WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006800020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
NAVY review(s)
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Declassified for NASA
Equities -Per NASA letter.
OSD review completed
Secret
~3
13 December 1968
No. 0051/68
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V I E'I'NAM
The Communists are completing preparations for re-
newed offensive action in widespread areas of South
Vietnam. In the political sphere, Saigon's delega-
tion to the Paris talks departed on 7 December after
last-minute approval by the National Assembly.
NORTH KOREAN HARASSMENT OF SOUTH MAY INCREASE
North Korea has appreciably improved its capability
for mounting infiltration operations, and Pyongyang's
propaganda has been claiming a growth of "revolution-
ary resistance" in the South.
PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT SEEKS TO REPAIR RELATIONS WITH US
President Marcos has made several high-level appoint-
ments recently that apparently are intended to foster
good relations with the next US administration as
well as to aid his own campaign for re-election next
year.
BURMESE REGIME GIVES CIVILIANS "ADVISORY" ROLE
General Ne Win's vague statements last September
about bringing civilians into the government have
thus far resulted only in his assigning a group of
former politicians some marginal "advisory" duties.
Europe
MOSCOW REACTS WITH RESTRAINT TO US BLACK SEA OPERATIONS
Soviet naval and air units kept the two US destroyers
that cruised the Black Sea this week under close sur-
veillance, but there was no attempt at harassment.
OSD review completed
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Dec 68
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PROSPECTS BLEAK FOR CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP
Party leader Dubcek returned from his meeting with
the top Soviet leaders in Kiev on 7-8 December to
face still more criticism of his government at home.
USSR ADOPTING NEW MEASURES AGAINST CRIME
Recent measures taken by Moscow in the internal secu-
rity area indicate that the Soviet Government is
stepping up its campaign to maintain law and order.
COMPUTER T$CHNOLOGY AND USE LAGS IN EASTERN EUROPE
The use of digital electronic computers in Eastern
Europe is lagging many years behind that of the Free
World despite the heavy emphasis being placed on
technological development.
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BIAFRA'S MILITARY POSITION IMPROVES
The Biafrans have scored some limited gains in the
civil war along the southern front and have contained
a Nigerian federal offensive from the north. The UK
is again seeking to end the war through negotiations.
POLITICAL CHAOS STILL THE RULE IN SUDAN
The serious illness of Prime Minister Mahjoub has
left the Sudanese Government mired in factionalism
and inertia. Unless he recovers soon
wi acce erate he country's downward spiral.
NEW THREATS RAISED TO ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI RELATIONS
Irresponsible actions by elements of both the Ethio-
pian and Somali military point up the vulnerability
of Somali Prime Minister Egal's detente policy.
ANTI-AYUB FORCES GAIN STRENGTH IN PAKISTAN
Open opposition to President Ayub's government be-
came more widespread during the past week as serious
rioting broke out in East Pakistan, rumblings of
discontent were reported among military officers,
anal yet another respected leader joined the opposi-
tion.
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Western Hemisphere
VENEZUELA'S NEW PRESIDENT CONSIDERED POLITICAL MODERATE 28
If Christian Democrat Rafael Caldera is inaugurated
on 12 March as expected, this will be the first time
in Venezuelan history that power has passed peace-
fully from one party to another and only the second
time that one democratically elected president has
followed another into office.
DISSENSION IN BAHAMIAN GOVERNMENT
Dissidence in Prime Minister Lynden Pindling's Pro-
gressive Labor Party has led to serious divisions
within the cabinet, as some of its members maneuver
to enhance their personal political positions.
INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN PANAMA DIMINISHES
Tension in the Panama - Costa Rica border area les-
sened last week as Costa Rica took steps to curb the
activities of exile supporters of ousted president
Arias.
STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE IN CHILE
Unless the issue of university financing, which pre-
cipitated two student-police clashes last week, is
resolved soon, it could become an issue in the cam-
paign for the congressional elections next March.
PERU ANNOUNCES LONG-RANGE DEVELOPMENT PLAN
Before it leaves office, the military government
hopes to further industrialization, expand export
industries, achieve a more equal distribution .of in-
come, and integrate-the large Indian population into
the economy.
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Some Vietnamese Communist forces, after refitting in their base areas,
appear to be moving into position for renewed offensive action in widely
scattered areas of South Vietnam. The attacks could begin momentarily, and
will apparently be focused on the western III Corps area.
The Saigon delegation led by Vice President Ky is now in place in Paris,
and an enlarged and strengthened Liberation Front delegation soon will be,
but there is still little sign of an early breakthrough in the procedural
deadlock that has delayed opening of the expanded talks. Even if the
Communists were to become more flexible on seating arrangements and
other procedural matters, the South Vietnamese seem set for a lengthy
period of haggling to prevent the Liberation Front from achieving an
independent position at the negotiating table.
Indications continue to mount that North Korea may be planning to
increase its actions against the South. One telling indicator is Pyongyang's
recent appointment of one of its leading experts in unconventional warfare
as minister of defense./
the North
Koreans may now have between 20,00 an trame men organized
and available for unconventional operations in the South.
In Manila, President Marcos has made some personnel changes that
seem as much intended to mend his fences with the US as to put himself on
abetter footing for his campaign for re-election next year. Recent moves in
this direction include the appointments of Carlos Romulo as foreign minister
and Ernesto V. Lagdameo, a man generally acknowledged to be on good
terms with the US president-elect, as the new ambassador to the US. The
recent announcement by the outgoing foreign minister that the Philippines
would undertake no new initiatives on the contentious Sabah issue until
after the Malaysian elections next spring was probably also intended at least
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~JUngTau
Lcrpitui Speezcs4 Zone
SOCJ7H VIETNAM
goo
MILES '
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VIETNAM
The Communists are completing
preparations for renewed offensive
action in widespread areas of
South Vietnam. It is becoming
increasingly clear that the main
focal point of future enemy action
is in III Corps. At present,
signs of intensified Communist
preparations to attack are espe-
cially evident in the arc of
provinces west and north of the
capital city.
the next route
of the Communist's "winter-spring"
campaign will begin in the second
half of December.
Increased enemy aggressive-
ness, evident this week in stepped-
up spellings and clashes with al-
lied forces, could well be a pre-
lude to a greater enemy effort
throughout III Corps, possibly
in concert with new enemy initia-
tives elsewhere.
Other potential battlefields
in key sections of the country
include the coastal areas of the
northern provinces, the western
highlands, and certain areas of
the delta provinces. A new ag-
gressiveness on the part of the
Viet Cong in the delta during
the past week suggests that they
may now at least be prepared to
offer greater resistance to al-
lied forces attempting to dis-
rupt their activities.
Political Developments
The South Vietnamese delega-
tion departed for Paris on 7 De-
cember after last-minute approval
by the National Assembly of Presi-
dent Thieu's decision to enter
the Paris negotiations.
Thieu and Vice President Ky
appear to be fully agreed that the
South Vietnamese delegation must
be firm on procedural matters.
Saigon believes that the North
Vietnamese will try to take ad-
vantage of a US desire for progress
to extract concessions from the
Americans that might affect the
status of the Saigon government.
The South Vietnamese are appar-
ently prepared for lengthly proce-
dural talks in order to prevent.
the Liberation Front from achieving
an independent position at the
negotiating table.
Meanwhile, some anti-Ky
elements in Saigon are attempt-
ing to undercut the Paris dele-
gation in order to get at the
vice president. Although Thieu
may welcome a certain amount of
criticism directed at his rival,
he will probably try to keep it
well enough in hand to prevent it
from becoming a serious embar-
rassment to the delegation as
a whole, because the latter's
performance will reflect on Thieu
as well.
Since the arrival of Saigon's
delegation in Paris, Hanoi has
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concentrated on discrediting al-
lied procedural proposals. The
Commnists have shown little will-
ingness to compromise as they try
to build-up the status of the
Liberation Front.
Hanoi's tough stance on prc,
cedures is similar to the one the
Communists took prior to the open-
ing of the Paris talks. At that
time, they maintained an inflexible
position for several weeks and
then suddenly proposed Paris as
a compromise site. In the current
procedural wrangle, the Communists
seem to want a period during
which they can try to discredit
the US position and picture
Saigon as reluctant to end the
war.
The Communists are continuing
to prepare for substantive dis-
cussions, however. On 11 Decem-
ber, the Front announced appoint-
ment of its first-string team for
the Paris talks, to be led by
the Front's top foreign affairs
official. Madame Binh, who heads
up the Front group now in Paris
for the preliminaries, will even-
tually become the deputy leader
of the full delegation.
P~ORTH KOREAN HARASSMENT OF SOUTH I~~AY INCREASE
There are growing indica-
tions that North Korea may be
planning to expand its actions
against South Korea. The North
has appreciably improved its ca-
pability for mounting infiltra-
tion operations, and Pyongyang's
propaganda has been claiming a
growth of "revolutionary resist-
ance" in the South.
The considerable disruption
caused by armed agent teams that
landed on South Korea's east
coast in late October and early
November may encourage Pyongyang.
Originally numbering 90 to 120,
the intruders have managed to
continue operations for over a
month despite severe personnel
losses and large-scale security
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forces deployed against them.
In the process they have caused
nearly 100 South Korean military
and civilian casualties.
North Korean
paramilitary orces appear to
have been expanded this year to
over 20,000 men, including sig-
nificantly increased personnel
trained and available for uncon-
ventional warfare operations in
the South. Significantly,
winter training has been a fea-
ture of their preparation. Agent
activity has heretofore been cur-
tailed during the harsh winter
months. The recent appointment
of a leading unconventional war-
fare expert--Choe Hyon, the fifth-
ranking North Korean party mem-
ber--to head the Defense Minis-
try may be a further indication
of the importance Pyongyang at-
taches to guerrilla tactics.
The South Koreans have re-
acted sharply to the east coast
landings, and the authorities
have been quick to identify
short-comings in the security
forces' performance. Remedial
measures, however, will take
considerable time to become ef-
fective.
North Korea's program of
armed harassment has also put
President Pak Chong-hui under
pressure from his supporters,
particularly the military, to
retaliate in kind. Over the
tion.
North Korea's Kim I1-song ap-
parently desire an open war,
this sort of activity carries
the inherent danger of escala-
Although neither Pak nor
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PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT SEEKS TO REPAIR RELATIONS L'~ITH US
Several high-level appoint-
ments recently made by Philippine
President Marcos apparently are
intended to foster good relations
with the next US administration
as well as to aid his campaign
for re-election next year.
Marcos appears to realize
that he overplayed his hand in
recent months by stimulating
anti-US demonstrations and har-
assing US activities in the Phil-
ippines. Marcos' actions were
prompted by Manila's displeas-
ure over the US attitude toward
the Philippine claim to Sabah.
The Filipinos have now said that
they will not make any more moves
on their claim until after the
Malaysian elections next spring.
Marcos probably regards his
appointment of Carlos Romulo as
foreign secretary, in particular,
as contributing toward good re-
lations with the next US admin-
istration. Romulo has long been
involved in US-Philippine affairs,
including two terms as ambassador
in Washington. Marcos probably
sees Romulo's blend of pro-Ameri-
canism and nationalism as serving
both to blunt the carping of
Philippine supernationalists and
to further Marcos' desire to mend
fences with the US.
At least two other recent
appointments seem to have been
made at least partly with an eye
toward good relations. Philip-
pine ambassador-designate to
Washington, Ernesto V. Lagdameo,
who was named after the US presi-
dential election, is generally
acknowledged to be a friend of
the US president-elect. In ad-
dition, Juan Ponce Enrile was
transferred from commissioner of
customs to secretary of justice.
He was deeply involved in re-
cent abrasive discussions with
US officials concerning the impo-
sition of fees on US military
shipments into the Philippines.
Marcos also encouraged the
resignation of two cabinet mem-
bers accused of malfeasance--a
maneuver that may have been de-
signed as much for its effect on
US attitudes as for its impact
on the Philippine electorate.
Several other recent cabinet and
subcabinet appointments appear
to have been made only for their
domestic political effect.
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BURMESE REGIME LIVES CIVILIANS `~ADVISORY~~ ROLE
General Ne Win's vague state-
ments last September about bring-
ing civilians into the Burmese
government have thus far resulted
only in his assigning a group of
former politicians same marginal
"advisory" duties. He has in-
dicated no intention of relin-
quishing any of his power.
Hopes had been raised among
former politicians that the mili-
tary government was preparing to
implement Ne Win's ambiguous
promises when last month most of
the remaining non-Communist po-
litical prisoners were freed and
the government convened an as-
sembly of 33 civilian leaders.
Ne Win quickly dampened any
expectations for an early sharing
of power, however. Although he
cited the drafting of a consti-
tution as the eventual aim of
the consultations, he clamped a
lid of secrecy on the proceedings
and limited the scope of their
activities. He reportedly im-
pressed on the civilians that
they had been summoned as indi-
viduals, not as representatives
of their banned political parties,
and he warned them against ex-
ploiting their consultations with
the military government for po-
litical purposes. He firmly re-
iterated his commitment to his
"Burmese road to socialism."
A government proclamation
on 4 December formalized the
gathering of civilian leaders as
the "Union of Burma Internal Unity
Advisory Body." It was given about
six months in which to come up
with suggestions for promoting
national unity and for a consti-
tution "to be drafted in the fu-
ture." A second proclamation on
5 December invited similar ideas
from the general public. The
military government has given no
assurances that any recommenda-
tions would be acted upon, how-
ever, and Ne Win clearly intends
to set the pace for any moves
toward constitutional ctovernment.
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When the Soviet party central committee met this week, its principal
business was to grant routine approval to the economic plan and budget for
next year. The published figures indicate a continuing rise in defense spend-
ing and a relatively low rate of growth for industrial production. Brezhnev's
speech to the plenum was not published, and he may have covered more
than purely economic matters.
Last weekend, the top three Soviet leaders met with Dubcek and other
Czechoslovak officials in Kiev. Neither side has said much about the meeting
officially, but enough has leaked out to suggest that once again the Soviets
"requested" Dubcek to meet with them so they could approve the steps he
planned to take at the Czechoslovak central committee meeting now under
way. Most reports say that while the atmosphere was cordial, the Soviets
took another tug on Prague's already tight leash.
At home, Dubcek is finding it more and more difficult to maintain a
unified leadership and rapport with the Czechoslovak population as he tries
to operate within the ever narrower limits the Russians set. Some Eastern
European diplomats believe he will not be able to stand the conflict inherent
in trying to satisfy both the Soviets and his own people.
Elsewhere in Eastern Europe there were signs of some lessening of
tension. The Czechoslovaks and the Hungarians have met to discuss
expanded economic cooperation-talks that had been broken off because of
the Soviet invasion. Bulgaria has renewed its efforts to advance one of its pet
policies-promotion of cooperation among the Balkan states, including
Yugoslavia and Rumania.
Rumania's Foreign Minister Manescu was in East Berlin, for what
appears to be part of Bucharest's fence-mending with its more orthodox
Eastern European partners. At the same time, the Rumanian minister of
trade arrived in Moscow to conclude talks on next year's trade exchanges.
Bucharest still has to work out detailed plans to implement its agree-
ment with the Warsaw Pact to permit joint maneuvers in Rumania next year.
No date has been set for the pact summit meeting at which this matter is
likely to be discussed.
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MOSCOW REACTS WITH RESTRAINT TO US BLACK SEA OPERATIONS
Soviet naval and air units
kept the two US destroyers that
cruised the Black Sea this week
under close surveillance, but
there was no attempt at harass-
ment. The Soviet behavior was
much the same as it was during
a similar US naval demonstra-
tion earlier this year, and
considerably milder than in 1967
when, in addition to diplomatic
protests, there was an attempted
ramming.
`Phe Soviet press reaction
to the visit has not been as
vehement as on past occasions
although the operations were
again labeled a violation of
the Montreux Convention and a
"provocation." Pravda took the
U5 to task for stirring up
trouble in the. otherwise peace-
ful Black Sea, but the article
was brief and ~n an inside page.
Soviet news media are still pay-
ing far more attention to the
recently created NATO maritime
air force command in the Mediter-
ranean.
The USSR has sent only a
pro forma diplomatic note to
Turkey in this instance. In
the past, Moscow has threatened
to hold Ankara responsible if
US destroyers were allowed to
enter the Black Sea with what
the Soviets charge is armament
exceeding the .limitations set
down in the Montreux Convention.
The Soviets have especially ob-
jected to US ships armed with
antisubmarine rockets that are
capable of carrying nuclear war-
heads. One of the destroyers
involved in this week's visit
is so armed.
The Soviets seldom miss an
opportunity to play on Turkish
domestic pressures against the
American presence there, and
they would especially like the
Turks to lessen their NATO-
sponsored military cooperation
with the US. In this case, how-
ever, P4oscow treated Ankara with
kid gloves, describing Soviet-
Turkish relations as an example
of the "cooperation and good
neighborly relations" that exist
among Black Sea nations. The
USSR may have decided that this
approach was required as part
of its effort t.o restore its
image with its neighbors in the
wake of the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia.
The low-key Soviet reaction
to the visit of the destroyers
is also consistent with a general
predisposition to avoid stirring
up a major flap with the US at
this time. By and large, the
Soviets have not wanted to com-
promise any opportunities that
remain for working with the
present US administration or to
prejudice relations with the
new administration.
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PROSPECTS BLEAK FOR CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP
Party leader Dubcek returned
from his meeting with the top So-
viet leaders in Kiev on 7-8 De-
cember to face still more criti-
cism of his government at home.
The party's main daily, Rude
Pravo, reported on 9 December t~ at
many local party organizations, in
assessing the resolutions issued
after the party plenum in Novem-
ber, have demanded that they be
given more information and have
complained that the party is re-
turning to making policy behind
closed doors. Implicit in their"
outspoken criticisms is a demand
that the party cease kowtowing to
the Soviets.
An explicit challenge to the
Dubcek leadership occurred on
11 December when railway engineers
threatened to strike. This, too,.
had anti-Soviet overtones, for
the engineers noted that the gov-
ernment changed its mind on rec-
ognizing their union after the
Soviet invasion.
The local party organiza-
tions also echoed the widespread
and continuing demands that the
party and government protest the
operation of the Soviet-sponsored
newspaper Z rav and Radio Vltava.
Dubcek had promised earlier
that the party would approach the
Soviets on this subject, and it
may have been one topic of dis-
cussion in Kiev. The two sides
may also have discussed Prague's
economic program and possible
changes in the government. Al-
though the communique issued af-
ter the meeting stated that the
talks had taken place in a "cor-
dial atmosphere" and in a
"friendly spirit," there was no
mention of the two sides agreeing
on any topic.
According to Rude Pravo, the
talks in Kiev concerned bilateral
economic and political coopera-
tion, and the strengthening of
ties within CEMA. The paper
added that the two sides agreed
that the resolutions passed at
last month's party plenum created
the "preconditions" for "consoli-
dating internal and foreign po-
litical relations"--cant indicat-
ing that the Soviets are demand-
ing continued obeisance from
Prague. Moscow made this clearer
on 12 December when Pravda
stressed that Soviet--Czechoslo-
vak relations are based on the
principles of "proletarian inter-
nationalism" and serve the cause
of the "socialist community."
Rude Pravo suggested that the
Czechoslovaks will continue to
consult with the Soviets, indi-
cating again the narrow limits
within which Dubcek must operate.
f Dubcek person-
~ly seems somewhat more self-
confident, but will find it
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increasingly difficult to maneuver
so as to satisfy both the Soviets
and the Czechoslovak populace.
Meanwhile, the party central
committee convened in plenary ses-
sion on 12 December to discuss
economic policies and the estab-
lishment of the Czech-Slovak fed-
eral overnmen
u the government of Premier
Cernik may soon resign in order
to facilitate the establishment
of the federal .government, due
to be formed on 1 January. Con-
siderable political jockeying is
likely as the various factions
within the party try to improve
their respective positions. Mos-
cow offered still further support
for Czechoslovak party conserva-
tives on 12 December when it
called upon the Dubcek regime to
strengthen the party and state
cadres with those "who are loyal
to Marxism-Leninism," and to
wage a struggle against "anti-
socialist forces and revisionist
tendencies."
Josef Smrkovsky, a member
of the presidium's executive coun-
cil and one of the party's most
outspoken proponents of reform,
may soon be resigning. Smrkovsky
ac-
knowledged on 11 December t at he
knew only what he read in the com-
munique concerning the Kiev meet-
ing. He denied that he would re-
sign, however, and the tone of
his remarks suggested that he was
challenging the party to force him
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USSR ADOPTING ~~EW MEASURES AGAINST CRIME
Recent measures taken by the
Soviet government in the internal
security area indicate that it is
stepping up its campaign to main-
tain law and order.
On 28 November, Moscow an-
nounced that the Ministry for the
Protection cf Public Order (MOOP)
had been renamed the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD). The res-
toration of the former title, a
symbol of Stalinist repression,
is yet another indication of the
conservative path the Soviet
leaders are taking in domestic
affairs. Although political
crimes will undoubtedly remain
the province of the Committee of
State Security (KGB), the MVD
may take over responsibility for
investigating "economic crimes,"
freeing the KGB's domestic forces
for an even more vigorous
effort against political dissi-
dents .
The militia--the uniformed
police--evidently are to play a
larger role in the crackdown
against crime which, despite of-
ficial disclaimers, seems to be
on the rise, particularly among
youth. Militiamen will get pay
increases and .other career bene-
fits, and a new recruitment drive
is under way. The recruits will
probably be drawn mainly from
the party, Komsomol, and the most
energetic among the volunteers
serving in auxiliary law enforce-
ment bodies, The most important
of these vigilante organizations,
the druzhina, will probably turn
from patrolling the streets to
such tasks as delivering lectures
on public safety, In fact, the
new measures may sound the death
knell for the druzhina, a develop-
ment that will please the USSR's
professional law officers, who
evidently have had little use for
their amateur colleagues.
The steps already taken dem-
onstrate clearly that Moscow's
present leaders intend to rely on
coercion, rather than public
opinion, in re-educating law-
breakers .
Meanwhile, several prominent
Soviet jurists :have argued for the
restoration of the justice minis-
tries, which would be a fitting
corollary to the MVD's rehabili-
tation. Although their abolition
strengthened the courts' inde-
pendence vis-a-vis the state, it
also left the courts more vulner-
able to pressure from the party
in the guise of "public opinion."
Re-establishing the ministries
would add to the bureaucratiza-
tion of Soviet justice and, in
the long run, could impede the
manipulation of the law by those
who would use it as a political
weapon .
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COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND USE LAGS IN EASTERN EUROPE
The use of digital electronic
computers in Eastern Europe is
lagging many years behind that of
the free world despite the heavy
emphasis being placed on tech-
nological development.
In an effort to overcome
their shortcomings, all of the
countries are devoting scarce
foreign exchange to the purchase
of computers in the West. Sev-
eral of the countries also are
developing fledgling industries
to produce their own computers.
In mid-1968, Czechoslovakia pur-
chased a license for production
of computers from a French firm,
The first computers used in
Eastern Europe were installed only
in scientific institutes. With
an inventory now of nearly 700
computers, the emphasis is shift-
ing to data-handling in industry,
business, and government. Their
total capacity, however, is far
below that of such Western na-
tions as France.
About one third of the com-
puters were produced locally,
one half were imported from the
free world (30 percent from the
US), and about one sixth came
from the USSR. There is little
interest in acquiring Soviet
computers because peripheral de-
vices and software (operating
systems and programs) are primi-
tive, and service and spare parts
are hard to obtain.
The computer production in-
dustry in Eastern Europe is in
its infancy. Less than 50 ma-
chines were produced in 1967,
and no more than 70 are expected
to be produced in 1968. As of
mid-1968, only Poland, East
Germany, and Czechoslovakia were
engaged in commercial production,
and Hungary was in the initial
stages of producing a model. De-
spite the reported contract with
France, Rumanian production is
still a long-range goal.
None of the Eastern European
countries expects to manufacture
a full line of computer equipment
in the foreseeable future. The
machines produced now are mostly
small and of obsolete design,
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inferior i:n speed and qual-
ity to comparable free world prod-
uct. At best, the industrially
more advanced countries--East Ger-
many, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary--can only hope to satisfy
domestic needs for small- to medium-
scale computers and to export some
to other East European countries
and the USSR.
All requirements for large-
scale computers will continue to
be met for the indefinite future
by importing available free world
models. A considerably larger
share of Eastern Europe's computers
would be of free world origin ex-
cept for stringent US export con-
trols. In the past several years,
however, the East Europeans have
been able to acquire all but the
largest and most powerful computers,
the technology of which is still
embargoed by trade controls. ~ 25X1
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MIDDLE EAST -AFRICA
Incidents along the Israeli-Jordanian border are on the increase again.
Jordanian officials are reported to be fearful that the Iraqis might side
with the fedayeen against any future effort by Amman to clamp down on
the terrorist groups. An alliance of the 20,000 Iraqi troops in northern
Jordan and the terrorists would have a good chance of toppling the govern-
ment in Amman.
The second round of Algerian-French economic negotiations has col-
lapsed. One important side effect is the postponing until at least February of
Foreign Minister Debre's visit to Algiers, which had tentatively been set for
later this month.
In the Nigerian civil war, the Biafrans have scored limited gains in the
south and apparently have contained a federal offensive from the north. The
Nigerian Air Force has been unsuccessful in its repeated attempts to knock
out the Biafran arms supply airstrip. The British Government, under in-
creasing parliamentary pressure to stop supplying arms to Nigeria, is again
investigating the possibility of a negotiated settlement.
Mali's new provisional military government is seeking aid from the
West, but probably is also trying to obtain assurances some assistance will
still be forthcoming from the East. The regime's pro-Western foreign minis-
ter, fresh from aweek-long aid and good-will mission to Paris, has left for
Moscow "to explain the new situation created in Mali."
Somali Premier Egal is having trouble maintaining his painfully worked
out detente with Addis Ababa. With an election campaign under way, his
opponents are charging him with ignoring Ethiopian persecution of Somali
nomads
Major antigovernment disturbances began this week in East Pakistan,
while the month-old unrest continued in the West. Another respected na-
tional figure endorsed the opposition cause and incipient discontent was
reported among middle-grade army officers.
In India, the Congress Party was jarred by the loss of Haryana, the only
state where the party had been able to regain power since the 1967 elections.
Campaigning has begun for the important February elections in the four
north Indian states now under direct rule from New Delhi, and a stable
government in Haryana would have rovided a favorable model of Congress
rule.
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BIAFRA~S MILITARY POSITION IMPROVES
The Biafrans have scored some
military gains in Nigeria's civil
war and have contained a federal of-
fensive. The UK, apparently now
convinced that an early federal mil-
itary victory is unlikely under the
present circumstances, may be moving
SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA
toward a more positive role to
bring the fighting to an end.
Biafran forces have been at-
tacking federal positions all along
the southern front, and on 7 Decem-
ber recaptured at least part of the
2nd Division
Ihiala Airstrip
Onitsha
~Enugu
'ist Division
3rtl Division
fort Harcourt
iJrtiii`ahia
Aha
.,
alabar
EQCfAT6R1Al.
6UINHA
,:43727 Y?-68
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important road junction town of
Owerri. The Biafrans are also at-
tacking Aba, where some Nigerian
troops have mutinied.
On the northern front, the
Federal 1st Division has been try-
ing to advance southwest from
Afikpo, but has so far made little
progress. The 2d Division remains
bogged down at Onitsha, where some
Biafran forces apparently still oc-
cupy parts of the outskirts of the
town .
The success of any federal of-
fensive would almost certainly re-
quire the interdicting of the Bia-
fran arms supply airstrip at Ihiala.
Nigerian Air Force MIG-17s have been
attacking Ihiala in both day and
night raids since mid-November,
but have thus far been unable even
The UK Government, which is
coming under increasing parliamen-
tary pressure to stop supplying
arms to Nigeria, is again working
to bring about a negotiated set-
tlement. In late November, the
British Foreign Office told for-
mer Nigerian president Azikiwe
that it was willing to play any
role it could in peace negotiations.
There is no evidence, however, that
Biafran leader Ojukwu would be
any more conciliatory than in the 25X1
past, and federal leaders appear
convinced that they can achieve a
military victory.
POLITICAL CHAOS STILL THE RULE IN SUDAN
The serious illness of Prime
Minister Mahjoub has left the Suda-
nese Government mired in factional-
ism and inertia. Unless he recovers
soon
the struggle to c oose a
successor will accelerate the coun-
try's downward spiral.
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In his absence, such policy
decisions as have been made have
been limited to-minor matters and
have been disposed of unilaterally
by one or another of the ministers.
Major decisions have been put off
indefinitely or simply ignored. On
the question of restoration of re-
lations with the US, neither those
who favor the action nor those who
oppose it have been willing to bring
the matter to open discussion. In-
evitably, the inaction and instabil-
ity in Khartoum-have exacerbated
the country's many internal prob-
lems. The internecine butcrrery in
the south has again intensified and
what passes for the economy is in
woeful condition.
Mahjoub's primary qualifica-
tion for the premiership was that
he was relatively inoffensive to the
disparate elements that make up the
cabinet. The deputy premier,
Sheikh Ali Abd al-Rahman, aside
from being in the pay of Cairo,
is generally unpopular, particu-
larly with the more moderate cabi-
net members. His Democratic Union-
ist Party and the recently re-
united Umma Party are desultorily
maneuvering for a test of strength
in the Constituent Assembly,
which is still. the acting parlia-
ment. If Mahjoub's prolonged ab-
sence finally produces a no-con-
fidence motion, the vote could
go either way, presenting the
prospect of yet another conten-
tious cabinet and another com-
promise premier.
SEW THREATS RAISED TO ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI RELATIONS
Irresponsible actions by ele-
ments of both the Ethiopian and
Somali armies point up the vulner-
ability of Somali Prime Minister
Egal's painfully arranged detente
with Ethiopia.
Trouble has again flared in
the Somali-inhabited Ogaden re-
gion. A senseless ambush of So-
mali civilians by Ethiopian troops
in mid-November is the most serious
of a number of recent incidents
demonstrating that army units are
once again needlessly harassing
Somali nomads. Currently, the
Ethiopian Army is also executing
an ill-timed government order to
reimpose a livestock tax on nomads
in certain areas, a move that in
the past has provoked considerable
resistance. Reinforcements al-
ready have been moved to some lo-
cations in anticipation of trouble.
The Ogaden had been rela-
tively quiet. In September, Egal
secured significant concessions
from Addis Ababa, ending the emer-
gency regulations under which the
region had been administered
since 1964 and permitting rela-
tivelX free movement by the nomads.
These concessions seemed to
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indicate an Ethiopian willingness
to ease tensions by restoring ci-
vilian rule, but no further moves
have been noted.
Despite the ambush, there is
no evidence to suggest any con-
scious attempt by the Ethiopian
military to sabotage- the detente
by creating frictions in the Oga-
den. Soldiers and armed nomads are
mutually abrasive elements, and
the central government's tradition-
ally loose rein on the freewheel-
ing army units in the area prac-
tically guarantees further clashes.
The latest incident took place on
6 December when Somali tribesmen
attacked a locust control team and
their military escort.
Egal's opponents are exploit-
ing the Ogaden incidents in the
current parliamentary election
campaign, and this publicity has
limited his ability to deal with
the problem. Under normal cir-
cumstances,. he could probably
smooth over such incidents as the
ambush by private and direct deal-
ings with Addis Ababa. If Egal
is aware of General Siad's activi-
ties, the pressures of the cam- 25X1
paign seem to have kept him from
doing anything about them.
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ANTI-AYU$ FORCES GAIN STRENGTH IN PAKISTAN
Open opposition to President
Ayub's government became more
widespread during the past week
as serious rioting broke out in
East Pakistan,. rumblings of dis-
content were reported among army
officers, and_yet another re-
spected leader joined the opposi-
tion.
The first major disturbances
in East Pakistan since the begin-
ning of the current unrest broke
out when pro-Peking leftists in-
itiated a series of demonstra-
tions and partially successful
strikes to coincide with Ayub's
week-long visit. Violence flared
unexpectedly in Dacca on 7 Decem-
ber when security forces were
caught by surprise and fired on
rioters, killing at least two.
The authorities regained control
after calling in the army.
The potential for further
disorders in the eastern wing re-
mains high because the volatile
East Pakistanis have many legiti-
mate and exploitable grievances.
All major opposition groups are
backing the call for a strike on
13 December. The situation can
probably be controlled as long
as the usually effective East
Pakistan security forces are
ready.
The massive demonstrations
and occasional violence in West
Pakistan have now given way to
smaller, more disciplined marches.
Although Ayub's announcement of
certain concessions may have
placated the dissidents somewhat,
the government's enforcement of
restrictions on public assembly
and its use of force are probably
equally responsible for toning
down the demonstrations.
Reports of incipient discon-
tent among middle-grade military
officers may indicate that poten-
tially significant disenchantment
with the government is also de-
veloping within. the army--Ayub's
most important element of support.
Alleged favoritism within the mil-
itary and widespread corruption
in the government are apparently
the main causes.
Another popular national fig-
ure has entered his name on the
roster of the opposition. Follow-
ing the example set by Asghar Khan,
Lt. Gen. Mohammed Azam Khan--
former governor of East Pakistan
and once a close associate of
Ayub--criticized the government,
declined to join any political
party, and vowed to work for op-
position unity. Azam's announce-
ment was not unexpected. He has
been a bitter foe of Ayub ever
since the President dismissed him
from the governorship, allegedly
because of his popularity with
the East Pakistanis. If Azam can
revive that popularity, he may be
able to overcome the disadvantage
of his West Pakistani origins and
attract substantial support in
the essential eastern wing of the
country. The extent to which
Azam, Asghar, and the other new
entries into opposition politics
will be willing to make common
cause to defeat Ayub remains un-
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Government activity in Latin America is slowing down considerably as
the holiday season draws near.
The official results of the Venezuelan national elections were finally
announced early this week. After three unsuccessful tries, Rafael Caldera of
the Christian Democratic Party was elected president-but with only 29
percent of the vote. If Caldera is inaugurated on 12 March as expected, it will
be the first time in Venezuelan history that political power has passed
peacefully from one party to another, and only the second time that one
democratically elected president has followed another into office.
Guyana is moving ahead with its parliamentary elections set for 16
December. Prime Minister Burnham still has a very good chance of being
re-elected, possibly with a clear majority. Charges by the opposition parties
d
d f
orce
that Burnham is rigging the elections have enlivened the campaign an
the prime minister to defend his conduct.
President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic has publicly said that he
will permit exiled General Wessin, a key leader of the regular military during
the 1965 revolt, to return before 10 January. Balaguer apparently is attempt-
ing to forestall an illegal return by Wessin. Although Wessin would not pose
an immediate threat to Balaguer, his return almost certainly would prove
unsettling at a time when the political situation is somewhat strained.
President Duvalier is reacting to rumors of another invasion of Haiti. He
has placed all military commanders on s ecial alert
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VENEZUELANS NEW PRESIDENT CONSIDERED POLITICAL MODERATE
After three unsuccessful tries,
Rafael Caldera has become the first
Christian Democrat elected to the
presidency in Venezuela. If, as ex-
pected, Caldera is inaugurated on
12 March, this will be the first
time in Venezuelan history that
power has passed peacefully from
one political party to another and
only the second time that one demo-
cratically elected president has
followed another into office.
Caldera, an outstanding Roman
Catholic layman, is politically,
professionally, and socially one of
the mos-t respected men in Venezuela.
Despite attacks by leftist and right-
ist extremists, he is generally con-
sidered a political moderate. In
many respects his administration
will resemble the Democratic Action
government of the past
ten years, but ini-
tially at least it will
be marked by reformist
zeal and a high degree
of nationalism.
The Democratic Ac-
tion government's pe-
troleum policies will
certainly come under
review. Caldera has
promised a policy guar-
anteeing Venezuela the
largest possible bene-
fit from its petroleum
resources. He has pro-
posed that fewer for-
eign (i.e., US) tech-
nicians be employed,
and that profits be
used to develop the
general economy. His
belief that there
should be greater Vene-
zuelan participation in manage-
ment and that the industry should
be "Venezuelanized" will probably
cause some uneasiness among oil
companies. It seems unlikely at
this time, however, that he will
push for outright nationalization,
as occurred in Peru in October.
In foreign affairs, Caldera
has put high priority on the devel-
opment of new markets for the na-
tion's goods. The Betancourt doc-
trine of nonrecognition of uncon-
stitutional regimes in Latim Amer-
ica will probably be dumped in fa-
vor of commercial and diplomatic
relations with all--except, appar-
ently, Cuba--regardless of inter-
nal policies. As for the highly
volatile territorial dispute with
Guyana, Caldera promises only to
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resolve it within the
framework of friendship
and understanding.
The new Christian
Democratic government
may be a little less cor-
dial toward the US. Ac-
cording to pre-election
statements, Caldera be-
lieves US relations must
be based on a revision
of the commercial treaty
between the two countries
and an end to US re-
strictions on petroleum
imports from Venezuela.
Nevertheless, Caldera
hopes for warm relations
with President-elect
Nixon.
On internal secu-
rity, Caldera will meet
present insurgency with
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