WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007800060001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 24, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
44
24 April 1970
No..0367/70
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v' SECRET `'f
(Information as of noon EST, 23 April 1970)
VIETNAM
Hanoi is approaching the idea of an international con-
gress on Indochina gingerly. Domestic pressures on the
Saigon regime are mounting despite government efforts
to mollify several discontented groups. The Communists'
spring offensive has generally tapered off
ENEMY IN LAOS BUILDING UP NEAR LONG TIENG
Communist military activity during the past week
continued to be focused on the immediate vicinity of
Long Tieng.
CAMBODIAN CRISIS DEEPENS
The Communists are intensifying military pressure
against the government.
THE PEKING-MOSCOW WAR OF WORDS
Renewed Chinese polemics against Moscow suggest that
border talks remain deadlocked.
MALAYSIA'S FUTURE BECOMES MORE AND MORE UNCERTAIN
Coup rumors are symptomatic of the uneasy domestic
scene as Malaysia approaches the first anniversary
of the May 1969 communal riots.
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Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
POPOVIC ILLNESS EMPHASIZES YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION PROBLEM
The illness of Yugoslav Federal Assembly President
Popovic underscores the necessity for Belgrade to
make provisions for an orderly transfer of power.
SOVIET CELEBRATION OF LENIN CENTENNIAL
General Secretary Brezhnev dominated the Soviet cele-
bration, but it is not yet clear to what extent he
has actually enhanced his position vis-a-vis the rest
of the politburo, all of whom appeared on the podium
on 21 April. His three-and-a-half hour speech broke
little new ground and contained no major departures
in Soviet policies.
SOVIET-ROMANIAN DIFFERENCES PERSIST
Despite formal displays of unity, such as Romanian
leader Ceausescu's appearance in Moscow for the Lenin
centenary this week, Moscow and Bucharest continue to
disagree on a broad range of issues.
POLAND EASES STRICT CONTROLS
Recent concessions to the youth and intellectuals
suggest that some of Warsaw's domestic policies are
becoming more flexible.
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES CONSIDER ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 20
The need to improve the environment has become an im-
portant concern of a number of international organi-
zations.
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE UP IN 1969
Slightly over half of last year's $1.9-billion in-
crease was accounted for by trade with the free world.
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Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
NO LETUP IN MIDDLE EAST STRIFE
Egyptian air raids against Israeli positions in Sinai
have highlighted the military situation in the Middle
East. Elsewhere, King Husayn carried through his
long-heralded cabinet reshuffle, and Libyan leader
Qaddafi made a flying visit to Algeria.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
DOMINICAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN ENTERS FINAL PHASE
The last hectic month of campaigning has been com-
plicated by the return of Juan Bosch, the death of a
presidential candidate, and rumors of an opposition
coalition.
COMMUNIST GAINS CONCERN PERUVIAN MODERATES
Intensified Communist political activity is causing
concern among moderate elements in both the govern-
ment and the armed forces and has prompted the Presi-
dent to deny publicly the presence of Communist in-
fluence in the government.
MORE DISTURBANCES LIKELY IN COLOMBIA
Daily nationwide demonstrations in behalf of General
Rojas since last Sunday's elections have been gener-
ally peaceful, but violence could erupt when final
presidential returns are made public on 26 April.
TRINIDAD AND BLACK RADICALISM IN THE CARIBBEAN
Developments of the past week in Trinidad suggest
that black radical groups in the Caribbean have a
strong potential to bring considerable pressure on
governments of the region. During the past year
the influence of "black power" advocates, "black
nationalists," and other groups with similar goals
seems to have grown in a number of countries.
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CARLOS MARIGHELLA'S MINIMANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
The publication by the Cubans of Marighella's article
supporting urban terrorism ma result in wide reader-
shi and more imitators.
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y% StUKL 1 `+rr/
Hanoi appears to be moving to expand its options throughout Indo-
china. The Vietnamese Communists are rapidly taking advantage of the
Cambodian situation to consolidate their hold over border sanctuaries, as
well as to keep the new government off balance and unable to move
effectively against them. In South Vietnam, although the Communists'
military offensive activity has slackened, they demonstrated their ability to
strike throughout the country simultaneously and boosted allied casualties
sharply. Periodic heightened action of this kind serves to shake the self-
confidence of South Vietnamese troops and helps ease pressures on Com-
munist political activity among the populace.
On the international scene, Hanoi has announced the formation of a
new political front for all Indochina that will help justify and cover up
increased North Vietnamese involvement in Laos and Cambodia as well as
foster increased opposition to the US presence in the area. Hanoi may also
deem the front useful in maneuvering toward a new multilateral conference
on Indochina, a notion that the Vietnamese Communists and the USSR are
approaching with a great deal of care.
On the occasion of the Lenin centenary observations the two principal
Communist powers, China and the USSR, resumed the level of invective that
existed before the border talks began last fall. This upsurge strongly suggests
that fundamental disagreement over border problems continues to block
progress at the Peking talks, and emphasizes the continuing ideological split
between the two.
In the process of renewing the semiofficial trade agreement with Japan,
Communist China also managed to hurl considerable abuse at Prime Minister
Sato and his government.
Increasing signs of discontent are appearing on the Malaysian domestic
scene. A leading Malay newspaper has pointedly editorialized on the advan-
tages of military coups, citing a number of countries where corrupt and
ineffectual civilian governments were replaced by the military. Malaysia's
leaders have done nothing to solve the country's deep racial conflict between
Malays and Chinese, and rumors about a military take-over have been
circulating recently. Although an outbreak of serious trouble does not seem
to be imminent, the military might be impelled to move if serious communal
rioting breaks out during the anniversary this May of last year's riots.
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VIETNAM
Hanoi is Expanding Its Options
The Vietnamese Communists
are approaching the question of
an international congress on In-
dochina with a great deal of
care, mixing hints of interest
with dashes of cold water. Using
the recent French proposal as a
point of departure,, Hanoi and
some of its friends appear to
have begun a cautious effort to
ferret out Western thinking on
the idea and, not incidentally,
to see how much mileage they can
make just by keeping the proposal
alive.
Probably with Hanoi's ap-
proval, Soviet UN Ambassador Malik
started the probing last week with
a hint that a new Geneva confer-
ence would be necessary to resolve
the burgeoning problems in Indo-
china, but he pulled back the
next day. Moreover, the Soviet
press has neither reported nor
commented on any of his remarks.
Nevertheless, the point was made
and Communist interest in the
idea is clearly on record.
The chief Viet Cong spokes-
man in Paris, Madame Binh, took
a similar line that "conditions"
were not appropriate for an in-
ternational gathering at a press
conference this week. Like Ma-
lik's "clarification", however,
her remarks fell far short of an
outright rejection of the French
idea. Rather, they simply make
Page 2
it clear that the Communists are
in no hurry and are keeping their
options open. Moreover, during
the past fortnight, a handful of
Vietnamese diplomats have echoed
in private Madame Binh's and Ma-
lik's public signals.
If indeed the Communists
are inclining toward an inter-
national conference, they have
significantly shifted their think-
ing about the modalities and
venue for a Vietnam settlement.
Heretofore they have consistently
held that a resolution of the
Vietnam problem must precede any
regional settlement and that the
quadripartite talks in Paris
would suffice for this purpose.
There have been hints in North
Vietnamese writings and speeches
for the past several months,
however, that Hanoi was rethinking
this position and perhaps laying
the groundwork for a new line.
Recent events, particularly the
upheaval in Cambodia, may have
forced the issue.
What the Communists have in
mind next is not altogether clear,
but they are unlikely to move much
faster in coming weeks. The
course they may be setting con-
tains a good many inherent dangers
and imponderables, and they may
encounter trouble in bringing
along militants like the Chinese,
without whose acquiescence any
international conference would
founder.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 Apr 70
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All this probably helps to
explain Le Duan's current mission
to Peking and Moscow. He arrived
in Peking on 14 April, was met at
the airport by Chou En-lai with-
out the normal Chinese welcoming
fanfare, and was immediately hus-
tled off for a round of obviously
sensitive talks. After three days
of apparently sticky going (nei-
ther the Chinese nor North Viet-
namese press has even mentioned
his stopover), Duan moved on to
Moscow, ostensibly to head Hanoi's
delegation to the Lenin obser-
vances. He joined chief Paris
negotiator Le Duc Tho, who had
been there for more than a week,
presumably conferring with Soviet
officials about diplomatic strat-
egy.
Perhaps partly with an eye
toward a multilateral conference,
Hanoi announced on 21 April that
it was forming a new political
front for Indochina as a whole.
Speaking at Lenin centennial
observances in Hanoi on the 21st,
politburo member Truong Chinh
indicated that the front is to
include the Viet Cong, the North
Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao, and
Sihanouk's faction. He hinted
that the Communists would use it
to promote their terms for a po-
litical settlement in the three
Indochinese countries. The front
would initially focus on proposals
that have already been advanced--
the Viet Cong's ten points, the
Pathet Lao's five points, and
Sihanouk's 23 March proclamation--
but it obviously could serve as
a useful rallying point for Hanoi
and its Indochinese friends in a
Geneva-type venue.
A detailed platform for the
front has not been announced, but
it will certainly focus on a
demand from all three groups for
total US disengagement from the
entire Indochina area. Hanoi
probably hopes to use the front
to foster an impression of wide-
spread opposition to US involve-
ment in the area, and to cover
up its own involvement in Laos
and Cambodia in much the same
way it justifies its support of
the Viet Cong.
Military Activity Slackens
in the South
The first phase of the Com-
munist spring offensive, which
began on 31 March now has tapered
fl-F
The enemy's recent spurt of
activity was of greater scope
and magnitude than anything the
Communists have mounted for some
months. They were nevertheless
unable, or unwilling, to sustain
it for very long, with the notable
exception of the central high-
lands area. There, in the re-
mote reaches of northwestern
Kontum Province, the Communists
are continuing their drive begun
in late March against several
allied Special Forces camps and
outposts, but the effort has cost
them dearly in terms of manpower.
Last week, some 225 Communists
were killed in fighting around
the Dak Pek camp.
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Despite the relatively lim-
ited nature of their spring offen-
sive, the Communists probably view
the first phase as a success.
Relying primarily on small-unit
operations, sappers, and mortar
and rocket attacks such as those
against Saigon, the Communists
have demonstrated that they are
still quite capable of striking
simultaneously throughout the
country and of sharply boosting
allied casualties when they so
choose. Although they appear
to have scored no significant
gains against government areas,
they have probably accomplished
their principal purposes of jolt-
ing the self-confidence of South
Vietnamese Government troops and
bolstering the morale of their
own forces.
The Communists therefore are
probably encouraged to continue
with the second phase of their
offensive, for which many of their
units now seem to be completing
preparations. The next round is
likely to be less intensive than
the first, however, not only
because of allied spoiling opera-
tions but because of the Commu-
nists' own mounting involvement
in Cambodia.
Since the ouster of Sihanouk
in late March, South Vietnamese
units have been making shallow
raids across the border almost
daily. So far, these raids have
disrupted enemy base areas and
operations, although there is
little evidence that the Com-
munists have been seriously hurt.
President Thieu, meanwhile,
has recently reiterated that he
recognizes the danger of moving
too aggressively against the
Communists on the other side of
the border. He stated privately
that Saigon's forces would con-
tinue to harass the enemy there,
but with the aim of assisting
the Cambodian Army and with care-
fully measured pressure so as
not to oblige the Communists to
risk an attack on Phnom Penh.
Political Pressures on Thieu
Remain Strong
Pressures building up as a
result of South Vietnam's worsen-
ing economic situation are affect-
ing the outlook of growing num-
bers of government officials, in-
cluding President Thieu himself
and Prime Minister Khiem. Khiem
appears extremely pessimistic
about the chances of his cabinet
surviving much longer, unless it
can find a way to deal more ef-
fectively with the economic ills.
Thieu has taken the brunt of popu-
lar criticism over the rising cost
of living, and he has become in-
creasingly frustrated over the
failure by his ministers to curb
inflation. The National Assembly
appears in no mood to grant the
President special economic powers,
and Thieu probably would not hes-
itate to scrap the Khiem cabinet
if he thought this would help
strengthen his over-all political
position.
Adding to Thieu's problems
was a scathing public attack
upon his administration last week
by an old nemesis, the An Quang
Buddhists, who are re-emerging
as a leading antigovernment po-
litical force. In a communiqu4,
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S1iXiKr;1 w
the An Quang charged the govern-
ment with failing to solve any
of the nation's serious problems
and questioned its right to rule.
This strong political stance sug-
gests that the Buddhist leader-
ship may have resolved some of
its internal disputes and may be
prepared to join forces with other
opposition elements.
In addition, reports of
atrocities committed against
Vietnamese living in Cambodia
may add another element of un-
rest in South Vietnam. Already
there have been mounting popular
and legislative demands that Sai-
gon do something to guarantee the
safety of ethnic Vietnamese liv-
ing in Cambodia. The Thieu gov-
ernnment will probably move to
respond quickly to Phnom Penh's
recent agreement to allow a pri-
vate group into Cambodia to assist
the Vietnamese who may be in dan-
ger there.
Meanwhile, the Thieu govern-
ment is trying to ease other po-
litical tensions in Saigon by ac-
ceding to some of the demands of
discontented groups. Apparently
on orders from above, the military
tribunal, which began this week to
try 21 students on various charges
of collusion with the Communists,
abruptly suspended the proceedings
to allow the Supreme Court to rule
on its jurisdiction in the case.
Although the military court is
empowered to try all national
security cases, its constitu-
tionality is in doubt and, in ad-
dition, it has developed a reputa-
tion for handing out overly severe
sentences. Student protesters may
be partly mollified by the suspen-
sion of the hearings, but they may
also be encouraged to renew their
demands that the accused students
be tried in a civil court.
In another move, the govern-
ment appears to have made a deal
with the disaffected Theravada
Buddhist monks of Cambodian de-
scent.
25X1
the government has
agreed to seek new legislation
to restore special minority status
to Cambodians living in South
Vietnam. In return, the monks
have promised to call off their
antiregime agitation, which has
been going on intermittently
since last November. President
Thieu probably hopes to duplicate
his recent success in halting
disabled veterans' demonstrations
by seeking quick action in the
National Assembly to increase
veterans' benefits.
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?'ovenment-held locati
? _ommunist-held location,
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SECRET terI
ENEMY IN LAOS BUILDING UP NEAR LONG TIENG
Communist military activity
during the past week continued to
be focused in the immediate vicin-
ity of Long Tieng. For the most
part, it consisted of efforts by
the enemy to improve its tactical
position around the Meo stronghold
and to launch occasional harassing
attacks. Although all signs indi-
cate that North Vietnamese forces
in the area are still committed to
a major assault on Vang Pao's head-
quarters, for the moment they ap-
pear to be occupied with replacing
losses in personnel and supplies
incurred during the recent campaign
for the Plaine des Jarres.
At the same time, the Commu-
nists have been attempting to keep
the Meo forces in the vicinity of
Long Tieng off balance with a se-
ries of rocket and shelling attacks,
punctuated by small-unit actions.
North Vietnamese elements struck at
Sam Thong and Tha Tam Bleung during
the week and twice directed 122-mm.
rocket fire on Long Tieng itself.
No major damage resulted from these
attacks, but the enemy's tactics
succeeded in maitaining pressure
on the government forces and in
masking Communist preparations for
more-substantial assaults in the
future.
In other areas of the country,
North Vietnamese units have ad-
vanced into more forward positions
and increased the threat to some
government outposts. The sole re-
maining government base north of
the Plaine at Bouam Long has ex-
perienced mounting pressure during
the past week.
There is still no firm indi-
cation of when the Communists in-
tend to kick off their offensive
against Long Tieng. Experience in-
dicates it should get under way
soon if any conclusion is to be
attempted before the heavy rains
start in early June. On the other
hand, last year's post - dry sea-
son attack on Muong Soui showed.
that the North Vietnamese can con-
tinue major actions into the rainy
season if they deem it important
enough. The elimination of Vang
Pao's forces at Long Tieng this
year could be viewed by Hanoi in
this light. Accordingly, the
enemy may continue to strengthen
its forces for some time longer
to improve its chances for success.
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Cambodia: Communists Increase Military Pressure
Kratie
sti.0 .4PCS CHAM
Phno nh Temporari)y pccu ied
Cut by VC
ARVN'raids
A
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NAK4F2i
P?C', NL"~D . - dRI!
Senmonorom
SOUTH VIETNAM
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CAMBODIAN CRISIS DEEPENS
The Communists are intensify-
ing military pressure against the
government. During the past week,
the heaviest action was concentrated
in Kandal and Takeo provinces,
south of Phnom Penh, and was high-
lighted by the enemy's temporary
occupation of a village within 20
miles of the Cambodian capital.
Farther south, the Communists again
raided the provincial capital of
Takeo, knocking out a bridge and
cutting the rail line that runs
through the town to Sihanoukville.
Renewed fighting was also re-
ported in Svay Rieng Province,
where South Vietnamese forces have
been raiding Communist bases al-
most daily. The government's po-
sition in Mondolkiri Province, on
the northeastern border, also ap-
pears to be deteriorating. Depend-
ents are being airlifted from the
provincial capital at Senmonorom
in the wake of enemy attacks against
important border posts and roads
linking Mondolkiri with adjacent
Kratie Province. The situation is
far from stable and could deterio-
rate rapidly.
The diplomatic community in
Phnom Penh is growing apprehensive
that the Communists may soon forci-
bly bring down the Lon Nol govern-
ment. Rumors are now rampant that
the enemy intends either to move
directly on Phnom Penh or to bring
it under a virtual state of siege.
Various embassies appear to be
spreading such predictions, along
with US reporters in the country,
who have been shocked at the inept-
ness of Cambodian security forces.
There are few outward signs of
crisis in the capital, however,
and although the leadership is in-
deed concerned over the whole situa-
tion, so far there is no evidence
they believe the capital is in im-
minent danger.
It is abundantly clear that
Cambodian forces are no match for
the Communists. If a limited num-
ber of main-force Viet Cong or
North Vietnamese units move west-
ward out of their border bases,
they could, in conjunction with in-
digenous and other forces already
operating in the interior, overrun
most of eastern Cambodia, including
Phnom Penh, in a matter of days.
The Communists probably could re-
'tain enough troops in their bases
to hold off South Vietnamese forces.
However, such an operation would
run certain military and political
risks, which the Communists may be-
lieve are unnecessary under present
circumstances.
The Communists probably believe
that they can force Lon Nol and Sirik
Matak out without taking the risks
involved in actually moving troops
into Phnom Penh. The isolation of
the capital from the eastern por-
tions of the country, increased
pressure in the countryside, and
the capture of some provincial cap-
itals might cause Lon Nol's support
within the army to crumble. Under
these circumstances, those who are
only lukewarm supporters of the re-
gime might join a move to return
Sinanouk as the "savior" of the
county
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THE PEKING-MOSCOW WAR OF WORDS
The upsurge of Chinese polemi-
cal attacks against Moscow over the
past week suggests that fundamental
disagreement over border problems
continues to block substantial
progress at the Peking talks. The
Chinese directly blasted the So-
viets over the frontier dispute
for the first time since the talks
began and accused Moscow of en-
croaching on Chinese territory and
of making nuclear threats against
China.
The revived Chinese attacks
appear to discredit reports ear-
lier this month that there had
been some progress at the talks.
A few reports had suggested, for
example, that Moscow had made some
token troop withdrawals from the
border. Recent Chinese charges
of Soviet "encroachment" along the
frontier, however, seem to indi-
cate that these withdrawals--if
indeed they did take place--were
not sufficient to meet China's de-
mand for a military pullback from
all sectors of the border.
The Chinese have chosen to
focus their new charges directly
against the Brezhnev leadership in
order to discredit the Kremlin
chiefs during Moscow's widely
touted Lenin centenary celebra-
tions. At the same time, the Chi-
nese recriminations clearly testify
to Peking's unwillingness to remain
silent in the face of Moscow's con-
tinued sharp attacks against China.
In a speech at the Lenin centennial
celebrations this week, for example,
Soviet party chief Brezhnev placed
full blame on Peking for the con-
tinuing dispute and charged that
China's "nationalistic policy" was
undermining Communist unity.
It is unclear whether these re-
vived polemics will interfere with
the reported Sino-Soviet agreement
to exchange ambassadors. Accord-
ing to one recent report, the Chi-
nese have finally agreed to for-
mally accept Soviet ambassador-des-
ignate Vladimir Stepakov and have
named an ambassador of their own.
There still has been no confirma-
tion of this from either Soviet or
Chinese officials, however.
Meanwhile, chief Soviet nego-
tiator Kuznetsov has returned to
Moscow, ostensibly for the centen-
ary celebrations. The absence of
official announcements of his de-
parture from Peking or his arrival
in Moscow suggests that neither side
views his visit as an immediate prel-
ude to his possible withdrawal
from the talks. A Soviet official
has told Ambassador Beam that Kuz-
netsov will be returning "shortly"
to Peking. 25X1
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MALAYSIA'S FUTURE BECOMES MORE AND MORE UNCERTAIN
Continuing indecisiveness by
the leadership of the governing Na-
tional Operations Council (NOC) and
its failure both to assuage Malay-
sia's deep racial conflict and to
return the country to parliamentary
democracy have fueled tensions that
could be exploited by politically
ambitious Malays. A leading Malay
newspaper in an editorial on 15
April came close to advocating a
military coup, thereby suggesting
that the political situation is
deteriorating with some rapidity.
The article pointed out that
more and more educated people are
entering the police and military,
and raised the question, "Is it not
a fact that world history has shown
that there are times when civil ad-
ministration has to be taken over
by the police and military such as
in Burma, Pakistan, and other coun-
tries in the world?" The story may
have been floated as a trial balloon
at a time when a number of top ci-
vilian leaders are abroad, some on
prolonged medical leave.
These disturbing notes are
counterbalanced in part, however, by
other developments. Malaysian Prime
Minister Rahman publicly stated after
the 15 April editorial was published
that he has no doubts about the loy-
alty of the armed forces
The
song rivZrytween the military
and police could make cooperation 25X1
difficult to achieve; coup partici-
pants would also run into trouble
from the predominantly Chinese staff
in the technical and logistics units
in the army. In addition, British-
instilled traditions of loyalty to
the administration might dissuade
many members of the armed forces
from participating in any antigov-
ernment action.
Despite all the rumors and
rumblings of discontent both among
the general populace and junior of-
ficers, an outbreak of serious trouble
does not appear likely in the next
few weeks. The government may face,
however, the possibility of some kind
of move by the military if intense
communal disturbances break out dur-
ing the anniversary of the postelec-
tion riots that took place in May of
last year.
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has Soviet public discussion Mosow s generaledisarmamentgo restrained. but at the same time has
the negotiations by restating
reiterated the standard pledges about strengthening Soviet defenses.
Soviet Ambassador to the UN Malik hinted French proposal to convene a new Geneva conference on
Soviets might t actually support rt the that Malik had exceeded his
Indochina. Subsequently, Moscow tried to make it appear
instructions. The balance of evidence, however, still suggests that his remarks were intended
to probe Western reactions. week A threatened civil servant stemployers and averted nd a and
governmenan agreement
n tiated
reached on 20 April between ents program for shifting blue-collar workers from hourly to monthly the effortseof tthe e Communist led
have created a social climate that will seriously hamper
General Confederation of Labor to organize a "week of action" for next week. Scattered civ
strikes and labor demonstrations are certain to occur this spring,
is unlikely.
Widespread European support has developed in NATO for an allied initiative on mutual Warsaw
possi and balanced reductions (MBFRorifoN g~O irig Europ enainterestein a ConfreMBFoR
proposal and the related questi
iattention in the remaining weeks before
European Security will continue to
Rome occupy yis allied l .
the NATO Ministerial to be held
The Council of Ministers the
onu EC financing ands amendments to the Treaty hof
week formally adopted a regulation
powers of the European Parliament. By so doing,
Rome increasing somewhat the budgetary
s with
the the Council eliminated an obstacle
Agreement nat the emeetingnon a common ma ke hng
membership applicants this summer. opened the way
policy for wine, which the Council has been trying to achieve for months, op
for the formal adoption of the financing package.
ership
Bonn has launched a world-wide effort to defeat the East German bid for me Pankow y in the UN's World HeatOrganization
status und`erHtOhe, bo-calledaViennasformula1CUnde ri s terms a
member measurably improve
memmber of the UN, any of its specialized agencies, the IAEA, or parties to the statute of the acced international Court of JuPankownhas aneoutsidetchan en ceal tre to suced in its bid because,
international conferences.
admission on to to WHO unlike accession to the other specialized agencies, is decided by a simple
majority of members present and voting.
The US this week presented at the Geneva arms control talks a paper on toxins that
bolster support for the UK draft convention on BW. The British have not yet decid a
a
y
m
toxins how to incorporate language
the UK text asethe most feasible for dealin with the subject
number of delegates to regard
t CBW draft is not possible.,
i
e
on the Sov
inasmuch as agreement
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POPOVIC ILLNESS EMPHASIZES YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION PROBLEM
The serious illness of
Milentije Popovic, president of
the Yugoslav Federal Assembly
and technically number-two man
in the government, may have
brought home to President Tito
the importance of soon legis-
lating provisions for an order-
ly transfer of power.
Under the constitution,
Popovic fills in when the 77-
year-old Tito is out of the
country or incapacitated. Since
this is the only legal provision
Tito has made for succession in
the government, whoever holds
the post when he leaves the
scene will be interim president
and as such might have an inside
track to power. Thus as Tito
ages, the Assembly presidency,
which in the past has been
mainly a protocol post, becomes
increasingly more attractive as
a political plum.
The revelation of Popovic's
ailment may complicate Tito's
efforts to maintain the precari-
ous balance in top Federal of-
fices among Yugoslavia's six re-
publics. It has been Yugoslav
practice to rotate high-level
federal offices among representa-
tives of the republics. Popovic
is a Serb and, if he is forced to
step aside, Serbia will undoubt-
edly try to have one of its men
succeed him--at least for the
ailing Assembly president's re-
maining year in office. Thus
Popovic's illness, by setting the
stage for an early and potentially
fierce contest for the- As-
sembly presidency next year, il-
lustrates the basic flaws and
inadequacies in the Yugoslav
system.
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SOVIET CELEBRATION OF LENIN CENTENNIAL
The Soviet celebration of the
centennial of Vladimir Ilich Lenin
was dominated by General Secretary
Leonid Brezhnev. It is not clear,
however, whether Brezhnev was
merely taking advantage of the
publicity opportunities afforded
him as party boss or has actually
enhanced his position in the lead-
ership.
Brezhnev's speech on 21
April, his fourth televised ad-
dress in ten days, marked the
climax of the months-long "Lenin-
iana." The gap between the per-
sonal publicity for Brezhnev
and that received by his col-
leagues has been even greater
than in 1967 when he stole the
show at the 50th anniversary of
the Bolshevik Revolution. At
the same time, the celebration
this week marks the first time
in four months that all 11 polit-
buro members appeared together
publicly, and the display of
their portraits in the proper
alphabetical order is another
sign of "normalcy." The sudden
withdrawal on 20 April of invi-
tations to non-Communist diplo-
matic personnel for the 22 April
Kremlin reception suggests, how-
ever, that plans for the centen-
nial remained somewhat confused
right up to the eve of the cele-
bration.
Brezhnev delivered a rou-
tine but somewhat defensive as-
sessment of the current situ-
ation in the USSR. He repeated
the vague formulations standard
since the December plenum that new
economic policies and methods are
needed to meet the country's cur-
rent stage of development. He
said, however, that party decisions
since 1965 have only "made it pos-
sible" to advance in this direc-
tion and that the approaching
party congress and the next five-
year plan will be occasions for
"new and major decisions." Brezh-
nev again chose to dwell on eco-
nomic tasks and to ignore the sub-
stance of any new policies. His
attention to better planning sug-
gests that he views this as a
principal key to economic progress.
His sharp attack on the economic
planners, however, injected a par-
tisan note into the festivities,
and his comments about party unity
and collective leadership smacked
of an attempt to interpret them
to his own advantage.
More routine were his warn-
ing about the danger of "bour-
geois ideology," which he equated
with "revisionism," and his comment
that the task of improving living
conditions cannot be accomplished
"in one fell swoop." Brezhnev
also reiterated the standard pledge
to continue to strengthen the coun-
try's armed forces, but gave no in-
dication that the USSR is about to
accelerate its defense buildup.
Brezhnev offered a sop to
West European Communist parties
in his reference to Lenin's rec-
ognition of the theoretical pos-
sibility of a peaceful road to
socialism but quickly noted that
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the Russian Revolution "went dif-
ferently." He was also adamant
in insisting that Leninism is an
international, not a Russian,
creed. He raised the issue of
the "cult of personality," the
standard euphemism for the blood-
shed of the Stalin years, but
quickly swept it under the rug
with the claim that the party had
uncovered and condemned it. He
followed the current Soviet prac-
tice of equating the "cult" with
the Khrushchevian evil of "subjec-
tivism," also uncovered and con-
demned by the party.
Brezhnev broke no new ground
on foreign policy. Speaking of
the present condition of world
Communism, he warned of the grow-
ing dangers posed by nationalism
and by "right and left opportun-
ism." Proponents of these devia-
tions came in for strong criti-
cism. Brezhnev reaffirmed Mos-
cow's commitment to disarmament,
but on other world issues his re-
marks were unexceptional.
Kosygin finally returned to
the spotlight with a brief speech
closing the two-day ceremonial
meeting. He also presented an
award in Kursk last week. Podgorny
made a similar appearance in Oren-
burg and Kirilenko in Armenia.
Shelepin spoke at an international
trade-union meeting in Lenin's
birthplace, Ulyanovsk, but like
his three seniors, received mini-
mal coverage in the Soviet media.
All East European leaders
attended the Moscow celebration
except Tito, who sent a lesser
ranking man to mark his disap-
proval of the present Soviet
leaders' policy toward Yugoslavia.
The Albanians, who revere Mao and
Stalin as the only true Leninists,
of course were not represented.
Like Tito, Romania's Ceau-
sescu made clear his differences
with the Soviets in an article
that appeared this week in Pravda.
In addition, in a speech before
his departure for the USSR, Ceau-
sescu indirectly excoriated the
"Brezhnev doctrine" of limited
sovereignty, objecting by impli-
cation to Moscow's "great-power
chauvinism and hegemonistic tend-
encies." He seemed to edge toward
attacking Brezhnev personally for
his inconsiderate attitude toward
other Communist leaders.
In his precelebration Pravda
article, Hungary's Kadar was muc
more proper, but he nevertheless
evidenced continuing concern about
Soviet suspicions as regards his
economic reform program, coming
out against blind adaptation of
the Soviet model. Celebrations
in East Germany took on a special
character because party boss Ul-
bricht is the only surviving Com-
munist leader who knew Lenin per-
sonally. Elsewhere the festivities
were predictably dull. In Czech-
oslovakia, the occasion was over-
shadowed by preparations for the
25th anniversary of the Soviet
liberation on 9 May, when top So-
viet leaders are expected in Prague
to sign a new friendship treaty.
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SOVIET-ROMANIAN DIFFERENCES PERSIST
The Soviets were able to count
Nicolae Ceausescu, Romanian Commu-
nist Party leader, among their for-
eign guests at Lenin Centenary cel-
ebrations on 21-22 April, but his
presence did little more than point
up the differences between him and
his Soviet hosts. Not surpris-
ingly, Ceausescu failed to applaud
Soviet party leader Brezhnev's
pointed criticism of the errors of
"nationalism" within the Communist
movement. Instead, he made a low-
key defense of Romania's policy.
There is little reason to doubt
that the Soviets took advantage of
Ceausescu's presence to press on
him their view of the obligations
of "socialist solidarity," although
apparently with little success. Sig-
nificantly, politburo member Petr
Shelest was given the task of greet-
ing him in Moscow. Shelest had
violently denounced unnamed "split-
ters" and "opportunists"--in a
speech only three days earlier--
and may well have had some tough
words for Ceausescu.
The Soviets have long been net-
tled by Romanian "obstructionism"
within the bloc and "opportunism"
in its relations with the non-Com-
munist world. The Soviets are prob-
ably most irked by Bucharest's ef-
forts to stall or block their at-
tempts to strengthen East European
unity through bolstering the Coun-
cil of Economic Mutual Assistance
(CEMA) and Warsaw Pact organizations.
In contrast with CEMA, where
the Soviets have not succeeded in
creating a consensus behind any of
their frequently ill-defined pro-
posals for "socialist economic in-
tegration," the Romanians are more
isolated in their open opposition
to the Soviets in the Warsaw Pact.
In addition to proposals aimed at
strengthening Pact organization,
the Soviets have long urged the Ro-
manians to host a Pact exercise and
otherwise to improve their coopera-
tion with the Pact. The Romanians
understandably fear that the Soviets
would use such cooperation to put
pressure on Bucharest.
A Soviet correspondent in Buch-
arest claimed earlier this year that
Ceausescu had been asked to extend
his April stay in Moscow. Last
month, however, the same correspond-
ent said that he--and perhaps the
Soviet Embassy--had been misled
about Ceausescu's plans for a longer
stay. This suggests that the Ro-
manians may have refused a Soviet
request for discussions.
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There is still no indication
that Moscow has managed to get Buch-
arest's agreement to host anything
more than limited command post ex-
ercises, and even the latter is in
doubt. It is likely, however, that
the matter of an exercise has not
been put to rest, and the Soviets
may bring it up with more persist-
ence once the Lenin celebrations
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POLAND EASES STRICT CONTROLS
The Warsaw regime's apparent
willingness at this time to empha-
size the carrot over the stick in
its relations with the cultural mi-
lieu is symptomatic of its pursuit
of a more flexible, although not al-
ways more liberal, domestic policy
since mid-1969.
Last week the party secretary
for propaganda, Stefan Olszowski,
virtually apologized in public for
past excesses in implementing cul-
tural policy. Taking unusual note
of criticism directed at censorship,
Olszowski denied any intent to dic-
tate form and style, reserving for
the party only the right to proscribe
antisocialist, but not nonsocialist,
works. He added that "only people"
are responsible for implementation
of this policy and, as a result,
"some mistakes" may have occurred.
In late March two prominent
blacklisted intellectuals, poet Jerzy
Andrzejewski and composer Zygmunt
Micielski, reappeared in public and
were allowed to return to work, a
privilege they lost in October 1968.
Both had written and publicized let-
ters to their Czechoslovak colleagues
expressing shame at Poland's partici-
pation in the invasion of that coun-
try, which clearly echoed the senti-
ments of other liberal intellectuals.
The most telling evidence of
some easing, however, has been the
regime's disposition of a series of
political trials over the past 18
months. The first involved the ring-
leaders of Poland's March 1968 stu-
dent demonstrations, and the second
those who protested against the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia. Most of
those sentenced reportedly have
been released or have had their
sentences substantially reduced
under the terms of an amnesty pro-
claimed in July 1969. Moreover,
some 30 young intellectuals who
have been in prison for months
while their role in an alleged an-
tiregime conspiracy was investi-
gated were reportedly released
early this year and the charges
against them dropped. The trial
of the remaining members of this
group was postponed to last Febru-
ary, reportedly in order that the
more lenient provisions in the new
Polish criminal code effective 1
January 1970 might apply.
These signs of increased flex-
ibility are not, however, indica-
tive of a new trend toward liberal-
ization, nor do they yet appear de-
signed to do more than heal old
wounds. Many prominent intellec-
tuals remain on the blacklist and
in professional limbo; moreover,
alternating periods of repression
and relaxation are characteristic
of Warsaw's policy of keeping do-
mestic opposition intimidated and
quiet. Nevertheless, the recent
developments in the cultural
sphere suggest that, as in other
policy areas, the new men intro-
duced into the party at the end of
1968--young, tough, but pragmatic
"rationalizers" of whom Olszowski
is one--are making their presence
felt by contributing tangibly to
the over-all regime effort to re-
furbish its image at home and
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INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES CONSIDER ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
NATO's Committee on the Chal-
lenges of Modern Society (CCMS)
firmed up last week its work plans
for the year on environmental prob-
lems, including air pollution, dis-
aster relief, and road safety. The
NATO program is only one example of
recently heightened concern with
the need for an international attack
on problems that are not only shared
but increasingly extend beyond na-
tional boundaries.
Established at the suggestion
of President Nixon, the CCMS ini-
tially got a Lukewarm response from
several Alliance members, who were
dubious that NATO had a role to play
in the environmental field or who
were worried about the relationship
the CCMS would have to other insti-
tutions created earlier to deal with
such problems. These skeptics seem
subsequently to have warmed to the
CCMS idea, and last week the CCMS
representatives agreed to recommend
to their governments that observers
from other international agencies be
invited to CCMS meetings on a case-
by-case basis.
The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
is also becoming more deeply in-
volved in environmental issues, but
will handle them from an economic
point of view to avoid duplicating
the work of other agencies. It has
established an ad hoc committee,
which met this week to identify the
most urgent problems and possible
approaches to their resolution. A
ministerial-level discussion of the
OECD's future work in this area is
scheduled for 20-22 May.
The Council of Europe, basi-
cally a forum for debating politi-
cal issues, has for several years
had a committee on conservation.
In February the Council sponsored
a conference at Strasbourg, which
issued a declaration urging the
convening of a European ministerial
conference on environmental prob-
lems. The Council has also desig-
nated 1970 as European Nature Con-
servation Year.
Because of its mixed member-
ship, the UN Economic Commission
for Europe (ECE) has seemed a logi-
cal agency to enhance East-West co-
operation on environmental matters.
For more than a decade it has con-
ducted a number of programs in the
field. An ECE conference on the
subject will be held in Prague in
May 1971, and moves are afoot to
upgrade its level of representation.
The UN itself has been active
on a world-wide scale and will con-
vene a Conference on the Human En-
vironment in Stockholm in 1972.
The conference may issue a declara-
tion on the environment similar to
the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, also launched by the UN.
There are a number of advocates of
a global system to monitor the en-
vironment, but the Soviets oppose
this approach as an encroachment
on national sovereignty. Another
key issue at the 1972 conference may
be that of the need to combat pol-
lution of an international charac-
ter caused by attempts to exploit
natural resources.
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SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE UP IN 1969
A $1-billion increase in trade
with the free world--just over half
the growth in Soviet trade last
year--is the largest absolute in-
crease in over a decade.
Soviet foreign trade last year
registered another ten-percent in-
crease. According to data released
by First Deputy Foreign Trade Minis-
ter M. R. Kuzmin, total trade
amounted to $22 billion, up $1.9
billion from 1968. Exports and im-
ports were not broken out.
Trade with the less developed
countries, after remaining stagnant
at around $1.8 million since 1965,
rose by $450 million. Trade with
three countries--Egypt, Iran, and
Algeria--accounted for over half
of this increase. Augmented Soviet
aid deliveries to Egypt and Iran,
and Soviet purchases of Algerian
wine and Egyptian crude oil were
contributing factors.
Page 21
Soviet purchases of machinery
and steel pipe from the industrial
West helped boost trade with that
area by $500 million. Both Italy
and West Germany showed gains of
$100 million. Finland, France, the
United Kingdom, and Japan were the
other major Western trading partners.
Trade with the six East Euro-
pean CEMA nations in 1969, which ac-
counts for over one half of Soviet
foreign trade, increased by some
$880 million. This is slightly less
than the annual average rate of
growth of ten percent since 1966.
No basic change occurred in the tra-
ditional exchange of Soviet raw ma-
terials, fuels, food, and machinery
for East European machinery and con-
sumer goods. Moscow's trade with
North Vietnam and North Korea in-
creased last year, but this was
more than offset by declines in
trade with Cuba and Yugoslavia.
Moscow's trade with Communist China
plummeted $40 million, totaling a
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Anti-US sentiment, high during Assistant Secretary Sisco's fact-finding
visit to the Middle East last week, has now cooled. Sisco was received in
relative calm in Cairo and Beirut. Expectations of his arrival in Amman,
however, led to fedayeen-sparked violence against US facilities, which in turn
resulted in the deferral of the visit and the transfer at Jordan's request of US
Ambassador Symmes.
Arab-Israeli military activity was marked by several Egyptian air raids
against Israeli positions in Sinai, apparently without major effect. Israeli
aircraft continued to strike along the Suez Canal, and there was desultory
ground activity on other fronts.
In Jordan, King Husayn's long-heralded cabinet reshuffle has been
announced, but the few substitutions made do not seem to foreshadow any
major changes in policy.
Iran's claim to hegemony over the Persian Gulf island of Bahrain may
soon be settled. A UN-sponsored public opinion poll presumably has shown
that the Bahrainis have opted for independence. The UN Security Council is
expected to endorse the findings about mid-May. Whether the Bahrainis will
then seek entry into the Federation of Arab Amirates is uncertain, but the
departure of the British from the Gulf in 1971 may induce them to seek
some sort of protection.
The preparatory meeting for the third summit conference of nonaligned
nations, which met in Tanzania last week, demonstrated the continued
inability of the nonaligned countries to reach agreement on specific issues.
Controversial questions such as representation of the Provisional Govern-
ment of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and several "liberation" movements
were referred to the summit. General agreement was reached, however, on a
broadly worded, six-point agenda. The summit will be held in Lusaka,
Zambia, before the opening of the UN General Assembly this September.
In Nigeria, General Gowon has announced the federation's first postwar
budget and indicated that a Reconstruction and Development Plan for
1970-74 is being prepared: Economic policy, as revealed in the new budget,
is designed to strengthen the federation's 12-state administrative structure
that replaced the old regional system. In his budget speech, Gowon clearly
indicated that there are no plans for an early return to civilian rule.
Ghana's Prime Minister Busia this week refused to accept a Supreme
Court ruling that in effect requires him to reinstate a recently fired civil
servant. He publicly vilified the court for its decision. The prime minister's
excessive response to the relatively unimportant case highlights his minimal
respect for the independence of the judiciary and once again demonstrates
his lack of political finesse.
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No LETUP IN MIDDLE EAST STRIFE
Israel. and Egypt traded air
strikes and. artillery fire across
the Suez Canal this week, and spo-
radic ground actions occurred on
other fronts. In Jordan King Hu-
sayn made some shifts in his cabi-
net and security services in the
aftermath of the aborted visit of
Assistant Secretary Sisco, while
behind the scenes Palestinian
leaders wrangled over the excesses
of the fedayeen demonstrators
against the visit. Premier Qad-
dafi of Libya literally dropped
in on the Algerian Government dur-
ing the week for an impromptu dis-
cussion of intra-Arab affairs.
struck back itself on Monday, hit-
ting Egyptian positions along the
central sector of the canal. On
Tuesday Cairo again sent its air-
craft into action but apparently
inflicted no casualties on the Is-
raelis although it lost another
aircraft, a MIG-17. This brings
the total number of Egyptian air-
craft lost since the June 1967 war
to 87. Cairo is apparently will-
ing to accept occasional losses
of aircraft as the price it must
pay for demonstrating to domestic
and foreign audiences that it is
still actively opposing the Is-
raeli presence on Egyptian soil.
Military Action
Egyptian aircraft were un-
usually active in conducting air
strikes against Israeli military
targets along the Suez Canal. In
addition to sporadic exchanges of
small-arms and artillery fire
across the canal, Egypt sent its
aircraft into action against Is-
raeli positions at least three
times during the past week. Tel
Aviv admitted that three of its
soldiers were killed and eight
wounded in air raids last Satur-
day. The Egyptians lost at least
one of their fighter-bombers to
an Israeli Hawk missile during the
attacks, and Tel Aviv claimed that
two other Egyptian planes were
downed.
Israel refuted Cairo's claim
of another raid on Sunday, but
Sporadic ground action oc-
curred along the other cease-fire
lines. In addition to the sabo-
tage of a kibbutz site in the
Golan Heights on Monday by infil-
trators from Syria, there were
several exchanges of gunfire along
the Lebanese and Jordanian fron-
tiers.
Jordan: Sisco Visit
Jordan's pro forma cabinet
reshuffle early this week reflects
King Husayn's intention to follow
a policy of coexistence with the
fedayeen and to take no initia-
tives. He had been mulling over
a cabinet shake-up since February,
and the breakdown in security that
attended the demonstrations
against the Sisco visit probably
provided the impetus for carrying
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it through. Although some indi-
vidual ministers who had lost fa-
vor with the King were removed,
the premier, foreign minister, and
most cabinet officials retained
their positions. The former min-
ister of defense was elevated to
deputy premier, the army chief of
staff moved up to become minister
of defense, and the respected gov-
ernor of Amman replaced the minis-
ter of interior. The director of
security was also replaced by an
able deputy experienced in dealing
with the fedayeen.
Husayn's appointment of three
military men who helped push
through the last settlement with
the fedayeen underscores the King's
continued reliance on the army as
his chief executor. It may also
be a reflection of his privately
expressed disappointment with the
"old politicians" who make up the
cabinet.
The attacks on the US Embassy
and cultural center in Amman on
15 April have increased the like-
lihood of a split between Fatah on
the one hand and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) and the Popular Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine (PDFLP) on the other. Rep-
resentatives of the PFLP and the
PDFLP took control of a demonstra-
tion organized by the United Fed-
ayeen Command (UFC) to protest the
impending Sisco visit and UFC se-
curity guards were unable to pre-
vent some of the demonstrators
from damaging the embassy and
burning the cultural center.
That evening, at an emergency
meeting of the UFC, Fatah repre-
sentatives denounced the attacks
and threatened to leave the UFC
if any new attacks against the
embassy or US Government agencies
occurred. During the next two
days, UFC security elements had
to disperse mobs led by the PFLP
and PDFLP moving on the embassy.
Fatah officials have stated that
had Sisco's visit taken place,
they were prepared to oppose any
fedayeen organization that at-
tempted to disrupt public order.
Should the PFLP and the PDFLP
continue to challenge Fatah's
leadership of the fedayeen move-
ment, a clash between them and
the more moderate Fatah seems
likely.
Libyan-Algerian Relations
Libyan junta leader Qaddafi's
sudden trip to Algiers last
week could be an indication that
Egypt's influence in Libya has
passed its apogee. Qaddafi's ar-
rival on 16 April came as a sur-
prise in both Tripoli and Algiers,
and there has been much specula-
tion about his motives.
One possibility is that he
wanted to consult Boumediene on
the issue of most immediate con-
cern to Libya--the negotiations
between Libya and the American
oil companies that have been
stalemated since January; Libya's
petroleum minister was already in
Algiers. In a joint communique,
the two governments expressed sat-
isfaction with agreements for
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cooperation in the exploitation of
their oil resources and the amal-
gamation of these resources.
There is also the possibility
that Qaddafi suddenly realized the
advantages, both domestic and in-
ternational, of playing Algeria
off against Egypt. In the com-
munique, the two governments re-
iterated Qaddafi's demand for the
unification of the Palestinian
commando organizations, which have
Egyptian backing, and implicitly
criticized them for their ineffec-
tiveness.
Algeria and Egypt have been
rivals for influence over Libya
ever since the coup toppled the
Libyan monarchy last September,
and Qaddafi's dependence on Egypt
has made the new regime unpopular
with a large segment of the Lib-
yan population which fears Egyp-
tian expansionism. Libya's fail-
ure to attend the conference of
Maghreb economic ministers last
March was taken as an indication
that the regime was drawing even
closer to Egypt. Qaddafi's trip
to Algiers may help to restore
some balance to Libya's foreign
relations and to lessen antire-
gime sentiment in the country.
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Attention in Latin America this week focused on Trinidad, where a
mutiny in the Defense Force threatened the government of Prime Minister
Eric Williams. The mutiny was the latest expression of the black-power
movement, which is increasing in importance in the Caribbean.
The Sixth Caribbean Commonwealth Summit Conference held in
Jamaica from 13 to 17 April was beset with dissension and sharply vindictive
personal criticism. Guyanese Prime Minister Burnham led an attack against
British influence in the Caribbean and called on the conference to push for
economic independence. The US and Canada were also criticized. Little
progress was made toward solving mutual problems, although a few resolu-
tions on economic development, land resources, and double taxation were
passed.
On 17 April a group of Cuban exiles infiltrated Cuba, prompting a blast
from Fidel Castro against the United States. Speaking at the funeral for the
five Cubans killed in early action against the invaders, Castro accused the US
of plotting against his government. He later claimed that the invaders had
come from the US naval base at Guantanamo. Castro probably is aware that
his charges are untrue, but he may believe that a manufactured threat will
serve to revitalize flagging Cuban enthusiasm for domestic problems. For
example, the most productive phase of the 1970 sugar harvest is coming to
an end almost two weeks behind schedule, and the ten-million-ton goal is
almost certainly beyond reach.
The murder of West German Ambassador von Spreti in Guatemala has
touched off dissension within the Cuban-oriented Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR), with some members believing their image has suffered. The Guate-
malan Communist Party also reacted negatively. Both groups intend to
continue terrorism, however, and the FAR hopes that further action will
push the Von Spreti incident into the background. The Guatemalan Govern-
ment has imposed strict censorship, in part to black out international
criticism of its failure to protect the diplomatic community.
A new law governing mining in Peru was announced on 17 April. The
legislation calls for considerably greater state participation in the mining
industry, hitherto dominated by large US companies. Primary emphasis was
put on marketing and refining, which will be reserved to the state. Refineries
currently operated by US companies apparently will not be affected. It is
not yet clear, however, how the new law will affect the Southern Peru
Copper Company's recent agreement to invest about $350 million for the
development of its Cuajone concessions.
The Canadian Government's draft bill on Arctic pollution control won
a unanimous vote (198-0) in the key second reading on Wednesday in the
House of Commons. The House will now review it in a committee for the
third and final reading, which is expected to be pro forma in view of the
unanimity of the vote.
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DOMINICAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN ENTERS FINAL PHASE
A hectic, if abbreviated,
campaign for the presidential
election on 1.6 May is now under
way. The return of former presi-
dent Juan Bosch, the death of one
of the presidential candidates,
and rumors of a possible opposi-
tion coalition to thwart President
Joaquin Balaguer' s re-election
bid have further complicated the
fluid political situation.
Balaguer's temporary resigna-
tion for 36 days, or until the
election results have been vali-
dated, and other political con-
cessions lured four parties back
into the race. The major opposi-
tion Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD), led by Juan Bosch, main-
tains, however, that it will con-
tinue to boycott the contest. Both
former president Bosch, recently
returned from self-imposed Euro-
pean exile, and the PRD secretary
general have repeated that the
turnabout decision to participate
by the four other opposition par-
ties will not affect the PRD's
position.
The PRD has not announced
any plans for public rallies,
which could set up a serious
clash between tense security
forces and crowds attracted by
the still popular Bosch. Never-
theless, three were killed and
more than a dozen wounded in
shooting incidents between army
patrols and PRD supporters when
Bosch arrived last week.
of former provisional president
and presidential candidate Garcia-
Godoy on 20 April could incline
his relatively small, personal-
istic party toward such an al-
liance. Leaders of the four par-
ties have also reportedly decided
to seek PRD support for a possible
unity ticket.
There are, however, major
political impediments to such
an agreement in addition to the
legal obstacles to be overcome
in the short time before elec-
tions. The moderate Social Chris-
tians, badly stung by their nearly
disastrous electoral alliance with
the PRD in 1966, will be reluctant
to accede to a coalition. Fur-
ther, neither of the two major
opposition candidates, former
General Wessin y Wessin and re-
cently resigned vice president
Lora has indicated much willing-
ness to step aside for the other.
The government, now under the
provisional leadership of the Su-
preme Court president, has continued
army patrolling in the capital. The
university remains blocked off and
some union headquarters are still
under the control of troops. The
24 and 28 April anniversary of the
1965 revolution and landing of US
troops could prompt new disorders.
The rural vote--66 percent of
the Dominican electorate--heavily
favored Balaguer in the last presi-
dential election in 1966. The op-
position parties have precious little
The four parties contesting
the elections have begun pre-
liminary discussions aimed at
forming a coalition. The death
time to erode Balaguer's support,
even if they succeed in working to-
gether.
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COMMUNIST GAINS CONCERN PERUVIAN MODERATES
The growing strength and in-
fluence of the Communists in Peru
are causing increasing concern
among moderate elements in both
the government and armed forces.
Apparently aware that such concern
might eventually threaten his po-
sition, President Velasco strongly
denied charges of Communist influ-
ence in his government in a speech
on 20 March. Despite the Presi-
dent's seeming rejection of the
Communists' embrace, the party
has continued to be Velasco's most
outspoken supporter and has.in-
tensified its activity in recent
weeks.
The establishment of Commit-
tees for the Defense of the Revolu-
tion (CDR) has provided the Com-
munists with their best opportun-
ity to build a mass organization.
The CDR concept, which bears many
similarities to its namesake in
Cuba, apparently was first pro-
posed by the Interior Ministry as
a means of achieving organized
mass support for the military gov-
ernment. The Communist Party,
however, immediately seized the
initiative in organizing the CDRs
and already controls many of them.
in a speech on 22
April President Velasco again dem-
Page 2 9
onstrated his sensitivity to
charges of growing Communist in-
fluence in Peru. He reiterated
his denial that the government was
influenced by Communists and chal-
lenged his detractors to identify
publicly the so-called "Communist
advisers." He also clarified his
position on the CDRs, saying that
the government would direct them
itself "because we do not wish that
small and discredited political
groups that obey foreign orders
to take advantage of them."
Nevertheless, Communist in-
roads into the government are
likely to remain an issue that
will be exploited by those who
oppose the Velasco government.
Recent reforms in the fishmeal
and mining industries probably
only coincidentally conform to
Communist recommendations, but
opponents of the reforms may make
the most of the coincidence. For
example, General Jose Benavides,
who aspires to the presidency him-
self, plans to alert his friends
in the military that a known Com-
munist in the Ministry of Industry
participated in the drafting of
the radical industrial reform
law presently under consideration
by the government. Such warnings
of increasing Communist influence
will not fall on deaf ears among
the reformist-minded but strongly
anti-Communist generals who fill
the top command positions in the
Peruvian Army.
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Daily nationwide demonstrations
in behalf of General Rojas since
last Sunday's elections have been
generally peaceful, but violence
could erupt when final presidential
returns are made public on 26 April.
Rojas and his followers are con-
vinced that the government is steal-
ing his victory in favor of National
Front candidate Misael Pastrana, who
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MORE DISTURBANCES LIKELY IN COLOMBIA
leads by less than 100,000 votes.
Rojas' political party, the Na-
tional Popular Alliance (ANAPO), has
called for continuous demonstrations
and strikes in a last-ditch effort
to persuade the government to give
Rojas his victory. In addition,
ANAPO is trying to convince the pub-
lic that the government has perpe-
trated a fraud against Rojas in the
hope that it will engage in popular
uprisings. Rojas' politically as-
tute daughter, in the meantime, has
proposed that ANAPO lay the ground-
work for armed insurrection and call
the people to arms.
The military and police have
controlled the situation thus far,
and the state of siege proclaimed
on Tuesday night may ease some of
the pressure.
The government is acting from 25X1
a position of strength. Moreover,
General Rojas appears to have lost
the initiative by not calling for
violent demonstrations immediately,
when his position appeared stronger.
Sentiment among high-ranking offi-
cials and indeed, that of President
Lleras himself, indicates that
Rojas would be denied the presi-
dency even if he should win.
Lleras is known to be a force-
ful and direct leader who would not
hesitate to act promptly to preserve
public order. This, in itself, may
have a dampening effect on future
demonstrations. Moreover, it is
clear to old-line Colombian politi-
cians that Pastrana will have a most
difficult time in governing the coun-
try as more than a caretaker or a
volcano sitter. Pastrana's slim lead
is likely to keep tensions high for
some time to come.
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TRINIDAD AND BLACK RADICALISM IN THE CARIBBEAN
Developments of the past dence of a coordinated regional
suggest that movement among black radicals,
week in Trinidad however.
black radical groups in the Car-
ibbean have a strong potential to
bring considerable pressure on
governments of the region. Dur-
ing the past year the influence
of "black-power" advocates, "black
nationalists," and other groups
with similar goals seems to have
grown in a number of countries.
This influence is reflected
in the apparently greater will-
ingness by established political
groups in Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago,
Barbados, and elsewhere to adopt
black-power slogans. Also, there
is more caution on the part of
government leaders to avoid ac-
tions that could reflect disagree-
ment with ideas of the black radi-
cals.
The black-power groups and
other radicals have made rela-
tively few gains in developing
an organizational structure, al-
though a few small groups
become more active. This is true
in a number of small islands, such
as Antigua, and St. Vincent, as
well as in the larger states. A
few spokesmen for black power have
attained prominence, however. Ged-
des Granger of Trinidad, for exam-
ple, has become a recognized leader
of the black-power movement there,
mainly because of his surprising
success in arousing considerable
public support for pco
strations. There is still no evi-
Black radicals are putting
pressure on governments to achieve
"economic independence" to match
the political independence that
most of the region has attained.
They argue that although Negroes
hold most of the political power,
the economies are dominated by
whites who are generally foreign
based. This theme has touched
the sensitive nerves of Prime
Ministers Pindling of the Bahamas,
Burnham of Guyana, and other gov-
ernment leaders, in
greater
been pushing for
economic control. At the recent
"Caribbean Summit Meeting" in
Jamaica, Burnham devoted a major
speech to criticizing foreign
interests in the region and urging
nationalistic policies.
Trinidad has been experienc-
ing frequent black-power demon-
strations, some of which have re-
sulted in violence. On 21 April
the government declared a state
of emergency in the face of threats
of further demonstrations and labor
agitation. A "mutiny" by some 30
to 50 members of the Defense Force
on the same day led Prime Minister
Williams to request immediate US
military assistance to restore
order. There is some evidence
that black extremists had gained
sympathy among junior officers and
enlisted men in the Defense Force.
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Earlier in the month Trini-
dad's External. Affairs Minister
Robinson, who is leader of the
black-nationalist wing of the
ruling party, resigned and pre-
sumably plans to devote more ef-
fort to black power activities.
Trinidad has banned a possible
visit by Stokely Carmichael, who
has also been invited to visit
Guyana next month by a black-power
group there. Another development
possibly related to the Trinidad
Government's concern over black
extremism is its private request
that the US relinquish control
over all of its facilities on
the island.
Sensitivity to the importance
of black power in Barbados has
caused an open clash between Prime
Minister Barrows and his cabinet.
During Barrows' recent absence
abroad, the cabinet announced that
two black-power militants from
Trinidad would be prohibited from
entering Barbados. This caused
Barrows to issue a strong public
disavowal of the cabinet's deci-
sion. The incident has become a
hotly debated public issue that
has special significance in view
of the Second Caribbean Black-
Power Conference scheduled in Bar-
bados for July. According to the
US Embassy, "even moderate groups
seem anxious to hop on the black-
power bandwagon."
Guyana Prime Minister Burnham
considers black radical influence
in his country an important enough
force to warrant special attention.
He seems determined to maintain a
Abk
cordial relationship with ASCRIA,
the major black-power group. Eusi
Kwayana, head of ASCRIA, holds two
important government posts and
is frequently consulted by Burn-
ham. Unlike Williams in Trinidad,
who has failed to establish rap-
port with black radicals, Burnham
shows evidence of having at least
partially succeeded, although one
militant group (Ratoon) remains
strongly opposed to him.
For the foreseeable future,
extremist groups throughout the
Caribbean probably will identify
increasingly with the themes of
black power and black nationalism.
More and more governments are
likely to show at least ostensible
interest in promoting economic
nationalism and other goals of
the black radicals out of polit-
ical expediency. Some leaders
will also use black-power slogans
to their advantage as a means of
consolidating political support
at home and of strengthening their
bargaining position abroad.
Granger's rise in Trinidad,
for example, is due at least as
much to the undercurrent of social
unrest and government ineptness as
to his personal effectiveness.
Through good timing and revolu-
tionary rhetoric others may be
able to convert resentment among
workers, students, and others into
open protest. Conditions similar
to those in Trinidad exist else-
where in the Caribbean, providing
opportunities for radicals to ex-
ploit.
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'%Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Carlos Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla
Secret
N! 44
24 April 1970
No. 0367/70A
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,r. SECRET
CARLOS MARIGHELLA'S MINIMANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
The recent success of Latin American urban terrorists in such activities as the
kidnaping and ransoming of foreign diplomats, as well as their proven ability to
create at least limited disorder, apparently has prompted the ever-pragmatic Fidel
Castro to accept and give some endorsement to urban terrorism as a revolutionary
strategy. Tricontinental, a magazine published by the Cuba-based Asia, Africa, Latin
America Peoples Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO), is currently circulating a
handbook for the revolutionist called theMinimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. It was
written last June by Brazilian terrorist Carlos Marighella, who was killed by police in
November. (In 1967 Tricontinental published letters and pictures received from Che
Guevara when he was in Bolivia). The manual is clearly designed to foster terrorist
activities in Latin America's growing urban areas. It is too early to tell whether the
handbook will be regarded as important as or with the esteem accorded the writings
on rural guerrilla activities by Che Guevara and Regis Debray, but its publishers
claim that "it will become one of the principal books of every man who, as a
consequence of the inevitable battle against the bourgeoisie and imperialism, takes
the road of armed rebellion."
Handbooks on revolution in Latin America
have been published before. Che Guevara pub-
lished several articles on rural guerrilla struggles in
the early 1960s, and his Guerra de las Guerrillas
was once considered the basic book on guerrilla
warfare in Latin America. Regis Debray, who is
still languishing in a Bolivian jail for taking part in
Guevara's ill-fated Bolivian adventure in 1967,
later became the primary spokesman for the rural
guerrillas with his Revolution Within the Revolu-
tion, published by the Cubans in May 1967, and
two earlier papers.
Guevara's death in October 1967, however,
forced the Cubans to reappraise the efficacy of a
rural-based guerrilla struggle. Moreover, domestic
considerations, including the national objective of
producing a ten-million-ton sugar harvest in 1970,
compelled the Cubans to reduce their hemi-
sphere-wide revolutionary activities.
This re-evaluation probably led to the con-
clusion that the typical Latin American peasant,
because of his conservative nature, is not a solid
base on which to develop revolutionary awareness
and antigovernment activity without considerable
ideological preparation at least at the present
time. Growing urban populations, especially their
student and labor sectors, and many young
priests, however, are already seedbeds of unrest
and antigovernment activity. It is only natural,
therefore, that the revolution should be advanced
in the urban areas until the rural peasants are
sufficiently indoctrinated to administer the final
coup de grace to the "establishment." The
Cubans can argue, therefore, that their original
emphasis on rural guerrilla activity is correct but
may need original impetus from the urban areas.
This point was made by Marighella.
In addition to this logical extension of rev-
olutionary theory, urban-based guerrilla activity is
not wholly at odds with the Castro-Guevara-
Debray approach. Debray stated that the "cities
Special Report
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are the graveyards for revolutionaries; city party
backers tend to abandon guerrilla warfare when it
suits their purpose; it is a mistake for guerrilla
movements to become overly dependent on urban
support and leadership." On the other hand, the
mobility and small size of the extra-party military
organization of the urban terrorist groups were
considered useful by Debray. Moreover, he main-
tained that by sharing common experiences in the
guerrilla struggle, the urban recruits would grad-
ually be integrated into the rural environment and
would gain an appreciation of peasant problems
while the peasants themselves were improving
their ideological understanding of revolution.
The author of the Minimanual Carlos
Marighella, is really an excellent authority for a
possible new aspect of Cuban revolutionary strat-
egy. In the first place, the circumstances of his
death (he was ambushed by Sao Paulo police)
have made him something of a revolutionary
martyr. Perhaps. some of the charisma surround-
ing Marighella resulted from accounts of his cap-
ture by Brazilian police in 1964. For instance,
Luis Carrera in January 1969 wrote, "Five agents
of the secret police opened fire on a robust man,
age 56, who was hit
twice in the lungs. Blood
comes out of his mouth,
but he manages to
scream, `You are going
to kill a manly Commu-
nist."' The fact that Mari-
ghella is already dead
and cannot fall victim to
some unglamorous end is
an asset. He was always
viewed by Castro as one
of the most important
revolutionary leaders in
Latin America and,
Special Report
25X1
despite his demise, his organization is still consid-
ered promising by the Cubans. Formerly a top
leader of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB),
Marighella submitted his resignation in 1966 to
form his own more militant group, which
achieved notoriety through terrorism, robberies,
bombings, airliner highjackings, and the kidnaping
of US Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick last Septem-
ber.
Marighella was dedicated to the idea of
violent revolution. He may have been recruited by
the Cubans from 1962 to 1964 when they had
diplomatic representation in Brazil. He was re-
sponsible at that time for contacts between the
Brazilian Communist Party and the Cuban
Embassy. On leaving the party he indicated his
distress at the conservatism and lack of revolu-
tionary dedication of the regular party-a theme
repeatedly stressed by Fidel Castro. Marighella
said, "I am ready to take part in the revolutionary
struggle with the masses but never to play a wait-
ing game in bureaucratic politics pending its con-
sideration.... There is a lack of revolutionary
impulse, a revolutionary conscience which is
generated by struggle."
Marighella repeated his position in Havana in
August 1967 at the Latin American Solidarity
Organization (LASO) conference. He stated that
the Brazilian revolution would be against "the
common enemy-American imperialism," and
that the way to unify revolutionary movements is
through armed struggle.
In February 1968 he issued a document out-
lining the objectives and modus operandi of a new
revolutionary organization dedicated to "action
now" through the recruitment and training of
guerrilla fighters and the eventual formation of a
people's liberation army. LASO's political line
was adopted; a complete break with the PCB was
announced; and a loosely structured organization
was advocated.
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In August 1968, Marighella published
another document in Cuba on tactics and strategy
of guerrilla warfare, which he dedicated to Che
Guevara. Basic to this strategy is the "existence of
a small nucleus of combatants." The ideological
struggle must be made known to the people in a
vastly bold, confident, and widespread manner,
with a view to ensuring the political and revolu-
tionary support of the masses. Moreover, the
guerrilla forces "must have proper training, which
begins with the careful selection of men, who
should come in particular from the workers' and
peasants' sectors." Eventually the elements of this
stage, it was contended, would lead to a revolu-
tionary army of peasants and workers, joined by
students and intellectuals.
In December 1968, Marighella produced his
"Message to the Brazilians," which was published
in Granma, the official organ of the central com-
mittee of the Cuban Communist Party on 1 Feb-
ruary 1969. In it he spelled out the tasks of his
"revolutionary" government. It was in fact a call
to arms, advocating the elimination of all North
American interests. It called for a prolonged war
to be launched in the blood of students, in the
action of the clergy, and in workers' strikes.
Moreover, it urged guerrillas to capture police and
military personnel to be exchanged for political
prisoners.
Subsequent information indicates that
Marighella was planning attacks against Americans
as early as 1968 in order to make the Brazilian
population aware that there were persons willing
to fight against US imperialism and to provoke
the US Government into intervention in Brazil (a
continuation of Guevara's "many Vietnams"
theory). Kidnaping of important persons, both
Brazilians and Americans, was advocated in 1968
with the objective of demoralizing the govern-
ment and securing the release of important
prisoners.
Special Report -3
In September 1969, Marighella was inter-
viewed by a correspondent from Paris Front. In
answer to a question on the continental aspects of
his revolutionary strategy Marighella replied, "We
must respond to the global plans of North Ameri-
can imperialism with a global plan for Latin
America. We have ties with the Latin American
Solidarity Organization, as do many other revolu-
tionary organizations on the continent, particu-
larly those in neighboring countries that are strug-
gling in the same direction as we are. And of
course, it is our duty toward Cuba to free it from
the imperialism encirclement, or to lighten the
burden on it by fighting everywhere else. The
Cuban revolution is the vanguard of the Latin
American revolution, and that vanguard must
survive."
Marighella's latest document, the Mini-
manual for the Urban Guerrilla, was written in
June 1969, five months before his death. The
direct link between Marighella's thoughts and the
Guevara-Castro-Debray thesis is provided in the
introduction, which is taken from the resolutions
of the LASO conference: "The duty of every
revolutionary is to make revolution." Further-
more, he reiterates his pronouncement that the
function of urban guerrilla warfare is to "de-
moralize and distract the enemy forces, permit-
ting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla
warfare, which is destined to play the decisive
role in the revolutionary war." He adds that
presently the men and women chosen for urban
guerrilla warfare are "workers, peasants that the
city has attracted as a market for manpower and
who return to the countryside indoctrinated and
politically and technically prepared, students,
intellectuals, and priests. This is the material with
which we are building-starting with urban guer-
rilla warfare-the armed alliance of workers and
peasants, with students, intellectuals, and
priests."
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and work interruptions as well as the occupation
of factories and schools, and cites a variety of
preferred targets including banks, local businesses,
and US-owned companies. Terrorism, Marighella
says, "is an action the urban guerrilla must ex-
ecute with the greatest cold-bloodedness, calm-
ness, and decision."
EXECUTION AND KIDNAPING
Brazilian Generals Examining Terrorist Damage
The article defines the urban guerrilla as a
man who fights the military dictatorship with
arms, using unconventional methods. "He is a
political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, a
fighter for his country's liberation, and a friend of
the people and freedom." The urban guerrilla is
opposed to and attacks the "government, the big
capitalists, and the foreign imperialists, particu-
larly North Americans." Thus, the urban guerrilla
in order to exist must aim at the "physical liqui-
dation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed
forces and the police" and expropriate govern-
ment resources and those belonging to capitalists.
The Minimanual provides detailed guidance
for sniping, ambushes, hijacking of aircraft,
executions, riots, sabotage, assassinations, strikes,
Special Report -4
Of particular interest, especially at the pres-
ent time, is Marighella's discussion of execution
and kidnaping as weapons of the urban terrorist.
As examples of execution, the manual cited the
killing of a North American spy (the assassination
of a US Army captain in Brazil); of an agent of
the dictatorship (opposition political figures in
Guatemala); of a police torturer (the murder of
the chief of the Montevideo police quick reaction
unit on 13 April 1970 by the Uruguayan
Tupamaros); of a fascist personality involved in
crimes and persecutions against patriots; and of a
stool pigeon, informer, police agent or police
provocateur. In many cases, according to the
article, these executions should be carried out by
a solitary sniper operating in absolute secrecy.
Kidnaping is described as "capturing and
holding in a secret place a police agent, a North
American spy, a political personality, or a notori-
ous and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary
movement." According to the Minimanual, kid-
naping is used to force the exchange or the libera-
tion of imprisoned revolutionary comrades, or to
force the suspension of torture in the jail cells of
the military dictatorship. The kidnapings of US
Ambassador Elbrick and the Japanese consul
general in Sao Paulo were used for these purposes.
The communiquE issued by the terrorists follow-
ing the Japanese consul's abduction, for example,
stated that the act was committed "to obtain the
freedom and ensure the physical integrity of some
political detainees who are in the prisons of Sao
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Paulo .... We would not have taken this attitude if
there was no extreme necessity to save the lives of
some comrades whose physical condition has be-
come alarming."
The kidnaping of noted nonpolitical persons
is also advocated inasmuch as the ensuing public-
ity can generate propaganda for the guerrilla
cause. The kidnaping of North Americans resident
in Brazil or visiting there is also considered useful
since it publicizes the involvement of US imperi-
alism in the country.
The kidnapings of political personalities thus
far-the US ambassador to Brazil, the Japanese
consul general in Brazil, the Paraguayan consul in
Argentina, the US air attache in the Dominican
Republic, and the US Embassy labor attache and
the West German ambassador in Guatemala, have
apparently been carried out by what Marighella
described as a "firing group." This group consists
of no more than four or five persons and con-
stitutes the basic urban guerrilla organizational
unit. It plans and executes urban guerrilla actions,
obtains and guards arms, and studies and corrects
its own tactics.
According to Marighella, "No firing group
can remain inactive waiting for orders from
above. Its obligation is to act." Moreover, any
single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a
"firing group" can do so. This organizational
structure leads to free initiative and security. Two
"firing groups," separated and sealed off from
other firing groups, make up a "firing team."
Marighella concludes his article with a
lengthy treatise on guerrilla security and the seven
"deadly sins" of the urban guerrilla: inexperience,
boastfulness, vanity, exaggeration of numbers,
precipitate action, poor tactics, and poor plan-
ning.
Special Report - 5 -
By maintaining good security, by sustaining
pressure on the police and armed forces, and by
propagandizing governmental failures, Marighella
says the urban guerrillas will not only preserve
themselves but will also win the support of the
people. As this support grows, the rural guerrilla
war will develop rapidly and a solid infrastructure
will be created. This group will be composed of
peasants, who know the land; of students, who,
although politically crude and coarse, have a
special talent for revolutionary violence and have
plenty of free time on their hands to spend on
revolution; of intellectuals, who spread the rev-
olutionary call and influence the people; of
churchmen, who have the ability to communicate
with the people; and of women, who have demon-
strated unmatched fighting spirit and tenacity. In
1969, these processes were under way and there
were reports that Marighella was preparing to un-
dertake rural guerrilla activity in conjunction with
the urban effort already in progress.
Fidel Castro in Animated Conversation with the
Brazilian Revolutionaries at the Havana Airport
The Minimanual appears to represent a logi-
cal extension of the Guevara, Castro, and Debray
revolutionary thesis. The already-widespread
publicity of the various kidnapings and terrorist
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activities as well as the publication of the article one who "takes the road of armed struggle."
in Tricontinental may result in its wide reader- Marighella, at least, maintains that to be a
ship. It is conceivable, therefore, that the docu- "terrorist is a quality that ennobles any honorable
ment may become a principal statement for any- man."
Special Report
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