WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008100050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 21, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
n, 3
DIA review(s) completed.
21 August 1970
No. 0384/70
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(Information as of noon EDT, 20 August 1970)
Page
Laos: Still Some Obstacles on the Road to Khang Khay . . . . . . . 1
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Cambodia: A Sense of Disquiet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
South Korea: Calling Pyongyang's Hand on Unification . . . . . . . . 6
USSR - North Korea: Liberation Anniversary . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Communist China - USSR: Token Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
EUROPE
Moscow Cancels Relief Airlift to Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Italy: New Center-Left Attempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Ghana: Election of a Civilian President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Middle East Peace Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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Uruguay: Government Keeps Pressure on the Tupamaros . . . . . . 13
Latin America: Reactions to Diplonapings . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Chile: Communists Hopeful But Nervous . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.
Guyana's Prime Minister Displays His "Independence" . . . . . . . 16
Panama Asks US to Leave Rio Hato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Argentina: A Look at the New Government
NOTES:~Czechoslovakia; Pakistan; Saudi Arabia; Bolivia; Paraguay;
Chile - Communist China.
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g AR EAST
f..- aos: Still Some Obstacles on the Road to Khang Khay
r he momentum for a continuing d!aloque be-
tween the government and the Pathet Lao seems
well established, but each side has a number of
problems that could delay the next stage in the
discussions. Suck Vongsak, the envoy from Com-
rnctn'ist leader 5ouphanouvonq, and Soth Pethrasy,
the senior Path(.:t Lao rer)resaantative in Vientiane,
reet with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on 15
August, presumably to discuss matters relating to
Ii projected talks A. Khanq Khay to which both
sides have tentatively agreed. i he Communist repre-
sentatives also delivered a message from Sou-
I;hanouvong which, according to a subsequent
f'trthet Lao broadcast of the text, protested alleged
youth Vietnamese military actions along the Ho Chi
Minh trail in Laos. This message did not indicate
that the conversations with Vientiane would be
broken off on this account, but it did state that
such acts "rendered the situation more corrmpli-
a ed" and "worsened the prospect'' for continued
u.gotiations.
The Communists may also object to a proposal
by the prime minister that the meetings at Khang
Khay should dispense with further preliminary dis-
ccussions and move directly to matters of substance.
Although an authoritative response to this sugges-
tion must come from Souphanouvong, a press ac-
count from Vientiane en 17 August, attributed to
Souk, claims that Souvanna's proposal will bring
about an impasse in the dialogue between the two
parties.
On the governrnerrl side, serious di sserrsion
may still arise over the composition of the nine-man
delegation that Souvan,ra proposes to send to
Khanq Khay. The prime minister has made an effort
to avoid a light over representation among "all the
interested Lac) Parties'' until the negotiations reach
a more conclusive stage. Fie has gone out of his way
in private and public: statements to stress that the
delegation is neither "right" nor "center," but only
the -government side." HHe also is attempting, ap-
parently, to accommodate- the Communist call for
two- rather than three-sicced talks at Khanq Khav.
The relative inactivity of North Vietnamese
and Pathet Lao units in recent weeks n most sec-
tions of the country may be directly related to the
diplomatic exchanges ere ng on in Vientiane. But
the difficulties in mounting attacks and moving
supplies during the rainy season arc undoubtedly
contributing factors also. Government forces, which
usually take the offensive in the summer months,
have for the most part stayed in their garrisons this
year.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Aug "0
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Vietnam
Saigon Government Under Fire
Much of this criti-
cism is directed at the government's performance
in the economic field and its failure thus far to
secure legislative authorization of special decree
powers to deal with the country's pressing eco-
nomic problems. The legislation has been stalled
in the Upper House, and there are indications that
a majority of the senators are prepared to vote
against the measure.
the country's politi-
cal atmosphere appears relatively calm as sena-
Page 2
torial candidates campaign for votes in the 30
August election. The government still faces a po-
tentially serious problem in veterans' demonstra-
tions, which continue to spread to cities outside
of Saigon. These disturbances, as well as agitation
by students, however, have remained rather minor
since last spring, at which time the government's
handling of large protest demonstrations gener-
ated considerably more intense and widespread
criticism than has occurred so far this time.
Efforts of a high-level North Vietnamese
delegation to sell Hanoi's new Cambodian policies
to the Communist world have not been crowned
with glory. The delegation, led by politburo mem-
ber Hoang Van Hoan, a hard liner, was received
by high-ranking party officials in some Eastern
European capitals but Hoan got short shrift in
Moscow. In Peking, not surprisingly, he was
warmly received.
The variations in the reception accorded
Hoan can be traced directly to his mission. There
is little enthusiasm in Moscow or in many other
East European capitals for the widening conflict
in Indochina, and even the most skillful public
relations effort would be likely to win few con-
verts. In Peking and Tirana, Hanoi's new mili-
tancy already has broad support.
There is little evidence that the delegation
had any purpose other than generating increased
political support for Hanoi's Cambodian policy.
For the most part, Hoan contacted none of the
officials he would be expected to see if he were
seeking new economic or military commitments.
Most of his hosts were parliamentary leaders with
government positions comparable to his own: he
is vice chairman of the National Assembly Stand-
ing Committee.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Aug 70
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Communist shellings and ground probes con-
tinue in South Vietnam's northernmost provinces,
but combat activity throughout most of the rest
of the country remains light.
This penetration of first-line North Vietnam-
ese combat units into the populated strip along
the northern coast, the first in a long time, under-
scores the enemy's renewed effort to contest al-
lied pacification gains in the region. It appears
that South Vietnamese forces defeated 304th Di-
vision elements in initial engagements last week,
but sizable North Vietnamese forces remain in the
lowlands and renewed fighting can be expected
soon.
In early July, South Vietnam's Chief of Staff
General Vien reinforced the northern Military Re-
gion with an additional South Vietnamese Marine
brigade. The brigade has been sweeping the area
west of Da Nang-apparently to help fill the gap
left by elements of the 1st US Marine Division
that are being withdrawn-but it could be sent
farther north to the Quang TO - Thua Thien
sector if North Vietnamese attacks there increase.
nam there are signs of enemy preparations for
new activity. These appear every year as impor-
tant Communist holidays in late August and early
September approach. So far, this year's prepara-
tions do not reflect any great urgency, but fairly
widespread harassing attacks may be
planned.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Aug 70
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AR MEANCHEY
~ONG THOM `,. fit' x j k
famPeng .~ +T s MQNDOiy.:" r R
" Ko ong
'Chh ang c-a f. f
KOMPON1
CHHNAN(
CAMBODIA
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Cambodia: A Sense of Disquiet
The military situation, meanwhile, remained
relatively quiet during the week with the excep-
tion of a battle near Kompong Chhnang town,
which began on 17 August. Communist troops
attacked government positions south of the town
along Route 5 and seized control of several im-
portant points on the highway. A 14-truck supply
convoy moving down Route 5 from Battambang
to Phnom Penh strayed into the Communist posi-
tions and its cargo of rice and fish was captured.
Three parachute battalions from Phnom Penh
have been dispatched to the area in an effort to
dislodge a Communist force estimated to number
some 1,000 troops.
There are rising fears in Phnom Penh that a
major Communist assault on the capital may soon
be forthcoming. According to the US defense
attache there, current Cambodian Army estimates
judge that there are approximately 8,000 enemy
troops within a 20-mile radius of the city.
Elsewhere, there are signs that the Commu-
nists may be preparing fresh attacks against the
city of Kompong Thom, which remains under
intermittent mortar and rocket fire. In an effort
to buoy the garrison's spirits and to improve the
government's image, Prime Minister Lon Nol
spent an entire day this week visiting with the
city's defenders. The visit was his first to a battle-
front area in Cambodia. 25X1
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South Korea: Calling Pyongyang's Hand on Unification
President Pak Chong-hui in his traditional titularly among those nations that heretofore
independence day speech on 15 August called on have been scared off by Seoul's militant
the North Koreans to renounce their policy of Communism. 25X1
communizing all of Korea by force so that the
peninsula can move toward reunification. In a
sharp departure from former South Korean
policy, Pak said that his government would no
longer oppose North Korean participation in the
UN debate on the Korean question providing
Pyongyang accepted the competence of the UN
to deal with the unification issue.
Pak's strong condemnation of the North
Korean leadership for causing the continued ten-
sion in Korea and his demand that it recognize
the competence of the UN-something Pyongyang
has never been willing to do-indicate that Pak's
primary intention is to wrest the propaganda initi-
ative from Pyongyang rather than to advance
materially the cause of unification. Pak has been
aware for some time that Seoul's intransigent
position regarding contact with the North has had
less propaganda appeal than has Pyongyang's
ostensibly more flexible approach. By stealing the
North Koreans' thunder, Pak hopes to strengthen
international support for his government, par-
USSR - North Korea: Liberation Anniversary
Moscow marked the 25th anniversary of
Korean liberation from Japan by dispatching a
joint party-government delegation on a five-day
visit to Pyongyang that ended on 19 August. The
delegation was headed by First Deputy Premier
Mazurov-the first politburo member to travel to
North Korea since May 1969. The primary pur-
pose of the visit was to counter the recent warm-
ing in Sino - North Korean ties.
Although Mazurov reiterated standard Soviet
support for Pyongyang's position on reunifica-
Pyongyang's renewed propaganda emphasis
this year on peaceful reunification is undoubtedly
a prime consideration in Pak's departure from
past policy. The North Koreans have proposed a
step-by-step program leading to eventual North-
South elections and the creation of a single gov-
ernment, a formula similar to propaganda over-
tures they have made in the past. Pyongyang's
program is in line with its switch last year to less
violent tactics toward the South after infiltrated
guerrilla teams failed to foment insurgency in
South Korea. The North Korean overture, how-
ever, like Pak's proposal, was couched in terms
calculated to be unacceptable to the other
tion, his visit also highlighted some of the dif-
ferences between the two countries. In an obvious
barb at Peking, Mazurov called for Soviet-style
"unity and cohesion" in the socialist camp. There
was no sign, however, that North Korea intends
to abandon its reluctance to become directly in-
volved in Sino-Soviet squabbling. For its part,
Pyongyang used the occasion to chide the Soviets
indirectly for underestimating the danger from
growing Japanese "militarism." Korean Vice
Premier Pak Song-chol, for example, warned in
the presence of Mazurov that "one cannot take an
ambiguous attitude" toward this problem.
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The presence of First Deputy Minister of tary cooperation suggests that, although the pro-
Defense Sokolov on the Soviet delegation hints gram will continue, Moscow has no immediate
that the Soviet military aid program may have plans to resume major military deliveries, which
been discussed. Mazurov's vague remarks on mili- ended early in 1969. 25X1
Communist China - USSR: Token Diplomacy
Recent diplomatic moves by both sides are
unlikely to lead to any significant breakthrough
in Sino-Soviet relations. On 15 August, Moscow
announced that it had replaced its chief delegate
to the Peking border talks, First Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov, with Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter Leonid Ilichev. Although Ilichev is of slightly
lesser rank than his predecessor, his appointment
has reaffirmed Soviet interest in continuing the
negotiations and has ostensibly satisfied China's
strong desire that the talks be continued at the
deputy foreign minister level. Nevertheless, the
Chinese almost certainly view Moscow's choice
with some ill feeling, particularly because Ilichev
was closely associated with virulent anti-Chinese
propaganda during the Khrushchev era and has
been in partial disgrace since Khrushchev's ouster.
They probably judge that the onus now is on
Peking to reciprocate. Thus far, however, there
has been no firm indication as to when
nese will send an ambassador to Moscow.
China's precise motivation for ending its de-
lay on accepting a Soviet ambassador remains
unclear. Chinese officials in the past had voiced
strong concern that Moscow would use the
appointment to downgrade the crucial Peking
border talks to the ambassadorial level. Moscow's
designation of Ilichev as the new head of the
Soviet delegation no doubt reassured the Chinese
somewhat over Soviet intentions. In any case,
Peking almost certainly decided that further
stalling would have been counterproductive and
would have opened China to charges that it is the
intransigent party in the dispute.
Ending a four-month period of parrying
strong Soviet efforts to accredit an ambassador to
Peking, the Chinese charge in Moscow told for-
eign diplomats last week that agrement has been
granted Vasily Tolstikov. As in the case of Ilichev,
Moscow's ambassadorial choice has little appeal
for the Chinese. Tolstikov, the former chief of the
important Leningrad party apparatus, has no dip-
lomatic experience and is known for his orthodox
views on ideological matters. The Soviets prob-
ably intend to cite his appointment, as well as the
dispatch of their new chief negotiator to Peking,
as evidence of their desire to normalize relations.
Peking's acceptance of Tolstikov, like Mos-
cow's appointment of Ilichev, is largely an empty
gesture and reflects little prospect for movement
in the deadlocked border talks or improvement in
the strained relations between the two states. This
point was most vividly brought home by propa-
ganda exchanges earlier this month in which the
Chinese voiced unusually strong concern over
Moscow's "greedy ambitions" against China,
while the Soviets accused Peking of attempting to
"sabotage" the border discussions.
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EU ROPE
Moscow Cancels Relief Airlift to Peru
The USSR has canceled its trouble-ridden
airlift to Peru after completing only about one
third of the 65 planned flights- The cancellation
probably will be the final blow to whatever quick
political gains Moscow had hoped to achieve from
the aid effort. The Soviets will deliver the remain-
ing relief goods by sea.
No reason has been given for the cancella-
tion, but the airlift was plagued from the very
beginning by bureaucratic inefficiency. It ap-
peared to be a hastily formulated effort to com-
pensate for Moscow's initial failure to respond to
the earthquake emergency on 31 May. Several
delays and last-minute changes preceded the de-
parture of the lead aircraft on 9 July. A number
of flights were delayed by equipment failures and
arrived in Lima behind schedule. The most serious
setback was the loss of one of the large AN-22s
over the Labrador Sea on 18 July, which was
followed by a week-long pause in flights. Only six
subsequent flights were made before the cancella-
tion was announced on 15 August.
Soviet difficulties in carrying out the airlift
have been well covered in the Lima press. Political
cartoons have depicted the airlift as a comedy of
errors and even the leftist press has found little to
play up in the airlift. The cancellation probably
will make the aid effort the butt of more deroga-
tory comment.
The seventeen AN-12s and four AN-22s that
made relief flights delivered about 175 tons of
materials, including a 200-bed field hospital and
three MI-8 helicopters, which will be donated to
Peru. The remaining goods, which will include
100 prefabricated houses, could easily be
delivered by one ship. The Soviets have hinted,
however, that more than one ship may be used,
possibly indicating that the amount of aid will be
increased. The total Soviet contribution, as orig-
inally announced, is worth an estimated $1
million. This is modest compared with the US
commitment of some $10 million.
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Italy: New Center-LeftAttempt
The new center-left government of Premier
Emilio Colombo faces serious problems in both
the political and the economic sphere. Conflicts
over the limits of acceptable cooperation with the
Communists and over economic policy, particu-
larly acute prior to Premier Rumor's resignation
last month, have probably not been resolved per-
manently. The country's recurring crises appear
to be causing concern in some military circles.
Colombo's political platform provides that
Socialist participation with Communists in re-
gional or local coalitions does not imply a break
with the center-left commitment. The platform
requires, however, that center-left coalitions be
formed wherever possible, to include the anti-
Communist Unitary Socialists (PSU) as well as the
Christian Democrats, orthodox Socialists (PSI),
and the Republicans.
This formula, nevertheless, has not impeded
a sharp rise in the number of PSI-Communist
coalitions below the national level. Such coopera-
tion is the basis of the new governments in the
central regions of Tuscany and Umbria, while the
Socialists are providing a degree of support to the
Communist-dominated government in the Emilia
Romagna region. In the municipalities, the first
3,000 governments formed since elections last
June showed a 50-percent increase in the number
of PSI-Communist coalition governments. Even as
the Italian Senate voted confirmation of the
Colombo government on 13 August, the PSU-PSI
polemic over cooperation with Communists again
appeared in the press. The issue also continues to
be divisive within the Christian Democratic Party,
the largest single party in the coalition.
The conflict over economic policy has cen-
tered on whether priority should be given to
controlling inflation or to enacting expensive
social reforms. Last spring, labor demands for
reform were marked by work stoppages that de-
creased production enough to contribute to the
widely feared inflation. Colombo's economic pro-
gram calls for worker cooperation to restore
strong economic growth and for subsequent grad-
ual progress on social reform. The new premier's
long experience as minister of the treasury and his
reputation as a competent economist improve his
chances for success, but his government will prob-
ably be engaged in serious trials of strength with
the powerful labor federations this fall.
In addition to the substantive problems in-
herited from his predecessors, Colombo must bear
in mind the newly aroused concern of some sen-
ior military leaders over the course of political
events. If there were a repetition this fall of the
seriously disruptive strikes and demonstrations of
last year's "hot autumn," Italy's military might
consider intervening in the political process. F
CZECHOSLOVAKIA:: Both the government and
the public seemed intent this week on keeping the
peace during the second anniversary of the War-
saw Pact invasion on 21 August. Security forces,
to prevent antiregime and anti-Soviet demonstra-
tions, took a number of precautionary steps, in-
cluding the mobilization of extra police units and
the limiting of access to potential rallying points
in major cities. Organized efforts to mark the
occasion were confined to a clandestine leaflet
campaign in Prague calling for a quiet evening
boycott of public establishments and a self-
imposed curfew and blackout. Significantly, the
leaflets did not call for active measures such as
strikes, which last year triggered widespread
clashes with police. The attitude of the public this
year may have been a welcome compromise to
the regime, which holds onto a fragile truce with
party conservatives who favor more repressive
government policies.
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MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
Ghana: Election of a Civilian President
Ghana has entered a politically unsettled
period precipitated by the recent dissolution of
the interim presidential commission and the
scheduling for 31 August of the indirect election
of the young republic's first civilian president.
i'rime Minister Busia's authority within the ruling
Progress Party (PP) and his leadership potential
should become clearer in the process.
I he commission had been composed of
three key members of the military-police junta
That overthrew Nkrumah in 1966 and governed
"Ghana until the return of civilian rule last year.
Created then as a transitional arrangement with a
Maximum life span of three years, the commis-
sion's demise at this time was hastened by a clash
w.uith the Busia government over appointments to
Ghana's new Supreme Court. The dissolution be-
-_ame effective on 7 August apparently with only
ass flamboyant and politically ambitious young
chairman, Lt. Gen. Afrifa, unhappy over the
decision.
i he civilian who will wield the largely
ceremonial powers of the presidency will be
chosen by an electoral college consisting of the
240 members of parliament-105 of whom belong
to Busia's party-and 24 tribal chiefs. Busia's
choice for the office is Chief Justice Akufo-Addo,
a 64-year-old lawyer and jurist who played a
primary role in drafting the present constitution.
The chief justice has long been identified with
Busia's political camp, but is not popular among
younger elements of the party. Busia will prob-
ably be able to bring his party to support Akufo-
Addo as its sole officially endorsed candidate.
The prime minister would be unlikely to com-
promise on anyone who might later prove to be
either a potential rival or too independent. Suc-
cess in imposing his own man would enhance
Busia's control over the party and the gov-
ernment.
Other government changes can be expected
soon, as Busia tries to solidify his position further
and to shake up a government whose performance
has been only mediocre so far. The prime minister
reportedly wants Foreign Minister Victor Owusu,
one of the major party leaders, appointed chief
ustice to succeed Akufo-Addo. By shifting the
ambitious Owusu. Busia would hope to neutralize
a potential competitor and also to ensure greater
party control over the judiciary. F__J 25X1
Middle East Peace Efforts
Tel Aviv has continued to insist on the
validity of its claims of Soviet-Egyptian violations
Of the cease-fire within the 50 kilometer "stand-
still" zone west of the Suez Canal and was clearly
irritated with what it took to be a rather casual
dismissal by the US of Israeli "proof." The
Israelis have charged new violations and have pub-
lished some of their evidence of earlier ones.
Israeli leaders are still saying, however, that Israel
intends to proceed with the Jarring talks. Israeli
Ambassador Rabin has returned to Israel "on
leave," suggesting that new tactics may be under
discussion in Jerusalem.
Prime Minister Golda Meir pinpointed the
Israeli worries by stating Tel Aviv would never
have agreed to a cease-fire had it thought that in
the event of renewed hostilities Israel would be
weaker than before. She said Israel views the
violations with the "utmost gravity" and claimed
that Israel has "indisputable proof" that the
Egyptians have redeployed missiles in the Suez
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Canal region. Mrs. Meir told her Labor Party that
this was not an "encouraging beginning." The US
Embassy in Tel Aviv reports that the redeploy-
ment issue has put the government on the defen-
sive and has tended to portray the now-renegade
Gahal party as a righteous prophet of an impend-
ing Israeli political and military disaster. This fac-
tor-in addition to Israel's already high degree of
sensitivity on security matters-goes a long way
toward explaining Israel's hardheadedness on the
alleged cease-fire violations. Israeli leaders do not
expect the Arabs to follow through on the peace
effort, and the reputed moves have added to
Israeli suspicions. Israeli officials have seemed to
indicate that, although such a missile shift is to
the disadvantage of Israel, they take some satis-
faction in US assurances that the military "bal-
ance" will be maintained.
Although continued and substantiated
Soviet-Egyptian violations of this kind would al-
most certainly block Israel's participation in talks
under Jarring, Israeli leaders say they intend to
proceed. Mrs. Meir told her Labor Party on 16
August that the government would concentrate in
the talks on trying to determine the nature of the
peace the Arabs want, and that if it were "not
illusory," Israeli concessions were possible. She
emphasized that what Israel wanted was not ter-
ritory but security. Foreign Minister Eban also
talked in terms of proceeding but threw up a
verbal barrage; he declared flatly that there could
be no peace with Egypt unless Israel controlled
Sharm ash-Shaykh, nor could an accord be
reached with Syria unless the Israelis remained in
the Golan Heights.
The Egyptian public media have been
prominently reporting Israeli charges that Egypt
has installed new antiaircraft missiles along the
Suez Canal in violation of the cease-fire. The
media have characterized the Israeli charges as an
organized campaign designed to wreck the US
peace initiative and upset the cease-fire. Egypt's
official spokesman was quoted by the press on 16
Page 11
August as having declared that Cairo did not
intend to reply to Israel's allegations. Egypt's
chief representative in the US told newsmen on
13 August, however, that Cairo denies the Israeli
allegations.
The Soviet news media first publicized the
Israeli charges on 18 August in a Pravda article
that cited the Egyptian denial and quoted the
Egyptian press as stating that Israel needs this
"myth" to try to block the Jarring mission while
pressing for new US arms deliveries. An article in
Red Star on the same day also discussed the
alleged Egyptian violation of the cease-fire and
quoted ABC news as saying there is no proof of
the charge.
Inter-Arab squabbling, agitated by Egypt's
acceptance of the US peace initiative and the
cease-fire, has continued. Cairo and Baghdad
radios pursued their war of words, with Cairo
accusing the Iraqi regime of "imprisoning the
vitality" of the Iraqi people and Baghdad radio
accusing Egypt of arresting Iraqi and Palestinian
students for unknown reasons. Egypt's leading
newspaper on 18 August also charged that a series
of "unjustified and arbitrary" measures have been
taken against Egyptian nationals residing in Iraq.
The depth of the rift between Egypt and Algeria
was also made public as both Cairo and Algiers
announced the withdrawal of the contingent of
Algerian soldiers from the Suez Canal front.
At the UN, mediator Jarring is still trying to
get Israel, Jordan, and Egypt to agree on the time,
place, and particularly the diplomatic level of
peace talks. The parties have all reportedly ac-
cepted New York as the location, but Egypt and
Jordan think the talks should be held at the
ambassadorial level, while Israel wants them at
the foreign ministers' level.
Pranjiyah Elected Lebanese President
During a stormy session of the Chamber of
Deputies on 17 August, Sulayman Franjiyah was
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elected president by a one-vote marqin. In the
final days of a campaign thrown into confusion
by the abrupt withdrawal of the frontrunner,
,ex-President Shihab, Franjiyah was increasingly
mentioned as a compromise candidate. Support
largely from the center and from the Maronite
Christian right, Franjiyah's own quarter, provided
the votes necessary for his election.
Despite the closeness of the balloting,
-ranjiyah, an experienced politician, has a fairly
oroad base of support among the leaders of all the
;political groups. Although he may make a number
of cabinet changes after he is inaugurated on 23
September, Franjiyah will probably attempt to
'AKISTAN: President Yahya's announcement
?n 15 August postponing elections to the con-
;'+_itutional convention has met with little
criticism. Yahya believed that the major effort
required to recover from this summer's severe
looding in East Pakistan would interfere unduly
with elections scheduled for 5 October. Because
itamadan-the Moslem month of fasting-occurs in
November this year, the polling was rescheduled
for 1 December.
'SAUDI ARABIA: Saudi Arabia now has finally
made the quarterly payments of $24 million to
I=:gypt and $9.6 million to Jordan that were due
on 15 July-these subsidies were agreed upon at
the Arab summit in Khartoum after the June
1967 war. The payments had been withheld in
the hope that Egypt and Jordan would put pres-
sure on Syria to allow repairs to the damaged
maintain a national unity cabinet such as is
presently in office under President Hilu.
In the field of foreign policy, Franjiyah
probably will maintain Lebanon's traditional pro-
Western policy and close relations with the US.
At home he will be faced with the same diffi-
culties as was his predecessor: the danger of a
deeper involvement in the Arab-Israeli problem
and in the struggle with the fedayeen. In the past
Franjiyah has taken a strong line against the
fedayeen, but his actions may be tempered by the
knowledge that previous attempts to move against
them have brought Lebanon close to civil
Yahya cleared his decision with at least some
politicians, most of whom, hoping that a delay
would give them time to improve their positions,
welcomed the announcement. Leaders of the
front-running parties-who wanted elections held
as originally scheduled-have remained quiet
Tapline through which Saudi oil is piped to the
Mediterranean. The pipeline has been out of com-
mission since 3 May. Neither state was able to
convince the Syrians, however, and the Saudis
have now told both recipients that tight finances
might force them to make future payments partly
in crude oil.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Uruguay: Government Keeps Pressure on the Tupamaros
An estimated 14,000 army troops and police
continue to comb Montevideo in search of the US
agronomist, the Brazilian diplomat, and their ter-
rorist captors.
police have turned up arms, propaganda, and
suspected terrorists, but they still have no sub-
stantial clues as to where the hostages are bei
held.
A total of over 180
Tupamaros now are in jail, but officials believe
that it will take several years to crush the sub-
versives completely. The Tupamaros demon-
strated on Wednesday that they are far from
beaten by holding a young American prisoner
while using his car to attempt two bank robberies.
A policeman was killed trying to stop them.
Government authorities have generally dis-
counted the authenticity of the numerous com-
muniques found in Uruguay, Argentina, and
Brazil warning that the Brazilian would be killed
unless 183 Uruguayan prisoners were freed; most
did not mention the US hostage, Fly.
Confusion also surrounds the purported
efforts of the Pacheco administration to negotiate
with the terrorists. Publicly, the government con-
tinues its refusal to consider releasing any pris-
oners for the hostages. The press, however, views
Raul Sendic
the recent "secret" meeting between arrested
Tupamaro leader Raul Sendic and some of his
jailed comrades, which was authorized by the
government, as a sign that behind-the-scenes nego-
tiations are in progress. The government has re-
fused to comment on the meeting. The arrest of a
Catholic priest and a Methodist minister who re-
portedly were attempting to negotiate with the
Tupamaros through a politician only added to the
confusion. The clergymen have since been re-
leased, but the politician will stand trial. F_
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Latin America: Reactions to Diplonapings
The audacious action of the Tupamaros in
kidnaping three foreigners and murdering one has
sent shock waves through governments and terror-
ist organizations alike in Latin America. Govern-
ments have responded to the events in the light of
their own experiences, while extremists are assess-
ing their own situations and some may attempt to
imitate the Tupamaros.
1-he strongest reaction has come from Brazil,
whose consul in Uruguay is still held by the
terrorists. Some Brazilian officials, who remember
their own dealings with terrorists holding foreign
diplomats, have been critical of Uruguay for re-
fusing to negotiate with the Tupamaros. Others,
however, realize the constitutional problem raised
because the prisoners are under the control of the
judiciary and not necessarily subject to executive
pardon. Some Brazilians, particularly military
officers, believe that a hard line by Uruguay will
permit Brazil also to refuse to release prisoners if
another foreigner is kidnaped in Brazil.
French officials have become extremely con-
cerned about the security threat, and at least one
of its ambassadors has left Latin America. I n
Chile, officials of the French Embassy visited
Congress and the police to ask for additional
protection. A French security official visited
Chile on 13 August to assess the threat]
Some Latin American governments have
supported Pacheco's stand. In Guatemala, where
the West German ambassador was murdered by
his abductors, Congress has passed a resolution
backing Uruguay. The Chilean Government has
commented that it, too, is constitutionally re-
strained from extending wholesale pardons to
imprisoned criminals. President Levingston of
Argentina stated on 14 August that "there should
be no negotiations with extremist groups that
exercise blackmail as a form of pressure against
governments." In Paraguay, a legislative proposal
has been introduced that would mete out ex-
tremely harsh sentences to abductors of foreign
diplomats.
Some extremist groups probably have been
inspired by the action of the Tupamaros to under-
take similar operations. Officials in Costa Rica,
where a Nicaraguan guerrilla leader is imprisoned,
have received abduction threats.
Not all leftist groups approve of the Tupa-
maros' action, however, and several have been
particularly critical of the slaying of the US offi-
cial. Although Havana has lauded the "prudent
and firm policy" followed by the Tupamaros in
the Mitrione case, it has avoided specifically
praising the killing.
The Organization of American States has
been ignored for the most part with respect to the
kidnaping developments. A resolution calling on
all governments not to provide asylum to people
released in exchange for diplomats is presently
under consideration by the OAS juridical commit-
tee. This committee was ordered by the first
General Assembly in July to draft proposals to
deal with terrorism, especially the kidnaping of
diplomats, and to report its findings to the OAS
Permanent Council by the end of November. Uru-
guay has presented its position on dealing with
the Tupamaros to the OAS Permanent Council,
but no action is anticipated because Uruguay said
it was not asking for OAS action at this
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Chile: Communists Hopeful but Nervous
The Communists are optimistic that Marxist
Salvador Allende will win the presidency in the
election on 4 September but they are concerned
that he might be denied the victory and are there-
fore making contingency plans to avert such an
eventuality. Most observers, however, still believe
that conservative former president Jorge Ales-
sandri will get more votes than the other two
candidates.
Leaders of the Communist Party (PCCh), the
predominant element in the Popular Unity (UP)
coalition backing Allende, believe that the So-
cialist senator will win enough votes to be one of
two contenders in the congressional runoff that is
required if no candidate wins a popular majority.
The Communists, who are adept politicians, re-
portedly will try to influence Congress to choose
Allende if he comes within 100,000 votes of
Alessandri. They plan to stage strikes and demon-
strations immediately after the election to con-
vince Christian Democratic legislators that an
Alessandri administration would create such deep
divisions in the country that it would not be able
to govern or ensure public order. This scheme, of
course, is predicated on their assumption that
Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic will run
third in the race and that support of only about
20 of his more leftist party colleagues in Congress
might be needed for an Allende victory in the
runoff.
The Communists also hope that the mass
public demonstrations will discourage rightists or
the military from mounting a coup to prevent an
Allende presidency. The Communists' fear of a
coup is almost pathological, particularly inasmuch
as they were surprised by the army uprising last
October. The PCCh political commission has gone
so far as to make plans for the preservation of the
party structure on a clandestine basis in the event
of political persecution--a situation the well-
established party has not faced in nearly 20 years.
The Communists' contingency plans even include
the measure of putting armed forces and police
officials who might lead or aid a coup under
house arrest.
Suspicion that the election will be
mania has also been expressed by spokes-
men for extreme leftist revolutionaries, who
recommend the use of terrorist tactics following
the elections. The PCCh, however, fears that vio-
lence by extremists would backfire, and its con-
tingency plans include control of all public
demonstrations by organizations under PCCh
discipline.
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Guyana's Prime Minister Displays His "Independence"
Prime Minister Burnham has decided to ac-
cede to a Soviet initiative proposing that the two
countries establish diplomatic relations, and has
made another move to exhibit his "inde-
pendence" of foreign influence by reaffirming his
plans to seek greater government control of for-
eign-owned businesses.
Burnham will probably announce the agree-
ment on relations with the USSR in the near
future, perhaps before he leaves on 2 September
for the nonaligned summit conference in Lusaka,
Zambia. The Soviets approached Guyanese
diplomats in Washington, New York, and London
last spring with a suggestion that Guyana demon-
strate its nonaligned posture by opening relations.
The delay in announcing the agreement is prob-
ably due to Guyana's preference for relations
with nonresident status over the Soviets' desire
for a resident mission. Government leaders are
fearful that a resident mission would pose serious
security problems, and Burnham believes that re-
lations between the two countries could be served
by their respective missions to the United Na-
tions-an arrangement Guyana now has with
Yugoslavia and other countries. The Guyanese
ambassador to the US expects the Soviets to
accept the nonresident offer, but Burnham may
give in if the Soviets insist on their terms.
The agreement will probably have some po-
litical repercussions. Many will interpret it as
Soviet abandonment of Communist leader Cheddi
Jagan; the moderates within Burnham's party and
the conservative United Force Party may also be
quite disturbed. Nevertheless, Burnham will prob-
ably follow through because of his interest in
demonstrating an "independent" foreign policy-
particularly with regard to the US-and because
he believes the move would enhance his standing
at the nonaligned conference.
Burnham, with a 14-man entourage, will be
the only Western Hemisphere chief of state at the
Lusaka meeting. Jamaican Prime Minister Shearer
has reversed his earlier decision to attend the
conference, concluding that it would be of no
importance. He also said that a tour of African
nations that he had planned in conjunction with
the conference would be a waste of time. Burn-
ham, however, will be happy to be the only
representative from the Caribbean. He will prob-
ably pursue his long-standing attack on "colonial
influence" and "imperialist control" throughout
the world. After the meeting, he will tour some
African nations.
Bu rnham recently announced his gov-
ernment's intention to begin negotiations with
the large Canadian- and US-owned bauxite
companies aimed at acquiring at least 51-percent
control of that industry. Bauxite is the largest
export industry in Guyana, accounting for nearly
half of last year's export earnings. He also an-
nounced that the recently established External
Trade Board, which was originally organized to
control imports only from Communist countries,
will actually control all imports. This will give the
government an effective instrument for setting
prices on all imports, and would be in line with
Burnham's "cooperative" campaign aimed at gain-
ing more "meaningful participation" in the coun-
try's natural resources. He asserted that "in the
past the foreign investors have enjoyed the lion's
share of the cake and we, the jackal's pick-
ings."
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BOLIVIA: Terrorist bombings in La Paz, student
battles in Santa Cruz, army clashes with guerrillas
in the jungles, and continued tension between the
military and President Ovando characterized the
unsettled political situation in Bolivia this week.
Such warring between the political left and right
will probably continue until the uncertainty sur-
rounding the government-who will lead it and
what direction it will take-is ended. Until the
situation is clarified, both the right and the left
will continue to make demands of the govern-
ment, with at least some expectation they will be
heeded.
The armed forces' decision to keep Ovando
on as president when he capitulated to their most
immediate demands earlier this month amounts
to no more than an uneasy truce. Minister of
Interior Colonel Ayoroa is playing an increasingly
important role in the military's opposition to
President Ovando and, being more rash and daring
than army commander General Miranda, he may
force a final confrontation between the military
and Ovando. At present, both sides are maneu-
vering for a stronger position.
PARAGUAY: Government security forces have
arrested more than 60 persons in connection with
an abortive plot to assassinate President Stroess-
ner. The attempt on the President's life appar-
ently was scheduled to take place during public
ceremonies in Asuncion on 15 August. On the
previous day, the Paraguayan Navy intercepted
four terrorists trying to enter the country clan-
destinely from Argentina. Small arms, ammuni-
tion, and a submachine gun were found aboard
the small river craft.
CHILE - COMMUNIST CHINA: Chile is in-
creasing its contacts with Peking. An agricultural
official will visit China next month in search of
products that Chile can buy in order to maintain
its sales of high-cost natural nitrate. China is the
only remaining significant market for what was
once Chile's major export. Chile is also interested
in selling its increasing copper production. Sales
of nitrate and copper make up most of the trade
between the two countries, which has amounted
Interrogation of the four-two Uruguayans,
an Argentine, and an Iraqi-resulted in the arrest
of approximately 60 people, mostly Uruguayans
and Argentines, believed to have been involved in
the plot. The government's roundup of student
leaders this week does not appear to be related.
The existence of the assassination plot, however,
may deter opposition criticism of the preventive
detention of the students, who are believed to
have been planning political a itation and demon-
strations in the capital.
to under $1 million annually in recent years.
Communist Chinese delegates have been invited
to a conference of Pacific Ocean countries in
Chile in September that is being organized by a
confidant of Foreign Minister Valdes. Although
Chile maintains diplomatic relations with Na-
tionalist China, the government in 1965 approved
what is now the only Communist Chinese trade
mission in Latin America outside Havana.
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Colon France-Field
Free Zone
/CriS ob
Gatu
Got- p
Locks
~[`Teblas
ir
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P'd' \
An" I
Locks Fort
a1i>vI(o.as CleyLer
\ ~/v~ c /lore ?
ra
Lock:
Balbo
---- International
boundary
OO National capital
'om Urban area
-- - Panama Canal
RA v or
PANAMA
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Panama Asks US to Leave Rio Hato
Unable to extract sufficient political advan-
tage from an extension of the Rio Hato Base
Agreement that expires on 23 August, the govern-
ment last week told the US it would have to
vacate the 19,120-acre training area, which in-
cludes an airfield.
This decision reverses a commitment General
Torrijos gave the US last year. At that time,
Torrijos had promised General Westmoreland that
the agreement would be extended without condi-
tions pending conclusion of Canal Treaty negotia-
tions. More recently, however, Torrijos had de-
manded a quid pro quo, placing particular em-
phasis on gaining the return of Old France Field
in order to enlarge the Colon Free Zone.
The government has agreed to a joint press
communique, and says that media treatment will
be kept in low key. Nevertheless, Torrijos
probably expects to make some political mileage
from the return of Rio Hato. The country's con-
trolled press will probably stress the advantageous
land-use possibilities of the Rio Hato area-
including development as a tourist resort-and
presumably will also commend Torrijos for his
ability to hold his own in dealings with the US.
The government has also held out the possi-
bility of negotiating a new base agreement some-
time in the future and undoubtedly hopes to use
Rio Hato as a bargaining counter in any new
Canal Treaty negotiations.
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Secret *40,
Secret
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Argentina: A Look at the New Government
Secret
N! 43
21 August 1970
No. 0384/70A
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Brigadier General (Retired) Roberto Levingston is the second military leader to
govern Argentina since 1966, when the armed forces overthrew the elected govern-
ment and declared that a national "revolution" had begun. In structure his adminis-
tration appears to differ little from that of his predecessor, Lieutenant General Juan
Carlos Ongania. Whereas Ongania wielded a great deal of personal power, the present
system involves a committee composed of Levingston and the commanders in chief
of the armed forces. The new administration is expected to continue most of the
policies of the Ongania government. Some reordering of priorities in the economic
sphere apparently is taking place, however.
The new Argentine Government, like its
forerunner, is a military dictatorship supported
by a cabinet composed largely of civilian tech-
nicians. Legislative power has been lodged in the
executive branch ever since the dismissal of the
National Congress in 1966, .but the judicial
branch of government remains independent.
President Roberto Levingston shares power
with the commanders in chief of the armed
forces, who installed him as Chief Executive on 8
June 1970. Although riot a mere figurehead,
Levingston has far less authority than did his
predecessor, Lieutenant General Juan Carlos
Ongania, who was able to establish a virtual one-
man rule during most of his three and a half years
in office. The strong man of the present regime is
the commander in chief of the army, Alejandro
Lanusse: the imprint of his political philosophy is
evident in most of the government's policy state-
ments to date.
General Lanusse professes to be a supporter
of constitutional government, and is considered a
conservative in economic matters. In his most
recent statements, however, he has stressed the
need for accelerated economic development and
implied that. "criteria of efficiency and compati-
bility" should be subordinated to that goal. La-
nusse's most significant political characteristic is
Special Report
his intense opposition to former dictator Juan
Peron, who imprisoned him, and to Peron's fol-
lowers. Lanusse claims not to believe in total
repression of the Peronists, but he has always
advocated control of their activities.
The new cabinet is composed of seven minis-
tries and a number of subordinate secretariats,
and its members represent a wide range of politi-
cal views. The heterogeneous character of the
Roberto Levingston (right) being sworn in as
Argentine president.
21 August 1970
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UJ~\J1\JL 1
cabinet apparently resulted from a deliberate at-
tempt on the part of the military chiefs to
broaden the base of the government by including
civilians from most of the major political factions.
General Lanusse reportedly hopes that this tactic
will allow the government to woo some of these
people away from their traditional political loyal-
ties and perhaps to buy time to accomplish the
goals it has set for itself.
Having pledged itself to an early return to
constitutional government, the Levingston admin-
istration, according to General Lanusse, has as its
first priority to prepare the nation for free elec-
tions. The regime does not plan to permit existing
political parties to reorganize but hopes to create
a broad-based party similar to one of the major
parties in the United States.
In approaching this task, however, the new
leadership faces a dilernma that has plagued every
Argentine government since 1955. The strongest
political force in the nation is composed of fol-
lowers of former dictator Juan Peron, who was
ousted in that year and now is exiled to Spain.
The current military leaders are adamantly op-
posed to any return to power b the Peron ists as
long as the aging dictator lives.
The govern-
ment apparently hopes to i utl Peeronist power
by submerging the movement in a newly created
political organization. Well aware that structuring
a new party will take a long time, the regime has
begun to hedge on a timetable for elections=
no elections are
planned tor at least ree years and no prepara-
tions will begin before that time. To date there
has been little public reaction to the delay.
Special Report
General Alejandro Lanusse,
Commander in Chief of the Armv
There has been considerable anxiety within
the government over economic policies. Pro-
ponents of stabilization fear that the Levingston
administration will adopt measures leading to an
accelerated inflationary spiral, wiping out gains
made under the Ongania government.
President Levingston has sought to reassure
the supporters of stabilization by stating publicly
that Ongania's policies will be continued. Goals
that he detailed in a nationwide broadcast on 25
June differed little from the most recent aims of
the Ongania administration: rapid and sustained
growth, a more equitable distribution of income,
and development of basic industries and infra-
structure. The over-all tenor of the speech, how-
ever, suggested that the new regime was reorder-
ing priorities, and that increased real wages and
social welfare needs would no longer be second-
ary to price stability.
21 August 1970
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The government devalued the peso shortly
after taking office. The minister of economy justi-
fied the move by arguing that an undervalued
peso would protect exchange reserves and pre-
serve the nation's economic autonomy by making
it unnecessary to subordinate economic policy to
the need to satisfy foreign financial centers. Most
Argentine businessmen, bankers, and economists,
however, consider this move premature and even
unnecessary. In spite of countervailing tariff and
tax measures, the devaluation will probably add
to inflationary pressures and weaken investor con-
fidence. The vague and sometimes contradictory
statements of the new minister of economy have
done little to allay the fears of the business com-
munity.
Despite the Levingston administration's
antipathy toward the Peronists, it has been ac-
tively courting the powerful, Peron ist-dominated
General Confederation of Labor (CGT) in an
effort to ensure social peace. A Peronist has been
appointed secretary of labor', and negotiations
for a wage increase and a return to the collective
bargaining system outlawed by Ongania are being
considered.
Long splintered into warring factions, the
trade union movement recently achieved a some-
what shaky unity at a CGT congress when repre-
sentatives of the five major factions won seats on
the governing board. The net effect of the con-
gress was to gloss over the deep political and
economic differences that have long divided the
movement, and union leaders apparently were
encouraged to renew demands on the government
that had been abandoned in 1969 because of
dissension within the CGT.
The fragility of this recently achieved unity
will probably cause the labor movement to oper-
ate in a low key fashion in the short run. The
immediate goal of the CGT leaders appears to be
participation in planning the nation's economic
policies. Should the L.evingston government fail
Special Report
to heed their demands on wage/price issues, how-
ever, they are likely to present a more combative
posture in the future.
The Levingston government is currently
faced with the threat of growing guerrilla and
terrorist activities in urban areas, carried out for
the most part by roving bands of leftist youths.
During the first four months of this year,
terrorist attacks, mainly on military and police
guard posts, were generally executed by groups of
four or five individuals who left markings indi-
cating membership in revolutionary Peronist or
pro-Communist organizations. During this period
many bank robberies were also committed by
small groups.
Since President Levingston came to power,
however, several larger scale raids, which appear
to have been coordinated, have been carried out.
On I July a 15-man commando group of left-wing
Peronist orientation cut telephone lines, occupied
the police station, and robbed a bank in a small
town near Cordoba. The group called themselves
the "Montoneros," as did the terrorists who kid-
naped and murdered former president Pedro
Aramburu. Four weeks later, a similar raid was
conducted on a town near Buenos Aires by a
group calling itself the Revolutionary Armed
Forces that may be connected with the left-wing
Peronist Armed Forces.
The insurgency situation is exacerbated by
the involvement of dissident Roman Catholic
priests of the Third World Movement who are
dedicated to bringing about a socialist form of
government in Argentina. As part of a stepped-up
police and military effort to counter the insur-
gency, the Levingston government has attempted
to launch a campaign to discredit the movement.
-3- 21 August 1970
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vrn' LJi;vl%.? , 1 i-
The government is being aided by the church
hierarchy, which has denounced the activities of
the Third World priests as a deviation from doc-
trinal orthodoxy.
Foreign Affairs
The Levingston government is pro-Western
and strongly anti-Communist, but it plans to
maintain diplomatic relations with all nations. It
dreams of playing an influential role as an inter-
mediary between the "great powers" and the less
developed nations of the world.
With respect to neighboring countries, the
administration is actively attempting to cultivate
better relations with Chile, which it sees as the
country closest to Argentina in terms of eco-
nomic development and human resources. It is
somewhat concerned that a leftist regime may
come to power in Chile following the September
presidential election there, but it reportedly has
no plans to intervene militarily if that should
occur.
The government is also concerned that
Bolivia may become more leftist. A recent visit
there by the Argentine foreign minister was de-
scribed as an attempt to strengthen the political
center in Bolivia. Argentina has also expressed an
interest in helping Bolivia to develop the prov-
inces contiguous to its own territory.
President Levingston plans to meet with
President Pacheco of Uruguay soon in a continu-
ation of the personal diplomacy instituted by
Ongania.
Because both Argentina and Brazil have mili-
tary governments, their concert of interest has
tended to mitigate somewhat the rivalries and
suspicions that have existed historically between
the two nations. The L.evingston government does
not appear to have made any special overtures to
Brazil, however.
Special Report
Argentina
-4- 21 August 1970
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As an interim government, the Levingston
administration probably will concentrate on
domestic problems. In the face of increased inter-
nal instability due to terrorist and guerrilla activi-
ties, it probably will try to buy social peace with
concessions to other potential troublemakers.
Among these, the labor unions are the most likely
antagonists. The government may therefore sacri-
fice the economic stabilization program in order
to buy the support of lower and middle-class
workers.
The government probably will drag its feet
with respect to political normalization. Given the
apathy with which the public has greeted the
delay in setting up a timetable for elections, the
announced three-year moratorium on political ac-
tivity may be stretched to five or more.
Special Report
When elections are held, they will probably
be staged by the military with handpicked candi-
dates, as there is no training ground for fledgling
politicians under the present governmental sys-
tem. Participation in the trade union movement
could conceivably provide the necessary exposure
for emerging leaders, but they would probably be
Peronists and consequently unacceptable to the
military.
The Argentine public, although disillusioned
by the ineptitude of the old political groupings, is
not likely to respond enthusiastically to a fabri-
cated party. Participation in elections will prob-
ably therefore be minimal, and the majority of
Argentine citizens will remain estranged from the
political mainstream in their country. ~ 25X1
-5- 21 August 1970
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