WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006700040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 25, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
45
25 October 1968
No. 0044/68
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EDT, 24 October 1968)
Europe
CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS FACE NEW PRESSURES
The Czechoslovak Government signed a demeaning status-
of-forces agreement with the Soviet Union last week,
and sharp differences of opinion are increasingly
evident among top Czechoslovak leaders and within the
rank and file as well. Meanwhile, Warsaw Pact troop
withdrawals continued throughout the week, but most
of the occupying forces are still situated in or near
Czechoslovakia.
YUGOSLAVIA REAPPRAISES ITS POLICIES
Faced with hostility from the Warsaw Five and filled
with misgivings about Soviet intentions, Yugoslavia
is reviewing its foreign policy priorities with an
eye toward closer ties with the West.
ECONOMIC REFORM PROSPECTS DIM IN USSR, EASTERN EUROPE
The invasion of Czechoslovakia has made the prospects
for economic reform, never especially promising in
most of Communist Europe, even more doubtful.
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SECRET
MOSCOW STILL PRESSING FOP WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE
Moscow continues its lengthy effort to bring at
least most of the world's Communist ~)arties to-
gether, despite the opposition of seIeral key West
European parties.
Far East
VIETNAM
For the second week, there were no large-scale en-
gagements between allied and enemy forces. The Com-
munists have been politically active throughout South
Vietnam, pushing ahead vigorously to establish local
"revolutionary administrations," but government
countermeasures continue to proceed at a deliberate
pace.
LAOTIAN COMMUNISTS RENEW OPERATIONS AS RAINS END
Government forces made some limited gains during
their traditional rainy season offenisive, but the
enemy is now beginning to step up it's own operations.
EXECUTIONS THREATEN SINGAPORE-INDONESIA RELATIONS
Indonesian authorities have moved tojcontrol popular
outbreaks in. reaction to Singapore's. execution of
two Indonesian marines on 17 October.
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Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
MERS EL KEBIR: CONTINUING ALGERIAN DILEMMA
The Algerian Government is said to be sharply divided
over a response to Soviet pressure for an agreement
permitting the Soviet fleet to use facilities at the
former French naval base of Mers el Kebir.
SOMALI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN UNDER WAY EARLY 22
Former Prime Minister Abdirazak, planning a comeback
attempt in next year's elections, has formed a new
party to oppose Prime Minister Egal.
INDIA'S NAGALAND PROBLEM HEATING UP
New Delhi is taking an increasingly tough line against
the underground movement that is seeking an independ-
ent Naga state in northeastern India, and some sharp
fighting could break out.
GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS IN LEBANON
The recent governmental crisis in Lebanon has been
temporarily solved but there has been no significant
change in the conditions that have paralyzed parlia-
ment for the last six months.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25
PANAMA'S JUNTA GOVERNMENT PLEDGES NEW ELECTIONS
No date has been set, however, and there appears to
be a dispute among junta officers over determination
of a time limit for returning the government to civil-
ian control.
RIOTING UNDERSCORES JAMAICAN MALAISE
The rioting in Kingston on 16 October took place
against a backdrop of increasing public dissatisfac-
tion with rapidly rising living costs, rumored cor-
ruption in the government, and breakdowns of essential
public service.
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET PASSES MAJOR TEST
Salvador's ratification of the San Jose Protocol
leaves only Costa Rica to approve this 30-percent
surcharge on imports from outside the area.
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PERU TO CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT
The military government plans to discredit the former
administration, as well as civilian politicians and
the congress, in the hope of diverting attention from
serious economic problems.
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The political repercussions of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
continue to be felt in Europe.
In the international Communist movement, the negative response of
leading parties has been so strong that the USSR was unable to prevent
indefinite postponement of the world Communist conference originally set
for 25 November. Moscow is using the delay to argue the need for Commun-
ist unity and to exert more direct pressure on certain parties.
The leadership of the French Communist Party, however, continues
successfully to resist Soviet efforts to bring the party back into line on the
Czechoslovak issue. Secretary General Waldeck Rochet has rallied the party's
top leadership in support of his policy of condemning the invasion while
avoiding an open break with Moscow.
Within Czechoslovakia itself political fissures are beginning to be evi-
dent both in the top leadership and among party rank and file. Party
conservatives clearly feel more confident and are beginning to organize. The
mood of gloom reportedly felt by most Czechoslvaks has been relieved by
the beginning of the withdrawal of a portion of the Warsaw Pact occupation
force.
The Yugoslavs, uncertain about the intentions of the USSR, have been
reviewing their foreign policy with an eye to closer ties with the West.
Rumania, despite its fears of long-range Soviet intentions, has renewed its
ideological offensive against the Warsaw Five.
In other developments, East German propaganda attacks on Bonn
became more shrill on the eve of the West German parliamentary "work
week" that begins in West Berlin on 28 October. The Soviets have balanced
their warnings that an unspecified East German reaction is to be expected
with diplomatic assurances that Moscow does not intend to interfere with
Allied interests in Berlin.
The French have checkmated efforts to promote closer collaboration in
the area of defense and politics between Britain and the Common Market
members within the framework of the seven-nation Western European
Union.
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CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS FACE PJEww PRESSURES
The Czechoslovak Government
signed a demeaning status-of-
forces agreement with the Soviet
Union on 16 October. Although
the treaty touches on a number
of important points that are
still to be negotiated in detail,
it was ratified two days later
by both Prague and Moscow. On
the basis of its terms, the
bulk of the occupation forces
theoretically should be out of
the country by mid--December.
Many of the articles in the
treaty lend themselves to various
SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM THE TREATY
Art. I. ...Soviet troops... will remain temporar-
ily ... to ensure against the increasing revanchist
strivings of West German :militarist forces.
Art II. ...Soviet troops do not interfere in inter-
nal affairs....
Art III. The Soviet side shall bear maintenance
costs....
i.nterp:retations. Among those
requiting further negotiations
between the two sides are the
number and location of the re-
maining Soviet troops; regula-
t.ionsjunder which the Czechoslovaks
will rovide currency, goods, and
servi es to these troops; and the
proce Tares applicable to Soviet
payments for these services.
The Soviet press gave heavy
play tjo the treaty. Moscow prob-
ably elieves that although it
has nt yet forced Prague's lead-
ers td admit that. the intervention
was justified, the agreement rep-
resents a large step toward achiev-
ing what it regards as "normaliza--
tion." All Czechoslovak newspapers
printed a full text of the treaty
without: comment. Moreover, Czech--
oslovak. mass media continued to
criticli.ze the Soviets subtly, to
voice ~>opular support for the Dub-
cek leadership, and to attack a
resurgence of conservative ac-
tivity.
Art IV. ...Persons serving with Soviet troops...
are exempt from passport or visa control:
Art VII; The government of the CSR shall
give... the necessary sums of Czechoslovak
crowns for expenses....
Art IX. ...In cases of crimes committed by...per-
sons serving with Soviet troops...Czechoslovak
legislation shall be applied.... Crimes committed
by Soviet servicemen shall be examined by
[Czech] militaryjudicial bodies....
Art X. ...The USSR agrees to compensate... the
CSSR for material damage! ...infiicted by...Soviet
armed units....
There are sharp differences
of opinion among top Czechoslovak
officials over the treaty, which
parliament ratified after a stormy
se_ssioh punctuated by speeches and
resolutions opposing it. Dubcek
appears resigned to the agreement,
Slovak party boss Husak'
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~)E KIf I
recent speeches suggest that he
too may be willing to collaborate
with Moscow.
reports suggest that another new
hard-line "leader" has emerged:
Miroslav Jodas, an Interior Min-
istry official during the Stalin-
ist era, is reportedly heading
a group trying to mobilize pro-
Soviet elements in the party.
Fear among liberals and mod-
erates that the conservatives
have formed the nucleus of an or-
ganization with which to chal-
lenge Dubcek is leading to a po-
larization in the party ranks.
Moreover, the pro-Du ce par y
organization in Prague claims
that the conservatives have called
for legal proceedings against of-
ficials of the mass media for
their activities during and im-
mediately after the invasion.
This report may have contributed
to rumors that hard liners have
drawn up a blacklist of liberals
and plan to stage show trials once
they have sufficient power.
Moscow presumably is attempt-
ing to strengthen the conservative
cause by imposing certain selective
restraints on Czechoslovak libera]G
The Soviets are said to have pro- 25X1
hibited mass public celebrations on
the 50th anniversary of the First
Republic on 28 October while forcing
Dubcek to allow pro-Soviet conserva-
tives to meet openly in preparation
for an anniversary "celebration" of
the Russian Revolution on 7 November.
25X1
The Soviets also reportedly
insisted that the Czechoslovak
party central committee postpone
any meeting until after 27 October.
Moscow probably hopes that the dis-
sension over the treaty among Czech-
oslovak leaders will intensify,
while conservative elements--with
Soviet assistance--strengthen their
position.
Warsaw Pact troop withdraw-
als continued this week. The bulk
of the occupying forces, however,
is still situated in or near Cze25X1
oslovakia.
By 24 October two Soviet div-
isions had finished their with-
drawal from Czechoslovakia to the
Baltic Military District of the
USSR. The Hungarian, Bulgarian,
and Polish governments have indi-
cated that their troops have be-
gun to return home and that they
would complete a total withdrawal
soon.
25X1
SECRE"I'
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YUGOSLAVIA REAPPRAISES ITS POLICIES
Faced with hostility from
the Warsaw Five and filled with
misgivings about Soviet inten-
tions, Yugoslavia is reviewing
its foreign policy priorities with
an eye toward closer ties with
the West..
The Yugoslav leaders believe
that, with the occupation of
Czechoslovakia, Moscow has aban-
doned the basic principle of
"separate paths of socialism."
Undefined references by Moscow
and its close allies to a "so-
cialist commonwealth"--a doctrine
Tito believes might be used to
justify Soviet. intervention in
any country that strays from or-
thodoxy--bring a chill of fear
to the party leaders in Belgrade.
The Yugoslavs do not believe
that they are faced with any im-
mediate military threat from the
USSR and have relaxed their partial
military mobilization. Belgrade
remains apprehensive, however,
about Moscow's long-range poli-
cies and in particular about the
increased Soviet naval presence in.
the Mediterranean.
Despite the continued polem.-
ics, Belgrade is working hard to
maintain normal economic relations
with !the Warsaw Five, which account
for approximately 29 percent of
its tirade. There is, however, no
firm date yet for negotiations,
usually held at this time, for
next ,ear's Yugoslav--Soviet trade
agree tent.
Last week, Yugoslavia at-
tendeO. Common Market negotiations
in Brussels in hopes of improving
its export position. West Germany
and Italy are sympathetic, and Bonn
.has already granted larger import
quotas on some Yugoslav products.
The Yugoslav press has favorably
treated Deputy Premier Gligorov's
recent visit to the US and Under-
secreEary Katzenbach's 17-19 Oc-
tober!trip to Belgrade, and has
stres ed the continuity of the US-
Yugoslav dialogue.
At the same time, the Yugoslav
.leadership is tasking advantage of
the crisis atmosphere to renew the
unity; and sense of purpose of the
Yugoslav people. Government offi.-
cials'will soon debate new consti.-
tutio~a1 proposals, suggesting that
Yugoslavia intends to continue its
decentralization. Republic and
federal party congresses, beginning
next month, probably will oust con-
servative elements, and replace
them i.vith more pragmatic supporters
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Oct 68
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SECRET
ECONOMIC REFORM PROSPECTS
Prospects for economic re-
form in the USSR and Eastern
Europe, never especially prom-
ising in much of the area, are
even more negative. as a result
of the invasion of Czechoslova-
kia. The reforms envisaged
greater freedom from detailed
central planning and control as
well as an increased role for
market forces and profit motives.
Most of these attempts to cope
with gross economic inefficiency
have not progressed far, and the
inclination of most leaders to
retain tight central control will
be reinforced by developments
in Czechoslovakia.
In the USSR, a rising tide
of orthodox, traditional views
has recently eclipsed the more
radical reformers' proposals
for decentralized planning and
pricing. This probably portends
a stabilization of the current
reform at its present limited
stage. Most of the East European
countries will continue to look
to the USSR for guidance, so
their economic policy decisions
are also likely to continue to
be conservative.
DIM IN USSR, EASTERN EUROPE
In Hungary, where prospects
for a loosening of economic con-
trols were the most promising,
the leadership says it will press
on with its reform. Although
Budapest claims that the program
does not break with Communist or-
thodoxy, the Hungarians can ill
afford to incur Soviet displeasure
by pushing their reform hard, par-
ticularly when the Soviets have at-
tacked similar Czechoslovak meas-
ures as "neocapitalist" and "re-
visionist."
Rumania probably feels se-
cure in continuing its experi-
ments with limited economic
change, including the formation
of an intermediate control level
between central planning author-
ities and enterprise managers.
The leadership, however, has no
intention of embarking on a full-
fledged reform program.
The leaders of East Germany
and Poland are probably the most
resistant in Eastern Europe to
any diminution of their power
and control. The East German
reform program has increased the
responsibility of enterprise man-
agers in the day-to-day decision
making process, but there is no
intention to reduce further the
central controls over East German
economic life.
Much of the bold economic
reform envisaged by the Czecho-
slovak leadership is dead, de-
spite the continuing affirmation
by the nation's leaders of their
intention to proceed with the
program. Instead, centralized
control probably will be tightened,
competent economists and technical
personnel demoted, and Czechoslo-
vakia's goal of becoming more
competitive in world markets at
least delayed.
Although Bulgaria adopted a
liberal-sounding program two years
ago, the nation will continue to
hew closely to the Soviet policy
line. Sofia therefore can be ex-
orw
to move
pected
implementing its reform.
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SECRET
MOSCOW STILL PRESSING FOR W'rbRLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE
Moscow is continuing its
lengthy effort to bring at least
most of the world's Communist
parties together, despite the
opposition of several key West
European parties. This opposi-
tion--:led by the :Italian, Aus-
trian, British, and French par-
ties--has already forced post: -
ponement of the next preparatory
meeting until 17 November, and
an indefinite postponement of
the world meeting earlier set for
25 November.
The communique' issued at
the end of the Budapest meeting
in late September said that the
period prior to 17 November would
be used for consultations among
the various central committees.
In fact, the Soviets have used
the delay to argue bluntly for
the need for Communist unity and
to exert more direct pressure
on certain parties. Pravda has
.run several articles citing the
need for a meeting. One of
these, appearing on 10 October,
argued strongly that world Com-
munism must have coordinated
action and not just common aims,
and reminded the weaker parties
of their dependence on Moscow.
The Soviets have not con-
fined themselves to the printed
word, however. Especially in
the case of the French Communist
Party (PCF), the Soviets have
made unprecedented approaches
to local leaders and have inun-
dated the rank and file with pro-
Soviet propaganda. Although a
serious division has resulted
in the ranks of the PCF, the
leaders remain united and. will
go td Moscow early next month.
Presumably, the Soviets will
offer to ease their pressure
in return for a more forthcoming
French attitude? Moscow appears
to have subjected the Austrian
and flinnish parties, and prob-
ably'iothers, to similar but per-
haps more subtle tactics.
Nevertheless, opposition
to the conference remains
stronjcr. The Italians have con--
ducte~L extensive consultations
with pther European parties,
and have been active in Latin
Ameripa. The Austrian, British,
and Sbandinavian parties show
no signs of bending to the So-
viets; The prospects for a
separate meeting of West European
parties have diminished, how-
ever,,and the opposition move-
rnent as gained little support
outside of Western Europe. if
Soviet. pressure succeeds and
the situation in Czechoslovakia
is further "normalized," Moscow
will probably propose reschedul-
ing the international meeting
after the briefest possible rT -
lay.
SECRET
10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Oct 68
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SECRET
Communist military forces remained relatively inactive in South Viet-
nam, but political cadre continued to push with great vigor the formation of
local "revolutionary administrations" in the countryside. At the same time,
Vietnamese Communists dangled before their people the prospect of a new
"national government" in South Vietnam. Any Communist decision on this
issue will probably be determined largely by developments in the Paris talks.
Sino-Vietnamese frictions stemming from the Paris talks and Hanoi's
relations with Moscow resurfaced during the week. North Vietnamese
authorities had to use force to extricate a group of Soviet officials in Hanoi
who were trapped in their car and treated to a long recitation of Mao's
thoughts by Chinese Embassy personnel. In Peking, Chinese propagandists
for the first time publicly acknowledged the existence of the Paris talks,
taking note of peace rumors and warning that President Johnson was
preparing "to dish out a fraud." Despite these stresses, however, Chinese
support for Hanoi continues in other important areas.
As the rains begin to abate, Communist forces in Laos are becoming
more active in the north. They have already begun their annual effort to
clean out pockets of government guerrilla resistance and have slowed a
government attempt to retake the Meo guerrilla redoubt at Phou Pha Thi. In
the south, however, government air strikes and flooding appear to be
delaying the resumption of Communist military activity.
In Thailand, Communist insurgents seem to be diverting assets from
their main area of strength in the northeast to begin operations in three
hitherto quiet provinces in the north-central part of the country. This effort
may help explain why armed insurgency in the northeast has been at a low
level in recent months. The newly affected provinces link insurgent strong-
holds in the northeast with northern provinces in which Communist-inspired
tribal insurgency has been on the rise.
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VIETNAM
For the second week in a
row there were no large-scale
engagements between allied and
Communist forces in South Viet-
nam. A large part of the Com-
munists' main force units con-
tinued to refit in base areas
and border sanctuaries. Allied
combat deaths for the week end-
ing 19 October were 187, the
lowest weekly total since August
1967.
As in past periods of re-
duced enemy activity, Communist
local force and guerrilla units
continued scattered shellings,
disruption of vital supply routes,
and other small-scale harassing
activities. Although this ef-
fort was down somewhat from pre-
vious weeks, it is effective in.
keeping some pressure on allied
forces.
Although there is no firm
evidence that the Communists are
prepared to initiate a new major,
widespread offensive in the im-
mediate future, there are some
signs of an intent to increase
the tempo of activity.
A renewal of fighting may
be planned in South Vietnam's
III Corps during the first half
of November ~
Should the Communists de-
cid to launch a new round of
widespread attacks to kick off
their annual winter-spring cam--
pail?n, a substantial number of
maj r Communist units presently
and rgoing refurbishment would
have to be returned to combat
zones near prime target areas.
Many of the enemy's main force
combat troops could do this in
less than two weeks.
South Vietnamese Political De-
velopments
During the past month, there
has been a steady flow of evi-
denbe from villages throughout
the; country that the Communists
are pushing ahead vigorously to
est Zblish local "revolutionary
admnistrations" as rapidly as
possible. From hamlet to prov-?
inc level, the Viet Cong are
apparently creating hundreds of
"liberation committees"--either
by fiat or through carefully
sup(Orvised elections.
The Communists also appear
to lpe preparing their people for
the possible creation of a new
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Oct 68
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THAILAND
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"national" government in South
Vietnam. Overt. propaganda state-
ments alluding to the Liberation
Front as a de facto government
.in South Vietnam were considerably
more frequent in the past month.
In the past, the Communists
have been chary of moving too
fast on this issue and have al-
ways stopped short of declaring
the existence of a national Com-
munist government in the South.
Such a unilateral move now would
be decided largely by develop-
ments in the Paris talks,.
For their part, South Viet-
namese Government officials in
the provinces do not appear to
take the new Communist commit-
tees seriously and are not in-
stituting political countermeas-
ures. The most effective local
actions still appear to come
from the security services, which
continue to capture at least some
of the Viet Cong cadre operating
among the populace.
Although leaders in Saigon
often speak in urgent tones about
preparing for a post - cease-fire
political competition, government
action at the national level con-
tinues to proceed at a relatively
deliberate pace. The new Lien
Minh, the front being organized
to strengthen the government's
position throughout the country,
is; operating about on schedule,
but its initial efforts have been
heavily concentrated in Saigon.
Th6 number of cadre trained to
work on Lien Minh projects there
ha$ been tripled from 300 to 900
during the last month, however,
and it is hoped that a showcase
peitformance in the Saigon area
will encourage the growth of the
front in the provinces where it
is 'most needed.
A women's organization is
still in the early stages of o.r-
garization, although Thieu first
began steps to create such a group
laslt: July. Opposition among wives
of men who dislike President Thieu.
is a problem, and greater emphasis
is ~)eing placed on avoiding any
possible misstep than on putting
pressure on the organizers to c~et
thel job done. .
Thieu is also proceeding
cautiously in drafting a land
reform law, which could win greater
peasant support for the Saigon
regime. Strong opposition from
absentee landlords is expected
whet the bill is considered in
the-National Assembly.
Meanwhile, speculation in
Saickon about the recent coup
rumors has been largely replaced
during the past week by reaction
to cress reports of possible new
movdment in the Paris talks.
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Resolutions passed by the two
houses of the National Assembly
emphasize the need for stiff
conditions if South Vietnam is
to endorse any bombing cessation.
Recent newspaper editorials, on
the other hand, have been more
evenly divided between a reluc-
tant endorsement of a bombing
halt based on a reciprocal re-
sponse from Hanoi and approval
of a halt as a move toward peace.
Sino-Vietnamese Relations
New evidence of Sino-Viet-
namese frictions surfaced this
week in reports that the Chinese
violated Vietnamese sensitivities
by harassing Soviet personnel in
the heart of the North Vietnamese
capital. Hanoi has been adamant
that no public display of Sino-
Soviet hostility take place on
Vietnamese soil, but on 17 Octo-
ber North Vietnamese authorities
had to use force to stop harass-
ment of Soviet citizens by per-
sonnel of the Chinese Embassy.
In the past, the Chinese
have generally respected Viet-
namese wishes on this, but Pe-
king's impatience with the in-
creasing warmth of Hanoi-Moscow
relations apparently has reached
a new high, probably in the wake
of rumors of new peace initia-
tives. Peking publicly acknowl-
edged the existence of the Paris
talks this week when it presented
a round-up of Western news specu-
lation and said that President 25X1
Johnson was pre arin "to dish
out a fraud."
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LAOTIAN COMMUNISTS RENEW OPERATIONS AS RAINS ENI)
Government forces made some
limited gains during their tradi-
tional rainy season offensive,
but. the enemy is now beginning
to step up its own operations.
In the northeast, a govern-
ment operation over the past four
months has been largely success-
ful in re-establishing a foot-
hold in the Muong Son Valley
area. Meo guerrillas attempting
to push back into the redoubt. at
Phou Pha Thi, which they :Lost.
LAOS
Government-held location
Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
-JV MILES
last spring, have encountered
stiff enemy resistance, however.
The Communists are trying to
solidify their hold in this area,
which has long been only nom-
inally under their control. A
new road has been built into the
area by the Communists, and it
should ease the movement of troops
and supplies into this heretofore
isolated region.
The enemy has already begun
to push government forces out of
some isolated positions in the
north, and there are indications that
Communist forces may attempt to
retake positions they recently
lost north of the Plaine des
Jarres. Furthermore, Communist
forces are expected to renew their
threat, which stalled toward the
end of the past. dry season, against
the key government guerrilla bases
at Na Khang and. Muong Hiem. There
are, however, no indications at
present that the enemy intends to
do much more than offset recent
government gains.
In the south, Communist
forces have been kept off balance
in the Muong Phalane area, but
it remains doubtful that govern-
ment forces could hold if the
enemy made a concerted thrust.
On the southern rim of the Bolo-
vens Plateau, serious flooding
and timely air strikes reportedly
Nave caused considerable damage
to enemy food and weapons caches
and may have seriously impaired
area.
I,-
SE CR ~ I
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EXECUTIONS THREATEN SINGAPORE-INDONESIA RELATIONS
Indonesian authorities have cized "heroes' funeral" on 18
moved to control popular out- October.
breaks in reaction to Singapore's
execution of two Indonesian ma-
rines on 17 October.
Indonesian Foreign Minister
Malik has called for restraint,
and has been reported ready to
assure Singapore's ambassador
that diplomatic relations would
not be broken. Several Indonesian
leaders initially favored some
form of economic reprisal, but
the government appears to have
realized that such measures might
be counterproductive. The Ministry
of Communications' ban on ship-
ping to Singapore, apparently
imposed without the approval of
the top leaders, has already
seriously affected small rubber
firms in Sumatra.
Popular resentment toward
Singapore rose sharply following
the emotional and highly publi-
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Local officials were stunned by
the ferocity of the rioters, who
were suppressed only after a
curfew was imposed and troops
were authorized to use force.
The rioters almost completely
wrecked the Chinese business
district and brought the city to
a virtual standstill.
Regional military commanders
have been ordered to take strong
action against any further ex-
ploitation of anti-Singapore
and anti-Chinese emotions. Au-
thorities have been able to cool
the emotions of most student
groups in Djakarta, and have been
able to maintain relative calm
elsewhere.
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An exchange of views between the Arabs and Israelis has begun in New
York under UN mediator Jarring's aegis, but an initial breakthrough hinges
on Israel's willingness to specify its intentions toward the occupied Arab
territories.
Meanwhile, an air encounter reportedly occurred along the Suez Canal
on 23 October, and skirmishes continue along the Jordan-Israel frontier.
Jordanian security officials seem to have eased their clamp-down on the
fedayeen, and tensions therefore have abated slightly. Ultimately, however,
the government's attitude toward terrorist activities depends on King
Husayn, who arrived home from London this week. The situation is still
fragile.
The latest round in the see-saw struggle between Lebanon's two parlia-
mentary blocs ended in compromise, but continuing conflicts are likely
despite the threat of army intervention.
In the Nigerian war, the Biafrans kept up their counterattacks on
federal positions in all sectors, but have thus far failed to score any major
breakthroughs. The federal forces are now facing serious supply problems of
their own, and appear likely to be bogged down for some time. French-
supported arms shipments to Biafra continued.
Ghana's seizure of two Soviet fishing trawlers for violating its territorial
waters may create serious new strains in Soviet-Ghanaian relations. Accra
security officials suspect the trawlers were engaged in subversive activities,
and they apparently intend to hold the trawlers and their 54 crew members
pending a thorough investigation. Moscow's reaction thus far has been
restrained.
The situation in India's Nagaland appears to be deteriorating, and New
Delhi is taking a harder line against the underground movement thnt Js
seekin an inde endent Naga state.
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HERS EL KEBIR: CONTINUING ALGERIAN DILEMMA
The Algerian Government
apparently is divided over grant-
ing the Soviet Navy some facili-
ties at the former French stra-
tegic base at Mers el Kebir in
the western Mediterranean.
The Soviets reportedly were
pressing the Algerian Government
earlier this month for an agree-
ment that would permit the Soviet
fleet to use "facilities" at Mers
el Kebir. They allegedly offered
to "maintain" the base--which
presently offers little more
than berthing facilities--and
to provide training there for
the Algerian Navy in exchange
for permission for Soviet naval
craft to put into the base for
upkeep and replenishment.
The Algerian Government is
said to be sharply divided. as
to its response, with Foreign
Minister Bouteflika and some
other ministers adamantly opposed
to granting such facilities. The
Algerians had earlier asked the
French Government for assistance
in reorganizing the Soviet-equipped
and trained Algerian Navy and in
refurbishing Mers el Kebir as
an Algerian naval base. Paris'
response probably has been de-
ferred until some pressing
Algerian-French economic problems
are resolved.
Page 20
The Soviet squadron has
used shipyard facilities in Egypt
and Yugoslavia for repairs, but
is npt known to have used any of
the $1ready available facilities
in Algiers, where several. Soviet
nava visits have occurred during
the past 16 months. Were the So-
viet to use Mers el Kebir, only
300 miles west of Algiers, dry-
docks: and other repair facilities
would have to be reconstructed.
Apprpximately 60 Soviet advisers
are Uurrently at Mers el Kebir,
where some of the Algerian missile
patrol boats are stationed.
;Speculation about eventual
Soviet access to Mers el Kebir
atte'Lded France's decision last
year! to pull out of the base
nearly a decade ear:tier than pro-
vided in the Evian accords of
1962. Algerian officials have
emphatically and repeatedly denied
that. the Soviets, or any one
else:, would be permitted to estab-
lish a base anywhere in Algeria.
In any case, recent European
press allegations that some 10,000
to 20,000 Soviet military personnel.
would be stationed in Algeria by
the end of 1968 seem grossly ex-
aggelrated. As of mid-1968 total
Communist military personnel in
Algeria were estimated at 1,150.
Thee have been no reports of any
appreciable increase in this
figure.
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SOMALI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION C4MPAIGN UNDER I'!AY EARLY
Former prime minister Abdi-
razak,, planning a comeback attempt
in the Somali parliamentary elec-
Lions in March 1969, has formed
a new party to oppose Prime Min-
ister Egal.
More than five months before
the elections, Somali politicians
are already campaigning. As is
the custom, numerous one-man
parties have been established.
Because tribal alliances remain a
key factor in Somali politics, the
more serious candidates are in
the bush bargaining for the sup-
port of their tribal clansmen.
join the new party, and as many
as 40 additional deputies favor
Abdifrazak but have not yet
fully committed themselves. In.
the unlikely event all 20 finally
def$ct to the DAP, the SYL would
enter the elections with its ma-
jorty substantially reduced to
onl about 65 of the 124 seats in
parliament.
More significant, however,
is the formation of the opposi-
tion Democratic Action Party (DAP)
by former prime minister Abdi-
razak. The move is designed to
bring Abdirazak back into the
Somali political arena after al-
most a year of relative inactiv-
ity, possibly with an eye on the
presidency in 1973.
The DAP is a breakaway from
the majority Somali Youth League
(SYL) party, which has controlled
the government: since independence
in 1960. Abdirazak, a long-time
SYL and cabinet stalwart, was re-
placed as prime minister by Egal
in mid--1967. He was subsequently
ousted by Egal as secretary gen-
eral of the SYL, and served as
the leader of the small anti-Egal
faction in the SYL parliamentary
bloc until he formed the DAP this
month. Some ten deputies have al-
ready resigned from the SYL to
It is not yet clear how Ab-
dir4zak plans to attract further
support beyond offering opposi-
tio to the present government.
A m4in line of attack will un-
dou4tedly aim at Egal's success-
fulpolicy of detente with Ethi-
opi and Kenya.. Egal probably
wil be accused of pursuing de-
ten e while neglecting the patri-
oti6 cause of "Somali unity."
Thi$ highly emotional issue, long
a w~nnincg slogan for Somali poli-
tic4ans, could serve as a rally-
ingpoint for all those who
oppose the government on. any
grounds.
Egal and President Scermarche
can'be expected to take measures
to strengthen the SYL and keep
defections to a minimum. More-
over, many deputies and prospec-
tiv candidates will wait until
February, when the SYL publishes
its ',official candidate lists,
before deciding which party offers
thet the best opportunity. Egal
has already taken one important
preliminary step by effecting an
almost total purge of regional
andl1Idistrict officials, replacing
theih with loyal SYL followers.
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INDIA'S NAGALAND PROBLEM HEATING UP
New Delhi is taking an in-
creasingly tough line against the
underground movement that is seek-
ing an independent Naga state in
northeastern India. With the on-
set of the dry season and the pos-
sible return of more trained and
armed rebels from Communist China,
some sharp fighting could break
out.
Over the past several months,
New Delhi's attitude toward the
Naga underground has hardened.
Attempts by the rebels to renew
peace talks with the government
have been spurned, and government
security forces have been used
more aggressively. Extensions
of the 1964 cease-fire have been
reduced to one month--the short-
est period yet.
New Delhi apparently hopes
to demoralize the underground,
capitalize on divisions within
the Naga ranks, and generally
tarnish the movement's image be-
fore the Nagaland state assembly
elections scheduled for next Feb-
ruary. The governing Naga Na-
tional Organization--the party
with New Delhi's blessing--will
be challenged in these crucial
elections by the more extreme
United Front of Nagaland, which
has strong ties with the under-
ground. Should the governing
party lose, or win by only a small
margin, New Delhi's hand could be
seriously weakened.
Indian securit forces in
Nagaland
(will probably intensify
their operations durin the com-
ing fall dry season.
The security forces would
have considerably more difficulty,
however, if the cease-fire lapsed
and full-scale fighting resumed.
The rebels, who have gradually
built up to a hard core of about
9,000, appear adequately armed
and enjoy the advantages of a
difficult terrain and a lack of
local popular support for New
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GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS IN LEBANON
A modus v.ivendi was reached
by Lebanon's rival Chamounist and
Shihabist parliamentary blocs on
20 October, temporarily averting
a governmental breakdown and a
possible military coup.
President Hilu's resignation
threat the night before served
as the catalyst, finally bring-
ing the feuding blocs into agree-
ment on a new four man cabinet.
The new cabinet consists of a
Shihabist prime minister, two
allies of ex-president Chamoun,
and a "neutral." Both groups
gave ground. The Chamoinists
abandoned their insistence upon
the inclusion of an official mem-
ber of their party in the cabinet,,
and the followers of ex-president
Shihab acceded to a cabinet that
they did not control. The
Shihabists won back some lost.
ground on 22 October when their
candidate for speaker of the
Chamber of Deputies won by a 50
to 42 vote.
Hilu's resignation, had it
stood, might have provoked Emile
B~stani, the commander in chief
of the Lebanese Army, to take
oVer as resident.
Hilu has achieved his imme-
diate objective: formation of a
cabinet. Nevertheless, the strug-
gle for power in parliament will
p-obably continue, and could be
exacerbated if either group presses
too hard. The threat of army
intervention will. act as a restrain-
4g factor, :however, for both
f4ctions are aware that should
conditions deteriorate as they
did earlier, this month the army
might take over.
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Two military coups in as many weeks in Latin America underscore the
inherent political and economic instability in the area.
The political situation in Panama appears to be calming down now that
former president Arias has left the Canal Zone. Peru's military government,
now basking in widespread public support, is planning a campaign aimed at
discrediting the former Belaunde administration and democratic institutions
in general.
Bolivian Communists, in coalition with Christian Democrats, strength-
ened their hold on student politics at last week's national student congress,
practically ensuring another year of university turmoil.
The atmosphere of apprehension that had been growing in the Domini-
can Republic, partly as a result of the coups in Peru and Panama, was calmed
somewhat by President Balaguer's address to the nation of 18 October.
Balaguer gave reassurances that coup rumors are mainly the work of frus-
trated opposition groups and had no basis in fact. There is some dissatis-
faction reported among military officers, but their resentment seems aimed
primarily at the Armed Forces secretary general Perez y Perez.
In Guyana, Prime Minister Burnham's governing coalition with the
United Force Party broke apart when the latter refused to support his plans
for electoral legislation. The government is not expected to fall, however,
because Burnham can probably scrape up enough votes to pass what little
legislation remains to be enacted between now and November, when he
intends to dissolve parliament and call for elections the following
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PANAMA'S JUNTA GOVERNMENT PLEDGES NEW ELECTIONS
The military junta that
ousted Arnulfo Arias J_rom the
presidency two weeks ago says it
intends to take "immediate steps"
to accelerate a return to consti-
tutional government.
The tense political situa-
tion that prevailed after the
coup began to ease when Arias
left the Canal Zone for the US
on Monday night. His brief occu-
pation of the Panamanian Embassy
in Washington, however, was re-
garded by junta leaders as an at-
tempt to be received as the legal
president in the US. Arias now
hopes to push his plea for recog--
nition in the OAS, and possibly
in the UN.
Chances of gaining interna-
tional recognition for Arias'
"government" seemed to vanish as
agitation against the junta. nearly
disappeared. Efforts by students
and Arias partisans to instigate
a general strike were only par
tially effective, and a business-
as-usual atmosphere has returned
to Panama. Some former govern-
ment officials incarcerated. by
the National Guard were flown
into exile and others who had
taken shelter in the Canal Zone
seem prepared to return to the
Junta President Piniilla and principal cabinet mernbers
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25X1
25X1
capital soon.
Provisional President Pinilla
has issued a "declaration of prin-
ciples" evidently designed to
garner domestic and foreign sup-
port. Calling for a repudiation
of Communism and the elimination
of the voting franchise for mili-
tary personnel, Pinilla also prom-
ised general elections following
the appointment of a new elec-
toral tribunal. No date has been
set, however, and there appears
to be a dispute among junta of-
ficers over determination of a
time limit for returning the gov-
ernment to civilian control.
The new administration claims
it is planning an attack on cor-
ruption and nepotism in govern-
ment, as well as the enactment of
"certain basic reforms."
targets of such a reform would be
the Communists and the oligarchy.
Pinilla and his high command
ave agreed that the principal
Indeed, the junta has already
arrested several prominent Com-
munists, but it may have done
so primarily to avert disorders.
Members of the elite--mostly
allies of ex-president Arias--
also came under attack last week
when decrees were issued estab-
lishing price controls on com-
modities produced by various
business monopolies owned by the
country's wealthy commercial
class. The junta is reported
to be planning further price
cuts in a campaign to limit the
oligarchy's influence and mol-
lify public opinion.
Attempts to institute long-
overdue reforms will probably
evoke considerable opposition
from the small circle of en-
trenched oligarchs who have con-
trolled Panama's economic and
political life for decades, and
they are likely to display a re-
sourcefulness that may well out-
last the junta's initial re-
formist zeal.
RIOTING UNDERSCORES JAMAICAN MALAISE
Rioting, vandalism, and
looting in Kingston on 16 Oc-
tober underscore many of the po-
litical and socioeconomic prob-
lems facing Jamaican Prime Min-
ister Shearer.
The trouble was sparked by
a peaceful student protest against
a government ban on the re-entry
of a leftist Guyanese lecturer
employed at the Jamaica branch
of the University of the West
Indies (UWI). Police dispersed
the students with tear gas, but
black Kingston slum dwellers and
other nonstudent hoodlums engaged
in serious violence, some of which
was apparently directed at whites
and mulattoes. Five of the
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SECRET
rioters were killed before the
police-- backed up by the Jamaica
Defense Force--restored order.
Although the prime minister
blamed "organized groups" for
fomenting the trouble, the dis-?
turbances appeared spontaneous
and disorganized. There is no
indication that members of the
Cuban Consulate in Jamaica were
linked to the violence.
Shearer defended the govern-
ment's ban of the lecturer, Dr.
Walter Rodney, by citing the
"'grave security risk" he posed.
Rodney,, along with some other
UWI leftists, had in fact estab-
lished contact with racist groups
with roots in Jamaica's black
lower class. Nevertheless,, the
leftists and their potential al-
lies do not appear to pose a
major problem for the government
at the present time.
Elsewhere, students at UWI
branches in Barbados and Trinidad
along with students at the Univer-
sity of Guyana engaged in mild
demonstrations in opposition to
the Jamaican Government's ban
on Rodney. Guyanese Marxist
Cheddi Jagan, who has recently
been visiting leftists in Bar-
bados and Trinidad, declared his
support for :Rodney in Port of
Spain on 1.9 October and criticized
"neocolonialism" and "US inter-
ference in. West Indian affairs."
While in Trinidad he urcied work-
ers to "learn to shoot" to pro-
tect themselves from "US imperi-
alism."
The turmoil in Jamaica oc-
curred against a backdrop of in-
creasing public dissatisfaction
with the government as a result
of rapidly rising living costs,
rumored corruption, and break-
downs of essential public serv-
ices. Labor unrest has been ex-
tremely troublesome and has re-
sulted in a rash of strikes even
among police and firemen. Shearer
has been the target of several.
demonstrations by the opposition
and of serious criticism by busi-
ness and citizen groups. In
early September, Shearer's men-
tor, former prime minister Busta-
mante, advised him to hurry back
from a visit to Canada and pay
more attention to domestic po-
litical problems.
Although Shearer's handling
of the imposition of the ban on
Rodney was criticized as clumsy
by the opposition, his forceful
condemnation of the disorders
seems to have temporarily bolstered
his political position. Shearer
now seems to be exploiting the
incident to draw attention from
his other problems. His alarm-
ist and xenophobic attacks on the
political activities of non-
,Jamaican West Indians at the
Kingston branch of UWI, however,
may jeopardize the concept of a
regional university and damage ef-
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CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET PASSES MAJOR TEST
The five-member Central
American Common Market (CACM),
threatened with a break-up
earlier this year, has passed
a major hurdle in moving toward
greater integration.
Last week, the Salvadoran
Government overcame political
and public opposition, and used
its one-vote legislative majority
to pass the San Jose Protocol,
which authorizes a 30-percent sur-
charge on imports from outside
the area. El Salvador was the
fourth country to ratify the
protocol, which has been arousing
a storm of protest in Central
America over the last five months.
The CACM, composed of Nica-
ragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica,
Honduras, and Guatemala, was
established in 1961, and has been
one of the most successful inte-
gration efforts by underdeveloped
nations. Booming economies and
early successes, however, gave
way to an economic slowdown, in-
duced by falling prices for ex-
port commodities, which began in
1966-67. To deal with the area's
rising trade deficit, the 30-per-
cent surcharge was proposed in
May of this year. A further
belt-tightening move--increasing
internal consumption taxes--was
proposed as an optional supple-
ment to the tariff measure.
Commercial and industrial
interests in the Central American
countries opposed the protocol
and distorted the issue by em-
phasizing the consumption taxes
and charging that consumer prices
might be increased.
Political opposition in the
various Central American legisla-
tures was further hardened when
Nicaraguan President Somoza used
his rubber-stamp congress to ap-
prove and unilaterally institute
the measure in June, contrary to
the agreement, and threatened to
break up the market by withdrawing
if the others did not quickly fol-
low suit.
Politicians in the legisla-
tures of other member countries
took umbrage at what they consid-
ered Somoza's high-handed moves,
but the opposition grudgingly gave
ground, and Guatemala and Honduras
approved the measure in September.
Honduran labor unions took advantage
of the public concern over increased
taxes to call a general strike,
but strong government countermeas-
ures, including the declaration of
a state of siege, broke the labor
effort.
In Costa Rica, the measure is
still the object of a bitter in-
ternal political hassle in the op-
position-dominated legislature,
but the combined pressure of the
other four ratifications will
probably lead to final approval.
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Sal-
vador have not yet officially de-
posited the protocol--necessary
before the surcharge can be in-
stituted--but are likely to do so
in the near future.
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PERU TO CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT
Peru's military government
is planning a campaign aimed at
discrediting not only the admin-
istration of former president
Belaunde but civilian politicians
and the congress as well. It
apparently hopes that this will
divert public attention from the
country's serious economic prob-
lems, which may well become worse.
The first victims of the
"moralization" campaign are three
of Belaunde's cabinet ministers
who were involved in the agree-
ment with the International Pe-
tr.-oleum Company (IPC) last Au-
gust. The ministers are charged
with "extortion against the state"
and conflict of interest in their
role in the IPC agreement. This
agreement was assailed by nation-
alistic politicians and served
as a pretext for the military
overthrow of Belaunde on 3 Octo-
ber.
The new government appar-
ently intends to continue the cam-
paign with a series of sensa-
tional disclosures and charges
against the political parties,
the Belaunde government, and mem-
bers of congress. There are in-
dications that the military plan
to reopen the contraband investi-
gations that earlier this year
prompted charges of corruption
against high officials of the
government, congress, and the
Despite its criticism of the
former ministers, the military
government apparently intends to
retain much of Belaunde's fiscal
program in formulating its own
austere economic policy. The
new government is following through
with foreign debt refinancing
begun under Belaunde, and plans
to retain the tax increases de--
creed by the former administra-
tion. In addition, expenditures
will be cut., possibly including
the military budget, wage in-
creases will be held down, and
administrative reform will be
implemented in government min-
istries.
The military are in a better
position to implement needed
economic reforms than was the
Belaunde government. They gained
widespread popular support for
their expropriation of the IPC
holdings, and the campaign against
corruption will, at least tempo--
rarily, distract public attention
from the country's economic prob-
lems. These problems may become
much worse, however, if foreign
aid and investment dry up as a
result of the nationalization of
the US-owned. oil company.
SECRET
Page 30 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2008/08/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06700040001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/08/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06700040001-6
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/08/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06700040001-6