WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 10, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed.
Secret
AA 0&
"10 October 1969
No. 0391/69
ARCHIVAT, Rr,CQR17
PI'E,A, .. 0
AGENCY ",A i li v fl _ 2 -2 T'
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 9 October 1969)
VIETNAM
Hanoi's leadership is trying hard to present a picture
of confidence and to avoid any suggestion that Ho's
death will change anything. The military lull in the
South was broken briefly last week by a brief flurry
of activity that may be a prelude to increased pres-
sure on the delta, where South Vietnamese troops have
already begun to take on a greater role in the war.
President Thieu has warned the South to expect to as-
sume more of the war burden, but has also expressed
his concern that the US not withdraw troops too rap-
idly.
PEKING AND MOSCOW TO HOLD BORDER TALKS
China's announcement on 7 October that it would enter
talks with the USSR marks the first concrete result of
the Kosygin-Chou meeting last month, and reflects re-
cent efforts by both sides to reduce tensions along
the border. The proposed talks appear to be only a
tactical move, however, and will not resolve fundamen-
tal differences dividing the two states.
HOSTAGE RELEASE EASES SINO-BRITISH TENSIONS
Peking's release of a British correspondent has re-
moved an irritant in Sino-British relations.
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
SECRET
STRAINS IN RULING OKINAWAN LEFTIST COALITION
The weak administrationof Okinawa's Chief Executive
is beginning to lead to'strains within the leftist
coalition government. Militant leftists may as a re-
sult be freer to raise more of a fuss over the issues
of US base rights, reversion to Japan, and nuclear
weapons.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
ARAN CONTROL PROGRESS IS UNEVEN
The US and the USSR have presented their draft seabeds
treaty at the Geneva arms control conference, where
enthusiasm for a substantive UN General Assembly re-
solution on chemical and biological warfare appears to
be diminishing.
SECRET
Page i i V EEKLY SUMMARY 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 20108/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
SECRET
POLICY TOWARD BONN DOMINATED EAST GERMAN ANNIVERSARY
Speeches by Soviet leader Brezhnev and East German
boss Ulbricht served to pinpoint strains caused by
differences in their attitude toward West Germany.
PARTY FACTION CLASH IMMINENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Infighting between party chief Husak's "realist" fac-
tion and the rival pro-Soviet group will intensify as
a result of the campaign by the ultraconservatives to
shift the balance of power in their favor.
SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ELECT NEW LEADER
Olof Palme, elected party chairman to succeed Tage
Erlander and also likely to be named prime minister
on 14 October, is cultivating a moderate image and may
attempt to improve Swedish-American relations.
USSR SEEKS TO EXPAND HEAVY TRUCK PRODUCTION
Unprecedented investment allocations for the motor
vehicle industry and attempts to secure Western tech-
nology underscore the urgent Soviet desire to produce
more trucks.
Middle East - Africa
ARAB-ISRAELI SKIRMISHES CONTINUE APACE
Egypt and Israel recently used night air strikes a ainst
each other for the first time.
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
SECRET
ANTIFOREIGN VIOLENCE ERUP'S IN IVORY COAST
Foreign workers are increasingly in conflict with un-
employed Ivorians. Repressive force has returned an
uneasy calm, but further clashes seem inevitable be-
cause of student and labor discontent.
SUDAN DISCUSSES AID WITH USSR AND WORLD BANK
Sudan may have the option of turning to the USSR for
assistance on a large-scale irrigation scheme if the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
does not provide financing.
Western Hemisphere
NEW BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT MQVING SLOWLY
General Ovando's government has consolidated its posi-
tion but has not yet taken any significant steps toward
redirecting government policy.
GENERAL EMILIO MEDICI TO BE BRAZIL'S NEW PRESIDENT
General Medici, a firn supporter and close friend of
President Costa e Silva, has announced that he hopes to
restore democracy to Brazil before the end of his term,
but warned that anyone attempting to disturb the coun-
try's tranquility and the national security will be
severely punished.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNING BEGINS IN COLOMBIA
Political campaigningby Conservative Party presiden-
tial hopefuls has temporarily taken the political spot-
light.
MILITARY AND POLITICAL PRESSURES PROLIFERATING IN CHILE
Interest groups jockeying for economic benefits and
political advantage in an election year are pressing
President Frei on many issues.
25X625X1
SECRET
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
Peking and Moscow have agreed to reopen talks aimed at easing ten-
sions along their 4,000-mile border. The Chinese announcement displayed a
more flexible approach toward the border issue, reflecting Peking's aware-
ness of the preponderance of Soviet power and its unwillingness to get
further embroiled with its northern neighbor while domestic troubles remain
unsolved. The border talks will be just that, however, and fundamental
differences between the two Communist powers will remain.
Peking, in a less dramatic but still important aspect of its foreign
relations, has moved to restore more correct relations with the UK by
releasing Reuters correspondent Anthony Grey, who had spent 807 days
under house arrest in Peking. The Chinese action was prompted by the
British release of the last of 13 journalists jailed during the 1967 distur-
bances in Hong Kong.
The leadership in North Vietnam is trying to show it is confidently
maintaining the policies of the late Ho Chi Minh. Hanoi appears especially
eager to avoid any suggestion that Ho's death will produce a break in the
Paris talks. Prosecution of the war in the south is continuing at the same
reduced pace set before Ho's demise, but with many indications that in-
creasing pressure will be brought to bear on South Vietnamese troops that
have been replacing US forces. President Thieu is telling the South to expect
to assume more of the burden of the war, but has warned that the US must
not withdraw its troops too rapidly.
The weak administration of Okinawan Chief Executive Yara is eroding
his authority in the leftist coalition government. Militant leftists may as a
result be freer to raise more of a ruckus over the issues of US base rights,
reversion to Japan, and nuclear weapons.
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
VIETNAM
Post-Ho Picture Still Murky.
Hanoi's new leaders are
striking a pose of business as
usual. Foreign Communists re-
turning from Ho Chi Minh's funeral
claim the North Vietnamese aro
trying hard to stop speculation
that Ho's death will lead eider
to significant policy changes or
to a crisis of indecision and
disagreement.
The picture of confidence
emanating from the north was re-
inforced this week by the further
travels abroad of two important
politburo members. Premier Pham
Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi, sent
to Peking last week for China's
national day celebrations, have
moved on to East Berlin for simi-
lar festivities. This attempt to
cultivate European Communist sup-
port suggests that the North-Viet-
namese will continue to carry out
Ho's balancing act in the Sirxo-
Soviet conflict, without going
too far into either camp.
The North Vietnamese appear
to be especially eager to avoid
any suggestion that Ho's death
will produce a break in their
hard-line stance in the Pari$
talks. In all forums the Viet-
namese Communists are sticking
to their demands for an uncondi-
tional US troop withdrawal ad
the formation of a eoalitiongov-
ernment as their price for p?og-
ress in Paris.
Hanoi's representatives in
Paris this week demonstrated spe-
cial sensitivity to rumors of a
break in this position. Within
hours of press reports that the
Communists would agree to elec-
tions while US troops were still
in South Vietnam, a formal denial
was issued
In North Vietnam, however,
the image of unity and continu-
ity shows some signs of tarnish.
On 4 October the politburo launched
an indoctrination campaign de-
signed to use Ho's prestige to
consolidate the new regime's con-
trol and to muster support for
its programs. The announcement
of the new campaign strongly sug-
gests that the new leadership has
some doubts about the quality of
support from both the party and
the army.
Thieu on Vietnamization
During the past week Presi-
dent Thieu has been coming to
grips with the realities of Viet-
namization. He has been prepar-
ing the public for further re-
ductions of US forces and is
trying to impress upon the govern-
ment and the armed forces that
they must now do more themselves
to carry the battle. Thieu
sought to give an impression of
confidence that South Vietnam is
strong enough to shoulder the in-
creasing burdens but he has also
warned against too rapid a rate
of withdrawal by US forces.
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
SECRET
Thieu played the theme that by
the end of 1970 a large number
of US combat troops will have been
withdrawn and that South Vietnam-
ese will replace them. At the
same time he was quick to as-
sure both audiences that the
US would not abandon South Viet-
nam, especially while North Viet-
namese troops remain in the South.
Thieu evidently views with some
alarm the renewal of antiwar agi-
tation in the US and he.may be-
lieve that by emphasizing his
support for Vietnamization he
can help dampen criticism of the
war in the US. Thieu betrayed
some apprehension over the US
withdrawals to the cabinet, how-
ever, saying that it might be-
come necessary for Saigon to
"set limits" on additional US
force reductions.
Thieu and his policy ad-
visers apparently have decided
to take a similar positive ap-
proach to the idea of a cease-
fire, indicating that they are
willing to discuss preconditions
with the enemy while rejecting
any idea of an unconditional
cease-fire. Thieu told the As-
sembly that such discussions
could be undertaken because of
government successes on the bat-
tlefield and in the pacification
program.
Thieu's recent statements
underline Saigon's deep concern
and recurrent fear that the US
Page 3
might eventually decide to press
for the establishment of a coali-
tion government. In his speech
to the Assembly, he strongly re-
iterated South Vietnam's determ-
ination never to a ree to a co-
alition government
Military Developments in
South Vietnam
Communist forces briefly
broke the prolonged lull in mili-
tary action last weekend with a
spate of shellings and occasional
ground attacks. Most of these
took place in the southern half
of the country, with more than
half in the delta provinces. Al-
though two provincial capitals
were hit by light bombardments,
the principal targets were South
Vietnamese military positions,
particularly Regional Force (RF)
positions. Casualties were gen-
erally light.
This latest flurry of at-
tacks may be a prelude to in-
creased enemy pressure against
South Vietnamese military forces
that have recently assumed
greater responsibility for the
defense of IV Corps. Following
the introduction of large num-
bers of North Vietnamese mili-
tary personnel into the delta--
which has been virtually concur-
rent with the withdrawal of US
combat forces--the number of
clashes between small enemy units
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
25X1 1
1
and South Vietnamese forces has
picked up in recent weeks. This
This October phase will
25X1
activity may be designed to test
be a period of testing and the i
f.
South Vietnamese defense capa-
Communist military hierarchy will
bilities in preparation for a
larger scale offensive in the
delta provinces soon.
Additional indicators of
enemy preparations for offensive
activity continue to crop up in
various strategic areas of South
Vietnam.
The Communists in Tay Ninh
Province hope to kick off a num-
25X1 ber of attacks during October,
probably base its planning for
the forthcoming winter-spring
campaign partly on the performance
and accomplishments of the enemy
forces during this phase.
Casualty figures for the
week ending 4 October further
exemplify the relatively low
level of combat throughout South
Vietnam. During that week, 64
Americans were killed, the lowest
weekly total since November 1966.
South Vietnamese casualties were
also down considerably, as were 25X1
enemy losses, which stood at some
1,900 for the week.
PEKING AND MOSCOW TO HOLD BORDER TALKS
China's announcement on 7
October that it would enter talks
with the USSR is the first fruit
of the Kosygin-Chou meeting last
month and reflects recent ef-
forts by both sides to reduce
tensions along the border. The
two sides have agreed on a meet-
ing of deputy ministers in Peking,
and Western news reports, quot-
ing Soviet sources, state that
the talks will begin later this
month. This has not been of-
ficially confirmed, however.
The Chinese announcement,
while it obviously attempted
to enhance China's case in the
dispute with Moscow, represented
a noticeable retreat from Pe-
king's border statement last
May. At that time the Chinese
indicated that discussions to
ease the border conflict would
require Moscow's prior recogni-
tion that the present boundary
is based on "unequal treaties,"
and the negotiation of a new
comprehensive settlement. Pe-
king's announcement of 7 Oc-
tober, however, omitted this
demand and stated that the
"status quo" along the frontier
would be acceptable for the
time being.
SECRET
Page 4 WEEK
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
China's more flexible ap-
proach was dictated by Peking's
concern over the current border
crisis. The Chinese statement
pointed to what it termed "nu-
clear war threats" by Moscow
and disavowed any Chinese in-
tention to launch an atomic
attack. China's anxiety over
the dangerous frontier situa-
tion is evident from pointed ref-
erences in recent Chinese propa-
ganda to "surprise nuclear at-
tack," as well as indications
that Peking is preparing con-
tingency plans for extended con-
flict with Moscow.
The Soviet Union has been
pressing China to hold border
talks for some time, and the two
may have already reached a lim-
ited understanding regarding
steps to quiet the border before
Peking released its statement.
(during the Kosygin-
Chou meeting both sides reached
a tentative agreement to talk
on border problems and have
since had several contacts on
an official level. China's an-
nouncement on 7 October mentioned
two earlier Chinese communica-
tions to Moscow--on 18 September
and 6 October.
Both sides have already
taken limited steps to lessen
outward signs of hostility ap-
parently in anticipation of the
negotiations. Although Peking
at first did not reciprocate
Moscow's near halt on anti-Chi-
nese propaganda following the
Kosygin-Chou meeting, the Chi-
nese softened their polemics
against the USSR during national
day ceremonies and reduced do-
mestic anti-Soviet propaganda.
The Soviets sent unusually cor-
dial anniversary greetings to
China this year, and Soviet am-
bassadors attended Chinese Na-
tional day receptions in a num-
ber of foreign capitals for the
first time in several years.
Nevertheless, the Chinese
statement clearly implies that the
proposed border talks will be
only a tactical move designed
to ease border tensions and
will not resolve fundamental
differences between the two
states. A lengthy Chinese re-
lease of 8 October refuted in
detail the USSR's most recent
major statement on the border
conflict and indicated Peking's
intention to continue debate on
its fundamental differences with
Moscow. It also contained a
five-point plan that established
China's stand for the upcoming
talks. Apparently to mask its
retreat on the question of border
talks with the Russians, Peking
maintained that a final over-all
settlement will still require
Moscow to recognize the "unequal"
treaties and conclude a new
"equal" treaty with China. The
statement emphasized, however,
that pending such a development,
both sides should maintain the
status quo along the border and
take steps, including troop with-
drawals from disputed areas, to
avert further conflict along the
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
SECRET
HOSTAGE RELEASE EASES SING-BRITISH TENSIONS
The release of Reuters corres-
pondent Anthony Grey on 4 October
after 807 days of house arrest has
removed a long-standing irritant in
Sino-British relations and demon-
strates Peking's willingness to
move, on a quid pro quo basis,
toward more correct Sino-British re-
lations. The Chinese action was
prompted by the British release on
3 October of the last of 13 leftist
journalists jailed during the 1967
disturbances in Hong Kong. Grey was
placed under house arrest in July
1967 in retaliation for the deten-
tion of the newsmen, and Peking from
the beginning had linked his freedom
to the release of the journalists.
The case of Grey and the Chi-
nese newsmen illustrates the compli-
cating role Hong Kong plays in Sino-
British relations. The Chinese have
taken the position that their anti-
British actions during the Cultural
Revolution were in response to the
"oppression of patriotic Chinese"
in Hong Kong. The British, however,
maintain that Hong Kong colonial af-
fairs should not become involved in
bilateral relations between Peking
and London. Thus, Hong Kong offi-
cials were reluctant to meet Pe-
king's demand and release the left-
ist newsmen prematurely, fearing
that this might encourage future
Communist blackmail tactics against
the colony. Nevertheless, mounting
pressure in London to do something
for the unfortunate Grey eventually
led to the review and reduction of
the journalists' sentences early
this year, as well as the rescission
of many of the colony's 1967 emer-
gency laws limiting antigovernment
political activities.
During the past year, Hong
Kong Communists retreated from
their policy of "confrontation" and
presently are under orders from Pe-
king to concentrate on low-key and
long-term efforts such as organiz-
ing labor and exploiting economic
and social grievances. The Chi-
nese have also returned to more
normal diplomatic procedures in
their dealings with British repre-
sentatives in both London and Pe-
king. Nevertheless, a full return
to a pre - Cultural Revolution
status in Sino-British relations
appears unlikely in the near fu-
ture. There is nothing in Grey's
release to suggest any movement
in the cases of 12 other British
subjects under detention in China.
In addition, there is no indica-
tion that the British consulate
in Shanghai, closed in 1967, will
be allowed to reopen or that the
Chinese will pay for British prop-
erty damaged or destroyed by Red
Guards during the same period.
STRAINS IN RULING OKINAWAN LEFTIST COALITION
Okinawa's first popularly I Ryukyus and the local populace.
elected Chief Executive, Chobyo
Yara, who was swept into office last
November on a broad leftist coali-
tion ticket calling for immediate
reversion of the island to Japan,
has proved to be a useful buffer be-
tween the US administration in the
Page 9
Despite his leftist trappings and
dogmatic espousal of revisionist
aims, Yara generally has treated
bilateral issues with restraint and
moderation. It is becoming doubt-
ful, however, that Yara can con-
tinue to restrain extremist elements
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
in the coalition from adopting
militant tactics against US in-
terests.
That Yara, a former teacher
with no formal political back-
ground, has provided weak admin-
istrative leadership is becoming
painfully clear as the Okinawan
government becomes increasingly
enmeshed in negotiations with both
US and Japanese government offi-
cials on complicated aspects of
the projected reversion in 1972.
Although Yara is still popu-
lar with the masses, the gap be-
tween the moderates and extremists
in the coalition has steadily
widened over the past year to a
point where his over-all control
is threatened. The small but ob-
streperous radical Socialist and
Communist groups in his coalition
were disturbed when Yara recently
persuaded labor leaders to cancel
a general strike against the pres-
ence of B-52s in Okinawa. Last
month, he was further isolated
from his radical supporters when
he refused to oppose Prime Minis-
ter Sato's trip to the US in No-
vember for negotiations on the
Okinawa issue. Okinawan radicals
criticized Sato's "subservience"
for not insisting on immediate re-
version and withdrawal of US bases
from the Ryukyus.
Yara's acquiescence in the
official Japanese position has en-
couraged the radical Socialists
and the Communists to take a more
aggressive line. Militant labor
unions and front organizations al-
lied with the reformist coalition
now may feel that they have a
freer hand to stage strikes and
violent demonstrations against US
bases. The developing campaign
in Japan by militant opponents of
Japanese-US.security ties is also
likely to stir the Okinawan ex-
tremists to similar activities.
Although long unhappy over
visits of US nuclear submarines
to Okinawa, Yara last week for the
first time officially requested
the US to stop these port calls.
He cited as a pretext an unsub-
stantiated report by Okinawan tech-
nicians of abnormally high radio-
activity in a local port following
a recent submarine visit. Yara's
demarche may be an attempt to
stave off further deterioration
in his position and could lead
to a harder line in his dealings
with US officials over base is-
sues.
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
SECRET
Moscow presumably is preparing for the prospective border talks with
China, but it has given out no official information regarding the next step.
There is speculation that First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov will head
the Soviet delegation when negotiations begin, possibly later this month.
Since Kuznetsov has also been considered the likely leader of the Soviet
team in the long-expected discussions with the US on strategic arms limita-
tions (SALT), his preoccupation with China could mean a further delay in
getting SALT under way. On the Arab-Israeli despute, Moscow news media
have taken a decidedly pessimistic view of the results of the Gromyko-
Rogers exchanges, accusing the US of "bad faith" for entertaining Israeli
Prime Minister Meir while the negotiations were in progress.
A compromise between West Germany and the European Community
(EC) has resolved the question of protecting German farmers from the
effects of the floating mark. Further difficulties can be expected, however,
when Bonn finally pegs the mark and requests longer term exceptions to the
Common Agricultural Policy.
The EC Commission has recommended that membership negotiations
with the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway be opened "as soon as pos-
sible," indicating that the members are taking a significantly more favorable
attitude toward enlargement.
Recent meetings of wheat exporting nations have raised expectations
that the international wheat market can regain stability. The increased
participation of the EC and Argentina has been particularly encouraging.
Delegations from 84 countries, including all Communist states except
China and Albania, attended the 20th anniversary of the East German
regime. Yugoslavia was represented only by a parliamentarian and Romania
by a deputy premier, however, reflecting both their poor relations with
Pankow and their good relations with Bonn. East Germany's nearest neigh-
bors all sent their top leaders, Gomulka of Poland, I-lusak of Czechoslovakia,
and Kadar of Hungary.
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
SECRET
ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS IS UNEVEN
The US and the USSR presented
at the Geneva arms control talks
this week their draft of a treaty
limiting the use of seabeds for mil-
itary purposes. In another arms
control field, chemical and biolog-
ical warfare (CBW), enthusiasm for
a substantive UN General Assembly
resolution appears to be diminish-
ing even though interest in the sub-
ject is likely to remain high.
Culminating several months of
bilateral negotiation, the treaty
would ban the emplacement on the
seabeds of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and facilities "specifically
designed for storing, testing, or
using such weapons." Nations that
adhere to the treaty would continue
to enjoy freedom of action within
a 12-mile coastal zone as defined
in the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Territorial Sea "and in ac-
cordance with international law."
This phraseology represents a com-
promise designed to blur a conten-
tious issue: whether certain mar-
ginal seas of the USSR--regarded by
Moscow as internal waters--fallwithin
the scope of treaty prohibitions.
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
SECRET
NATO disarmament experts ex-
pressed a wide range of objections
to the proposed treaty at a recent
Alliance meeting. The Belgian rep-
resentative made the most compre-
hensive attack on the draft, stating
that he did not see "how Belgium
could support it." Brussels favors
a more complete demilitarization of
the seabeds and, along with several
other NATO members, is deeply con-
cerned over the lack of a provision
for international verification of
compliance with the treaty. Ot-
tawa's representative stated that
the treaty does not meet the Cana-
dian security requirement of a larger
coastal zone for national freedom
of action. The Italian disarmament
expert noted his government's op-
position to the provision giving
the nuclear powers a veto over amend-
ments to the treaty. These objec-
tions are indicative of the con-
tinuing sensitivity of the NATO mem-
bership concerning full consultation
on matters affecting the Alliance.
The Geneva conferees had shown
increasing impatience and dissatis-
faction during the course of the
bilateral negotiations, and time
is growing short for adequate con-
sultations there before the UN Gen-
eral Assembly tackles the subject,
probably in November. NATO members
represented in the Geneva talks are
expected again to stress their prob-
lems with the draft treaty, and sev-
eral non-NATO Geneva conferees also
appear to have serious reservations.
If agreement on a text is not
achieved during the arms control
talks, the unhappy parties will cer-
tainly raise their grievances in the
General Assembly, a development that
would adversely affect the treaty's
prospects.
Meanwhile, participants in the
Geneva talks appear to be losing some
of their ardor for a substantive CBW
resolution that would have the ef-
fect of barring the use of tear gas.
Sweden now doubts that its proposal--
which cites "a customary rule of in-
ternational law" prohibiting CBW use,
including tear gas and other non-
lethal substances, in international
wars--can obtain consensus backing
at the General Assembly. There is
some sentiment that after Assembly
consideration of the subject, the
various CBW proposals should be re-
ferred to Geneva for review along
with the report of Secretary Gen-
eral Thant on CBW. He wants a UN
resolution clearly affirming that
the Geneva Protocol of 1925 already
prohibits the use of CBW agents,
including tear gas, in war.
Moscow is continuing to push
its draft convention banning the
development, production, and stock-
piling of CBW agents for consid-
eration by the Assembly. Parties
to the convention would be required
to destroy existing stocks or di-
vert them to peaceful uses. The
Soviets have been able to secure
Assembly review of their initiative
apart from those--such as the
Swedish one--offered at the Geneva
talks.
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
SECRET
POLICY TOWARD BONN DOMINATED EAST GERMAN ANNIVERSARY
Delegations from 84 coun-
tries gathered in East Berlin
to pay homage to East Germany
on its 20th anniversary on 7
October. Speeches by Soviet
leader Brezhnev and East German
boss Ulbricht, however, served
to pinpoint strains caused by
differences in their attitude
toward West Germany.
Brezhnev avoided strident
condemnation of Bonn, probably
with an eye toward influencing
the prospective left-of-center
coalition government in West
Germany. Moreover, he left the
door open for improved relations
by declaring his readiness to
"respond accordingly" should
the Federal Republic develop a
more "realistic" foreign policy.
Ulbricht, on the other hand
made no such gesture and his
speech was spiced with the usual
polemics. While neither leader
demanded Bonn's full diplomatic
recognition of East Germany nor
mentioned the status of Berlin,
Ulbricht attached a great many
preconditions for improved re-
lations with West Germany. Per-
haps reflecting Pankow's dis-
satisfaction with Brezhnev's
remarks, the East German media
did not carry his speech until
late in the day after reporting
the speeches of other delegations.
The East Germans had pre-
viously felt that the Soviets
were too forthcoming in their
dialogue with Bonn. Brezhnev's
speech will not allay Pankow's
fears that rapprochement between
Moscow and Bonn may eventually
lead to its isolation. Never-
theless, the East Germans may
not have much choice. When the
Soviets responded last month to
the Allied demarche calling for
talks on Berlin and support for
East - West German talks on top-
ics of mutual interest, for ex-
ample, the East Germans, presumably
at Soviet urging, met with Bonn
officials on postal and trans-
portation matters.
Several incidents marred
the celebrations. During a fi-
nal rally in Alexanderplatz on
7 October, youths in a large
crowd responded to the appear-
ance of Czechoslovak leader
Husak with shouts of "Dubcek!
Dubcek! Liberalization in
Prague." Police moved in quickly
and silenced the dissidents.
Similar incidents occurred on
Unter-den-Linden and near the
Wall.
PARTY FACTION CLASH IMMINENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Party leader Husak's "real-
ist" faction and rival pro-So-
viet group in an attempt to
strengthen their respective po-
sitions, are both trying to
substitute their own people for
Page 16
those of Dubcek's reformers who
still hold responsible positions
in the party, government, and
mass organizations. Consequently,
clashes between the two factions
appear imminent. Husak must
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
break the power of the opposition
group before the hard liners can
shift the balance of power in
their favor.
Personnel changes within
the Slovak party hierarchy last
week indicate that Husak's power
base in Bratislava is still in-
tact. Reformists removed from
the Slovak party presidium were
replaced by moderates who will
probably support him. However,
Vasil Bilak--long a Husak adver-
sary--was returned to the Slovak
central committee, where a con-
servative resurgence appears to
25X1 have begun.
Bilak ultimately hopes
to undermine Husak's authority
and regain control of the Slovak
25X1 party himself.
On another front, the con-
servatives are intent on testing
Husak's resolve that no trials
of liberals will be staged. They
are demanding a "show trial" of
General Prchlik, an ultrapro-
gressive who allegedly revealed
military secrets in a speech last
year. Aware that this would open
the floodgate for legal proceed-
ings against other reformists,
Husak must act now to squelch
the affair or to force the con-
servatives and the courts to
treat the indictment as an iso-
lated case.
Husak has also been unable
to prevent his opposition from
getting influential government
and party posts. An ultracon-
servative, Mamula, who had been
in disgrace for backing former
party boss Novotny when he at-
tempted to use military force
to sustain his power in early
1968, has been exonerated.
Manula probably will be returned
to a key post in the security
apparatus, a development that
could give additional impetus to
the conservative drive to hold
show trials.
The population at large has
become increasingly apathetic
toward domestic political devel-
opments. Regime ultraconserva-
tives probably will benefit most
from this trend and may become
more open and daring in their ef-
forts to gain control of the re-
gime. Public indifference to-
ward the regime, moreover, ap-
pears to have increased mark-
edly since popular leaders--
primarily Dubcek and Josef
Smrkovsky--were dismissed from
the top leadership, and because
Husak himself has played a key
role in eliminating the reforms
of 1968. The primary reason for
popular apathy is the realiza-
tion that the Husak government
will deal harshly with any anti-
regime or anti-Soviet demonstra-
tions.
Moscow's show of satisfaction
with Husak's performance reflects
Soviet approval of the policies
he has introduced thus far.
Husak's inflexibility on issues
such as his refusal to give an
outright endorsement of the So-
viet invasion, however, has de-
terred the Russians from whole-
heartedly supporting the Czecho-
slovak party leader. Domestic
conservatives--apparently encour-
aged by this anomalous situa-
tion--seem to be trying to estab-
lish a strong, unified alterna-
tive to the Husak regime.
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ELECT MEW LEADER
The Swedish Social Democratic
Party has elected Olof Palme to
succeed retiring party chairman
Tage Erlander. It is likely that
he will also be named Prime Minis-
ter when Erlander retires from that
office on 14 October.
The 42-year-old Palme, an
Erlander protege for 15 years
and member of the government for
six, has long been identified with
the party's left wing. Prior to
the 1968 parliamentary elections
he was one of the leading spokes-
men against US involvement in the
Vietnam war. His participation
alongside a North Vietnamese dip-
lomat, in a demonstration in Feb-
ruary 1968 led to the recall of
the US ambassador. Subsequent
government actions favorable to
the North Vietnamese and the Na-
tional Liberation Front, which
were intended to curry favor with
the left Social Democrats, further
contributed to the cooling of
Swedish-American relations. As
a result Washington has delayed
naming a new ambassador to Stock-
holm.
Since his party's sweeping
victory in the 1968 parliamentary
elections, Palme has cultivated
a more moderate image. He took
this step to improve his maneuver-
ability once he became party and
government leader and to make him-
self acceptable to the more con-
servative trade union and middle-
class members of the party. The
success of this tactic can be seen
in his election to the chairman-
ship, by unanimous consent of the
party congress, and the frequently
repeated observation in the Swed-
ish press that seldom has a man
risen to such high office without
revealing his own political be-
liefs.
The first statement made by
Palme following his election
stressed the themes of greater
social equality in domestic af-
fairs and a firm and consistent
neutrality in foreign affairs.
The domestic reforms recommended
are not dramatic and include
such measures as shortening the
work week to 40 hours, lowering
the retirement age to 65, and
adjusting the tax structure to
benefit lower income groups.
In foreign policy, Palme
has stated his desire for good re-
lations with the great powers and
active Swedish participation in
the cause of peace and progress.
This aim is complicated by the par-
ty's concurrent approval of in-
creased aid to North Vietnam and
Cuba. The Social Democrats' pen-
chant for making such gestures to
the left has affected adversely
Stockholm's relations with the
United States, and to a lesser
extent the other Nordic countries.
Palme presumably will avoid
controversy while the party pre-
pares for the next parliamentary
elections, scheduled for September
1970 and may also attempt to im-
prove relations with the US. He
has already made several state-
ments implying a desire to do this.
Should he succeed in demonstrating
skill as a statesman while main-
taining his party's growing popu-
larity, Palme can probably look
forward to a term comparable to
Erlander's 23 years in office.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
SECRET
USSR SEEKS TO EXPAND HEAVY TRUCK PRODUCTION
The Soviet Government has
exhibited an urgent desire for
more trucks by stepping up pro-
duction goals and announcing plans
to build a large new complex to
produce heavy trucks. During the
past year, high Soviet officials
have made several probes to de-
termine the availability of Amer-
ican, Japanese, and Western Euro-
pean truck manufacturing technol-
ogy. In July, officials revealed
that the projected complex, when
completed in 1974, is to be cap-
able of producing annually 150,000
diesel-powered trucks of 8- to
11-ton capacity. Heavy truck pro-
duction now totals about 40,000--
less than 10 percent of annual
truck output.
Soviet officials acknowledge
the need for foreign technological
assistance, but none of the West-
ern firms is responding to Soviet
overtures with much enthusiasm.
The preferred source of technol-
ogy is the American truck building
industry, as Kosygin has made
clear in bidding for official US
cooperation. Soviet prospects for
securing American assistance are
doubtful, however, because of US
export controls. It is likely
that Italy's FIAT--which already
is participating in the construc-
tion of a large passenger-car
plant in the USSR--eventually will
play a major role in the truck
project, perhaps in collaboration
with France's Berliet truck firm.
Top officials of FIAT reportedly
have discussed this subject with
Soviet officials in Moscow re-
cently. Earlier this year, Soviet
officials held discussions with
representatives of Berliet and
two other French firms.
The minister of the Soviet
motor vehicle industry, who boasts
that vehicle manufacturing has a
status enjoyed by no other Soviet
industry, is under heavy pressure
to speed the expansion of truck
production of all types. The
1970 plan target has been raised
from 600,000 to 750,000, and a
recent decree by the Council of
Ministers calls for rapid comple-
tion of major expansion programs
at the biggest truck producing
plants.
To accomplish the high goals
set for the motor vehicle industry,
the government has allocated an un-
precedented amount of investment
for 1969--1,260 million rubles--
a sum equaling the total amount
invested in the industry from 1965
through 1968. A program to in-
crease capacity for passenger cars
is nearing completion, freeing the
motor vehicle industry to devote 25X1
a larger portion of its funds and
attention to truck building.
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
Clashes continued to occur almost daily along the Arab-Israeli cease-fire
lines this past week. On 6 October Egyptian aircraft struck Israeli positions
in the Sinai, losing three planes in the action. Israel, meanwhile, continued
its own air attacks on Egyptian positions along the Suez Canal and the Gulf
of Suez. In other recent actions, Israeli ground forces raided areas in
southern Lebanon on the weekend of 4 October, and Israeli jets attacked
suspected fedayeen camps in Jordan on 7 October.
Indian External Affairs Minister Dinesh Singh, following his return
from the UN, told the press on 8 October that he had discussed with US
officials India's intention to upgrade its diplomatic mission in North Viet-
nam.
African members of the Universal Postal Union are pushing for South
Africa's expulsion from the organization. If their tactic is successful, similar
moves to expel Pretoria from other UN-related agencies would be bolstered.
Emperor Haile Selassie is undertaking a new initiative to get peace talks
under way between Biafra and the federal government of Nigeria, but
prospects for an early meeting are not bright. The over-all military situation
remains stalemated
Dahomey's former army chief of staff and acting president for seven
months in 1968, Alphonse Alley, has been given a ten-year jail sentence for
his part in an antigovernment plot last July that included an attempt on the
life of the current chief of staff. Few Dahomeans seem concerned over the
fate of Alley, and no public protest is expected.
In Tunisia, former defense minister Ahmed Mestiri, who resigned early
in 1968 in protest over the government's agricultural cooperative program,
has made an unprecedented bid for political power by calling for the
postponement of presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2
November. Mestiri also announced he would seek election to the National
Assembly.
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY . 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
SECRET
Egypt and Israel Initiate Night Air Strikes
............. nal boundary
--- Arrnistice boundary
f
Haderal.
L~$ANON) `t SAY R I A
>Y l
ti
l Nlu
TEL AVIV-YAFO BAs Salt
I. ~~. R D AN *AMMAN
Ashdodti trl,'A
~~ y ~erusaem
Hebron t
GazS?i1
ha X /., '
I fr rA
Beersheba
I S R A E L
aE13t
gyptran night ait attack j
Suez?-7tsraeli night air attack
Miles
25
Hai1aJ
0Oron
1 I
Ma'an
JORDAN
Elate
*Al'Agabah
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
ARAB-ISRAELI SKIRMISHES CONTINUE APACE
Israel has kept steady pressure
on Egypt by almost daily air strikes
along the Suez Canal, where both
sides recently used the tactic of
night air attacks for the first
time.
On 28 September the Egyptians
carried out a night attack in Is-
raeli-held Sinai. Under cover of
darkness helicopters swept in from
the Mediterranean and launched a
rocket attack in the Bir Misafir
area. The Egyptians, however, ap-
parently missed their intended tar-
get, Nahal Yam.
The Egyptians are probably
encouraged by the fact that they
were able successfully to launch
air-to-surface rockets against Is-
raeli positions without being im-
mediately intercepted by Israeli
fighters.
On the same night, the Israelis
carried out an hour-long air attack
at night against Egyptian targets
at the southern end of the Suez
Canal.
Although the re-
sults of this raid are not known, it
is likely to be a prelude to further
night air strikes.
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
? SECRET
ANTIFOREIGN VIOLENCE ERUPTS IN IVORY COAST
Violence has flared again in
Abidjan between unemployed Ivorians
and resident foreign workers, who
make up more than a third of the
city's population. Ivorian police
and army troops have reacted swiftly
and brutally, returning an uneasy
calm to the city.
Ivory Coast has one of the
fastest growing economies in Africa,
and its cities have attracted in-
creasing numbers of jobless migrants
both foreign and Ivorian. As com-
petition for jobs and housing has
intensified, local citizens have
become particularly resentful of
the numerous Mossi tribesmen who
have come from poverty-stricken
Upper Volta to work for the lowest
of wages. Antiforeign sentiment
has also been fed by slowly emerging
nationalist feelings and ancient
tribal animosities.
The latest incidents--the most
serious antiforeign manifestations
in a decade--included organized pro-
test marches, a large rally of un-
employed Ivorians, and harassment
of foreigners throughout the city
by rioting youths. Troops and po-
lice used considerable force to
break up the protests; more than
1,500 Ivorians were imprisoned.
the government has warned it
will use any force required to
thwart further demonstrations or
violence. Houphouet may attempt
to ease the situation by deporting
some Voltans, but at the cost of
straining relations with Upper
Page 2 4
Volta. Voltans in Abidjan thus far
have relied on diplomatic repre-
sentations from their own govern-
ment for protection, but now may
be arming themselves.
Houphouet's difficulties are
compounded by a number of other
problems. A conflict with students
last spring that resulted in the
closing of Abidjan University re-
mains unresolved despite extensive'
efforts to cajole students into ac-
cepting absolute government control
of their organizations. Also, dis-
content in the ranks of organized
labor remains thinly papered over
following a national congress a
year ago in which labor proved much
more aggressive than the regime had
expected. In addition, resentment
over the large and exploitive French
presence, directed especially at the
contingent of French combat troops
stationed near Abidjan, is growing
in all segments of the population.
Partly in an effort to demon-
strate sensitivity to the country's
social problems, the government is
publicizing a program of "dialogue"
with "all social strata" in the
coming weeks. These meetings will
be used to remind the various groups
involved what is expected of them,
with Houphouet typically mixing
veiled threats with vague promises.
Ultimately, the President will rely
on the use of force, including
French troops if necessary, to main-
tain control. Although further
clashes with discontented elements
seem inevitable, Houphouet's "sys-
tem" will probably keep matters
within bounds for the foreseeable
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
SECRET
SUDAN DISCUSSES AID WITH USSR AND WORLD BANK
Sudan may have the option of
turning to the USSR for assistance
on a large-scale irrigation scheme
if the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (IBRD)
does not provide financing for
the project.
the Soviet eco-
nomic delegation that recently
visited the Sudan plans to recom-
mend that the USSR provide $108
million for the Rahad irrigation
scheme if Khartoum's current ne-
gotiations with the IBRD are un-
successful. This irrigation
scheme, devised by the previous
Sudanese regime, is being pushed
by the present government, which
would like to succeed where its
predecessor failed by implementing
significant economic development
projects that had previously lain
dormant.
Since the coup of 25 May 1969,
the Sudanese Government has sought
and accepted economic assistance
from the USSR and several East
European countries. East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Poland have agreed, at least
in principle, to supply such things
as machinery and equipment. Khar-
toum has given unwarranted pub-
licity to these agreements, ap-
parently to demonstrate a policy
shift away from the West. For
example, after Minister of Eco-
nomics and Foreign Trade Abdal
Karim al-Mirghani returned from
a visit to Eastern Europe in Au-
gust, he held a series of press
conferences to report "extensive"
aid for economic development. The
East European representatives in
Khartoum were said to be amazed
at his statements, because only
preliminary trade and credit agree-
ments had been signed.
Talks with the USSR on both
trade and aid have taken place
during the past two months. The
recent Soviet economic delegation
reportedly told the Sudanese that
Moscow was mainly interested in
agricultural development and was
unlikely to assist in the country's
industrial development. A second
Soviet delegation, however, is
scheduled to spend six months
making a comprehensive survey of
economic development projects,
probably including the Rahad scheme.
The Sudan, probably preferring
to have the important Rahad scheme
financed by an international agency
rather than by any single nation,
is continuing its discussions with
the IBRD. A bank representative
visited Sudan in July and on 22 Sep-
tember the Sudanese minister of
planning went to Washington to make
a final appeal to bank officials
for funds for Rahad. The IBRD, how-
ever, is hesitant to provide fi-
nancing unless the Sudan promises
to put its economy in order. Gov-
ernment overspending and accompanying
inflation have become worse during
the past few years, and balance-of-
payments deficits have been a per-
sistent problem.
SECRET
Page 2 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
SECRET
SECRET
Page 2 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
Guerrilla and terrorist activity was quite widespread in Latin America
this week, perhaps in part to commemorate the second anniversary of the
death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara.
The largest rural guerrilla action in Guatemala in at least two years
occurred on 4 and 5 October. A well-disciplined group of 40 men attacked
three sulphur exploration sites in an unpopulated area near the Mexican
border that previously had had no history of guerrilla activity. The guerrillas
systematically stripped the camps of supplies and painted Rebel Armed
Forces' slogans on the buildings.
On 7 October guerrillas and troops of the Panamanian National Guard
clashed near the town of Chepo, where skirmishes had occurred in August.
According to one report, eight soldiers were wounded.
In South America, five Colombian Army battalions are searching for
the kidnaped son of the Swiss Consul in Cali and a Swiss Embassy employee
from Bogota. Both were abducted on 5 October. Swiss officials have received
a ransom note demanding $290,000. Other guerrilla incidents have been
reported from Colombia, and minor violence is continuing in Venezuela.
Near Montevideo, Uruguay, a force of approximately 500 soldiers and
policemen fought a pitched gun battle with the pro-Castro urban terrorist
group called the Tupamaros. At least two of the raiders were killed and 15
arrested. An undetermined number escaped, however, leaving leaflets saying
that "Che" Guevara's death was not in vain. Argentine terrorists also had a
busy week as they detonated 22 bombs throughout the country. Observers
believe that these attacks were aimed at marking the death of Guevara, who
was born in Argentina, and at protesting the government's economic policies.
Commercial airliners from Argentina and Brazil were hijacked on 8 October
and forced to fly to Cuba.
Peruvian President Velasco, during
ceremonies celebrating one year in office, gave highly nationalistic speeches
in Lima and at Talara, where IPC had its major oil installations.
SECRET
Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
SECRET
NEW BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT
General Ovando's two-week-old
government has consolidated its po-
sition but has not yet taken any
significant steps toward redirect-
ing government policy. "Revolution"
has become a catch-word for the new
government as it has elsewhere in
Latin America, but it remains to
be seen how far Ovando can go in
carrying out his promise to trans-
form Bolivian society.
Ovando and his new government,
which is dominated by outspoken na-
tionalists, have mouthed popular
phrases and attacked US imperialism
in an effort to validate their rev-
olutionary credentials. So far,
however, they have not backed up
their rhetoric with action. In
fact, there are few options open
to them in internal politics or in
the international sphere. Agrarian
reform was to a great extent accom-
plished by earlier administrations,
and the tin mines have been state
owned for more than a decade. Ru-
mors have abounded that the US-
owned Gulf Oil Company will be na-
tionalized and Ovando has done
little to discourage such rumors
in his public statements on the
matter. He is aware, however, that
Bolivia is heavily dependent on US
investment and financial assist-
ance/
The anti-US rhetoric will
likely continue for some time, how-
ever, and Ovando will continue to
search for an issue that will allow
him to take some action against the
US without provoking a costly con-
frontation. The Peace Corps is
one US target already under attack,
and it may be requested to with-
MOVING SLOWLY
draw from the country.
The appointment of the moder-
ate General Ruiz Velarde as for-
eign minister may have been in re-
action to the military's expressed
concern about leftist cabinet mem-
bers. Bolivia may try to improve
its relations with the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, but the Ovando
government has for now specifically
ruled out diplomatic relations with
Cuba or Communist China.
SECRET
Page 2 g WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
GENERAL EMILIO MEDICI TO BE BRAZIL'S NEW PRESIDENT
The armed services joint high
command on 6 October named Gen-
eral Emilio Medici to succeed
President Costa e Silva. The an-
nouncement of the choice of Medici
climaxed the military's drawn-out
process of selecting the man whom
they believe could best ensure
unity in the armed force.
The 63-year-old Medici is a
firm supporter and close friend
of Costa e Silva, and, as head of
the National Intelligence Service,
was a key adviser during the Pres-
ident's first two years in office.
The President-designate is a well-
regarded career military man who
has received all of his promotions
on merit. He strongly backed the
executive's assumption of increased
authoritarian powers last Decem-
ber, but apparently did not oppose
Costa e Silva's more recent inten-
tion to permit a very limited move
toward political normality.
Medici told a nationwide tele-
vision audience on 7 October that
he hopes to restore democracy to
Brazil before the end of his term
and that this will require "free
universities, free parties, free
unions, free press, and a free
church." At the same time, how-
ever, he warned that anyone who
attempts to disturb public tran-
quility and the national security
will receive severe punishment.
to have firm supporters in the key
ministries. Medici reportedly in-
tends to focus particularly on re-
forms in the areas of education,
economic development, and land
reform.
No official announcement has
as yet been made on the name of
the man he will appoint to the
vice presidency, or when the
heavily purged Congress will be
called into session to ratify his
selection as chief executive.
These decisions are likely to be
made soon, however.
The governing triumvirate's
long delay in finding a successor
caused considerable criticism in
military circles. Many officers
believed that some ambitious in-
dividuals were using the delay
to create a political climate of
uncertainty and doubt. The of-
ficers placed much of the blame
Although Medici is likely to
follow the same general policy
guidelines as his predecessor, he
probably will carry out a major
overhaul of the cabinet in order
SECRET
Page 29 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
on the President's wife, who report-
edly tried to persuade him not to
resign, and on a handful of his
close advisers who have been fear-
ful of losing their jobs.
The officers also have been
concerned about the maneuvering
of General Albuquerque Lima, who
carried on the most extensive cam-
paign to become Costa e Silva's
successor. The General has sent
at least two vehement letters to
the army minister protesting what
he considers the service high com-
mand's failure to give due consid-
eration to his candidacy. Some
of the younger officers who sup-
port Albuquerque Lima have promoted
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNING BEGINS IN COLOMBIA
Political campaigning by Con-
servative Party presidential hope-
fuls has temporarily taken the po-
litical spotlight.
Under the ruling National
Front's arrangements between the
Liberal and Conservative parties,
the two will support a Conservative
in the election next year. Liberal
President Lleras' choice for presi-
dent is former ambassador to the
US Misael Pastrana, who is committed
to Lleras' economic and political
reform programs. Pastrana's can-
didacy has been weakened among Lib-
erals, however, because of adverse
reaction to a speech he made on re-
turning to the country in mid-Sep-
tember in which he implied that he
would make some changes in the
Front's reform program after taking
office.
Several respected Liberal news-
papers, which had previously favored
Pastrana's candidacy, immediately
editorialized over the need to con-
tinue Lleras' work. The President
also pointedly announced that he
would not permit his programs to
be slighted or forgotten. Although
Pastrana has made clear his deter-
mination to continue the adminis-
tration's major policies, other as-
pirants will take advantage of the
situation. So far, there are seven
candidates for the presidency and
more can be expected before the
Conservative Party convention meets
on 11 November to ratify the de-
cision that almost certainly will
have been predetermined.
The Liberal and Conservative
directorates met recently to de-
cide on procedures for selecting
the presidential candidate for
April 1970 and to recommend a leg-
islative program. Proposed leg-
islation covered numerous issues
but did not include the tax re-
forms desired by Lleras. He sub-
sequently withdrew the tax pro-
posals but will insist on retain-
ing a strong voice in other Na-
tional Front decisions until the
SECRET
Page 30 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Oct 69
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
SECRET
MILITARY AND POLITICAL PRESSURES PROLIFERATING IN CHILE
Interest groups jockeying
for economic benefits and polit-
ical advantage in a pre-election
year are pressing President Frei
on many issues.
Frei is most affected at the
present time by growing pressure
from army officers for higher
salaries, more modern equipment,
and a general improvement in the
role of the armed forces. His
fear that the military might take
some drastic action has caused
him to back down from his refusal
to consider a military pay raise
before the end of the year. Fol-
lowing this week's annual meeting
of army commanders, the President
will probably also replace the
minister of defense and some gen-
erals who are resented because
they are political appointees
who do not effectively represent
the men under them.
A pay raise at this time,
although justified at many levels,
would set off a serious chain
reaction among others suffering
from the inflation that has in-
creased by more than 30 percent
since September 1968. This would
be useful to the opposition.
The Communist Party is push-
ing for the military pay raise,
and the Radicals are plumping for
quick increases for all government
workers. Both say that the cost
Page 31
should be underwritten by taking
funds from banks and US copper
companies. Hard-line Socialists
advised copper workers to hold
out for more than a 45-percent
wage increase at a large mine that
is half-owned by the Chilean Gov-
ernment. Conservative politicians
who hope to re-elect former Pres-
ident Jorge Alessandri next Sep-
tember see an advantage in stepped-
up inflation, which would surely
be triggered by wage hikes.
Many of Frei's own poorly
disciplined Christian Democratic
Party members, including presi-
dential candidate Radomiro Tomic,
are more concerned with improving
their declining political position
than with carrying out his poli-
cies, inasmuch as he cannot run
in the next election. Leaders of
the maverick youth arm of the party
recently berated the government
publicly for not implementing
party decisions designed to move
it noticeably leftward.
Frei is even criticized for
entering a joint mining venture
company with the Romanians on 6
October on the grounds that he
will use it, and perhaps similar
arrangements with Hungary and Yugo-
slavia, to justify government
participation in such ventures
with US copper companies.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007400010001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0740001 0001 -1