WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT ETHIOPIA: PROBLEMS OF A FADING DYNASTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007200020003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 3, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Ethiopia: Problems of ~ Fading Dynasty
Secrete
State Dept. review completed.
Ne 43
3 July 1969
No. Q377/69B
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ETHIOPIA: PROBLEMS OF A FADING DYNASTY
:Emperor Haire Selassie wi i arrive in the US on 7 July for his: fourth official visit._ As
regent and emperor since 19'16,. he has become a symbol of order and stability in the oldest.
and: one of the-most backward of Africa's independent countries.: He has imposed a measure
of stability on Ethiopia. that is in sharp contrast with- the violence--and turmoil that have
marked that-country's history. The prestige he has attained as a world figure a:nd as an elder
statesman-of Africa. has brought considerable foreign economic and mill ary assistance to help
him modernize the country and gain international standing for Ethiopia.
Although Haile Selassie's highly personalized style of rule has enabled him to remain in
power. and to control all aspects of the government apparatus and the-military.establishment,
he has failedto prepare anyone. to succeed- him as he enters=his wa-Wing-years. The reforms he
has introduced have -set in motion forces that he is no longer able to control. Student unrest
is intensifying, discontent is strong among the educated elite, and the government is being
hurt financially by budgetary difficulties and by the rising costs ofcombating insurgency. -
THE IMPERIAL SYSTEM
When Haile Selassie became regent in 1916,
the Ethiopian Empire was little more than a col-
lection of squabbling kingdoms whose ruling
strong men were under little if any control by the
reigning monarch in Addis Ababa. As regent, he
used armed force and palace intrigue to eliminate
or neutralize various contenders for power until
1930, when he himself became emperor. During
this period, Haile Selassie also established his
reputation as a modernizer, particularly in the
area of foreign relations. Through personal con-
tacts abroad, and by such efforts as gaining mem-
bership for Ethiopia in the League of Nations in
1923, he clearly showed his intent to embark on
an activist foreign policy. He has pursued this goal
throughout his 53-year rule.
Haile Selassie's accession to the throne in
1930 was marked not only by the beginning of
effective government control from Addis Ababa,
but also by the Emperor's personal commitment
to achieving economic and social change. His ef-
forts were interrupted by the Italian invasion in
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1936, but were intensified following his return
from exile in 1941. A national army responsive to
him personally replaced the local forces of the
traditional leaders, who were also deprived of
their independent powers of taxation. A govern-
ment bureaucracy was established, and a system
of provincial administration was inaugurated,
both staffed with loyal appointees. Completely
on his own initiative, the Emperor instituted a
constitution in 1955 that established a popularly
elected lower house of parliament. National elec-
tions have been held regularly ever since. A na-
tional education system, virtually nonexistent
until the late 1940s, is now operating in parts of
Ethiopia, and a national university is expanding.
The Emperor's ambitious diplomatic efforts
have assured Ethiopia a continuing flow of for-
eign loans, assistance, and technicians from a wide
variety of free world and Communist countries.
His objectives of leading Ethiopia away from its
isolationist past, protecting Ethiopia's territorial
integrity, and assuming for himself a prestigious
place in world and African affairs have been
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largely realized. Moreover, Ethiopia's military
contributions to United Nations forces in Korea
and the Congo, the Emperor's almost single-
handed founding of the Organization of African
Unity and his role of mediator in the Algerian-
Moroccan border war in 1963, together with his
continuing efforts to mediate the Nigerian civil
war, have given him world-wide prestige.
EVOLUTION INSTEAD OF REVOLUTION
Haile Selassie has been far more receptive to
change than others of his generation who are still
active and in positions of influence in Ethiopia.
His fame has been achieved by his unusual per-
sonal vigor and determination, his long tenure,
and his exceptional ability to make effective use
of his immense personal power at critical mo-
ments. Even these qualities, however, have not
been enough to overcome the basic conservatism
of all but a relatively small group of modernist
Ethiopians, and the Emperor has faced many in-
ternal obstacles in implementing even limited re-
forms. Consequently, he has moved cautiously,
maneuvering between the conservatives and those
who press for faster progress, and attempting to
promote change through evolution.
Above all else, however, he wants to preserve
the traditional political and social framework of
Ethiopia-even at the cost of progress. The Ethio-
pian Empire itself dates back into murky antiq-
uity. Its political, cultural, and religious traditions
are largely those of the ruling element that Haile
Selassie represents: the Amhara and closely re-
lated Tigrai people who constitute only about 30
percent of Ethiopia's approximately 24 million
people. The Amhara are proud, aggressive, and
fiercely independent. They occupy the moun-
tainous highlands of central Ethiopia and, except
for the Italian occupation, have been able to resist
numerous attempts at conquest by Muslim and
other foreign invaders.
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Other peoples dwelling within the country's
boundaries have long been ruled by the Amhara,
who have assimilated some of them but more
often have simply sought to impose-with varying
degrees of success-their own feudal-like culture
and Christian religion. Haile Selassie has had some
success in instilling a sense of nationhood among
Ethiopians although always maintaining Amhara
supremacy. Some minority groups in the outer
areas of the empire are governed harshly, how-
ever. They remain basically hostile to the central
government and are the source of continuing se-
curity problems.
Around this framework, Haile Selassie has
tacked a veneer of Western political institutions
that he seems to believe will eventually become
meaningful under his guidance. Political parties
are prohibited, however, and the government ex-
ercises strict censorship. But the key to holding
Ethiopia's political and social patchwork together
has always been the Emperor's particular style of
leadership. He has mastered and refined all the
techniques of manipulating individuals, the gov-
ernment apparatus, and the military. He has re-
tained the backing of the highly conservative
l;thiopian Orthodox Church and the Amhara
land-owning aristocracy, whose support is essen-
tial to the monarchy. At the same time, he has
balanced, fragmented, or suppressed rival factions
within their ranks when they opposed him. Haile
Selassie also stands at the center of a web of
competing private and official intelligence net-
works that keep him informed of possible plots
against him and of the goings on within the in-
trigue-filled atmosphere of the capital.
The reforms and changes Haile Selassie has
introduced, however, have now produced a num-
ber of problems that pose an increasing challenge
to his rule, and it is becoming more difficult for
him to manage the affairs of the country in his
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old style. The government is in financial difficul-
ties, and economic development is bogged down.
There are also problems in the armed forces.
Discontent within the Amhara ruling establish-
ment and the bureaucracy is growing, and student
unrest is intensifying. Insurgency on the periph-
ery of the empire continues to be of pressing
concern and is becoming more costly to combat.
While the Emperor wears his 76 years well
and is capable of working long hours and of
making exhausting trips abroad, the government
itself has slowed into immobility. The cabinet and
bureaucracy now seem unable to focus closely or
respond quickly, especially on complicated do-
mestic problems, and Haile Selassie spends more
and more time on foreign affairs.
GOVERNMENT FINANCES
AND THE ECONOMY
Ethiopia has been gradually overextending
itself financially to keep pace with rising security
and development costs. Despite some significant
achievements, however, economic development in
general has barely scratched the surface. The
economy continues to be shackled by highly con-
servative financial policies and by the near-feudal
social structure. The prerogatives of the Amhara
aristocracy, the ownership of choice land by the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and the outmoded
systems of land tenure have kept agricultural out-
put well below Ethiopia's rich potential. Simul-
taneously, expenditures for military purposes
have been rising as the government has relied on
costly military measures to control large areas of
the country.
There appears to be no lack of foreign aid
funds for more intensive development, however.
A US Embassy survey of April 1969 shows that at
the end of 1968 there was a total of some $100
million in undisbursed aid from free world
sources available to the government. Also, most
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Emperor Haile Selassie
of the $100 million Soviet credit granted in 1959
still has not been used. Standing in the way of the
effective use of foreign aid, however, are the
primitive tax structure and an inability to mobi-
lize savings so that the government can generate
its own revemie to hold up its end of specific aid
projects.
The Emperor himself is partly responsible
for this poor economic performance. Government
ministers, unable to establish their own priorities,
have to divert funds at the Emperor's bidding.
More important, the fact that Haile Selassie for
political reasons has not pressed vigorously for
land reform is one of the main barriers to eco-
nomic development. A Ministry of Land Reform
has been in existence since 1966, for example,
but only halting steps have been taken. The Em-
peror is unlikely to push harder in this direction
for fear of undermining the Amhara land-owning
system and, indirectly, the monarchy itself.
An accumulation of budgetary difficulties
more noticeably severe than in the past brought
about a serious financial crisis earlier this year and
belatedly focused the government's attention on
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its economic problems. The bureaucracy's eco-
nomic planning apparatus was strengthened fol-
lowing cabinet changes last February, but the new
cabinet has not yet produced any long-range cor-
rective measures, and it is questionable that it
will. Despite clear warning, Haile Selassie will
probably not consent to any serious economic
reforms that might have the side effect of stimu-
lating demands for political reform.
PROBLEMS WITH THE ARMED FORCES
With Ethiopia's long history of foreign in-
vasions and internal violence always in mind,
Ilaile Selassie has built a large national army and
has consistently given top priority to its modern-
ization. The need for the army to maintain order
in the provinces, together with the government's
anxiety over Soviet activities in the Middle East,
the Red Sea Basin, Sudan, and Somalia, keeps
defense spending the largest item in the national
budget. By African standards, the army is well
trained and equipped. The US provides the major
portion of arms and training for the 37,000-man
army and for the small but well-trained and jet-
equipped air force. As a quid pro quo for the
Kagnew communications base in Asmara, the US
has provided military assistance worth slightly
over $135 million since 1953, Washington's
largest expenditure of this type in Africa.
Apart from its defense role, the army is the
key prop by which Haile Selassie keeps himself in
power. His control of the military is essential, for
plotting among them has been a chronic threat to
political stability. The two most recent and se-
rious threats to the Emperor originated in the
army. These were the Imperial Bodyguard's abor-
tive coup of 1960 and a plot in 1964 that was
nipped in the planning stage. Accordingly, the
Emperor constantly maneuvers to keep the mili-
tary establishment divided and politically im-
potent, but at a reasonable level of efficiency.
Nevertheless, by acquiring modern arms and
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training, the army has in fact attained a position
of strength second only to the Emperor's.
Haile Selassie's subordination of military ef-
ficiency to the neutralization of possible military
rivals has been costly, however. The high com-
mand has been kept so fragmented by the Em-
peror's divide-and-rule manipulations that there is
doubt that the army could move quickly or effec-
tively in a moment of crisis. Haile Selassie's con-
trols have fanned unrest and frustration among
educated lower- and middle-level officers, many
of whom have been trained in the US. They chafe
at the Emperor's tolerance of loyal but incom-
petent generals, slow promotions, the inefficiency
that pervades the armed forces, and at the lack of
progress toward economic and political reform in
the country.
The army is also ill equipped to deal with
the insurgency problem should it worsen. For
obvious reasons, the Emperor has only reluctantly
permitted some counterinsurgency training for of-
ficers, and the army has been left to operate by
ill-suited means and uninspired leadership. Morale
is a serious problem, especially among units sta-
tioned for long periods in desolate areas of the
Ogaden and Bale.
INSURGENCY
Control over the restive ethnic minorities
and the insurgent groups in the empire is being
maintained, but at an increasing cost to the gov-
ernment. Haile Selassie has always been willing to
tolerate a certain amount of dissidence as a means
of keeping the army occupied and away from the
capital. The over-all level of insurgency is rising,
however, and could jeopardize internal security if
the authority of the central government weakens.
In Eritrea, the largely Muslim separatist Eri-
trean Liberation Front has embarked on a new
campaign after a period of relative inactivity
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T.H130.~tA
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Lake Rudol f
Massai
Asmara
SO.
YEMEN
F. T. A
.y..~Djibouti
~Diredawa
' Harar
SOMALIA
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dating back to mid 1967, when supplies from the
Front's radical Arab donors dwindled following
the Arab-Israeli war. Communist arms, including
some Chinese small arms, have been filtering in
from Arab middlemen through Aden, Yemen, and
Sudan. Front trainees from Syria-and possibly
from Communist China and Cuba-are back in the
field. The Front, avoiding its past errors of trying
to best the army in the open, is undertaking a
more sophisticated campaign of selective sabotage
against targets in Eritrea. In order to publicize its
cause, it is attacking targets outside Ethiopia, and
damage has been inflicted so far on Ethiopian
Airlines jets in Frankfurt and Karachi as well as
on Ethiopian property in neighboring Djibouti.
The Ethiopians are nervously watching the
new radical Sudanese Government that gained
power in May. Because Sudan has been the stag-
ing area for Front operations in Eritrea, Addis
fears the new Khartoum regime will follow up on
its public statements to aid liberation movements
by more actively supporting the Front than did
past Sudanese governments.
An active insurgency has also been sput-
tering along among dissident Arusi Galla tribes-
men in Bale and parts of Sidamo provinces since
1966. Although little more than bandits, these
guerrilla bands have continually harassed and in-
flicted casualties on regular and irregular units
sent against them. The dissidents, supplied
through the illegal arms trade in the Horn of
Africa and by occasional donations from Somali
sources who evade the Somali Government's re-
strictions, have stepped up the pressure since late
last year. By themselves, the Arusi Gallas are not
a significant threat but they are a costly irritant.
The government seems unwilling or unable to
.divert forces from elsewhere to subdue them.
Military operations are bogged down, hampered
by poor logistical support, inept officer leader-
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ship, and by the use of poorly trained and unre-
liable irregulars from the Territorial Army.
The Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of east-
ern Ethiopia, long an area of contention with the
Somali Republic, has been relatively quiet since
the border clashes of 1964. This peace rests on a
fragile base, however. Mutual suspicions continue
to trouble Somali-Ethiopian relations, and Somali
Prime Minister Egal's successful efforts to achieve
detente could easily be upset in the event of a
change of government in Mogadiscio and an up-
swing in Somali Irredentist ambitions. The Oga-
den has been administered largely through the
Ethiopian Army, whose strong-arm measures to
collect taxes and pacify the Somali nomads have
caused much of the friction between the two
countries. The Ethiopians have taken some steps
to return the area to civilian administration and
to ease tensions, but the warlike nature of the
nomads requires a large military presence, which
in turn raises the possibility of further incidents
with Somalia.
THE STUDENTS
Although Haile Selassie still manages to neu-
tralize the military and the aristocracy by his
maneuvers, none of his techniques has been suc-
cessful with Ethiopia's restive students. Their dis-
content is currently the most visible sign of dis-
satisfaction with the regime. The gradual social
reform Haile Selassie has encouraged over the
years has not kept pace with the demands of the
students, who see themselves alienated from what
they consider a backward and authoritarian so-
ciety. Student radicals are now actively seeking
pretexts for violent confrontation with the gov-
ernment. In turn, the authorities have become
hypersensitive to the protests for fear that the
students might serve as a catalyst for dissident
ethnic minorities and other malcontents.
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The most serious student disorders, which
for the first time had anti-US overtones, occurred
in April 1968. Firm government intervention pre-
vented demonstrations planned for last March,
lbut subsequent student disruptions brought effec-
tive education in the capital to an early end for
the school year. Anti-US sentiment was notice-
ably strong among the students again this year.
"Their discontent focused on the large US presence
.at the university, on the Peace Corps, and on US
military and economic assistance to the govern-
ment, which the students believe is keeping the
.Emperor in power.
The most significant recent development is
the involvement of secondary students in the
provinces. Practically all previous unrest had cen-
tered in the student unions and in the leftist
student "Crocodile Society" in Addis. Under a
government program begun in 1965, students
from the university in Addis, who spend one year
working in the provinces, have evidently im-
planted their ideas among the previously apoliti-
cal provincial students.
The government is faced today with the
problem of isolating the students from other mal-
contents. The students have not won the sym-
pathy of the general public, but there is a clear
bond between them and discontented young
bureaucrats, university faculty members, and
some army officers. Using force against the stu-
dentsinvolves considerable risk because many stu-
dents are from families in the establishment. The
students seem willing to keep up their pressure,
and they have ignored the Emperor's appeals for
order.
OUTLOOK
Each of these problems is likely to become
more difficult for Haile Selassie during his remain-
ing years. Although he is now in control of the
government and security forces, unhappiness with
his autocratic rule will likely continue to grow
and could nurture serious and perhaps successful
plotting.* Further incidents, such as serious stu-
dent demonstrations, could also precipitate a gen-
eral breakdown in public order in the capital that
the Emperor might not be able to contain. The
continuing mood of unease and pessimism that
prevails among ranking Ethiopians in Addis casts
some doubt on the government's ability to re-
spond to a major crisis. There is reason to believe
that, should it fail to do so, the military might
intervene and depose the lmpcror if this alterna-
tive became a condition for restoring order.
*The government, in keeping with its usual censorship policy but also perhaps indicative of its nervousness, banned all
sales of a recent issue of Time for its review of a new book by Edward Luttwak entitled, Coup d'Etat, A_ Practical
Handbook.
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These problems have particularly serious im- The Crown Prince is relatively unknown. He
plications for the future because they will be is 52 years old and has some medical problems.
inherited by the Emperor's successor, who will r
not have Haile Selassie's prestige and authority to
deal with them. The Emperor has designated his
son, Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, to succeed to the
throne, but successions have rarely been peaceful
in Ethiopia. There are strong possibilities that real
trouble will come after Haile Selassie's firm hand
is removed. In the early stages of succession, it is
likely that the Amhara establishment and the
military leadership will rally around the Crown
Prince in the interest of national unity and order.
Beyond this, it is impossible to make predictions
informed on domestic and foreign affairs.
25X1
e favors a faster pace for politi-
cal and social reforms, andOhe is interested in 25X1
except that the military will certainly play a cru- seeing Ethiopia become a true constitutional
cial role. monarchy.
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