WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006700070001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 15, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OSD review State Dept. review
completed completed
Secret
45,
15 November 1968
No. 0047/68
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(Information as of noon EST, 14 November 1968)
VIETNAM
Amid some signs that the Saigon government is looking
for ways to close ranks with the US, the Vietnamese
Communists stepped up their propaganda efforts to
exploit Saigon's absence from Paris. Meanwhile, the
Communists launched their first large-scale attack
in South Vietnam since late September, although the
bulk of their main force units remain in border and
base area sanctuaries.
P age
1
COMMUNISTS PREPARE TO RESUME MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LAOS 4
No significant fighting has yet developed in Laos as
the rains taper off, but signs still point to a re-
sumption of limited Communist offensive activity
during the coming dry season.
OKINAWA'S NEW CHIEF EXECUTIVE FOCUSES ON REVERSION
The election of the Okinawan leftist opposition's
candidate as chief executive on 10 November fore-
shadows greater Okinawan pressures on the.US and
Japan for early action on the question of reversion
of the islands to Japanese administration.
OSD review
completed
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SOUTH KOREANS COUNTER LARGE GROUP OF NORTHERN AGENTS
South Korean security forces are making good progress
in tracking down the North Korean infiltrators who
landed on the central coast early this month.
Europe
CZECHOSLOVAKS MAKE NEW CONCESSIONS TO SOVIET UNION
The Dubcek leadership will probably lose more of its
popularity as it continues to make concessions to
the Soviets, whose support for conservatives within
the Czechoslovak party is becoming more open.
MOSCOW SEET'S A RETURN TO NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE WEST
Makin, determined effort to restore a business-as-
usual a isphere to its relations with the West, the
USSR hopes to sell the notion that Soviet domination
of Eastern Eupore--on which Moscow has been insist-
ing vehemently--is one thing, while "detente" is
another.
WEST GERMANY PUSHES SALE OF LEOPARD TANKS
Having now equipped its own forces with the Leopard
tank, West Germany has negotiated contracts with
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, and is seeking
additional markets.
USSR APPLIES ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON YUGOSLAVIA
Several Soviet commercial actions have been directed
against Yugoslavia since its criticism of the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia, leading Belgrade to fear
a Soviet economic reprisal.
FRENCH SUCCEED IN SWING-WING AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
After a year of testing, the single-engine prototype
of the Mirage-G swing-wing fighter has proven to be
a technical success.
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Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
POTENTIAL REMAINS FOR ARAB STATES - ISRAELI DONNYBROOK
No major incidents have taken place in the past week
but the area remains in an uneasy truce, with spo-
radic shooting exchanges taking place along the
Jordan border on a daily basis.
STUDENTS SPARK ANTIGOVERNMENT DISORDERS IN PAKISTAN
West Pakistan remains tense following nearly a week
of student riots, a possible attempt on the life of
President Ayub Khan, and the arrest of former for-
eign minister Z. A. Bhutto.
ELECTIONS SET FOR FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS
In contrast to the volatile atmosphere that often
surrounds major political events in the French Ter-
ritory of Afars and Issas, the current election
campaign seems to be proceeding quietly and proba-
bly will produce little in the way of political
change.
COMMUNIST CHINA RETAINS AN AFRICAN FOOTHOLD
For a number of years, Peking has been extending
substantial economic and military aid to several
African countries, notably Tanzania, Mali, and
Guinea, which in turn to varying degrees look to
China as a model. Chinese prestige is high in a
number of other countries as well, largely because
of Peking's low-key diplomacy and well-run, liber-
ally financed aid projects.
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Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25
DISCONTENT GROWING IN BRAZIL
In the present atmosphere of military and civilian
dissatisfaction, any serious new incident could
move President Costa e Silva toward more authoritar-
ian government.
VENEZUELAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN ENTERS FINAL PHASE
The four leading presidential contenders have tried
to enliven the campaign by trading charges of coup
plotting, election fraud, and violence, but without
any major issues at stake these tactics do not ap-
pear to have aroused the electorate.
PANAMA'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT RELAXES CONTROLS
The junta has taken several steps toward returning
the Country to normality, although some constitu-
tional guarantees remain suspended and press censor-
ship continues.
COLOMBIA'S QUIET POLITICS BEGIN TO HEAT UP
An impasse in the Colombian Senate over President
Lleras' constitutional reform bill has surfaced
growing strains within the National Front coalition.
PRESIDENT PACHECO MAKING SOME PROGRESS IN URUGUAY
President Pacheco is meeting with some success in
his uphill, battle to halt inflation, control the
security situation, and get key legislation through
a hostile congress.
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Saigon, while holding out for a status in the Paris talks on a par with
Hanoi and higher than the Liberation Front, seems to be groping for ways to
close ranks with the US. The solid support initially given by South Viet-
namese to President Thieu's strong stand on the issue is eroding slightly as
some of his rivals begin to criticize him for inflexibility in his jousting with
the Americans.
After some initial fumbling, the Vietnamese Communists have de-
veloped a reasonably clear propaganda line regarding Saigon's reluctance to
come to Paris. They say in essence that it matters little to them whether
Saigon comes or not because the Front is competent to speak for the South
Vietnamese. Front spokesmen, with the stage pretty much to themselves,
have exploited Saigon's absence from Paris to emphasize the Front's sup-
posed legitimacy, pointing to the emergence of a "revolutionary adminis-
tration" throughout the South and recognition of the Front by foreign
powers.
Communist forces in South Vietnam, for the first time in seven weeks,
staged a multibattalion attack on 14 November. The unsuccessful and costly
assault against an allied artillery base in northeastern Tay Ninh Province
broke this week's pattern of generally small-scale and widely scattered
artillery, rocket, and mortar harassment.
With the advent of the dry season in Laos, Laotian and Vietnamese
Communist forces appear to be completing preparations for their annual
limited offensive. In the north, the enemy is expected as usual to move
against numerous guerrilla pockets in Houa Phan and Xieng Khouang prov-
inces. Activity in the south will probably await completion of the rice
harvest at the end of this month.
The election of the leftist opposition's candidate as Okinawa's chief
executive will increase pressure on the US and Japan for the early reversion
of the Ryukyus to Japanese administration. This was a major element in
Chobyo Yara's campaign, and one of his first postelection statements called
for the establishment of a unit in his administration to prepare for reversion.
On local issues, Yara will probably try to steer a moderate course, but he
may have trouble controlling extremists in his coalition who are much more
strident than he is on matters relating to the vast US military presence on
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VIETNAM
There are some signs that
the Saigon government is begin-
ning to look for ways to close
ranks with the US, but it is still
sticking to its stated precondi-
tions that any Saigon delegation
at the Paris talks must have sta-
tus equal to Hanoi but superior
to the National Liberation Front.
Thieu's stand on this issue
has at least temporarily enhanced
his national standing and has won
public support from his strongest
critics. On the other hand, some
of his opponents are apparently
trying to take advantage of
Thieu's differences with Washing-
ton by privately criticizing him
as too inflexible. Public criti-
cism has generally been muted;
the government has tightened its
press controls to prevent attacks
on its policies toward the talks.
The only significant dissident
note sounded in public has come
from the militant Buddhists, who
want the government to join the
talks immediately. They claim
that the present impasse would
never have occurred if Thieu had
kept the country from becoming
overly dependent on foreigners,
thus attacking his performance as
a national leader while most oth-
ers are praising him.
During the last few days,
the government has embarked on a
limited publicity campaign to re-
furbish its image abroad as a
peace-loving nation, originally
pushing the line that South Viet-
nam would like to get on with the
talks as soon as possible. The
firmness of public comments by
South Vietnamese officials defend-
ing the government's stand, how-
ever, has tended to sharpen the
impression of a rift with the US.
Vietnamese Communist efforts
to exploit Saigon's absence from
Paris have gained some momentum
after an unsteady beginning. A
fairly consistent Communist line
has emerged that is designed to
damage Saigon's prestige, bolster
the status of the Front, exacer-
bate US-Saigon differences, and
place the blame for the two-week-
old impasse solely on the US.
The main Communist public
effort has been to push for the
opening of tripartite talks in
Saigon's absence. Several spokes-
men, including Xuan Thuy and
Madame Binh in Paris, have as-
serted that Saigon's presence is
not necessary because the Front
is "competent" to speak for the
South Vietnamese. They have
sought to embellish and legiti-
mitize this "competence" of the
Front by pointing to the emergence
of a "revolutionary administra-
tion" throughout South Vietnam
and to the recognition of the
Front by foreign states. These
claims stop just short of pro-
claiming the Front a government.
Meanwhile, Hanoi apparently
has been reviewing its policies
in preparation for the next stage
of negotiations, and politburo
member Le Duc Tho may well return
to Paris soon. A general recall
of North Vietnamese diplomats has
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been under way for some weeks.
While in Hanoi, the diplomats al-
most certainly will be briefed on
the situation in South Vietnam
and Paris, and will be given new
guidelines.
North Vietnam has treated
continued US aerial reconnaissance
in a way that leaves the Commu-
nists free to use this issue at
any time to block progress in the
Paris talks. Hanoi has issued a
handful of pro forma complaints
about reconnaissance in the past
week, charging that these flights
violate North Vietnamese sover-
eignty, but they are refraining
at the moment from saying that
the flights constitute an obstacle
to proceeding with the Paris
talks. Meanwhile, Communist anti-
aircraft gunners have stepped up
their firings at reconnaissance
aircraft over North Vietnam and
have downed three drones since
the bombing halt took effect.
Military Developments
in the South
For the first time in some
seven weeks, the Communists late
this week staged a multibattalion
attack on an allied field posi-
tion. Following a heavy mortar
barrage, an estimated two enemy
battalions stormed a remote artil-
lery base in northeastern Tay Ninh
Province. The attackers withdrew
after more than seven hours of
fighting, leaving nearly 300 bod-
ies and numerous weapons behind,
and resumed shelling the outpost.
With the return of improved
weather conditions in the area,
this attack could signal the be-
ginning of renewed enemy offen-
sive activity in northwestern
III Corps, where a large concen-
tration of enemy combat units has
assembled in recent months.
Meanwhile, with the bulk of
the Communists ' main force units
still in border and base area
sanctuaries, the remaining enemy
forces are attempting to maintain
some pressure on allied forces by
increasing the number of small-
scale attacks.
During the week, these enemy
tactics continued to feature mor-
tar and rocket attacks against
allied bases and smaller urban
centers in scattered areas from
the Demilitarized Zone to the
delta provinces. These barrages
included at least seven launched
from within the zone against al-
lied targets just to the south.
Ground fighting this week gen-
erally developed as the result
of allied offensive operations
and countermeasures taken in re-
action to enemy bombardments.
There have been further in-
dications of enemy plans for at-
tacks at varying times from mid
to late November in selected sec-
tions of South Vietnam, but the
weight of the evidence suggests
that this activity will be limited
largely to shellings and light
ground actions. 25X1
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COMMUNISTS PREPARE TO RESUME MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LAOS
No significant fighting has
yet developed in Laos as the
rains taper off, but signs still
point to a resumption of limited
Communist offensive activity dur-
ing the coming dry season.
In the north, the enemy ap-
pears to be setting the stage
for the annual effort against
guerrilla positions in Houa Phan
and Xieng Khouang provinces.
Roads are being constructed to-
ward major government base areas
and, in recent days, the Com-
munists have taken a number of
outlying defensive positions in
the Houei Hinsa area. An enemy
build-up is also currently threat-
ening government forces at Phou
Pha Louam, a position astride
Route 6 that has frequently
changed hands.
In the northwest, Chinese
construction units have resumed
work on the road net from southern
Yunnan Province into northern
Laos. Since early September, sev-
eral thousand Chinese--possibly
including engineers--have been
working on a road that reportedly
will be constructed south from
the border to Nam Tha, with a
branch heading southeast to Muong
Sai. Roads linking China with
these villages would facilitate
the flow of supplies to Pathet
Lao troops in the remote areas
of northwestern Laos. The cur-
rent activity is the most sig-
nificant since 1963, when similar
numbers of Chinese laborers were
used to complete the Meng-la -
Phong Saly road.
In the south, Communist of-
fensive activity continues to
focus on Muong Phalane, which
the government recaptured in late
August. Government air strikes
have succeeded in keeping the
enemy off balance, and there is
no indication that the Communists
intend to launch the concerted
thrust necessary to retake the
area. In the northern Bolovens
Plateau area, government forces
have moved back into the Toumlane
Valley, which they lost last De-
cember. In addition, government
forces have taken advantage of a
recent lull in enemy activity to
clear enemy forces east of Sara-
vane. If the enemy remains true
to form, offensive activity will
probably not begin until the rice
harvest is completed in late No-
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LAOS: Current Situation
Phong
i..~~ ~. Sty
t..li..
Men la,
L ; Chinese resume
road construct on
BURMArr?? -
Road construction
Government-held location
Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
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OKINAWA'S NEW CHIEF EXECUTIVE FOCUSES ON REVERSION
The election of the Okinawan
leftist opposition's candidate
as chief executive on 10 November
foreshadows greater Okinawan
pressures on the US and Japan
for early action on the question
of reversion of the islands to
Japanese administration.
in his campaign, Chobyo
Yara, who won by an unexpectedly
wide margin, advocated immediate,
unconditional reversion and re-
moval of B-52s from bases in
Okinawa. He also deplored "ra-
dioactive contamination" of har-
bors by US nuclear submarines
and base-related damage to pri-
vate property. In his first
postelection speech, Yara was
consistent with his campaign
position on reversion, and called
for the creation of an organiza-
tion in his administration to
prepare for reversion. He did
not,'however, refer directly to
issues involving the bases.
Yara's private comments
to the US high commissioner
prior to the election suggest,
however, that while he will con-
tinue to press the US and Japan
for early reversion he will not
publicly call for a drastic
cutback in US forces on Okinawa.
He is well aware of the heavy
dependence by much of the popu-
lation on income generated by
the US bases and realistically
appreciates the disruption
that a withdrawal of the US
presence would cause in the
Ryukyuan economy.
Yara will probably staff
his government with noncontro-
versial moderate Socialists who
will, at least for the immediate
future, be inclined to preserve
the existing good working rela-
tionship with the US military
administration. Some problems
may arise, however, if Yara
presses the US for greatly ex-
panded local autonomy. Addition-
ally, he may have difficulty in
dealing with extremist elements
of his coalition regarding the
maintenance of adequate security
for US bases.
Yara's election was widely
interpreted in Japan as an
overwhelming mandate by the
Okinawan people for rapid rever-
sion, an impression quickly
exploited by the Japanese op-
position parties. Moreover,
a o s room tor maneuver in
dealing with the US on the
reversion question may be further
restricted.
SEC R 1'F
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SOUTH KOREANS COUNTER LARGE GROUP OF NORTHERN AGENTS
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South Korean security forces
are making good progress in track-
ing down the North Korean infil-
trators who landed on the central
coast early this month.
Of the estimated 60
agents involved. 26 have
killed
hp,-n
The intruders are believed to have
been organized into four teams of
15 men each. A bitter cold wave
and snow in the operational area
should make it even more difficult
for the remaining infiltrators to
move undetected and to obtain ade-
quate food supplies.
identified the infiltrators as be-
ing with the North Korean 124th
Army unit, which was responsible
for the attempted raid on South
Korea's presidential residence
last January.
According to evidence from
civilians in the area
the infiltra-
tors were to establish operational
bases and intelligence nets, in-
doctrinate villagers, recruit ci-
vilians for agent work, and col-
lect intelligence on South Korea's
military forces. The operational
plan reportedly called for an
eight-day mission followed by a
20-day march north to exfiltrate
across the Demilitarized Zone.
Apparently only one of the
agent teams succeeded in occupy-
ing a village. On 3 November, it
forced the villagers to listen to
"lectures" and to sign applica-
tions for membership in the North
Korean Labor Party. One villager
was beaten to death in front of
the others as a "propaganda" les-
son. This is the first instance
of armed propaganda since the Ko-
rean War.
Pyongyang radio is claiming
that the "revolution" in the South
is rapidly gaining in scope and
strength, but all indications
show that the North Koreans are
only alienating the populace by
their actions along the Demili-
tarized zone and within South Ko-
rea. 25X1
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Moscow's effort to compartmentalize its foreign policy came through
more clearly this week.
In a major speech at the Polish party congress, General Secretary
Brezhnev demanded tight party control within Communist countries and
emphasized the "imperialist" threat. A day earlier, Premier Kosygin sought
out former defense secretary McNamara, who was passing through Moscow,
and told him of the USSR's continuing interest in opening talks with the US
on the limitation of strategic arms.
The Soviet leaders' difference in approach was, in part, a reflection of
the audiences to which they spoke, but it showed up in other places as well.
Moscow kept steady pressure on the Czechoslovak leaders, for example, and
pushed foreign Communist leaders reluctant to follow the Soviet lead on
Czechoslovakia and the World Communist Conference. In a variety of other
trouble spots, however, Soviet officials tried hard to foster a "business-
as-usual" atmosphere.
The Czechoslovak party central committee convened on 14 November
for a three-day meeting. there may be some
personnel changes and consideration given a e mee ing to new concessions
to the USSR in domestic and party affairs. Such steps are likely to lose more
popular support for the Dubcek regime.
At the well-managed party congress in Warsaw, the facade of unity was
maintained by Gomulka and both his major challengers, hard-line party
secretary Moczar and reformist politburo member Gierek. A deal on the
sharing of power evidently had been worked out ahead of time.
The East Germans have again been inspiring rumors that they will
further restrict the travel of West Germans and West Berliners to and from
West Berlin. East Germany already controls various aspects of such travel as
well as the movement of goods and could easily invoke other controls that
would not affect the Allies' access rights.
The NATO members' foreign, defense, and finance ministers met in
Brussels to seek agreement on new ways of strengthening the alliance. The
conference, a regular semiannual event, had been moved up from mid-
December to underscore Allied concern over the events in Eastern Eu-
25X1 rope.
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CZECHOSLOVAKS MAKE NEW CONCESSIONS TO SOVIET UNION
The Dubcek leadership is
making new concessions to Mos-
cow, and will probably lose more
of its popularity in the process.
The party central committee,
which opened its plenum on 14
November, is reviewing a draft
document that calls for a closer
adherence to Moscow's interpre-
tation of "normalization." It
proposes organizational and
personnel changes that will mean,
according to one source, "disil-
lusionment for the nation."
Liberal party presidium
members Mlynar and Spacek are
said to be dejected by Dubcek's
acquiescence to Moscow, and Mly-
nar's resignation may be presented
to the meeting. Moreover, a ma-
jority of the presidium may be
ready to accept more pro-Soviet
conservatives into the party
leadership.
Before the plenum, the party
took several major steps to sat-
isfy the Soviets. It restricted
foreign travel, expelled some
foreign correspondents, forcibly
broke up anti-Soviet demonstra-
tions while sternly warning
against any renewed outbreaks,
and suspended several major pub-
lications critical of the Soviets.
There are indications that the
hard liners are about to be given
a large measure of control over
Czechoslovak mass media through
their appointments to key govern-
ment and media posts.
Czechoslovak youth, con-
cerned over the outcome of the
plenum, have threatened to demon-
strate throughout the country if
decisions taken by the central
committee are too favorable to the
conservatives. Student leaders
are planning a general strike and
street demonstrations on 17 Novem-
ber, even though Dubcek and other
top leaders--aware that Soviet
patience is wearing thin--have
warned that any disturbances will
be put down with force. More-
over, the youth and workers re-
portedly have set up committees
to arrange joint strikes to pro-
test the Soviet occupation.
Moscow is leaving the ini-
tiative at this stage to its
conservative allies within the
Czechoslovak party, but its sup-
port of them is becoming more
open. Soviet officers have been
much in evidence at the recent
demonstrations by Czechoslovak
hard liners, and last week the
occupation forces added a weekly
publication to the Czech-language
propaganda daily that they have
distributed since the early days
of the occupation. The Soviet-
run "Radio Vltava" continues to
issue daily demands for the sup-
pression of "antisocialists" while
praising "true" Communists. \ 25X1
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MOSCOW SEEKS A RETURN TO NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE WEST
Moscow is making a determined
effort to restore a business-as-
usual atmosphere to its relations
with the West. The Soviet aim is
to implant the notion that Soviet
domination of Eastern Europe--on
which Moscow has been insisting
vehemently--is one thing, while
"detente" is another. To this
end, the Soviets have toned down
their propaganda attacks on the
West, have made a number of con-
ciliatory gestures on particular
issues, and have tried to revive
interest in questions of mutual
East-West concern.
The USSR has publicly and
privately made clear that it is
willing to begin exploratory talks
with the US on limitation of stra-
tegic weapons. At a Soviet anni-
versary reception in London last
week, for example, a Russian dip-
lomat urged that the US get on
with arms discussions. In the
main address at the celebration
of the Bolshevik Revolution in
Moscow on 7 November, First Dep-
uty Premier Mazurov reiterated
Russia's readiness to do so, as
did the Soviet ambassador at the
UN in a major speech on disarma-
ment this week. Premier Kosygin
was apparently eager to convey
the same message to former de-
fense secretary McNamara in Mos-
cow this week.
The Russians also have moved
recently to.conclude some minor
agreements with the US on which
both sides had been marking time,
including a long-planned exchange
of new embassy sites. The pur-
pose of these actions clearly was
Page 11
to hasten the end of the period
of coolness in Soviet-American re-
lations which set in with the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia. In ad-
dition, the Soviets and their East
German allies refrained from re-
taliatory moves during a fortnight
of West German meetings in Berlin,
although Moscow may yet give East
Germany the green light to impose
new restrictions on West German ac-
cess to Berlin. It seems clear,
however, that the Soviets wish to
avoid the kind of harassment that
could lead to a Soviet-Allied con-
frontation.
The Soviets recently took
pains to receive amiably the UK's
new ambassador in Moscow. Presi-
dent Podgorny contended that An-
glo-Soviet relations had suffered
"unnecessarily" as a result of
the Czechoslovak affair.
Moscow's diplomatic efforts
have resulted in the rescheduling
for this winter of a session of
the Franco-Soviet "Grande Commis-
sion" on cooperative projects,
which was due to meet in Septem-
ber but had been postponed by
Paris. The Soviets have studi-
ously avoided including France in
their press attacks on the "impe-
rialist" West since the Czecho-
slovak invasion in order to main-
tain at least the appearance of
a special "detente" with Paris.
Recently, some of the venom has
been dropped from Soviet propa-
ganda directed at West Germany,
a favorite target. Indeed, Mos-
cow has made the gesture of of-
fering to reopen negotiations with
Bonn on a civil air agreement.
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Moreover, the USSR has generally
muted its anti-Western propaganda,
and for several weeks has ceased
to accuse the US of having incited
Czechoslovak "reactionaries."
Other efforts to improve the
Soviet image can be found in the
succession of high-level foreign
visitors welcomed in the USSR.
Since the invasion, ranking offi-
cials from all of the non-Commu-
nist countries on Russia's borders
except Turkey and Norway have re-
ceived the red carpet treatment.
WEST GERMANY PUSHES SALE OF LEOPARD TANKS
Having equipped its own
forces with the Leopard tank,
West Germany has negotiated con-
tracts with Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Norway, and is seeking
additional markets.
Belgium announced last year
that it would purchase 334 Leop-
ards at less than $250,000 each.
The total cost, including spare
parts, was slightly over $90 mil-
lion, which the Germans agreed to
offset completely through the
purchase of Belgian products.
Deliveries probably will run
through early 1970, and Belgium
is expected to phase out the US-
made M-47s as the Leopards are
received.
The Netherlands has agreed
to purchase 415 Leopards with an
option to buy 135 more. The
Dutch will be paying about the
same unit price as the Belgians.
Deliveries will begin late next
year and are to be completed by
Page 12
1971. The new US-German main
battle tank (MBT-70) was in com-
petition but lost out because it
will not be available for several
years. The Dutch may buy MBT-70s
later but they have already or-
dered enough Leopards to replace
about two thirds of their present
tank force.
Norway is purchasing 74 Leop-
ards. Despite hard bargaining,
the Norwegians will be paying
considerably more per tank than
the Belgians or the Dutch. The
higher per-unit cost stems from
more stringent offset arrangements
and from the special equipment
needed for Arctic operations. De-
liveries are to be completed by
mid-1970.
The 105-mm. cannon on the
Leopard is effective to a range
of more than 3,000 meters. The
tank itself is capable of deep-
fording with a snorkel, and can
be buttoned up for protection
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THE WEST GERMAN "LEOPARD" TANK
COMBAT WEIGHT
ARMAMENT
AMMUNITION
CREW
MAX. SPEED
RANGE
against chemical, biological, and
radiological warfare.
German manufacturers have
sold more than 2,500 Leopards to
the German and other West European
armies over the past several
years--at the expense of US, Brit-
ish, and French tank manufacturers.
Inasmuch as the export sales have
involved substantial offset ar-
39 tons
105mm gun
63 rounds
4 men
40-44 mph
350 miles
rangements, however, they have
not significantly augmented West
German foreign exchange holdings.
Nevertheless, the Germans can be
expected to push for additional
sales, restrained only by their
ability to meet delivery sched-
ules. At their present produc-
tion rate of 35 to 40 per month,
they are already committed until
about mid-1970.
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USSR APPLIES ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON YUGOSLAVIA
Several Soviet commercial
actions have been directed against
Yugoslavia since its criticism
of the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
leading Belgrade to fear a Soviet
economic reprisal. Nevertheless,
Yugoslav-Soviet trade under ex-
isting agreements, including de-
liveries under Soviet industrial
credits, has continued thus far.
Soviet pressure on Yugosla-
via since August has taken sev-
eral forms. Shortly after the
invasion, Moscow canceled a con-
ference that was to discuss So-
viet purchases of Yugoslav ships
worth about $200 million. Nego-
tiations on Yugoslav railway car
sales to the USSR and other War-
saw Pact countries have been de-
layed. Recently, Soviet state
banks have refused to purchase
Yugoslav commercial paper, thus
causing a reduction in its value
and complicating Belgrade's trade
relations with the West.
The USSR has also delayed
the beginning of talks, usually
held in the fall, on the 1969
Soviet-Yugoslav trade protocols.
In sharp contrast, the USSR has
either concluded or is in the
process of negotiating protocols
with all its other trading part-
ners in East Europe.
If the USSR and the other
Warsaw Pact countries break eco-
nomic relations with Yugoslavia,
the country at the maximum would
lose one third of its export mar-
ket and one fourth of its total
supply of imports. The effect
on the entire economy of such a
trade cutoff would be to slow
down domestic production and
raise unemployment. The main
impact would fall on the exports
of the steel, machine building,
chemical, textile, and shipbuild-
ing industries.
A rupture in Yugoslavia's
Eastern trade would also set
back temporarily the liberalizing
measures that are part of the
economic reform. Belgrade prob-
ably would increase import and
price controls, and exercise a
more direct influence on produc-
tion and investment decisions to
assure that changes in output
and employment would conform to
the altered foreign trade con-
ditions. Rationing of some raw
materials might be necessary
until new sources of supply
could be found.
A trade cutoff would almost
certainly result in new requests
for Western assistance in re-
scheduling debt repayments and
providing long-term credits.
Although Yugoslavia and the War-
saw Five reportedly have agreed
privately that normal economic
relations will be maintained
despite political controversy,
Belgrade's distrust of Soviet
intentions is leading it to make
increased efforts to solidify
and broaden its commercial con-
tacts with the West. As a re-
sult, Yugoslavia's trade with
the Warsaw Pact countries is not
likely to increase significantly
in the next few years unless the
political atmosphere improves
markedly.
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FRENCH SUCCEED IN SWING-WING AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
ENGINE
SPAN
LENGTH
RADIUS
SPEED
COMBAT CEILING
ARMAMENT
WEIGHT
l turbofan
43 feet
55 feet
350 nautical miles
1,435 knots (Mach 2.25)
65,600 feet
unknown
50,000 pounds
After a year of testing,
the single-engine prototype
of the Mirage-G swing-wing
fighter has proven to be a
technical success.
The aircraft was tested
at both high and low altitudes
at speeds as low as 98 knots
and as high as Mach 2.25.
According to Dassault, its
manufacturer, the aircraft
can land with its wings fully
swept. No other swing-wing
aircraft is known to have ac-
complished this maneuver, al-
though it has been a standing
requirement in all known
swing-wing designs.
Reflecting confidence in
Dassault's progress toward an
operational variable-geometry
fighter, the French Government
recently placed an order for
the development of two pro-
totypes for a larger, and
faster (Mach 2.5), twin-engine,
swing-wing fighter--the Mirage
G-4. The French Navy had been
interested in the smaller
Mirage-G, since it would have
been more suitable for air-
craft carrier operations, but
the French Air Force wanted
the larger G-4. Inasmuch
as French aircraft carriers
probably will be phased out
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soon, the Navy could use the
larger G-4 at its land-based
facilities. Flight testing
of the G-4 is scheduled to be-
gin in late 1970 or early 1971.
The early success of the
Mirage-G has increased the
number of potential customers,
and Dassault now is attempting
to determine how many NATO
countries would be interested
in a tactical version of the
Mirage G-4. Dassault also
has agreed to provide its de-
sign techniques to a US firm,
which thus hopes to avoid the
problems encountered by other
swing-wing aircraft developers
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UN representative Jarring's mission to mediate the Arab-Israeli dispute
is still stalled, and it will take a good bit of ignition repair to get it moving
again. Meanwhile, sporadic shooting exchanges occur daily along the Jordan-
Israel frontier. Israel may believe that the current gloomy prospects for a
peaceful settlement will remove any restraints against taking strong retali-
atory action against either Jordan or Egypt.
Lebanese Prime Minister Yafi, in a move to change the political com-
plexion of his cabinet, submitted his resignation on 12 November. He
probably achieved his aims, because he withdrew the resignation the follow-
ing day.
In Pakistan, the government has moved to quell disturbances by arrest-
ing potential troublemakers. It also arrested ex - foreign minister Bhutto,
whose appearance in several cities sparked student demonstrations. The
arrests probably will increase the chances of further serious trouble.
On the African continent, Communist China continues its support of
such radical African states as Mali, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), and Tan-
zania with economic aid programs.
Algeria is moving to improve its relations on several fronts. The Al-
gerian press has announced that Premier Boumediene will visit Morocco early
in January to resume discussions with King Hassan begun in September at
the African summit meeting in Algiers. To be meaningful, such discussions
must touch on the problem of the undefined Saharan border, the site of a
short war in 1963. Foreign Minister Bouteflika has returned from a week's
visit to Cuba, where he sought to warns up the chilly relations that have
prevailed since Castro's pal Ben Bella was overthrown in June 1965.
Widespread disorders have occurred in Sierra Leone, where the coun-
try's two tribally and regionaly based political parties are competing in
important parliamentary by-elections. Prime Minister Stevens, faced with a
fractious army and unable to control extremists in his party, has done little
to stem the serious tribal polarization between the political forces.
Uganda's President Milton Obote continues to take a tough line toward
his critics, especially those in the university and the press. The arrests and
verbal attacks seem to stem from Obote's hypersensitivity to any criticism as
well as from his extreme xenophobia. His tough line has recently taken on an
anti-US flavor because, in his view, some of his critics are overly pro-
US.
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POTENTIAL REMAINS FOR ARAB STATES - ISRAELI DONNYBROOK
No major incidents between
the Israelis and Arabs have taken
place in the past week but the
area remains in an uneasy truce,
with sporadic shooting exchanges
occurring along the Jordan bor-
der on a daily basis.
UN special representative
Jarring's efforts to work out
an Arab-Israeli peace settle-
ment went on the back burner
following the departure of the
Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli
foreign ministers from New York.
All sides insist they will main-
tain contact with Jarring, and
there were vague hints of hold-
ing talks in Geneva or elsewhere.
It seems certain, however, that
unless Israel comes forward with
some spelling-out of its position
on withdrawal from the occupied
Arab territories, new talks are
unlikely in the immediate future.
Italian Foreign Ministry
officials have said that their
embassies in Moscow and elsewhere
have reported that Jarring ex-
pects to terminate his mission
and return to his Moscow post
either at the end of November
or in early December. Recent
public statements by Israeli
officials that there can never
be any Arab troops west of the
Jordan River, and that Israel
will require a presence at Sharm
ash Shaikh are not likely to en-
courage the Arabs to negotiate
a settlement.
In Jordan, King Husayn has
apparently ridden out for the
moment the possibility of another
major clash with terrorist organ-
izations. He has made no specific
statements about his plans for
dealing with the groups, but is
apparently hoping to avoid open
encounters in the near future
while working out a long-term
strategy for keeping them under
control. Whether or not he can
successfully carry out such a
strategy remains open to doubt.
The approximately 20,000
Iraqi forces stationed in north-
ern Jordan may also get into the
act in the event of future trouble.
Should the terrorists, with or
without some other political back-
ing, move against the King, the
Iraqis could easily turn the tide
in favor of the coup movement.
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STUDENTS SPARK ANTIGOVERNMENT DISORDERS IN PAKISTAN
West Pakistan remains tense
following nearly a week of stu-.
dent riots, a possible attempt
on the life of President Ayub
Khan, and the arrest of former
foreign minister Z. A. Bhutto.
Quiet reportedly has returned
to Rawalpindi, where a dusk-to-
dawn curfew has been lifted, and
army troops--called out on 8
November to help quell disturb-
ances have been withdrawn.
Three persons were reported killed,
a number injured, and many more
arrested during the rioting there.
The disorders in the capital city
were touched off on 7 November
when police forcibly tried to
disperse several thousand students,
gathered in defiance of a ban on
public assembly to greet Bhutto,
one of the government's sharpest
critics. A stone-throwing melee
ensued when police fired into
the crowd, killing one student.
Although the authorities
immediately took precautions and
closed the schools in major cities,
violence broke out in Karachi
and other large cities, includ-
ing Lahore, when Bhutto arrived
there on 9 November. Peshawar
became the center of tension
during a progovernment rally on
10 November when a young man
fired a pistol twice near the
speakers' platform where Presi-
dent Ayub sat waiting to address
the crowd. Various sources,
however, indicated that the firing
might have been merely an effort
to disrupt the meeting rather
than a serious assassination at-
tempt.
The riots climax a month of
largely nonviolent student strikes
and marches throughout West Pak-
istan. These demonstrations, at
the outset based primarily on
academic grievances, had become
increasingly political and anti-
government in flavor, a matter
of particular concern to Presi-
dent Ayub in this pre-election
year. Evidence that professional
political agitators were involved
in the most recent disturbances
aggravated the government's con-
cern and led it to detain some
suspected troublemakers and,
finally, to arrest Bhutto on 13
November. Although the arrest
did not result immediately in
serious new disorders, it has
enhanced the possibility of fur-
ther disturbances and, at the
least, may bring Bhutto increased
stature as a political martyr.
Although the riots in
Rawalpindi were initially mis-
handled by the police, the gov-
ernment subsequently responded
effectively to the crisis. The
police were used mainly to re-
strain rather than to prevent
the demonstrations, but there
was no hesitation to call in
the army and use full police
powers when this proved necessary.
Moreover, despite the unprece-
dented manifestations of anti-
government sentiment, Ayub appears
to retain firm control of the
political machinery in Pakistan.
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ELECTIONS SET FOR FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS
In contrast to the volatile
atmosphere that often surrounds
major political events in the
French Territory of Afars and
Issas (FTAI), the current par-
liamentary election campaign
seems to be proceeding quietly
and probably will produce little
in the way of political change.
Elections for the 32 seats of
the Chamber of Deputies will be
held on 17 November to replace
the present parliament chosen
in 1963.
The tension that has al-
ways existed between the pro-
French Afar and pro-Somali Issa
ethnic groups seems to have sub-
sided in recent months. In March
1967, the serious Issa-provoked
disturbances that erupted when
the territory opted by referendum
to remain French appeared to fore-
tell continued difficulty for the
French. Now, however, both the
Afars and the Issas seem to have
reached some accommodation. The
French also appear to have made
some effort to bring the two groups
together, and have reportedly
made some adjustments to permit
a slightly larger Issa represent-
ation in the new chamber.
The Issas still have griev-
ances, however, although for the
moment at least they seem to have
channeled them into legitimate
political activity. The French
continue to maintain the political
r?r balance clearly in favor of the
Afars. Moreover, since the ref-
erendum, Afars have replaced the
Issa labor force that tradition-
ally serviced the port of Djibouti.
Assassination attempts in May
against the pro-French Afar leader,
Ali Aref Bourhan and against an
Issa member of the government
threatened to rekindle Afar-Issa
hostility, but in fact did not
arouse much local feeling.
Somali Prime Minister Egal's
successful efforts to improve
relations with Addis Ababa and
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Paris have helped quiet the
Issas of the FTAI. Inflammatory
broadcasts from Somalia to the
Issas have been stopped by Egal
and, in contrast to his predeces-
sor, he has apparently refrained
from providing clandestine as-
sistance to the Issas.
Inasmuch as there are more
registered Afar than Issa voters,
the election results probably will
not change the line-up signifi-
cantly in the new chamber. The
Afars presently hold 16 of the 32
seats with the rest apportioned
among the Issas, "nonresident"
Somalis (immigrants from Somalia),
and the Arab and French population.
The presence of 6,000-7,000
French military and police in
and around Djibouti should dampen
any potential violence, but any
incidents there could have re-
percussions in Somalia, where
the atmosphere is already charged
by the parliamentary elections
COMMUNIST CHINA RETAINS AN AFRICAN FOOTHOLD
For a long time, certain
African countries have been re-
ceiving considerable attention
from Communist China. Through
a generally low-keyed diplomatic
approach and an open-handed aid
program, China has managed to
gain a large measure of prestige
in a number of countries that
to varying degrees look to China
as a model in fashioning many
of their domestic and foreign
policies. Peking can be expected
to expand its influence using
established positions in east
and west Africa as bases for
operations.
Peking has been most effec-
tive with its generous, well-run
aid program, which is given in
support of such radical govern-
ments as Guinea, Mali, and Congo
(Brazzaville), as well as to
Tanzania's highly nationalistic
government and to the revolution-
ary movements based in that coun-
try. African recipients have
been generally well pleased with
the Chinese efforts, as the
aid is provided with dispatch
and is liberally financed.
Chinese aid falls into three
categories: high-impact projects
such as railroad building, gen-
eral agricultural development,
and military assistance in spe-
cific areas. Three countries--
Tanzania, Guinea, and Mali--are
the principal beneficiaries of
Chinese economic aid programs.
Peking has begun preliminary
work on a 1,000-mile railroad
linking Tanzania and Zambia, which
will give Zambia an outlet to
the sea through friendly terri-
tory. Peking has also agreed
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to help construct a 200-mile
rail link between Mali and Guinea.
In addition, the Chinese have
offered to modernize the port
of Conakry, presumably in antici-
pation of increased traffic from
the railroad.
The three countries have
been receiving a wide range of
Chinese aid for many years--
Guinea since 1959--and have used
about $100 million worth, ex-
cluding the railroads, or half
that received by all African
countries from Communist China.
Aid to about a dozen other Af-
rican countries consists pri-
marily of agricultural develop-
ment and construction of light
industry such as match factories
and sugar mills. In some coun-
tries, such as Mauritania, the
Chinese have received a warm
welcome; in others, Peking's aid
serves largely to maintain a
Chinese presence, as in Algeria
where the Soviets have a massive
aid program.
The Chinese provide the ma-
jor support for the largest and
most capable African liberation
movement--that aimed at overthrow-
ing the white-run government of
Mozambique. They also provide
limited support to other, smaller
insurgency operations in Africa.
Peking's aid is largely composed
of small arms and other military
equipment and instruction in guer-
rilla warfare at several training
camps in Tanzania. Many of the
better qualified Africans are
sent to China for specialized
training and political indoctri-
nation.
On a country-to-country
basis, the major recipient of
Chinese military hardware is
Tanzania, which fears possible
Portuguese retaliation against
the Tanzanian-based and -supported
insurgency operations, particularly
in Mozambique. The Chinese have
provided medium tanks, patrol
boats, small arms and ammunition,
and military training for the 25X1
police. Peking also has recently
agreed to construct a naval support
facility in Dar es Salaam.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Foreign relations and visiting dignitaries preoccupied the governments
of several Latin American nations this week.
Peru's military government is moving ahead with its plans to expand
ties with the countries of Eastern Europe. Diplomatic relations have already
been established with Rumania, and the foreign minister has hinted that
relations with other Communist countries may soon follow.
Ecuador's President Velasco apparently is also interested in establishing
diplomatic relations with most of Eastern Europe's Communist governments.
He has already signed an agreement with Rumania, which has had a great
deal of success lately expanding its economic and diplomatic ties in the
hemisphere. In addition, a consul general from Czechoslovakia arrived re-
cently to upgrade his country's trade mission. cuador
will soon establish diplomatic relations with the , ast ermany, and
Bulgaria, and that consular relations will be opened with Hungary and
Poland.
The busy Velasco has also declared Ecuador's "acceptance" of last
year's Declaration of Punta del Este, reserving at the same time some choice
words for his predecessor, Otto Arosemena, for the grandstand play that left
Ecuador the only nonsigner. Velasco says that he is looking forward to
meeting President-elect Nixon and the other American presidents at a new
hemisphere conference to "revitalize" the Alliance for Progress.
In keeping with its "buy Europe" policy, Argentina reportedly will
soon purchase 12 all-weather French Mirage III supersonic fighters. The
Argentine negotiations, which follow Peru's purchase of Mirages last year,
may increase Chile's interest in the US-built F-5 or a similar aircraft built in
Europe.
Cuba had an active week of foreign contacts. In addition to entertaining
the Algerian foreign minister, Havana also received a top-ranking East Ger-
man politburo member, accompanied by the East German interior minister.
A Cuban military delegation to the 51st October Revolution celebration in
Moscow has received a warm welcome from Soviet Defense Ministry of-
ficials.
A Canadian ministerial mission is on a month-long visit to nine Latin
countries. The mission has been undertaken to demonstrate Canadian in-
terest in Latin America and to determine how Ottawa can play a larger role
in hemisphere affairs. Queen Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinbur are also
touring South America on a good will mission.
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DISCONTENT GROWING IN BRAZIL
Military and civilian dis-
content with the Costa e Silva
government is increasing.
A recently published "cap-
tains' manifesto" expresses acute
dissatisfaction with low military
pay and poor personnel practices
as well as concern over the army's
deteriorating prestige. The young
officers particularly criticized
the government's failure to de-
fend the army against charges that
it has usurped power and is op-
pressing the people.
The manifesto reportedly has
won support from some high mili-
tary officers, especially those
associated with the "hard line"
who have long urged a crackdown
on "subversives." Army Minister
General Lyra Tavares told the
press that he views the document
as meant only for internal army
use, and he claimed that there-
fore it is not a "political" man-
ifesto. He blamed the press for
"distorting the facts of the case
in order to promote division and
discrediting of the army."
The officers will be further
irritated by recent bitter attacks
in the influential newspaper Jornal
do Brasil on the "shameless dic-
tatorship" and its harassment of
the press. In a second sharp ed-
itorial, the newspaper berated
the government for its failure to
maintain order--citing the bomb-
ing of Jornal do Brasil's own
warehouse on 7 November as well
as damage done by a smaller bomb
placed in the Soviet Consulate
garden.
The government reportedly is
tightening military security and
keeping younger officers under
closer watch. Costa e Silva ap-
parently already intends to grant
a substantial military pay hike,
but he may soon have to accommo-
date some of the military's po-
litical complaints as well.
The administration's contest
with Congress is another source
of tension. The Supreme Court
has officially requested that Con-
gress revoke opposition Deputy
Marcio Moreira Alves' parliamen-
tary immunity so that he may be
tried for "subversion"--his of-
fense was making a speech in Con-
gress condemning the government's
"militaristic leadership." If
Congress does not accede to the
military's efforts to strip Dep-
uty Alves of his political rights,
it runs the risk of provoking re-
taliatory measures.
In this atmosphere, any se-
rious new incident could move Costa
e Silva to adopt a more authori-
tarian style government.
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VENEZUELAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN ENTERS FINAL PHASE
Venezuela's close-fought
election campaign is entering its
final phase, but none of the four
major presidential candidates has
a large enough lead at this time
to ensure victory on 1 December.
The four leading presidential
contenders--Gonzalo Barrios, Luis
Prieto, Rafael Caldera, and Miguel
Burelli Rivas--have tried to en-
liven the campaign by trading
charges of coup plotting, elec-
tion fraud, and violence, but
without any major issues at stake
these tactics do not appear to
have aroused the electorate.
Attempts to portray the
Christian Democratic Party and
its leader, Rafael Caldera, as
exponents of excessive state con-
trol and New World Fascism appar-
ently have convinced only those
already committed to other candi-
dates. Charges by the governing
Democratic Action Party and its
candidate, Gonzalo Barrios, that
Luis Beltran Prieto of the People's
Electoral Movement has entered
into an "unholy alliance" with
the Communists have cost Prieto
some support, but not enough to
put him out of the race. Although
leftist splinter groups and the
Communists are attracted to Prieto
he says that he is not actively
seeking Communist support.
The ruling Democratic Action
Party is banking heavily on the
government and its own extensive
electoral machinery to secure a
victory for Barrios. A large
amount of government funds has
been spent on public works projects
in electorally important areas.
The fourth contender, Miguel
Burelli Rivas, is running as an 25X1
independent backed by three minor
parties.
In addition to the presidency
for the next five years, the ap-
proximately 4.1 million voters
will elect all 197 members of the
chamber of deputies and all 42
members of the senate. In ac-
cordance with Venezuela's unique
electoral system, several other
senate and deputy seats will be
awarded to under-represented par-
ties on the basis of their share
of the total vote. Because of
the number of parties involved
in the race and the complexity
of the system, no party will have
a majority in either congressional
chamber. By the same token, it
appears likely that the new presi-
dent will receive less than 30
percent of the popular vote. A
long period of bargaining there-
fore is expected before the new
president and congress assume of-
fice in March.
The military has increased
its security precautions as a
result of recent clashes with
guerrillas of the Castro-supported
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Movement of the Revolutionary
Left. Troops have also un-
covered a substantial quantity
of explosives and ammunition,
which reportedly were to be used
before the elections. Although
the ability of the guerrillas to
disrupt the elections is limited
by their small numbers and effec-
tive government security proce-
dures, some sporadic incidents
may occur during the electoral pe-
riod. 25X1
PANAMA'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT RELAXES CONTROLS
The Panamanian junta has
taken some steps toward returning
the country to normality, although
some constitutional guarantees
remain suspended and press cen-
sorship continues.
In a move designed to im-
prove its image and pave the way
for further diplomatic recogni-
tions, the government on 8 Novem-
ber re-established provisions
prohibiting the death penalty,
retroactive laws, and double
jeopardy, among others. The ar-
ticles relating to habeas corpus
and freedom of expression remain
suspended, however. Newspapers
owned by relatives of deposed
president Arias resumed publica-
tion last week, but were not per-
mitted to criticize the govern-
ment. Some pro-Arias radio sta-
tions'are still off the air.
A reshuffle in the national
guard command is under way that
will set the stage for coup lead-
ers Colonels Torrijos and Martinez
to take over the top posts. The
present guard commander is sched-
uled to retire shortly, allowing
Torrijos to take his place. Mean-
while, Martinez was appointed
second in command on 11 November.
Active internal opposition
to the government has waned since
the failure of student groups to
spark disorders during the inde-
pendence holidays earlier this
month. The university resumed
classes this week with limited
attendance and there have been
no signs of renewed antijunta
activity.
Die-hard Arias supporters
have been planning to initiate
guerrilla activities near the
Costa Rican border and an "in-
vasion" was planned for sometime
this week by armed refugees in
Costa Rica. Exile activities,
however, are unlikely to present
more than a local problem for
the guard; Arias supporters in
the border area are poorly trained
and organized, and have little
prospect of rallying popular su -
port at this time. 25X1
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COLOMBIA'S QUIET POLITICS BEGIN TO HEAT UP
An impasse in the Colombian
Senate over President Lleras'
constitutional reform bill has
surfaced growing strains within
the National Front coalition.
Lleras had made adoption of the
reforms a major issue, and the
senate's recent refusal even to
bring the bill to a vote is a
rebuff to his strong leadership.
The repercussions could have an
upsetting effect on the carefully
regulated arrangement that has
brought some order to Colombian
politics after a period of vio-
lence and dictatorship.
The National Front was
formed in 1957 when the Liberal
and Conservative parties agreed
to subordinate their long enmity
during a 16-year period in which
they would share equally in of-
fices at every level and alter-
nate the presidency each four-
year term. It has worked rea-
sonably well, but problems are
increasingly apparent as the time
for dismantling the coalition
approaches.
Many of Lleras' Liberal col-
leagues want to begin the process
with the 1970 elections, instead
of waiting until 1974. They do
not believe that Lleras' reforms--
such as strengthening the power
of the executive and reducing the
number of legislators--are in
their interest, particularly in-
asmuch as the president to be
elected in 1970 will be a Conserv-
ative. Some Liberals also re-
sent Lleras' decisive and some-
times high-handed approach, such
as his recent appointment of
provincial governors without con-
sultation with local party repre-
sentatives. This resentment was
responsible for an unfavorable
legislative vote that caused
Lleras to offer his resignation
last June, as well as for the de-
feat of the reform bill on 5 No-
vember. This latest rebuff has
raised rumors of a possible po-
litical crisis.
On the other hand, the ma-
jority faction of the Conserva-
tives favors the bill, which in
addition to strengthening the ex-
ecutive in relation to the legis-
lature, would restore simple ma-
jority rule in congressional vot-
ing, increase presidential power
in the economic field, restructure
departmental and municipal gov-
ernments, and spell out the proc-
ess of dissolution of the National
Front. These Conservatives, led
by aging former president Mariano
Ospina and his ambitious and
strong-willed senator-wife, be-
lieve that they stand to gain by
having the reforms in force dur-
ing the tenure of a Conservative
president.
Lleras appears to be plan-
ning to work with this group to
influence their choice of a pres-
ident and to find ways to accom-
plish his program. He appears
ready to drop his efforts to
force recalcitrant Liberals into
line, and recently said he would
treat them as political opposi-
tionists. This break could mean
that Lleras' supporters will lose
control of the party directorate,
deepening the internal Liberal
rift.
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Lleras reportedly has de-
cided not to resort to a plebi-
scite to prove popular support
for his program because of Ospina's
opposition to such a move. The
President may seek other means
to develop the more efficient
governmental system he considers
as necessary as the far-reaching
economic reforms he has instituted.
The more forceful the means he
chooses, however, the more marked
the opposition may become, as is
apparent in recent student and
labor as well as political diffi-
PRESIDENT PACHECO MAKING SOME PROGRESS IN URUGUAY
Uruguayan President Pacheco's
policy of economic austerity--
combined with stiff penalties for
antigovernment agitation--is
meeting with some success.
Pacheco unilaterally imposed
a wage and price freeze in June
and as a result the cost-of-living
increase will probably not ex-
ceed 70 percent this year, com-
pared with a 136-percent in-
crease in 1967. The Communist
Party has prudently adopted a
program of peaceful rather than
violent opposition. Rowdy student
demonstrations continue to occur
sporadically, but their fre-
quency and intensity do not ap-
proach the levels reached this
summer when several youths were
killed and many buildings looted.
Despite the fact that Pacheco
does not have the support of all
sectors of his party, and there-
fore is virtually a minority
President, he is still able to
maneuver his legislation through
Congress. On 6 November, the
senate approved a labor, price,
and wage bill that forms a major
plank in Pacheco's economic
reform program. Its passage,
intact,.by the chamber of
deputies is still not assured
but its approval by the senate
was a victory for the adminis-
tration. In addition to pro-
viding the means for slowing
down wage-price spirals, the
bill contains provisions aimed
at diminishing the number and
seriousness of strikes.
Pacheco's growing confi-
dence in his authority was
demonstrated last week when he
removed two of the nation's top
security officers--the Monte-
video police chief and the gen-
eral commanding the army in the
capital area. Neither removal
was challenged, and both were
accompanied by a minimum of
publicity. If the labor, price,
and wage bill is approved by
Congress in essentially its
present form, Pacheco may risk
lifting the limited state of
siege under which he has governed
since June. With the approach
of summer--traditionally a re-
laxed time in Uruguay--short-
run prospects for continued
stability and concomitant prog-
ress are good.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Nov 68
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