WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007100030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 23, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed.
Secret
44
23 May 1969
No. 0371/69
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 22 May 1969)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
The first significant Communist responses to Presi-
dent Nixon's Vietnam address denounced proposals for
mutual troop withdrawals, insisted on complete and
unconditional US withdrawal, and scored the US for
not replying to demands for a "provisional coali-
tion. By taking up the US comments in some detail
and by spelling out their objections, the Communists
appear to be inviting further dialogue. On the mil-
itary scene, available evidence points to June or
shortly thereafter as the time the enemy will start
their "summer" campaign.
5
POST-CONGRESS EVENTS BELIE CHINESE UNITY CLAIMS
The regime has not embarked on any major policy ini-
tiatives in the wake of the ninth party congress and
in many senses appears to be merely marking time.
6
MALAYS TAKE CONTROL IN AFTERMATH OF COMMUNAL VIOLENCE
Malay political leaders have assumed virtually ex-
clusive authority in the wake of last week's com-
munal violence in Malaysia. Their evident intention
to exclude the Chinese community from any significant
national political role will aggravate the breach
between the two racial groups caused by the rioting.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
WARSAW PACT COMMAND IS REALIGNED
Recent changes in the Joint Armed Forces Command
seem designed to give East European member states a
somewhat stronger voice in the conduct of Pact mili-
tary affairs.
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TWO NATO MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETINGS SCHEDULED NEXT WEEK
The Defense Planning Committee is expected to dis-
cuss 11
the on-call naval force for the Mediterranean
and also force planning, while the Nuclear Planning
Group considers the tactical use of nuclear weapons
and consultation procedures.
DISARMAMENT TALKS FOCUS ON SEABED CONTROLS
The first of the 1969 sessions of the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee ends without agreement on any
disarmament measure. Attention will focus on seabeds
arms control when the July session opens.
SOVIETS PUSHING CIVIL AIR ROUTES ABROAD
The USSR now serves 40 countries by its national air
carrier. Opening the airspace over Siberia to in-
ternational air travel next year probably will cause
the USSR to consider seriously joining the Interna-
tional Civil Air Organization.
FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN GATHERS MOMENTUM
Centrist Alain Poher continues to gain strength in
the French presidential race and polls indicate he
would beat Gaullist challenger Georges Pompidou on
the crucial second ballot.
CZECHOSLOVAKS STRENGTHEN PARTY CONTROL OVER SOCIETY
Party chief Husak introduced additional measures for
more effective party control over key elements of
Czechoslovak society, but he may be inadvertently
strengthening the conservatives at the expense of
his moderate leadership.
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WARSAW SEEKS A FLEXIBLE POLICY TOWARD BONN
A new initiative, subtly brought out in Polish leader
Gomulka's recent speech, has pointed up Warsaw's de-
sire for a more flexible policy toward Bonn.
25X1
Middle East - Africa
MIDDLE EAST REMAINS VOLATILE
The agreement to form a new cabinet may end Lebanon's
political crisis, but the fedayeen problem probably
will continue. Two major clashes occurred this past
week on the cease-fire line.
TURKISH POLITICAL CRISIS EASES
The political crisis, which mushroomed in Turkey this
past week over the issue of restoring full political
rights to those ousted in the military revolution
nine years ago, has eased.
RHODESIA PREPARES FOR REFERENDUMS
Referendums on Prime Minister Smith's proposed con-
stitution and on declaring Rhodesia a republic will
be held on 20 June. If the proposals pass, as ex-
pected, Rhodesia will be within a step of severing
all remaining ties with Britain.
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Western Hemisphere
US-PERUVIAN RELATIONS DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER
Peru has responded to the public disclosure that the
US has suspended military sales with a statement that
if this action is confirmed there will no longer be
any need for US military missions and that Governor
Rockefeller's visit will be "inopportune.
STUDENT LEADERSHIP SHIFTING IN VENEZUELA
Long dominated by leaders affiliated with political
parties, especially extreme leftist parties,, the stu-
dents are now following new leaders who are calling
for "academic renovation."
TENSIONS RISE IN BRAZIL
Political tension is building up between the govern-
ment and the disparate opposition forces in the
church, the schools, and the increasingly disen-
chanted populace.
LABOR SUFFERS SETBACK IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
The government has squelched a month-long, illegal
strike by transport workers, but faces growing prob-
lems in the labor sector.
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The Vietnamese Communists have indicated by their detailed response
to President Nixon's proposals on Vietnam that they now are prepared for
some further substantive dialogue. The Communists may well go no further
themselves, however, until they have assessed the presidential conference to
take place on Midway early next month. They will be especially watchful for
signs of strains between Washington and Saigon.
Meanwhile, the Communists are trying to regain the diplomatic initia-
tive by giving heavy propaganda play to the Liberation Front's ten-point
program. They have not gone beyond nor clarified the language contained in
their initial announcement.
South Vietnamese reaction to President Nixon's proposals has been
generally favorable but cautious.
The evident intention of Malay political leaders to exclude Malaysia's
Chinese community from any significant political role will widen the breach
between the two racial groups. In the wake of last week's communal rioting,
Malay leaders suspended the constitutional government and established an
all-powerful National Operations Council under control of Deputy Prime
Minister Razak.
The government ignored repeated offers by Chinese opposition leaders to
assist in restoring order during the riots and its insistence on blaming the
opposition for starting the postelection disturbances has further alienated
the mass of Chinese.
The Chinese Communist regime has not embarked on any major policy
initiatives in the wake of the much heralded ninth party congress. It appears
merely to be marking time on all major issues.
The dispatch of ambassadors, both central committee members, to Paris
and Tirana this week indicates that the Chinese leadership is paying more
attention to foreign affairs, but Peking will probably take its time in filling
vacant ambassadorial slots.
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VIETNAM
The first significant Commu-
nist responses to President Nixon's
Vietnam address focused on two key
issues--future political arrange-
ments in South Vietnam and troop
withdrawals. Commentaries broad-
cast by the North Vietnamese and
the Liberation Front and state-
ments by their spokesmen in Paris
have come down hard on these ques-
tions.
The Communists have again de-
nounced US proposals for mutual
troop withdrawals and insisted
that a complete and unconditional
US military pull-out is essential
for a settlement. They contend
that to permit some American
troops to remain and to leave
the South Vietnam armed forces
intact while processes leading
to a political arrangement are
in motion is tantamount to de-
manding a Communist surrender
to Saigon.
Similarly, the Communists
scored the US for failing to re-
spond to their demand for a "pro-
visional coalition" prior to elec-
tions and for implying that such
elections would take place under
the aegis of the present South
Vietnamese Government.
The Communists did not re-
ject President Nixon's proposals
outright, however, nor did they
rule them out as a basis for ne-
gotiations in Paris. Indeed, by
taking up the US initiative in
some detail, and by spelling out
their objections, the Communists
appear to be inviting further
substantive dialogue.
During the next week or so
the Communists probably will not
go much beyond what they have
said already as they attempt to
come to grips with the Presi-
dent's proposals and to assess
their impact on the total situa-
tion. Hanoi will be especially
watchful of the presidential con-
ference on Midway for signs of
a fissure in Washington-Saigon
relations. Major new public
pronouncements may well be held
up pending an assessment of
this meeting.
Meanwhile, the Communists
appear to be trying to regain
their balance and the diplomatic
initiative through heavy public
relations exploitation of the
Front's new ten-point program.
They are playing up the ten points
on a grand scale with only passing
reference to the President's
speech. Their leading negotia-
tors in Paris have trumpeted the
Front's proposals at an unusual
number of press conferences,
interviews and social functions
during the past several days
without going beyond the language
contained in their initial an-
nouncement.
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President Thieu Responds
The US peace initiative has
prompted President Thieu to
make his most flexible statement
yet on a political settlement.
Speaking to US newsmen on 17 May,
Thieu said he was willing to
abide by the results of free na-
tional elections, even if a co-
alition or pro-Communist govern-
ment were chosen. Thieu proba-
bly believes such forthcoming
remarks will allay American press
criticism of his attitude toward
dealing with the Communists; he
probably has little fear that a
coalition or pro-Communist gov-
ernment would actually be elected.
Thieu was careful to dis-
tinguish between interim politi-
cal arrangements in connection
with a negotiated settlement to
end the war, and final arrange-
ments resulting from new elec-
tions. He rejected the establish-
ment of a coalition or any other
type of new interim government
before elections, but he said
he was willing to discuss ar-
rangements for elections with
the Communists. A political set-
tlement, he said, might include
a general amnesty so that every-
one could vote. Another point
for negotiation would be the man-
ner in which members of the Na-
tional Liberation Front might
participate as voters or as
candidates. Thieu said he would
even consider allowing them to
run as "Communists," but he did
not believe they would be "stupid
enough" to do so.
Other South Vietnamese Reactions
South Vietnam's cautious
reading of President Nixon's
proposals was reflected in the
government's initial lukewarm
statement which described the US
proposals as "not contrary to"
the spirit of Thieu's six-point
peace program. The government
later revised this statement and
called the proposals "consistent
with" Thieu's program.
Press reaction to the Presi-
dent's proposals was divided.
Two papers which took a critical
line were quickly closed and
their publishers are awaiting
an investigation and possible
legal action by the government.
Most of the concern focused on
the issues of the elections, the
regroupment of foreign troops,
and international supervision.
Politicians and National Assembly
deputies were particularly wor-
ried about the implications of
elections without reference to
the present constitution.
The Military Situation
The upsurge of Communist
military activity during the
period 11-13 May was apparently a
high point of the enemy's so-
callec "May Action Phase"; the
tempo of enemy-initiated action
fell off this week to a level
similar to other periods between
enemy offensives. Nevertheless,
heavy ground fighting took place
in several places, largely as
the result of allied drives against
enemy redoubts and base areas.
The disposition of most Com-
munist main force combat units
and other available evidence
points to June or shortly there-
after as the most likely time for
the enemy to start their "sum-
mer" campaign. Some parts of
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South Vietnam, however, are threat-
ened by concentrations of enemy
forces. These areas include
northern Quang Tri Province, the
central highlands, and the peri-
pheral areas of South Vietnam's
III Corps to the northwest and
east of Saigon.
The heaviest fighting this
week occurred in western Thua
Thien Province where combined US
and South Vietnamese forces are
sweeping the northern end of the
A Shau Valley? A strongly de-
fended hilltop position--dubbed
Hamburger Hill by American troops---
was seized on 20 May after days of
fierce fighting. US losses were
44 killed, 297 wounded, and one
missing, compared with known enemy
losses of 505 killed.
In southwestern Kontum Prov-
ince, military action seesawed
between the enemy's occasional
shellings coupled with limited
ground probes, and allied-initiated
engagements with elements of North
Vietnamese regiments threatening
allied targets spread throughout
the area.
In III Ccrps, sporadic ground
contacts between allied and Commu-
nist units were punctuated by gen-
erally light enemy bombardments of
allied field positions and base
camps. The most significant
ground battle developed near the
Long Khanh provincial capital of
Xuan Loc where allied forces en-
gaged elements of the Viet Cong
5th Division which attacked targets
in the area after being refitted
in War Zone "D."
Small-unit contacts also
flared up near the Demilitarized
Zone, south of Da Nang, and in
the delta provinces. Rocket and
mortar attacks were also directed
at scattered US air bases in mid-
week but they caused little dam-
age. This type of military action
is expected to continue as enemy
forces get set for their next of-
fensive campaign, but another
spate of country-wide shellings
could come at any time.
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POST-CONGRESS EVENTS BELIE CHINESE UNITY CLAIMS
The regime has not embarked on
any major policy initiatives in the
wake of the ninth party congress and
in many senses appears to be merely
marking time. Domestic political is-
sues remain much as they were before
the meeting began, and the congress
seems to have done little to resolve
difficult policy questions.
Mammoth meetings are now being
held in most provinces to "convey
the spirit" of the congress to party
activists. Speeches and communiques
connected with these meetings largely
repeat the opaque and ambiguous lan-
guage of Lin Piao's report to the
congress. The "revolutionary"
themes of the Cultural Revolution
and more constructive slogans call-
ing for administrative rebuilding
and greater economic growth are fre-
quently bracketed together at these
provincial meetings.
A recent article in Pekin
Dail has renewed complaints that
many revolutionary committees--the
new organs of administration at the
provincial and lower levels--are be-
set by factionalism, by power strug-
gles, and by other signs of disunity
As a result, the article says, the
revolutionary committees have dif-
ficulty in firmly establishing their
authority and in getting their direc-
tives obeyed. Similar complaints
were frequently aired in the months
preceding the congress and, although
the conclave was billed as a triumph
of "unity," it does not seem to have
done much to resolve persistent fac-
tional problems.
Propaganda remains focused on
the complicated and divisive ques-
tion of cadre "rehabilitation"--a
subject that has wide-ranging im-
plications for every political in-
terest group within the regime.
Most pronouncements on rehabilita-
tion have excoriated "extreme left-
ists" who are said to be blocking
progress in this field and have
called for the exoneration of most
officials who were severely criti-
cized at the height of the Cultural
Revolution. Nevertheless, several
broadcasts and newspaper articles
from central China have warned that
"rightists" have been taking advan-
tage of the rehabilitation process to
protect "class enemies."
One sign that at least some
progress has been made in the area
of cadre rehabilitation was the
presence at a meeting of "activists"
in Peking on 19 May of three former
army marshals--Chen Yi, Hsu Hsiang-
chien, and Nieh Jung-then--who had
been dropped from the new politburo
announced after the party congress.
All three were listed as vice chair-
men of the important Military Affairs
Commission. Despite this indication
that these men are not totally in dis-
favor, their role on the commission in
the future is likely to be largely
ceremonial.
Chen Yi continues to absent him-
self from the Foreign Ministry and al-
most certainly has been permanently re-
moved from that office. Nieh Jung-
chen, who was chief of the Chinese ad-
vanced weapons program before the Cul-
tural Revolution, may still retain
some authority in this important area,
but his removal from the politburo
means that China's technological and
scientific establishment now lacks a
ivoice at the highest policy-making
levels.
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MALAYS TAKE CONTROL IN AFTERMATH OF COMMUNAL VIOLENCE
Malay political leaders
have assumed virtually exclusive
authority in the wake of last
week's communal violence in Ma-
laysia. Their evident intention
to exclude the Chinese community
from any significant national
political role will aggravate the
breach between the two racial
groups caused by the rioting.
These developments threaten to
inflict irreparable damage to
the Malaysian goal of building
a multiracial society and could
result in further outbreaks of
violence.
An emergency National Oper-
ations Council, established on 17
May under Deputy Prime Minister
Razak, wields unlimited powers
at the national level, and also
at the local level through its
control of operations councils
in each state. All parliamentary
government on national and state
levels has been suspended. The
Malays' determination to direct
matters is evident in the assign-
ment of portfolios in the largely
advisory emergency cabinet an-
nounced on 20 May. All port-
folios are held by Malays, ex-
cept for two assigned to rep-
resentatives of the Malaysian
Indian Congress. Four members
of the Malaysian Chinese Asso-
ciation, two of whom previously
held cabinet posts, were also
appointed to the cabinet but
their "special functions" were
not identified.
During the riots the govern-
ment ignored repeated offers by
opposition leaders to assist in
restoring order, and apparently
has made no effort since then to
approach responsible opposition
figures for help to decrease ten-
sions. Instead Razak and others
have continued to blame the op-
position for starting the post-
election disturbances even though
Malay elements appear equally re-
sponsible.
Whatever
constitutional or organizational
changes may be made by the opera-
tions Council, it seems increas-
ingly likely that 66-year old
Prime Minister Rahman will be
eased out of power. This would
lead to further alienation of the
Chinese, most of whom regard Rah-
man as a moderate.
Razak's decision to recruit
three regular army battalions and
one additional territorial battalion,
all of them Malay, will strengthen
the Malay hold on power. These
units are to be in addition to the
armed vigilante groups that are
already being organized.
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Sarawak and Sabah have re-
mained quiet in the wake of the
government announcement suspend-
ing incomplete elections there.
The general sentiment, especially
in Sarawak, is that Kuala Lumpur
has exploited rioting in West
Malaysia to interfere in the
democratic process in the two
East Malaysia states. Kuala
Lumpur's action has dimmed hopes
for a stable federal-state re-
lationship in Sarawak, where a
"state's rights" atmosphere has
been strong since its incorpora-
tion in Malaysia in 1963. Any
long-term suspension of the elec-
tions will only increase the
probability of serious trouble
in East Malaysia.
In neighboring Singapore,
security forces were placed on
alert early this week after scat-
tered incidents of violence be-
tween Chinese and Malays. The
trouble thus far seems to be
largely between criminal elements,
but racial violence similar to
that in Malaysia could easily
flare up in Singapore.
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As the last week of the presidential campaign begins, opinion poles
indicate a tight race between centrist Alain Poher and Gaullist Georges
Pompidou on the first ballot. Pompidou is trying to hold on to his Gaullists
and also widen his appeal by indicating flexibility. Poher is taking advantage
of the French weariness with De Gaulle's authoritarianism.
Two important NATO meetings take place next week. The Defense
Planning Committee will discuss force planning and political control of the
on-call Mediterranean naval force, and the seven-member Nuclear Planning
Group will consider political guidelines for the tactical use of nuclear
weapons and consultation procedures for weapons release.
Representatives of most of the world's Communist parties gathered in
Moscow for the "final" preparatory session before the International Com-
munist Conference, scheduled to open on 5 June. There were some signs that
the combination of Soviet pressure and watered-down wording in the main
conference documents would bring wavering parties into line. Given the
checkered history of this project, however, Moscow could hardly feel certain
that it had finally found the formula that would both keep some key parties
from walking off at the last minute and produce agreed documents with
some substantive meaning.
Rumania still has problems accepting the documents. Ceausescu was in
Moscow for ten hours to meet with the Soviet leaders a week ago, one of a
number of fence-mending consultations prior to the preparatory meeting. He
followed this visit with a two-day visit to Warsaw for talks with Polish leader
Gomulka. In neither case does there seem to have been more than an
exchange of views, and no meeting of the minds was evident.
Czechoslovak leader Husak has moved to establish more effective party
control over key elements of society. In doing this, however, he appears to
be inadvertently strengthening regime conservatives at the expense of his
own moderate leadership. He may soon be forced to take steps against the
pro-Soviet conservatives and their spokesman, Czech art bureau leader
Strougal, in order to keep his regime intact.
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WARSAW PACT COMMAND IS REALIGNED
Articles in the Soviet and
East European press marking the
Warsaw Pact's fourteenth anniver-
sary last week provided new infor-
mation on recent changes in its
Joint Armed Forces Command. The
changes, approved at the Budapest
meeting of the Pact's top leader-
ship in March, appear designed to
give the East European member states
a somewhat stronger voice in the con-
duct of Pact military affairs.
One of the resolutions adopted
at the meeting stipulates that each
member state will appoint a deputy
to the Soviet commander in chief of
the Warsaw Pact forces. The depu-
ties will be in charge of the forces
which their countries have committed
to the Pact. They apparently will
be senior commanders but not the
national defense ministers, who
heretofore have been nominal deputy
commanders in chief.
The removal of the defense
ministers from the chain of com-
mand will mean that they will no
longer be directly subordinate to
the Pact commander, who is also
a Soviet first deputy defense min-
ister. Inasmuch as the new Pact
deputies presumably will be ac-
countable to their respective de-
fense ministers as well as to the
Pact commander, the East European
countries may acquire somewhat
greater leverage in matters re-
lating to their own armed forces.
The member states also agreed
to assign "a suitable number of gen-
erals and officers for work in the
leading organs" of the Pact. One of
the organs to which these officers
will be assigned is a newly created
committee for coordinating the de-
velopment and standardization of
weapon systems within the Pact.
Other officers may be assigned
to the staff of the Joint Command.
Rumania and Czechoslovakia have
long been calling for organiza-
tional changes which would give
the East European states meaning-
ful representation on this body.
Presently, each :country is repre-
sented in Moscow by a single of-
ficer who has only a liaison func-
tion in contrast to the sizable
Soviet staff in'each East European
capital. The chief of the Pact
staff has always been a first
deputy chief of the Soviet General
Staff, which does most of the
military planning for the Pact.
By establishing a Committee of
Defense Ministers, the Budapest meet-
ing formalized the practice of having
the national defense ministers meet
periodically to discuss matters of
common concern. The committee will
review the Pact's military require-
ments, draw up proposals for in-
creasing the effectiveness of the
joint armed forces, and submit rec-
ommendations to "organs competent
to make decisions." All major deci-
sions presumably will be made by the
Political Consultative Committee, the
Pact's highest policy-making body.
These changes in the Joint Com-
mand do not constitute a major re-
organization of the Warsaw Pact. So-
viet chairmanship of the Pact's vari-
ous organs will. ensure Moscow's con-
tinued dominance of the alliance and,
to a large extent, counterbalance
any increased autonomy which the
East European members may have gained
through the organizational changes.
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Two NATO MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETINGS SCHEDULED NEXT WEEK
The Defense Planning Commit-
tee, consisting of all NATO mem-
bers except France, will convene
at Brussels on 28 May, while the
seven-nation Nuclear Planning
Group meets in London on 29-30
May, two ministerial-level meet-
ings of unusual importance.
The main topics for discus-
sion at the Defense Planning Com-
mittee meeting are expected to
be the on-call naval force for
the Mediterranean, and force
planning. The principal issue
relating to the on-call naval
force is the question of providing
for political control over its
employment, especially in times
of crisis.
Regarding force planning,
the defense ministers will review
last January's decision after the
invasion of Czechoslovakia to up-
grade military forces and will
provide policy guidance for the
preparation of force-level pro-
posals for the 1971-1975 period.
The West European governments are
likely to press the US concerning
its intentions on future force
levels before they offer any
changes in their own force com-
mitments.
The Canadian decision to re-
duce its forces in Western Europe,
announced in April, is also cer-
tain to receive considerable at-
tention.
Discussion at the Nuclear
Planning Group meeting will center
on political guidelines for the
tactical use of nuclear weapons
and consultation procedures for
crisis situations. The British
and the Germans will present a
draft of a policy statement on
NATO's use of tactical nuclear
weapons. The West Europeans have
been pressing for firm crisis con-
sultation procedures.
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DISARMAMENT TALKS Focus ON SEABED CONTROLS
The first of the 1969 ses-
sions of the Eighteen Nation Dis-
armament Committee (ENDC) ends 23
May in Geneva, without agreement
on any new disarmament measure,
but with seabeds arms control es-
tablished as the main focus of
attention when the second session
begins early in July.
Draft treaties on seabeds
introduced by the US and USSR are
rather far apart, and there is
growing pressure to work out a
compromise. Most ENDC members are
anxious to show progress to the
24th UN General Assembly this
fall, however, and the US and
USSR, in view of their commitments
under the nuclear nonprolifera-
tion treaty, are under pressure
to resolve their differences.
The Soviet draft treaty, with
its sweeping proscription of all
military uses of the seabed and
its verification scheme that in-
cludes reciprocal inspection
rights, has generated a favorable
response from a number of ENDC
members. The Soviets have hinted
that they are flexible and may
move toward the US position. This
favors a less comprehensive ban,
to cover only nuclear and other
mass-destruction weapons fixed to
the seabeds but does not include
any formal procedure for inspec-
tion.
provisions, however, and they may
press for changes when the ENDC
reconvenes. Canada, for example,
favors including conventional
military activities in the ban,
but would spell out an exception
for "limited defensive activities"
such as submarine detection de-
vices. Denmark and Belgium ap-
pear to agree with Canada that
coverage should be broader than
that proposed by the US, but not
so broad as suggested by the USSR.
Most of the nonaligned coun-
tries at the ENDC can be expected
to support a more far-reaching
weapons ban than in the US formu-
lation, but will probably let the
US and the Soviet Union take the
lead in this area. They will,
however, probably urge that a
compromise draft include a veri-
fication provision guaranteeing
rights of inspection indiscrimi-
nately to all pact adherents.
One procedure discussed calls for
the establishment of a new inter-
national agency with authority to
inspect all signatories' underseas
installations. Another suggests
a guarantee that countries with-
out the technical capabilities to
perform deep sea inspections be
afforded the mandatory assistance
of any other state having that
capability.
General feeling among most
ENDC members is that the US draft
is too restrictive, but nonethe-
less represents a constructive
first effort. It was tabled on
22 May with the consent of NATO
countries as a tactical maneuver
to provide an alternative to the
Soviet draft before adjournment.
A number of the Allies have res-
ervations regarding some of its
Considerable controversy sur-
rounds the question of territorial
coverage. Several countries, in-
cluding some NATO members, support
the Soviet preference for apply-
ing the ban beyond the twelve-mile
limit, rather than the US proposed
three-mile delineation. Bilateral
discussions on this and the vari-
ous other issues can be expected
to continue during the ENDC recess
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;;ivii Air Routes of the USSR
into the free World
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SOVIETS PUSHING CIVIL AIR ROUTES ABROAD
The USSR continues to expand
its world-wide network of civil
air routes. In the past two
months Aeroflot, the Soviet com-
mercial carrier, has made inau-
gural flights to four countries--
Norway, Uganda, Southern Yemen
and Singapore; this raises to 40
the number of free world countries
now served by Aeroflot. The So-
viets also have moved rapidly to
replace the obsolete twin-jet TU-
104 as well as the aging TU-114
and IL-18 turboprop transports
on Aeroflot's free world routes
with two of the USSR's newest jets,
the long-range IL-62 and the short-
to-medium haul TU-134.
A recent significant develop-
ment in Soviet civil aviation has
been the opening of airspace over
Siberia to international air
travel. The decision to permit
independent Japanese flights over
Siberia by next March probably re-
sulted in part from Moscow's
search for a trans-Pacific route,
which hinges on securing onward
rights from Tokyo. In line with
this, the USSR probably will in-
itiate serious negotiations to
join the International Civil Air
Organization.
A high-level Soviet spokesman
recently said that Aeroflot is in-
terested in obtaining from the US
the right to operate IL-62 flights
between Tokyo and San Francisco/
Los Angeles via Honolulu. Moscow
also may be planning to initiate
talks with Australia in the hope
of acquiring onward rights from
Sydney, which eventually could
provide the basis for an around-
the-world service by the Soviet
carrier.
Once the trans-Siberian
route is inaugurated, Japan Air
Lines will have the initial edge
over other foreign carriers.
Western airlines such as KLM, SAS,
BOAC and Air France, however,
will quickly press for a share
in this potentially lucrative air
route.
Inauguration of Aeroflot
service to Singapore on 18 May
presages further expansion into
Southeast Asia; attempts to se-
cure air agreements with Malaysia,
Thailand and Cambodia probably
will be intensified. After three
years of intermittent negotia-
tions Moscow succeeded in March
in opening a new air route to
Hanoi through South Asia, avoid-
ing Communist China.
in the Somali Republic.
Moscow also has achieved
partial success in its longstand-
ing efforts to open air service
to East Africa via the Sudan.
Flights to both Uganda and Tan-
zania now have been added to Aero-
flot's regularly scheduled service
to Khartoum. With the inaugura-
tion of this flight, Aeroflot has
been able to abandon its more cir-
cuituous route to Tanzania. That
flight via Egypt, Yemen, and a
new stop at Aden now terminates
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FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN GATHERS MOMENTUM
With elections for the pres-
idency a little over a week away,
centrist Alain Poher not only is
eating into the lead which the
polls give Georges Pompidou on
the first ballot but he has over-
taken the former prime minister
on the crucial second ballot.
The two front runners continue to
conduct campaigns which are quite
similar.
Pompidou, stressing that he
is open to change but within the
nontext of stability and continu-
ity, is trying both to keep dedi-
cated Gaullists in his camp and
to woo the opposition. Poher,
taking advantage of the hostility
which many Frenchmen felt about
De Gaulle's authoritarian han-
dling of the presidential office,
is emphasizing that he will be a
"president for all the French."
Pompidou has stepped up his
campaign efforts, because of the
slippage in his standing in the
polls and the fact that he is the
principal target of all six other
candidates. In a TV address this
week, Pompidou raised again the
specter of Communism, a tactic
used effectively by the Gaullists
in the past. He charged that
Poher, if elected, would be the
"prisoner of his electorate, in-
cluding the Communists." In
corning days, Pompidou doubtless
will try to put Poher on the de-
fensive by questioning how the
interim president can hope to
carry out his plans when the par-
liamentary majority is against
him.
Pompidou, is avoiding numerous
public appearances and rallies.
Although he has stated that he
will do everything'; possible to
avoid dissolving is e National As-
sembly, he has famed to explain
how he would proceed. He probably
will try, despite ~:rodding by
Pompidou, to remain ambiguous on
the subject.
Foreign policy, as usual, is
taking a back seat: to the domes-
tic issues in the icampaign. Both
major candidates are trying not
to stray too far from their tra-
ditional foreign policy positions
while giving the electorate the
impression of an open mind. Pom-
pidou's effort to ; take off in new
directions has been complicated
by ardent Gaullist Foreign Min-
ister Michel Debre's repeated
public statements on the need to
continue De Gaulle's policies.
Poher, meanwhile,!is seeking to
shed the "European at any price"
label which Gaullist opponents
are trying to attach to him.
By the time the campaign
ends on 30 May, each candidate
will have appeared on radio and
TV on seven diffe 'ent occasions.
Such exposure usually works to
the advantage of lesser known
figures--as it d:Ld in the 1965
presidential race,; Poher should
derive particular, benefit from
his appearances. He has made
the need for objectivity in the
French radio and 'V organization
one of his main campaign issues,
and, as interim president, he has
already objected to the generous
coverage given Pompidou on news
programs.
Poher is conducting his cam-
paign in a low key and, unlike
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CZECHOSLOVAKS STRENGTHEN PARTY CONTROL OVER SOCIETY
Party chief Husak last week
introduced additional measures to
assert more effective party control
over key elements of Czechoslovak
society. In so doing he appears
inadvertently to be strengthening
regime conservatives at the expense
of his own moderate leadership.
The regime banned or suspended
a number of prominent liberal non-
party publications and forced
changes in the editorial boards of
several others for failure to heed
previously imposed press restric-
tions. The crackdown on nonparty
media, which followed a successful
effort to muzzle outspoken party
publications, probably presages
further actions against those dis-
sident publications that continue
to use veiled language and subtle
cartoons to voice their dissent.
Husak also reshuffled person-
nel in the Interior Ministry's
party committees in order to tighten
the party's grip on the police and
security apparatus. This move may
increase the influence of pro-
Soviet hard liners who are seeking
the ouster of progressives through
a sweeping personnel shake-up at
the working levels of the ministry.
Encouraged by Husak's apparent
desire to appease Moscow, Czecho-
slovak conservatives have become
more openly active in their drive
to intimidate the liberals and
moderates who supported Dubcek and
the reform program last year. In
a Rude Pravo declaration last week,
1,300 conservative journalists
appealed to all media officials
to fall in line behind party policy.
In addition, conservative
Czech party bureau leader Strougal
seems to be attempting to build his
own power base in the Czech lands---
probably to put him in a better
position to challenge Husak in the
future. St:rougal is about to place
his own supporters on the North
Moravian regional party committee.
They will replace 12 officials of
the once-liberal committee who
have either !been dismissed or felt
compelled to resign after the com-
mittee rescinded resolutions,
passed last year, which no longer
conform to the party line. Strou-
gal probably will try to pull off
similar power shifts in other re-
gions within his political domain.
Consequently, Husak may ul-
timately be forced to move against
Strougal and the conservatives in
order to keep his regime intact.
Given the polLtics and the back-
grounds of the two leaders a clash
over various issues appears inev-
itable, possibly as early as the
next central committee plenum ten-
tatively set for 29 May.
Husak, meanwhile, continued
to renew relations with the inva-
sion powers. He went to Budapest,
apparently alone, to establish a
personal rapport with Hungarian
party boss Kadar on 15 and 16 May.
In Moscow, however, the Soviet
press is maintaining a wait-and-see
attitude, reporting anti-Sovietism
still exists in the Czechoslovak
party. The implication is that
Husak's firmness has not yet been
enough to bring stability.
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WARSAW SEEKS A FLEXIBLE POLICY TOWARD BONN
A new initiative by Polish
party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka
has pointed up Warsaw's desire
for a more flexible policy toward
Bonn. In a major speech on 17
May Gomulka indirectly indicated
that Warsaw wants to improve its
relations with Bonn. He implic-
itly admitted that fundamental
issues, such as the final recog-
nition of frontiers, cannot be
solved bilaterally because they
are too closely tied up with
broader East-West relationships.
Mindful of his critics at
home and among his Warsaw Pact
allies, Gomulka focused on the
proposition, patently unrealistic,
that Bonn sign a treaty with War-
saw along the lines of the 1950
Polish treaty with East Germany
providing de jure recognition of
Poland's western frontier. Once
again, he rejected West German
Foreign Minister Brandt's proposal
of March 1968 for a nonaggression
pact with a de facto recognition
of the Polish border. He sug-
gested that Bonn seek the advice
of the four major signatories of
the Potsdam agreement on the le-
gality of a treaty containing de
jure recognition of the Oder-
Neisse frontier, thus implicitly
throwing the issue into the sphere
of great power relations.
liberately avoided comment on cer-
tain aspects of Poland's improving
relations with West Germany. He
said nothing of the well-estab-
lished trade relations between
the two, or about budding private
political contacts. For the first
time in recent years there were
no rigid preconditions even for
diplomatic relations with the
West Germans. The matter was just
ignored, implying it might be ne-
gotiable. Gomulka even failed
to voice support for East Germany's
Ulbricht, who in late April de-
manded diplomatic recognition
from Bonn. Warsaw may believe
that this latest East German ploy
blocks improvement of the situa-
tion in central Europe.
Having set the stage, Gomulka
counted on a careful reading in
Bonn to get the message across
that Warsaw intends to be flex-
ible and invites an, intensified
bilateral dialogue. Foreign Min-
ister Brandt promptly welcomed
Gomulka's speech, restating Bonn's
readiness to engage in bilateral
talks. He rejected, however, any
de jure recognition of Poland's
borders except by a reunified
Germany, i.e., after a final
peace treaty.
In other respects, Gomulka
appeared to be treading the line
between a moderate approach to
Bonn and an attempt to avoid
alarming his East European col-
leagues. Gomulka apparently de-
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Gomulka undoubtedly was
aware his statements would stir
up the pre-election political
atmosphere i:n Bonn, and domes-
tically would be well received
prior to Poland's national elec-
tions slated for 1 June. More
fundamentally, however, the
speech is another indication of
Poland's anxiety over recent bi-
lateral contacts between Bonn and
Moscow, as well as East German
pressure for a resumption of
talks between the two Germanies.
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Israel continued to issue tough statements this past week, both on the
military situation and on the possibility of a Middle East settlement.
Israeli leaders
L
seemed to be hardening even further their opposition to the four-power
and US-Soviet talks, reiterating that they will reject "external" suggestions
for a settlement.
In the Nigerian civil war neither side has made any significant military
gains, although the Biafrans are still counterattacking at Umuahia and
remain on the offensive along the southern front. The secessionists have
evidently continued to receive substantial munitions shipments over the
French-supported arms airlift from Gabon.
The beleaguered Dahomey Government has had some success in dis-
rupting labor solidarity, and a threatened general strike again failed to
materialize this week. The situation remains volatile, however, with second-
ary school teachers, students, and some civil servants still on strike.
Political activity in Pakistan maintained its gradual upswing, highlighted
by rumors of mergers among various existing parties. Meanwhile, President
Yahya Khan's anticorruption drive may suffer a loss of credibility unless
some action is taken against members of former President Ayub Khan's
family.
Student demonstrations in Afghanistan reached sizable proportions
during the last ten days, provoking more vigorous government action than
was the case last year. Political elements of the extreme right and left are
probably partially responsible for encouraging the students to take to the
streets in seeking redress of their grievances, which focus on unsatisfactory
academic conditions. The government is prepared to take more forceful
action if necessary, and presumably wants to be sure that Kabul remains
quiet during Kosygin's five-day visit beginning 26 May.
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MIDDLE EAST REMAINS VOLATILE
Rashid Karami agreed to
:Form a new Lebanese cabinet this
week which may end the month-long
political crisis that has para-
lyzed the government. His new
cabinet is expected to be as
broadly based as possible, with
the probable exclusion of ex-
President Chamoun's party.
The cabinet will probably
soon be faced with the same
dilemma that forced the downfall
of its predecessor--how to deal
with the fedayeen. The fedayeen
have found it increasingly dif-
ficult to mount guerrilla opera-
tions into Israel from Jordan and
are seeking new bases in Lebanon.
PPresident Hilu is convinced that
Lebanon's existence as a state in
:its present form will come to an
end if the terrorists are per-
mitted to establish new bases.
He anticipates that either Israel
will retaliate against Lebanon
for allowing anti-Israel feda-
yeen operations, or the fedayeen
will engage in subversive activ-
ities against the Lebanese Gov-
ernment in order to bring about
one that is more sympathetic to
their cause.
There have been no further
,clashes this past week between
the Lebanese Army and the feda-
yeen, who are presumably waiting
to see what the new cabinet's
;policies are. The fedayeen's in-
activity may also be due to
,pressure from their friends.
The Soviets have
promised to protect Palestinian
rights in any settlement that
is reached.
The Middle East cease-fire
lines remained tense this past
week as fighting flared on two
fronts.
Israel claimed it
shot down three Egyptian MIG-21s
Wednesday in an air battle along
the northern section of the Suez
Canal. Egypt has denied losing
any aircraft.
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TURKISH POLITICAL CRISIS EASES
The political crisis, which amnesty measure. The Turkish Labor
mushroomed in Turkey this past week Party, however, warned of dire con-
over the issue of restoring full { sequences and threatened to take the
political rights to those overthrown issue to the Constitutional Court.
nine years ago, has eased. The gov-
ernment sent the controversial bill -
back to committee for further study.
It will remain there at least until
after the elections in October.
Amnesty was a hot issue within
the ruling Justice Party as ousted
President Bayar maneuvered to re-
gain his rights and influence.
Prime Minister Demirel, realizing
the strong military opposition to
amnesty, and possibly concerned
over Bayar's potential influence
within the party, was able to keep
the situation under control. When
major opposition leader, Inonu, pub-
licly declared his party's support
for amnesty, however, Demirel
speedily introduced the measure in
Parliament.
Inonu almost certainly real-
ized his announcement would be a
political bombshell, but he prob-
ably didn't expect to be the main
target of the resultant rancor in
both military and youth circles.
Most of the minor parties, af-
firmed support for the proposed
The military brought its full
weight against the measure, prov-
ing once again that they are the
ultimate source of power in the po-
litical structure. The military
recalled ships, canceled leaves,
Tanks rumbling through
Ankara were probably a show of
force.
This highly controversial is-
sue has been shelved, but its in-
troduction probably has weakened
the political structure and the
democratic process in Turkey. Old
wounds have been opened; much of
the goodwill between military and
political leaders has been dissi-
pated; and the bitterness will in-
fect the election campaign.
Only the extremist elements
of both the left and right, too
weak to gain power through normal
democratic procedures, stand to
gain from a period of renewed po-
litical instability and military
involvement. Some military offi-
cers might even be tempted to seek
a Greek solution of the dilemma--
a military junta in command of the
government to "re-educate" politi-
cal circles in the "responsibili-
ties of citizenship," but no such
group is identifiable at this
time.
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RHODESIA PREPARES
Prime Minister Ian Smith
plans to hold referendums on 20
June on his new draft constitu-
tion and on the proposal to de-
clare Rhodesia a republic. If
the proposals pass, as expected,
Rhodesia will be within a step
of severing all remaining ties
with Britain.
Students and lecturers at
the multiracial University Col-
lege in Salisbury held four days
of peaceful demonstrations this
week to voice their strong op-
position to the referendums
which they believe will not only
end all hope for a settlement
with London but lead to a more
:Formal and stricter form of
racial segregation. Several
prominent church leaders, the
college principal, and a former
prime minister publicly endorsed
the protest.
A small but vocal white
supremacist group has also come
out against Smith's constitution
as being too liberal, and the
moderate, pro-settlement Centre
Party has begun a campaign to
bring out a large "no" vote.
Smith's proposals provide, in
essence, for eventual racial
parity in the national parlia-
ment (although not for many
decades at best), thus preclud-
ing any chance of ultimate ma-
jority rule and ensuring continued
white dominance.
No one really doubts that
the Rhodesian Front government
will win the referendums, although
some opponents believe that there
FOR REFERENDUMS
may be a significant number of
abstentions. The government,
apparently worried about absten-
tions, indicated general elec-
tions may be held if it wins
a weak mandate.
Smith's opponents seem to
be hoping for a party split.
Some Front supporters, and pre-
sumably some party members, are
unhappy with the government's
handling of the constitutional
issue. This is partly because
the government was so slow in
drafting its constitutional pro-
posals--they were not published
until 21 May--and because neither
the party membership nor parlia-
ment will have e chance to de-
bate the proposals before they
are submitted to the voters.
Smith must: rally the Front
if he is to win the strong man-
date he seeks; he should be able
to do so. Kicking off his own
campaign on 7 May Smith declared
somewhat melodramatically that
his constitution would "sound
the death knell" for majority
rule. Such appeals should find
plenty of support within the
overwhelmingly white electorate.
The British, moreover, ex-
pect Smith to buttress his cam-
paign by publishing their diplo-
matic exchanges soon, in edited
form, to convince the voters that
Prime Minister Wilson, not Smith,
has been unwilling to compromise,
choice but to go its own wav_
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Student unrest has again erupted in a number of Latin American
countries.
In Argentina, universities in five provincial cities have been closed and
the country's second largest city, Rosario, has been put under military rule
as a result of student violence. Leftist extremists are turning the deaths of
five students into a major political issue; student indignation is running high,
and, because of the new martyrs, more trouble can be expected.
In Brazil, students took to the streets for the first time since December
to protest the forced retirement of many popular professors. In Ecuador,
secondary school and university students, egged on by radical leftists and
opportunistic politicians, have briefly occupied three universities to push
their demands for an easing of entrance requirements.
In Venezuela, a nationwide student strike is in effect as a result of the
death of two students involved in clashes with police last week. The demon-
strations are being led by anarchists and independent student leaders who
have been interested in "academic renovation" rather than in traditional
politics or rebellion against the state.
Antigovernment demonstrations are continuing in Honduras in the
wake of Governor Rockefeller's recent visit. Although the Lopez government
is the main target of the demonstrators, there is much latent hostility toward
the US, especially among leftist university students who are using the killing
of one of their colleagues during the governor's visit as a rallying cry for the
riots.
The first of Governor Rockefeller's four trips to Latin America ended
on 19 May. The second will begin 27 May in Colombia. Colombian students
reportedly are planning disturbances, as are students in Bolivia and Ecuador.
Venezuelan authorities also fear demonstrations against the governor during
his visit there on 2 June.
Relations between the US and Peru deteriorated even further this week.
On 20 May the military government issued a communique asserting that the
US military missions "no longer have any purpose" in Peru and that the
scheduled visit of Governor Rockefeller on 30 May would be "inopportune."
The communique was released after the cabinet discussed the suspension of
US military sales because of the seizure of a US fishing boat last February.
Charges have also been made by Peru against the US schools in Lima. The
minister of transportation and communications has said that all communica-
tions systems in Peru should be nationalized.
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US-PERUVIAN RELATIONS DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER
Peru's military government
reacted strongly to the public
disclosure that the US had sus-
pended military sales to the
Peruvian armed forces. An of-
ficial government communique,
unanimously endorsed by the cab-
inet, said that if the suspension
was officially confirmed there
would no longer be any need for
the US military missions and that
Governor Rockefeller's scheduled
visit to Lima would be "inoppor-
tune."
According to US law military
sales to any country that seizes
US fishing boats must be suspended.
The suspension was invoked against
Peru after its navy seized a fish-
ing boat last February, but it
was not made public until after
Peru seized and fined another
boat on 16 May. The story of the
suspension made headlines in the
Lima press, putting pressure on
the Velasco government to take
some retaliatory action.
There has been confusion in
Peru as to what precisely is in-
cluded in the suspension. Despite
explanations that only official
military sales and not military
grant aid or commercial sales have
been suspended, the official gov-
ernment response and the press
treatment of the matter have re-
flected the opinion that all US
military assistance has been cut
off.
Further complicating the
over-all situation, many Peru-
vians have linked the suspension
of sales with the resignation
of Ambassador Jones and the con-
tinuing intensive efforts to find
a solution to the dispute over
the expropriation of the Interna-
tional Petroleum Company.
President Velasco and many
other high-ranking military of-
ficers have for some time been
thinking of replacing the US mili-?
tary missions with advisers from
France and other European coun-
tries. Such a move has met with
some opposition--particularly
from the navy--but the events of
the past week appear to have pro-
vided the needed ammunition for
its proponents.
A high-:Level military mis-
sion, headed by army chief of
staff General Winklereid, is cur-
rently touring Western Europe at
the invitation of the host coun-
tries. The trip, which is spot-
lighting France, has been des-
cribed as necessary to "observe
the variety and quality of arma-
ments" available. Peru has al-
ready purchased Mirage aircraft
and tanks from France and brought
in technicians to advise the Peru-
vians on the operation and main-
tenance of the equipment.
The government's communique
can also be seen as an attempt to
gain political advantage by rally-
ing nationalistic support for
President Velasco's strong stand
against the "yankees" and perhaps
by further isolating some of the
moderates in the government who
would have preferred a less dras-
tic reaction. It also has given
the Velasco government another
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opportunity to make a play for
Latin American support for Peru
in its problems with the US by
declaring that the US had "uni-
laterally" broken the military
assistance agreement signed in
1952.
STUDENT LEADERSHIP SHIFTING IN VENEZUELA
The recent outburst of stu-
dent violence points up a funda-
mental change in student politics.
Clashes between students and
police in the western Venezuelan
town of Merida last week led to
a riot in which one student was
killed by gunfire and at least
six others were hospitalized.
Violence then broke out in other
cities, culminating in a nation-
wide strike by university and
secondary students.
Student unrest has been ris-
ing throughout the country since
last March. The new activism is
led by anarchists and independents
rather than by the traditional
student leaders, who are affili-
ated with political parties and
have tried to mobilize student
support for party policies. The
most militant of the traditional
leaders have been the leftists,
who used the universities as head-
Page 2 7
quarters in their armed rebellion
against the government.
The new activists, although
exhibiting a strong Marxist cast,
have shown no interest in tradi-
tional politics or rebellion
against the state. Instead they
have directed their efforts
against the universities them-
selves in a vague movement for
"academic renovation." They have
resorted to widespread violence
in support of such demands as
abolition of entrance examina-
tions, new school buildings and
facilities, and reformed curricula.
The renovation movement has also
had a strong impact on secondary
students.
The traditional leaders were
successful last week in regaining
control of the students by calling
for and imposing the general strike,
but it is not likely that they will
succeed in controlling or stilling
the new activists for long.
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TENSIONS RISE IN BRAZIL
Political tension is build-
ing up between the government and
the disparate opposition forces
in the church, the schools, and
the increasingly disenchanted
populace.
A student strike has occurred
in Rio de Janeiro and police have
arrested the presidents of sev-
eral student councils. On 16 May
students took to the streets for
the first time since the govern-
ment's assumption of broad new
powers last December to denounce
the government's forced retirement
of numerous popular professors.
In the northeastern city of
Recife, the army is attempting to
weed out all "subversive" stu-
dents. For example, all 800 en-
gineering students at the federal
university have been required to
submit a written defense or face
expulsion. Some 70 other Recife
students have already been ex-
pelled, and more seem likely to
follow.
The government's hard line
with students may well swell the
ranks of protesters, but faction-
alism among student leaders and
the government's determination to
stamp out "subversion" will prob-
ably prevent effective protests
on a nationwide scale for the time
being. The tough policy is, how-
ever, angering many moderates who
previously had supported the gov-
ernment.
Adding to the unsettled atmos-
phere is a military court's sen-
tencing of at northeastern priest
to one year in prison for making
"critical and offensive" state-
ments about the armed forces. This
is the first action against a
priest since December; it seems
likely to alienate even further
progressive churchmen such as Arch-
bishop Dom Helder Camara, who is
already heavily involved in defend-
ing the Recife students.
Undeterred by the signs of
growing disaffection, the Costa
e Silva government issued Institu-
tional Act 10 on 16 May. The act
extends and amplifies the govern-
ment's power to punish persons who
lose their political rights. The
terms are so broad that if vigor-
ously applied, they could prohibit
practically any gainful employment
for such persons.
The government is also under-
taking steps aimed at a major re-
structuring of the political sys-
tem--specifically measures designed
to increase control over elections,
politicians, and parties prior to
the reopening of Congress. Presi-
dent Costa e Silva reportedly hopes
to reopen congress by August as a
step toward restoring a more normal
political life. Military and ci-
vilian hard liners, however, may
not be prepared for such liberali-
zation.
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The pattern of protest and
reaction is not yet broad enough
to threaten the government's sta-
bility, but it could increase ten-
sions between hard liners and mod-
erates in the government. If the
President pushes his liberaliza-
tion plans too vigorously, this
tension could erupt abruptly, per-
haps even jeopardizing his own po-
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LABOR SUFFERS SETBACK IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
The Trinidad Government has
squelched a month-long, illegal
strike by transport workers, but
faces growing problems in the la-
bor sector.
The arrest of leaders of the
small but militant Transport and
Industrial Workers Union (TIWU) on
13 May for disrupting traffic sig-
naled the effective end of their
strike effort and the union for-
mally capitulated on 19 May. Pub-
lic and labor response to the
walkout--begun in protest against
a court wage award--had been only
lukewarm at best and the govern-
ment clearly has the upper hand
over labor at present. Indeed,
the administration may be planning
to withdraw recognition from the
TIWU and thereby deprive militants
of an important protest vehicle.
Despite these temporary gains
for the government, labor is
likely to pose increasing diffi-
culties for Prime Minister Eric
Williams. Economic growth has
slowed since 1961 and the govern-
ment's investment policies have
not stemmed the rise in unemploy-
ment, now estimated to be about
20 percent of the work force. In
addition, labor leaders have a
tempting political target in the
government's Industrial Stabili-
zation Act. The act, hurriedly
passed in 1965 to deal with labor
problems at the time, virtually
prohibits the right to strike and
has drawn increasing fire in the
last year. The transport strike
was viewed as a challenge to the
act.
Prime Minister Williams has
maintained firm control of the
country since it became independ-
ent in 1962; he was re-elected
in 1966. In part, his success
can be attributed to the disunity
of the opposition. Labor, how-
ever, promises to become a focal
point for political dissent. Ex-
tremists, who played a prominent
part in the current strike, will
probably also continue their ef-
forts to exploit the issue of the
controversial ban on strikes de-
spite their temporary setback.
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