
and the negotiations with the oil companies are
still deadlocked, with the government continuing
to add pressure through enforcing the reduction
of oil production. The combined tensions in
Libya were obvious in the anniversary speech
made by Qaddafi, which, although murky in
spots, underlined Libya's great desire to be a
leading force in bringing about Arab unity,
especially the establishment of unified military
forces capable of successfully confronting Israel.
Qaddafi displayed Libya's recent acqui-
sitions of modern arms from the USSR and
France, as well as earlier weapons acquired from
Britain and the US, as evidence of the military
progress the new republic had made in a year. He
postponed, however, a detailed discussion on
domestic topics, which will presumably include
statements on petroleum affairs, until he speaks
again in Benghazi on 4 September. At that time
the other shoe may drop. 25X1
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~7i',.j1CJ1
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Bolivia Counters Insurgents
Bolivian security forces have had their hands
full the past two weeks coping with guerrillas in
the countryside and a rising tide of student agita-
tion and urban terrorism in the cities.
Guerrillas of the extreme left Army of Na-
tional Liberation (ELN) have generally managed
to elude army units pursuing them through the
mountainous jungles north of La Paz, but the
guerrillas' numbers are slowly being reduced.
Some have surrendered, a few have been cap-
tured, and at least 16 have been killed in the five
skirmishes that have occurred since 31 July. The
army says it has lost only one man; the ELN
appears to have lost 20 to 25 men out of an
original total of approximately 70.
Meanwhile, agitation by leftist students who
sympathize with the E:LN cause has increased,
particularly after the military announced two
weeks ago that four students who left school last
July to join the guerrillas had been killed. Two
were well-known university leaders. Urban terror-
ism also reached a high point on 27 August when
nine bombings occurred in La Paz. The targets
included the homes of US and Soviet diplomatic
officials, as well as private US businesses and
official Bolivian installations.
ECUADOR: The Ecuadorean armed forces are
preparing themselves to play a greater role in the
government.
Already, the military
have pre-emp e a num er of civilian functions.
The navy has taken over control of the port of
Guayaquil, and last week the country's two major
airports were placed under military administra-
tion. The air force has recently taken over the
functions of the customs police and of the civil
aviation administration.
Although the police and military have re-
strained themselves so far, they are increasingly
tempted to ignore university autonomy and elimi-
nate what they see as the principal safe haven for
guerrillas and terrorists. They believe that some
ELN guerrillas have escaped from the current area
of operations and are hiding at San Andres Uni-
versity in La Paz. There is also strong evidence
that the recent series of bombings is the work of
student radicals.
In spite of, or perhaps partly because of, the
increasing preoccupation of the police and mili-
tary with student agitation and rural and urban
violence, relations between President Ovando and
the principal military leaders continue strained.
Many of them still do not trust Ovando, and
although the military have taken a hard line to-
ward insurgents whether they are students or not,
Ovando has preached the need for negotiations
with the "student idealists." Thus, the political
breach between the President and armed forces
leaders continues to widen. Some military leaders
expect that Ovando's final day of reckoning will
come before 26 September, the first anniversary
of his seizure of power. 25X1
This new aggressiveness by the military re-
sults in part from their decision in August to offer
greater cooperation with civilian authorities.
Although military leaders have publicly pledged
their support of the government, many of them
are increasingly concerned about the President's
ability to govern Ecuador in the face of his
continued administrative ineptitude. Ecuadoreans
are quite accustomed to political and economic
disarray, but there is a limit to the amount of
confusion they can tolerate before they demand
political changes.
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Cuba: No Ready Solutions for Regime Ills
Fidel Castro seems to be groping for solu-
tions to his economic and administrative prob-
lems. Despite the long list of setbacks and produc-
tion failures he enumerated in his speech on 26
July, Castro has so far failed to reveal any com-
prehensive plan of attack that would overcome
his difficulties and satisfy the expectant and dis-
gruntled elements of the population. The only
measures he has adopted--the replacement of a
few top-level administrators and the creation of a
new cabinet post-fall short of the extensive
changes required to revitalize the economy and
refurbish his somewhat tarnished image. His ad-
mission that there is no spectacular overnight
panacea, however, is realistic and contrasts with
his vindictive reactions, such as the "revolution-
ary offensive" and the "microfaction purge," to
setbacks in previous years.
In a rambling speech on 23 August, Castro
made further reference to his vague schemes for
greater public participation in the decision-
making process that he discussed on 26 July. He
tabled no specific proposals, however, and left his
listeners in the dark as to how this was to be
carried out. He spoke whimsically of developing
"truly democratic principles that will replace
habits which were merely administrative during
the first years of the revolution," but admitted
that "we still do not have all the formulas."
In acknowledging the necessity of overcom-
ing deficiencies in the country's mass organiza-
tions, he placed special emphasis on developing
fully the Cuban Workers Central Organization
(CTC). This suggests that the fifth national coun-
cil of the CTC, which is scheduled for early Sep-
tember, will bring about an overhaul of the entire
labor union apparatus. Increasing labor productiv-
ity, reducing overtime work, and forming work-
ers' councils to assist in the administration of
work centers will probably be the major topics of
discussion during the meeting.
Castro also earmarked the association of
owners of small farms (ANAP) for revamping. In
statements over the past year, he has made it clear
that small farms, of which there are about
200,000, are uneconomical and therefore should
be absorbed by the state. This process now seems
to be under way, and Castro apparently believes
that ANAP is the best political mechanism to
control any possible adverse reaction from those
who have lost their lands. The poor performance
of the small-farm owners in the 1970 sugar har-
vest was probably also a factor in his decision to
restructure ANAP.
In discussing international topics in his
speech on 23 August, Castro went over much the
same ground he covered on 26 July and 22 April.
He repeated his scurrilous description of the Or-
ganization of American States, renewed his threat
to take offensive action against those countries
that would permit the launching of attacks
against Cuba from their territories, and reiterated
his disposition to establish, "if possible," even
closer military ties with the Soviet Union. ~25X1
PANAMA: General Torrijos, already concerned
about the plotting of Panamanian exiles in the
US, may soon have to deal with growing unrest
within the National Guard.
many junior 25X1
officers and enlisted men are grumbling about low
pay and slow promotions. Guard factionalism and
discontent coming at this time may work to the
advantage of anti-Torrijos forces, which include
former Guard chief of staff Colonel San-
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USSR-Peru: Economic Cooperation on the Increase
The USSR is pressiing forward with trade and cooperatives in the USSR, and Soviet technicians
technical assistance but remains wary of respond- will advise the Ministry of Agriculture on the
ing to Peruvian requests for large development establishment in Peru of similar cooperatives.
projects.
Moscow has announced final agreement on a
$30-million line of credit to Peru for the purchase
of Soviet agricultural machinery and other heavy
equipment. The credit, first discussed in Decem-
ber 1969, is to be repaid over 10 years a-t an
annual interest rate of 3 percent for government
use and 3.5 percent fer private borrowers
Trade between the two countries has been
minimal. Soviet figures registered a total exchange
of only $1.4 million last year. The USSR, how-
ever, announced the purchase of a large consign-
ment of Peruvian cotton last month, but the
amount is not yet known. Trade could increase
sharply if the Soviets commence direct purchases
of Peruvian fishmeal rather than making its pur-
chases through European brokers.
The Soviet Union reportedly also will assist
Lima in the development of its fishing industry.
Moscow will build a fishing port in Peru and 25
may provide fishing boats equipped for on-board
processing. The Peruvians are seeking Soviet as-
sistance for building shipyards, primarily for the
construction of fishing vessels. Lima, however,
has so far failed to elicit any Soviet commitments
for major economic assistance for the construc-
tion of the Olmos irrigation and hydroelectric
project in northern Peru or for the development
of mineral resources.
Purchases of Soviet equipment are more
likely to be made by the Peruvian Government
than by the private sector, particularly in those
ministries where the Soviets are providing advice.
Some 30 Peruvians already are studying agrarian
URUGUAY: The Tupamaros remain silent on
the fate of the two hostages they have held for
over four weeks. Since the kidnapings, intensive
search operations in Montevideo by thousands of
police and soldiers have resulted in the capture of
about 40 Tupamaros, including some of the prin-
cipal leaders. Nine of those, including Raul Sendic
and Raul Bidegain, went on trial this week.
The Pacheco government has allowed the
20-day suspension of civil rights to expire, but has
moved decisively against recent student agitation,
Although Moscow formalljr canceled its
trouble-ridden airlift of relief supplies to Peru last
week, it has sought landing rights for one addi-
tional flight and has indicated that other indivi-
dual flights might also be made. There may be
some need for the urgent delivery of low-bulk
medical supplies to maintain their medical aid
effort. Soviet officials announced earlier that aid
not delivered by the 21 flights completed out of
the planned 65 would be shipped by sea.
On 28 August, all secondary schools were closed
until the new school year begins next March.
Although political activity within the educational
system by leftist students and teachers has se-
riously damaged the quality of education in Uru-
guay, there has been little public support for
reform. Closure of secondary schools has been
unpopular, and President Pacheco may have given
his opponents an issue on which to attack him.
He is firm in his position, however, and some
moves to bring much-needed educational reforms
may be initiated soon.
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SI UKI I'
Colombia: President Pastrana's Conciliatory Start
President Misael Pastrana has successfully
weathered the first critical month of his admin-
istration, and he probably will have clear sailing
for the foreseeable future. His cabinet and guber-
natorial appointments generally reflect his in-
dependence from political forces that might at-
tempt to wield an unduly strong influence over
him. Most of the cabinet appointees, although
relatively young and unknown, have the technical
or political qualifications needed for the job, and
for the most part have been well received by
Colombian politicians. There are strong indica-
tions, however, that some of the new ministers
were named in order to settle old political debts
and that there will be changes in a few months.
Although Pastrana's followers did not win a
clear majority in Congress, his position in the
legislature has improved substantially. The Presi-
dent apparently has secured the cooperation of
defeated presidential candidate Evaristo Sourdis
by appointing two of his men to cabinet posts.
Moreover, there are deep divisions in former presi-
dent Rojas' National Popular Alliance. Even so,
Pastrana's legislative programs will still face op-
position in Congress.
Pastrana's unenviable position of being the
last president under the National Front system of
EL SALVADOR - HONDURAS: The two coun-
tries took a step forward last week by agreeing to
restore postal and telecommunication services dis-
rupted since the five-day war of July 1969. The
more difficult issues, including the boundary dis-
pute and the re-establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions, are expected to be tackled during the next
round of bilateral talks scheduled to begin in
October.
The economics ministers of the five Central
American countries, meanwhile, have been
government, nevertheless, is likely to cause him
increasing difficulties as time goes on. Already
there is evidence that leaders of the various politi-
cal parties have begun to maneuver in preparation
for the municipal and departmental elections in
1972 and the presidential contest in 1974. Most
of these politicians, possibly including former
president Carlos Lleras, a Liberal, are expected to
go into open opposition to Pastrana, perhaps
within the next six months.
Although partisan political interests are
strong in Colombia, Pastrana's evident desire to
provide for the disaffected masses and his call to
all political parties to join him in a "Social Front"
are cause for optimism. He seems to sense from
Rojas' near victory last spring that popular dis-
content and the traditional political leadership
could cause a major shake-up in Colombia's
course if adjustments are not made soon.
meeting in Guatemala in an attempt to resolve
some of the Common Market problems that were
severely aggravated by the Salvador-Honduras
dispute. Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica
have been attempting to deal with Honduras'
demands that means be found to liquidate its
chronic intraregional trade deficit and to assist its
industrial development. There is some concern
among these countries, however, that Honduras
will refuse to compromise and may withdraw
from the integration movement.
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THE CARIBBEAN: Prime Minister Shearer of
Jamaica has become the first head of state to
reverse his decision to attend the nonaligned
countries' conference in Lusaka. His decision not
to attend because he felt the conference would be
of no importance also led to the cancellation of a
planned African tour and a scheduled meeting
with British Prime Minister Heath. Shearer's ab-
sence from the conference has upset the Kingston
diplomatic community, particularly the British. A
delegation headed by the attorney general and
minister of legal affairs will attend, however. In-
ternal political considerations were probably the
main reason Shearer decided not to attend the
meeting. He is a senior official in one of Jamaica's
two major labor unions that are engaged in a
vigorous election campaign and a struggle over
worker representation. Shearer also does not want
to be upstaged by Guyana's Prime Minister Burn-
ham, who is leading a large delegation. Burnham
may be tempted to use the meeting as a forum for
his new nationalistic and independent posture,
with which Shearer does not necessarily
agree.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Third Nonaligned Summit:
The Sean Song of Yugoslav Predominance
Secret
Na 44
4 September 1970
No. 0386/70A
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE THIRD NONALIGNED SUMMIT: The Swan Song of Yugoslav Predominance
The sound of the gavel in Lusaka on 6 September will mark the
successful culmination of a two-year effort on the part of Yugoslav President
Tito to restore interest in the moribund nonaligned movement. Whether or
not Belgrade has been successful in breathing new life into the movement
will not be known, however, until months-even years-after the gathering.
Because of the varying and often conflicting interests and views of the
participants, the Lusaka summit may possibly be the last world-wide gather-
ing of nonaligned nations. The fact that it is being held at all is a tribute to
Tito's prestige and to the ability of Belgrade's Foreign Ministry to stimulate
interest in a movement that two years ago was considered dead.
The first two days of the meeting will be devoted to consultation
among the foreign ministers, at which time-hopefully-the thorny problem
of whether or not to seat rival Cambodian and South Vietnamese delegations
will be resolved. The foreign ministers are also expected to decide on
whether to seat African liberation movement delegations. The heads of state
will then meet on 8 September.
The Lusaka gathering, however, reveals nonalignment at a critical cross-
road. The agenda is broad enough for all participants to accept, and un-
doubtedly a number of resolutions will be published-including a denuncia-
tion of the war in Indochina, support for the Palestinian cause, and
condemnation of the remnants of colonialism in Africa. Considering Tito's
age (78), he cannot be expected to hold nonalignment together much longer.
Therefore, the challenge at Lusaka will be to lay the foundation for a
nonalignment movement that can survive its most prestigious and foremost
advocate.
Nonalignment is the stepchild of the cold
war. During the late 1940s and 1950s, the de-
veloping and newly independent nations con-
sidered themselves at the mercy of the super-
powers. There arose a gradual recognition that the
peoples of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and
Latin America might have a common interest in
promoting peaceful coexistence and in avoiding
an alliance with one or another of the super-
powers. This led to the convening of the first
nonaligned summit nearly ten years ago.
If it were not for Tito, it is safe to say there
would be no nonaligned summit in Zambia. He
alone of the four original supporters of nonalign-
ment (Nehru of India and Sukarno of Indonesia-
both deceased-and Nasir of the UAR) has given
the movement momentum. Nonalignment began
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take shape as far back as 1947 in the policy
~h ectives and pronouncements of India's Prime
Minister Nehru. In the early 1950s President Tito
helped qive the movement meaning. In the words
{31 one student of nonaliqnment, "Tito, the
rod t i a n metal worker, accomplished what
Nehru, the Brahmin aristocrat, thought beyond
w,ach-the vitalization of nonalignment."
Tito is the most traveled nonaligned leader,
;and his personal diplomacy has been a key to the
r-novement's success. i he first inkling of Tito's
future role on behalf of the nonaligned cause
~.ame during his 1954 visit to India. In an address
to the Indian Parliament, Tito called for active
cooperation among states with different social
sysl.ems "to remove a I elements liable to impede
.a broad cooperation between states, large and
Hall "
The concept of nonalignment was aided by
the Bandung Conference of 29 Asian and A4rican
i ocrntries, held in Indonesia in April 1955 to
promote peaceful coexistence. The Bandung
raatherinq was strictly a regional conference, in-
c.luding representatives fromsome states that were
early aligned. The decisions adopted, however,
rifted Tito's own foreign policy objectives as
much as it he had taken part in drafting -:hem.
]he gathering strongly condemned colonialism,
advocated universality of membership in the
United Nations, and called for disarmament as
well as the prohibition of nuclear testing.
The first nonaligned summit was held in
Belgrade in September 1961. Attended by 25
countries as full members, three countries as
official observers, and 19 national liberation
movements and Socialist labor splinter groups as
unofficial observers, the summit adopted a pro-
gram whose tenets have become standard non-
aligned rhetoric-world disarmament, the closing
of foreign military bases, a condemnation of
imperialism, and the restoration of the rights of
the Palestinians. In addition, the summit called
attention to the needs of the developing nations
and urged that Communist China be admitted to
the UN.
The initial achievements of nonaliqnment
were impressive. The various nations accelerated
their move toward decolonization through lobby-
ing efforts at the UN and in bilateral talks around
the globe. Moreover, as a result of a united stand
by the nonaligned countries, the UN Dis-
armament Committee was enlarged in 1962, and
by their implicit rejection of Moscow's "troika"
proposal for leadership of the UN when Dag
Hammarskjold was killed in an airplane accident,
they contributed to the solution of that crisis.
Participants at the first nonaligned summit, September 1961, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
4 September 1970
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Tito, Ben Bella, and Nasir in Cairo on the
eve of the second nonaligned summit in
October 1964.
The cohesion that marked the initial phase of
nonalignment and promised so much, was, how-
ever, short lived.
By the time the second summit was held in
Cairo in October 1964, the earlier harmony and
unity were gone. Forty-seven nations were on
hand as full members and ten as observers, but
along with the increased number of participants,
contradictory regional interests and rivalries
flared. Indonesia's President Sukarno spearheaded
a pro-Chinese, anti-imperialist,and anti - peaceful
coexistence platform that nearly wrecked the
meeting. Through the united efforts of Tito,
India's Prime Minister Shastri, and Nasir, the con-
ference was able to end on a positive note by
condemning colonialism and stressing the eco-
nomic needs of the third world.
The diversity of interests displayed at Cairo,
the growing detente in East-West relations, as well
as the end of most colonial rule in Africa took
much of the punch out of nonalignment. In the
succeeding years, the movement waned and ap-
peared to be on the verge of extinction. A num-
Special Report
ber of world events, however, convinced Tito that
nonalignment should be revived and actively
pursued. These included the Soviet occupation of
Czechoslovakia, the continuation of the war in
Indochina, and the failure to resolve the Middle
East crisis. Beginning in 1968, Yugoslavia re-
newed its activity in support of convening a third
nonalignment summit.
Yugoslavia's call for a viable nonaligned
movement brought hope to the third world by
offering an alternative to leaning on either the
East or West. Furthermore, Tito's message is
based on the example of Belgrade's past successes
as well as on an appeal to emerging governments
as co-equals. Yugoslavia's problems are much the
same as those of many third-world nations. Large
parts of the country remain backward, and it is
still struggling for national identity, internal
cohesion, and political independence. In spite of
all this, however, Belgrade has made great strides
both economically and socially. Moreover, under
Tito's leadership, Yugoslavia's neutrality toward
the superpowers is backed up by its actions:
Belgrade does business with both the East and
West, but it maintains an independent foreign
policy.
Belgrade owes a great deal to nonalignment.
Not only is it the vehicle by which Yugoslavia
emerged from diplomatic isolation in the early
fifties, but it has enabled Tito to play an active
and far greater role in international politics than
he otherwise could have managed. As a result,
nonalignment gave Yugoslavia a source of pride
and accomplishment no other policy could offer.
Belgrade, however, has offered the third
world something more tangible than just the
theory of nonalignment. Since the rnid-1950s, it
has extended slightly over $900 million in credits
and other assistance to some 40 less developed
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Almost all of the credits have been given to
finance Yugoslav exports of capital equipment
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and for associated technical assistance. The largest
recipients have been India, Indonesia, Pakistan,
the UAR, and Iran. Included in the wide variety
of complete projects financed are hydroelectric
and thermal electric power stations, food pro-
cessing plants, building-materials factories, textile
plants, ships, port facilities, water-supply systems,
arid geological exploration.
Most recently, the Yugoslavs signed a two-
year program of technical cooperation with the
East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tan-
zania, and Zambia. In connection with the sum-
mit itself, Belgrade is picking up the bill for the
physical plant in Lusaka. The 60 "prestige''
houses as well as the conference hall are being
built with Yugoslav money and by Yugoslav tech-
nicians. Although the Yugoslav aid program does
not depend directly on Western grants and
credits, the large volume of such assistance to
Yugoslavia has put it in a better position to con-
tinue its own economic aid program.
Backed up by the extension of credits, Bel-
grade's policy has called for a rising share of trade
with the less developed countries, both to prcvide
outlets for exports that cannot compete in West-
ern markets and to acquire needed raw materials.
The results of this policy have been far less than
hoped. Many of the recipients of Yugoslav credits
have been slow to draw upon them-only $300
million had been drawn and an additional $140
million definitely contracted for by the end of
1967. .Moreover, difficulties in arranging mutually
satisfactory exchanges of goods have led to a near
stagnation of Yugoslavia's clearing trade with less
developed countries in recent years. Trade turn-
over with this area last year accounted for only 9
percent of total Yugoslav trade compared with 11
percent in 1966.
The aid program itself is not without its
critics and problems. A number of Yugoslav of-
ficials ask why Belgrade offers technical assistance
to developing countries when large parts of Yugo-
slavia remain backward and woefully in need of
assistance. Moreover, Belgrade's assistance has not
always been well planned or smoothly executed.
Yugoslav businessmen have in the past committed
themselves to projects they were totally unpre-
pared to handle and haveshown naivete in thinking
that Yugoslav responsibility ended with the com-
pletion of the projects. As a result, the Yugoslavs
have left finished plants and projects in the hands
of totally unprepared and unqualified bureau-
crats.
These problems will not prevent the Yugo-
slavs from continuing their assistance program,
however, inasmuch as it has enhanced their image
and political influence in the third world. Accord-
ing to one source, "the Yugoslavs are the most
appreciated whites in Africa-they are able,
conscientious, and do not come as missionaries of
a particular cause." Moreover, the Yugoslav brand
of socialism holds some appeal for new nations.
Not only is "socialism" a potent political word-
rightly or wrongly conjuring up thoughts of social
justice, economic improvement, and political
democracy, but Yugoslavia's decentralized system
of enterprise management holds a great deal of
fascination for the third world. The UAR's
Corporation Law, adopted in early 1966, may
well reflect Yugoslavia's experience with
autonomy for plant managers.
Belgrade has given a great deal to nonalign-
ment, but it has also taken much. Because of it,
Yugoslav influence and prestige have grown out
of proportion for a country its size. Psychologi-
cally at least, this has helped make it difficult for
Moscow to bring overt pressure on Belgrade to
rejoin the Communist bloc.
In Moscow's eyes, nonalignment has only
compounded the sins of Yugoslavia's erring ways.
The Soviets are well aware of the attraction Bel-
grade holds for the developing nations and view
its nonaligned activity as working at cross pur-
poses and undercutting Soviet influence. How-
ever, as long as nonalignment attacks colonialism
and imperialism in terms acceptable to the Soviet
Union, the Kremlin must tolerate it. The prob-
lem, as Moscow sees it, is that Yugoslavia takes its
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nonaligned neutrality seriously. It not only criti-
cizes US involvement in South Vietnam but de-
nounces the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia,
and insists that both the US and Soviet fleets
withdraw from the Mediterranean in the interest
of peace.
Belgrade began preparing for the upcoming
summit early in 1968 but did not succeed in
mustering enough support for a preparatory con-
ference until 1969. In July of that year, 51 non-
aligned nations met in Belgrade in what was a
well-managed and low-key affair, but they hesi-
tated to call a summit.
The next step was a meeting of the foreign
ministers of the nonaligned states in New York
last September during the 24th UN General As-
sembly session. It was then decided to proceed
with plans for a summit, and a second prepara-
tory conference was set for this April in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania.
Tito and wife on arrival in Tanzania last Febru-
ary as Yugoslavia's charismatic president continued
his drive to drum up support for nonalignment.
Before the Dar es Salaam gathering, how-
ever, Tito began to use the power of his personal
diplomacy to gain support for the summit. In late
January and February he toured eight east
African nations, praising the merits of nonalign-
ment at every stop. Tito's tour was paralleled by
that of Dimce Belovski (head of the Yugoslav
mass organization SWAPY) through seven west
Special Report
President of the Revolutionary Command
Council of Sudan, Jaafar Numayri,welcoming
President Tito to Khartoum last February.
African nations, and by Foreign Minister
Tepavac's excursion to southeast Asia in March.
Tito's tactic apparently worked. The meet-
ing in Tanzania was attended by 51 countries and,
to the surprise of many, proceeded swiftly and
efficiently, side-stepping potential pitfalls and
postponing settlement of the Cambodian and
South Vietnamese representation problem until
the summit itself.
In all, approximately 74 nations have been
approached on attending the meeting in Lusaka,
and the latest count indicates 45 will be repre-
sented. An anticipated additional 17 would raise
this total to 62. Among the government heads
committed to attend are Tito, India's Prime Min-
ister Gandhi, and Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia. Representatives of most of the African
national liberation movements are expected to be
on hand, as are delegates from the Palestinian
Liberation Movement.
The motives of those attending the Lusaka
gathering are as varied as are the participants. For
Cairo, as well as most of the Arab world, the
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DELEGATIONS EXPECTED TO ATTEND THE NONALIGNED SUMMIT
Country
Position on
Cambodia
Heading Delegation
Afghanistan
Algeria
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Ceylon
Chad
Congo (B)
Congo (K) L
Cuba S
Cyprus N
Ethiopia
Equatorial Guinea
Ghana
Guinea
Guyana
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Kenya
Laos
Lenanon
Liberia L
Malaysia L
Mali N
Mauritania S
Morocco
Nepal
Rwanda L
Senegal Both
Sierra Leone N
Singapore L
Somalia S
Sudan S
Swaziland
Tanzania
Tunisia
Premier Nur Ahmad Etemadi
Foreign Minister Bouteflika
President Seretse Khama
President Micombero
Vice President Muna
President Bokassa
Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike
President Tombalbaye
President M akarios
Emperor Haile Selassie
President Macias
Prime Minister Kofi Busia
President of National Assembly Leon M aka
Prime Minister Burnham
Prime Minister Gandhi
President Suharto
Vice President Hardan Abd al-Ghaffar
Vice President Moi
Prince Souvanna
Foreign Minister Majdalani
Vice President Tolbert
Deputy Prime Minister Razak
Foreign Minister Sory Coulibaly
President Ould Daddah
Foreign Minister Abdelhadi Boutaleb
King Mahendra
Foreign Minister Sylvester Nsanzimana
Foreign Minister Gueye
Prime Minister Stevens
Premier Lee Kwan Yew
Foreign Minister Omar Arteh
President Numayri
Prime Minister Dhlamini
President Nyerere
UAR S Foreign Minister Riad
Uganda President Milton Obote
Yugoslavia S President Tito
Zambia President Kaunda
S = Sihanouk
L = Lon Nol
N = Neither Cambodian Representative
Also expected to attend as official or unofficial observers are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Equador,
Gambia, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malawi, Peru, Jamaica, Somalia, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, the Vatican,
Colombia, the Yemen Arab Republic, Turkey and Venezuela.
Special Report
6 4 September 1970
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AFRICAN LIBERATION -MOVEMENTS
LIKELY TO PARTICIPATE AT THE SUMMIT"
African National Congress
(ANG or SAANG)
Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
South West African People's
Organization (SWAPO)
Mozambique Liberation Front
(FRELIMO)
Mozambique Revolutionary
Committee (COREMO)
Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU)
Zimbab African Peoples Union
(ZAPU)
African Party for the Inde-
pendence of Guinea and Cape
Verde (PAGIC)
Lusaka summit marks a return to overt support
for nonalignment. Obviously the Arabs hope to
gain support for their cause against Israel. It also
provides them with a convenient forum from
which to gain a strong endorsement of the rights
of the Palestinians. Nasir, originally a major sup-
porter of the movement, has had little time to
devote to nonalignment since the June 1967 war,
and he only returned to the fold after meeting
with Tito last February at Aswan.
India, by virtue of its historical ,ole in non-
alignment, is committed to attend. New Delhi,
however, even before Nehru's death, had begun
changing its concept of nonalignment. Although
its basic principle-avoiding commitments to any
great-power alliance system-has been maintained,
Indian interest in association with a nonaligned
bloc has waned, and the country's interests are
now concentrated on South Asia. It is going to
Lusaka with a view toward protecting its own
particular interests and to see what benefits there
may be for it in refurbishing its fading image as a
leader of the nonaligned nations.
For Indonesia, Asia's other giant neutral, the
summit at first held out prospects of reasserting
its international posture after several years of
preoccupation with domestic policy following
Sukarno's ouster. The overthrow of Cambodian
Prince Sihanouk and Djakarta's strong support for
Lon Nol has-to many who will be gathered at
Lusaka-undercut Indonesia's credentials as a
nonaligned nation.
Special Report
The Black African states take a particular
pride in the summit because it is being held in
Zambia. The attitudes of the various countries
concerning the merits of nonalignment vary, but
there is a general consensus that with Lusaka as
host, the entire region has gained new prestige.
Economic cooperation will be foremost in the
minds of many Africans attending. Furthermore,
for a few short days the world will be focusing on
an international conference in which they will
play a vital role. The Black African states, there-
fore, have a vested interest in the success of the
conference and will work toward this end.
Some 12 Latin American countries may be
in Lusaka. Each has its own reason for attending,
but all view their presence as a means of self-
expression. As the nations of Latin America move
away from the United States politically, nonalign-
ment becomes more attractive. Most of them are
leery of both the USSR and the US, and therefore
are willing to explore nonalignment as an al-
ternative.
I n an effort to avoid the friction and tension
that marred the Cairo summit, a broad, clearly
defined agenda has been drafted for the Lusaka
gathering. The major points for discussion will be:
1) a general review of the international situation;
2) the democratization of international relations
as well as the safeguarding and strengthening of
peace, freedom, development, and cooperation;
3) the safeguarding of national independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality
among states-including support for liberation
movements and a strong anticolonial stance; and
4) the economic development and self-reliance of
the nonaligned states.
More narrowly defined issues will include a
strong restatement of support for the rights of the
Palestinian Arabs. Portuguese, Rhodesian, and
South African policies toward the blacks will
come under strong attack as will Britain's decision
to resume limited arms sales to South Africa.
There also may be some movement toward
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developing a program of closer economic and
technical cooperation between the nonaligned
states with an emphasis on self-reliance. In addi-
tion, support for Communist China's admittance
to the United Nations is anticipated.
The summit is expected to praise the first 25
years of the United Nations. Moreover, a special
resolution calling for the strengthening of that
organization (to be presented at the 25th UN
General Assembly jubilee session) will be drafted.
Among other things, the resolution is scheduled
to call for the implementation of the 1960 UN
Declarations on Decolonization, a statement of
respect for national sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the formulation of an international de-
velopment strategy for the 1970s, a proclamation
to make the 1970s the "Decade of Disarma-
ment," and a "Declaration for Peace, Freedom,
Development, and Democratization of Interna-
iional Relations."
A number of problems will have to be dealt
with, however, if the gathering is to be a success.
First and foremost is the question of seating the
rival Cambodian delegations. The preparatory
meetings simply avoided the issue by referring it
to the summit. At the moment neither the
Sihanouk nor the Lon Not representatives appear
to have enough support to win a seat, and a large
number of prospective participants are in favor of
recognizing neither. Many of those going to
Lusaka who might otherwise favor seating
Sihanouk or his group are concerned about the
danger of setting a precedent in recognizing a
government in exile.
Despite rumors to the contrary, there is no
evidence that Sihanouk intends to put in a per-
sonal appearance at Lusaka. The possibility, how-
ever, cannot be ruled out. Just what the impact of
his presence would mean is difficult to say, but
ton Nol supporters are concerned that it could
start a stampede on Sihanouk's behalf that would
end in the seating of his government.
For its part, the Lon Not regime is actively
lobbying for admission at Lusaka. Two delega-
Special Report
tions have been dispatched to Africa to present
the Cambodian Government's case for a seat at
the summit. The effort appears to be in vain, and
best indications are that few, if any, converts will
be made. All Lon Not can realistically hope for is
that these governments will abstain on the Cam-
bodian question. At the moment, a quick count
of the delegates committed to Lusaka indicates
Lon Not simply does not have enough support to
gain a seat. The best bet now is that the issue will
die in committee.
Also touchy is the problem of seating the
Communist Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment of South Vietnam. As in the case of the
Sihanouk delegation, a large number of those
countries planning to attend the conference are
wary of setting a controversial precedent.
Furthermore, a great many of the delegates main-
tain ties with Saigon, and the seating of the Viet
Cong could cause the conference to break down
by making it impossible for nations such as
Indonesia to continue its participation. It is un-
likely, therefore, that any South Vietnamese
delegation will be seated.
Bei'oird the Summit
The Lusaka summit will probably end on a
positive note, with the nonaligned nations suc-
cessfully drafting a program to present to the UN
jubilee session in October. The final results, how-
ever, will undoubtedly reflect the lowest common
denominator upon which the participants can
agree. Just as in Cairo in 1964, this will mean
heavy emphasis on the broadest possible issues
and a de-emphasis of specific problems.
A major question for this meeting, however,
is the future of nonalignment itself. As it was
conceived and practiced in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, nonalignment is no longer applicable
to today's world in a meaningful way. It has
limitations, and even Tito recognizes that his
once-cherished dream of a large, cohesive bloc of
nonaligned states dramatically influencing the
course of world events has not borne fruit. If
nonalignment is to survive and play a role in
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world affairs, it obviously will have to undergo
some basic changes.
One possibility is to organize along regional
lines. Most recently, the Ugandan Foreign Min-
ister, Sam Odaka, has suggested that future co-
operation follow the example of the East African
community-a loose organization providing a
number of common services for and economic
cooperation between Tanzania, Kenya, and
Uganda.
The Lusaka summit could also be the end of
Yugoslav predominance in the nonaligned move-
ment. From the beginning, this has been Tito's
pet project; the rest of the Yugoslav leaders are
somewhat less enthusiastic, although they are
nearly unanimous in recognizing the merits of the
movement. Tito's years at the helm in Belgrade
are numbered, and whoever follows him is un-
likely to have the qualifications or the drive to
lead nonalignment. Moreover, most Yugoslav
leaders are looking for more immediate and more
relevant returns.
Furthermore, Yugoslavia itself has changed
drastically. Belgrade now feels its security and
future lie in a loose association with the West, and
it is actively and successfully cultivating a wide
range of political and economic contacts in
Western Europe-including a recent and signifi-
cant agreement with the Common Market. Al-
though the new generation of Yugoslav leaders
will undoubtedly continue to cultivate Belgrade's
political and economic ties in the third world,
nonalignment will no longer hold center stage in
its foreign policy.
The real challenge for the delegates gathered
at Lusaka will be to lay the foundation for a
movement that can transcend Tito's personality
and survive with a smaller Yugoslav commitment.
Chances are that neither Nasir, Mrs. Gandhi, nor
Suharto has the time or interest to lend prestige
to such an endeavor. If a new moving spirit is to
appear, it will probably come from among one of
the better developed but smaller states that pro-
fess nonalignment as a policy. F_
Special Report - 9 -
4 September 1970
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-.me N.r
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Britain and the European Communities.
The Accession Negotiations Begin
Secret
N? 43
4 September 1970
No. 0386/70B
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_ CONFIDENTIAL ftr'
BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN
The negotiations on the accession of Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and
Norway to the European Communities (EC) begin in earnest this month. The
formal opening session on 30 June, which provided the participants an
opportunity to present their basic positions, generally got the negotiations
off to a good start. The first working session on 21 July settled a number of
procedural matters and cleared the way for the discussion of substantive
issues. These preparations made it plain that the negotiations will not be
easy, and that the greatest effort will be required to keep them relatively
short and general, In spite of the difficult issues to be settled,* the parties
seem determined this time to succeed. The new Conservative government in
Britain, although faced with widespread public opposition to entry, is
strongly "European." Present EC members are all interested in seeing the
Communities enlarged, and both Britain and Europe are aware that their
marriage would be a momentous achievement.
Although there were few surprises at the
formal opening of negotiations in Luxembourg on
30 June-a meeting that had been billed primarily
as an occasion for a "family photograph"-the
presentations made it inescapably clear that the
talks will be arduous and that success is not
foreordained. Pierre Harmel, Belgium's foreign
minister, speaking for the Communities in his
capacity as president of the EC Council, used the
opportunity to mention again the triptych so
frequently heard in community rhetoric the last
few months: the leftover business of the Common
Market's transition period, the EC's internal de-
velopment, and its enlargement must all move
forward simultaneously. One objective cannot be
allowed to overshadow the others.
After speaking briefly about the EC's com-
pletion and internal development, Harmel pre-
Special Report
sented in general terms the EC's "common posi-
tion" for enlargement negotiations. Most impor-
tant, he said, the candidates for membership must
accept the treaties on which the Communities
were founded and all the decisions that have since
been taken. Furthermore, although the EC recog-
nizes that certain adjustments will have to be
made as the candidates are admitted, these must
be transitional measures, not changes in existing
community rules. The transition period with re-
spect to the customs union should be the same
length for all the candidates, but in other areas,
transition periods could vary in length from sub-
ject to subject and from country to country.
Finally, Harmel said, the treaties of accession for
the new members and the arrangements reached
with the remaining countries of the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) should all come into
force on the same date.
Following Harmel, Jean Rey, the outgoing
president of the EC Commission, elaborated
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European Communities (EC)
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
members riot applying for membership in
the EC but with whom the EC may make
trade arrangements
4 September 1970
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somewhat on the political aspects of enlargement.
An increase in the number of member states, he
said, could cause the Communities' decision-
making machinery to become unwieldy and
cumbersome. Especially in the field of institu-
tions, therefore, the enlargement negotiations
should be an occasion to proceed with the EC's
development. By this Rey no doubt meant, as the
Commission has often emphasized, that the pow-
ers of the European Parliament should be ex-
tended and that the taking of decisions by major-
ity vote should become general practice in the
Council.
Anthony Barber, at that time Britain's chief
negotiator, made it clear in response that the
newly elected Conservative government, like the
Labor government before it, did in fact accept the
treaties of the Communities and the decisions
subsequently taken. But, he said, there were cer-
tain problems to be solved-most importantly
those concerning agricultural policy, Britain's
contribution to the EC's budget, and a variety of
Commonwealth matters (especially how to ac-
commodate the large amounts of Commonwealth
sugar and New Zealand butter presently exported
to Britain).
Barber stressed in particular the problem
posed by the EC's financing arrangements-in ef-
fect, the problem of financing the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP), which presently consumes
the lion's share of the EC's budget. He quoted the
1967 judgment of the EC Commission itself that
the CAP's financing arrangements, if applied to
Britain, would "give rise to a problem of balance
in the sharing of financial burdens." The EC's
decision last December on how the Communities
should be permanently financed, he added, had
only made the problem more severe. Unless a
solution is found, according to Barber, "the
burden on the United Kingdom could not be
sustained and no British government could con-
template joining."
Barber went on to say that Britain welcomes
EC progress in economic and monetary integra-
Special Report
British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home
and French Foreign Minister Schumann at the
formal opening of negotiations in Luxem-
bourg on 30 June.
tion, in industrial policy, in regional policy, and
in technology. London is ready to play its full
part in these advances, and it realizes that prog-
ress in the Communities requires effective institu-
tions. Barber also expressed support for EC ef-
forts to find new methods of coordinating foreign
policy and defense-a remark that caused a con-
siderable stir among his listeners 25X1
The representatives of Ireland, Norway, and
Denmark spoke after Barber, addressing them-
selves to the special problems accession would
pose for their countries. The Irish statement was
the most sanguine, and the Danes indicated that
most of their problems could also be resolved.
The Norwegian representative, however, irritated
his Community listeners by insisting on the need
for exceptions to a number of EC policies.
The opening statements, in short, confirmed
what had been widely expected-that the most
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troublesome and crucial issue of the negotiations
will be Community financing. The EC's financing
agreement of December 1969 is pre-eminent
among those rules that Harmel said the candidates
would have to accept. Because the Communities
realize, however, that the British financial burden
under the present arrangements would be enor-
mous, the question becomes one of what sort of
adjustments can be made. Harmel put the EC
position plainly: any adjustments made on Brit-
ain's behalf must take place during a transitional
period and cannot change the basic policy.
F
The formal statements pointed to a number
of other matters that will be tough. Britain's
Commonwealth commitments were mentioned
only briefly, but finding acceptable ways to ac-
commodate specific Commonwealth exports will
take time and patience. Harmel's insistence that
the agreements reached with the four candidates
and with the noncandidate members of EFTA be
put into force at the same time could cause corn-
plications. Several of the EFTA countries are not
sure what sort of arrangement they want with the
Communities, and the EC is uncertain in some
cases about the type of arrangement it will offer.
Settling on a transition period for the customs
union which, as Harmel stated, would be the same
for all the candidates, could also prove difficult.
The Danish representative, for example, said in
his statement that Copenhagen would prefer to
have no transition period at all.
Most observers considered the Luxembourg
meeting a hopeful beginning, but the subsequent
meeting on 21 July in Brussels-at which the
representatives of the EC and Britain settled on
negotiating procedures-was somewhat less
smooth. Several preliminary meetings had been
held at the working level to prepare the way for
the Brussels session, but the EC still seemed sur-
prised by the British proposal to establish six
working groups to produce sets of agreed facts on
the main issues to be negotiated, and had to
withdraw for five hours to come up with a re-
sponse.
The compromise that the two sides even-
tually agreed upon preserved the essence of the
British initiative but put it in a form acceptable to
the Communities. The EC Commission, in cooper-
ation with the British, will conduct fact-finding
studies on five negotiating topics: agriculture (in-
cluding financing), New Zealand, Commonwealth
sugar, coal and steel, and the production of
English texts of EC regulations. The deputy nego-
tiators of the EC and UK will examine the appli-
cation of the Common External Tariff to Britain
and the application of the CAP to certain particu-
larly troublesome product areas.
It was also agreed that negotiators for the
EC and the UK will meet twice quarterly at the
ministerial level and twice a month at the depu-
ties' level. The deputies are schedu led to resume
on 16 September, the ministers in the latter part
of October. A joint secretariat for the negotia-
tions has also been set up.
West German Foreign Minister Scheel, the
current president of the EC Council, and
Anthony Barber, the UK's chief negotiator, at
the first working session of the negotiations
on 21 July in Brussels.
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Another procedural matter the July session
settled is when and how the agricultural financing
issue should be taken up. France came to the
meeting still convinced that this question should
not be broached at the beginning of the negotia-
tions, but Barber's strong statement that the Brit-
ish would "be perfectly willing to accept the
Common Agricultural Policy as members of an
enlarged community" softened the French view.
This crucial issue can therefore be taken up as
soon as the Commission finishes its fact-finding
work, probably not long after negotiations re-
sume this month.
Those who believe that the accession negoti-
ations must necessarily be quick if they are to
succeed were somewhat discouraged by the out-
come of the first working session. If the Com-
munities needed five hours to respond to a British
initiative that had been widely rumored before-
hand, how quickly are they likely to proceed, it
was asked, when substantive issues are at stake?
Others have also been troubled that the first
working session may have revealed the extent to
which the member states intend to keep rigid
control over the negotiations as they proceed.
Nevertheless, both sides have publicly ex-
pressed their pleasure with the outcome of the
July meeting. Barber, speaking to the press when
he returned to London, was elated at how much
of the British fact-finding idea the Communities
had accepted, and Franco Malfatti, the new presi-
dent of the EC Commission, has pointed out how
far the British have gone toward embracing the
CAP as it is. Furthermore, although the negotia-
tions remain largely under the control of the
Council, where national interest is frequently the
Special Report
main consideration, the Commission itself now
has been given a significant role. Many observers
are predicting that this role will increase further
because those who control the facts will have a
good deal to say about the solutions that are
reached.
Despite the August vacation, part of the
Commission staff has begun work on the fact-
finding exercise. The British have been making
contributions to this effort, the most interesting
being a paper on agricultural financing. Others
deal with the Common External Tariff (CXT) and
the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.
The paper on agriculture estimates some of
the effects of applying the EC's financing regula-
tions, unaltered, in an enlarged community in
1978. Britain's contribution to the EC's budget
for that year, according to the paper, would be
over $1.3 billion. This would represent 31 percent
of the total budget, as compared with the 21
percent contributed by Germany and the 16 per-
cent contributed by France. Britain's receipts
from the CAP's agricultural fund, on the other
hand, would be $250 million, or only six per cent
of the total receipts. Britain would thus be a net
contributor of about $1 b i l l i o n to the Communi-
ties' budget for 1978. I n contrast, Germany
would be a net contributor of only $315 million,
and France would be a net recipient of $765
million.
These estimates are quite similar to those
arrived at in the British White Paper of last Feb-
ruary. This time, however, the UK has tried to
lend an appearance of greater accuracy to its
figures by avoiding the wide ranges of its earlier
estimates. The British paper can best be viewed as
part of the general UK strategy of getting the
Communities to admit that there is a real problem
in applying the present financing regulations to
Britain, and then enlisting the Communities' aid
in figuring out solutions.
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In its paper on the CXT, the UK states that
it will accept and apply the tariff levels that will
be in effect after the final Kennedy Round cuts
have been made. For 12 commodities-mostly
raw materials-that now enter Britain duty free
from Commonwealth and EFTA countries, how-
ever, the application of the CXT would have a
damaging effect on British industry. The British
paper recognizes that arrangements with the Com-
monwealth and EFTA countries during the course
of the negotiations can resolve some of these
difficulties, and it expresses the hope that the
remainder can be dealt with through existing EC
rules.
The paper on the Commonwealth Sugar
Agreement is largely a descriptive document,
showing the importance of the agreement to the
Commonwealth countries that are dependent on
sugar exports. In addition, it notes that if the UK
becomes a community member, its obligations
under the agreement will end on 31 December
1974, at which time it must consult with the
Commonwealth parties to the agreement to find
other ways to fulfill its objectives. London may
therefore be suggesting that this would be the
time to phase out the present arrangements and
to bring into effect the new.
Neither the change of government in
London in June nor the appointment of a new
chief negotiator in late July has had a noticeable
impact on the progress of negotiations so far-but
both may prove helpful. Many in the Communi-
ties who favor British accession welcomed the
Conservative victory in June. The lingering doubts
on the Continent about Wilson's devotion to
European ideals have never quite disappeared, but
Heath's credentials have rarely been questioned.
The new cabinet, moreover, has several other
"strong Europeans" in Foreign Secretary Doug-
las-Home, Minister of Agriculture Prior, and
Chancellor of the Exchequer Barber-the close
and trusted associate of the prime minister who
represented the UK at the opening of the entry
talks. Barber's performance at both the 30 June
meeting and the 21 July working session was
widely praised in the press and in official circles.
Since Barber was named Chancellor of the
Exchequer upon the death of lain MacLeod in
late July, Geoffrey Rippon from the Ministry of
Geoffrey Rippon,
the UK's new
chief negotiator
Technology has taken over
as chief negotiator. An-
other close associate of the
prime minister, Rippon
was a junior member of
Heath's team at the
1961-63 negotiations. Al-
though his right-wing
views on a number of is-
sues and his sharp tongue
have made him something
of a controversial figure,
few doubt his strong sup-
port for British entry into
the EC. He will not be
tested until the negotia-
tions resume in the fall,
but his recent public state-
ments have indicated that
he will take the long view
on accession and will try to avoid minutiae. In a
press interview after his appointment, Rippon
said that Britain should "demonstrate the neces-
sary political will on the main issues and...go
ahead with it." Some observers thought it hopeful
that he did not emphasize, as has become almost
obligatory for British spokesmen, that the price
of Common Market entry must be "fair."
It had been widely speculated before the
general election that Harold Wilson in opposition
would play politics with the British entry issue
and gradually turn against membership in the
Communities. There have been no indications so
far, however, that this is occurring; instead, by
appointing Harold Lever as Rippon's opposite
number in the shadow cabinet, Wilson has shown
that his support for British membership con-
tinues. Lever is one of the shadow cabinet's ablest
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members and is known for his strong European
sympathies. Furthermore, the majority of Wil-
son's shadow cabinet favors accession, Healey and
Jenkins being the best known of the "Euro-
peans."
Government and opposition support for
British entry will be essential to the prime minis-
ter when he begins the formidable task in the
next several months of reversing public opinion
on the Common Market. The British people at
this point are far from enthusiastic about entering
the EC even on the best of terms. Polls taken
before the negotiations began, for example,
showed that only about 22 percent favored Brit-
ish membership. If the negotiations seem to be
going well, however, some of the popular opposi-
tion will no doubt begin to disappear. But the
prime minister and his team must still convince
the public that short-run increases in the cost of
butter are insignificant when compared with the
long-run political and economic advantages of
membership. Luckily for Heath, the "anti-
Marketeers," although noisy, remain a fragmented
grouping, and are concentrated neither in one
party nor in any one segment of the population.
Those like Enoch Powell, the noisiest "anti-
Marketeer" of them all, are nevertheless still
forces to be reckoned with.
At this point, most officials are hesitant to
hazard a guess as to how long the negotiations
will last-let alone predict whether they will suc-
ceed. Some believe that the negotiations will take
at least two years, although West German Chan-
cellor Brandt said recently that their direction
should be clear by next spring.
The best chance for success is to keep the
negotiations relatively short, to focus on getting
agreement on the big issues, and to avoid becom-
ing bogged down in detail. Even a confirmed
"European" like Heath might find it hard to
sustain London's application in the face of a
British public opinion that had become convinced
Special Report
that the negotiations were going nowhere. A num-
ber of press accounts of the opening negotiating
sessions thought tendencies in this direction could
already be detected. The Economist, for example,
called them "haggling sessions" in which every-
one's eyes were "firmly fixed on the ground."
But it is unrealistic to expect the negotia-
tions to deal only with lofty themes or even with
general principles. If the agricultural financing
issue is to prove susceptible of solution, there will
probably be some fine calculations of national
advantage, often close to haggling. Britain's pres-25X1
ent insistence on some adjustments in the fi-
nancing arrangements is artly for home con-
sumption
Although there have been signs of a growing
convergence of interest in the Communities on
lower CAP support-price levels-a development
that would make the CAP much more palatable
to Britain-this too is a divisive issue, even among
the present members. EC Commissioner Mansholt
is about to propose a scheme that would freeze
prices at their present levels for three years with
the aim of eventually reducing them, and the
French would favor this objective because of the
inflationary effect of the present support levels
and the enormous cost of the system itself. The
West Germans, however, and farm elements gen-
erally, continue strongly to oppose any reduction
in prices.
Thus, as the opening sessions this summer
were dominated by form and procedure, technical
matters, of which agriculture is only one, will be
the principal concern of the negotiators in the
fall. In this context, it may be too easily forgot-
ten that a development of profound political im-
portance is potentially at stake. As outgoing Com-
mission president Jean Rey said at the 30 June
meeting: "It is not simply a case of eliminating a
few customs or tax barriers or of organizing a
market. What we are really doing is building a
continent."
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the possibility of the EC's enlargement in
fact confronts Europe with a historic opportunity
and challenge. If the negotiations with the four
applicants for membership are successful, and if
associative ties of some sort are established with
the remaining EFTA countries, most of f-ee
Europe will have taken a decisive step toward
economic-and perhaps eventual political-coa-
lescence around the EC. Provided this grouping
can be consolidated into a strong and integrated
community, it is the hope of many involved in
the undertaking-among them Italy's new Premier
Colombo-that "a force for equilibrium and peace
in the world" will also have emerged.
The challenge still lies in imparting to this
community the necessary cohesion and the instru-
ments of effective direction. The applicants for
admission to the EC have committed themselves
to participate in the construction of a European
entity within the framework created by the Rome
treaties. The existing members, for their part,
have opted at least in principle to try to accom-
modate a much larger and more diverse member-
ship by pursuing further the main lines of the
Communities' development so far. This is the
broad implication of their insistence on the sanc-
tity of the Common Agricultural Policy, their
commitment to try to achieve economic and
monetary union in the next ten years, and their
endorsement of the basic features of EC institu-
tions.
What kind of community will in fact emerge
from the forthcoming negotiations remains to be
seen, but there is no doubt that a European
Special Report
structure of some kind is a key element in the
calculations the individual nations are making of
their future world roles. The UK's continued pur-
suit of membership in the EC throughout the
years of De Gaulle's opposition has brought offi-
cial British thinking ever further from Empire and
Commonwealth and ever more firmly into a Euro-
pean frame. If membership can now be achieved,
Britain's search for a postwar identity will, in
many ways, be over--it will have shown, as the
London Times has recently put it, that it is not
"just another Empire lying hulked on the beach
of history."
At a time, moreover, when detente has be-
gun to hold out the prospect of at least a limited
East-West accommodation in Europe, the Com-
munities and their prospective consolidation re-
appear once more in 'the stabilizing light in which
they were originally seen. They are addressed, at
least in part, to the problem of the re-emergence
of Germany which, having established its eco-
nomic and financial pre-eminence in Western
Europe, now has achieved in the eyes of many
Europeans a new-found "independence" of for-
eign policy. Despite its preoccupation with Ost-
politik, the Brandt coalition has continued to
assert that it sees a strong EC as an essential part
of the "firm Western anchor" it needs. Paris and
London could well eventually agree that a
strengthened community is more important than
their precise share in the cost of the CAP and
more vital than illusions of competitive independ-
ence.
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