WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT COMMUNIST CHINA'S PRESENCE IN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007100070002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 20, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Communist China's Presence in Africa
State Dept. review completed. Secret
N! 37
20 June 1969
No. 0375/69A
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S PRESENCE IN AFRICA
Despit the general failure of Communist China's once wide ranging diplomatic
efforts iri the=de eloping world, Peking has been able to maintain and expand
signif~cant presence in a handful of African states. It has attached considerable
imp rtance to. ti ffs remnant of conventional Chinese diplomacy during a period
when Cttf uraj Revolution excesses have disrupted its relations with most of the
world P k n had displayed a surprisingly low-keyed and circumspect diplomati
p t re rn -its African foothold. Although its effort in these few African Mates i`s
cantered around a generally well-received aid program, its eagerness to cooperate
wit list African governments in support of black nationalist "liberation trove-
me ts" has also redounded to Peking's favor. Because of these relatively favorable
it tstances and ,Peking's rather bleak prospects elsewhere in the wo ld Afri a
probak ly will remain a major area of Chinese diplomacy. Any significant expansion
of rnese-influence there appears unlikely, however, particularly in view of tl-e
c m tion Pekin faces from foreign rivals and the poor, image it cost t ues tt
profi t t r ugho t most of Africa.
BACKGROUND
In the early 1960s Peking began a large-scale
effort to establish itself as a major influence on
the African continent. Increasing numbers of
African states were gaining independence and
experimenting with a wide range of domestic and
international policies, often radical in nature.
Peking hoped to encourage such radical tenden-
cies and establish an "anti-imperialist" African
bloc amenable to Chinese guidance. To this end
the Chinese employed opportunistic and free-
wheeling tactics aimed at developing a broad pres-
ence in a short time. Speed was essential because
Peking's major rivals, the Soviet Union, the West-
ern powers, and Nationalist China were also
attempting to cultivate the Africans. Chinese dip-
lomatic missions to Africa were increased; promi-
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nent Chinese leaders, including Premier Chou
En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, made exten-
sive good will tours to drum up diplomatic sup-
port. African delegations were encouraged to visit
Peking, and promising African "revolutionaries"
were sought out and occasionally brought to
China for training. Chinese radiobroadcasts were
beamed to Africa with increasing frequency, and
a large number of New China News Agency
offices were established on the continent.
Bribery, subversion, and aid to anticolonial
and radical organizations in Africa also were uti-
lized. In Zanzibar, where Peking quickly gained
significant influence within the government appa-
ratus, over half of the ruling council was on
Chinese retainer by the mid 1960s.
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COMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN AFRICA
SPANISH
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Nevertheless, China's ambitious Africa effort
soon ran into trouble. Many African leaders were
anxious to maintain a position of nonalignment
and became increasingly alienated by doctrinaire
Chinese insistence that they adopt narrow anti-
Soviet and anti-US positions. Moreover, Peking's
heavy-handed and indiscriminate support of
"revolutionary action" in Africa gradually
aroused a deep suspicion of Chinese sincerity and
intentions. The discovery of Chinese subversive
activities in Burundi, Congo (Kinshasa) and
Ghana served as a warning to these and other
African governments.
The overthrow of governments friendly to
the Chinese in a few other states painfully
pointed out to Peking the risks involved in seek-
ing influence in such politically unstable areas,
and further limited China's presence on the con-
tinent. Additionally, many African leaders were
accepting generous offers of economic and mili-
tary assistance from Moscow and the West-offers
which Peking apparently felt it could not match.
In Algeria, for example, Peking's efforts were
overwhelmed by a massive Soviet military and
economic aid commitment.
The recall of diplomats and Peking's increas-
ingly militant diplomacy during the early stages
of the Cultural Revolution detracted further from
China's position on the continent. Although the
Chinese generally isolated their prime interests in
Africa from the worst effects of the radical "Red
Guard diplomacy," overbearing political tactics,
including preaching Mao's thought and virulent
attacks against the Soviet Union, strained Peking's
relations with Congo (Brazzaville), Algeria, Tuni-
sia, and Morocco. Significant Chinese presence in
Africa became limited to a mere handful of states.
Despite these setbacks, the Chinese have
continued to maintain and develop a limited foot-
hold in Africa, largely through a generally well-
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received foreign aid program. At present, Peking
is the strongest foreign presence in Tanzania, has
a growing position in Zambia, and has aid pro-
grams in Guinea, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville), and
Mauritania.
AFRICA'S SPECIAL ROLE IN
CURRENT CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
The Maoist world view assigns Peking the
roles of leader of the world revolution, champion
of "peoples liberation movements" and supporter
of Afro-Asian nationalism against white racism,
colonialism and neocolonialism. In terms of Chi-
nese ideology, therefore, Africa has been and will
remain important to Peking. At a time when
China stands isolated to an unprecedented degree
from the international community, it must take
some comfort in its relative success in even a
handful of African states.
The states of primary Chinese concern-
Tanzania, Guinea, Zambia, Mali, Congo (Brazza-
ville), and Mauritania-are all ruled by national-
istic, independent-minded leaders. They do not
take direction from any Western state or the
Soviet Union, and have periodically agreed with
Peking's point of view on certain world issues.
These states have all encouraged Peking's support
for African and Asian "people's liberation" move-
ments, have publicly opposed US "imperialism
and neocolonialism," and most have denounced
the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. A few
of the more radical states, most notably Guinea,
have enthusiastically praised the "success" of the
Cultural Revolution in China.
As a result of these relatively favorable polit-
ical circumstances, Peking's effort in Africa ap-
pears to be one of the few areas in which the
Chinese leadership is generally agreed on strategy
in foreign affairs. Even the staunchest advocate of
"revolutionary diplomacy" in Peking could
hardly fault China's efforts in the above six states
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which follow policies that correspond in varying
degrees to the demands of Maoist ideology. On
the other hand, the more pragmatic elements of
the Chinese leadership, together with Foreign
Ministry professionals, doubtless have welcomed
the opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness
of conventional diplomacy in at least a limited
area.
Moreover, Peking's current interest in these
African states is also a reflection of its limited
possibilities in other parts of the developing
world. The Chinese have traditionally regarded
the developing "third world" as the area of great-
est opportunity for their diplomacy, but a combi-
nation of factors has critically limited Peking's
sphere of effective activity in recent years.
China's rigid ideological posture, as well as
stepped-up competition from Moscow and strong
US commitments, has blocked significant ad-
vances in Asia. In the Middle East, Peking's inabil-
ity to back up its calls for an Arab "people's war"
with substantial amounts of military and eco-
nomic assistance has left these states within the
Soviet pale, while the possible intrusion of Chi-
nese revolutionary influence into Latin America
has been effectively blocked by Peking's own
blunders and by the presence of Castro's influ-
ence during the past ten years. As a result, the
Chinese have apparently had little choice but to
concentrate their efforts in the few states where
competition is less intense.
For the most part, the Chinese have dis-
played a surprisingly low-keyed and circumspect
diplomatic approach-moving ahead with a for-
eign aid program at a time when Chinese foreign
relations elsewhere were largely paralyzed. Some
African leaders have criticized Western and Soviet
aid programs as too expensive and elaborate. By
contrast, Peking's relatively simple, labor inten-
sive, and inexpensive projects have met with
approval. Chinese technicians work hard and live
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closer to African standards than do their Western
and Soviet counterparts--a fact generally noted
with appreciation by the host governments. Most
importantly, ChirI'ese personnel have not engaged
in the level of provocative propaganda activity
which, during the period of "Red Guard diplo-
macy," strained. Chinese relations with other
states throughout the world.
PEKING'S ",DOLLAR" DIPLOMACY:
A STRONG POSITION IN TANZANIA
"Unlike the imperialist countries of the West and
the modern revisionists who are plundering the
recipient countries in the name of "aid, " Chinese
assistance is designed to help recipient countries
embark on the road of independent development
and self-reliance. In accordance with Chairman
Mao's teachings; the Chinese experts have been
working hard and have forged a close friendship
with the African: workers. "
New China News Agency
6 February 1968
Chinese Agricultural Specialist in Tanzania
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Since 1962, China has steadily improved its
relations with Dar es Salaam; Tanzania now is
Peking's most important African base of opera-
tions and one of China's foremost "foreign
friends." As in other African states of prime inter-
est to Peking, success in Tanzania rests primarily
on a well-run foreign aid program and a continued
low-key diplomatic posture. China is the primary
source of aid for Tanzania's military forces and a
main source of that country's economic develop-
ment aid. The Chinese work closely with Tanzan-
ians in arming and training Mozambique guer-
rillas. In 1967, Peking agreed to construct the
1,200-mile TanZam Railroad from the Zambian
copper mines to Dar es Salaam-a major project
to which the Tanzanian Government attaches
great importance. The Chinese are rapidly com-
pleting the detailed engineering survey for the
line. In addition to some 350 Chinese technicians
engaged in the railway survey in 1968, Peking had
another 500 technicians and advisers in the coun-
try and has given Dar es Salaam about $30 million
in economic credits.
Tanzania's recent decision to terminate
Canadian military assistance has left Peking with
the dominant foreign role in all branches of Tan-
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zania's security forces. Chinese aid has included
small arms, trucks, antiaircraft guns, medium
tanks, patrol boats, and landing craft. Commit-
ments to future expansion of the Tanzanian
armed forces include construction of a $1.5 mil-
lion army barracks complex, a factory to produce
small arms, and the construction of a naval base
at Dar es Salaam. Tanzania was offered MIG-17s
and pilot training by Peking in 1967 but in the
meantime was considering proposals from both
the USSR and Canada. Dar es Salaam has now
rejected these proposals making it likely that Tan-
zania will now be the fifth nation to receive Chi-
nese Communist MIGs.
A GROWING ROLE IN ZAMBIA
Peking appears to view Zambia as one of its
brightest prospects for future expansion. Al-
though the Chinese had never before extended aid
to the Lusaka government, in 1967 they gave it a
$16.8 million interest free loan for the construc-
tion of a road from Lusaka to western Zambia.
Soon after, they agreed to build the TanZam
railroad which will give the Zambians an outlet
for their copper through friendly Tanzania rather
than Rhodesia. By supplying technicians and
workers for their projects, the Chinese have been
Chinese Doctor
And Medical Personnel
I n Tanzania
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increasing their presence in the country, and there
now are more than 300 Chinese technicians there.
Although President Kaunda generally resists large
foreign influences in his country, he has sanc-
tioned the Chinese presence. He has been pleased
with their apparently well-managed work and the
generous terms of Chinese aid, but he is aware of
China's past record in Africa and undoubtedly
will maintain a close surveillance.
CONTINUED SUCCESS IN GUINEA;
UNCERTAINTY IN MALI
The radical Guinea Government has the
longest history of Chinese assistance, dating back
to 1959. Chinese relations with the Conakry re-
gime have been cordial even though President
Toure in recent years has sought to play East
against West and Moscow against Peking. Through
1968 the Chinese had extended almost $60 mil-
lion in economic credits to the Guineans, of
which almost $38 million had been drawn. Peking
further consolidated its position in Conakry by
agreeing a year ago to help construct the 200-mile
Guinea-Mali railroad-a project now in doubt
because of the coup in Mali last November. Al-
though the Chinese commitment in Guinea to
date has consisted entirely of economic and tech-
nical assistance, an exchange of military delega-
tions between Peking and Conakry last year indi-
cated that Peking is making an effort to gain
influence within the Guinean military, which has
been receiving assistance from Soviet bloc na-
tions.
Mali has been another major target of
China's effort to gain influence in Africa, al-
though the overthrow of the radical Keita govern-
ment last November has cast considerable doubt
on Peking's future status there. Since 1961 China
has dispersed $35 million of economic aid in Mali
and at the end of 1968 had almost 900 techni-
cians in the country. Since the fall of the Keita
government and his replacement by a moderate
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military regime, Peking has taken a more cautious
and circumspect approach, avoiding any public
comment on the neW Malian leadership. With the
exception of the Guinea-Mali railroad, however,
the Chinese seem tp be continuing to follow
through on projects already under way, appar-
ently in the hope of maintaining a presence in the
country.
ELSEWHERE
The aid progran s in Congo (Brazzaville) and
Mauritania are smaller, but the Chinese neverthe-
less continue to demonstrate an active interest in
both states. Elsewhere in Africa, however, signifi-
cant Chinese presence and influence are almost
Chinese Technician in Guinea
nil. Soviet competition has been especially trou-
blesome to Peking; Moscow's aid programs in
Algeria and Somalia have served to undercut
China's efforts there, and the Soviet presence in
Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, and Guinea also repre-
sents a potential tlheat to Peking's position.
Moreover, Nationalist: China's persistent efforts to
expand its presence dn. the continent have met
with considerable success in recent years. This is,
perhaps, the most dramatic reflection of Peking's
general failure in Africa. At present the
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Nationalist Government is recognized by 21 Afri-
can governments, and the Communists must find
Taipei's limited but exceptionally efficient aid
program especially galling.
ASSISTANCE TO REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS
Although state-to-state relations have been
the primary sphere of Chinese activity in Africa,
Peking has also used aid to African nationalist and
other insurgent groups to develop its influence on
the continent. In general, the assistance consists
of varying amounts of small arms and financial
support as well as Chinese sponsored guerrilla
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"At present, the African people's revolutionary
struggles against imperialism, colonialism, and
neocolonialism are developing in depth. In con-
junction with the anti-imperialist national revolu-
tionary movements in Asia and Latin America,
the national revolutionary movement in Africa is
forcefully pounding and weakening the founda-
tion of the rule of imperialism, colonialism, and
neocolonialism and it is a component part of the
anti-imperialist revolutionary front of our time."
Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih, NCNA
26 April 1969
Guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea with Chinese-made Arms
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training in Africa or China, political instruction,
and propaganda support. Most of the Chinese-
backed movements are small and to date have
demonstrated little capability for successful revo-
lutionary action. Nevertheless Peking's assistance
has strengthened its ties to those African govern-
ments which are most committed to the black
nationalist movements- notably Tanzania, Zam-
bia, and Guinea.
The most effective insurgent group substan-
tially supported by the Chinese is the Mozam-
bique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). This rela-
tively large Tanzania-based organization probably
receives half of its military aid from China.
FRELIMO has managed to gain control of small
Mozambique areas which border on Tanzania.
The Mozambique Revolutionary Committee, a
much smaller, ineffective group based in Zambia
which split from FRELIMO in 1964, also has
received limited Chinese aid. In addition, the Chi-
nese have extended token aid to the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which is
dependent on the Soviet Union for most of its
support.
Peking is a major supporter of the Zimbabwe
African National Union, a small Rhodesian group
which split from the larger Soviet-backed Zim-
babwe African People's Union in 1963. In
Guinea, the Chinese provide limited assistance to
the African Party for the Independence of Guinea
and the Cape Verde Islands, an anti-Portuguese
nationalist group, despite the fact that the Soviet
Union is this group's primary supplier. The Pan
African Congress, a small Tanzania-based South
African organization, also receives some token
assistance.
Aside from African nationalist groups,
Peking has recently given limited support to a
small Ethiopian insurgency group, certain Congo-
lese rebels opposed to the anti-Chinese Mobutu
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regime in Kinshasa, and to;Oginga Odinga, a dissi-
dent Kenyan politician. Last fall Peking belatedly
endorsed Biafran independence and agreed "in
principle" to supply aid to the rebel regime-a
move primarily designed to please Tanzanian Pres-
ident Nyerere, a strong advocate of Biafra. Al-
though Peking has been replacing Chinese arms
given to Biafra by Tanzania, it has shown little
interest in assuming a more direct involvement in
the Nigerian civil war.
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS
"We get along very well with the Chinese. One
either gets along well with them or one doesn't
get along at all.
Tanzanian President Nyerere
to Ambassador Bums
11 June 1969
Because of its importance ideologically and
Peking's rather bleak prospects elsewhere, Africa
is likely to remain an area of major focus for
Chinese diplomacy in, the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, the short term prospect for a signifi-
cant expansion of Chinese influence there appears
negligible. In general, tie conditions that caused
the collapse of China's more ambitious and wider
efforts in the early 1960s still prevail. China's
image in Africa remains tarnished by the convul-
sive disorder of the Cultural Revolution, and
Peking's continuing support for dissidents in their
struggle against the black ruled nations of Congo
(Kinshasa) and Kenya. ;probably has further rein-
forced the general African suspicion of Chinese
intentions.
Moreover, China's position in the foothold it
now enjoys is far from secure. Although the host
governments have generally been ideologically
appealing to the Chinese and receptive to Peking's
advances, they have avoided any significant politi-
cal commitments to Peking. On the contrary, the
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Chinese generally have achieved a continuing pres-
ence in Africa simply by "paying off' certain
African states with generous foreign aid offers. In
general, the governments which have accepted
assistance have been careful to maintain an inde-
pendent posture while merely accepting the aid
program best suited to their national interest.
On the plus side, China's low-keyed effort in
these few African states demonstrates that, in
reasonably auspicious circumstances, Peking is
capable of effective diplomacy and suggests some
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promise over the long term for Chinese diplo-
matic efforts throughout the developing Afro-
Asian world. To date, however, Peking has shown
little sign of trying to enhance its appeal by down
playing indiscriminate championing of "peoples
war" and abandoning its penchant for alienating
potential friends for the sake of ideological prin-
ciple. Until Peking is willing to abandon this mili-
tant and doctrinaire Maoist approach to foreign
affairs, China's potential for leadership or even
influence in Africa and elsewhere in the develop-
ing world will remain largely unrealized
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