WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008100060001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed
28 August 1970
No. 0385/70
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(Information as of noon EDT, 27 August 1970)
Page
Cholera Epidemic Peaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Vietnam: Southern Politicians Eye Elections and Economic Reform . . 4
Burma - Communist China: With Hat in Hand . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Thailand: Trouble for Thanorn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Laos: Fights and Talks-No Gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Korea: Parry and Riposte on Unification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
CHINA'S CURRENT APPROACH TOWARD JAPAN
Moscow Summit Maps Next Steps in European Policy . . . . . . . 11
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Middle East: Rocky Road to Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
India: Mrs. Gandhi and the Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chilean Presidential Campaign Closing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
Uruguay: Negotiations with Tupamaros . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
New Adm
inistration Taking Shape in Dominican Republic . . . . .
19
Peruvian
Reforms Spark Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
20
USSR-Bo
livia: Expanding Economic Relations . . . . . . . . . .
20
Cuba: Ch
anges in the Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
Malta; Congo (Kinshasa); Costa Rica
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'-)E U
Cholera Epidemic Peaks
The outbreak of cholera this summer in
South Asia, the USSR, the Middle East, and
northern Africa may soon begin to subside. The
impact of the disease has not been great in the
less developed countries, but it has restricted free-
dom of movement in the USSR.
Apparently the first outbreak-in June-
occurred in Egypt, where authorities quickly took
measures to prevent the spread of the disease to
military personnel. It reportedly was carried to
the USSR by sea from the Middle East. The
USSR publicly noted the presence of cholera in
early August and instituted antiepidemic meas-
ures. Rail travel from Moscow to several southern
republics has been banned except for local resi-
dents, and travel is prohibited to the Black Sea
coast, including that to the important port of
Odessa. Precautionary measures concerning food
markets in Moscow have been taken to prevent
spread of the disease.. Soviet borders with Poland
and Romania were closed temporarily
August, and movements continue to
trolled.
in early
be con-
In addition to the severe burden on public
health resources of containing the disease and
detecting carriers, the outbreak has disrupted
commerce and apparently is causing some delays
in shipping from Black Sea ports.
Countries Infected With Cholera Since Early June
Country officially acknowledging cholera outbreak
Country reportedly infected with cholera
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Vietnam: Southern Politicians Eye Elections and Economic Reform
Candidates sympathetic to the government
are expected to win a majority of the 30 seats at
stake in South Vietnam's Senate elections on Sun-
day. The ten-man slates headed by Senator Cao
and by Senate Chairman Huyen, which are gen-
erally progovernment, as well as the opposition
An Quang Buddhist-backed Mau slate, are the
favorites in the contest. Several other slates com-
posed of government supporters and the mod-
erate opposition Progressive Nationalist Move- Improving the "General"Situation
ment list also have a chance of winning.
President Thieu apparently prefers the Cao
list He
also is said to be backing the ticket headed by
Nhan Xa party leader Truong Vinh Le, but he
may have cooled toward Huyen's slate. Thieu
apparently has not pushed the bureaucracy to line
up behind specific slates, and various elements
within his administration reportedly are backing
different lists.
Although a victory for two progovernment
slates presumably would increase Thieu's support
in the Senate, the elections probably will not
produce any substantially greater political unity
among non-Communist forces. There has been
much talk of collaboration between various slates,
but there is little evidence that the competing lists
have actually cooperated during the campaign.
Moreover, winning tickets may not remain to-
gether as cohesive units once the new Senate: gets
back to work. Most. of the slates elected in the
last Senate contests in 1967 subsequently split
up.
The government's high-priority request for
special powers in the economic field remains
stalled in the National Assembly, and there are
indications that President Thieu is considering
taking some anti-inflationary steps by decree./
President Thieu's latest reshuffling of top
army officers brings improved leadership to two
of the important regional military commands.
-General Lu Lan, who is being removed from com-
mand of the large Military Region 2 in the central
part of South Vietnam, has been criticized by
both US and Vietnamese officers for his lack of
aggressiveness and administrative ability, as well
as for corruption. Although Thieu apparently has
long shared this general view of Lu Lan, he has
cautiously delayed moving against him until now.
Lu Lan's replacement, General Dzu, comes
generally well recommended as a military com-
mander, although even his ability and honesty
have been questioned by a few senior South Viet-
namese generals. Dzu reportedly has served.effec-
tively as commander of Military Region 4 in the
Mekong Delta recently, and he has the added
advantage of being a native of one of the
provinces in MR-2. Dzu will face some difficult
challenges, however, in trying to carry forward
pacification in MR-2, where increased activities
by Communist local forces and terrorists in recent
months have stalled government programs in
several key provinces.
The widely respected commander of the
South Vietnamese 1st Division, General Truong,
now is slated to take over Dzu's former command
in the delta. Truong is a good choice for the delta
job as he is a native of the area and the brightest
light among the younger combat division com-
manders. He will be missed, however, in the
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heavily threatened northernmost provinces.
Truong's 1st Division faces formidable opposition
along the DMZ and the Laos border, and his
replacement, General Phu, is probably now con-
fronting the most serious test of his career.
Thieu has thus succeeded in getting rid of
the worst of the previous regional commanders,
General Lu Lan; improved the top leadership in
MR-2 and MR-4; and promoted a deserving divi-
sion commander in the process. Regional com-
mand changes always have some political over-
tones- in South Vietnam, and the new
commanders can be expected to support his
policies in their areas. The primary motive for the
command shifts, however, probably is Thieu's
desire to improve the South Vietnamese military
and pacification efforts.
Hanoi Calls for More Men for Many Tasks
The regime in Hanoi appears bent on step-
ping up manpower mobilization in the North and
has marshaled its most prominent leaders and its
considerable propaganda apparatus to push this
effort. Party First Secretary Le Duan early this
month called for "all out" efforts to strengthen
the armed forces. Defense Minister Vo Nguyen
Giap reminded party leaders at a conference on
local military affairs in mid-August that Hanoi's
"people's war" strategy implies wide mobiliza-
tion. He enjoined the populace to support a
build-up of North Vietnam's military estab-
lishment. The conference report stressed that the
local militia should be enlarged and maintained in
readiness even while its personnel carry on their
day-to-day tasks, in order to help North Vietnam
"meet all of the front line's requirements."
Recruitment drives of this kind are not new,
but it appears that this one is receiving more
attention and heavier emphasis than usual from
the authorities in Hanoi. The North Vietnamese
could be expanding their military manpower base
in anticipation of a more intense level of fighting
over the short run, but it seems more likely that
their concerns are longer range. They probably
expect that the personnel needs implicit in their
commitment to a protracted struggle in much of
Indochina could become quite heavy at some
point. By pulling more people into organizations
such as the militia, they hell) ensure the avail-
ability of suitable manpower for the military over
the long haul without significantly reducing the
present size of the civilian labor force.
The regime may also be counting on in-
creased mobilization to benefit the civilian sector
by producing a more efficient organization of the
labor force. Hanoi frequently uses military
organizations to assist in economic projects,
particularly in agriculture and public works; in
July, the government called on the army for more
help of this kind.
Burma- Communist China: With Hat in Hand
Rangoon has taken a new initiative toward
restoring better relations with Communist China.
General Ne Win has sent an emissary to Peking
with a personal letter to Premier Chou En-lai
calling for negotiations to repair the damage done
to the two countries' relations by anti-Chinese
riots in Rangoon in mid-1967.
Ne Win's hopefulness on this score was re-
cently expressed in a conversation with a Western
ambassador. The general said that moderating in-
fluences he perceived in Peking could make pos-
sible an improvement in relations. He expressed
the view that new attitudes in the Chinese leader-
ship had made China less of a threat to Southeast
Asia, and he implied that what he saw as a
Chinese desire for a belt of friendly neighboring
countries held promise for Burma's fence-
mending initiatives.
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Reflecting Rangoon's eagerness to seize on
any indication of Chinese receptivity to addi-
tional initiatives, the Burmese Embassy in Peking
has been asked to report any changes in China's
attitude toward countries with which it has had
difficulties. Also, in a continuation of efforts be-
gun by Ne Win last November, Rangoon has
nominated an ambassador for Peking's approval.
Burma's diplomatic representation in Peking was
upgraded from first secretary to counselor level
last winter; Peking has not reciprocated.
Despite Ne Win's professed optimism, the
Chinese have made few responses to his recent
Thailand: Trouble for Thanom
gestures. Peking has toned down its anti - Ne Win
propaganda, but it is not clear that it is ready for
a resumption of the ambassadorial ties that were
suspended three years ago. Although perhaps dis-
posed toward the restoration of some amicability,
Peking is unlikely to cease its support for
Burmese Communists and other dissidents.
Ne Win had been trying to send the recently
dispatched emissary for over a year, but the
Chinese refused to grant a visa. Peking's agree-
ment to receive him suggests that it now is at least
interested in hearing what Rangoon has to of-
Long suppressed divisions within govern-
ment ranks have led to another parliamentary
crisis and fresh doubts about Prime Minister
Thanom's leadership. The government barely
weathered the opening round of a battle over the
budget in mid-July, when a coalition of wayward
government and opposition MPs came within one
vote of defeating Thanom's bill to raise taxes.
In the recent second round of the fight over
the new budget, a similar group of dissidents in
the government's Saha Pracha Thai (SPT) party
joined opposition members in the parliament to
defeat Prime Minister Thanom. As a result, oppo-
sition parliamentarians now have a one-vote ma-
jority on the 37-man committee responsible for
reviewing and amending the 1971 budget and are
in position to alter it considerably if they vote as
a bloc.
The rift over the budget has surfaced a wid-
ening breach within government ranks. Many
members of the parliament, including some from
the SPT, have been pressing the prime minister
for increased recognition and responsibility and
for constitutional amendments that will give the
legislature more power. They are also agitating for
a cabinet reshuffle that would more accurately
reflect current Thai political realities.
In this effort, disgruntled SPT members
evidently are receiving encouragement from some
high-ranking military leaders who have been at
odds with Thanom's close advisers. The prime
minister himself has come under increasing criJ-
cism for his lackluster and ineffective leadership.
The country's top military strong man, Deputy
Prime Minister General Praphat, whose power has
been growing at Thanom's expense for some time, 25X1
is once again being mentioned as a possible suc-
cessor. It is not clear how much encouragement
Praphat is giving his supporters,
Thanom, meanwhile, has attempted to quiet
legislative unrest. In addition to making a strong
plea for party unity, he has vigorously denied
Bangkok press reports that his defeat on the
budget committee issue nearly sparked the dis-
solution of parliament. The prime minister has
also taken other patchwork moves in the last few
weeks to bring SPT mavericks back into the fold,
but he has still not addressed himself to the
fundamental problems. 25X1
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Laos: Fights and Talks--No Gains
Southwest of the Plaine des Jarres, General
Vang Pao, in an attempt to improve his defensive
position, has renewed a three-month drive to take
Ban Na, a former government outpost about 14
miles north of Long Tieng. In an effort to circum-
vent enemy forces that had blocked the general's
previous drives toward Ban Na from the south,
the government on 18 August moved over 500
men by helicopter to positions five miles north of
the enemy stronghold.
In the past week these troops have been hit
hard by elements of the North Vietnamese 174th
regiment. So far they have been unable to carry
out their plan to move south on Ban Na. Their
situation is further complicated because they are
beyond the range of artillery support and because
the extremely bad weather in recent days has
frustrated friendly air strikes on the enemy. The
Communists are known to have taken substantial
casualties and are experiencing some supply prob-
lems, but they appear determined to hold Vang
Pao's irregulars within their present boundaries
for the remainder of the rainy season.
Similar difficulties are being encountered by
government forces trying to re-establish a defen-
sive line to the northwest of Luang Prabang. An
irregular battalion has been attempting for some
time to gain control of the ridge that runs be-
tween a northeast-to-southwest loop in the Me-
kong river. Recently, enemy resistance to this
operation in mountainous territory has increased
considerably and several key positions have been
lost. It is by no means certain that the tenacity of
the Communist forces in this sector and elsewhere
in northern Laos has been prompted only by
military considerations in preparation for the
coming dry season. It may also be intended, in
part, to provide a show of strength in relation to
talks with the government, which the Commu-
nists apparently intend to continue.
There have been no major developments in
these discussions since the departure of Soth
Pethrasy, the senior Pathet Lao representative in
Vientiane, for Sam Neua on 21 August. Soth
presumably is consulting with Communist leader
Prince Souphanouvong about the differing ideas
of the two sides on the nature of the talks tenta-
tively agreed to be held in Khang Khay. The
Communists are expected to reject the govern-
ment's proposal that these discussions proceed
directly to matters of substance and that the
negotiations be conducted by large delegations
representing all the interested parties. The govern-
ment assumes that Soth will return to Vientiane
with the Pathet Lao response before the depar-
ture of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma for an
extended trip abroad on 2 September.
Q Communist controlled
territory
r Contested territory
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Korea: Parry and Riposte on Unification
Pyongyang's reply to President Pak Chong-
hui's recent call for peaceful reunification clearly
reflects its concern over being challenged in an
area where it has long exercised the propaganda
initiative. Editorials appearing in authoritative
government and party media label Pak's proposal
a "vicious trick" designed to deceive the Korean
people. Repeating Pyongyang's two long-standing
conditions for reunification-withdrawal of all US
forces from Korea and the overthrow of the Pak
government-the editorials berate Washington and
Seoul for the continued tension in Korea.
The editorials also reflect North Korean
sensitivity over growing ties between Seoul and
Tokyo. Pyongyang recognizes that Japan's in-
creasing involvement in South Korea's rapidly de-
veloping economy is an additional obstacle to
reunification on Communist terms. Lashing out at
Pak for accepting "foreign monopoly capital,"
the editorial demands that the Japanese also be
expelled from South Korea as a precondition for
reunification.
The completely negative tone of the North
Korean response appears likely to redound to the
advantage of the South in its continuing competi-
tion for international support, particularly among
those nations that heretofore have been attracted
by Pyongyang's ostensibly more flexible approach
to reunification. Pak has insisted that, as a pre-
condition to opening talks, the UN must verify a
North Korea renunciation of force toward the
South. His demand might create interest within
the UN to certify that tensions have eased when
the General Assembly again takes up the Korean
question in the fall. This in turn could put pres-
sure on Pak to move more quickly on the re-
unification issue than he wants. The North Ko-
rean cause, however, is unlikely to be helped by
Pyongyang's flat rejection of any role for the UN
in Korean reunification.
Pak has also pre-empted his domestic op-
ponents. In general, Koreans long for their coun-
try to be reunited, but in the South few are ready
to see this accomplished on Communist terms.
With an eye toward the 1971 presidential elec-
tion, Pak, by making his proposal in his own
name, has affirmed that reunification is a job
requiring his hand at the helm for an indefinite
period.
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Moscow Summit Maps Next Steps in European Policy
Soviet and Eastern European party and gov-
ernment leaders met in Moscow on 20 August to
discuss German and European policy for the sec-
ond time in nine months. The first summit, early
last December, cleared the way for the beginning
of talks between the West Germans and the Sovi-
ets, Poles, and East Germans. The most recent
meeting, which was labeled a meeting of the Polit-
ical Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact,
was convened to give formal endorsement to the
recently concluded Soviet - West German treaty
and to map out the next diplomatic moves
toward Germany and Western Europe.
A brief communique revealed little about
what decisions were made, but there is slight
doubt about the principal ones. The Pact leaders
almost certainly agreed to work toward the con-
clusion of other bilateral treaties to complete the
de facto postwar settlement between Bonn and
the East. Polish negotiations with the West Ger-
mans are already far advanced, and there are
indications that the Czechoslovaks are willing to
talk. The East Germans obviously are the most
reluctant participants in the dialogue with Bonn,
and
one reason or last week's meeting was Moscow's
desire to put pressure on the East Germans by
presenting them with a united front. In any event,
Pankow had no real alternative but to accept the
line favored by Moscow.
MALTA: Prime Minister Borg Olivier has pushed
through parliament an amendment of the Con-
stitution providing for an increase from 50 to 55
in the number of seats in the Houseof Represent-
atives. The extra seats will go to the five most
densely populated of the ten electoral divisions.
Borg Olivier thinks that this amendment has ad-
vantages for his Nationalist Party not present in
the recommendations of the Electoral Commis-
sion last June that called for electoral district
boundary changes. This conclusion is borne out
The Communist leaders also agreed to take
immediate steps to implement the long-standing
proposal for an "all-European conference" on
European security problems. Although the
communique' did not spell out what these steps
would be, Moscow obviously intends to use its
treaty with Bonn as evidence that the West's
""preconditions" for a conference now have been
largely met. The Berlin talks have also been cited
in the West as a test of Soviet intentions on
European security, and the Soviets may have
briefed their allies on the proposal they plan to
present at the next four-power meeting in Sep-
tember. The summit participants probably
formulated tactics aimed at using developments in
the Berlin talks and negotiations with Bonn to
press for quick progress toward a conference.
The Soviet - West German treaty in fact has
been received favorably throughout Western
Europe, and it will have an important impact on
NATO discussions of European security this fall.
Most Allies probably will urge a cautious appraisal
of the situation. Some, however, encouraged by
public and parliamentary opinion, will be more
receptive than before to the Eastern arguments
and may press for a less conservative Allied o-
sition on a security conference.
by the fact that the opposition Labor Party, led
by the controversial Dom Mintoff, vigorously
opposed the bill. The amendment will also pre-
vent a tie vote in the house should the Nation-
alists and Laborites divide all the seats evenly
between them in the next election that must be
called by March 1971. I n the 1966 election, Borg
Olivier's party won a small majority, but at this
point it is running neck and neck with the Labor-
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MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
Middle East: Rocky Road to Peace
Israel this week finally agreed to proceed
with the Jarring talks, but after only one session
Israel's alternate delegate, UN Ambassador
Tekoah, left on 25 August for consultations in
Jerusalem.
Foreign
Minister Eban on the same day suggested that the
Jarring talks were not likely to succeed unless
Egypt withdrew the missiles set up in violation of
the cease-fire.
King Husayn's visit to Cairo between 20 and
23 August seems to have been partly undertaken
to dramatize the fact that he was merely follow-
ing Nasir's lead in accepting the US peace plan.
Husayn no doubt hopes that close association
with Nasir will help deflect fedayeen criticism
that he has sold out the Arab cause. It is unlikely,
however, that the two leaders attempted to ham-
mer out a specific position with respect to the
peace talks; press reports after the meeting spoke
vaguely of the need for complete coordination
between Egypt and Jordan, but said only that the
problem was "extremely difficult and compli-
cated." The final communique included an
attempt to placate the fedayeen by saying that
"the national interest requires the preservation by
all means of the Palestinian resistance move-
ment."
King Husayn probably hoped to line up
Nasir's support for his effort either to bring the
approximately 19,000 Iraqi forces in Jordan
under his command or have them returned to
Baghdad. In this he seems to have failed; the
communique said specificially that "the battle
requires the presence of the Iraqi Army in
Jordan," even though they may take no part in
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actual fighting. The Jordanians are probably in no
position to force the issue, and the Iraqis are not
likely either to budge or to accept Jordanian
control.
Yasir Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, was in Cairo this past
week to discuss Middle East peace developments
with President Nasir. The fedayeen leader had
already expressed his opposition to the current
cease-fire agreement and other moves, and it is
unlikely that Nasir was able to persuade him to
acquiesce in these actions. It is more probable
that Nasir summoned Arafat to Cairo to warn him
personally not to interfere in peace negotiations.
The fedayeen would have difficulty in
posing any effective interference at present. They
have been thrown off balance by Nasir's campaign
to silence opposition to Egyptian and Jordanian
participation in peace negotiations. Fedayeen
leaders fear that the personal popularity of the
Egyptian President among the Arab masses is such
that any attacks upon him would backfire. Per-
haps more significant is the acceptance the peace
plans have received among Palestinian refugees in
both the East and West Bank areas. Many Pal-
estinians, weary of 20 years of "temporary" dis-
placement and conflict, are apparently willing to
accept peace talks that give some weight to their
aspirations and interests and promise some kind
of permanent home for them.
CONGO (Kinshasa): President Mobutu's visits to
Romania and Yugoslavia this week round out his
most ambitious international junket. While visit-
ing the US in early August he filled two of the
Congo's prime security needs with purchase and
maintenance contracts for three C-130 air trans-
ports and six patrol boats for Lake Tanganyika.
He also signed a civil aviation agreement that gives
Air Congo access to the US, and he persuaded
American investors to proceed with several indus-
trial projects, including a tire plant in Kinshasa
and an aluminum smelter using hydroelectric
power from the Congo River.
Mobutu spent ten days in Western Europe
before proceeding to Bucharest. His meetings
with Romanian and Yugoslav leaders may pro-
duce minor economic or cultural accords that can
be used to demonstrate that Kinshasa's policy is
one of nonalignment.
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India: Mrs. Gandhi and the Communists
Following the split in the Congress Party in
1969, Mrs. Gandhi's faction-termed the Ruling
Congress-found itself a minority government
dependent on the support of non-Congress mem-
bers of the Lower House of Parliament to stay in
power. Among the parties that usually rallied to
her side were the two major Communist Parties-
the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI)
and the more militant Communist Party of India/
Marxist (CPM). Although the support of the two
parties, or even of one of them, was not essential
to Mrs. Gandhi's retaining power, their votes in
Parliament were a useful cushion the prime minis-
ter could rely upon in case of unforeseen events-
such as an unexpected vote of confidence. In
recent weeks, however, friction between Mrs.
Gandhi and the Communists has begun to in-
crease.
To bolster its radical credentials, the CPI on
1 July initiated a campaign urging landless peas-
ants to occupy illegally lands owned by the gov-
ernment and by the wealthier farmers and ab-
sentee landlords. This "land-grab" movement has
continued, and several thousand CPI supporters
have been jailed. Recently, the movement seems
to be running out of steam. The CPI has been
satisfied with the publicity it has received and
party leaders do not appear overly eager to inter-
fere with the prime minister's efforts to walk a
tightrope between governmental criticism of law-
lessness and her individual expressions of sym-
pathy for the landless. The movement has, how-
ever, increased friction between her and the CPI
leadership-friction that Mrs. Gandhi probably
will work hard to avoid exacerbating.
Some cooperation between the CPI and the
Ruling Congress remains possible, however. The
CPI, in fact, has aligned itself with Mrs. Gandhi's
party in the elections scheduled in the state of
Kerala next month. It sees no other way of de-
feating the more powerful CPM. CPI leaders, how-
ever, remain concerned that this alliance, taken
together with their usual support for Mrs. Gandhi
in New Delhi, may damage the party's all-India
image as a revolutionary organization.
The CPM is another story, and several of
Mrs. Gandhi's recent actions suggest that she may
be prepared to write off its support. Meanwhile,
leaders of the CPM for their part appear increas-
ingly ready to compete openly with the govern-
ment. In Kerala, the CPM is trying to bloc the
CPI/Ruling Congress - led coalition by working
for an unwritten electoral understanding with the
Organization Congress Party, Mrs. Gandhi's arch-
enemy since the Congress Party split. In West
Bengal, where in March 1970 New Delhi replaced
a CPM-dominated coalition government with
direct rule from the center, the national govern-
ment and the CPM remain in open conflict. The
CPM has launched a campaign of crippling strikes
and mass rallies to force early elections, but Mrs.
Gandhi, recognizing that the CPM stands a good
chance of again coming out on top if elections are
held now, is not prepared to acquiesce.
The Gandhi government has survived at the
center in large degree because few politicians of
any party are eager to bring it down and force
early elections. New elections must be held by
February 1972, however. Both Communist par-
ties, especially the CPM, appear to have chosen
conflict with Mrs. Gandhi as an ideal means to
emphasize their separate identities. Although in
the end one or the other of them may even arrive
at an electoral arrangement with her Ruling Con-
gress Party, during the pre-electoral period their
support at the center will become increasingly
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 IN CRUCIAL MOMENTS OF THEIR HISTORY, THE PEOPLE SEE THEIR GRAND OLD MEN COME FORTH.
CHILE CALLS FOR DON JORGE ALESSANDRI.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chilean Presidential Campaign Closing
The three-man race for the presidency of
Chile still appears close only a week before the
election on 4 September. The candidates have
accelerated their campaigns to influence the many
voters who are still undecided.
Conservative former president Jorge Ales-
sandri, who is generally considered leading by a
slight margin, continues to pitch his campaign to
the large portion of the electorate that is anti-
Communist but at the same time leftist in atti-
tude. His campaign frequently equates Christian
Democrat Radomiro Tomic with Marxist Salvador
Allende. A new twist is an attempt to turn the
drawback of Alessandri's age (74) into an asset
utilizing full-page newspaper ads.
Allende, supported by a multiparty coalition
put together and dominated by astute Communist
party leaders, is concentrating his efforts in Santi-
ago, where about 40 percent of the votes will be
cast and where the Communists fear Alessandri is
leading. Allende has announced that as president
he would not allow the US to maintain its "air-
base"--actually an ionospheric weather testing
station---on Easter Island, a Chilean possession in
the mid-Pacific.
A pro-Alessandri daily has published the
names of 167 private firms it claims Allende will
nationalize in fulfillment of a campaign promise.
Allende has not received all-out support from the
dominant labor confederation, although its lead-
ership is dominated by Communists and Social-
ists. Thus Alessandri backers probably hope to
influence workers by raising the possibility that
they would lose their jobs under an Allende
government. Allende now is backing off from
some of his more outspokenly Marxist state-
ments, claiming that the coalition he heads will
merely lay the groundwork for a truly Commu-
nist state. He continues to say, however, that he
will immediately recognize Cuba, Communist
China, North Vietnam, North Korea, and East
Germany.
The governing Christian Democrats' candi-
date, Radomiro Tomic, has improved his poor
position somewhat, largely because of last-minute
efforts by party colleagues who apparently have
decided that their lack of enthusiasm for him is
outweighed by their desire to keep the party in
power. Tomic, however, insists on shunning the
middle ground where he probably could have
found the strongest following. He prefers instead
to try to outdo Allende in appeals to leftist vot-
ers, while making only mild or sporadic attacks
on Allende's.vulnerabilities, such as his respon-
siveness to the Chilean Communist Party.,
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Uruguay: Negotiations with Tupamaros
Uruguay's Foreign Minister Peirano has
opened the possibility of negotiations by an out-
side party with the Tupamaros. In an interview on
21 August in a progovernment newspaper, he said
that the Pacheco administration was maintaining
its adamant refusal to deal with "such low crim-
inals." He added, however, that if a third party
were to undertake negotiations for the two cap-
tives "within Uruguay's juridical framework," his
government could not legally interfere. He cited
as a precedent the ransoming of a prominent
Uruguayan banker by friends late last year.
Peirano mentioned Brazil as a third party that
might negotiate with the Tupamaros for diplomat
Dias Gomide.
COSTA RICA: Costa Rica and the USSR have
agreed to "resume" diplomatic relations, and an
exchange of ambassadors may follow soon. To
bypass the legislature, where opposition to com-
mercial accords has grown steadily, President
Figueres rationalized that relations with the
Soviets established in the early 1940s had never
been ruptured. The Soviet envoy agreed that the
commercial protocol, which required congres-
sional approval, was "unnecessary." Figueres has
countered criticism at home and throughout
In Montevideo, President Pacheco vowed in
an Independence Day address to root out the
terrorists, but he also warned those on the right
who advocated extraconstitutional measures to
curb the left, "We are not here to sign the death
certificate of democracy in Uruoua
The government
paper.
also took steps to cut off a major Tupamaro
source of funds by ordering the temporary closing
of 58 small bank branches in Montevideo and
increasing guards at the larger offices. The meas-
ure was taken because the Tupamaros frequently
have robbed these small banks; one policeman
was killed in such an attempt last week.
The upswing in Tupamaro activity continued
this week. On Monday the group stole $56,000
from a department store, and then turned to
attacking communications media to achieve a
greater public impact. Bombs damaged four radio
and television stations and a Montevideo news-
Central America for his open door policy toward
the Communist countries by associating his
actions with President Nixon's call for an era of
negotiations. Figueres has shown considerable
sensitivity on the issue, however. He has been
evasive with the US Embassy regarding his
dealings with a high-level visiting Soviet delega-
tion and also has made a vitriolic attack against
San Jose's leading daily newspaper for its
opposition to his foreign olic .
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New Administration Taking Shape in Dominican Republic
President Balaguer, who took office for a
second four-year term on 16 August, has named
his new "government of national unity," which
includes members of the opposition in the cab-
inet. Despite surface appearances, however, the
personalistic and centralized rule that char-
acterized his first term is likely to continue.
As was the case during 1966-70, Balaguer
appears more interested in using proffered po-
litical posts to divide the political opposition than
to foster interparty cooperation. Two of the par-
ties represented in the cabinet-the National
Conciliation Movement and the National Civic
Union-are insignificant, and the third, that of
ex-general Wessin y Wessin, has been badly split
over the issue of accepting government posts.
Thus far, both the runner-up, rightist political
party and the major leftist opposition Dominican
Revolutionary Party-which abstained from the
elections-have declined to participate in the new
government.
An indication of the President's continued
penchant for personalized politics was his as-
sumption last week of responsibility for the
operation of the Dominican Agrarian Institute,
which controls agrarian reform. Balaguer has
stressed that agriculture will be a fundamental
concern during his second administration, and he
is seeking to emphasize its importance by taking
direct control. The important secretariats of for-
eign relations and finance are headed by opposi-
tion politicians, and Balaguer may be inclined
initially to dictate policy in these fields as well.
An opposition leader was also named to head the
labor secretariat, a frequent target of opposition
complaints, and the appointment will allow
Ealaguer to deflect some criticism from his own
Reformist Party. Congress, firmly in the hands of
the President's supporters, is expected to follow
executive dictates obediently.
In the only major military change, the long-
time secretary of the armed forces, General Perez
y Perez, was transferred to the secretariat of in-
terior and police. He was replaced by a relatively
weak commander who is personally loyal to the
President. The ready acceptance of the shift by
the armed forces is indicative of the widespread
military support Balaguer now enjoys. Most
military leaders appear confident that the Presi-
dent will allow them a freer hand to deal with the
left than has been the case in the past. In the
weeks surrounding the inauguration, counterter-
rorism by the security forces has picked up, and
the leading activist Communist group is now in
serious disarray.
With the two major opposition political par-
ties declining to participate in the government,
Balaguer is faced with a sometimes embarrassing
but not unmanageable problem. Their political
sniping is nettlesome but lacks impact; neither
party commands much military or legislative sup-
port and neither appears likely to commit itself to
suicidal coup plotting in the near term. Moreover,
opposition politicians may find it expedient to
accept minor positions with the government as
individuals rather than as party members, despite
prohibitions from their political parties.
President Balaguer takes oath of office.
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Peruvian Reforms Spark Dissent
The principal leaders of the Peruvian busi-
ness community are continuing their public op-
position to the Velasco government's industrial
reform decree and appear to be gaining some
influential allies within the military. That the
government intends to pursue its "revolution,"
however, is evidenced by the renewal of pressure
on US mining companies.
Business leaders are most strongly opposed
to the provisions in the new industrial law that
call for worker participation in the ownership and
management of industrial enterprises. Manufac-
turers believe the collective nature of such partici-
pation is a negation of the principle of private
ownership of property as well as a threat to
Peruvian economic progress. The influential Na-
tional Society of Industrialists has embarked on a
series of press communiques pointing out the
difficulties and dangers of the new law, but the
government has given no indication that it intends
to modify the reform.
In the face of this opposition, as well as the
depressed state of foreign investment, the govern-
ment last week issued a new mining law that has
lines. The government already is demanding that
two arms sign contracts giving the gov-
ernment 5 percent interest in the development
of their copper concessions.
This latest flurry of restrictive legislation af-
fecting business, particularly the industrial re-
form, has caused grave concern to several top
military leaders. The army chief of staff and other
high-ranking officers recently questioned the min-
ister of industry on the industrial law that he was
primarily responsible for and voiced their concern
that small businesses would be adversely affected.
They also expressed fear that the law would
further aggravate the already serious unem-
ployment problem.
further alarmed businessmen,
the law requires that min-
ing concessionaires submit by 30 September new
and accelerated schedules for the development of
their concessions and arrange financing by the
end of the year. Under the new regulations com-
panies could lose their concessions if the minister
of mines determines that development is not on
schedule. The law may be designed to force other
companies to enter joint ventures with the gov-
ernment, which in turn would probably permit
the companies some slippage on meeting dead-
USSR-Bolivia: Expanding Economic Relations
Several recent agreements signed in Moscow
could open the way for tie first significant trade
between the two countries.
The USSR extended a $27.5 million credit
to Bolivia on 17 August for the purchase of
Prime Minister Montagne, who is also the
minister of war and commander of the army, is
strongly opposed to the law and increasingly con-
cerned over the growing influence of the Com-
munists in Peru.
Soviet mining and metallurgical machinery. The
credit, the first extended to Bolivia by Moscow,
reportedly is to be repaid in hard currency over
ten years at an annual interest rate of three per-
cent. At the same time, the two countries signed
their first trade agreement, which also provides
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for the establishment of trade missions in both
capitals. The USSR expects to sell mining and
petroleum equipment and to purchase Bolivian
finished and semifinished products, probably tin
and other minerals.
Bolivia already has begun to implement its
first commercial contract with Moscow. Signed in
June, it calls for the export of 3,200 tons of
Bolivian tin and tin concentrates in 1970-71 for
some $8 million in hard currency. The first ship-
ments of tin concentrates to the USSR have been
made, but Bolivia may encounter difficulties in
refining tin metal until early next year when a
new tin smelter goes into operation. Another
agreement for future deliveries, however, is ex-
pected to be reached in 1971.
Moscow also has become more receptive to
Bolivian requests for Soviet technical assistance
for the development of its mining industry since
the establishment of diplomatic relations in De-
cember 1969. Arrangements are currently being
worked out for the provision of Soviet techni-
cians to assist in the development of Bolivia's tin
industry. Bolivia may also seek Soviet help in
expanding its production of tungsten and bis-
muth. This aid probably is part of a wider pro-
gram of technical exchange envisaged under the
scientific and technical cooperation agreement
signed earlier this year.
Cuba: Changes in the Hierarchy
The first of the high-level administrative
changes promised by Fidel Castro in his speech on
26 July have been announced. The new appoint-
ments follow the pattern set in the past two years
of assigning capable military officers and ex-
perienced technocrats to key positions in the gov-
ernment. The appointments also conform to the
current trend of increasing military influence in
nonmilitary affairs and reflect Castro's tendency
to depend primarily on old "comrades-in-arms"
who proved their loyalty in the guerrilla war of
1957-58.
Although more changes are expected, they
will not be in the nature of a purge. The shifts
merely represent Castro's continuing effort to
find a winning combination to improve the state
of the economy and to regain the momentum his
revolution has lost in the past decade. Moreover,
the new appointments bear his personal trade-
mark and constitute solid evidence that he has
lost none of his grip on the country or its political
apparatus.
The long-awaited removal of Domestic Trade
Minister Manuel Luzardo was announced on 19
August. The aging Luzardo, an "old Communist"
who found the problems of his ministry too com-
plex to overcome, was replaced by First Captain
Serafin Fernandez Rodriguez, an experienced sup-
ply officer from the Armed Forces Ministry
(MINFAR). Another MINFAR officer, Vice Min-
ister for Training Major Jose Fernandez Alvarez,
appointed first vice minister of the Education
Ministry in mid-August, will function as deputy
to Major Belarmino Castilla Mas, a former
MINFAR official named as education minister in
early July. The former education minister had
been unsuccessful in getting the Cuban school
system to produce the technicians and teachers
required to implement the regime's ambitious
development programs.
One of the economic trouble spots identified
by Castro in his speech was the merchant shipping
industry. To resolve the problem, Havana an-
nounced on 21 August the creation of a new
Ministry of Merchant Marine and Ports. Major
Angel Joel Chaveco Hernandez, who has held
important staff positions in MINFAR's air and air
defense system, was named to head the new min-
istry.
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Chinas Current Approach Toward Japan
Secret
N2 43
28 August 1970
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.. %W N4000~
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Intellectual Dissent in the USSR
Secret
N2 43
28 August 1970
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