WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007600030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
30 January 1970
No. 0355/70
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(Information as of noon EST, 29 January 1970)
VIETNAM
New surges of enemy military activity are expected
as the Tet holidays draw near. Meanwhile, the 40th
anniversary of the Vietnamese Communist Party may
provide new clues on the leadership and on policy
trends in Hanoi.
ELECTION POLITICS ON THE RISE IN SOUTH KOREA
Government and opposition politicians are strength-
ening their positions for next year's presidential
and National Assembly elections.
PHILIPPINES DOMESTIC POLITICS BESET MARCOS
Important families within the Philippine oligarchy
have moved to curb President Marcos' political power.
CHINA'S CRIME IN THE STREETS
Peking is showing'increasing concern over the rising
urban crime rate.
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Europe
USSR TAKES NEW TACK TOWARD EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
Moscow seems to be pushing back the target date for
its projected European security conference by propos-
ing that a "people's congress" be held in the second
half of this year, presumably to precede such a secu-
rity conference.
YUGOSLAVS SEEK TO INFLUENCE FUTURE COMMUNIST MEETINGS
Belgrade expects to have a hand in drawing up the
agenda and choosing the participants of the "people's
congress" proposed by the USSR to be held later this
year. /
EAST GERMAN TACTICS TOWARD BONN
East Germany displayed an ambivalent: attitude toward
Bonn this week. It reacted negatively to Brandt's
proposal to begin renunciation-of-force talks, but
suggested that "technical negotiations" resume.
DUTCH COALITION FACES ROUGH FUTURE
Prime Minister De Jong may soon call parliamentary
elections, which are not mandatory until May 1971.
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Middle East - Africa
CONFLICT CONTINUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Israel's continuing military attacks on Egypt this
week were highlighted by the capture of Egypt's
Shadwan Island. Reactions to President Nixon's
statement on the Middle East, meanwhile, ranged
from elation in Tel Aviv to new bitterness in Arab
capitals.
NIGERIANS MOVING TO ENSURE ORDERLY OCCUPATION
Federal officers have taken firm measures to tighten
troop discipline, and an improvement in troop con-
duct has been reported.
PAKISTANI POLITICS MARKED BY VIOLENCE
The campaign for the constituent assembly election
in October, under way since 1 January when full-scale
political activity resumed throughout the country,
has been marred by serious violence, and more is
likely as the election' nears.
UNITY GROWING AMONG MAGHREB COUNTRIES
Apprehension with rOgard to expanding Egyptian in-
fluence in Libya apparently has accelerated the slow
trend toward collaboration among the three other
Maghrebian countries--Morocco, Algeria,. and Tunisia.
Western Hemisphere
CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE TAKES SHAPE
The Communist-leftist electoral front has finally
settled on Socialist Senator Allende to oppose Jorge
Alessandri and Radomiro Tomic in the presidential
race next September.
PANAMANIAN ELECTION TIMETABLE IN DOUBT
It is becoming increasingly unlikely that elections
will take place this year as promised earlier by
government strong-man General Torrijos.
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ARGENTINA STRIVES FOR NEW LOOK IN LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 27
President Ongania is continuing his efforts to de-
velop more harmonious relations with neighboring
countries.
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After some seven months' absence, Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's chief adviser
to the Paris talks, is returning to the French capital as head of the North
Vietnamese delegation to the French Communist Party congress. Tho's
return to Paris may be intended by the Communists to suggest that they
have new positions to offer. Tho has turned up in Paris at important
junctures in the past.
On 29 January, the same day the announcement was made that Tho
would be in Paris, the North Vietnamese delegation to the talks accused the
US of bombing populated areas in North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese
deputy delegation leader said three US planes were shot down well north of
the Demilitarized Zone on 28 January. A US F-105 was in fact shot down by
Communist antiaircraft gunners along the border between North Vietnam
and Laos on the 28th. In addition, MIG fighters attacked US aircraft for the
first time in 15 months, downing a US rescue helicopter as it searched for
the crew of the F-105.
Government and opposition politicians in South Korea are busily
strengthening their positions for next year's presidential and National
Assembly elections. President Pak is pressing ahead with one of the country's
most sustained and far-ranging anticorruption drives. Within the regime, the
President is assembling the team that will be responsible for ensuring his
smooth re-election. Pak has patched up differences with the dynamic Kim
Chong-pil and apparently intends him to play a major role in the campaign,
as he did in the coup that brought Pak to power in 1961.
Philippine President Marcos is coming under increasing pressure from
important families within his country's oligarchy. Politically ambitious
families are trying to curb Marcos' political power before he has an oppor-
tun ity to prolong his presidency beyond a second term. It is widely assumed
in the Philippines that Marcos' ambitions will cause him to try to pack the
jconstitutional convention, whose members are scheduled to be elected in
November. If Marcos succeeds in controlling the convention, he is ex ected
to alter the constitutional limit -on presidential terms in office.
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/d'
VIETNAM
Communist forces maintained
a relatively low tactical profile
during the past week, but there
were continuing signs that the
enemy intends to increase, its
activity during and around the
Tet holiday period.
There is little hard evidence
that the Communists plan or are
in a position to launch massive,
country-wide attacks comparable
with those that came during the
Tet holidays of 1968 and after
the holidays in.1969. New.surges
of military activity--consisting
largely of shellings, sapper and
terrorist raids, and limited ground
attacks--are expected in several
areas, however. These could be
a curtain-raiser for a larger ef-
fort later this spring.
Combat preparations appear
to be more advanced in some re-
gions, notably I and IV corps,
than in others, reinforcing the
likelihood of a series of local-
ized attacks rather than a simul-
taneously timed big-unit offensive
to usher in Tet 1970. In I Corps,
for example, an extensive movement
of supplies from enemy base areas
along the Laotian border toward
the coastal lowlands has been un-
er way for several wPPk,I ---
At the opposite end of the
country, there is evidence that
several North Vietnamese regi-
ments that moved from III to IV
corps late last year may be get-
ting ready for an early clash
with South Vietnamese forces,
rather than waiting to become
firmly entrenched in their sanc-
tuaries along the Cambodian bor-
der. vElements of three North
Vietnamese regiments have begun
to converge on.Chau Doc city in
the western reaches of the delta,
while elements of a fourth re-
portedly plan to link up with
local Viet Cong forces for pos-
sible large-scale attacks against
the city of My Tho and its neigh-
boring military base at Dong Tam.
There are few signs that
the enemy is contemplating a sharp
increase in offensive activity in
II and III corps in the near fu-
ture. Except for the North Viet-
namese 3rd Division, which has
been in a state of readiness for
several weeks in Binh Dinh Prov-
ince, most enemy main force units 25X1
in the highlands and coastal re-
gions of II Corps have assumed
a defensive posture while refit-
ting in base areas well removed
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from high-priority targets. In
III Corps, the evidence suggests
that the Communists may be planning
to intensify terrorist and sapper
activity in Saigon and in its sur-
rounding subregions during the
Tet holidays. Available intelli-
gence, however, does not reflect
preparations for coordinated,
large-scale military operations
by the division-sized forces based
near the Cambodian border in the
corps' northern tier of provinces.
fl 01) 1 A
Hue
A 4 CORPS
IN,
Hanoi's politburo "adviser"
to the Paris talks is returning
to France, ostensibly to attend
the French Communist Party Con-
gress next week. Le Duc Tho has
been absent for seven months and
his return is likely to arouse
widespread speculation that Hanoi
is showing renewed interest in
the negotiations. This probably
is exactly what the Communists
have in mind. They may calculate,
among other things, that having
Tho on tap in Paris will generate
interest in, and pressure for, the
naming of a successor to Ambassa-
dor Lodge. Communist intransigence
in recent months has facilitated
US and South Vietnamese efforts to
demonstrate that progress in the
negotiations is only possible if
the Communists show some flexi-
bility, and Hanoi may want to re-
dress this impression.
A possible hint that Hanoi
still sees some usefulness in the
SOUTH VIETNAM
U 5U 00
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Jan 70
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Although there are reports
that COSVN has ordered a country-
wide standdown of all Communist
forces in compliance with its uni-
lateral declaration of a four-day
Tet cease-fire (5-9 February), the
enemy will probably use the pe-
riod to reposition and resupply
combat units. South Vietnamese
commanders in those areas where
Vietnamization may soon face its
stiffest challenge--I and IV
corps--are optimistic, however,
that they can turn back any at-
tacks thrown. at them over the
holidays.
Le. Duc Tho to Paris
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Paris talks has appeared in two
recent radiobroadcasts containing
references to the Viet Minh com-
promise agreement with France in
March 1946. The way in which the
agreement was praised as buying
time for the Communists to prepare
for a protracted war of resistance
could mean that the Communists see
opportunities for applying similar
tactics now.
Party Anniversary Coming Up
Meanwhile, Hanoi is preparing
to mark the 40th anniversary of
the Vietnamese Communist Party on
3 February. Unlike recent years
when the occasion had been given
perfunctory treatment, the party
announced last April that this
year's celebration would be spe-
cial. Despite Ho's death, it is
making good on its promise.
Party histories and chrono-
logies of past achievements have
already started to appear in the
press and a rash of articles and
speeches by important party lead-
ers can be expected. The day it-
self probably will be marked by
appearances by the party hier-
archy, possibly along with a host
of foreign Communist dignitaries
and a heavy round of speeches.
The turnout and rhetoric
could be revealing vis-a-vis North
Vietnam's future course and the
shape of its leadership. The
Page 4
occasion should bring back into
public view party first secretary
Le Duan, who has been out of the
spotlight for several months. It
might also provide some clues about
whether the leadership is confi-
dent enough and considers itself
sufficiently organized to hold a
party congress this year, as
might be in order.
Some indications of policy
and leadership trends in Hanoi
since Ho's death were provided
by a pamphlet published for the
party anniversary. A summary
of it broadcast on 20 Janaury
was noteworthy for its hints of
current Communist tactics in the
war, and of the rise of Truong
Chinh to special prominence in
the politburo. It cites the "Au-
gust Revolution" of 1945--and
links Chinh and Ho as its chief
architects--as a "model" of revo-
lutionary war and suggests that
the Communists, as they did then,
should now concentrate on pre-
paring militarily to exploit fa-
vorable openings for a seizure
of power in the South.
Generally the summary
strengthens the impression that
Hanoi is trying to restore a
better balance between the ef-
forts needed to consolidate and
develop North Vietnam and those
devoted to fighting the war.
The relative priority of these
two tasks has been the touchstone
of debate in Hanoi for the past
decade and it has been only since
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late 1968 that the pendulum has
swung back toward re-emphasizing
the North and trying to prose-
cute the war in less costly ways.
This course has long been cham-
Page 5
view.
pioned by Truong Chinh even
though the broadcast attempts to
associate Le Duan with a similar
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ELECTION POLITICS ON THE RISE IN SOUTH KOREA
With the economy booming and
subversion by the Communist North
currently at low ebb, government
and opposition politicians alike
seem mainly preoccupied with
strengthening their positions for
next year's presidential and Na-
tional Assembly elections. To pro-
mote an image of austere efficiency
and honest administration, President
Pak Chong-hui is pressing ahead with
one of the country's most sustained
and far-ranging anticorruption
drives. Although no senior offi-
cials have been directly affected,
the public is being treated to the
satisfying, if rare, experience of
seeing a number of government bu-
reaucrats called to account.
Democratic Republican Party.
The fragmented opposition is
also beginning to show signs of
pulling itself together in prepara-
tion for contesting the elections.
At its annual convention early
this week, the New Democratic
Party, the nation's only signifi-
cant opposition grouping, named
veteran politician and party vice
chairman Yu Chin-san to succeed
the party's ailing leader. The
New Democrats also called for a
nominating convention next June
to select their candidate to op-
pose Pak next year. The nomina-
tion is likely to be hotly con-
tested, but even if the party is
able to overcome its many fac-
tional divisions and close ranks
behind its candidate, the New
Democrats face an uphill fight
against Pak and his entrenched
PHILIPPINES DOMESTIC POLITICS BESET MARCOS
Important families within the
Philippine oligarchy have moved to
curb President Marcos' political
power. Earlier this month when the
speakership of the House of Repre-
sentatives was up for election, the
Manila press interpreted the re-
election of the incumbent as a
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victory for the sugar bloc over
Marcos.
The President wanted to re-
place the speaker, Jose Laurel,
Jr., with a former Liberal Party
president who. contributed sub-
stantially to Marcos' re-election
by switching sides during the
1969 campaign. The President was
displeased with Laurel because of
his intrusion into national eco-
nomic planning, which Marcos con-
siders an executive preserve.
A number of the oligarchic
families involved in the speaker-
ship skirmish, some with rela-
tives aspiring to carry the col-
ors in the 1973 presidential race,
apparently hope to block Marcos'
expected efforts to prolong his
presidency beyond the constitu-
tional eight-year limit. It is
widely assumed in the Philippines
that Marcos' ambitions will be
reflected in an attempt to pack
the constitutional convention,
for which delegates will be elected
next November.
In this political maneuver-
ing, Marcos appears to be under-
strength in two areas that are
normally strongpoints for a
newly elected Philippine presi-
dent. He is being pressed by ex-
cessive patronage demands from
his Nacionalista Party followers,
who are still heady from their
landslide victory in November and
who expect the usual distribution
of posts by a new incumbent. Mar-
cos' ability to respond is limited,
however, because most political
plums were awarded during his first
term in office. Also, a national
mood of cynicism stemming from
flagrant election irregularities
in the recent election is reflected
in the almost universally harsh
treatment the press has accorded
Marcos instead of permitting him
the normal grace period.
Should Marcos fix his sights
on perpetuating himself in of-
fice, his success will depend on
his ability to play upon family
rivalries that exist in the oli-
garchy and to reduce those eco-
nomic issues on which they could
make common cause.
Concern within the establish-
ment over Marcos' overriding am-
bition appears to be filtering
down into other levels of Philip-
pine society. Student demonstra-
tions on 26 January demanding the
nonpartisan election of delegates
to the constitutional convention
erupted in a display of disre-
spect toward the chief executive
unparalleled in Philippine poli-
tics. Sticks and bottles were
hurled at the President and his
wife as they left the Congress
building after he delivered his
annual state-of-the-nation address.
Meanwhile, the consuming at-
tention Marcos will probably be
forced to devote to political
infighting will further reduce
the likelihood of any meaningful
attack on the Philippines' basic
social and economic ills. It
probably will also place any for-
eign affairs initiatives on the
back burner for the time being,
elp.ecially the renegotiation of
political and economic a reements
with the US.
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CHINA'S CRIME IN THE STREETS
Peking is showing increasing
concern over the risi'ig urban
crime rate and the pe3'sistence of
widespread illegal practices in
both town and countrysi4e. Cor-
ruption, petty crime, arr?on, and
thievery, which were almd-pt non-
existent before the Cultu.~:al Revo-
lution, are beginning to receive
attention at nearly all lev is of
administration,
Although the ',
current level of disorder does'.
not threaten Peking's political\
control, the regime's efforts to'~
restore political and social sta-\
bility are being hampered.
At the top of the list are
corruption and "bureaucratic
maneuvering." An article in the
latest issue of the party's theo-
retical journal, Red Flag, com-
plained that "class enemies" in,
an east China province were ac.=
tively engaged in speculation,
embezzlement, and the theft,bf
state property. Similar qom-
plaints have been echoedin sev-
eral other provinces. Reports
from Kwangtung Provincae indicate
that a stepped-up anticorrup-
tion campaign is currently under
way in both urban and rural
areas. Some government officials
have been questioned and a num-
ber of rural commune members
have been purged for corruption
and black-market activities.
Other reports indicate that se-
curity patrols have been aug-
mented in urban areas to suppress
blatant black-market operations
and to prevent arson and hotel
robberies.
A prime source for much of
the current criminality appears
to be the huge number of urban
unemployed, mostly high school
and college students, who have
been sent to rural areas since
late 1968. The enforced migra-
tion is bitterly resented by most
of the students, and it is fre-
quently evaded by those who have
learned to circumvent police
controls and checks. Curbing the
student crime problem is compli-
cated because urban and commune
authorities apparently lack
clear-cut' guidelines that would
deter the students' return to
the cities.
Alienation of the youth,
\however, includes other young
eople as well. Radiobroadcasts
suggest that undisciplined young
woXkers are a problem, and even
those ex - Red Guards who have
been allowed to participate in
the new "revolutionary committees"
are legs than politically docile.
There are reports that some
steps have been taken to central-
ize urban police functions under
a single authority, a move that
would greatly aid crime control
efforts. The reassertion of
strict authoritarian controls,
however, is not likely to be
achieved until the regime is
sufficiently confident both of
its political control apparatus
and the personnel who administer
it. Thus far, the pace of revi-
talizing the public security
system has been slow and uneven
at best.
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Czechoslovak party chief Husak enhanced his position to a degree this
week by reshuffling the leadership, but at the expense of compromises that
enabled more conservatives to move closer to the top. Husak was able to
promote a probable supporter to the powerful post of Czech party boss, to
replace a potential rival,''Lubomir Strougal. Strougal was transferred to the
job of federal premier, a position less dangerous to Husak's future. Neverthe-
less, several hard liners who served under Novotny returned to power, and
Alois Indra, Moscow's present watchdog in Prague, was elevated -to a non-
voting post on the party presidium. More personnel shifts are expected.
European security was the primary topic discussed laseweek when the
deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries _.met in Sofia. The
participants reportedly reviewe4 the position NATO representatives took on
this subject at their meeting last December.
The North Atlantic Council`Wecided this week to intensify efforts to
develop ground rules for conducting future pit lilateral talks between NATO
and Warsaw Pact countries on Eur peap--security. The Allies are likely to
find it hard to come up with an a peed policy on appropriate forums and
procedures for negotiating with the?\Communists, but the Warsaw Pact's
continuing efforts to arrange a corrfereice will serve as a catalyst.
A meet ngr on 27 January, billed as decisive for the formation of a new
Italian center-left coalition government, ended inconclusively. The four
party secretaries who attended are now holding sessions with their respective
executives.
A Soviet delegation arrived in the US on 28 January to negotiate a
cultural exchange agreement for 1970-1971, but the recent demonstrations
involving the Moscow Philharmonic in Washington and New York may be
used by Moscow as a pretext to cut back on exchanges. Bilateral discussions
of peaceful uses of nuclear explosions will begin on 11 February in Moscow,
and the two sides have arranged to reconvene the Geneva Disarmament
Conference on 17 February
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USSR TAKES NEW TACK TOWARD EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
The Soviets seem to be push-
ing back the target date for their
proposed European security con-
ference. A Soviet Foreign Min-
istry spokesman on 13 January pub-
licly admitted that the timing
was slipping, presumably from
Moscow's earlier estimate of the
first half of 1970. That same
week 28 European Communist par-
ties met in Moscow in what may
be the beginning of a new Soviet
effort to solicit broad-based sup-
port for the conference.
parties in 1967 and was restated
during the world Communist meeting
in Moscow last year. 25X1
differ about
whether the Soviets intend to link
this newly proposed congress to
the preparation of a conference
of European governments. The
timing strongly suggests, however,
that the Soviets do indeed plan
to use the congress as an instru-
ment for broadening mass support
for a later meeting on European
security.
The Soviets reportedly pro-
posed that the 28 parties work
toward a European "people's con-
gress"--which will probably in-
clude many of what the Communists
call "progressive" European
forces--in the second half of this
year. The concept of holding such
a congress before a conference of
governments was established at the
Karlovy Vary conference of European
In the process of arranging
and staging such an appeal to the
peoples of Europe, however, the
Soviets seem to be delaying the
achievement of their aim of con-
vening a meeting of governments--
a meeting Moscow hopes would end
in a tacit acceptance of the per-
manent division of Germany.\
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YUGOSLAVS SEEK TO INFLUENCE FUTURE COMMUNIST MEETINGS
Belgrade sees Moscow's pro-
posal at the January meeting of
European Communist parties that
a people's congress be convened
later this year as tailored to
it own specifications. It clearly
expects to take a hand in drawing
up the agenda and choosing the
participants.
Belgrade is eager to
sc edule these talks as soon as
possible.
It plans to push, as its
representative did at the meeting
in Moscow, for the participation
in the congress of all parties
in Europe on an equal basis. The
Yugoslavs do not want the con-
gress to be confined to European
security but to explore all ave-
nues to detente. In their view,
only from such discussions can
the smaller states of Europe ob-
tain guarantees regarding non-
Page 11
interference in their internal
affairs.
Although Moscow's proposals
for the congress appear similar
to Belgrade's, the Yugoslavs are
not sanguine that their format
will gain wide acceptance. Bel-
grade realizes that, contrary to
its own objectives, the Soviets
see the congress as a device to
give impetus to a European security
conference designed to do little
except verify the status quo, in-
cluding the Soviets' right to
intervene in the affairs of other
socialist states. Nevertheless
the Yugoslavs will play the game
as long as the ground rules for
future meetings, including the
congress, remain as they are now--
an open exchange of views with
no binding resolutions. The
leeway provided by these ground
rules allowed the Yugoslavs to
send a representative to the Com-
munist meeting in mid-January,
the first they have attended
since 1957. Should the rules
tighten, however, Yugoslavia will
again retreat to the sidelines
to protect its independent stand-
ing.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Jan 70
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EAST GERMAN TACTICS TOWARD BONN
The East German press this
week commented negatively on Chan-
cellor Brandt's lette to Premier
Stoph, and its frontie guards
harassed West Germans t veling to
and from West Berlin unti 28 Jan-
uary. Nevertheless, Pank pro-
posed that technical-level ego-
tiations on postal and tran orta-
tion matters resume soon.
The East German Governmen
has yet to reply officially to
Brandt's formal proposal that th
two Germanies begin discussion on
a renunciation-of-force agreement.
The news media, however, predicta-
bly criticized Brandt for allegedly
failing to propose talks on Pan-
kow's terms and for not accepting
the draft treaty proposed in De-
cember by Ulbricht as a basis for
negotiations. The main party paper
claimed that this treaty "shows
the only realistic way" to estab-
lish peaceful relations, and in-,,,-
sisted that recognition of East/
Germany as a sovereign state by
Bonn is "necessary." The paper
did not claim that this was/a pre-
condition for beginning talks, but
Ulbricht had previously s id that
a renunciation-of-force greement
is useless unless the ontracting
parties are both re co nized as sov-
ereign, independent tates.
East Germany ;/`s harassment of
West German trayo-lers reached its
peak on the 27,h, then stopped the
next day following the conclusion
of meetings in West Berlin of Bun-
destag committees and party groups.
The carefully controlled exercise
was designed to emphasize Pankow's
claim that West Berlin is an inde-
pendent political entity and that
East Germany controls West German
access to the city. Allied traf-
fic was not affected.
Pankow, at the same time, how-
ever, took the initiative in pro-
posing that the two sides resume
discussions of postal matters on
30 January, to which Bonn agreed.
One of the major issues to be re-
solved in these talks is whether
an agreement; should include pro-
visions relating to West Berlin.
In Novembe the East Germans balked
at accepting language suggesting
that the Federal Republic is legally
ompet,gnt to handle West Berlin's
p sta'i affairs. On 22 January,
Pa kow also proposed that talks on
trahsportation matters be resumed
,.d n t e 26th. The West Germans,
'howev r, said that they were un-
able t` accept the proposal on such
short nptice and suggested that
these talks begin in mid-February.
East''-.Germany this week also
held meetings with several of its
allies. Soviet Defense Minister
Grechko met on 26 January with the
East German big three--Ulbricht,
Honecker, and Stoph--as well as
with Defense Minister Hoffmann and
Security Minister Mielke. The top-
ics of conversation were not dis-
closed. Hungarian party and gov-
ernment chiefs Kadar and Fock ar-
rived on 28 January, and there is
evidence that they wish to discuss
Hungarian - East German differences,
especially over how to respond to
West German overtures.
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DUTCH COALITION FACES ROUGH FUTURE
Elections for provincial as-
semblies in March may determine the
future of Prime Minister De Jong's
four-party coalition. Faced with
an unpopular legislative program
and declining support in public
opinion polls, De Jong
may call early
parliamentary elections if the op-
position parties, as expected, do
well in the balloting. Parliamen-
tary elections are not mandatory
until May 1971.
The coalition, long assailed
from many quarters, has managed to
outlive the predictions of most ob-
servers. Its longevity may be due
in part to its technically expert
but politically colorless makeup.
Coalition supporters view this in-
creasingly as a liability, however,
and are urging the uncharismatic
De Jong to try to develop a more
positive public image, particularly
on TV. They believe such an effort
must be made if the government is
to carry through with its diffi-
cult legislative program.
Since early 1968 the govern-
ment has been grappling constantly
with mounting inflation while try-
ing to maintain balanced budgets.
In this effort, De Jong has had to
accommodate the varying interests
of the four coalition parties, as
well as divert the criticisms of
an increasingly vocal opposition.
De Jong narrowly averted a coali-
tion crisis last November over tax
policy and one in January over
wage policy. In the latter case,
the coalition sacrificed its eco-
nomics minister and its own economic
guidelines to maintain labor peace
by approving a wage agreement that
all the experts labeled clearly in-
flationary. Most observers are pes-
simistic about the future, antici-
pating other painful economic and
fiscal problems and expecting in-
flationary pressures to become more
acute in 1971.
The coalition is also the vic-
tim of growing public impatience
with traditional Dutch politics.
More and more people, particularly
of the educated, younger generation,
are disenchanted with the conserva-
tive, highly structured political
system, and advocate the creation of
a two-party system. This feeling
pervades all parties to some extent,
but it is most clearly expressed
by the Democrats '66, a relatively
new party that has done increasingly
well in local elections in the past
two years. Most observers expect
it also to do well in the March
elections.
De Jong may conclude that the
coalition parties are better able
to face general elections this year
than next. On the one hand, the
powerful opposition Labor Party is
currently so split on doctrinal is-
sues that it might suffer at the
polls. On the other hand, De Jong's
own Catholic Party is beginning to
show signs of disarray over the re-
ligious controversies in the Catholic
Church, and recent public opinion
polls have shown some slippage in
the party's standin .
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SECRET'
Page 16 WEEKLY SUM CRY 30 Jan 70
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
i
In Nigeria, federal officials are continuing their efforts to ensure an
orderly occupation of the forme secessionist area of Eastern Nigeria. Large
population movements and the breakdown of secessionist administrative
machinery are causing some disruption, however. Lagos, in an effort to
impose firm discipline on its occupying forces, is executing some looters, and
an improvement in troop conduct leas been reported.
The Middle East continues to immer, as Israel hammers constantly at
targets in Egypt. In the clearest exp nation to date of Israeli motives for air
attacks close to Cairo, Minister of Dfense Dayan said flatly on 28 January
that they were intended to undermi?e Nasir's authority. Dayan said, "We
want to tell the people of Egypt...' our leaders are not doing you any
good.' He added that the raids made it easier to hold the line along the
Suez Canal and to convince Egypt that it is not ready for full-scale war.
An abortive coup attempt against'
t,fhe regime in Iraq last week has
further strained already cool relations? between Baghdad and Tehran. Iraqi
accusations of Iranian participation'in the coup, backed by extensive details,
produced the mutual expulsion of ambassaors and consular staffs, and has
probably eliminated any chance of solving the Shatt al-Arab River border
problem in the near future.
In Congo (Kinshasa) President Mobutu's -decision to purchase a large
It appears, however, that he does not intend to purchase any sophisticated
jet fighters this year, although he reportedly made inquiries about Mirage
and Fiat jets.
A delegation representing the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary
Government is presently in Somalia, and the chances look better than ever
that the new "revolutionary" Somali regime will extend recognition to the
Viet Cong.
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Israeli Airstrike in Cairo Area
28 January
AIeX?Ha4
/-,_* QamaScus
GOLAN u irI4T5
ISRAEL
41A
Tel Aviv- WEST
Yafo BANK
~Jeru
~~ 1/)
Gaza
GAZA STRIP
Port Said V / I
Sedom.~
Israeli armo\ed thrust,
;Al Qantarah 20 January \
y `,v
cairn ? SINAI Suezal
I E D
Ra L . C
~ G f P T)
I,
E Iitt) ba
Sharni ash-
Shaykh
Shadwan Island
Israeli commando attack,
22 January
H_urShada.
SECRET-'
4Aro_ ,~._ ,f
nfarnakhond
-Heliopolis...
A1. a adi ,
?#lrn ' traThi'ig eaA'p
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CONFLICT CONTINUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Israel has continued its
military strategy, begun in early
January, of dramatic and embar-
rassing raids against Egypt. Is-
raeli planes struck the closest
yet to Cairo on 28 January when
they hit an army training camp
in Al Ma'adi some five or six
miles from Cairo. The bombing
of Al Ma'adi came close to the
Cairo-American college there and
shook the US Embassy. Heliopolis,
on the northeast edge of Cairo,
may also have been hit. The high-
light of the past week, however,
was the Israeli capture for 30
hours of the Egyptian-held Shad-
wan Island in the Gulf of Suez,
about 20 miles northwest of an
Egyptian naval base at Hurghada.
The Israelis claim to have demol-
ished the base after killing 60
Egyptians and taking 62 prisoners
and some equipment.
Other cease-fire lines were
relatively quiet. The Israelis,
however, continued to hunt out
Arab fedayeen in southern Jordan
in the aftermath of terrorist at-
tacks on Tel Aviv's Sedom potash
plant and of Israel's armored
thrust of 20 January into the
As Safi area east of the Dead
Sea.
Israel was still concerned
about the fate of the Israeli
watchman captured by Arab feda-
yeen on 31 December. He was re-
portedly visited in Jordan by the
Red Cross, but his captors ap-
parently are holding out for a
swap--not of the 20-odd Lebanese
civilians captured in retaliation
by the Israelis--but of Palestin-
ian fedayeen prisoners held by
the Israelis.
Page 19
President Nixon's message
to a conference of Jewish leders
ii Washington evoked accola4} s
f'om Tel Aviv, but produce znew
bitterness in the Arab Stales.
Th'e President made a stand&rd
reiteration of US friends]ip for
Israel, called again fora peace
settlement reached through agree-
ment-and negotiations between the
principals, and denied again that
the US was trying to ifnpose a
settlement. He also o tated that
the U was prepared to supply
arms to Israel if an;-'imbalance
occurred.
aft to Israel.
ud, to the provision by the US
o more Phantom and Skyawk air-
The Israelis,4'who have been
talking 1n terms cif a "serious
erosion": of US pa1icy, saw new
hope in the President's state-
ments. Foreign inister Eban
even went so fa as to suggest
that the U mi t reconsider its
position regar ing Big Power talks
and revert to what Israel has been
suggesting all along--that the Big
Power stop drawing maps and re-
strict themselves to getting the
parties concerned together.
The Akab States reacted
sharply, aking`"special note of
the timi of the statement, when
Israel h s been kattering them
consist tly and.ard over the
past month. They=saw new proof
that tilt US is "hopelessly in the
Israeli camp" and described the
Nixon statement as `'_the most hos-
tile JJS attitude yet toward the
Araba." They predicted that the
US was attempting to foreclose
Fre 'ich arms sales to the Arabs
an( viewed the statement as a prel-
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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NIGERIANS MOVING TO ENSURE ORDERLY OCCUPATION
Federal authorities have
continued their efforts to en-
sure an orderly occupation of
the former secessionist area of
Eastern Nigeria. At present,
however, the basic situation
there is characterized by the dis-
ruption common to most conquered
areas, compounded by large-scale
population movements.
The fear among Eastern tribes-
men that the Nigerians intended
to massacre them has been sub-
siding, as large numbers of people
have come out of the bush and
returned to their towns and vil-
lages. Some have already gone
to other parts of the federation,
including Lagos.
These population movements,
coupled with the sudden collapse
of the secessionists' adminis-
trative machinery, have disturbed
the patterns of life in most of
the main towns of the former en-
clave, however. In addition, a
serious economic problem has re-
sulted from the virtual absence
of Nigerian currency, although
Lagos reportedly intends to cir-
culate some soon.
Some soldiers of the federal
3d Division, which became widely
dispersed in the course of over-
running the former enclave, have
been behaving like conquerors.
Fairly widespread looting and rape
took place shortly after the seces-
sionists' collapse. In addition,
the advancing federal forces' prac-
tice of commandeering vehicles was
Page 2 0
continued by undisciplined soldiers
after the war had ended.
Federal officers have taken
firm measures to improve disci-
pline, including the execution
of some looting soldiers, and an
improvement in troop conduct has
been reported. Federal authori-
ties have also replaced some 3d
Division troops, who were oper-
ating far from their field head-
quarters, with soldiers from the
lst Division, whose command head-
quarters is nearby. This move
should ensure closer control of
occupying soldiers by officers
in division headquarters. It
also means, however, that elements
of the predominantly northern and
Muslim 1st Division troops are
now garrisoned in the heart of
Iboland, where northerners are
remembered above all for their
massacres of Easterners in North-
ern Nigeria in 1966.
The Nigerians remain extremely
sensitive about foreign partici-
pation in their relief effort.
Relief officials in Nigeria main-
tain that there is enough food
available to prevent widespread
starvation and that the major
need is additional transport,
which is being acquired from the
UK, the US, and West Germany.
The Nigerians are also bitter
about foreign press reporting
of the relief effort and now
seem inclined to limit, if not
prevent, access to secessionist
territory by the press.
SEC1 E '
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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PAKISTANI POLITICS MARKED BY VIOLENCE
The campaign for the constit-
uent assembly election in October
has been under way since 1 Janu-
ary, when full-scale political
activity resumed throughout the
country. Serious violence has
already marred the opening days
of the campaign, and more is
likely to occur.
President Yahya Khan has taken
extensive precautions to avoid
civil disturbances. He has is-
sued a statement outlining rules
of conduct for political activity,
making it clear that violence
will not be tolerated and that
troublemakers will be dealt with
harshly. Furthermore, he has
kept aloof from the political
fray in the hope that, at least
initially, his government may be
able to act as a neutral arbiter
among rival political groups.
Nevertheless, security conditions
are shaky at best, especially in
turbulent East Pakistan. The
capabilities of the armed forces
and police would be severely
strained by any massive outbreak
of violence in the eastern prov-
ince.
Some trouble has already oc-
curred, prompting Yahya publicly
to warn politicians to keep their
supporters in line. On 18 Janu-
ary, orthodox Muslims and leftists
clashed at a political rally in
Dacca. In the ensuing melee, at
least two died and hundreds were
wounded. This violence erupted on
the eve of a week of public meet-
ings, demonstrations, and strikes
called by students in Dacca to com-
memorate last year's widespread
agitation against the unpopular
Ayub regime. The week saw further
disorders and two highly success-
ful general strikes that brought
activity in the city to a near
standstill.
These disturbances are merely
a taste of things to come as the
intensely emotional electoral cam-
paign progresses. Many of the
major parties have already held
mass rallies. Bengali politician
Mujibur Rahman drew the largest
crowd on 11 January; about 300,000
people gathered to hear him in
Dacca. Crowded meetings and
rallies will be increasingly fre-
quent in the coming months and
will almost certainly produce
further incidents. Although Yahya
apparently sincerely wants and
intends to hold elections in Oc-
tober, a serious breakdown in do-
mestic peace and order could cause
him to reconsider his announced
timetable for a return to civilian
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UNITY GROWING AMONG MAGHREB COUNTRIES
Apprehension with regard to
expanding Egyptian influence in
Libya apparently has accelerated
the slow trend toward growing col-
laboration among the other Ma-
ghrebian countries--Morocco, Al-
geria, and Tunisia.
The Libyan coup and mutual
hostility toward Nasir seem to
have spurred Algeria and Tunisia
to conclude a treaty of friend-
ship and cooperation early this
month and to settle several long-
pending problems. The last ob-
stacle to the successful conclu-
sion of the prolonged and diffi-
cult negotiations was overcome
when Tunisia renounced its claims
to a small strip of the Algerian
Sahara.
Subordination, rather than
renunciation, of Morocco's far
more substantial territorial
claims led to the signing a year
ago of a similar treaty of friend-
ship between Algiers and Rabat.
Subsequently, Algeria's Boumediene
facilitated Morocco's rapproche-
ment with Mauritania, and this
may pave the way for Nouakchott's
inclusion in Maghrebian regional
organizations and meetings.
Moreover, during both the
Islamic and Arab summit confer-
ences held in Rabat last year,
the Algerians aligned themselves
with the Moroccans and Tunisians.
All three countries have adopted
similar basic approaches to the
Middle East situation: they are
emphasizing the role of the Pales-
tinians and playing down that of
the "front line" Arab states. z--"
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The Inter-American Economic and Social Council talks in Caracas have
so far beep characterized by more responsible discussion and fewer polemics
than has been the case in previous meetings of this sort. The Latin American
nations are'1ar from unified over the major issues of trade and development
assistance. On sour note has been the criticism of the US position by some
of the Brazilian, press, perhaps reflecting the pessimism of the Brazilian
delegate to the ?talks as well as the sensationalist nature of the 'papers
themselves.
Officials in several Latin American countries are again taking public
positions in favor of increased ties with Cuba. The foreign 9inisters of Peru
and Chile have recently\ nade statements to this effect, as has Luis Eche-
verria, the sure winner of;the Mexican presidential campaign. Castro stated
last year, however, that the Latin American nations-must repudiate OAS
sanctions against Cuba before he will agree to, work toward establishing
diplomatic relations.
Military disenchantment witli the leftist trend of the Bolivian Govern-
ment and with the presence of leftist civilians in the cabinet is continuing to
grow. President Ovando appears to be under increasing pressure to remove
the radical civilians from his cabinet"This dissatisfaction could also reflect
on General Juan Torres, the armed fors commander. Torres, who is highly
nationalistic and anti-US, isfrequently heated as one of the cabinet and is
considered one of the four members of the "political committee," which
reportedly is responsible for major policy decisions.
Bilateral talks between El Salvador and` Honduras began last week.
Honduran insistence on dealing first with the border dispute is expected to
hamper efforts to reach agreement on other matters and to prevent quick
movement toward restoration of diplomatic and trade relations.
Elections hold center stage in Costa Rica, Guatemala, the Dominican
Republic, and El Salvador. In Costa Rica and Guatemala, mudslinging
campaigns are the rule. The winner in Costa Rica's election on 1 February
may have trouble achieving national unity as a result. Juan Bosch's
Dominican Revolutionary Party has all but ruled out official participation in
the elections on 16 May if President Dalaguer runs for re-election. If the party
does not participate officially, its bloc of votes is likely to be scattered
among several smaller opposition groups, increasing Balaguer's chances of
victory.
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CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE TAKES SHAPE
The long-predicted, three-
man contest for the presidency in
elections next September is now
a reality. After extensive ma-
neuvering and much disagreement,
the Communist-leftist electoral
front has settled on Socialist
Senator Salvador Allende. He
will be a strong contender against
independent conservative Jorge
Alessandri and Christian Democrat
Radomiro Tomic.
Allende has run well in two
of his three previous tries for
the presidency. In the election
of 1958 he trailed the victorious
Alessandri by less than 34,000
votes, and received nearly 39 per-
cent of the vote in 1964, when
Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei
won the only majority achieved
in a Chilean presidential elec-
tion in this century. Frei's
total vote--56 percent--was at-
tained, however, with the almost
complete support of the Chilean
right, and his party's electoral
showing has de ned sharply ever
since. Tom', or example, re-
ceived onlyA percent of the vote
in a recent poll in the Santiago
area.
The selection of Allende
came suddenly after a prolonged
deadlock that had seriously
strained the Popular Unity Move-
ment, a combination of six dis-
Page 2 4
parate parties put together by
the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh).
Allende's persistence overcame a
contagious disenchantment with
his credentials and with what some
view as a shopworn image, which
at one point infected even the
PCCh. Communist leaders prob-
ably concluded that their long,
if often uncomfortable, alliance
with the more extremist Socialists
was the most important element
in their drive for power and that
the four lesser parties must go
along without further compromise.
Allende, an active supporter
of Fidel Castro, is running on
a program specifically designed
to create a socialist state.
This plan, worked out by a com-
mittee representing all the mem-
bers of the front, contains some
compromises that in the long run
may be too moderate for Allende.
He is, however, a pragmatic and
experienced politician who will
try not to alienate the non-Com-
munist support he needs to win.
His most effective campaign sup-
port will come from the Communist
political machine. He can also
count, however, on the revolution-
ary image of his own less well-or-
ganized Socialist Party, Chile's
largest labor organizations, and
groups responsive to other ele-
ments of the leftist front. All
will be peddling a program echo-
ing that of the Communist Party
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Jan 70
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photograph again"]
Now we are ready Fort
except for some cosmetic verbiage.
The program includes promises that
an "assembly of the people" will
control a completely overhauled
executive, judiciary, and legis-
lature, as well as the economy,
armed forces, all communications
media, and foreign policy.
Chileans have long accepted
the Communists and Socialists as
legitimate sectors of their po-
litical kaleidescope. Many feel
that the Christian Democrats' in-
novations and economic mistakes
have been disastrous for the coun-
try; that Alessandri, at 73, rep-
resents worn-out solutions; and
that there is no real risk in
giving socialist theories a try.
This attitude makes the victory
of Allende and his Communist spon-
sors a real possibility in Septem-
25X1
A AMA N LE ION IMETA IN OUBT
T he Provisional Junta Govern-
ment's already tenuous promise to
hold elections in 1970 has been.
further compromised by the presi-
dent of the electoral tribe al,
who has indicated that there is
insufficient time to organize an
election for this year.
With only 11 -months left, the
tribunal has not yet received in-
structions from the government con-
cerning the form or method of elec-
tion,`-and it has not even been
given thie_,ecessary budget. More-
over, time i-s,.growing short for
preparation of-- ie large number
of identity documbx ts that prob-
ably would be required.
Although the government be-
gan promising elections over a
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year ago, its primary motivation
has been to enhance its public
image rather than ta, promote a
freely elected, repreeentative
government. Initially,`?, residen-
tial and congressional Lections
were under consideration; ?.but
later it became apparent that
the government would only pgrmit
the election of a constituent\
assembly charged with amending-
the constitution. This was con\
firmed last October by General
Torrijos on the first anniver-
sary of his seizure of power.
The significance of Torrijos'
vague promise to hold an election
late in 1970 was sharply down-
graded when the electoral tribu-
nal revealed that the government
was considering three voting plans.
The first vastly simplified the;`
election process. The government
would select the delegates, alf-
though constituent assembly deci-
sions would subsequently be sub-
mitted to a referendum. Thd sec-
ond method permitted any individ-
ual to nominate himself to run
for the assembly from his electoral
district. With all political par-
ties excluded from participating
in the electoral proce,s, few in-
dividuals who do not Onjoy govern-
ment patronage could/expect to
win. The third plarx' called for
the election of del4gates by busi-
ness, labor, peasa t, and profes-
sional groups.
This latter met];kod dovetailed
with the government, s plans to or-
ganize the New Par fma Movement, a
political machin on the style of
the Mexican Gov nment party, and
appeared to be/the preferred ap-
proach. Effo is to organize the
movement, ho ever, had not pro-
ceeded very/tar and were further
sidetracked by the December coup
attempt..In addition, efforts to
organiz 'a compulsory government-
contro/Ted labor federation, which
could.1form one of the pillars of
the overnment party, ran into
. stiff business and labor opposi-
`ti 6n.
Torrijos, meanwhile, is
lstiil involved in reorganizing
the 'National Guard. The prin-
cipal' coup plotters remain under
arrest-,and will be tried for sub-
version Other officers whose
loyalty bas been suspect have
been removed from key positions.
A number staff posts have been
vacant for over a month, and re
t-s-vf t S"on within the Guard
stiff. persist. Under these cir-
cumstances, t,e government may
wish to avoid the increased level
of political adtivity implicit
even in a contr&lled election,
and may want mor'' time to build
a popular base otN support. Last
week's electoral ibunal state-
ment, therefore, m y represent
a trial balloon des'gned to test
public reaction to urther slip-
page in then'electio timetable.
SECRET
Page 2 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Jan 70
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SECRET
ARGENTINA STRIVES FOR NEW LOOK IN LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS
President Ongania is contin-
uing his efforts to develop more
harmonious relations with neigh-
boring countries, especially
with Chile.
Recent meetings with Chilean
President Frei and President
Stroessner of Paraguay, as well
as cordial receptions given Uru-
guayan and Bolivian officials,
apparently were designed to
overcome what the Argentines be-
lieve is an unfavorable image as
an aggressive and militant na-
tion.
In a communique marking the
end of President Ongania's two-
day visit to Asuncion last No-
vember, both presidents set aside
ideological differences and past
disputes and concentrated on
mutual economic objectives. Al-
though both came away with less
than they wanted, the visit was
cordial and created a reservoir
of good will.
The meeting with Stroessner
set the stage for Ongania's
highly publicized meeting with
Chilean President Frei. For
Ongania, the visit marked the
culmination of extended efforts
to improve relations, which have
Page 2 7
been strained by boundary dis-
putes and the movement of Chilean
migrant workers. Although the
meeting did not produce dramatic
results, the two leaders agreed
to facilitate economic coopera-
tion, to continue the work of the
mixed boundary commission, and to
seek adoption of new regulations
to provide for entry and resi-
dence for migrant workers from
both countries.
Ongania's trips could be
criticized as producing no con-
crete results other than delin-
eating mutual economic objec-
tives, but they probably have
provided some internal domestic
political advantage--however
marginal--for him. For example,
the publicity engendered by the
visits has diverted the atten-
tion of the populace at a time
when the government is being
blamed for not providing solu-
tions to long-standing economic
and social problems. Now that
the groundwork has been laid for
closer cooperation between Ar-
gentina and its neighbors, it
remains to be seen whether Bue-
nos Aires will take concrete
steps to implement many of the
economic objectives cited in
SECRET,/'`
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